
**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Executive Summary**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Executive Summary

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	EXECSUM-1
EXECSUM-1.0 Overview	EXECSUM-1
EXECSUM-1.1 Contents of the CRA-2009	EXECSUM-2
EXECSUM-1.2 Changes Since the CRA-2004	EXECSUM-2
EXECSUM-1.3 Results	EXECSUM-3

List of Figures

Figure EXECSUM-1. Overall Mean Total Releases for the CCA, CRA-2004, and CRA-2009	EXECSUM-4
--	-----------

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CCDF	complementary cumulative distribution functions
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEPs	features, events, and processes
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LWA	Land Withdrawal Act
MgO	magnesium oxide
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
T fields	transmissivity fields
TRU	transuranic
RH	Remote-Handled
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECSUM-1.0 Overview

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located near Carlsbad, New Mexico, is a deep geologic repository for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes generated by U.S. defense activities. The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) (Pub. L. 102-579, 106 stat. 4777, as amended by Pub. L. 104-201, 110 stat. 2422) requires the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to certify the WIPP's compliance with the long-term disposal regulations of 40 CFR Part 191 Subparts B and C prior to the commencement of disposal operations. To comply with this requirement, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) submitted the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) in October 1996 demonstrating compliance with the disposal standards and the criteria for compliance established at 40 CFR Part 194. The CCA demonstrated how the geological, hydrological, physical, chemical, and environmental characteristics of the site, along with engineered features of the facility, would safely contain radioactive waste for the 10,000-year regulatory time period. After a thorough review of the CCA, the EPA certified WIPP's compliance with these regulations in May 1998, paving the way for waste disposal operations which began on March 26, 1999.

The WIPP LWA also requires the DOE to submit documentation of WIPP's continued compliance with the disposal regulations to the EPA not later than five years after initial receipt of TRU waste for disposal at the repository, and every five years thereafter until the decommissioning of the facility is completed. This periodic documentation of continued compliance is referred to as "recertification." The DOE has completed one recertification cycle. The first Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) was submitted to the EPA on March 26, 2004. After a thorough review of the CRA-2004, the EPA recertified the WIPP's compliance on March 29, 2006. The second five-year recertification cycle ends on March 26, 2009. As with the CRA-2004, the CRA-2009 is being submitted to the EPA in accordance with the provisions of the LWA and demonstrates that the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the applicable radioactive waste disposal standards.

According to the WIPP Certification Criteria at 40 CFR § 194.15, recertification applications must include any information that is new or different from information contained in the most recent compliance application. Therefore, the DOE must review any new information that relates to the WIPP's certification basis and include the new information in each CRA. The central message of this CRA-2009 is that no significant changes have taken place since the CRA-2004 was submitted in March 2004. While there are minor changes documented and analyzed in the following recertification application, none compromise compliance with the radioactive waste disposal standards. The second five-year recertification cycle ends on March 26, 2009. As with the CRA-2004, the CRA-2009 is being submitted to the EPA in accordance with the provisions of the LWA and demonstrates that the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the applicable radioactive waste disposal standards. Continuing scientific studies and analyses have led to the conclusion that the WIPP repository is operating and performing as expected. This conclusion is underpinned by the fact that the results and analyses based on well-established probabilistic modeling tools show that the repository will not adversely impact public health and the environment during the required regulatory period.

1 **EXECSUM-1.1 Contents of the CRA-2009**

2 The CRA-2009 has been developed in accordance with the EPA’s Certification Criteria found at
3 Part 194. The Criteria allow unchanged information contained in previous applications to be
4 referenced, rather than repeated in recertification applications. Topics addressed in the
5 CRA-2009 include, but are not limited to, the following:

- 6 • Natural and engineered features of the disposal system, including geology, geophysics,
7 and hydrogeology of the repository and its environs, as well as the geochemistry of
8 interactions between the disposal system and the wastes placed in it
- 9 • Information concerning the inventory of TRU waste emplaced in the repository, stored at
10 DOE sites, and the waste expected to be generated at those sites and shipped to the WIPP
11 in the future
- 12 • Updated WIPP-relevant features, events, and processes (FEPs) based on data and
13 information acquired since the most recent CRA. FEPs are screened using specific
14 criteria to determine what phenomena and components of the disposal system can and
15 should be dealt with in PA calculations.
- 16 • Assessments of the disposal system’s long-term performance, including the input
17 parameters and models used in those assessments
- 18 • Individual and groundwater protection standards and the DOE’s analyses demonstrating
19 that the WIPP meets or exceeds those standards and will continue to do so
- 20 • Assurance requirements, including active and passive institutional controls, monitoring,
21 and the effects of natural resource extraction.

22 **EXECSUM-1.2 Changes Since the CRA-2004**

23 This application incorporates information about, and assessments of, changes proposed by the
24 DOE and approved by the EPA or requested by the EPA since the CRA-2004. In addition, some
25 changes were driven by the availability of new data. These changes may involve different
26 aspects of the physical repository and its components, as well as changes to the predictive tools
27 used to demonstrate compliance. These changes include

- 28 • Inventory: The inventory included in the CRA-2004 was updated during the CRA-2004
29 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (PABC) in response to comments from the
30 EPA. The inventory used in the CRA-2009 PA is the same as the PABC inventory,
31 which is slightly different from that used in the CRA-2004. Section 24 of this application
32 contains details on the inventory.
- 33 • Remote-Handled (RH) TRU Waste: WIPP began accepting RH-TRU waste in January
34 2007. The impact to the performance of the repository for this waste is assessed in the
35 current performance assessment (PA) as was done in all previous PAs. Information
36 related to the RH-TRU certification process is found in Sections 8 and 21.

- 1 • CRA-2004 PABC Parameters: Changes to the CRA-2004 PA were made during the
2 recertification process as part of the CRA-2004 PABC. The CRA-2004 PABC included
3 changes in gas generation modeling, PA parameter changes, new Culebra transmissivity
4 fields (T fields), and revisions to the calculations of spillings releases during drilling.

- 5 • CRA-2009 PA Updates: Changes to PA since the CRA-2004 PABC include parameter
6 updates, code improvements, and corrections. Upgrades were also made to the
7 computational platform used to execute the CRA-2009 PA. These changes are described
8 in detail in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.1.

- 9 • Engineered Barrier: The DOE obtained approval from the EPA to reduce the excess
10 factor for the WIPP's engineered barrier (magnesium oxide – MgO chemical buffer) from
11 1.67 to 1.2. Additionally, the supplier for the engineered barrier has changed from that
12 used during the CRA-2004. See Section 44 of this application for additional information.
13 These changes are detailed in Appendix MgO-2009.


- 14 • Peer Review: Documentation of WIPP peer reviews pertaining to RH-TRU waste visual
15 examination data verification and sealed sources at Los Alamos National Laboratory
16 (LANL) are presented in the CRA-2009. These peer reviews are detailed in Section 27.

17 **EXECSUM-1.3 Results**

18 Past PA results included in the previous certification applications (and two previous EPA-
19 requested PAs) have all demonstrated compliance with the release limits of 40 CFR Part 191.
20 Based on these PA results and other information contained in the compliance applications, the
21 EPA has continued to certify the WIPP's compliance with the long-term disposal regulations.
22 Similar to the CRA-2004, the CRA-2009 assesses the combined effect of any new changes on
23 the performance of the disposal system. As with the results of past PAs, the combined effects of
24 changes analyzed in this CRA do not adversely impact performance or compliance; the predicted
25 releases from the repository remain well below the limits specified in Part 191 Subpart B.
26 Continued compliance with the assurance requirements of the standards and the criteria is also
27 demonstrated by CRA-2009.

28 The results of the CRA-2009 PA demonstrate that the repository continues to comply with the
29 disposal standards. The results demonstrate a greater-than-95% level of statistical confidence
30 that the overall mean of the population of complementary cumulative distribution functions
31 (CCDFs) is in compliance with the containment requirements of 40 CFR § 191.13. The overall
32 mean CCDFs of the CCA, CRA-2004, and CRA-2009 are shown in Figure EXECSUM-1 and
33 illustrate the wide margin of compliance of the predicted releases with respect to the release
34 limits.

35 Similarly, compliance analyses performed on the undisturbed repository result in a single
36 postulated release whose value is significantly smaller than even the very small release estimated
37 by the same analyses in the CCA. Taken together, the CCA, the CRA-2004, and the CRA-2009
38 compliance analyses demonstrate that the WIPP continues to comply with the individual and
39 groundwater protection standards in Part 191 Subparts B and C.



1
2 **Figure EXECSUM-1. Overall Mean Total Releases for the CCA, CRA-2004, and**
3 **CRA-2009**

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Approval Process for Waste Shipment From
Waste Generator Sites for Disposal at the
WIPP
(40 CFR § 194.8)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Approval Process for Waste Shipment From
Waste Generator Sites for Disposal at the
WIPP
(40 CFR § 194.8)**

Table of Contents

8.0 Approval Process for Waste Shipment From Waste Generator Sites for Disposal at the WIPP (40 CFR § 194.8).....	8-1
8.1 Requirements	8-1
8.2 Background.....	8-3
8.3 1998 Certification Decision	8-4
8.4 Changes in the CRA-2004	8-4
8.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification.....	8-5
8.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification	8-5
8.7 References.....	8-6

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANL	Argonne National Laboratory
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCP	Central Characterization Project
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
NTS	Nevada Test Site
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
QA	quality assurance
RFETS	Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
RL	Hanford-Richland
SRS	Savannah River Site
TRU	transuranic
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WWIS	WIPP Waste Information System

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **8.0 Approval Process for Waste Shipment From Waste Generator** 2 **Sites for Disposal at the WIPP (40 CFR § 194.8)**

3 **8.1 Requirements**

§ 194.8 Approval Process for Waste Shipment From Waste Generator Sites for Disposal at the WIPP

(a) *Quality Assurance Programs at Waste Generator Sites.* The Agency will determine compliance with requirements for site-specific quality assurance programs as set forth below:

(1) Upon submission by the Department of a site-specific quality assurance program plan the Agency will evaluate the plan to determine whether it establishes the applicable Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) requirements of § 194.22(a)(1) for the items and activities of §§ 194.22(a)(2)(i), 194.24(c)(3) and 194.24(c)(5). The program plan and other documentation submitted by the Department will be placed in the dockets described in § 194.67.

(2) The Agency will conduct a quality assurance audit or an inspection of a Department quality assurance audit at the relevant site for the purpose of verifying proper execution of the site specific quality assurance program plan. The Agency will publish a notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER announcing a scheduled inspection or audit. In that or another notice, the Agency will also solicit public comment on the quality assurance program plan and appropriate Department documentation described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section. A public comment period of at least 30 days will be allowed.

(3) The Agency's written decision regarding compliance with the requisite quality assurance requirements at a waste generator site will be conveyed in a letter from the Administrator's authorized representative to the Department. No such compliance determination shall be granted until after the end of the public comment period described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. A copy of the Agency's compliance determination letter will be placed in the public dockets in accordance with § 194.67. The results of any inspections or audits conducted by the Agency to evaluate the quality assurance programs described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section will also be placed in the dockets described in § 194.67.

(4) Subsequent to any positive determination of compliance as described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section, the Agency intends to conduct inspections, in accordance with §§ 194.21 and 194.22(e), to confirm the continued compliance of the programs approved under paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this section. The results of such inspections will be made available to the public through the Agency's public dockets, as described in § 194.67.

(b) *Waste characterization programs at transuranic waste sites.* The Agency will establish compliance with Condition 3 of the certification using the following process:

(1) DOE will implement waste characterization programs and processes in accordance with § 194.24(c)(4) to confirm that the total amount of each waste component that will be emplaced in the disposal system will not exceed the upper limiting value or fall below the lower limiting value described in the introductory text of § 194.24(c). Waste characterization processes will include the collection and use of acceptable knowledge; destructive and/or nondestructive techniques for identifying and measuring waste components; and the validation, control, and transmittal to the WIPP Waste Information System database of waste characterization data, in accordance with § 194.24(c)(4).

(2) The Agency will verify the compliance of waste characterization programs and processes identified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section at sites without EPA approval prior to October 14, 2004, using the following process:

(i) DOE will notify EPA by letter that a transuranic waste site is prepared to ship waste to the WIPP and has established adequate waste characterization processes and programs. DOE also will provide the relevant waste characterization program plans and documentation. EPA may request additional information from DOE.

(ii) EPA will conduct a baseline compliance inspection at the site to verify that adequate waste characterization program plans and technical procedures have been established, and that those plans and procedures are effectively implemented. The inspection will include a demonstration or test by the site of the waste characterization processes identified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section. If an inspection does not lead to approval, we will send an inspection report to DOE identifying deficiencies and place the report in the public docket described in § 194.67. More than one inspection may be necessary to resolve compliance issues.

(iii) The Agency will announce in the FEDERAL REGISTER a proposed Baseline Compliance Decision to accept the site's compliance with § 194.24(c)(4). We will place the inspection report(s) and any supporting documentation in the public docket described in § 194.67. The site inspection report supporting the proposal will describe any limitations on approved waste streams or waste characterization processes. It will also identify (through tier

designations in accordance with paragraph (b)(4) of this section) what changes to the approved waste characterization processes must be reported to and approved by EPA before they can be implemented. In the notice, we will solicit public comment (for a minimum of 45 days) on the proposed Baseline Compliance Decision, including any limitations and the tier designations for future changes or expansions to the site's waste characterization program.

(iv) Our written decision regarding compliance with the requirements for waste characterization programs and processes described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section will be conveyed in a letter from the Administrator's authorized representative to DOE. EPA will not issue a compliance decision until after the end of the public comment period described in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section. EPA's compliance decision will respond to significant and timely-received comments. A copy of our compliance decision will be placed in the public docket described in § 194.67. DOE will comply with any requirements identified in the compliance decision and the accompanying inspection report.

(3) Subsequent to any positive determination of compliance as described in paragraph (b)(2)(iv) of this section, the Agency intends to conduct inspections, in accordance with § 194.24(h), to confirm the continued compliance of approved waste characterization programs and processes at transuranic waste sites. EPA will make the results of these inspections available to the public in the dockets described in § 194.67.

(4) Subsequent to any positive determination of compliance as described in paragraph (b)(2)(iv) of this section, the Department must report changes or expansions to the approved waste characterization program at a site in accordance with the tier designations established in the Baseline Compliance Decision.

(i) For changes or expansions to the waste characterization program designated as "Tier 1," the Department shall provide written notification to the Agency. The Department shall not ship for disposal at WIPP any waste that has been characterized using the new or revised processes, equipment, or waste streams until EPA has provided written approval of such new or revised systems.

(ii) For changes or expansions to the waste characterization program designated as "Tier 2," the Department shall provide written notification to the Agency. Waste characterized using the new or revised processes, equipment, or waste streams may be disposed at WIPP without written EPA approval.

(iii) EPA may conduct inspections in accordance with § 194.24(h) to evaluate the implementation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 changes or expansions to the waste characterization program at a site.

(iv) Waste characterization program changes or expansions that are not identified as either "Tier 1" or "Tier 2" will not require written notification by the Department to the Agency before implementation or before shipping waste for disposal at WIPP.

(5) Subsequent to any positive determination of compliance as described in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section, EPA may revise the tier designations for approving changes or expansions to the waste characterization program at a site using the following process:

(i) The Agency shall announce the proposed tier changes in a letter to the Department. The letter will describe the Agency's reasons for the proposed change in tier designation(s). The letter and any supporting inspection report(s) or other documentation will be placed in the dockets described in § 194.67.

(ii) If the revised designation entails more stringent notification and approval requirements (e.g., from Tier 2 to Tier 1, or from undesignated to Tier 2), the change shall become effective immediately and the site shall operate under the more stringent requirements without delay.

(iii) If the revised designation entails less stringent notification and approval requirements, (e.g., from Tier 1 to Tier 2, or from Tier 2 to undesignated), EPA will solicit comments from the public for a minimum of 30 days. The site will continue to operate under the more stringent approval requirements until the public comment period is closed and EPA notifies DOE in writing of the Agency's final decision.

(6) A waste generator site that EPA approved for characterizing and disposing transuranic waste at the WIPP under this section prior to October 14, 2004, may continue characterizing and disposing such waste at the WIPP under paragraph (c) of this section until EPA has conducted a baseline compliance inspection and provided a Baseline Compliance Decision under paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

(i) Until EPA provides a Baseline Compliance Decision for such a site, EPA may approve additional transuranic waste streams for disposal at WIPP under the provisions of paragraph (c) of this section. Prior to the effective date of EPA's Baseline Compliance Decision for such a site, EPA will continue to conduct inspections of the site in accordance with § 194.24(c).

(ii) EPA shall conduct a baseline compliance inspection and issue a Baseline Compliance Decision for such previously approved sites in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, except that the site shall not be required to provide written notification of readiness as described in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section.

(c) *Waste characterization programs at waste generator sites with prior approval.* For a waste generator site

that EPA approved for characterizing and disposing transuranic waste at the WIPP under this section prior to October 14, 2004, the Agency will determine compliance with the requirements for use of process knowledge and a system of controls at waste generator sites as set in this paragraph (c). Approvals for a site to characterize and dispose of transuranic waste at WIPP will proceed according to this section only until EPA has conducted a baseline compliance inspection and provided a Baseline Compliance Decision for a site under paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

(1) For each waste stream or group of waste streams at a site, the Department must:

(i) Provide information on how process knowledge will be used for waste characterization of the waste stream(s) proposed for disposal at the WIPP; and

(ii) Implement a system of controls at the site, in accordance with § 194.24(c)(4), to confirm that the total amount of each waste component that will be emplaced in the disposal system will not exceed the upper limiting value or fall below the lower limiting value described in the introductory text of § 194.24(c). The implementation of such a system of controls shall include a demonstration that the site has procedures in place for adding data to the WIPP Waste Information System (“WWIS”), and that such information can be transmitted from that site to the WWIS database; and a demonstration that measurement techniques and control methods can be implemented in accordance with § 194.24(c)(4) for the waste stream(s) proposed for disposal at the WIPP.

(2) The Agency will conduct an audit or an inspection of a Department audit for the purpose of evaluating the use of process knowledge and the implementation of a system of controls for each waste stream or group of waste streams at a waste generator site. The Agency will announce a scheduled inspection or audit by the Agency with a notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER. In that or another notice, the Agency will also solicit public comment on the relevant waste characterization program plans and Department documentation, which will be placed in the dockets described in § 194.67. A public comment period of at least 30 days will be allowed.

(3) The Agency’s written decision regarding compliance with the requirements for waste characterization programs described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section for one or more waste streams from a waste generator site will be conveyed in a letter from the Administrator’s authorized representative to the Department. No such compliance determination shall be granted until after the end of the public comment period described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. A copy of the Agency’s compliance determination letter will be placed in the public dockets in accordance with § 194.67. The results of any inspections or audits conducted by the Agency to evaluate the plans described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section will also be placed in the dockets described in § 194.67.

(4) Subsequent to any positive determination of compliance as described in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the Agency intends to conduct inspections, in accordance with §§194.21 and 194.24(h), to confirm the continued compliance of the programs approved under paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this section. The results of such inspections will be made available to the public through the Agency’s public dockets, as described in § 194.67.

[63 FR 27404, May 18, 1998, as amended at 69 FR 42581, July 16, 2004]

1

2 8.2 Background

3 The requirements of [40 CFR § 194.8](#) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2004a) apply to
 4 the process used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to approve the disposal of
 5 transuranic (TRU) waste from U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) waste generator sites to the
 6 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).

7 The requirements were established at the time of the EPA’s 1998 Certification Decision to
 8 address compliance of site-specific quality assurance (QA) programs and a system of waste
 9 characterization and controls at waste generation sites.¹

¹ The dose rate of transuranic waste to be shipped to WIPP is measured at the generator sites to determine if the waste is remote-handled transuranic (RH-TRU) waste or contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste and the waste is certified in accordance with these measurements. Radionuclide dose rates of waste assemblies (i.e., drum seven packs, ten drum over pack) are measured at the WIPP site for worker health and safety issues only.

1 **8.3 1998 Certification Decision**

2 In order to clarify the EPA’s original intent for the compliance criteria regarding approval of
3 site-specific activities, the EPA amended the compliance criteria at [40 CFR Part 194](#) to include
4 the site-specific approval process ([U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998, pp. 27404–406](#)).
5 Appendix A of the EPA’s Certification Decision contains the requirements for the approval
6 process and four certification-related conditions. Two of the four conditions included in this
7 appendix are related to QA and waste characterization. Condition 2 specifies that no waste
8 generator site other than the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) shall be allowed to ship
9 waste for disposal at the WIPP until the EPA determines that the site has established and
10 executed a QA program in accordance with [40 CFR §§ 194.22\(a\)\(2\)\(i\)](#) (U.S. Environmental
11 Protection Agency 1996), [194.14\(c\)\(3\)](#) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996), and
12 [194.24\(c\)\(5\)](#) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2004a) for waste characterization activities
13 and assumptions. Condition 3 specifies that no waste from any additional LANL waste streams
14 (other than the ones already certified) or from any waste generator site other than LANL shall be
15 shipped for disposal at the WIPP until the EPA has approved the process for characterizing those
16 waste streams for shipment using the process set forth in [section 194.8](#). The approval process
17 includes an opportunity for public comment and an inspection (of a DOE audit) or audit of the
18 waste generator site by the EPA. The procedures for demonstrating compliance with Conditions
19 2 and 3 of the EPA’s 1998 Certification Decision were incorporated in the final rule as a new
20 section to section 194.8, “Approval Process for Waste Shipment from Waste Generator Sites for
21 Disposal at the WIPP.”

22 For both QA and waste characterization programs, the approval process includes placement in
23 the docket of site-specific documentation submitted by the DOE, publication of a *Federal*
24 *Register* notice by the EPA announcing a scheduled inspection or audit, a period of at least 30
25 days for the public to comment on information placed in the docket, and the EPA’s written
26 decision regarding the approval of these programs in the form of a letter from the EPA to the
27 DOE. The EPA proposed to approve QA programs on a site-wide basis and to approve waste
28 characterization measures and controls on the basis of waste streams or, where multiple waste
29 streams may be characterized by the same waste characterization processes and techniques,
30 groups of waste streams.

31 **8.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

32 A discussion of the requirements for [section 194.8](#) was added to the Compliance Recertification
33 Application of 2004 (CRA-2004) ([U.S. Department of Energy 2004, Chapter 4.0](#)). The CRA-
34 2004 notes, “based on EPA acceptance of the site-specific TRU waste characterization and QA
35 program, the Carlsbad Field Office Manager is responsible for granting and revoking the
36 program certification that allows the TRU waste site to characterize and to ship waste to WIPP”
37 but also adds, “consistent with the provisions of section 194.8, EPA also has a role in the
38 approval process. The EPA determines compliance with requirements for site-specific QA
39 programs.” In addition to determining QA compliance, the EPA also approves the waste
40 characterization programs at generator sites to ensure that the system of controls required to track
41 important components is technically adequate.

1 The CRA-2004 notes that according to the WIPP Waste Information System (WWIS), as of
2 September 30, 2002, the following five sites had approved QA and waste characterization
3 programs under section 194.8 requirements: Hanford-Richland (RL), the Idaho National
4 Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (now called the Idaho National Laboratory [INL]),
5 LANL, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS), and the Savannah River Site
6 (SRS). Additionally, the DOE's Central Characterization Project (CCP) had been approved to
7 characterize and ship waste from SRS, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and the Nevada
8 Test Site (NTS).

9 **8.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

10 The CRA-2004 did not identify instances where waste had been shipped to the WIPP from a
11 generator site prior to approval of its waste characterization programs by the EPA before the
12 CRA-2004 cutoff date of September 22, 2002. However, instances have occurred where waste
13 was shipped before approval of instrumentation or techniques used to characterize that waste by
14 the EPA Compliance Application Review Document (CARD) 8 ([U.S. Environmental Protection
15 Agency 2006a](#)). In these cases, the DOE discontinued shipment of the waste under investigation
16 until the EPA completed its inspection and approval. The EPA received no public comments on
17 the DOE's continued compliance with the approval process for waste shipment from waste
18 generator sites for disposal at the WIPP.

19 Based on its review and evaluation of the CRA-2004, supplemental information provided by the
20 DOE, and the EPA inspections and audits, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to
21 comply at that time with the requirements for [section 194.8](#) (U.S. Environmental Protection
22 Agency 2006b).

23 **8.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

24 The TRU waste sites approved by the EPA to ship contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-
25 TRU) waste to the WIPP in accordance with the requirements of [section 194.8](#) are as follows:
26 RL, INL/CCP, Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project, SRS/CCP, Oak Ridge National
27 Laboratory (ORNL)/CCP (EPA-ORNL-CCP-CH-11.07-8) ([U.S. Environmental Protection
28 Agency 2008a](#)), and LANL/CCP. The TRU waste sites identified in the CRA-2004 that have
29 shipped CH-TRU waste to the WIPP but are not currently active are Lawrence Livermore
30 National Laboratory (LLNL), NTS, ANL, and RFETS. RFETS has completed shipping its TRU
31 waste. LLNL was certified after the CRA-2004 was submitted (EPA-LANL-CCP-5.04-8) ([U.S.
32 Environmental Protection Agency 2004b](#)).

33 Since the CRA-2004, TRU waste characterization at LANL, SRS, and INL that was previously
34 performed using site resources is now being performed by CCP resources. An inspection was
35 performed by the EPA in April 2004 at LANL/CCP (EPA-LANL-CCP-4.04-08) ([U.S.
36 Environmental Protection Agency 2004c](#)). Approval was granted in August 2004 for the CCP to
37 characterize and ship CH-TRU waste from LANL. The EPA conducted a baseline inspection
38 and QA audit of INL/CCP in May 2005. Approval was granted by the EPA on November 1,
39 2005, for the CCP to characterize and ship CH-TRU waste from the INL.

1 On March 26, 2004, the EPA announced its final decision ([Marcinowski 2004](#)) to approve the
2 DOE's *Remote-Handled TRU Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan* ([U.S.](#)
3 [Department of Energy 2003a](#) and [2003b](#)). The EPA stated that on-site inspections and approval
4 of site-specific, remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-TRU) waste characterization
5 programs will be conducted under the authority at [section 194.8](#) or [40 CFR § 194.24](#), as
6 appropriate. Since then, four sites have been approved for RH-TRU waste characterization and
7 shipment to the WIPP. The EPA conducted a baseline inspection at INL/CCP in June and
8 August 2006 ([U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2007a](#)) and approved the characterization
9 program on January 12, 2007 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2007a). The baseline
10 approval designated the initiation of the WWIS for RH-TRU waste as a Tier 1 change (as
11 defined in section 194.8). The EPA approved a Tier 1 change request in January 2008 to add K-
12 Cell waste to the RH-TRU Waste Certification for INL/CCP ([U.S. Environmental Protection](#)
13 [Agency 2008b](#)). The EPA also conducted a QA program inspection and baseline inspection
14 (Inspection Number EPA-ANL-CCP-RH-09.06-08) at ANL/CCP in September 2006 ([U.S.](#)
15 [Environmental Protection Agency 2007b](#)). The QA program was approved on December 20,
16 2006 ([Reyes 2006](#)), and the characterization program was approved on January 16, 2007 (U.S.
17 Environmental Protection Agency 2007b). As with INL/CCP, the baseline approval designated
18 the initiation of the WWIS for RH-TRU waste as a Tier 1 change. A review of WWIS data entry
19 and waste component tracking was conducted by the EPA on November 21, 2006. The WWIS
20 system was determined to be adequate for RH-TRU waste characterized by INL/CCP and
21 ANL/CCP, as described by EPA correspondence dated January 17, 2007 ([Reyes 2007](#)). The
22 EPA approved a Tier 1 change request in July 2008 to add newly-packaged waste to the RH-
23 TRU Waste Certification for ANL/CCP ([U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2008c](#)). In
24 February 2008, the EPA approved the baseline for RH-TRU Waste Characterization for
25 LANL/CCP (Inspection Number EPA-LANL-CCP-RH-05.07-8) ([U.S. Environmental Protection](#)
26 [Agency 2008d](#)). In August 2008, the EPA approved the baseline for RH-TRU Waste
27 Characterization for SRS-BCL/CCP (Inspection Number EPA-SRS-CCP-RH-07.07-8) ([U.S.](#)
28 [Environmental Protection Agency 2008e](#)). The EPA conducted a baseline inspection (July 2008)
29 of the RH-TRU Waste Characterization process at ORNL/CCP. Approval of the inspection has
30 not been received at this time. The DOE continues to comply with the requirements of section
31 194.8 and there are no outstanding issues with the EPA related to section 194.8.

32 **8.7 References**

- 33 Marcinowski, F. 2004. Letter (with attachments) to R. Paul Detwiler. 26 March 2004. U.S.
34 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 35 Reyes, J. 2006. Memorandum to Dr. David Moody, Manager. 20 December 2006. U.S.
36 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 37 Reyes, J. 2007. Memorandum to David Moody, Ph.D., Manager. 17 January 2007. U.S.
38 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 39 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003a. *Remote-Handled TRU Waste Characterization*
40 *Program Implementation Plan* (Revision 0D, October 30). DOE/WIPP 02-3214. Carlsbad, NM:
41 Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003b. *Notification of Planned Change to the EPA 40 CFR*
2 *Part 194 Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: Remote-Handled TRU Waste*
3 *Characterization Plan* (April 30). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 4 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
5 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
6 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
8 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
9 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
10 52234–45.
- 11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
12 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
13 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
14 1998): 27353–406.
- 15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
16 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
17 Disposal Regulations; Alternative Provisions” (Final Rule). *Federal Register*, vol. 69 (July 16,
18 2004): 42571–583.
- 19 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004b. *Waste Characterization Inspection*
20 *Report: EPA Inspection No. EPA-LLNL-CCP-05.04-8 of the Central Characterization Project*
21 *(CCP) as Implemented at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Site May 4–7,*
22 *2004* (August). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 23 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004c. *EPA Inspection No. EPA-LANL-CCP-*
24 *4.04-08 of the Central Characterization Project (CCP) as Implemented at the Los Alamos*
25 *National Laboratory, April 26–April 30, 2004* (August). Waste Characterization Inspection
26 Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. “Recertification CARD No. 8: Approval
28 Process for Waste Shipment from Waste Generator Sites for Disposal at the WIPP.” *Compliance*
29 *Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the*
30 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations:*
31 *Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 8-1 through 8-10). Washington, DC: Office of
32 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 33 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
34 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
35 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision” (Final Notice). *Federal Register*, vol. 71 (April
36 10, 2006): 18010–021.
- 37 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2007a. *Waste Characterization Inspection*
38 *Report: EPA Baseline Inspection No. EPA-INLL-CCP-RH-6.06-8 of the Central*
39 *Characterization Project Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Characterization Program at the*

- 1 *Idaho National Laboratory June 12–16, and August 9 and 29, 2006* (January). Washington, DC:
2 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2007b. *Waste Characterization Inspection*
4 *Report EPA Baseline Inspection No. EPA-ANL-CCP-RH-9.06-8 of the Central Characterization*
5 *Project Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Characterization Program at the Argonne National*
6 *Laboratory September 12–14, 2006* (January). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor
7 Air.
- 8 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2008a. *Waste Characterization Inspection*
9 *Report and Approval: EPA Baseline Inspection No. EPA-ORNL-CCP-CH-11.07-8 of the*
10 *Central Characterization Project Waste Characterization Program at the Oak Ridge National*
11 *Laboratory November 13–15, 2007* (August). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor
12 Air.
- 13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2008b. *Waste Characterization Report: Tier 1*
14 *Change: Evaluation of the Modification of the Central Characterization’s Remote Handled TRU*
15 *Waste Characterization Program at the Idaho National Laboratory to Add Containers of K-Cell*
16 *Waste to Waste Stream ID-ANLE-S5000* (January). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
17 Indoor Air.
- 18 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2008c. *Waste Characterization Report: Tier 1*
19 *Change Evaluation: New Process for Visual Examination for Newly-Packaged Waste at the*
20 *Central Characterization Program’s Remote-Handled TRU Waste at Argonne National*
21 *Laboratory May 28, 2008* (June). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2008d. *EPA Baseline Inspection No. EPA-*
23 *LANL-CCP-RH-5.07-8 of the Central Characterization Project: Remote-Handled Transuranic*
24 *Waste Characterization Program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, May 8–10, 2007*
25 (February). Waste Characterization Inspection Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation
26 and Indoor Air.
- 27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2008e. *Waste Characterization Inspection*
28 *Report: EPA Baseline Inspection No. EPA-SRS-CCP-RH-7.07-8 of the Central Characterization*
29 *Project Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Characterization Program for Battelle Columbus*
30 *Laboratories Decommissioning Project Wastes Stored at the Savannah River Site July–*
31 *December 2007* (August). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Content of Compliance
Recertification Application(s)
(40 CFR § 194.15)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Content of Compliance
Recertification Application(s)
(40 CFR § 194.15)**

Table of Contents

15.0 Content of Compliance Recertification Application(s) (40 CFR § 194.15) 15-1

 15.1 Requirements 15-1

 15.2 Background 15-1

 15.3 1998 Certification Decision 15-2

 15.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 15-2

 15.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 15-2

 15.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 15-2

 15.6.1 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(1) 15-3

 15.6.1.1 Geologic Information 15-4

 15.6.1.2 Geophysical Information 15-4

 15.6.1.3 Geochemical Information 15-5

 15.6.1.4 Hydrologic Information 15-6

 15.6.1.5 Meteorological Information 15-8

 15.6.2 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(2) 15-10

 15.6.3 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(3) 15-13

 15.6.3.1 WIPP Repository Conditions, Chemistry, and Processes 15-13

 15.6.3.2 MgO Studies and Characterization 15-13

 15.6.3.3 Actinide Investigations 15-13

 15.6.4 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(4) 15-14

 15.6.4.1 Status of Underground Excavation 15-14

 15.6.4.2 Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Emplacement 15-14

 15.6.4.3 Proposed RH-TRU Waste Container Modifications 15-15

 15.6.4.4 Neutrino Experiments in the WIPP Underground Repository 15-16

 15.6.5 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(5) 15-17

 15.6.5.1 Status of Waste Emplacement 15-17

 15.6.5.2 Waste Characteristics and Components Important to Demonstration of Compliance 15-17

 15.6.6 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(6) 15-17

 15.6.6.1 Status of Compliance 15-17

 15.6.7 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(7) 15-18

 15.6.7.1 Status of Compliance 15-18

 15.6.8 40 CFR § 194.15(b) 15-18

 15.6.8.1 Status of Compliance 15-18

 15.7 References 15-18

List of Figures

Figure 15-1. Monthly Precipitation for the WIPP Site, 1990-2006 15-10

Figure 15-2. 2003 Annual Wind Rose at 10-m (33-ft) Height at the WIPP Site 15-11

Figure 15-3. 2004 Annual Wind Rose at 10-m (33-ft) Height at the WIPP Site 15-11

Figure 15-4. 2005 Annual Wind Rose at 10-m (33-ft) Height at the WIPP Site 15-12

Figure 15-5. 2006 Annual Wind Rose at 10-m (33-ft) Height at the WIPP Site 15-12

Figure 15-6. Status of Mining and Waste Emplacement as of October 1, 2007 15-15

List of Tables

Table 15-1. Routine Reports 15-3
Table 15-2. Seismic Events in the Delaware Basin 15-6
Table 15-3. Annual Average, Maximum, and Minimum Temperatures 15-9

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACR	Annual Change Report
ASER	Annual Site Environmental Report
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
COMP	compliance monitoring parameter
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBDSP	Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
DRZ	Disturbed Rock Zone
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EXO	enriched xenon observatory
ft	foot/feet
GAR	Geotechnical Analysis Report
high-T	high-transmissivity
in	inch
km	kilometer
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LWA	Land Withdrawal Act
MEGA	multiple element germanium array
mi	mile
mm	millimeters
NE	northeast
NMIMT	New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology
PA	performance assessment
PABC	performance assessment baseline calculation
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
SEGA	segmented enriched germanium assembly
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SPDV	Site and Preliminary Design Validation

SSW	shallow subsurface water
SW	southwest
TDS	total dissolved solids
TRU	transuranic
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Am	americium
MgO	magnesium oxide
Nd	neodymium
Pu	plutonium
U	uranium

1 **15.0 Content of Compliance Recertification Application(s) (40 CFR**
2 **§ 194.15)**

3 **15.1 Requirements**

§ 194.15 Content of Compliance Recertification Application(s)

(a) In submitting documentation of continued compliance pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP LWA, the previous compliance application shall be updated to provide sufficient information for the Administrator to determine whether or not the WIPP continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations. Updated documentation shall include:

- (1) All additional geologic, geophysical, geochemical, hydrologic, and meteorological information;
- (2) All additional monitoring data, analyses and results;
- (3) All additional analyses and results of laboratory experiments conducted by the Department or its contractors as part of the WIPP program;
- (4) An identification of any activities or assumptions that deviate from the most recent compliance application;
- (5) A description of all waste emplaced in the disposal systems since the most recent compliance certification or re-certification application. Such description shall consist of a description of the waste characteristics and waste components identified in § 194.24(b)(1) and § 194.24(b)(2);
- (6) Any significant information not previously included in a compliance certification or re-certification application related to whether the disposal system continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations; and
- (7) Any additional information requested by the Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative.

(b) To the extent that information required for a re-certification of compliance remains valid and has been submitted in previous certification or re-certification applications(s), such information need not be duplicated in subsequent applications; such information may be summarized and referenced.

4

5 **15.2 Background**

6 Information documented in the 2009 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2009) is
7 prescribed in 40 CFR § 194.15 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996). These
8 documentation requirements parallel the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.14 (U.S. Environmental
9 Protection Agency 1996), which apply primarily to the Compliance Certification Application
10 (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), the original application. The focus of section 194.15
11 is to ensure that CRAs include documentation regarding any changes to the disposal system that
12 may have occurred since the previous certification or recertification. Updated information
13 regarding relevant aspects of the waste and the disposal system is documented. However, in
14 cases where information and assumptions have not changed, no new information need be
15 documented; the CRA-2009 may reference or summarize such unchanged information.

16 The CRA-2009 must identify relevant systems and program changes implemented during the
17 preceding five-year period. Any activity or assumption that deviates from what was described in
18 the most recent compliance certification or recertification application would be considered a
19 change. The CRA-2009 also documents changes reviewed and approved by the U.S.
20 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the preceding five-year period (through modification
21 of the certification or other processes). The CRA-2009 documents instances where new baseline
22 program elements were established as a result of changes.

1 **15.3 1998 Certification Decision**

2 The CCA, Chapters 2.0 and 3.0 and Appendices GCR, HYDRO, and MASS, include general
3 information about the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site and disposal system design. Other
4 site characteristics, design, location, and construction information is primarily provided in the
5 CCA, Chapter 7.0 and Appendices BACK, DEL, PCS, and SEAL. After its review, the EPA
6 concluded that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) adequately addressed the geology,
7 geophysics, hydrogeology, hydrology, meteorology, climatology, and effects of waste and
8 geochemistry of the disposal system and its vicinity, and how these conditions are expected to
9 change and interact over the regulatory time frame (Compliance Application Review Document
10 [CARD] 14, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a). The EPA reviewed the DOE's
11 CCA and additional information submitted by the DOE and determined that the DOE complied
12 with each of the criteria of section 194.14. A complete description of the EPA's 1998
13 Certification Decision for section 194.14 can be found in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
14 1998b, as well as CARD 14 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

15 **15.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

16 Baseline documentation for section 194.14 was established at the time of the original EPA
17 certification. Information on changes to section 194.14 topics that occurred since the original
18 certification is required to be documented by section 194.15. Changes that occurred during the
19 five-year period following the original certification are documented in the CRA-2004 (U.S.
20 Department of Energy 2004a), which was submitted by the DOE and reviewed by the EPA under
21 the requirements of section 194.15.

22 During public review of the CRA-2004, the EPA received comments regarding karst features,
23 vertical fracturing, and transport through the Magenta. The EPA assessed these comments and
24 concluded that DOE has demonstrated continued compliance. The EPA responses to comments
25 on the CRA-2004 are documented in CARD 14/15, Appendix 15-A (U.S. Environmental
26 Protection Agency 2006a).

27 **15.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

28 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
29 the DOE (available for review in EPA Docket A-98-49), the EPA determined that the DOE
30 continued to comply with the disposal standards (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

31 **15.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

32 To document that the WIPP continues to comply with the disposal standards in each five-year
33 recertification cycle, changes and new information since the previous recertification must be
34 described. Changes and new information since the CRA-2004 related to section 194.15 are
35 either described below, or references are provided to other sections or appendices of the CRA-
36 2009 that provide the necessary material.

37 Much of the information provided in this section was obtained from routinely published reports.
38 Table 15-1 lists these reports and summarizes the type of information contained in each.

Table 15-1. Routine Reports

Description	Summary	Frequency	Reference ^a
Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER)	Describes compliance status with applicable federal regulations and environmental monitoring performed during the year at the WIPP. Highlights any significant monitoring results or findings.	Annual	U.S. Department of Energy 2007a
Geotechnical Analysis Report (GAR)	Reports data related to the geotechnical performance of the various underground facility components, including the shafts, shaft stations, access drifts, and waste disposal areas. Volume 1 describes the overall program; Volume 2 provides a compilation of the collected data.	Annual	U.S. Department of Energy 2008a
Annual Change Report (ACR) (194.4(b)(4) ^b Report)	Provides information each year on any change in conditions or activities related to the disposal system, as required by 40 CFR § 194.4(b)(4). The majority of the items reported are inspections, reports, and modifications to written plans and procedures. In addition, the ACR provides updates on waste volumes of several parameters and radionuclides upon which the EPA imposes limits.	Annual	U.S. Department of Energy 2007b
Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Report	Lists changes in drilling including rates for shallow and deep drilling; pipeline activity; borehole plugging; injection wells; potash, sulfur, and solution mining; and any other new activity related primarily to human intrusion.	Annual	U.S. Department of Energy 2007c
Compliance Monitoring Parameters (COMPs) Report	The DOE uses PA to simulate the expected long-term performance of the WIPP. COMPs are used to indicate conditions that are not within expected PA data ranges or conceptual model assumptions, and to alert the project to unexpected conditions. Examples of COMPs include waste activity, changes in groundwater conditions, and creep closure rate.	Annual	Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) 2008
Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey	Survey includes determination of the elevation of each of the existing subsidence monuments and the WIPP baseline survey, and of the National Geodetic Survey's vertical control points.	Annual	U.S. Department of Energy 2007d
Biennial Environmental Compliance Report	As required by the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA), this document reports the status of the project's compliance with a variety of environmental protection laws and regulations.	Biennial	U.S. Department of Energy 2006a

^aThe entry in this column is the most recent report available.

^bU.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996.

1

2 **15.6.1 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(1)**

3 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(1) requires the submittal of “all additional geologic, geophysical,
 4 geochemical, hydrologic, and meteorological information.” Information responding to this
 5 requirement is provided in the following sections.

1 **15.6.1.1 Geologic Information**

2 New geologic information has been developed since the preparation of the CRA-2004, and is
3 provided in Appendix HYDRO-2009. Geologic studies between 2003 and 2007 focused on
4 Rustler Formation halite margins and karst. The map of Rustler halite margins delineated by
5 Powers (2002) for the CRA-2004 was revised by Powers (2007) to incorporate data from recent
6 drilling near the WIPP site. Lorenz (2006a and 2006b) reviews historical data and arguments on
7 karst at the WIPP. Lorenz (2006b, p. 243) concludes that most of the geological evidence
8 offered for the presence of karst in the subsurface at the WIPP site “has been used uncritically
9 and out of context, and does not form a mutually supporting, scientifically defensible framework.
10 . . . The remaining evidence is more readily interpreted as primary sedimentary features.”
11 Powers et al. (2006) provide new details on the gypsum karst present in the Rustler of Nash
12 Draw. Powers (2006a) studies some of the natural brine lakes in Nash Draw, finding some of
13 them to be fed by a shallow gypsum karst system with enough storage to sustain year-round
14 flow, while others were fed by the potash-processing effluent discharged by Mosaic Potash
15 Carlsbad into Laguna Uno. Powers (2006b) also maps closed catchment basins in the SW arm of
16 Nash Draw that drain internally to karst features.

17 **15.6.1.2 Geophysical Information**

18 Regional seismic activity has been the focus of ongoing geophysical investigations since the
19 development of the CRA-2004. Regional seismic activity is monitored to establish a basis for
20 predicting ground motions that the WIPP repository may experience in both the near and distant
21 future. Historic seismic monitoring data are divided into two categories: pre- and
22 postinstrumentation. Prior to 1962, instrumented seismic monitoring stations did not exist in
23 New Mexico; information about seismic activity was derived from qualitative sources, such as
24 reports of effects on people, structures, and surface features. Since 1962, seismograph coverage
25 for New Mexico has become sufficiently comprehensive to locate regional epicenters. As would
26 be expected, after the installation of the monitoring network, the number of reported events
27 increased. Recorded events include natural seismic events as well as those resulting from human
28 activities.

29 In the early 1990s, to increase coverage in the vicinity of the WIPP, the New Mexico Institute of
30 Mining and Technology (NMIMT) installed a network of seven seismograph stations in
31 southeastern New Mexico. These instruments are sufficiently sensitive to detect events with
32 magnitudes as low as 0.1 on the Richter scale. This further increased the number of seismic
33 events recorded in the area.

34 Starting in January 1997, a large number of seismic events were concentrated in an area known
35 as Dagger Draw, northwest of Carlsbad, New Mexico, and near the Dagger Draw gas field,
36 suggesting that the events may be induced by natural gas production activity. In 2003, two more
37 seismograph stations were located in the vicinity of Dagger Draw to allow the recording of
38 smaller events that could not previously be detected. Although the number of recorded events
39 increased dramatically in this area, peaking in 2004, almost all of the recorded events are of low
40 magnitude.

1 Information regarding seismic events is generally recorded in catalogs, which are divided into
2 categories based on the magnitude registered for each event. Most catalogs have a section
3 detailing seismic events with a magnitude greater than 3.0 because this is the point at which
4 seismic events can be felt.

5 The NMIMT has recently generated comprehensive catalogs incorporating new programs for
6 locating the epicenter and defining the magnitude of seismic events. NMIMT then regenerated
7 information from the old catalogs using the new programs. For some past events, both the
8 recorded magnitude and epicenter changed, while in others, either the magnitude or the epicenter
9 changed.

10 The WIPP Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program (DBDSP) tracks seismic events
11 occurring in the vicinity of the WIPP Site. In 2007, the DBDSP completed the update of its
12 seismic database, incorporating the changes and adding events that were not previously
13 considered in the area.

14 During the current CRA-2009 monitoring period (October 2002 through September 2007), there
15 were 703 seismic events recorded within approximately 240 kilometers (km) (150 miles [mi]) of
16 the WIPP site. Almost all (85%) of the recorded events occurred in the Dagger Draw area of
17 Eddy County. Nearly all of these events were of a magnitude that would not be felt by humans.

18 Although the DBDSP collects information on areas outside of the Delaware Basin, such as
19 Dagger Draw, the Delaware Basin is used as the defining area for data collection and input to
20 PA. The number of recorded events that have occurred within the Delaware Basin between 1971
21 and September 2007 (the CRA-2009 cutoff date) are listed in Table 15-2, Seismic Events in the
22 Delaware Basin.

23 A map showing the locations of 87 seismic events that have occurred within 240 km (150 mi) of
24 the WIPP with a reported magnitude greater than 3.0 is provided in Appendix DATA-2009,
25 Section DATA-2.2. Of these 87 events, only 4 occurred in the Delaware Basin. The one closest
26 to the WIPP site occurred as a result of a roof fall in one of the local potash mines (U.S.
27 Department of Energy 2007a).

28 Although an increased number of seismic events has been recorded, no significant or anomalous
29 seismic events have occurred in the vicinity of the WIPP since the CRA-2004.

30 **15.6.1.3 Geochemical Information**

31 New hydrogeochemical information has been collected since the CRA-2004. This new
32 information is described in detail in Domski and Beauheim (2008) and in Appendix HYDRO-
33 2009. Extensive groundwater sampling has been performed in new wells and selected older
34 wells. The last major geochemical evaluation of Culebra groundwater was performed by Siegel,
35 Lambert, and Robinson (1991) based on samples from 22 wells. Samples are now available
36 from 59 wells, allowing refinement of the conceptual understanding provided by Siegel,
37 Lambert, and Robinson (1991). Whereas Siegel, Lambert, and Robinson (1991) identify only
38 four hydrochemical facies (A, B, C, and D) based primarily on ionic strength and major
39

Table 15-2. Seismic Events in the Delaware Basin

County	No. of Events	Earliest Event	Latest Event	Smallest Magnitude	Largest Magnitude
Culberson	12	10/27/1992	12/20/2005	1.1	2.4
Eddy	15	11/28/1975	07/05/2007	0.5	3.7
Lea	1	06/23/1993	06/23/1993	2.1	2.1
Loving	4	02/04/1976	04/24/2003	1.1	2.0
Pecos	18	01/30/1975	12/22/1998	1.0	2.6
Reeves	18	02/19/1976	05/25/2002	1.0	3.1
Ward	47	09/03/1976	08/19/1978	0.3	2.8
Winkler	8	09/24/1971	09/15/1988	0.0	3.0

Key:

Magnitude

Less than 2 Very seldom felt

2.0 to 3.4 Barely felt

3.5 to 4.2 Felt as a rumble

4.3 to 4.9 Shakes furniture; can break dishes

5.0 to 5.9 Dislodges heavy objects; cracks walls

6.0 to 6.9 Considerable damage to buildings

7.0 to 7.3 Major damage to buildings; breaks underground pipes

7.4 to 7.9 Great damage; destroys masonry and frame buildings

Above 8.0 Complete destruction; ground moves in waves

Source: DBDSP, U.S. Department of Energy 2007c

1

2 constituents, two transitional facies (A/C and B/C) and one entirely new facies (E) can now be
 3 delineated (Domski and Beauheim 2008). The spatial distribution of these facies is consistent
 4 with the locations of the Rustler halite margins, the distribution of transmissivity in the Culebra,
 5 and the areas of known or suspected recharge to the Culebra.

6 **15.6.1.4 Hydrologic Information**

7 New piezometers have been installed, and new hydrological investigations have been undertaken
 8 since the CRA-2004. Related information is provided below and in Appendix HYDRO-2009.

9 **15.6.1.4.1 New Piezometers**

10 Shallow subsurface water (SSW) was first detected at the WIPP site in 1995 when a video
 11 inspection of the exhaust shaft showed seepage from about 50 to 80 feet (ft) below the ground
 12 surface. The SSW occurs in a perched water-bearing zone above the contact between the Santa
 13 Rosa Formation and the upper Dewey Lake Formation.

14 To evaluate if the Site and Preliminary Design Validation (SPDV) mined tailing pile was
 15 contributing to the anthropogenic SSW, piezometers PZ-13, PZ-14, and PZ-15 were drilled in
 16 August 2007. This pile has been decommissioned and is no longer used. An engineered cover
 17 has been placed on the pile.

1 Piezometers PZ-13, PZ-14, and PZ-15 indicated saturated sections in all three locations at
2 different horizons, and, in one case, a different formation. Based on data from the piezometers,
3 analysis of water levels, and geological analysis, it is concluded that the water levels identified in
4 PZ-13 and PZ-14 are the result of the SPDV pile runoff or infiltration prior to the installation of
5 the engineered cover. Water in PZ-15 is much more shallow and chemically different from that
6 in the other two wells, indicating a different source, such as recharge and infiltration from a
7 topographic depression east of the SPDV pile. A report on this investigation using the new
8 piezometers is provided in U.S. Department of Energy 2008b.

9 **15.6.1.4.2 Recent Hydrological Investigations**

10 Since the September 2002 data-cutoff date for the CRA-2004, the DOE has collected a
11 significant amount of new information on WIPP hydrogeology, both in response to requests from
12 the EPA and as a result of ongoing monitoring programs. Appendix HYDRO-2009 describes the
13 new information collected as of the end of 2007; a brief summary is provided below.

14 Hydrological investigations conducted from 2003 through 2007 provided a wealth of new
15 information, some of it confirming long-held assumptions and others offering new insight into
16 the hydrological system around the WIPP site. A Culebra monitoring-network optimization
17 study was completed by McKenna (2004) to identify locations where new Culebra monitoring
18 wells would be of greatest value and to identify wells that could be removed from the network
19 with little loss of information. Eighteen new wells were completed, guided by the optimization
20 study, geologic considerations, and/or unique opportunities. Seventeen wells were plugged and
21 abandoned, and two others were transferred to the U.S. Bureau of Land Management.

22 The WIPP groundwater monitoring program has augmented monthly water-level measurements
23 with continuous (nominally hourly) fluid-pressure measurements using downhole programmable
24 TROLL[®] pressure gauges in all Culebra wells except for the Water Quality Sampling Program
25 wells. The most significant new finding arising from the continuous measurements has been the
26 observation of Culebra water-level responses to rainfall in Nash Draw. The Culebra has long
27 been suspected of being unconfined in at least portions of Nash Draw because of dissolution of
28 the upper Salado, subsidence and collapse of the overlying Rustler, and karst in Rustler gypsum
29 units (Beauheim and Holt 1990). However, continuous monitoring with TROLL[®] gauges has
30 provided the first direct evidence of Culebra water levels responding to rainfall. Furthermore,
31 the rainfall-induced head changes originating in Nash Draw are now observed to propagate under
32 Livingston Ridge and across the WIPP site over periods of days to months (Hillesheim,
33 Hillesheim, and Toll 2007), explaining some of the changes in Culebra water levels. Other
34 water-level changes that appear to occur quite suddenly can now be conclusively related to
35 drilling of nearby oil and gas wells.

36 Extensive hydraulic testing has been performed in the new wells (Appendix HYDRO-2009).
37 This testing has involved both single-well tests, which provide information on local
38 transmissivity and heterogeneity, and long-term (19 to 32 days) pumping tests that have created
39 observable responses in wells up to 9.5 km (5.9 mi) away. The transmissivity values inferred
40 from the single-well tests (Roberts 2006 and 2007) support the correlation between geologic
41 conditions and Culebra transmissivity developed by Holt and Yarbrough (2002) and elucidated
42 by Holt, Beauheim, and Powers (2005). The types of heterogeneities indicated by the diagnostic

1 plots of the pumping-test data are consistent with the known spatial distribution of transmissivity
2 in the Culebra. Mapping diffusivity values obtained from analysis of observation-well responses
3 to pumping tests shows areas north, west, and south of the WIPP site connected by fractures, and
4 also a wide area that includes a NE-to-SW swath across the middle part of the WIPP site where
5 hydraulically significant fractures are absent (Beauheim 2007). This mapping, combined with
6 the responses observed to the long-term SNL-14 pumping test, has confirmed the presence of a
7 high-transmissivity (high-T) area extending from the SE quadrant of the WIPP site to at least
8 10 km (6 mi) to the south. Additional information related to this high-T area is discussed in
9 Appendix HYDRO-2009, Section HYDRO-6.4.

10 Combining the Culebra monitoring data with catchment basin mapping in southwestern Nash
11 Draw and groundwater geochemistry data provides insight into Culebra recharge. While some of
12 the water entering gypsum karst in Nash Draw discharges into brine ponds such as Laguna
13 Cinco, some portion of it must come into hydraulic communication with the Culebra, at least
14 locally, because Culebra wells in Nash Draw show water-level responses to major rainfall
15 events. However, these responses do not mean that the precipitation reached the Culebra.
16 Rather, they indicate that the Culebra cannot be completely confined, but must be in hydraulic
17 communication with a water table in a higher unit that does receive direct recharge from
18 precipitation. Some of this water must eventually reach the Culebra, where it is recognized as
19 the low ionic strength, CaSO_4 -dominated hydrochemical facies B, but it must first have spent a
20 considerable period in the Rustler gypsum beds to have as high a total dissolved solids (TDS) as
21 it does. As a further indication of the recharge's indirect nature, the water from SNL-16 (which
22 is located within a small catchment basin in Nash Draw) does not fall in the domain of facies B,
23 but is instead in the higher ionic strength facies C, even though SNL-16 shows a clear pressure
24 response to major rainfall events. This shows conclusively that rainfall is not rapidly flushing
25 the Culebra in this area (Domski and Beauheim 2008).

26 Lowry and Beauheim (2004 and 2005) conclude from two modeling studies that leakage from
27 units above the Culebra through poorly plugged and abandoned boreholes is a plausible
28 explanation for the long-term rise in water levels observed at and near the WIPP site. The
29 Intrepid East tailings pile may well be the primary source of leaking water north of the WIPP
30 site, while natural recharge where the Culebra is unconfined southwest of the site could provide
31 the leaking water ascribed to a southern borehole by Lowry and Beauheim (2005). The studies
32 showed that a physically reasonable amount of leakage through unconfirmed but realistic
33 pathways is consistent with the observed rising water levels. Greater detail is provided in
34 Appendix HYDRO-2009.

35 **15.6.1.5 Meteorological Information**

36 The Meteorological Monitoring Program measures atmospheric data for the WIPP site. This
37 section provides a brief description of the program and updated meteorological data covering the
38 years 2002 through 2006. No anomalous weather events or changes in climatic conditions
39 occurred during 2002–2006.

40 The primary WIPP meteorological station is located 600.5 m (1,970 ft) northeast of the Waste
41 Handling Building. The main function of the station is to provide data for atmospheric
42 modeling, measuring and recording wind speed, wind direction, and temperature at elevations of

1 2, 10, and 50 m (6.5, 33, and 165 ft) above ground level, as well as ground-level measurements
 2 of barometric pressure, relative humidity, precipitation, and solar radiation.

3 Information related to recent meteorological conditions is provided below. Data are from the
 4 WIPP environmental monitoring reports.

5 Temperatures are moderate throughout the year, although seasonal changes are distinct. The
 6 mean annual temperature in southeastern New Mexico is 17 °C (63 °F). In the winter (December
 7 through February), nighttime lows average near -5 °C (23 °F), and highs average in the 50s (°F).
 8 The lowest recorded temperature at the nearest Class A weather station in Roswell was -34 °C
 9 (-29 °F) in February 1905. In the summer (June through August), the daytime high temperature
 10 exceeds 32 °C (90 °F) approximately 75% of the time. The National Weather Service
 11 documented 50 °C (122 °F) at the WIPP site as the record high temperature for New Mexico on
 12 June 27, 1994.


13 The annual average, maximum, and minimum temperatures from 1990 through 2006 are listed in
 14 Table 15-3.

15 **Table 15-3. Annual Average, Maximum, and Minimum Temperatures^a**

Year	Annual Average Temperature		Maximum Temperature		Minimum Temperature	
	(°C)	(°F)	(°C)	(°F)	(°C)	(°F)
1990	17.8	64.0	46.1	115.0	-13.9	7.0
1991	17.2	63.0	42.8	109.0	-7.8	18.0
1992	17.2	63.0	42.8	109.0	-10.0	14.0
1993	17.8	64.0	42.8	109.0	-18.9	-2.0
1994	17.8	64.0	50.0	122.0	-14.4	6.0
1995	17.0	63.0	42.0	107.0	-7.0	19.0
1996	17.0	63.0	41.0	106.0	-7.0	19.0
1997	16.3	61.4	38.6	101.5	-11.4	11.4
1998	18.3	64.9	41.6	106.9	-10.8	12.6
1999	18.1	64.6	40.9	105.6	-7.9	17.8
2000	17.4	63.3	40.2	104.4	-6.8	19.7
2001	17.5	63.5	39.5	103.2	-7.8	18.0
2002	17.2	62.3	40.82	105.5	-10.4	13.3
2003	18.1	64.6	39.2	102.7	-9.1	15.6
2004	16.8	62.2	38.6	101.5	-12.0	10.4
2005	16.8	62.2	39.8	103.6	-13.0	8.6
2006	18.3	65.0	39.6	103.3	-6.0	21.1
Average	17.4	63.4	41.5	106.8	-10.2	13.5

^a Source: WIPP annual Site Environmental Reports for calendar years 2002 through 2006 (U.S. Department of Energy 2003, 2004b, 2005a, 2006b, and 2007a).

1 Precipitation is light and unevenly distributed throughout the year, averaging 400 millimeters
 2 (mm) (15.7 inches [in.]) per year from 1990 through 2006. Winter is the season of least
 3 precipitation, averaging less than 15 mm (0.6 in.) of rainfall per month. Snow averages about
 4 137 mm (5 in.) per year at the site and seldom remains on the ground for more than a day.
 5 Approximately half the annual precipitation comes from thunderstorms in June through
 6 September. Rains are usually brief, but occasionally intense, when moisture from the Gulf of
 7 Mexico spreads over the region. Monthly average, maximum, and minimum precipitations
 8 recorded at the WIPP site from 1990 through 2006 are shown in Figure 15-1.




9
 10 **Figure 15-1. Monthly Precipitation for the WIPP Site, 1990–2006**

11 Recent wind roses indicating the frequencies of wind speeds and directions at the WIPP are
 12 provided as Figure 15-2, Figure 15-3, Figure 15-4, and Figure 15-5.

13 **15.6.2 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(2)**

14 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(2) requires the submittal of “all additional monitoring data, analyses, and
 15 results.” Information responding to this requirement is provided below.


16 The DOE has implemented and/or continued several experimental activities designed to address
 17 specific issues and needs of the WIPP repository. In addition, other investigations were initiated
 18 to examine the impacts of planned changes. The general areas covered under these investigations
 19 include the following:



1

2


Figure 15-2. 2003 Annual Wind Rose at 10-m (33-ft) Height at the WIPP Site



3


4

Figure 15-3. 2004 Annual Wind Rose at 10-m (33-ft) Height at the WIPP Site



1
2

Figure 15-4. 2005 Annual Wind Rose at 10-m (33-ft) Height at the WIPP Site



3
4

Figure 15-5. 2006 Annual Wind Rose at 10-m (33-ft) Height at the WIPP Site

- 1 • Geochemistry
- 2 • Engineered barriers
- 3 • Rock mechanics

4 Environmental monitoring programs and references to relevant reports are included in Appendix
 5 MON-2009 and Appendix DATA-2009. Data on parameters required for preclosure and
 6 postclosure monitoring, including programs for geotechnical and geoscience monitoring, are
 7 described in Appendix MON-2009, which focuses on parameters that may be relevant to the
 8 long-term performance of the repository. Appendix DATA-2009, Sections DATA-2.0 through
 9 DATA-5.0, describes the data collection procedures and references the reports related to
 10 parameters such as human activities in the Delaware Basin, including drilling rates, oil and gas
 11 production activities, and subsidence monitoring. Appendix DATA-2009, Attachment A, WIPP
 12 Borehole Update, provides an updated borehole list for the WIPP vicinity.

13 **15.6.3 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(3)**

14 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(3) requires the submittal of “all additional analyses and results of laboratory
 15 experiments conducted by the Department or its contractors as part of the WIPP program.”
 16 Experimental work conducted since the CRA-2004 in the areas of WIPP repository conditions
 17 and parameters, magnesium oxide (MgO) characterization and chemistry, and actinide studies is
 18 described in the following sections.

19 **15.6.3.1 WIPP Repository Conditions, Chemistry, and Processes**

20 There were no significant changes in the WIPP repository conditions, chemistry assumptions, or
 21 subsurface processes used in PA to establish compliance since the CRA-2004. Appendix
 22 DATA-2009, Section DATA-9.0, describes the disturbed rock zone (DRZ) experiments and
 23 waste shear strength experiments that occurred after the CRA-2004. A detailed description of
 24 the current conditions and assumptions used in PA is given in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section
 25 SOTERM-2.0 and Appendix PA-2009.

26 **15.6.3.2 MgO Studies and Characterization**

27 Experimental investigations of MgO have continued since the CRA-2004. This experimental
 28 work has centered on two key aspects of MgO performance: (1) the characterization and
 29 qualification of vendor-provided MgO to insure that DOE requirements were being met and (2)
 30 MgO hydration studies to further establish the reaction pathways of this engineered barrier under
 31 repository-relevant conditions. A detailed description of these experimental results is provided
 32 in Appendix MgO-2009 and Appendix DATA-2009, Section DATA-9.0. The impact of MgO
 33 chemistry on actinide chemistry and solubility is described in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section
 34 SOTERM-2.3.3.

35 **15.6.3.3 Actinide Investigations**

36 Experimental investigations to establish the speciation and solubility of actinides under WIPP-
 37 related conditions were reinitiated after the CRA-2004. These investigations focused on three

1 areas: (1) the solubility of neodymium (Nd) (III), as an analogue for the plutonium (Pu) (III) and
2 americium (Am) (III) oxidation states, in simulated WIPP brine, (2) the reduction of higher
3 valent Pu(V/VI) by iron to form low-solubility Pu(III/IV) phases, and (3) the solubility of
4 uranium (U) (VI) in carbonate-free WIPP brine. The details of these experimental studies are
5 given in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-3.0. All results reported in these studies
6 support the CRA-2004 PA position and did not lead to changes in the CRA-2009 PA.

7 **15.6.4 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(4)**

8 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(4) requires that the DOE “identify any activities or assumptions that deviate
9 from the most recent compliance application.” Information related to this requirement is
10 provided in the following sections.


11 **15.6.4.1 Status of Underground Excavation**

12 The progress of mining the WIPP underground repository is shown in Figure 15-6. As shown on
13 the figure, as of October 1, 2007, Panels 1 through 4 had been mined completely; Panels 1, 2,
14 and 3 were filled with waste; waste was being emplaced in Panel 4; and mining of Panel 5 was in
15 progress.

16 Geotechnical analysis reports from 2003 through 2007 show that no major ground control
17 problems or events occurred since the CRA-2004 (U.S. Department of Energy 2004c, 2005b,
18 2006c, 2007e, and 2008a). As expected, slow deterioration of ground conditions has occurred in
19 the WIPP underground repository as a result of aging, but this has been mitigated by routine
20 maintenance and the implementation of engineered systems, as needed. One incident of minor
21 damage occurred to a catch basin installed in the exhaust shaft to intercept water and prevent it
22 from flowing laterally into the waste shaft sump. The catch basin was originally installed in
23 March 1996; it was damaged by falling debris. A new catch basin was installed in December
24 2004. This basin was damaged in August 2005, again by debris. The catch basin was replaced
25 by an interception well system between November 2005 and March 2006. The interception well
26 system consists of 4, 30-ft deep, small-diameter holes located in the floor of the drift between the
27 exhaust shaft and the waste shaft. The quantity and quality of fluid entering the system
28 continues to be measured and analyzed. The fluid is routinely removed to prevent drainage into
29 the waste shaft sump.

30 **15.6.4.2 Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Emplacement**

31 The original plans for waste emplacement included the placement of remote-handled (RH)
32 transuranic (TRU) (RH-TRU) waste in horizontal boreholes in the walls of waste-emplacement
33 rooms, followed by the emplacement of contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU)
34 waste in containers in each room. This configuration was planned to be used in all panels in the
35 underground repository. Because CH-TRU waste disposal was approved about six years before
36 RH-TRU waste approval, no RH-TRU waste was emplaced in Panels 1, 2, and 3. RH-TRU waste
37 was emplaced beginning with Panel 4.



1
2 **Figure 15-6. Status of Mining and Waste Emplacement as of October 1, 2007**

3 **15.6.4.3 Proposed RH-TRU Waste Container Modifications**

4 On November 15, 2007, the DOE submitted a planned change request to the EPA to use shielded
 5 RH-TRU waste containers (Moody 2007) for a portion of RH-TRU waste shipped to the WIPP.
 6 The proposed shielded containers, approximately the size of a 55-gallon drum, have 1-in.-thick
 7 lead shielding placed between a double-walled steel shell. The external wall is 1/8 in. thick, and
 8 the internal wall is 3/16 in. thick. The lid and the bottom of the containers are made of carbon
 9 steel and are 3 in. thick. The containers are designed to hold a 30-gallon container, and would be

1 shipped to the WIPP in HalfPACT transportation containers. The surface dose rate would be no
2 higher than 200 millirem/hour.

3 Use of the shielded containers is proposed to increase efficiency of transportation and operations
4 at the WIPP, as well as at generator sites, because the shielded containers could be managed in
5 the same manner as CH-TRU waste. Record-keeping for RH-TRU waste would not change;
6 containers and waste streams would continue to be designated as RH-TRU waste in the WIPP
7 Waste Information System, and would count against the limit of 5,100,000 curies for RH-TRU
8 waste as specified in the WIPP LWA, as well as the limit of 250,000 ft³ defined by the
9 Consultation and Cooperation Agreement between the DOE and the State of New Mexico.

10 It is estimated that approximately 27% (Crawford and Taggart 2007) of the RH-TRU waste
11 inventory would be suitable for management in the shielded containers. Higher-activity RH-
12 TRU waste would continue to be managed and emplaced using the current practice.

13 An analysis of the disposal system performance implications of using the shielded container was
14 performed. The analysis shows that use of shielded containers for candidate waste streams
15 would have an insignificant impact on long-term performance of the disposal system (Dunagan
16 et al. 2007).

17 **15.6.4.4 Neutrino Experiments in the WIPP Underground Repository**

18 Several new research projects have been initiated at the WIPP. Although these projects are not
19 related to the expected performance of the repository, they are described here because they are
20 being performed in the WIPP underground facility. The WIPP underground repository is a
21 desirable location for the experiments because it provides an environment shielded from cosmic
22 radiation that would otherwise interfere with the experiments. Equipment used during these
23 experiments will be removed before closure of the repository.

24 The Segmented Enriched Germanium Assembly (SEGA) project and the Multiple Element
25 Germanium Array (MEGA) projects are being performed to investigate double-beta decay, a rare
26 type of nuclear decay that provides information on the mass of the neutrino. A modular building
27 for housing the experiments was assembled in the Room Q alcove of the WIPP underground
28 facility in 2003 and 2004. Experiments began in 2005, and preparations began in 2007 for
29 additional studies and experiments in electroforming copper fabricated underground to purify the
30 metal of its natural radioactive contaminants. The SEGA and MEGA projects are being
31 performed by a collaboration of several universities, with Stanford University serving as the
32 lead.

33 In addition, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is leading the Enriched Xenon
34 Observatory (EXO) project, also in the WIPP underground repository. This project is
35 investigating neutrinoless double-beta decay. In 2007, several pallets of materials for the
36 experiment were received at WIPP after assembly in California. Setup of the experiments is
37 planned for 2008. The experiments will be performed in the former E-300 shop space between
38 drifts N-1100 and N-1400.

1 For all of these experiments, the role of the WIPP operator, Washington TRU Solutions, LLC, is
2 to provide support in transporting project materials to the underground facility, health and safety
3 oversight, infrastructure to operate and maintain the experiments, and operational coordination
4 with project researchers.

5 **15.6.5 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(5)**

6 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(5) requires that the CRA-2009 include “a description of all waste emplaced
7 in the disposal system since the most recent compliance certification or recertification
8 application. Such description shall consist of a description of the waste characteristics and waste
9 components identified in § 194.24(b)(1) and § 194.24(b)(2).” Information responsive to these
10 requirements is provided in the following sections.

11 **15.6.5.1 Status of Waste Emplacement**

12 The status of waste emplacement in the WIPP underground repository is indicated in Figure 15-
13 6. Additional detail is provided in Section 24, “Waste Characterization.”

14 **15.6.5.2 Waste Characteristics and Components Important to Demonstration of** 15 **Compliance**

16 Section 24 provides an updated waste inventory of both waste anticipated to be emplaced in the
17 WIPP and waste that has already been emplaced since the CRA-2004. Section 24 also reports an
18 analysis of waste inventory impacts on the performance of the WIPP disposal system.
19 Information about the limits imposed by the DOE on significant components or characteristics of
20 the waste to ensure that they are consistent with assumptions made for the PA is also provided in
21 Section 24.

22 The inventory for the CRA-2009 PA is the same inventory used for the CRA-2004 PABC. Since
23 the CRA-2004 PABC was completed, the *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report–2007*
24 (U.S. Department of Energy 2008c) was published and provides updated inventory information.
25 The DOE anticipates this inventory update will have only a small impact on normalized releases
26 relative to the CRA-2009 PA, and will not be significant for compliance. Therefore, the DOE is
27 in compliance with section 194.24(a) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2004).

28 **15.6.6 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(6)**

29 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(6) requires the submittal of “any significant information not previously
30 included in a compliance certification or recertification application related to whether the
31 disposal system continues to be in compliance with the disposal regulations.” Information
32 related to this requirement is provided below.

33 **15.6.6.1 Status of Compliance**

34 The remainder of this CRA provides the information required by this section of the certification
35 criteria. The DOE believes that this information demonstrates that the WIPP continues to
36 comply with the disposal regulations.

1 **15.6.7 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(7)**

2 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(7) requires the submittal of “any additional information requested by the
3 Administrator or the Administrator’s authorized representative.” Information related to this
4 requirement is provided below.

5 **15.6.7.1 Status of Compliance**

6 There currently are no outstanding requests from the EPA for additional information. As such,
7 the DOE is in compliance with this certification criterion.

8 **15.6.8 40 CFR § 194.15(b)**

9 40 CFR § 194.15(b) states, “To the extent that information required for a re-certification of
10 compliance remains valid and has been submitted in previous certification or re-certification
11 applications(s), such information need not be duplicated in subsequent applications; such
12 information may be summarized and referenced.” Information related to this requirement is
13 provided below.

14 **15.6.8.1 Status of Compliance**

15 The DOE has followed this direction in the preparation of this recertification application. To the
16 extent appropriate, information from the CCA and the CRA-2004 that remains valid and
17 unchanged is not repeated in this recertification application; instead, it is summarized and
18 incorporated by reference.

19 **15.7 References**

20 Beauheim, R.L. 2007. “Diffusivity Mapping of Fracture Interconnections.” *Proceedings of the*
21 *2007 U.S. EPA/NGWA Fractured Rock Conference* (pp. 235–49). Westerville, OH: National
22 Ground Water Association.

23 Beauheim, R.L., and R.M. Holt. 1990. “Hydrogeology of the WIPP Site.” *Geological and*
24 *Hydrological Studies of Evaporites in the Northern Delaware Basin for the Waste Isolation Pilot*
25 *Plant (WIPP), New Mexico* (pp. 131–79). Geological Society of America Field Trip No. 14
26 Guidebook. Dallas: Dallas Geological Society of America.

27 Crawford, B.A., and D. Taggart. 2007. *Analysis of RH TRU Wastes for Containment in Lead*
28 *Shielded Containers* (Revision 0). INV-07-08-25-01-01. Carlsbad, NM: Los Alamos National
29 Laboratory, Carlsbad Operations.

30 Domski, P.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2008. *Evaluation of Culebra Brine Chemistry*. AP-125.
31 ERMS 549336. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

32 Dunagan, S.C., G.T. Roselle, E.D. Vugrin, and J.J. Long. 2007. *Analysis Report for the*
33 *Shielded Container Performance Assessment* (Revision 1). ERMS 547358. Carlsbad, NM:
34 Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Hillesheim, M.B., L.A. Hillesheim, and N.J. Toll. 2007. "Mapping of Pressure-Head Responses
2 of a Fractured Rock Aquifer to Rainfall Events." *Proceedings of the 2007 U.S. EPA/NGWA*
3 *Fractured Rock Conference* (pp. 522–36). Westerville, OH: National Ground Water
4 Association.
- 5 Holt, R.M., and L. Yarbrough. 2002. *Analysis Report: Task 2 of AP-088; Estimating Base*
6 *Transmissivity Fields* (July 8). ERMS 523889. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Holt, R.M., R.L. Beauheim, and D.W. Powers. 2005. "Predicting Fractured Zones in the
8 Culebra Dolomite." *Dynamics of Fluids and Transport in Fractured Rock* (pp. 103–16). B.
9 Faybishenko, P.A. Witherspoon, and J. Gale, eds. Geophysical Monograph Series 162.
10 Washington, DC: American Geophysical Union.
- 11 Lorenz, J.C. 2006a. *Assessment of the Potential for Karst in the Rustler Formation at the WIPP*
12 *Site*. SAND2005-7303. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 13 Lorenz, J.C. 2006b. "Assessment of the Geological Evidence for Karst in the Rustler Formation
14 at the WIPP Site." *Caves and Karst of Southeastern New Mexico* (pp. 243–52). L. Land, V.W.
15 Lueth, W. Raatz, P. Boston, and D.L. Love, eds. 57th Annual Fall Field Conference Guidebook.
16 Socorro, NM: New Mexico Geological Society.
- 17 Lowry, T.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2004. *Analysis Report: Task 2 of AP-110; Evaluation of*
18 *Water-Level Rise in the Culebra Due to Recharge from Refining Process Water Discharged onto*
19 *Potash Tailings Piles*. ERMS 536239. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 Lowry, T.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2005. *Analysis Report: Task 3 of AP-110; Evaluation of*
21 *Water-Level Rise in the Culebra Due to Leakage through Poorly Plugged and Abandoned*
22 *Potash Boreholes*. ERMS 540187. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 McKenna, S.A. 2004. *Analysis Report: AP-111; Culebra Water-Level Monitoring Network*
24 *Design*. ERMS 540477. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Moody, D.C. 2007. Letter to J. Reyes (Subject: Transmittal of Planned Change Request for
26 Shielded Containers). 15 November 2007. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office,
27 Carlsbad, NM.
- 28 Powers, D.W. 2002. *Analysis Report: Task 1 of AP-088; Construction of Geologic Contour*
29 *Maps* (April 17). ERMS 522086. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Powers, D.W. 2006a. *Analysis Report: Task 1D of AP-114; Collect Current and Historic*
31 *Information on Water Levels and Specific Gravity in Potash Tailings Ponds within the Culebra*
32 *Modeling Domain* (March 31). ERMS 543124. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 33 Powers, D.W. 2006b. *Analysis Report: Task 1B of AP-114; Identify Possible Area of Recharge*
34 *to the Culebra West and South of WIPP* (April 1). ERMS 543094. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
35 National Laboratories.

- 1 Powers, D.W. 2007. *Analysis Report for Task 1A of AP-114: Refinement of Rustler Halite*
2 *Margins within the Culebra Modeling Domain* (October 5). ERMS 547559. Carlsbad, NM:
3 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Powers, D., R. Beauheim, R. Holt, and D. Hughes. 2006. "Evaporite Karst Features and
5 Processes at Nash Draw, Eddy County, New Mexico." *Caves and Karst of Southeastern New*
6 *Mexico* (pp. 253–66). L. Land, V.W. Lueth, W. Raatz, P. Boston, and D.L. Love, eds. 57th
7 Annual Fall Field Conference Guidebook. Socorro, NM: New Mexico Geological Society.
- 8 Roberts, R.M. 2006. *Analysis Report for AP-070: Analysis of Culebra Pumping Tests*
9 *Performed between December 2003 and August 2005*. ERMS 543901. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
10 National Laboratories.
- 11 Roberts, R.M. 2007. *Analysis Report for AP-070: Analysis of Culebra Hydraulic Tests*
12 *Performed between June 2006 and September 2007*. ERMS 547418. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
13 National Laboratories.
- 14 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2008. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
15 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2007*. ERMS 548041. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
16 Laboratories.
- 17 Siegel, M.D., S.J. Lambert, and K.L. Robinson, eds. 1991. *Hydrochemical Studies of the*
18 *Rustler Formation and Related Rocks in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Area, Southeastern New*
19 *Mexico*. SAND88-0196. ERMS 225624. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
21 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
22 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 23 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental*
24 *Report: Calendar Year 2002* (Rev. 1, September). DOE/WIPP 03-2225. Carlsbad, NM:
25 Carlsbad Field Office.
- 26 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004a. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
27 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
28 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 29 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004b. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2003 Site Environmental*
30 *Report*. DOE/WIPP 04-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004c. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2002–June*
32 *2003* (March). 2 vols. DOE/WIPP 04-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 33 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005a. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental*
34 *Report*. DOE/WIPP 05-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 35 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005b. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2003–June*
36 *2004* (March). 2 vols. DOE/WIPP 05-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006a. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Biennial Environmental*
2 *Compliance Report*. DOE/WIPP 06-2171. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006b. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site*
4 *Environmental Report for 2005* (September). DOE/WIPP 06-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad
5 Field Office.
- 6 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006c. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2004–June*
7 *2005* (April). 2 vols. DOE/WIPP 06-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 8 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007a. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site*
9 *Environmental Report for 2006* (September). DOE/WIPP 07-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad
10 Field Office.
- 11 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007b. *Annual Change Report 2006/2007: From July 1,*
12 *2006, to June 30, 2007* (November 16). DOE/WIPP 07-3317. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field
13 Office.
- 14 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007c. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report*
15 (September). DOE/WIPP 07-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 16 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007d. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey 2006*
17 (December 2006). DOE/WIPP 07-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 18 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007e. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2005–June*
19 *2006* (March). 2 vols. DOE/WIPP 07-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 20 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008a. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2006–June*
21 *2007*. DOE/WIPP 08-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 22 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008b. *Basic Data Report for Piezometers PZ-13, PZ-14,*
23 *and PZ-15 and Shallow Subsurface Water* (Revision 1, April). DOE/WIPP 08-3375. Carlsbad,
24 NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 25 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008c. *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report–2007*
26 *(Revision 1)*. DOE/TRU 2008-3379. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
28 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
29 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
30 5223–45.
- 31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “CARD No. 14: Content of Compliance
32 Certification Application.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the*
33 *Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40*
34 *CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 14-1 through 14-
35 86). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
2 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
3 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
4 1998): 27353–406.
- 5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
6 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
7 Disposal Regulations; Alternative Provisions” (Final Rule). *Federal Register*, vol. 69 (July 16,
8 2004): 42571–583.
- 9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. “Recertification CARD Nos. 14/15:
10 Content of Compliance Certification Application and Compliance Recertification
11 Application(s).” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the
12 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
13 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 14/15-1
14 through 14/15-34, pp. 14-A-1 through 14-A-3, and pp. 15-A-1 through 15-A-17). Washington,
15 DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
17 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
18 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision” (Final Notice). *Federal Register*, vol. 71 (April
19 10, 2006): 18010–021.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Inspections
(40 CFR § 194.21)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Inspections
(40 CFR § 194.21)

Table of Contents

21.0 Inspections (40 CFR § 194.21) 21-1
 21.1 Requirements 21-1
 21.2 Background 21-1
 21.3 1998 Certification Decision 21-1
 21.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 21-2
 21.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 21-4
 21.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 21-4
 21.7 References 21-5

List of Tables

Table 21-1. Monitored Parameters 21-2
Table 21-2. CRA-2004 Monitoring and Waste Emplacement Inspection Results
 (1999–2005) 21-3
Table 21-3. Post-CRA-2004 Monitoring and Waste Emplacement Inspection Results
 (2006–2007) 21-5

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMWTF	Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
QA	quality assurance
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
TRU	transuranic
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WWIS	WIPP Waste Information System

Elements and Chemical Compounds

MgO	magnesium oxide
-----	-----------------

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **21.0 Inspections (40 CFR § 194.21)**

2 **21.1 Requirements**

§ 194.21 Inspections

(a) The Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative(s) shall, at any time:

(1) Be afforded unfettered and unannounced access to inspect any area of the WIPP, and any locations performing activities that provide information relevant to compliance application(s), to which the Department has rights of access. Such access shall be equivalent to access afforded Department employees upon presentation of credentials and other required documents.

(2) Be allowed to obtain samples, including split samples, and to monitor and measure aspects of the disposal system and the waste proposed for disposal in the disposal system.

(b) Records (including data and other information in any form) kept by the Department pertaining to the WIPP shall be made available to the Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative upon request. If requested records are not immediately available, they shall be delivered within 30 calendar days of the request.

(c) The Department shall, upon request by the Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative, provide permanent, private office space that is accessible to the disposal system. The office space shall be for the exclusive use of the Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative(s).

(d) The Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative(s) shall comply with applicable access control measures for security, radiological protection, and personal safety when conducting activities pursuant to this section.

3

4 **21.2 Background**

5 40 CFR § 194.21 (2004) provides the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with the
6 authority to inspect all activities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and all activities
7 located off-site that provide information relevant to any compliance applications.

8 **21.3 1998 Certification Decision**

9 The EPA conducted no inspection under the authority of section 194.21 prior to the 1998
10 Certification Decision. With the issuance of its 1998 Certification Decision (U.S. Environmental
11 Protection Agency 1998), the EPA identified inspections that may be performed under the
12 authority at section 194.21. These include the following:

- 13 • The inspection of the panel closure system on waste panels that have been filled and are
14 being sealed to confirm compliance with Condition 1 of the EPA's 1998 Certification
15 Decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998)
- 16 • The verification that specific actions identified by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in
17 the Certification and supplementary information (and in any additional documentation
18 submitted in accordance with Condition 4) are being taken to test and implement passive
19 institutional controls
- 20 • Announced and unannounced inspections of activities at the WIPP and at all off-site facilities
21 that provide information included in certification applications

- 1 • The inspection of the DOE’s implementation of the monitoring plans that the DOE has set
2 forth to demonstrate compliance with 40 CFR § 194.42
- 3 • The inspection of any records relevant to the Certification kept by the DOE, including those
4 records required to be generated in accordance with the compliance criteria
- 5 • The inspections of approved quality assurance (QA) programs at the WIPP and at waste
6 generator sites to ensure the programs are being adequately maintained and documented

7 After the 1998 Certification Decision, the EPA began using the authority given by section 194.21
8 to conduct inspections at the WIPP. Inspections include magnesium oxide (MgO) backfill, waste
9 emplacement, the monitoring programs established to collect data for each of the Monitored
10 Parameters identified in Table 21-1, and the examination of documentation (records) to verify
11 compliance at the WIPP.

12 **Table 21-1. Monitored Parameters**

Monitored Parameters	
Geomechanical Parameters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creep closure • Extent of deformation • Initiation of brittle deformation • Displacement of deformation features Hydrological Parameters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culebra groundwater composition • Change in Culebra groundwater flow direction 	Waste Activity Parameter <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Waste activity subsidence parameter • Subsidence measurements Drilling-Related Parameters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drilling rate • The probability of encountering a Castile brine reservoir

13

14 The monitoring inspection activities included an examination of monitoring and sampling
15 equipment both on- and off-site and underground. The EPA also reviewed sampling procedures
16 and measurement techniques and verified implementation of an effective QA program for
17 monitoring activities.

18 This provision of the EPA’s Compliance Criteria was not applied prior to the 1998 Certification
19 Decision. After 1998, the EPA used the authority given by section 194.21 to inspect the WIPP
20 monitoring programs, MgO backfill, and waste emplacement requirements.

21 **21.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

22 The 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy
23 2004) did not address the EPA’s inspection activities under section 194.21. However, the EPA
24 inspection activities were addressed in Compliance Application Review Document (CARD) 21
25 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a). CARD 21 identified monitoring inspections
26 and waste emplacement inspections that were conducted from March 23, 1999, through July 12,
27 2005. This information is duplicated in Table 21-2.

Table 21-2. CRA-2004 Monitoring and Waste Emplacement Inspection Results (1999–2005)

Date of Inspection	Inspection Type	Inspection Results	Reference
March 24–25, 1999	Monitoring	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999a)
September 8, 1999	Waste Emplacement	The EPA did not have any findings. The EPA had one minor concern that two procedures did not specify the form that records must take. This concern did not require a response from the DOE.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1999b)
June 21–22, 2000	Monitoring	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2000a)
June 20–22, 2000	Waste Emplacement	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2000b)
June 20–21, 2001	Monitoring	The EPA had one finding and no concerns. The finding noted that the subsidence monitoring program at the WIPP did not have an adequate written procedure to implement an effective QA program. In response to the EPA’s finding, the DOE developed a new subsidence procedure. The EPA evaluated the procedure and found it to be adequate.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001a)
June 21, 2001	Waste Emplacement	The EPA did not have any findings, but they identified one concern. The EPA found that the DOE did not appear to have a procedure that required proper documentation of off-normal events. This concern did not require a response from the DOE because the DOE provided all documentation requested.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2001b)
June 26–28, 2002	Monitoring	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2002a)
June 24–27, 2002	Waste Emplacement	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2002b)
June 18–19, 2003	Monitoring	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2003a)
June 17–19, 2003	Waste Emplacement	The EPA had one finding and no concerns during this inspection. The EPA was unable to determine that waste was being emplaced in a random manner. This finding was resolved in the CRA-2004.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2003b)

Table 21-2. CRA-2004 Monitoring and Waste Emplacement Inspection Results (1999–2005) (continued)

Date of Inspection	Inspection Type	Inspection Results	Reference
June 28 through July 1, 2004	Monitoring	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2004a)
June 28 through July 1, 2004	Waste Emplacement	The EPA did not have any findings but did have one concern. The EPA found that the DOE did not appear to have a real-time system to track and calculate the actual MgO placed with waste at disposal. This concern was resolved by using the WIPP Waste Information System (WWIS) to track the quantities of MgO.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2004b)
July 12–15, 2005	Monitoring	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2005a)
May 17–19, 2005	Waste Emplacement	The EPA did not have any findings, but did have one concern during this inspection. The EPA found that the DOE needed to develop a formal procedure that guides the MgO emplacement decision-making process rather than using training materials, and that the WWIS needs to be back-populated with the quantity of emplaced MgO. In response to this concern, the WWIS was back-populated.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2005b)

1

2 **21.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

3 During each of the inspections listed in Table 21-3, the DOE provided the EPA with unfettered
 4 access to facilities, lists of records, access to these records as requested, and access to private
 5 office space. Additionally, the DOE actively supported the EPA’s inspection activities. Based
 6 on the EPA’s review and evaluation of the CRA-2004, the EPA determined that the DOE
 7 continued to comply with the requirements for section 194.21 (U.S. Environmental Protection
 8 Agency 2006a).

9 **21.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

10 Table 21-3 lists the seven new inspections conducted by the EPA under the authority of section
 11 194.21 since the ones reported in CARD 21 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a).

12 During each of the inspections listed in Table 21-3, the DOE met all the requirements of section
 13 194.21, providing the EPA with unfettered access to facilities, lists of records, access to the
 14 records requested, and access to private office space. Additionally, the DOE actively supported
 15 the EPA’s inspection activities as required by section 194.21.

Table 21-3. Post-CRA-2004 Monitoring and Waste Emplacement Inspection Results (2006–2007)

Date of Inspection	Inspection Type	Inspection Results	Reference
June 20–22, 2006	Monitoring	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2006b)
June 20–22, 2006	Waste Emplacement	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2006c)
July 10–12, 2007	Monitoring	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2007a)
July 10-12, 2007	Waste Emplacement	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2007b)
January 9–11, 2007	Remote-Handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-TRU) Emplacement Plan	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during this inspection. The EPA verified that RH-TRU waste could be emplaced in the WIPP repository according to the RH-TRU Emplacement Plan.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2007c)
October 7, 2007	Unannounced inspection at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility (AMWTF) and the Accelerated Retrieval Project at the Idaho National Laboratory	The EPA did not have any findings or concerns during the inspection of the AMWTF. However, the EPA requested information on the process used for regrouping four pre-1970 buried waste streams. EPA also requested information for estimating TRU, mixed TRU, and low-level waste volumes. On December 28, 2007, the DOE provided the EPA with the requested information. The DOE is awaiting the EPA’s response as of November 1, 2008.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2007d)
November 21-28, 2007	DOE document development and review process	Five process improvement recommendations were made.	Reyes (2008)

1

2 **21.7 References**

3 Reyes, J. 2008. Letter to D. Moody. 21 February 2008. U.S. Environmental Protection
4 Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

5 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
6 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
7 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

8 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
9 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
10 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
11 1998): 27353–406.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1999a. *Monitoring Inspection Report (40 CFR*
2 *194.42) of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, March 24–25, 1999*. Washington, DC: Office of
3 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1999b. *Report: EPA Inspection No. EPA-*
5 *WIPP-9.99-21 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, September 8, 1999 (October)*. Washington,
6 DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2000a. *Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-6.00-21*
8 *(Monitoring) of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 21–22, 2000 (August)*. Inspection Report.
9 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 10 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2000b. *Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-6.00-21A*
11 *(Waste Emplacement) of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 20–22, 2000 (August)*. Inspection
12 Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2001a. *Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-6.01-21c of*
14 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 20–21, 2001 (September)*. Monitoring Inspection Report.
15 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2001b. *Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-6.01-21b of*
17 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 21, 2001 (September)*. Emplacement Inspection Report.
18 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 19 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2002a. *Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-6.02-21c of*
20 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 26–28, 2002 (November)*. Parameter Monitoring
21 Inspection Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2002b. *EPA Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-6.02-*
23 *21b of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 24–27, 2002 (November)*. Waste Emplacement
24 Inspection Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 25 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2003a. *Inspection Number EPA-WIPP-6.03-18c*
26 *of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 18–19, 2003 (October)*. Monitoring Inspection Report.
27 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 28 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2003b. *EPA Inspection Number EPA-WIPP-*
29 *6.03-17b of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 17–19, 2003 (October)*. Emplacement
30 Inspection Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004a. *Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-6.04-28c of*
32 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 28 to July 1, 2004 (August)*. Monitoring Inspection Report.
33 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004b. *EPA Inspection Number EPA-WIPP-*
35 *6.04-28b of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 28–July 1, 2004 (August)*. Emplacement
36 Inspection Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2005a. *Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-7.05-12b of*
2 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, July 12 to July 15, 2005* (August). Monitoring Inspection
3 Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2005b. *EPA Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-05021*
5 *of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, May 17–19, 2005* (June). Emplacement Inspection Report.
6 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. “Recertification CARD No. 21:
8 Inspections.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification*
9 *and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191*
10 *Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 21-1 through 21-5).
11 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. *Inspection No. EPA-WIPP-6.06-20b of*
13 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 20 to June 22, 2006* (September). Monitoring Inspection
14 Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006c. *EPA Inspection Number EPA-WIPP-*
16 *6.06-20c of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, June 20–22, 2006* (September). Emplacement
17 Inspection Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 18 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2007a. *Inspection Number EPA-WIPP-7.07-10b*
19 *of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, July 10 to 12, 2007* (August). Monitoring Inspection Report.
20 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2007b. *EPA Inspection Number EPA-WIPP-*
22 *7.07-10c of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, July 10–12, 2007* (September). Emplacement
23 Inspection Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 24 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2007c. Emplacement Inspection for First
25 Receipt of RH Waste: EPA Inspection of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, January 9–11, 2007.
26 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2007d. *Unannounced EPA Inspection at*
28 *AMWTP, October 7, 2007*. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Quality Assurance
(40 CFR § 194.22)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Quality Assurance
(40 CFR § 194.22)**

Table of Contents

22.0 Quality Assurance (40 CFR § 194.22)..... 22-1

 22.1 Requirements..... 22-1

 22.2 Background 22-1

 22.3 1998 Certification Decision..... 22-2

 22.4 Changes in the CRA-2004..... 22-3

 22.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 22-3

 22.5.1 NQA Standards 22-4

 22.5.2 Audits of QA Plan Implementation 22-4

 22.5.3 Audits of QA Programs at Lower-Tier Organizations..... 22-4

 22.5.4 NUREG-1297 for Peer Reviews..... 22-5

 22.5.5 Assessments of Data Quality Characteristics 22-5

 22.5.6 Data Qualifications 22-5

 22.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification..... 22-6

 22.6.1 Changes to QAPD..... 22-6

 22.6.2 Changes to CBFO/DOE Procedures 22-6

 22.6.3 Updated List of Waste Generator Sites Certified under the QA
 Program..... 22-7

 22.7 References 22-8

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANL	Argonne National Laboratory
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CBFO	Carlsbad Field Office
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CCP	Central Characterization Project
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
MP	Management Procedure
NQA	Nuclear Quality Assurance
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
QA	quality assurance
QAPD	Quality Assurance Program Document
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SRS	Savannah River Site
TRU	transuranic
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WTS	Washington TRU Solutions

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **22.0 Quality Assurance (40 CFR § 194.22)**

2 **22.1 Requirements**

§ 194.22 Quality Assurance

(a)(1) As soon as practicable after April 9, 1996, the Department shall adhere to a quality assurance program that implements the requirements of ASME NQA-1-1989 edition, ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda, part 2.7, to ASME NQA-2-1989 edition, and ASME NQA-3-1989 edition (excluding Section 2.1 (b) and (c), and Section 17.1). (Incorporation by reference as specified in § 194.5.)

(2) Any compliance application shall include information which demonstrates that the quality assurance program required pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section has been established and executed for:

- (i) Waste characterization activities and assumptions;
- (ii) Environmental monitoring, monitoring of the performance of the disposal system, and sampling and analysis activities;
- (iii) Field measurements of geologic factors, ground water, meteorologic, and topographic characteristics;
- (iv) Computations, computer codes, models and methods used to demonstrate compliance with the disposal regulations in accordance with the provisions of this part;
- (v) Procedures for implementation of expert judgment elicitation used to support applications for certification or re-certification of compliance;
- (vi) Design of the disposal system and actions taken to ensure compliance with design specifications;
- (vii) The collection of data and information used to support compliance application(s); and
- (viii) Other systems, structures, components, and activities important to the containment of waste in the disposal system.

(b) Any compliance application shall include information which demonstrates that data and information collected prior to the implementation of the quality assurance program required pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section have been qualified in accordance with an alternate methodology, approved by the Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative, that employs one or more of the following methods: Peer review, conducted in a manner that is compatible with NUREG-1297, "Peer Review for High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories," published February 1988 (incorporation by reference as specified in § 194.5); corroborating data; confirmatory testing; or a quality assurance program that is equivalent in effect to ASME NQA-1-1989 edition, ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda, part 2.7, to ASME NQA-2-1989 edition, and ASME NQA-3-1989 edition (excluding Section 2.1 (b) and (c) and Section 17.1). (Incorporation by reference as specified in § 194.5.)

(c) Any compliance application shall provide, to the extent practicable, information which describes how all data used to support the compliance application have been assessed for their quality characteristics, including:

- (1) Data accuracy, i.e., the degree to which data agree with an accepted reference or true value;
- (2) Data precision, i.e., a measure of the mutual agreement between comparable data gathered or developed under similar conditions expressed in terms of a standard deviation;
- (3) Data representativeness, i.e., the degree to which data accurately and precisely represent a characteristic of a population, a parameter, variations at a sampling point, or environmental conditions;
- (4) Data completeness, i.e., a measure of the amount of valid data obtained compared to the amount that was expected; and
- (5) Data comparability, i.e., a measure of the confidence with which one data set can be compared to another.

(d) Any compliance application shall provide information which demonstrates how all data are qualified for use in the demonstration of compliance.

(e) The Administrator will verify appropriate execution of quality assurance programs through inspections, record reviews and record keeping requirements, which may include, but may not be limited to, surveillance, audits and management systems reviews.

3

4 **22.2 Background**

5 40 CFR § 194.22 (2004) establishes quality assurance (QA) requirements for the Waste Isolation
6 Pilot Plant (WIPP). QA is a process for enhancing the reliability of technical data and analyses

1 used for the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Compliance Certification Application (CCA)
2 (U.S. Department of Energy 1996) and 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-
3 2004) (U.S. Department of Energy 2004) that demonstrate compliance with the U.S.
4 Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) disposal standards. Section 194.22 requires the
5 DOE to (1) establish and execute a QA program for all items and activities important to the
6 containment of waste in the disposal system, (2) qualify data that are collected prior to
7 implementation of the required QA program, (3) assess data for their quality characteristics, to
8 the extent practicable, (4) demonstrate how data are qualified for their use, and (5) allow
9 verification of the above measures through the EPA inspections and audits. The DOE’s QA
10 program is required to adhere to specific Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) standards issued by
11 the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) (NQA-1-1989, NQA-2a-1990 addenda
12 part 2.7, and NQA-3-1989).

13 **22.3 1998 Certification Decision**

14 The EPA’s Certification Decision was provided in *Federal Register* vol 63 (1998), pp. 27353–
15 406, as “40 CFR Part 194 Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation
16 Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” A
17 complete description of the EPA’s 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.22 is contained in
18 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998 (Docket A-93-02, Items V-A-1 and V-B-2).

19 The EPA performed three types of assessments during review of the CCA to determine
20 compliance with section 194.22:

- 21 1. Determine if the DOE correctly established and implemented QA programs for items and
22 activities important to the long-term isolation of transuranic (TRU) waste in the disposal
23 system (40 CFR § 194.22(a))
- 24 2. Determine if the DOE qualified all data, including existing data collected prior to the
25 implementation of QA programs (40 CFR §§ 194.22(b) and (d))
- 26 3. Determine if the DOE assessed the CCA data for their quality characteristics (40 CFR §
27 194.22(c)).

28 The EPA took two general steps to perform each of the three assessments mentioned above.
29 First, the EPA reviewed the CCA and associated references to determine if the DOE provided a
30 satisfactory description of compliance with the QA requirements. During this stage, the EPA
31 requested and reviewed additional information.

32 In the second step, the EPA conducted formal audits at WIPP-related facilities to verify
33 compliance with the requirements of section 194.22. These audits were conducted under the
34 authority of 40 CFR § 194.22(e) and were essential to verifying implementation of the QA
35 requirements. Each WIPP-related facility generated much activity and documentation, and it
36 was not practical to witness proper implementation of QA programs away from each facility
37 based solely on documents provided by the DOE. Therefore, the EPA auditors went to four
38 DOE facilities to witness the proper implementation of the QA requirements of section 194.22.
39 As a result of the audits, the EPA approved the WIPP’s QA programs at the DOE Carlsbad Field
40 Office (CBFO), the WIPP site (managed by Washington TRU Solutions [WTS]), Sandia

1 National Laboratories (SNL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). These four WIPP-
2 related facilities are all located in New Mexico.

3 At that time (1996–1998), other WIPP-related facilities located outside of New Mexico were not
4 approved by the EPA. 40 CFR § 194.22(a)(2)(i) requires the DOE to apply QA programs for
5 waste characterization activities prior to certification. The criteria in 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3) and
6 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5) cross-reference the QA requirements set forth in section 194.22(a)(2)(i).
7 The CCA indicates that waste generator sites outside New Mexico would not begin waste
8 characterization until after 1997 and that it was not reasonable to implement QA programs at that
9 time for future waste characterization. The EPA applied a condition to the approval of the CCA
10 that sites without approved QA programs could not dispose of TRU waste at the WIPP. Each
11 unapproved site would have to be audited after the approval of the CCA to verify compliance
12 prior to shipment of waste from each unapproved site.

13 The EPA examined the application of QA for waste characterization at one waste generator site
14 as part of the CCA review. After DOE informed the EPA that LANL was ready for an audit, the
15 EPA auditors reviewed the LANL QA Plan to verify establishment of QA requirements, and
16 later verified the proper implementation of the QA Plan at LANL. Based on the audit samples
17 taken, the EPA determined that LANL had properly established and implemented a QA program
18 for its waste characterization. The other waste generator sites required EPA audits of their
19 individual QA programs before the EPA could allow them to send waste to the WIPP.

20 After the EPA approved the CCA, the agency conducted periodic audits at the four approved
21 facilities to verify continued compliance. The EPA also began to audit other facilities that had
22 not been ready to perform work at the time of the CCA.

23 **22.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

24 The CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, like the CCA, Chapter 5.0, discusses the QA programs for the
25 WIPP. The DOE extensively revised the CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0 to make it clearly match the
26 structure of the NQA standards and to update information. Changes to the QA portions of the
27 CRA-2004 reflected a maturing and expansion of the WIPP QA program since the CCA. The
28 QA programs that were new at the time of the CCA had increased their effectiveness over time.
29 Between 1998 and 2004, new waste generator sites were added, thus adding more QA programs.

30 The QA Plan that establishes the NQA standards for the WIPP is the “Quality Assurance
31 Program Document” (QAPD). The CRA-2004, Appendix QAPD, as in the CCA, contained the
32 current QAPD at the time. The DOE revised the QAPD between the CCA and the CRA-2004 to
33 more clearly establish each of the applicable NQA elements and to update the DOE
34 organizational structure. The CRA-2004, Appendices PEER-2004 and AUD-2004 were also
35 updated to include peer reviews and audits performed since the CCA.

36 **22.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

37 The EPA’s Recertification Decision was published in *Federal Register* vol. 71 (2006), pp.
38 18010–021, (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a) as “40 CFR Part 194 [EPA–HQ–
39 OAR–2004–0025; FRL–8055–1] Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste

1 Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision.”
2 Detailed technical evaluation of the CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, Quality Assurance, was provided in
3 Compliance Application Review Document (CARD) 22 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
4 2006b). The following is a summary of the EPA’s evaluation of compliance with section 194.22
5 (CRA 2004, Chapter 5.0 and Appendices PEER-2004 and AUD-2004), as contained in the EPA
6 documents mentioned above.

7 **22.5.1 NQA Standards**

8 The CRA-2004 provides information on the DOE’s implementation of the NQA standards.
9 ASME NQA-1-1989 requirements are addressed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, Sections 5.3.1
10 through 5.3.19. ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda part 2.7 is addressed in the CRA-2004, Chapter
11 5.0, Section 5.3.20. ASME NQA-3-1989 is addressed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, Sections
12 5.3.21, 5.3.22, and 5.3.23 (Docket A-93-02 Items V-A-1 and V-B-2).

13 The DOE QA Plan that implements the NQA standards, the QAPD, is provided in the CRA-2004
14 as Appendix QAPD. Since the CCA, the EPA periodically audited the QAPD to verify the
15 continued proper establishment of the NQA standards.

16 The EPA found that the CBFO QA Plan (the CRA-2004, Appendix QAPD) properly established
17 the applicable elements of the NQA standards invoked under section 194.22 for items and
18 activities important to the long-term isolation of TRU waste.

19 **22.5.2 Audits of QA Plan Implementation**

20 The CRA-2004 provides information on internal and external auditing of the implementation of
21 the CBFO QAPD in the CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, Sections 5.3.19 and 5.7. The CRA-2004,
22 Chapter 5.0, Section 5.7 describes the CBFO audit process that covers internal and external
23 audits, audit schedules, and audit team leader requirements. The CRA-2004, Appendix AUD-
24 2004, Table AUD-10 provides a summary of audits conducted on the CBFO QA Plan.
25 The EPA determined that the CRA-2004 provided references to general and auditable
26 information regarding internal and external audits to verify proper implementation of the CBFO
27 QA Plan. Further, the EPA conducted periodic audits since the CCA to verify the proper
28 implementation of the CBFO QA Plan.

29 **22.5.3 Audits of QA Programs at Lower-Tier Organizations**

30 The CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, Section 5.3.19 addresses internal and external auditing of the
31 CBFO QA Plan as a requirement of NQA-1-1989, and the CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, Section 5.7
32 describes the CBFO audit process that covers internal and external audits, audit schedules, and
33 audit team leader requirements. An audit history of assessments of TRU waste generator sites
34 and suppliers performing quality-affecting work between 1999 and 2003 is located in CRA-
35 2004, Appendix AUD-2004, Tables AUD-1 through AUD-11. All audits are assigned an audit
36 number, which allows traceability.

1 Audited suppliers included CBFO Technical Assistance Contractor, Argonne National
2 Laboratory (ANL) – East, Battelle Columbus Lab, Mobile Characterization Services, LLC, and
3 Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring and Research Center.

4 The EPA found that the CRA-2004 contained general and auditable information describing an
5 active auditing program by the CBFO of lower-tier and supplier organizations. Further, the EPA
6 conducted periodic audits since the CCA to verify the proper execution of QA programs at the
7 lower-tier organizations.

8 **22.5.4 NUREG-1297 for Peer Reviews**

9 NUREG-1297 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1988) provides guidance on the definitions
10 of peer reviews, the area for which peer review is appropriate, the acceptability of peers, and the
11 conduct and documentation of peer reviews. The CBFO peer review process is outlined in the
12 CRA-2004, Chapter 9.0, Section 9.2, which is broken into Sections 9.2.1 through 9.2.8 that
13 generally mirror the topics in NUREG-1297. The remainder of the CRA-2004, Chapter 9.0
14 discusses the results of peer reviews conducted prior to 2004.

15 CBFO Management Procedure (MP) 10.5 defines the requirements of NUREG-1297. The EPA
16 evaluated MP 10.5 and its description in the CRA-2004, Chapter 9.0, Sections 9.2.1 through
17 9.2.8 and found it to be acceptable.

18 **22.5.5 Assessments of Data Quality Characteristics**

19 The CRA-2004 provides information that describes how all data used to support the compliance
20 application have been assessed for accuracy, precision, representativeness, completeness, and
21 comparability.

22 The DOE applies the data quality characteristics to tasks involving the quantification of specific
23 constituents in an environmental medium through sampling and analysis, and applies these data
24 quality characteristics to activities such as the determination of the presence or absence of
25 constituents within TRU waste streams. In these cases, the performance measurement is the
26 concentration of the constituent of interest. Data quality measures are found in the CRA-2004,
27 Chapter 5.0, Section 5.3.22.

28 The EPA found that the CRA-2004 provides information that describes how all data used to
29 support the compliance application have been assessed for their quality characteristics.

30 **22.5.6 Data Qualifications**

31 The CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, Section 5.3.23 provides information on how all data are qualified
32 for use in the demonstration of compliance. This section provides information on how all data
33 used are qualified by using one or more of five methods. Audits were conducted to verify that
34 data not qualified by one of these methods were not used for demonstrating compliance. The
35 EPA found that the CRA-2004 provides information describing how all data used to support the
36 compliance application have been qualified.

1 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
2 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
3 section 194.22.

4 **22.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

5 Changes to the QAPD since the CRA-2004, additions and changes to the CBFO implementing
6 procedures, and an updated list of waste generator sites certified under the QA program are
7 described below.

8 **22.6.1 Changes to QAPD**

9 Revisions to the QAPD identified below are a summary of changes as noted in the revision
10 history. The detailed changes are incorporated within the document.

11 In October 2004, Rev. 6 of the QAPD implemented the restructured CBFO organization.

12 In July 2005, changes implemented in Rev. 7 of the QAPD were the direct result of the DOE
13 Headquarters (DOE EM 3-2) comments relative to compliance with the DOE Order (DOE O
14 414.1B).

15 The changes implemented in Rev. 8 of the QAPD, effective November 2006, were made to
16 address 13 minor findings and 1 concern from an EPA inspection of the CBFO QA program.
17 Document citations were added to include remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-TRU)
18 waste packaging. The exemption of National Environmental Policy Act–related software from
19 the requirements of the QAPD was deleted. The applicability of software QA to safety software
20 was clarified. Editorial changes related to the June 26, 2006, reorganization of the CBFO were
21 also incorporated.

22 In December 2007, Rev. 9 of the QAPD clarified that reliance on administrative controls alone is
23 not sufficient for differentiating between waste that is acceptable for shipment to the WIPP and
24 waste that does not meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria. The classification of conditions
25 adverse to quality related to the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit was also clarified. The
26 language regarding reporting nonconformances was revised to comply with the November 16,
27 2006, Permit Modification. The requirements for records disposition were revised to comply
28 with the Class 1 Permit Modification that took effect on September 13, 2007.

29 **22.6.2 Changes to CBFO/DOE Procedures**

30 The following CBFO procedures have been added since the CRA-2004:

- 31 • MP 3.2, “Trend Identification and Reporting” (changed from a Team Procedure to an MP)
- 32 • MP 3.4, “CBFO Manager Actions upon Notification of Potential Noncompliant Waste
33 Identified During the Waste Confirmation Process”
- 34 • TP 3.3, “Protocol for CBFO Observers at Baseline Inspections”

- 1 • MP 4.11, “Safety Basis Review Procedure”
- 2 • MP 4.12, “National Environmental Policy Act Compliance”
- 3 • MP 4.14, “Review of Acceptable Knowledge Sufficiency Determination Requests”
- 4 • MP 5.4, “Orders Compliance Program Implementation”

5 The following procedure has been inactivated:

- 6 • MP 2.1, “Personnel Qualification and Training”

7 **22.6.3 Updated List of Waste Generator Sites Certified under the QA** 8 **Program**

9 The contact-handled TRU waste generator sites currently certified under the QA program
10 include:

- 11 • LANL/Central Characterization Project (CCP)
- 12 • Hanford
- 13 • Idaho National Laboratory (INL)/Central Characterization Project
- 14 • Savannah River Site (SRS)/CCP
- 15 • Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project
- 16 • Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)/Central Characterization Project

17 Since the CRA-2004, two RH-TRU waste generator sites, INL/CCP and ANL/CCP, have been
18 certified (see Section 8, Approval Process of Waste Shipment from Waste Generator Sites for
19 Disposal at the WIPP). There have also been three peer reviews since the CRA-2004 (see
20 Section 27, Peer Review). A listing of audits and surveillances performed by CBFO can be
21 found in Appendix AUD-2009.

22 The following CBFO procedures were revised since the CRA-2004:

- 23 • MP 1.2, “Selection of Quality Levels”
- 24 • MP 3.1, “Corrective Action Reports”
- 25 • MP 4.1, “Preparation and Maintenance of CBFO Procedures”
- 26 • MP 4.2, “Document Review”
- 27 • MP 4.4, “Document Preparation and Control”

- 1 • MP 4.10, “Processing of TRU Waste Site Documents”
- 2 • MP 5.2, “TRU Waste Site Certification/Recertification”
- 3 • MP 7.1, “QA Requirements for Procurement of Services”
- 4 • MP 9.1, “Management Assessments”
- 5 • TP 10.1, “Qualification of Audit Personnel and Certification of Lead Auditors”
- 6 • MP 10.2, “Surveillances”
- 7 • MP 10.3, “Audits”
- 8 • MP 10.5, “Peer Review”
- 9 • TP 10.7, “Operational Assessments”

10 The changes identified to the QAPD and its implementing procedures since the CRA-2004
11 represent normal evolution and improvement in the DOE QA program. The current WIPP QA
12 program is effectively managed and maintained as demonstrated by the CBFO audit and
13 surveillance program (see Appendix AUD-2009), and meets the provisions of section 194.22.

14 **22.7 References**

15 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
16 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
17 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

18 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
19 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
20 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

21 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005. *Management Procedure: Peer Review* (Rev. 6,
22 Effective July 25, 2005 to July 25, 2007). CBFO MP 10.5. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field
23 Office.

24 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
25 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
26 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
27 1998): 27353–406.

28 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
29 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
30 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision” (Final Notice). *Federal Register*, vol. 71
31 (April 10, 2006): 18010–021.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. "Recertification CARD No. 22: Quality
2 Assurance." *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification
3 and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191
4 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 22-1 through 22-17).
5 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 6 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 1988. *Peer Review for High-Level Nuclear
7 Waste Repositories: Generic Technical Position*. NUREG-1297. Washington, DC: U.S.
8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Models and Computer Codes
(40 CFR § 194.23)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Models and Computer Codes
(40 CFR § 194.23)

Table of Contents

23.0 Models and Computer Codes (40 CFR § 194.23) 23-1

23.1 Requirements 23-1

23.2 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(1)..... 23-1

 23.2.1 Background..... 23-1

 23.2.2 1998 Certification Decision..... 23-2

 23.2.3 Changes in the CRA-2004..... 23-3

 23.2.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 23-5

 23.2.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification..... 23-6

23.3 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(2)..... 23-8

 23.3.1 Background..... 23-8

 23.3.2 1998 Certification Decision..... 23-8

 23.3.3 Changes in the CRA-2004..... 23-9

 23.3.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 23-9

 23.3.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification..... 23-10

23.4 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(3)..... 23-10

 23.4.1 Background..... 23-10

 23.4.2 1998 Certification Decision..... 23-11

 23.4.3 Changes in the CRA-2004..... 23-11

 23.4.3.1 Documentation..... 23-11

 23.4.3.2 Conceptual Models..... 23-13

 23.4.3.3 Mathematical Models..... 23-13

 23.4.3.4 Numerical Models..... 23-13

 23.4.3.5 Computer Models..... 23-14

 23.4.3.6 Peer Review..... 23-15

 23.4.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 23-16

 23.4.4.1 Conceptual Models..... 23-16

 23.4.4.2 Mathematical Models..... 23-16

 23.4.4.3 Numerical Models..... 23-16

 23.4.4.4 Computer Models..... 23-17

 23.4.4.5 Peer Review..... 23-17

 23.4.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification..... 23-18

 23.4.5.1 Conceptual Models..... 23-18

 23.4.5.2 Mathematical Models..... 23-18

 23.4.5.3 Numerical Models..... 23-19

 23.4.5.4 Computer Models..... 23-19

 23.4.5.5 Peer Review..... 23-19

23.5 40 CFR § 194.23(b)..... 23-19

 23.5.1 Background..... 23-19

 23.5.2 1998 Certification Decision..... 23-20

 23.5.3 Changes in the CRA-2004..... 23-20

 23.5.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 23-20

 23.5.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification..... 23-20

23.6 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(1)..... 23-21

 23.6.1 Background..... 23-21

 23.6.2 1998 Certification Decision..... 23-21

23.6.3 Changes in the CRA-2004	23-21
23.6.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification	23-21
23.6.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification	23-22
23.7 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(2)	23-22
23.7.1 Background	23-22
23.7.2 1998 Certification Decision	23-23
23.7.3 Changes in the CRA-2004	23-23
23.7.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification	23-23
23.7.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification	23-24
23.8 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(3)	23-24
23.8.1 Background	23-24
23.8.2 1998 Certification Decision	23-24
23.8.3 Changes in the CRA-2004	23-25
23.8.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification	23-25
23.8.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification	23-25
23.9 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(4)	23-25
23.9.1 Background	23-25
23.9.2 1998 Certification Decision	23-25
23.9.3 Changes in the CRA-2004	23-26
23.9.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification	23-27
23.9.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification	23-29
23.10 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(5)	23-29
23.10.1 Background	23-29
23.10.2 1998 Certification Decision	23-29
23.10.3 Changes in the CRA-2004	23-29
23.10.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification	23-30
23.10.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification	23-30
23.11 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(6)	23-30
23.11.1 Background	23-30
23.11.2 1998 Certification Decision	23-30
23.11.3 Changes in the CRA-2004	23-30
23.11.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification	23-31
23.11.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification	23-31
23.12 40 CFR § 194.23(d)	23-31
23.12.1 Background	23-31
23.12.2 1998 Certification Decision	23-31
23.12.3 Changes in the CRA-2004	23-32
23.12.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification	23-32
23.12.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification	23-32
23.13 References	23-32

List of Tables

Table 23-1. WIPP Conceptual Models	23-2
Table 23-2. FEPs Change Summary in the CRA-2004	23-4
Table 23-3. FEPs Change Summary Since CRA-2004	23-7

Table 23-4. APs for the CRA-2009 PA 23-18
Table 23-5. Location of Documentation for Models and Computer Codes Used in PA 23-24
Table 23-6. Location of Required Information on Parameters Used in Codes for PA 23-28

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AP	Analysis Packages
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DD	Design Document
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DRP	Data Records Packages
DRZ	Disturbed Rock Zone
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEP	features, events, and process
IB	Inside Boundary
ID	Implementation Document
LHS	Latin Hypercube Sampling
NQA	Nuclear Quality Assurance
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OB	Outside Boundary
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
PEF	Parameter Entry Form
PIRP	Principal Investigator Records Package
QA	quality assurance
QAP	Quality Assurance Procedure
QAPD	Quality Assurance Program Document
RD	Requirements Document
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
UM	User's Manual
VD	Validation Document
VVP	Verification and Validation Plan
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **23.0 Models and Computer Codes (40 CFR § 194.23)**

2 **23.1 Requirements**

§ 194.23 Models and Computer Codes

(a) Any compliance application shall include:

(1) A description of the conceptual models and scenario construction used to support any compliance application.

(2) A description of plausible, alternative conceptual model(s) seriously considered but not used to support such application, and an explanation of the reason(s) why such model(s) was not deemed to accurately portray performance of the disposal system.

(3) Documentation that:

(i) Conceptual models and scenarios reasonably represent possible future states of the disposal system.

(ii) Mathematical models incorporate equations and boundary conditions which reasonably represent the mathematical formulation of the conceptual models.

(iii) Numerical models provide numerical schemes which enable the mathematical models to obtain stable solutions.

(iv) Computer models accurately implement the numerical models; i.e., computer codes are free of coding errors and produce stable solutions.

(v) Conceptual models have undergone peer review according to §194.27.

(b) Computer codes used to support any compliance application shall be documented in a manner that complies with the requirements of ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda, part 2.7, to ASME NQA-2-1989 edition.

(c) Documentation of all models and computer codes included as part of a compliance application performance assessment calculation shall be provided. Such documentation shall include, but shall not be limited to:

(1) Descriptions of the theoretical backgrounds of each model and the method of analysis or assessment.

(2) General descriptions of the models; discussions of the limits of applicability of each model; detailed instructions for executing the computer codes, including hardware and software requirements, input and output formats with explanations of each input and output variable and parameter (e.g., parameter name and units); listing of input and output files from a sample computer run; and reports on code verification, bench marking, validation, and quality assurance procedures.

(3) Detailed descriptions of the structure of the computer codes and complete listings of the source codes.

(4) Detailed descriptions of data collection procedures, data reduction and analysis, and code input parameter development.

(5) Any necessary licenses;

(6) An explanation of the manner in which models and computer codes incorporate the effects of parameter correlation.

(d) The Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative may verify the results of computer simulations used to support any compliance application by performing independent simulations. Data files, source codes, executable versions of computer software for each model, other material or information needed to permit the Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative to perform independent simulations, and to access necessary hardware to perform such simulations, shall be provided within 30 calendar days of a request by the Administrator or the Administrator's authorized representative.

3

4 **23.2 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(1)**

5 **23.2.1 Background**

6 The criteria in 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(1) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) requires
7 descriptions of the conceptual models and scenario construction used to demonstrate compliance.

1 **23.2.2 1998 Certification Decision**

2 To meet the requirements for section 194.23(a)(1), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
 3 (EPA) expected the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to include a complete, clear, and logical
 4 description of each conceptual model used to demonstrate compliance in the application.
 5 Documentation of the conceptual models was expected to discuss site characteristics and
 6 processes active at the site (e.g., gas generation or creep closure of the Salado salt formation).
 7 The conceptual models were to consider both natural and engineered barriers. The DOE
 8 developed 24 conceptual models to describe the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) disposal
 9 system.

10 For the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), the
 11 EPA reviewed each of the 24 conceptual models included in the CCA (Table 23-1), using
 12
 13

Table 23-1. WIPP Conceptual Models

Conceptual Model	Component
1 Disposal System Geometry^a	Salado F/T
2 Culebra Hydrogeology	Non-Salado F/T
3 Repository Fluid Flow	Salado F/T
4 Salado	Salado F/T
5 Impure Halite	Salado F/T
6 Salado Interbeds	Salado F/T
7 DRZ	Salado F/T
8 Actinide Transport in the Salado	Salado F/T
9 Units Above the Salado	Non-Salado F/T
10 Transport of Dissolved Actinides in the Culebra	Non-Salado F/T
11 Transport of Colloidal Actinides in the Culebra	Non-Salado F/T
12 Exploration Boreholes	Human Intrusion
13 Cuttings and Cavings	Human Intrusion
14 Spallings	Human Intrusion
15 Direct Brine Release	Human Intrusion
16 Castile and Brine Reservoir	Human Intrusion
17 Multiple Intrusions	Human Intrusion
18 Climate Change	Non-Salado F/T
19 Creep Disposal	Salado F/T
20 Shafts and Shaft Seals	Salado F/T
21 Gas Generation	Salado F/T
22 Chemical Conditions	Salado F/T
23 Dissolved Actinide Source Term	Salado F/T
24 Colloidal Actinide Source Term	Salado F/T

^a Entries in bold were modified and peer reviewed for the CRA-2004 PA.

1 information contained in the CCA, supplementary peer review panel reports, and supplementary
2 information provided to the EPA by the DOE in response to specific EPA comments. Upon the
3 conclusion of the conceptual model peer review, the panel states, “With the exception of the
4 Spallings Model presented in the CCA, which the Panel continues to find inadequate, all
5 remaining conceptual models have been determined to be adequate and all significant issues
6 regarding their adequacy have been resolved” and “Although further refinement in understanding
7 and predictive capability for spallings events would be desirable as part of a new conceptual
8 model, the Panel has determined that the additional information presented by the DOE is
9 sufficiently complete at this time to support a conclusion that the spallings volumes used in the
10 CCA are reasonable, and may actually overestimate the actual waste volumes that would be
11 expected to be released by the spallings process at the WIPP” (Compliance Recertification
12 Application of 2004 [CRA-2004] [U.S. Department of Energy 2004], Appendix PEER-2004,
13 Section PEER-2004 1.1.5, Section 4.0). The EPA agreed with the peer review panel that all
14 models, with the exception of spallings, were considered adequate to represent future states of
15 the repository. In the case of the spallings model, the EPA considered the results adequate,
16 because the DOE showed in its additional spallings modeling that the release of solid waste
17 predicted by the PA spallings model overestimated releases by a factor of 10 or more (Sandia
18 National Laboratories and Carlsbad Area Office Technical Assistance Contractor 1997).

19 The EPA determined that the CCA and supporting documentation contained a complete and
20 accurate description of each conceptual model and the scenario construction methods used in
21 performance assessment (PA). The scenario construction descriptions included sufficient detail
22 to understand the basis for selecting some scenarios and rejecting others, and were adequate for
23 use in the CCA PA calculations. The EPA found the DOE to be in compliance with the
24 requirements of section 194.23(a)(1) (Compliance Application Review Document [CARD] 23,
25 Section 1.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

26 A complete description of the EPA’s 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(a)(1) can be
27 obtained from CARD 23, Section 1.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

28 **23.2.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

29 For the CRA-2004, the DOE undertook an extensive screening process to determine which
30 features, events, and processes (FEPs) were still applicable to the disposal system and which
31 changes were appropriate for the CRA-2004. The DOE’s scenario construction methods have
32 not changed since the CCA. The DOE constructed two basic scenarios: undisturbed performance
33 and disturbed performance, which include drilling and mining events. As part of this scenario
34 development, the DOE selected FEPs that were relevant. FEPs judged to be significant were
35 included in the 24 conceptual models of the CCA and the CRA-2004.

36 The CCA FEPs were reassessed to determine if the screening justifications remained valid in
37 light of changes within the WIPP project. Although minor changes were made to the FEPs, the
38 results of the reassessment did not impact the original conceptual models or scenarios (CRA-
39 2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SCR and Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.6). In the CRA-2004,
40 Appendix PA, Attachment SCR-1.0, the DOE summarized the results of the CRA-2004 FEPs
41 reevaluation. Of the original 237 CCA FEPs, 106 had not changed in the CRA-2004, and 120
42 FEPs required minor updates to their descriptions and/or screening arguments (CRA-2004,

1 Appendix PA, Attachment SCR, Table SCR-2). The screening decisions for seven of the
 2 original baseline FEPs were changed, four FEPs had been deleted or combined with other related
 3 FEPs, and two new FEPs had been added to the list (see Table 23-2 for a summary of these
 4 changes).

5 **Table 23-2. FEPs Change Summary in the CRA-2004^a**

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Summary of Change
FEPs Combined with other FEPs		
N17	Lateral Dissolution	Combined with N16, Shallow Dissolution. N17 removed from baseline.
N19	Solution Chimneys	Combined with N20, Breccia Pipes. N19 removed from baseline.
H33	Flow Through Undetected Boreholes	Combined with H31, Natural Borehole Fluid Flow. H33 removed from baseline.
W38	Investigation Boreholes	Addressed in H31, Natural Borehole Fluid Flow, and H33, Flow Through Undetected Boreholes. W38 removed from baseline.
FEPs with Changed Screening Decisions		
W50	Galvanic Coupling	Screened-out probability to screened-out consequence
W68	Organic Complexation	Screened-out consequence to undisturbed performance
W69	Organic Ligands	Screened-out consequence to undisturbed performance
H27	Liquid Waste Disposal	Screened-out regulatory to screened-out consequence
H28	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production	Screened-out regulatory to screened-out consequence
H29	Hydrocarbon Storage	Screened-out regulatory to screened-out consequence
H41	Surface Disruptions	Screened-out consequence to undisturbed performance
New FEPs for the CRA-2004		
H58	Solution Mining for Potash	Separated from H13, Potash Mining
H59	Solution Mining for Other Resources	Separated from H13, Potash Mining

^a From the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SCR, Table SCR-1.

6
 7 The CRA-2004 maintained 24 conceptual models to describe the WIPP disposal systems. The
 8 DOE did, however, modify three conceptual models related to the Salado Formation modeling:
 9 Disposal System Geometry, Repository Fluid Flow, and the Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ).
 10 Furthermore, the DOE developed a new spallings model for the CRA-2004. The 24 conceptual
 11 models included in the CCA and the CRA-2004 are listed in Table 23-1; the four changed
 12 models are noted in bold type. The components in this table refer to broad groupings of the
 13 conceptual models for those models related to human intrusion, flow and transport within the
 14 Salado Formation (Salado F/T), and flow and transport in hydrostratigraphic units other than the
 15 Salado (Non-Salado F/T).

1 **23.2.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

2 The EPA's review of the CRA-2004 for compliance with section 194.23(a)(1) focused on
3 changes to FEPs, conceptual models, scenarios, or models since the 1998 Certification Decision
4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b). The CCA and CRA-2004 scenario construction
5 process had not changed and was based on screening decisions using a comprehensive list of
6 FEPs developed for the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (also known as SKI), and other
7 WIPP-specific FEPs developed by the DOE (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1, and
8 the CCA, Chapter 6.0). The DOE's methods for addressing conceptual model development and
9 scenario construction had not changed since the CCA, and consisted primarily of identifying and
10 screening processes and events and combining them into scenarios. The EPA reviewed each of
11 the steps used in this process during its evaluation and review of changes since the CCA. The
12 EPA reviewed the DOE's FEPs reevaluation and found the documentation to be adequate and the
13 reasons for changes to the FEPs reasonable (see Section 4.0 in U.S. Environmental Protection
14 Agency 2006a).

15 During the CRA-2004 evaluation, the EPA paid particular attention to any FEP changes
16 concerning human intrusion scenarios related to mining and oil and gas drilling, such as fluid
17 injection and air drilling. The review is documented in *Technical Support Document for Sections*
18 *194.32 and 33: Compliance Recertification Application Re-evaluation of Selected Human*
19 *Intrusion Activities* (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006b). As noted in this document,
20 some parameters, such as drilling rate and other drilling-related values were updated since the
21 CCA as a result of continued activities in the Delaware Basin. The parameter changes did not
22 have a detrimental impact on the compliance determination, as exhibited by the results of the
23 subsequent PA, the CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (PABC) (see U.S.
24 Environmental Protection Agency 2006c, Section 11.3). Drilling practices, such as injection
25 techniques and air drilling, and mining activities have not significantly changed since the CCA.
26 Therefore, the EPA did not believe that the original conclusions during the CCA needed to be
27 modified for the CRA-2004.

28 In the EPA's August 2002 Guidance Letter (Marcinowski 2002), the EPA instructed the DOE to
29 develop a new spallings model for the CRA-2004 PA. The new spallings model (CRA-2004,
30 Appendix PA, Attachment MASS-2004, Section 16.1.3) included three major elements:
31 consideration of multiphase flow processes in the intrusion borehole, consideration of
32 fluidization and transport of waste particulates from the intact waste mass to the intrusion
33 borehole, and a numerical solution for the coupled mechanical and hydrological response of the
34 waste as a porous medium. The new spallings model was peer reviewed in 2003 and found to be
35 adequate (CRA-2004, Chapter 9.0, Section 9.3.1.3.5 and CRA-2004, Appendix PEER-2004,
36 Section PEER-2004 3.0). The EPA found the spallings model peer review to be adequate (U.S.
37 Environmental Protection Agency 2006d, Section 5.0) and the new spallings model to be
38 appropriate for use in the WIPP PA (see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c, Section
39 10.3.1).

40 The DOE modified the Disposal System Geometry, Repository Fluid Flow, and DRZ conceptual
41 models. These models were changed to reflect new information on the Salado and to incorporate
42 the EPA-mandated Option D panel closure design requirements. The DOE modified the
43 BRAGFLO computational grid and the computational grid for the direct brine release

1 calculations to include the Option D panel closure design requirements. The DOE also
2 simplified the shaft in the BRAGFLO grid and refined the BRAGFLO grid. These modified
3 conceptual models were peer reviewed during 2002 to 2003 and found to be adequate (CRA-
4 2004, Chapter 9.0, Section 9.3.1.3.4 and CRA-2004, Appendix PEER-2004, Section PEER-2004
5 2.0). The EPA found the Salado flow peer review to be adequate (see the U.S. Environmental
6 Protection Agency 2006e, Section 5.0). The EPA determined that while these new models better
7 reflected the knowledge of the disposal system, the changes had little impact on the results of the
8 PA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c, Section 12.0).

9 The EPA's review found that the CRA-2004 and supplementary information contained a
10 complete and accurate description of each conceptual model that changed, and that
11 documentation of all conceptual models continued to adequately discuss site characteristics and
12 processes at the site. The EPA determined that the conceptual models continued to adequately
13 represent those characteristics, processes, and attributes of the WIPP disposal system affecting its
14 performance, and that the conceptual models considered both natural and engineered barriers.
15 The EPA found that the DOE considered conceptual models that continued to adequately
16 describe the future characteristics of the disposal system. The conceptual models continued to
17 reasonably describe the expected performance of the disposal system and incorporate reasonable
18 simplifying assumptions of the disposal system's behavior. The EPA found that the
19 modifications to four of the conceptual models were reasonable and the related CRA-2004
20 documentation was complete (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(a)(1)," U.S.
21 Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

22 The EPA concluded that the CRA-2004 continued to contain an adequate description of the
23 scenario construction methods used, and that the scenario construction descriptions include
24 sufficient detail to understand the basis for selecting some scenarios and rejecting others. Based
25 on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by the
26 DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for section
27 194.23(a)(1) (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(a)(1)," U.S. Environmental
28 Protection Agency 2006f).

29 **23.2.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

30 A FEPs reassessment was conducted for the CRA-2009 and the results are documented in
31 Appendix SCR-2009. In Appendix SCR-2009, Section SCR-1.0, the results of the CRA-2009
32 FEPs reevaluation are summarized. Of the 235 FEPs considered for the CRA-2004, 188 have
33 not been changed, 35 have been updated with new information, 10 FEPs have been split into 20
34 similar but more descriptive FEPs, one screening argument has been changed to correct errors
35 discovered during review, and one FEP has had its screening decision changed (Appendix SCR,
36 Table SCR-2). Table 23-3 summarizes the FEPs that have been added, separated or had a
37 screening decision change since the CRA-2004.

38 No changes in the 24 conceptual models or scenario construction methodology resulted from the
39 FEPs reevaluation. Thus, the DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with the provision of
40 section 194.23(a)(1).

Table 23-3. FEPs Change Summary Since CRA-2004^a

EPA FEP I.D. ^{b,c}	FEP Name	Summary of Change
FEPs Clarified to be Less Generic		
H27	Liquid Waste Disposal – Outside Boundary (OB)	Name changed to “Liquid Waste Disposal Boundary – OB” to specify that this FEP pertains to those activities outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H28	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – OB	Name changed to “Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – OB” to specify that this FEP pertains to those activities outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H29	Hydrocarbon Storage – OB	Name changed to “Hydrocarbon Storage – OB” to specify that this FEP pertains to those activities outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
W6	Shaft Seal Geometry	Name changed to be specific to Shaft Seals, rather than generic “seals” which also included panel closures (seals).
W7	Shaft Seal Physical Properties	Name changed to be specific to Shaft Seals, rather than generic “seals” which also included panel closures (seals).
W8	Shaft Seal Chemical Composition	Name changed to be specific to Shaft Seals, rather than generic “seals” which also included panel closures (seals).
W17	Radiological Effects on Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to Shaft Seals, rather than generic “seals” which also included panel closures (seals).
W36	Consolidation of Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to Shaft Seals, rather than generic “seals” which also included panel closures (seals).
W37	Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to Shaft Seals, rather than generic “seals” which also included panel closures (seals).
W74	Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to Shaft Seals, rather than generic “seals” which also included panel closures (seals).
FEPs With Changed Screening Decisions		
H41	Surface Disruptions	Screening changed from screened-out regulatory to screened-out consequence due to inconsistency with screening rationale.
New FEPs for CRA-2009		
H60	Liquid Waste Disposal – Inside Boundary (IB)	New FEP; separated from H27. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on regulatory provisions pertaining to activities within the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H61	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – IB	New FEP; separated from H28. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on regulatory provisions that pertain to activities within the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H62	Hydrocarbon Storage – IB	New FEP; separated from H29. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on regulatory provisions that pertain to activities within the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
W109	Panel Closure Geometry	New FEP; separated from W6. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W110	Panel Closure Physical Properties	New FEP; separated from W7. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.

^a From the Appendix SCR-2009, Table SCR-1.

^b H = Human-induced FEP.

^c W = Waste and Repository-Induced FEP.

Table 23-3. FEPs Change Summary Since CRA-2004^a (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{b,c}	FEP Name	Summary of Change
W111	Panel Closure Chemical Composition	New FEP; separated from W8. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W112	Radiological Effects on Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W17. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W113	Consolidation of Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W36. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W114	Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W37. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W115	Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W74. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.

^a From the Appendix SCR-2009, Table SCR-1.

^b H = Human-induced FEP.

^c W = Waste and Repository-Induced FEP.

1

2 **23.3 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(2)**

3 **23.3.1 Background**

4 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(2) requires a description of those conceptual models that were identified or
5 developed while preparing the compliance application, but were determined not to be appropriate
6 for portraying disposal system performance. It also requires that the reasons for not using these
7 models be explained.

8 **23.3.2 1998 Certification Decision**

9 To meet the requirements of section 194.23(a)(2), the CCA described the plausible alternative
10 conceptual models considered but not used and explained why these models were not used. The
11 description of the rejected alternative models did not need to be as detailed as the description of
12 the models actually used in the CCA. In the CCA, the DOE describes plausible alternative
13 conceptual models considered but not used for PA in the CCA and supplementary information
14 (the CCA, Chapters 2.0, 9.0, and Appendix MASS). The DOE also explains why these
15 alternative models are not used to describe the performance of the repository. The descriptions
16 of the alternative models and justifications for the conceptual model selections are summarized
17 in Dials (1997, Table 1). The EPA reviewed the material on alternative conceptual models and
18 the comments made by the Conceptual Models Peer Review Panel on alternative models. The
19 peer review panel identified no substantive issues regarding alternative models. The EPA found
20 the DOE to be in compliance with the requirements of section 194.23(a)(2) (CARD 23, Section
21 2.4, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

1 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(a)(2) can be
2 obtained from CARD 23, Section 2.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

3 **23.3.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

4 As stated at the time of the CCA, the DOE's position is that the basic elements of the conceptual
5 models used in the CCA have been developed over a number of years, as a result of continuing
6 analysis of alternatives and elimination of those alternative conceptual models found to be
7 unacceptable or inappropriate.

8 For the CRA-2004, the DOE describes the conceptual models used to evaluate the WIPP's
9 performance in the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0; Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4; and Chapter 9.0, Section
10 9.3.1. The DOE changed four conceptual models since the CCA. The DOE developed a new
11 spillings model for the CRA-2004 and made minor changes to three other conceptual models:
12 the Disposal System Geometry, Repository Fluid Flow, and DRZ models. These changes can be
13 considered alternative models, as described by section 194.23(a)(2). All of these models were
14 peer reviewed as required by 40 CFR § 194.27. The Conceptual Models Peer Review Panel's
15 consideration of alternative conceptual models for the four changed conceptual models is
16 described in the CRA-2004, Appendix PEER-2004, Sections PEER-2004 2.0 and PEER-2004
17 3.0.

18 **23.3.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

19 The EPA reviewed the CRA-2004 documentation listed above and reevaluated the CCA
20 documentation. The EPA reviewed all aspects of the DOE's work related to alternative
21 conceptual models to confirm that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements of
22 section 194.23(a)(2) (CARD 23, Section "Evaluation of Compliance for Recertification
23 194.23(a)(2)," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

24 As part of the EPA's alternative model review, the EPA examined the CRA-2004 documentation
25 to determine if any other models had changed or if any new alternative models had been
26 developed since the CCA. The EPA also reexamined the CCA for alternative conceptual models
27 seriously considered in the CCA, as summarized by Dials (1997, Table 1), to determine if any of
28 the DOE's original approach or justification had changed since the original certification. Based
29 on this review, the EPA determined that all alternative models had been appropriately considered
30 by the DOE and that the DOE continued to be in compliance with the requirements of section
31 194.23(a)(2) (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(a)(2)," U.S. Environmental
32 Protection Agency 2006f).

33 Members of the public suggested that karst formation and processes may be a possible
34 alternative conceptual model for flow in the Rustler. Karst may be thought of as voids in near-
35 surface or subsurface rock created by water flowing when rock is dissolved. Public comments
36 stated that karst could develop interconnected "underground rivers" that may enhance the release
37 of radioactive materials from the WIPP. Because of this comment, the EPA required the DOE to
38 perform a thorough reexamination of all historical data, information, and reports, both those by
39 the DOE and others, to determine if karst features or development had been missed during
40 previous work done at the WIPP. The DOE's findings are summarized in Lorenz (2006). The

1 EPA also conducted a thorough reevaluation of karst and of the work done during the CCA (U.S.
2 Environmental Protection Agency 2006g). The reevaluation of historical evidence and recent
3 work by the DOE did not show even the remotest possibility of an “underground river” near
4 WIPP, nor did it change the CCA conclusions. Therefore, the EPA believed karst was not a
5 viable alternative model at the WIPP. For a more complete discussion of the reevaluation of
6 karst, see CARD 14/15 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006h) and Lorenz (2006).

7 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
8 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements of
9 section 194.23(a)(2) (CARD 23, Section “Recertification Decision 194.23(a)(2),” U.S.
10 Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

11 **23.3.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

12 The 24 conceptual models have not changed since the CRA-2004 decision in March 2006. As
13 part of DOE’s continuous evaluation of alternative conceptual models, the DOE proposed in
14 2007 modifications that would affect two of the existing conceptual models, cuttings and cavings
15 and DRZ (Vugrin and Nemer 2007). It was determined that since these proposed modifications
16 would impact the conceptual models, an independent technical peer review on the adequacy of
17 the proposed changes to the approved conceptual models should be performed in accordance
18 with the requirements of section 194.27. Before the peer review was completed, the DOE
19 decided in October 2007 to postpone the consideration of the proposed modifications (see
20 Section 27.7.3). The DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with the provision of section
21 194.23(a)(2).

22 **23.4 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(3)**

23 **23.4.1 Background**

24 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(3) includes provisions to ensure documentation of the basis for conceptual
25 models used in compliance applications. Specific requirements are for documentation that

- 26 1. Conceptual models and scenarios reasonably represent possible future states of the disposal
27 system.
- 28 2. The equations and boundary conditions in a model reasonably represent the mathematical
29 basis of the conceptual model.
- 30 3. Numerical schemes enable the mathematical models to obtain stable solutions.
- 31 4. Computer models implement the numerical models, have no coding errors, and produce
32 stable solutions.
- 33 5. Peer review has been conducted on the conceptual models.

1 **23.4.2 1998 Certification Decision**

2 For the CCA, the DOE convened a Conceptual Models Peer Review Panel to review the 24
 3 conceptual models used in PA (see Section 23.2.2). The EPA concurred with the panel’s findings
 4 and found the DOE in compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR §§ 194.23(a)(3)(i) and
 5 194.23(a)(3)(v).

6 During the CCA, the EPA performed an independent review of the computer codes, focusing on
 7 (1) whether mathematical models incorporated equations and boundary conditions that
 8 reasonably represented the mathematical formulation of the conceptual models reviewed under
 9 section 194.23(a)(1); (2) whether the numerical models provided numerical schemes that enabled
 10 the mathematical models to obtain stable solutions; and (3) whether the computer codes were
 11 properly implemented.

12 The EPA independently reviewed the mathematical models and boundary conditions for the
 13 following codes: CUTTINGS_S, SECOFL2D, SECOTP2D, CCDFGF, PANEL, BRAGFLO,
 14 NUTS, FMT, SANTOS, and GRASP-INV. The codes that used numerical solvers included
 15 CUTTINGS_S, SECOFL2D, SECOTP2D, PANEL, BRAGFLO, NUTS, and SANTOS. The
 16 EPA concluded that the mathematical models incorporated equations that reasonably represented
 17 the conceptual models.

18 A complete description of the EPA’s 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(a)(3) can be
 19 obtained from CARD 23, Sections 4.4, 5.4, 6.4, and 7.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
 20 1998a).

21 **23.4.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

22 **23.4.3.1 Documentation**

23 A description of the code documentation is given here for completeness and to aid in further
 24 discussion.

- 25 • User’s Manual (UM)—describes the code’s purpose and function, mathematical governing
 26 equations, model assumptions, the user’s interaction with the code, and the models and
 27 methods employed by the code. The UM includes:
 - 28 – The numerical solution strategy and computational sequence, including program
 29 flowcharts and block diagrams.
 - 30 – The relationship between the numerical strategy and the mathematical strategy (e.g., how
 31 boundary or initial conditions are introduced).
 - 32 – A clear explanation of model derivation. The derivation starts from generally accepted
 33 principles and scientifically proven theories. The UM justifies each step in the derivation
 34 and notes the introduction of assumptions and limitations. For empirical and semi-
 35 empirical models, the documentation describes how experimental data are used to arrive

- 1 at the final form of the models. The UM clearly states the final mathematical form of the
 2 model and its application in the computer code.
- 3 – Descriptions of any numerical method used in the model that go beyond simple algebra
 4 (e.g., finite-difference, Simpson’s rule, cubic splines, Newton-Raphson Methods, and
 5 Jacobian Methods). The UM explains the implementation of these methods in the
 6 computer code in sufficient detail that an independent reviewer can understand them.
 - 7 – The derivation of the numerical procedure from the mathematical component model. The
 8 UM gives references for all numerical methods. It explains the final form of the
 9 numerical model and its algorithms. If the numerical model produces only an
 10 intermediate result, such as terms in a large set of linear equations that are later solved by
 11 another numerical model, then the UM explains how the model uses intermediate results.
 12 The documentation also indicates those variables that are input to and output from the
 13 component model.
 - 14 • Analysis Packages (APs)—contain detailed information on how the computer codes were
 15 used in the PA, including code implementation approaches and justification of parameters
 16 used. The DOE required each code to supply the following information relevant to 40 CFR §
 17 194.23(c)(1) in its APs:
 - 18 – Description of the overall nature and purpose of the general analysis performed by the
 19 model. The APs describe the specific aspects of the analysis for which the model is used.
 20 The documentation shows input and output parameters of the model. The APs discuss
 21 the input and output parameters for each model.
 - 22 – The modeling information describing the components (e.g., unsaturated vs. saturated) and
 23 their role in the overall modeling effort. The APs identify the contribution of each
 24 component model to the complete solution of the problem and the linkages between the
 25 component models. The documentation uses flowcharts and block diagrams to describe
 26 the mathematical solution strategy for the PA.
- 27 The DOE continued to use five additional documents as secondary references for the CRA-2004:
- 28 • Requirements Document (RD)—identifies the computational requirements of the code (e.g.,
 29 MODFLOW must be able to simulate groundwater flow under steady-state conditions)
 - 30 • Verification and Validation Plan (VVP)—identifies tests and associated acceptance criteria
 31 for the code and validation that all aspects of the code work properly together.
 - 32 • Design Document (DD)—describes the major features of the software design: the theoretical
 33 basis; the embodied mathematical model; control flow; control logic; data structures;
 34 functionalities and interfaces of objects; components, functions, and subroutines used in the
 35 software; and the allowed or prescribed ranges for data inputs and outputs in a manner that
 36 can be implemented.

- 1 • Implementation Document (ID)—provides the information necessary to recreate the code
2 used in the PAs. Using this information, the computer user can reconstruct the code or install
3 it on an identical platform to that used in the PAs. The document includes the source code
4 listing, subroutine-call hierarchy, and code compilation information.

- 5 • Validation Document (VD)—summarizes the results of the testing activities prescribed in the
6 RD/VVP documents for the individual codes and provides evaluations based on those results.
7 The VD contains listings of sample input and output files from computer runs of each model.
8 The VD also contains reports on code verification, bench marking, and validation, and
9 documents the results of the quality assurance procedures (QAPs).

10 **23.4.3.2 Conceptual Models**

11 Analogous to the original certification, all modified conceptual models used in the WIPP PA
12 were reviewed by conceptual model peer review panels. The peer review panels considered
13 whether a conceptual model represents possible future states of the disposal system. For each of
14 the four changed conceptual models in the CRA-2004 PA (see Section 23.2.3), the peer review
15 panels approved the conceptual models considered (see CRA-2004, Appendix PEER-2004;
16 Sections PEER-2004 2.0 and PEER-2004 3.0).

17 **23.4.3.3 Mathematical Models**

18 In the CRA-2004, the DOE consolidated computer code documentation of mathematical models
19 and initial and boundary conditions, primarily in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Section PA-4.0.
20 The DOE also discussed specific topics in CRA-2004, Appendix PA, and Attachments
21 PORSURF, MASS, SOTERM, and TFIELD. The DOE documented each code's characteristics
22 in the UM and the other documents listed in Section 23.4.3.1.

23 The mathematical models or initial or boundary conditions for the following codes did not
24 change after the CCA: SANTOS, BRAGFLO, FMT, NUTS, PANEL, and SECOTP2D. The
25 cuttings and cavings mathematical models in CUTTINGS_S were not changed, but the spillings
26 mathematical models were replaced by the new DRSPALL code. Three new codes were
27 included in the EPA's review for the CRA-2004: MODFLOW, PEST, and DRSPALL. See U.S.
28 Environmental Protection Agency (2006i, 2006j) for more information on the code review
29 conducted for the CRA-2004.

30 **23.4.3.4 Numerical Models**

31 Information used to evaluate the stability of the numerical schemes was provided in the VDs and
32 APs that the DOE prepared for each of the CRA-2004 PA computer codes. The DOE's
33 evaluation of numerical schemes to ensure the stability of the numerical solutions included an
34 evaluation of the impact on previous analyses and any appropriate corrective actions to either the
35 computer code or the earlier analyses. Errors that qualified as a condition adverse to quality,
36 such as computer code stability problems, were controlled and resolved as described in the CRA-
37 2004, Chapter 5.0, Section 5.3.20.

1 The DOE maintains a record of whether any of the codes experienced stability problems during
2 the PA calculations. This record is documented in the output for each code and notes the
3 convergence criteria and the number of numerical iterations required to reach convergence.
4 Convergence criteria, and the maximum number of iterations allowed to achieve convergence,
5 are set within various subroutines in the computer codes where appropriate. Although the DOE
6 did not specify strict requirements for the convergence criteria, if the criteria are too lenient, the
7 results will indicate potentially unstable solutions to the numerical model's numerical schemes.
8 The code generates messages if the mathematical solution algorithm does not converge within
9 the user-specified criteria (see the UM for each computer code). Problems are documented in
10 each code's AP.

11 **23.4.3.5 Computer Models**

12 As in the CCA, to ensure that the DOE's computer codes accurately implement the numerical
13 models and are free of coding errors, a number of QAPs were adopted (see the CRA-2004,
14 Chapter 5.0). The QAPs specify quality assurance (QA) requirements for each step of the
15 software development process (see CARD 22, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006k, for
16 a discussion of EPA's review of the DOE's QA program). This process involved four primary
17 development phases: (1) requirements, (2) design, (3) implementation, and (4) verification and
18 validation (CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, Section 5.3.20 and Appendix QAPD, Section 6.0). The
19 objective of each phase is discussed below.

20 The requirements phase consists of defining and documenting both the functional requirements
21 that the software must meet and the verification and validation activities that must be performed
22 to demonstrate that the computational requirements for the software are met. Two documents
23 are produced during this phase: the RD and the VVP, which, when combined, are called
24 RD/VVP. The RD contains the functional requirements that the proposed software must satisfy,
25 with specific requirements relating to the aspects of the system to be simulated with a particular
26 computer code. For example, groundwater flow through the Culebra Dolomite Member of the
27 Rustler (hereafter referred to as Culebra) is assumed to be steady through time. Therefore,
28 MODFLOW was required to demonstrate that the flow equation provided accurate solutions over
29 time under steady-state conditions. The VVP identifies tests and associated acceptance criteria
30 to ensure verification of each software development phase (i.e., that the portion of the code being
31 tested matches known solutions) and validation of the entire software baseline the first time the
32 computer code is placed under QA control (i.e., that all aspects of the code work together
33 properly). The RD documents what the PA computer codes do by listing the functional
34 requirements of each computer code. The VVP explains the various tests needed to show that
35 the computer code properly performed the functional requirements listed in the RD.

36 The design phase consists of developing and documenting the overall structure of the software
37 and the reduction of the overall software structure into descriptions of how the code works.
38 During this phase, the software structural design may necessitate modifying the RD and VVP.
39 The DD describes the theoretical model, the mathematical model, and the major components of
40 the software.

41 The implementation phase consists of developing source code using a programming language
42 (e.g., FORTRAN) or other form suitable for compilation or translation into executable computer

1 software. The design, as described in the DD, is used as the basis for the software development,
2 and it may need to be modified to reflect changes identified in the implementation phase. Two
3 documents are produced during this phase: the ID and the UM. The ID provides the source code
4 listing and describes the process performed to generate executable software, and the UM
5 provides information that assists the user in understanding and using the code.

6 The verification and validation phase consists of executing the functional test cases identified in
7 the VVP to demonstrate that the developed software meets the requirements defined for it in the
8 VVP. The tests demonstrate the capability of the software to produce valid results for problems
9 encompassing the range of permitted usage as defined by the UM. One document, the VD, is
10 produced during this phase. The VD documents the test case input and output files and evaluates
11 the results against the acceptance criteria in the VVP.

12 In the CCA, the DOE used these procedures and documents to show that the PA computer codes
13 calculated numerical models properly, were free of coding errors, and produced stable results.
14 The DOE used the same process and requirements for the CRA-2004 PA computer codes.

15 **23.4.3.6 Peer Review**

16 The DOE performed two peer reviews to support the CRA-2004 PA calculations. These peer
17 reviews evaluated the new spillings model and the minor changes made to the Disposal System
18 Geometry, Repository Fluid Flow, and DRZ conceptual models.

19 The Spallings Model Peer Review was performed from July 2003 to October 2003; the final
20 report was published in October 2003 (CRA-2004, Appendix PEER-2004, Section PEER-2004-
21 3.1.2). The new spillings model includes three major elements: consideration of multiphase
22 flow processes in the intrusion borehole, consideration of fluidization and transport of waste
23 particulates from the intact waste mass to the borehole, and a numerical solution for the coupled
24 mechanical and hydrological response of the waste as a porous medium. The DOE developed a
25 new numerical code, DRSPALL, to implement the new spillings conceptual model that
26 calculates the volume of WIPP solid waste that may undergo material failure and be transported
27 to the surface as a result of a drilling intrusion.

28 The Salado Flow Conceptual Model Peer Review was performed from April 2002 to March
29 2003; the final report was published in May 2003 (CRA-2004, Appendix PEER-2004, Section
30 PEER-2004-2.1.3). This peer review evaluated changes made to three conceptual models
31 (Disposal System Geometry, Repository Fluid Flow, and DRZ) as a result of (1) new information
32 acquired after the original certification decision; or (2) changes to conceptual model assumptions
33 mandated by the EPA in the final CCA decision, such as the Option D panel closure condition.
34 The changes included: (1) modification of the computational grid to accommodate the new panel
35 closure requirement, (2) shaft simplification, and (3) refinement to the BRAGFLO grid.

1 **23.4.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

2 **23.4.4.1 Conceptual Models**

3 As in the CCA, all conceptual models used in the CRA-2004 were approved (see Section 23.2.4
4 for more discussion of the results of the CCA conceptual model peer review) by conceptual
5 model peer reviews that considered whether or not conceptual models represented possible
6 futures of the disposal system. The EPA agreed with the peer review panels and therefore found
7 that the DOE continued to be in compliance with section 194.23(a)(3)(i) (CARD 23, Section
8 "Recertification Decision 194.23(a)(3)," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

9 **23.4.4.2 Mathematical Models**

10 In the evaluation for recertification, the EPA evaluated each of the mathematical models for the
11 computer codes used in the CRA-2004 PA to determine if the governing equations (e.g., flow
12 and transport governing equations), process-related equations (e.g., the anhydrite fracture
13 model), and boundary conditions (e.g., no-flow boundary assumptions) included in each
14 mathematical model provided a reasonable representation of each conceptual model used in the
15 CRA-2004 PA. CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Section PA-4.0 and UMs and APs for each code were
16 the primary sources of information on the mathematical models employed in PA. In general,
17 mathematical formulations were adequately explained and reasonable. The DOE adequately
18 documented and described simplifications of conceptual models in the CRA-2004 PA. The EPA
19 found that the DOE provided an adequate technical basis to support the mathematical
20 formulations (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(a)(3)," U.S. Environmental
21 Protection Agency 2006f).

22 The EPA also reevaluated the functional tests described in the VD for each computer code to
23 ensure that the DOE's tests of the computer codes demonstrated that they performed as specified
24 in the RD. The EPA reviewed the testing of each code to verify that the DOE adequately tested
25 functional requirements listed for each computer code. This analysis and testing indicated that
26 equations and boundary conditions were properly incorporated into the mathematical models and
27 those boundary conditions were reasonable representations of how the conceptual models should
28 be implemented. The EPA found that the DOE continued to comply with 40 CFR §
29 194.23(a)(3)(ii) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c, Section 12.0; 2006j, Section 6.0;
30 2006i, Section 6.0; CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(a)(3)," U.S.
31 Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

32 **23.4.4.3 Numerical Models**

33 For the CRA-2004, the EPA reviewed all relevant documentation on numerical models solution
34 schemes, which was primarily contained in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA; APs; and
35 supplementary information (e.g., UMs, VDs). The EPA also reviewed each code's QA
36 documentation package for completeness and technical adequacy.

37 For the CRA-2004, the EPA reviewed the testing used to qualify each code for use in the CRA-
38 2004 PA. The EPA found that the DOE had adequately set the range of functional tests for each
39 code to verify that the code would perform as expected and provide reasonable results (see each

1 code's VD for details of this testing). The EPA found that the DOE continued to comply with
2 the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(3)(iii) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c,
3 Section 12.0; 2006j, Section 6.0; 2006i, Section 6.0; CARD 23, Section "Recertification
4 Decision 194.23(a)(3)," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

5 **23.4.4.4 Computer Models**

6 The EPA reviewed all of the relevant documentation (UM, DD, RD, VVP, and VD) pertaining to
7 each of the major codes described above as well as the CRA-2004, Appendix PA and associated
8 attachments. Since the CCA, the EPA also periodically performed an independent review of the
9 DOE's testing of each code to verify that results appeared accurate and free of coding error (U.S.
10 Environmental Protection Agency 2006c, 2006i, and 2006j). The EPA ultimately found that each
11 PA computer code produced results that showed continued compliance with this requirement.

12 During its review, the EPA questioned whether SANTOS produced results that were an accurate
13 implementation of the numerical models and were free of coding errors (Cotsworth 2004).
14 Specifically, the EPA questioned whether SANTOS was properly tested for accuracy and
15 whether the average stress of less than 5 megapascal that SANTOS predicted for waste was
16 reasonable. In the DOE's response (Detwiler 2004a), the DOE showed that a full functionality
17 test of SANTOS was performed as part of the code qualification and that the results of SANTOS
18 calculations were compared to the results of another computer code called SPECTROM-32.
19 These activities showed that SANTOS produces results adequate for the development of porosity
20 surfaces used in the CRA-2004 PA and was accepted by the EPA (U.S. Environmental
21 Protection Agency 2006l, Section 6.0).

22 The EPA was able to determine that the CRA-2004 PA computer codes continued to comply
23 with 40 CFR § 194.23(a)(3)(iv) (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(a)(3)," U.S.
24 Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

25 **23.4.4.5 Peer Review**

26 The DOE performed two peer reviews to support the CRA-2004 PA calculations. The DOE
27 developed a new spillings model and made minor changes to the Disposal System Geometry,
28 Repository Fluid Flow, and DRZ models.

29 The EPA examined the peer review plan and the final peer review report for the Spallings Model
30 Peer Review and found that they adequately fulfilled the requirements of section 194.27 and
31 NUREG-1297. The EPA also observed the actual performance of the peer review panel, the
32 selection of the panel members, the interaction of the panel with the DOE, and the documents
33 produced during and as a result of the peer review. The EPA found the process satisfied the
34 requirements of section 194.27 and the guidance in NUREG-1297 (U.S. Environmental
35 Protection Agency 2006d, Section 5.0).

36 The EPA examined the peer review plan and the final peer review report for the Salado Flow
37 Conceptual Model Peer Review and found that they adequately fulfilled the requirements of
38 section 194.27 and NUREG-1297. The EPA also observed the actual performance of the peer
39 review panel members, the selection of the panel, the interaction of the peer review panel with

1 the DOE, and the documents produced during and as a result of the peer review. The EPA found
 2 the process compatible with the requirements of section 194.27 and the guidance in NUREG-
 3 1297 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006e, Section 5.0).

4 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
 5 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
 6 section 194.23(a)(3)(v) (CARD 23, Section “Recertification Decision 194.23(a)(3),” U.S.
 7 Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

8 **23.4.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

9 **23.4.5.1 Conceptual Models**

10 All conceptual models used in the CRA-2009 PA were previously peer reviewed. No
 11 modifications have been made to the conceptual models since the 2006 recertification decision
 12 (see Section 23.3.5 for a discussion of modifications that were proposed, but not included in the
 13 CRA-2009). Thus, there is no new information to provide in the CRA-2009 and the DOE
 14 continues to demonstrate compliance with the provision of section 194.23(a)(3)(i).

15 **23.4.5.2 Mathematical Models**

16 No changes were made in the methodology used to document mathematical models and initial
 17 and boundary conditions from the CRA-2004. Discussion of the mathematical models and initial
 18 and boundary conditions are found in Appendices PA-2009, PORSURF-2009, SOTERM-2009,
 19 and TFIELD-2009. UMs and APs are also used to document mathematical models and the initial
 20 and boundary conditions for the CRA-2009. Table 23-4 lists the APs for the CRA-2009 PA.

21 **Table 23-4. APs for the CRA-2009 PA**

AP	Reference
Parameters	Kirchner 2008a; Fox 2008
Cuttings & Cavings	Ismail 2008
Spallings	Vugrin 2005; Ismail 2008
Direct Brine Release	Clayton 2008
Actinide Mobilization	Garner and Leigh 2005
Salado Flow	Nemer and Clayton 2008
Salado Transport	Ismail and Garner 2008
Culebra Flow	Lowry and Kanney 2005
Culebra Transport	Lowry and Kanney 2005
Normalized Release	Dunagan 2008
Sensitivity Study	Kirchner 2008b
Summary	Clayton et al. 2008

22

1 No new codes have been added to the WIPP PA since the CRA-2004 PABC. Two codes,
2 BRAGFLO and NUTS, were modified for the CRA-2009 PA. BRAGFLO was modified from
3 version 5.0 to version 6.0 to incorporate additional capabilities and flexibility (Nemer 2006).
4 The UM (Nemer 2007a), RD/VVP (Nemer 2007b), ID (Nemer 2007c), and VD (Nemer 2007d)
5 were generated for BRAGFLO version 6.0. NUTS version 2.05a had a time and date
6 incompatibility with the upgraded operating system (Gilkey 2006), so it was modified to version
7 2.05c. The only difference between version 2.05a and 2.05c is the change made to correct the
8 time and date incompatibility. As this was a minor code change, only the ID (Gilkey 2006) was
9 updated and no changes were made to the UM, RD/VVP, or VD.

10 The DOE continues to provide documentation that mathematical models incorporate equations
11 and boundary conditions that reasonably represent the mathematical formulation of the
12 conceptual models, and thus continues to demonstrate compliance with the provision of section
13 194.23(a)(3)(ii).

14 **23.4.5.3 Numerical Models**

15 As in the CRA-2004, the information used to evaluate the stability of the numerical schemes was
16 provided in the VDs and APs that the DOE prepared for each of the CRA-2009 PA computer
17 codes. Therefore, the DOE continues to provide documentation that numerical models provide
18 numerical schemes that enable the mathematical models to obtain stable solutions and thus
19 continues to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of section 194.23(a)(3)(iii).

20 **23.4.5.4 Computer Models**

21 As in the CRA-2004, the information used to show that the PA computer codes calculated
22 numerical models properly and that the computer codes were free of coding errors and produced
23 stable results was provided in the RD/VVP and VD prepared for each of the CRA-2009 PA
24 computer codes. Therefore, the DOE continues to provide documentation that computer models
25 accurately implement the numerical models and thus, continues to demonstrate compliance with
26 the provision of section 194.23(a)(3)(iv).

27 **23.4.5.5 Peer Review**

28 No additional peer review results since the 2006 recertification decision have been included in
29 the CRA-2009 PA calculations (see Section 23.3.5 for a discussion of modifications that were
30 proposed, but not included, in the CRA-2009). Thus, there is no new information to provide in
31 the CRA-2009, and the DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with the provision of section
32 194.23(a)(3)(v).

33 **23.5 40 CFR § 194.23(b)**

34 **23.5.1 Background**

35 40 CFR § 194.23(b) requires that computer codes be documented in accordance with an
36 appropriate quality assurance standard.

1 **23.5.2 1998 Certification Decision**

2 In the CCA, to meet the requirements of section 194.23(b), the DOE provided documentation of
3 compliance with quality assurance requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers
4 (ASME) Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA)-2a-1990 addenda, Part 2.7, to ASME NQA-2-1989
5 edition. This documentation included plans for QA software, software requirements
6 documentation, software design and implementation documentation, software verification and
7 validation documentation, and user documentation. Based on the EPA audits and the CCA
8 review, the EPA found the DOE in compliance with the requirements of section 194.23(b).

9 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(b) can be
10 obtained from CARD 23, Section 8.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

11 **23.5.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

12 The CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0 describes the DOE's QA program. Software QA is described in the
13 CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0, Section 5.3.20. The DOE's QA program, dated May 2003, is contained
14 in the CRA-2004, Appendix QAPD. Section 6 of the DOE QAPD incorporated the requirements
15 of ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda, Part 2.7, to ASME NQA-2-1989 edition. See CARD 22, U.S.
16 Environmental Protection Agency (2006k), for further discussion of the EPA's review of the
17 DOE's approach to the QA requirements for computer codes and models.

18 **23.5.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

19 The EPA verified compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.22(a)(2)(iv) by reviewing
20 Section 6.0 of the Carlsbad Field Office QAPD and conducting periodic inspections of the
21 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Washington TRU Solutions QA programs since the
22 CCA decision. The DOE's documentation included plan(s) for software QA, software
23 requirements documentation, software design and implementation documentation, software
24 verification and validation documentation, and user documentation. The EPA found that the
25 DOE's QA requirements for computer codes used in the PA and compliance assessment
26 continued to be in agreement with those specified in 40 CFR § 194.22, and that their code
27 documentation was adequate. See CARD 22, Section "Evaluation of Compliance for
28 Recertification" (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006k), for further discussion of the
29 EPA's review.

30 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
31 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
32 section 194.23(b) (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(b)," U.S. Environmental
33 Protection Agency 2006f).

34 **23.5.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

35 The documentation standards of the computer codes have not changed since the CRA-2004
36 decision. Thus, there is no new information to provide in the CRA-2009, and the DOE continues
37 to demonstrate compliance with the provision of section 194.23(b).

1 **23.6 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(1)**

2 **23.6.1 Background**

3 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(1) requires documentation of all models and computer codes, including
4 descriptions of the theoretical backgrounds and the method of analysis for each model.

5 **23.6.2 1998 Certification Decision**

6 In the CCA, the DOE provided documentation of all models and computer codes, including
7 descriptions of the theoretical backgrounds and the method of analysis for each model. The
8 EPA's evaluation found that the CCA and supplementary information provided an adequate
9 description of the theoretical backgrounds and method of analysis for each model used in the
10 calculations. The DOE's documentation of conceptual models, alternative conceptual models,
11 and the Conceptual Models Peer Review Panel is discussed in CARD 23 Sections 1.4, 2.4, and
12 7.4, respectively (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

13 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(c)(1) can be
14 obtained from CARD 23, Section 9.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

15 **23.6.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

16 Most of the major codes used for modeling the PA in the CRA-2004 had not changed since the
17 CCA. Codes added to the CRA-2004 PA since the CCA were MODFLOW, PEST, and
18 DRSPALL. Each of the CRA-2004 PA codes is documented in its own UM, AP, RD, VVP, DD,
19 ID, and VD (see Section 23.4.3.1 for a summary of each document). The DOE used these
20 documents as the primary vehicles to describe the conceptual models, mathematical models, and
21 numerical methods that provided the basis for the theory and the assumptions underlying the
22 computer codes. The DOE included additional documentation in various appendices to the
23 CRA-2004 (e.g., CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS and Attachment SOTERM). The
24 DOE's documentation also contained justification for the use of the models, conceptual model
25 derivation, mathematical derivations, and solution methods used in the codes (see the CRA-
26 2004, Chapter 6.0 and Appendix PA).

27 **23.6.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

28 The primary codes that the EPA reviewed include: CUTTINGS_S, MODFLOW, SECOTP2D,
29 SUMMARIZE, PRECCDFGF, CCDFGF, LHS, DRSPALL, PANEL, BRAGFLO, NUTS, FMT,
30 PEST, SANTOS, and ALGEBRA. The EPA found the DOE's description of the theoretical
31 background of each code, provided primarily in the UM and AP, to be adequate. With respect to
32 the documentation pertaining to the method of analysis, the EPA found the descriptions in the
33 AP for each code to be sufficiently complete.

34 For the CRA-2004, the EPA reevaluated all available documentation on each of the computer
35 codes for completeness, clarity, and logical development of the theoretical bases for the
36 conceptual models used in each computer code. Documentation was considered complete if it

1 contained sufficient information from which to judge whether the codes were (1) formulated on a
2 sound theoretical foundation, and (2) used properly in the PA analysis.

3 The EPA reviewed all of the relevant documentation pertaining to the theoretical development
4 and application of the models. For further discussion of the EPA's review of documentation for
5 conceptual models, alternative conceptual models, and the Conceptual Models Peer Review
6 Panel, see Section 23.2, Section 23.3, and Section 23.4. The majority of the information was
7 located in the UM and AP for each code. For the CRA-2004, the DOE's theoretical background
8 for almost all of the codes had not changed since the CCA decision. Since the CCA, the DOE
9 had continued to test the PA codes to verify that they still perform as they did during the CCA.
10 The EPA had periodically reviewed and inspected these activities to verify that the PA codes
11 continue to produce adequate results (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006i and 2006j).
12 The CRA-2004, Appendix PA included the theoretical background, mathematical development,
13 and numerical development of the main PA codes and its use in the CRA-2004 PA analyses.

14 After the execution of the original CRA-2004 PA, the DOE discovered problems with the
15 method of analysis for a number of input files and computer code errors related to the
16 SUMMARIZE, PRECCDFGF, and CCDFGF sequence of calculations. The EPA requested that
17 the DOE verify that these errors had been corrected and that the codes passed the correct
18 information to assure the analysis methods and assessments achieve correct results (Cotsworth
19 2005). The DOE modified the codes, corrected the analysis process, and retested to confirm that
20 the errors had been corrected. The DOE also reran parts of the original CRA-2004 PA to assess
21 the impact of these corrections. The EPA found that the DOE had corrected the errors and
22 verified that the code obtained the correct data to perform their analysis for the CRA-2004
23 PABC (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c, Section 12.0). The EPA found that the
24 DOE's level of documentation continued to be consistent with the adequate level of
25 documentation produced during the CCA review, and that the DOE continued to be in
26 compliance with section 194.23(c)(1) (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(c),"
27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

28 **23.6.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

29 No changes were made to the documentation procedure of PA computer codes used in the CRA-
30 2009. Thus, there is no new information to be provided as part of the CRA-2009, and the DOE
31 continues to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of section 194.23(c)(1).

32 **23.7 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(2)**

33 **23.7.1 Background**

34 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(2) requires (1) general descriptions of the models; (2) discussions on the
35 limits of applicability of each model; (3) detailed instructions for executing the computer codes,
36 including hardware and software requirements; (4) input and output formats with explanations of
37 each input and output variable and parameter (e.g., parameter name and units); (5) listings of
38 input and output files from a sample computer run; and (6) reports on code verification,
39 benchmarking, validation, and QAPs.

1 **23.7.2 1998 Certification Decision**

2 In the CCA, the DOE provided documentation of all models and computer codes; detailed
3 descriptions of data collection, data reduction and analysis, and parameters developed from
4 source data; detailed descriptions of the structure of the computer codes; and a complete listing
5 of computer source codes. The EPA's evaluation found that the CCA and supplementary
6 information included (1) an adequate description of each model used in the calculations; (2) a
7 description of limits of applicability of each model; (3) detailed instructions for executing the
8 computer codes; (4) hardware and software requirements to run these codes; (5) input and output
9 formats with explanations of each input and output variable and parameter; (6) listings of input
10 and output files from sample computer runs; and (7) reports of code verification, benchmarking,
11 validation, and QAPs.

12 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(c)(2) can be
13 obtained from CARD 23, Section 10.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

14 **23.7.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

15 As in the CCA, documentation for the CRA-2004 regarding the DOE's compliance with section
16 194.23(c)(2) is primarily contained in the UM, AP, VD, ID, DD, RD, and VVP for each code.
17 Table 23-5 lists the requirements of section 194.23(c)(2) and where these requirements are
18 addressed in the DOE documents.

19 **23.7.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

20 The EPA reviewed all of the relevant documentation pertaining to requirements specified in
21 section 194.23(c)(2) for the following codes: CUTTINGS_S, MODFLOW, SECOTP2D,
22 CCDFGF, LHS, PANEL, BRAGFLO, NUTS, FMT, PEST, DRSPALL, SANTOS, and
23 ALGEBRA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c; 2006i; and 2006j). The DOE's code
24 documentation provided enough information for the EPA to understand and execute the models,
25 determine the possible impact of any assumptions, and verify that the codes were tested and
26 quality assured.

27 The DOE replaced the SECOFL2D flow code used in the CCA with the MODFLOW-2000 flow
28 code. The primary reasons given for the change are (1) that MODFLOW-2000 is well supported
29 by a large user base and is continuing to be developed, while SECOFL2D is not; (2)
30 MODFLOW is designed to operate on multiple computer platforms, while SECOFL2D was
31 designed to work on only the VAX/Alpha platforms; and (3) the new pilot point estimation code,
32 PEST, was designed to use only MODFLOW-2000 (Detwiler 2004b). The EPA determined that
33 MODFLOW-2000 is a reasonable replacement to SECOFL2D and that the MODFLOW/PEST T
34 field estimate combination is a significant improvement over the SECOFL2D/GRASP-INV
35 combination used in the CCA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c). The EPA
36 determined that the DOE continued to demonstrate compliance with section 194.23(c)(2) (CARD
37 23, Section "Evaluation of Compliance for Recertification 194.23(c)," U.S. Environmental
38 Protection Agency 2006f).

1 **Table 23-5. Location of Documentation for Models and Computer Codes Used in PA**

Requirement in Compliance Application Guidance	Document Containing Information						
	UM	AP	VD	ID	DD	RD/VVP	SNL QA Procedures ^a
General descriptions of the models	X	X	—	—	X	—	—
Discussions of the limits of applicability of each model	X	X	—	—	X	—	X
Detailed instructions for executing the computer codes	—	X	—	X	X	—	X
Hardware requirements for executing the computer codes	X	X	—	X	—	—	X
Software requirements for executing the computer codes	X	X	—	—	—	—	X
Input and output formats with explanations of each input and output variable and parameter	X	X	—	—	X	—	—
Listings of input and output files from a sample computer run	X	X	—	—	—	—	X
Reports on code verification	—	X	X	—	—	X	X
Reports on benchmarking	—	X	X	—	—	X	X
Reports on validation	—	X	X	—	—	X	X
Reports on QAPs	—	X	—	—	—	—	X

X = Information meeting the requirement is found in this document.

^a See the CRA-2004, Appendix QAPD, Section 6.0.

2

3 **23.7.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

4 No changes were made to the documentation procedure of PA computer codes used in the CRA-
 5 2009. Thus, there is no new information to provide in the CRA-2009, and the DOE continues to
 6 demonstrate compliance with provision of section 194.23(c)(2).

7 **23.8 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(3)**

8 **23.8.1 Background**

9 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(3) requires detailed descriptions of the computer code structures and a
 10 complete listing of computer source codes.

11 **23.8.2 1998 Certification Decision**

12 In the CCA, the DOE provided detailed descriptions of the computer code structure and a
 13 complete listing of computer source codes. The EPA’s evaluation found that the CCA and
 14 supplementary information adequately provided a detailed description of the computer code
 15 structures and supplied a complete listing of the computer source code in supplementary
 16 documentation to the CCA. The documentation of computer codes described the structure of

1 computer codes with sufficient detail to allow the EPA to understand how software subroutines
2 are interrelated. The code structure documentation shows how the codes operate to provide
3 accurate solutions of the conceptual models.

4 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(c)(3) can be
5 obtained from CARD 23, Section 11.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

6 **23.8.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

7 The ID for each modeling code contains the information relevant to compliance with section
8 194.23(c)(3). The ID provides the information necessary for the recreation of the code as used in
9 the CRA-2004 PA calculation. With this information, the user can compile the source code and
10 install it on a computer system identical to that used in the CRA-2004 calculations. The ID also
11 includes the source code listing and code compilation information.

12 **23.8.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

13 The EPA reviewed all of the relevant documentation, and in particular the ID for each computer
14 code pertaining to the requirements specified in section 194.23(c)(3) for the following codes:
15 CUTTINGS_S, MODFLOW, SECOTP2D, CCDFGF, LHS, PANEL, BRAGFLO, NUTS, FMT,
16 PEST, SANTOS, DRSPALL, SUMMARIZE, and ALGEBRA. The EPA found that the DOE
17 submitted all of the source code listings. The EPA identified no problems with the detailed
18 descriptions of the structure of the computer codes. The CRA-2004 documentation of computer
19 codes continued to adequately describe the structure of computer codes with sufficient detail to
20 allow the EPA to understand how software subroutines were linked and how to execute the PA.
21 The EPA determined that the DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with section
22 194.23(c)(3) (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(c)," U.S. Environmental
23 Protection Agency 2006f).

24 **23.8.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

25 No changes were made to the documentation procedure of PA computer codes used in the CRA-
26 2009. The DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of section
27 194.23(c)(3).

28 **23.9 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(4)**

29 **23.9.1 Background**

30 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(4) requires detailed descriptions of data collection, data reduction and
31 analysis, and code input parameters development.

32 **23.9.2 1998 Certification Decision**

33 In the CCA, the DOE provided detailed descriptions of data collection, data reduction and
34 analysis, and code input parameters development. The EPA's evaluation found that the CCA
35 and supplementary information adequately (1) provided a detailed listing of the code input

1 parameters; (2) listed sampled input parameters; (3) provided a description of parameters and the
 2 codes in which they are used; (4) discussed parameters important to releases; (5) described data
 3 collection procedures, sources of data, data reduction and analysis; and (6) described code input
 4 parameter development, including an explanation of QA activities.

5 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(c)(4) can be
 6 obtained from the CARD 23, Section 12.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

7 **23.9.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

8 The primary sources of CRA-2004 parameter information are in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0
 9 (especially Tables 6-10 to 6-30), Appendix PA, Attachment PAR, and other appendices
 10 describing specific computer codes and parameter records. Records of parameters for the CRA-
 11 2004 included the following:

- 12 • SNL Form NP 9-2-1 WIPP Parameter Entry Form (PEF): All PA parameters are defined
 13 using this form, which contains the numerical values and distributions of parameters used as
 14 input to PA codes, identifies the code the parameter is used in, and includes information to
 15 trace the development of each parameter. The PEF replaced Form 464 used in the CCA PA.
- 16 • Requestor Documents or Forms: Requestor documentation described parameters that
 17 involved considerable data reduction and analysis by the SNL Principal Investigator or other
 18 technical personnel. The Requestor documentation is the second step of PA parameter
 19 development. Data reduction and analysis are usually explained at this step. The Requester
 20 documentation replaced the Principal Investigator Records Packages (PIRPs) used during the
 21 CCA PA.
- 22 • Data Records Packages (DRP): These documents are typically generated for parameters
 23 derived from empirical testing as a result of laboratory or field measurements (for example,
 24 actinide solubility experiments or brine inflow rate measurements in the WIPP underground
 25 repository). These packages are generally the first step that links the development of a
 26 parameter from the measured data to the values used in the PA.
- 27 • APs: These are supplementary documents that generally describe all parameters used by a
 28 particular code in the PA calculations.

29 The main source for parameter documentation is the PEF. The need for further documentation in
 30 the other three types of documents depends upon the nature of the parameter, such as whether it
 31 is a widely accepted chemical constant (e.g., atomic weight of an isotope) or a value requiring
 32 experimental data for verification. Table 23-6 describes the types of information found in each
 33 of these four documents and possible paths in documenting parameter record information.

34 The CCA contained approximately 1,600 parameters and the CRA-2004 contained
 35 approximately 1,700 parameters consisting of numerical values or ranges of numerical values
 36 that describe different physical and chemical aspects of the repository, the geology and geometry
 37 of the area surrounding the WIPP, and possible scenarios for human intrusion. Some parameters
 38 are well-established chemical constants, such as Avogadro's number or the universal gas

1 constant. Other parameters describe attributes unique to the WIPP, such as the solubility and
2 mobility of specific actinides in brines in the WIPP. An example of a parameter related to the
3 geology of the WIPP is the permeability of the rock in the Culebra above the WIPP. The DOE
4 also assigned parameters to consider the effects of human intrusion, such as the diameter of a
5 drill bit used to drill a borehole that might penetrate the repository.

6 In the documents described above, the DOE described the methods that develop and support the
7 approximately 1,700 parameters used in the CRA-2004. All of the documents listed above are
8 used to explain the full development of parameter values used as inputs to the PA calculations.
9 Table 23-6 indicates the documents that contain information required under section 194.23(c)(4).

10 **23.9.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

11 The EPA, as for the CCA, performed a thorough review of the parameters and parameter
12 development process for the CRA-2004. For the CRA-2004 parameter review, the EPA focused
13 its review on parameters that had changed or were new since the CCA. The EPA's review of the
14 parameters and parameter development is described in detail (U.S. Environmental Protection
15 Agency 2006m, 2006n). The EPA reviewed parameter packages for a sample of approximately
16 1,700 parameters used in the CRA-2004 PA calculations. The parameter records include WIPP
17 PEFs (NP 9-2-1), requestor documents or forms, DRPs, and APs.

18 The EPA's review of PA parameters took place in three phases. In 2003, the EPA reviewed the
19 transfer of parameters from the CCA database to a new database system (U.S. Environmental
20 Protection Agency 2006n). Next, the EPA reviewed the parameters changed as a result of the
21 parameter transfer to the CRA-2004 PA calculations (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
22 2006n). The EPA found 128 new parameters and 203 changes to existing parameters. Many of
23 the parameter changes were due to revisions of the waste inventory values in the PA calculations
24 and new parameter values used in the new spillings code, DRSPALL. The EPA was able to
25 verify that the new and changed parameters were adequately recorded in the WIPP parameter
26 database and that most of these parameters were justified and traceable to adequate supporting
27 documentation. Finally, the EPA reviewed the parameter changes and documentation for values
28 changed for the CRA-2004 PABC calculations required by the EPA to confirm the impact of
29 code errors and parameter changes on the PA compliance results (U.S. Environmental Protection
30 Agency 2006m).

31 The EPA found minor concerns at each phase of the review. Ultimately, the DOE corrected each
32 concern, and the EPA verified that parameters used in the CRA-2004 were adequately
33 developed, documented, and traceable. The EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply
34 with section 194.23(c)(4) (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(c)," U.S.
35 Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

36 During the EPA's completeness review, stakeholders commented on the drilling rate used in the
37 CRA-2004 PA calculations. During meetings with stakeholders in July of 2004, comments arose
38 regarding the drilling rate used in the CRA-2004 and suggested that a number twice the existing
39 rate should be used in PA calculations. In a December 3, 2004 email, the EPA informed the
40 DOE that they were required to evaluate the impact of using twice the CRA-2004 PA drilling
41

1 **Table 23-6. Location of Required Information on Parameters Used in Codes for PA**

Requirement in Compliance Application Guidance	Document Containing Information							
	PEF	PIRP	DRP	AP	CRA-2004 ^a	Att. PAR ^b	App. QAPD ^c	Parameter Database
Detailed listings of code input parameters	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	X
Detailed listings of the sampled parameters	—	—	—	—	—	X	—	X
Codes in which the parameters were used	X	—	—	X	—	—	—	X
Computer code names of the sampled parameters	X	—	—	X	—	—	—	X
Descriptions of the data sources	X	X	X	X	—	—	—	X
Descriptions of the parameters	—	—	—	X	X	X	—	X
Descriptions of the data collection procedures	—	X	X	—	—	—	—	—
Description of the data reduction and analysis	—	X	X	X	—	—	—	—
Descriptions of code input parameter development	—	—	X	—	—	—	—	—
Discussions of the linkage between input parameter information and data used to develop the input information	—	X	X	X	—	—	—	X
Discussions of the importance of the sampled parameters relative to final releases	—	—	—	X	—	—	—	—
Discussions of correlations among sampled parameters and how these are addressed in PA	—	—	—	—	—	X	—	—
Listing of the data sources used to establish parameters (e.g., experimentally derived, standard textbook values)	X	X	X	X	—	—	—	X
Data reduction methodologies used for PA parameters	—	X	X	X	—	—	—	—
Explanation of QA activities	—	—	—	—	X	—	X	—

X = Information meeting the requirement is found in this document.

^a See CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0 for parameter descriptions and CRA-2004, Chapter 5.0 for an explanation of QA activities.

^b CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment PAR.

^c CRA-2004, Appendix QAPD.

2

1 rate. The analysis was conducted and the DOE documented the results (Kanney and Kirchner
2 2004). The EPA reviewed the DOE's response and noted that doubling the drilling rate does
3 increase predicted releases, but that the results are still well within regulatory release limits.

4 Ultimately, the EPA was able to determine that the DOE continued to be in compliance with
5 section 194.23(c)(4) (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(c)," U.S.
6 Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

7 **23.9.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

8 For the CRA-2009, there are 90 new parameters and 15 modified parameters (Fox 2008, Table
9 6). The 15 modified parameters and 10 of the 90 new parameters are a result of corrections and
10 parameter updates. The remaining 80 new parameters arose from the capability improvements
11 added to the BRAGFLO computer code. More discussion of the CRA-2009 parameters is found
12 in Fox (2008).

13 As in the CRA-2004, the information used to show detailed descriptions of data collection
14 procedures, data reduction and analysis, and code input parameter development was provided in
15 the PEFs that the DOE prepared for each of the CRA-2009 PA parameters (see Fox 2008).
16 Therefore, the DOE continues to provide documentation of the parameter development and thus
17 continues to demonstrate compliance with the provision of section 194.23(c)(4).

18 **23.10 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(5)**

19 **23.10.1 Background**

20 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(5) requires documentation of any necessary licenses for all models and
21 computer codes.

22 **23.10.2 1998 Certification Decision**

23 The DOE did not use any software that requires a license, so the EPA found that the DOE
24 demonstrated compliance with section 194.23(c)(5).

25 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(c)(5) can be
26 obtained from CARD 23, Section 13.1 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

27 **23.10.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

28 As in the CCA, no licenses from software vendors were required to operate the codes essential
29 for the WIPP PA. Most of the computer codes for the WIPP PA were developed and
30 programmed by the DOE or its contractors as custom software, and require no license to execute
31 or use the computer codes documented in the CCA and supplementary materials. MODFLOW
32 and PEST are public domain codes and are readily accessible.

1 **23.10.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

2 As the DOE did not use any software that requires a license, the EPA determined that the DOE
3 continued to comply with section 194.23(c)(5) (CARD 23, Section “Recertification Decision
4 194.23(c),” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

5 **23.10.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

6 No new codes were added for the CRA-2009 PA and no software requiring a license was used.
7 Thus, there is no new information to provide in the CRA-2009, and the DOE continues to
8 demonstrate compliance with the provisions of section 194.23(c)(5).

9 **23.11 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(6)**

10 **23.11.1 Background**

11 40 CFR § 194.23(c)(6) requires an explanation of the manner in which models and computer
12 codes incorporate the effects of parameter correlation.

13 **23.11.2 1998 Certification Decision**

14 In the CCA, the DOE provided an explanation of the manner in which models and computer
15 codes incorporate the effects of parameter correlation. The EPA’s evaluation found that the
16 CCA and supplementary information adequately discussed how the effects of parameter
17 correlation are incorporated, explained the mathematical functions that describe these
18 relationships, and described the potential impacts on the sampling of uncertain parameters. The
19 CCA also adequately documented the effects of parameter correlation for both conceptual
20 models and the formulation of computer codes, and appropriately incorporated these correlations
21 in the PA.

22 A complete description of the EPA’s 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(c)(6) can be
23 obtained from CARD 23, Section 14.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

24 **23.11.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

25 User-specified parameter correlations for sampled parameters were introduced into the CRA-
26 2004 PA calculations using the Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) computer program. The DOE
27 used two types of parameter correlations: user-specified and induced. User-specified (explicit)
28 parameter correlations are input to the LHS computer code using a correlation matrix (or table).

29 When values sampled using the LHS computer code are used to calculate other values in the PA
30 calculations, an induced correlation parameter relationship is created. This is the prevalent
31 method of parameter correlation in the WIPP PA.

32 The DOE implemented parameter correlations in the WIPP PA using the LHS computer code
33 (CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Section PA-5.4). CRA-2004 parameter correlations are described in
34 the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment PAR, Section 4.0.

1 **23.11.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

2 The EPA determined that parameter correlations were adequately explained in the CRA-2004,
3 Appendix PA, Attachment PAR, Section PAR-4.0 and were adequately incorporated. The EPA
4 also found that the CRA-2004 presented an adequate explanation of the manner in which models
5 and computer codes incorporated the effects of parameter correlations. The EPA determined that
6 the DOE continued to comply with section 194.23(c)(6) (CARD 23, Section “Recertification
7 Decision 194.23(c),” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006f).

8 **23.11.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

9 The description of the parameter correlations used in the CRA-2009 PA can be found in Fox
10 (2008, Section 4.0). No changes were made in the parameter correlations since the CRA-2004
11 PABC, except that the conditional relationship between the inundated and humid microbial
12 cellulose degradation rates was modified from the CRA-2004 PABC methodology. For the
13 CRA-2004 PABC, the conditional relationship was enforced in the preprocessing step for the
14 BRAGFLO calculations by setting the humid rate equal to the inundated rate if the sampled
15 humid rate was higher than the inundated rate for a single vector. Changing these values this
16 way introduced a small error into the sensitivity analysis because the regression analysis was
17 based on the sampled value rather than the conditional values.

18 For the CRA-2009 PA, a conditional relationship was applied so that the sampled inundated rate
19 is used as the maximum in the sampling for the humid rate. This conditional relationship results
20 in a correlation of 0.74 between the humid and inundated rates (Kirchner 2008a). The
21 conditional relationship was applied during the LHS process. The LHSEEDIT utility was
22 developed to account for this conditional relationship. The implementation and verification of
23 the LHSEEDIT utility is discussed in Kirchner (2008a).

24 The DOE continues to provide an explanation of the manner in which models and computer
25 codes incorporate the effects of parameter correlation and thus demonstrate compliance with the
26 provisions of section 194.23(c)(6).

27 **23.12 40 CFR § 194.23(d)**

28 **23.12.1 Background**

29 The DOE must provide the EPA free access to PA models and computer codes.

30 **23.12.2 1998 Certification Decision**

31 During the review of the CCA, the DOE provided the EPA with ready access to computer
32 hardware required to perform independent computer simulations. Therefore, the EPA found the
33 DOE in compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.23(d).

34 A complete description of the EPA’s 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.23(d) can be
35 obtained from CARD 23, Section 15.4 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

1 **23.12.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

2 No specific changes were made to the CRA-2004 to demonstrate compliance with section
3 194.23(d). The DOE provided access for the EPA during the CRA-2004 to PA models and
4 computer codes.

5 **23.12.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

6 The EPA expected the DOE to identify points of contact to facilitate the process for the EPA to
7 perform independent simulations, provide ready access to the hardware and software needed to
8 perform simulations related to the CRA-2004 evaluation, and assist the EPA personnel in
9 exercising the DOE computer codes.

10 The DOE provided contacts to assist the EPA in operating the hardware needed to perform the
11 independent computer simulations necessary to verify the simulations related to the CRA-2004.
12 The DOE provided the EPA and authorized personnel with unrestricted access to this computer
13 hardware and software.

14 Based on adequate support and access to PA computer codes, input files, and PA-related
15 documentation, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
16 section 194.23(d) (CARD 23, Section "Recertification Decision 194.23(d)," U.S. Environmental
17 Protection Agency 2006f).

18 **23.12.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

19 No specific changes were made to the CRA-2009 to demonstrate compliance with section
20 194.23(d). Thus, the DOE will continue to provide the EPA with unrestricted access to the
21 computer hardware and software and the DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with the
22 provisions of section 194.23(d).

23 **23.13 References**

24 Clayton, D.J. 2008. *Analysis Package for Direct Brine Releases: Compliance Recertification*
25 *Application-2009*. ERMS 548571. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

26 Clayton, D.J., S. Dunagan, J.W. Garner, A.E. Ismail, T.B. Kirchner, G.R. Kirkes, and M.B.
27 Nemer. 2008. *Summary Report of the 2009 Compliance Recertification Application*
28 *Performance Assessment*. ERMS 548862. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

29 Cotsworth, E. 2004. Letter to R.P. Detwiler (1 Enclosure). 20 May 2004. ERMS 535554. U.S.
30 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

31 Cotsworth, E. 2005. Letter to I. Triay (1 Enclosure). 4 March 2005. ERMS 548357. U.S.
32 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

33 Detwiler, R.P. 2004a. Letter to E. Cotsworth. 29 September 2004. U.S. Department of Energy,
34 Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.

- 1 Detwiler, R.P. 2004b. Letter to E. Cotsworth (Subject: Partial Response to EPA May 20, 2004,
2 Letter on CRA; 1 Enclosure). 15 July 2004. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office,
3 Carlsbad, NM.
- 4 Dials, G.E. 1997. Letter to R. Trovato. 7 February 1997. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad
5 Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 6 Dunagan, S. 2008. *Analysis Package for CCDFGF: 2009 Compliance Recertification*
7 *Application*. ERMS 548776. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 8 Fox, B. 2008 *Parameter Report for the CRA-2009 PA* (Revision 0). ERMS 549747. Carlsbad,
9 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Garner, J., and C. Leigh. 2005. *Analysis Package for PANEL, CRA-2004 Performance*
11 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 540572. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
12 Laboratories.
- 13 Gilkey, A.P. 2006. *Implementation Document for NUTS, Version 2.05c*. ERMS 543407.
14 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 Ismail, A.E. 2008. *Analysis Package for CUTTINGS_S: Compliance Recertification*
16 *Application 2009* (Revision 1). ERMS 548618. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 17 Ismail, A.E., and J.W. Garner. 2008. *Analysis Package for Salado Transport Calculations:*
18 *Compliance Recertification Application 2009*. ERMS 548845. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
19 Laboratories.
- 20 Kanney, J.F., and T.B. Kirchner. 2004. *Impact of Potential Drilling Rate Increases on WIPP*
21 *Repository Performance*. ERMS 538262. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 Kirchner, T. 2008a. *Generation of the LHS Samples for the AP-137 Revision 0 (CRA09) PA*
23 *Calculations*. ERMS 547971. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 24 Kirchner, T. 2008b. *Sensitivity of the CRA-2009 Performance Assessment Calculation Releases*
25 *to Parameters*. ERMS 548788. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Lorenz, J.C. 2005. *Assessment of the Potential for Karst in the Rustler Formation at the WIPP*
27 *Site*. SAND2005-7303. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 28 Lowry, T.S., and J. Kanney. 2005. *Analysis Report for the CRA-2004 PABC Culebra Flow and*
29 *Transport Calculations*. ERMS 541508. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Marcinowski, F. 2002. Letter to I. Triay. 6 August 2002. ERMS 533337. U.S. Environmental
31 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 32 Nemer, M.B. 2006. *Change Control for BRAGFLO, Version 5.0 (Proposed 6.0)*. ERMS
33 544904. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Nemer, M.B. 2007a. *User's Manual for BRAGFLO, Version 6.0*. ERMS 545016. Carlsbad,
2 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 3 Nemer, M.B. 2007b. *Requirements Document and Validation and Verification Plan for*
4 *BRAGFLO, Version 6.0*. ERMS 545014. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 5 Nemer, M.B. 2007c. *Implementation Document for BRAGFLO, Version 6.0*. ERMS 545017.
6 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Nemer, M.B. 2007d. *Validation Document for BRAGFLO, Version 6.0*. ERMS 545018.
8 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Nemer, M.B., and D.J. Clayton. 2008. *Analysis Package for Salado Flow Modeling, 2009*
10 *Compliance Recertification Application Calculation*. ERMS 548607. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
11 National Laboratories.
- 12 Sandia National Laboratories and Carlsbad Area Office Technical Assistance Contractor. 1997.
13 *Spallings Release Positions Paper: Description and Evaluation of a Mechanistically Based*
14 *Conceptual Model for Spall*. ERMS 414916. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
16 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
17 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 18 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
19 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
20 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. "40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
22 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40
23 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule." *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
24 5223–45.
- 25 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. "CARD No. 23: Models and Computer
26 Codes." *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
27 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
28 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 23-1 through 23-93). Washington, DC:
29 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. "40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
31 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the
32 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule." *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
33 1998): 27353–406.
- 34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. *Technical Support Document for*
35 *Sections 194.25, 194.32 and 33: Compliance Recertification Application Review of Features,*
36 *Events and Processes* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. *Technical Support Document for*
2 *Sections 194.32 and 33: Compliance Recertification Application Re-Evaluation of Select Human*
3 *Intrusion Activities*. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006c. *Technical Support Document for Section*
5 *194.23: Review of the 2004 Compliance Recertification Performance Assessment Baseline*
6 *Calculation* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006d. *Technical Support Document for Section*
8 *194.27: Spallings Conceptual Models Peer Review*. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
9 Indoor Air.
- 10 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006e. *Technical Support Document for Section*
11 *194.27: Salado Flow Conceptual Models Peer Review*. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation
12 and Indoor Air.
- 13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006f. “Recertification CARD No. 23: Models
14 and Computer Codes.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the*
15 *Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40*
16 *CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 23-1 through 23-
17 37). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 18 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006g. *Technical Support Document for Section*
19 *194.14/15: Evaluation of Karst at the WIPP Site* (March). Washington, DC: Office of
20 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006h. “Recertification CARD No. 14/15:
22 Content of Certification Application and Compliance Recertification Application(s).”
23 *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
24 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
25 *Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 14/15-1 through 14/15-34, pp. 14-A-1
26 through 14-A-3, and pp. 15-A-1 through 15-A-17). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
27 Indoor Air.
- 28 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006i. *Technical Support Document for Section*
29 *194.23: Models and Computer Codes* (March). PABC Codes Changes Review. Washington,
30 DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006j. *Technical Support Document for Section*
32 *194.23: Review of WIPP Recertification Performance Assessment Computer Codes* (March).
33 CRA Code Review. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006k. “Recertification CARD No. 22: Quality
35 Assurance.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification*
36 *and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with 40 CFR Part 191*
37 *Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 22-1 through 22-17).
38 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006l. *Technical Support Document for Section*
2 *194.27: SANTOS Computer Code in WIPP Performance Assessment*. Washington, DC: Office
3 of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006m. *Technical Support Document for*
5 *Section 194.23: Review of Changes to the WIPP Performance Assessment Parameters from the*
6 *Compliance Recertification Application to Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation*
7 (March). PABC Parameter Review. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 8 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006n. *Technical Support Document for Section*
9 *194.23: Review of Changes to the WIPP Performance Assessment Parameters Since the*
10 *Database Migration: CRA Parameter Review*. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
11 Indoor Air.
- 12 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 1988. *Peer Review for High-Level Nuclear*
13 *Waste Repositories*. NUREG-1297. Washington, DC.
- 14 Vugrin, E.D. 2005. *Analysis Package for DRSPALL, CRA 2004 Performance Assessment*
15 *Baseline Calculation*. ERMS 540415. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 Vugrin, E.D., and M.B. Nemer. 2007. *Analysis Plan for the 2009 Compliance Recertification*
17 *Application Performance Assessment (Revision 0)*. AP-132. ERMS 545496. Carlsbad, NM:
18 Sandia National Laboratories.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Waste Characterization
(40 CFR § 194.24)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Waste Characterization
(40 CFR § 194.24)

Table of Contents

24.0 Waste Characterization (40 CFR § 194.24) 24-1

 24.1 Requirements 24-1

 24.2 Background 24-2

 24.3 1998 Certification Decision 24-3

 24.3.1 40 CFR § 194.24(a) 24-3

 24.3.2 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(1) 24-3

 24.3.3 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(2) 24-4

 24.3.4 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(3) 24-4

 24.3.5 40 CFR §§ 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2) 24-4

 24.3.6 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(2) 24-5

 24.3.7 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3) 24-5

 24.3.8 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(4) 24-5

 24.3.9 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5) 24-6

 24.3.10 40 CFR §§ 194.24(d) and (f) 24-6

 24.3.11 40 CFR § 194.24(g) 24-6

 24.3.12 40 CFR § 194.24(h) 24-7

 24.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 24-7

 24.4.1 40 CFR § 194.24(a) 24-7

 24.4.2 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(1) 24-9

 24.4.3 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(2) 24-13

 24.4.4 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(3) 24-14

 24.4.5 40 CFR §§ 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2) 24-14

 24.4.6 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(2) 24-14

 24.4.7 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3) 24-14

 24.4.8 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(4) 24-15

 24.4.9 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5) 24-15

 24.4.10 40 CFR §§ 194.24(d) and (f) 24-15

 24.4.11 40 CFR § 194.24(g) 24-15

 24.4.12 40 CFR § 194.24(h) 24-16

 24.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 24-16

 24.5.1 40 CFR § 194.24(a) 24-16

 24.5.2 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(1) 24-19

 24.5.3 40 CFR §§ 194.24(b)(2) and (b)(3) 24-21

 24.5.4 40 CFR §§ 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2) 24-21

 24.5.5 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(2) 24-22

 24.5.6 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3) 24-22

 24.5.7 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(4) 24-23

 24.5.8 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5) 24-23

 24.5.9 40 CFR §§ 194.24(d) and (f) 24-24

 24.5.10 40 CFR § 194.24(g) 24-24

 24.5.11 40 CFR § 194.24(h) 24-24

 24.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 24-24

 24.6.1 40 CFR § 194.24(a) 24-24

 24.6.2 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(1) 24-25

 24.6.3 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(2) 24-25

24.6.4 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(3)..... 24-27
24.6.5 40 CFR §§ 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2) 24-27
24.6.6 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(2) 24-28
24.6.7 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3) 24-28
24.6.8 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(4) 24-29
24.6.9 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5) 24-29
24.6.10 40 CFR §§ 194.24(d) and (f)..... 24-29
24.6.11 40 CFR § 194.25(g)..... 24-29
24.6.12 40 CFR § 194.24(h)..... 24-30
24.7 References..... 24-30

List of Tables

Table 24-1. Significance and Changes in Components and Characteristics..... 24-10
Table 24-2. CPR Parameters Used in the CRA-2009 PA 24-26

Acronyms and Abbreviations

%	percent
AK	acceptable knowledge
AMWTF	Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility
CAO	Carlsbad Area Office
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CBFO	Carlsbad Field Office
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
Ci	curie
CPR	cellulose, plastic and rubber
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBR	Direct Brine Release
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FMT	Fracture-Matrix Transport
gal	gallon
GWB	generic weep brine
HLW	high-level waste
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
kg	kilogram
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LHS	Latin Hypercube Sampling
LWA	Land Withdrawal Act
M	molar
m ³	cubic meters
NDA	nondestructive assay
NDE	nondestructive examination
NMED	New Mexico Environment Department
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
PDP	performance demonstration program
QA	quality assurance

QAO	quality assurance objective
QAPP	Quality Assurance Program Plan
RFETS	Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
RTR	real-time radiography
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
TRU	transuranic
TWBIR	Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report
VE	visual examination
WAC	Waste Acceptance Criteria
WAP	Waste Analysis Plan
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WTWBIR	WIPP Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report
WUF	Waste Unit Factor
WWIS	WIPP Waste Information System
yr	year

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Am	americium
An	actinide
An(III)	general actinide in the +3 oxidation state
An(IV)	general actinide in the +4 oxidation state
An(V)	general actinide in the +5 oxidation state
CH ₄	methane
Cm	curium
CO ₂	carbon dioxide
Cs	cesium
EDTA	ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid
f(CO ₂)	fugacity of carbon dioxide
Mg ₅ (CO ₃) ₄ (OH) ₂ ·4H ₂ O	hydromagnesite
Mg	magnesium
Mg(OH) ₂	brucite
MgO	magnesium oxide
Np	neptunium
pH	the negative, common logarithm of the activity of H ⁺
Pu	plutonium
Sr	strontium
Th	thorium
Th(OH) ₄	thorium hydrate
U	uranium

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **24.0 Waste Characterization (40 CFR § 194.24)**

2 **24.1 Requirements**

§ 194.24 Waste Characterization

(a) Any compliance application shall describe the chemical, radiological and physical composition of all existing waste proposed for disposal in the disposal system. To the extent practicable, any compliance application shall also describe the chemical, radiological and physical composition of to-be-generated waste proposed for disposal in the disposal system. These descriptions shall include a list of the waste components and their approximate quantities in the waste. This list may be derived from process knowledge, current non-destructive examination/assay, or other information and methods.

(b) The Department shall submit in the compliance certification application the results of an analysis which substantiates:

(1) That all waste characteristics influencing containment of waste in the disposal system have been identified and assessed for their impact on disposal system performance. The characteristics to be analyzed shall include, but shall not be limited to: solubility; formation of colloidal suspensions containing radionuclides; production of gas from the waste; shear strength; compactability; and other waste-related inputs into the computer models that are used in the performance assessment.

(2) That all waste components influencing the waste characteristics identified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section have been identified and assessed for their impact on disposal system performance. The components to be analyzed shall include, but shall not be limited to: metals; cellulose; chelating agents; water and other liquids; and activity in curies of each isotope of the radionuclides present.

(3) Any decision to exclude consideration of any waste characteristic or waste component because such characteristic or component is not expected to significantly influence the containment of the waste in the disposal system.

(c) For each waste component identified and assessed pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, the Department shall specify the limiting value (expressed as an upper or lower limit of mass, volume, curies, concentration, etc.), and the associated uncertainty (i.e., margin of error) for each limiting value, of the total inventory of such waste proposed for disposal in the disposal system. Any compliance application shall:

(1) Demonstrate that, for the total inventory of waste proposed for disposal in the disposal system, WIPP complies with the numeric requirements of §194.34 and §194.55 for the upper or lower limits (including the associated uncertainties), as appropriate, for each waste component identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, and for the plausible combinations of upper and lower limits of such waste components that would result in the greatest estimated release.

(2) Identify and describe the method(s) used to quantify the limits of waste components identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

(3) Provide information which demonstrates that the use of process knowledge to quantify components in waste for disposal conforms with the quality assurance requirements found in Section 194.22.

(4) Provide information which demonstrates that a system of controls has been and will continue to be implemented to confirm that the total amount of each waste component that will be emplaced in the disposal system will not exceed the upper limiting value or fall below the lower limiting value described in the introductory text paragraph (c) of this section. The system of controls shall include, but shall not be limited to: Measurement; sampling; chain of custody records; record keeping systems; waste loading schemes used; and other documentation.

(5) Identify and describe such controls delineated in paragraph (c)(4) of this section and confirm that they are applied in accordance with the quality assurance requirements found in Section 194.22.

(d) The Department shall include a waste loading scheme in any compliance application, or else performance assessments conducted pursuant to § 194.32 and compliance assessments conducted pursuant to § 194.54 shall assume random placement of waste in the disposal system.

(e) Waste may be emplaced in the disposal system only if the emplaced components of such waste will not cause:

(1) The total quantity of waste in the disposal system to exceed the upper limiting value, including the associated uncertainty, described in the introductory text to paragraph (c) of this section; or

(2) The total quantity of waste that will have been emplaced in the disposal system, prior to closure, to fall below the lower limiting value, including the associated uncertainty, described in the introductory text to paragraph

(c) of this section.

(f) Waste emplacement shall conform to the assumed waste loading conditions, if any, used in performance assessments conducted pursuant to §194.32 and compliance assessments conducted pursuant to §194.54.

(g) The Department shall demonstrate in any compliance application that the total inventory of waste emplaced in the disposal system complies with the limitations on transuranic waste disposal described in the WIPP LWA.

(h) The administrator will use inspections and records, such as audits, to verify compliance with this section.

1

2 **24.2 Background**

3 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) first demonstrated and documented compliance with the
 4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) radioactive waste disposal requirements found
 5 in 40 CFR Part 191 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) in its Compliance
 6 Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996a). The EPA reviewed the
 7 CCA against their Certification Criteria, found in 40 CFR Part 194 (U.S. Environmental
 8 Protection Agency 1996), and certified that the DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
 9 complies with the radioactive waste disposal regulations set forth in 40 CFR Part 191 Subparts B
 10 and C (Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
 11 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Waste) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a). In
 12 their demonstration of compliance, the DOE developed a computational modeling system to
 13 predict the future performance of the repository for 10,000 years (yrs) after closure. The system,
 14 called WIPP Performance Assessment (PA), must consider both natural and man-made processes
 15 and events that affect the disposal system.

16 The WIPP PA requires many input parameters to represent the complex coupled processes that
 17 are expected to occur throughout the 10,000-yr regulatory time period. Some of these
 18 parameters relate directly to the transuranic (TRU) waste inventory. The TRU waste inventory
 19 includes information about materials in the waste (wood, metal, soil, etc.), materials used to
 20 package waste (steel drums, plastic liners, etc.), emplacement materials (cellulose, plastic, and
 21 rubber [CPR]), radionuclides in the waste, and key chemicals in the waste that are expected to
 22 impact or have a role in the performance of the repository. The TRU waste information needed
 23 as input to WIPP PA is waste volumes, waste materials, packaging materials, emplacement
 24 materials, radionuclide activities, complexing agents (ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid [EDTA],
 25 acetate, citrate, oxalate, acetic acid, citric acid, and oxalic acid), and oxyanions (sulfate, nitrate,
 26 and phosphate).

27 TRU waste inventory has been reported by the DOE since 1994. The first inventory was
 28 reported as the *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report*
 29 (WTWBIR) (U.S. Department of Energy 1994). This report was followed by Revision 1 of the
 30 WTWBIR (U.S. Department of Energy 1995a) and two additional baseline reports, *Transuranic*
 31 *Waste Baseline Inventory Report* (TWBIR) Revisions 2 and 3 (U.S. Department of Energy
 32 1995b and 1996b, respectively).

33 The TWBIR Revisions 2 and 3, included in the CCA, Appendix BIR, reported the TRU waste
 34 inventory basis for the CCA WIPP PA and the Performance Assessment Verification Test
 35 (PAVT) (U.S. Department of Energy 1997). Following the receipt of the CCA PAVT analysis,

1 the EPA ruled in May 1998 that the WIPP met the requirements for permanent disposal of TRU
2 waste (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

3 The first shipment of radioactive TRU waste from the nation's nuclear weapons complex arrived
4 at the WIPP site in late March 1999. This marked the time for subsequent recertification of the
5 WIPP every five years after initial waste receipt, as required by the Land Withdrawal Act (LWA)
6 (U. S. Congress 1996). Thus the first Compliance Recertification Application (CRA), CRA-
7 2004, was submitted to the EPA by the DOE in March 2004. In the CRA-2004, the DOE
8 prepared a TRU waste inventory that was published in Appendix DATA, Attachment F and
9 associated annexes.

10 During its review of the PA submitted in the CRA-2004, the EPA directed the DOE to conduct
11 the CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (PABC) (Cotsworth 2005). Leigh,
12 Trone, and Fox (2005) defined the inventory for the CRA-2004 PABC. This inventory
13 information was later published in the Transuranic Baseline Inventory Report-2004 (U.S.
14 Department of Energy 2006).

15 Following the receipt of the CRA-2004 PABC analysis, the EPA ruled on March 29, 2006 that
16 the DOE demonstrated continued compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.24 and the
17 repository was recertified (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a).

18 The inventory for the CRA-2009 PA is the same inventory used for the CRA-2004 PABC. Since
19 the CRA-2004 PABC was completed, the *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report-2007*
20 (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a) was published and provides updated inventory information.
21 The DOE anticipates this inventory update will have only a small impact on normalized releases
22 relative to the CRA-2009 PA, and will not be significant for compliance. The details of the
23 inventory used for CRA-2009 are presented in the CRA-2004 PABC inventory summarized in
24 *TRU Waste Inventory for the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance*
25 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005).

26 **24.3 1998 Certification Decision**

27 **24.3.1 40 CFR § 194.24(a)**

28 In accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.24(a), the DOE provided in the CCA a
29 description of existing TRU waste, a list of approximate quantities of waste components, and
30 descriptions for to-be-generated TRU waste to the extent practicable. This information was
31 provided by the DOE in the form of waste profiles that were reviewed by EPA. Upon
32 completion of the review of these profiles, the EPA found the DOE in compliance with section
33 194.24(a) (Compliance Application Review Document [CARD] 24, Section 24.A.6 [pp. 24-7
34 through 24-9], U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

35 **24.3.2 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(1)**

36 In accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(1), the DOE presented the results of
37 its waste characteristic and components analyses in the CCA, Chapter 4.0 and Appendices
38 MASS, WCA, SOTERM, and SA. The DOE indicated that the following characteristics were

1 expected at the time of the CCA to have a significant effect on disposal system performance:
2 radionuclide solubilities (including oxidation state distributions); formation of colloidal
3 suspensions containing radionuclides; production of gas from the waste (hydrogen, and microbial
4 substrate/nutrients for methane (CH₄) gas generation); shear strength, compactability (waste
5 compressibility), and particle diameter; radioactivity in curies (Ci) for each isotope; and TRU
6 radioactivity at closure.

7 These characteristics were included in the PA for the CCA. The EPA concluded that the DOE
8 generally performed a thorough and well documented analysis, adequately identified all waste
9 characteristics and, except for actinide (An) solubility and shear strength, appropriately assessed
10 them as PA input parameters. The CCA PAVT was run using modified parameters, which
11 satisfied the EPA's concerns (CARD 23, p. 23-10 and Section 12.4 [pp. 23-42 through 23-68],
12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998c, and CARD 24, Section 24.B.6 [pp. 24-26 through
13 24-31], U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

14 **24.3.3 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(2)**

15 In accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(2), the DOE identified a number of
16 waste components and characteristics that would be important to performance. The EPA
17 reviewed these components and characteristics and identified several issues with the DOE's
18 treatment of them in the CCA PA. However, through independent analysis and changes made in
19 the CCA PAVT, these issues were resolved and the EPA determined that the DOE complied with
20 this section (CARD 24, Section 24.C.5 [pp. 24-40 through 24-41], U.S. Environmental
21 Protection Agency 1998b).

22 **24.3.4 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(3)**

23 In accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(3), the DOE provided a list of those
24 waste characteristics and components that were excluded from consideration in the PA for
25 various reasons. The EPA had questions pertaining to assumptions and conclusions made by the
26 DOE regarding organic ligands, but concluded that DOE's treatment of organic ligands in the PA
27 was adequate based on relevant literature and bounding assumptions using 1000 times the EDTA
28 concentrations expected to be present in the repository (CARD 24, Section 24.D.5 [pp. 24-43
29 through 24-44], U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

30 **24.3.5 40 CFR §§ 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), (e)(2)**

31 In accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR §§ 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2), the DOE
32 specified the limiting value of the following waste material components: ferrous metals
33 (minimum 2×10^7 kilograms [kg]); CPR (maximum 2×10^7 kg); free water emplaced with the
34 waste (maximum 1,684 cubic meters [m³]); and nonferrous metals (metals not containing iron)
35 (minimum 2×10^3 kg). In addition to these limits, the DOE provided plausible combinations of
36 upper and lower limits and a rationale for these limits, the results of modeling code runs, the
37 demonstration of numeric compliance, and the greatest release estimates. These limits, model
38 runs, maximum calculated releases, and release estimates are found to be adequately described
39 according to the EPA. (CARD 24, Section 24.F.5 [pp. 24-58 through 24-65], U.S. Environmental
40 Protection Agency 1998b).

1 The EPA also agreed that the PA appropriately accounted for the upper and lower limits because
2 fixed values were used.

3 In a determination of compliance with sections 194.24(e)(1) and (e)(2), the EPA reviewed the
4 DOE's description of system controls, chain of custody information, controls in place to track
5 WIPP TRU waste, waste record keeping and accountability systems, and WIPP Waste
6 Acceptance Criteria (WAC) requirements and controls. The EPA reviewed the CCA and
7 determined that the DOE adequately referenced and summarized the WIPP WAC in the CCA
8 (CARD 24, Section 24.H.5 [pp. 24-80 through 24-84], U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
9 1998b).

10 **24.3.6 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(2)**

11 In accordance with 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(2), the DOE proposed using nondestructive examination
12 (NDE). Real-time radiography (RTR) and visual examination (VE) were used to quantify the
13 amounts of specific waste material components in TRU waste. The DOE described numerous
14 nondestructive assay (NDA) instrument systems to determine radionuclides in the waste and
15 described the equipment and instrumentation for NDA, RTR, and VE found in facilities. The
16 DOE also provided information about performance demonstration programs (PDP) intended to
17 show that data obtained by each NDA method could meet data quality objectives established by
18 the DOE including sensitivity, precision, and accuracy relative to limiting values.

19 The EPA found the methods described, when implemented appropriately, would be adequate to
20 characterize the important waste material components and radionuclides in TRU waste (CARD
21 24, Section 24.I.6 [pp. 24-87 through 24-89], U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b, and
22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996).

23 **24.3.7 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3)**

24 In accordance with 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3), the EPA determined that the DOE adequately
25 described the use of acceptable knowledge (AK) only for legacy debris waste at the Los Alamos
26 National Laboratory (LANL) (Dials 1997; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996; CARD
27 24; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

28 **24.3.8 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(4)**

29 In accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(4), the DOE described the system of
30 documented controls used for waste characterization activities that described the management,
31 operations, and quality assurance (QA) aspects of the program ensuring data completeness,
32 accuracy, and discrepancy resolution prior to waste receipt at the WIPP. The DOE indicated that
33 this system of controls would be monitored by the DOE/Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) audit and
34 surveillance program. In addition, the DOE provided descriptions of the documentation, data
35 fields, and features of the WIPP Waste Information System (WWIS).

36 The EPA determined that the DOE provided an adequate description of the system controls and
37 processes for maintaining centralized command and control over TRU waste characterization
38 activities. This was inspected and verified by the EPA at LANL. Conditions 2 and 3 of the 1998

1 Certification Decision specified that the DOE was prohibited from shipping waste for disposal at
2 the WIPP until the EPA approved site-specific waste characterization programs and controls
3 (CARD 24, Section 24.H.5 [pp. 24-80 through 24-84], U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
4 1998b).

5 **24.3.9 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5)**

6 In accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5), the DOE described the PDP for
7 NDA as required by the WIPP Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP). Under this CBFO
8 program, the PDP standards address activity ranges relative to WAC limits, QAPP quality
9 assurance objectives (QAO), and NDA method detection limits. (See CARD22 U.S.
10 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b, for additional discussion of QA for waste
11 characterization activities.) The EPA reviewed the updated PDP Plan for NDA and concluded
12 that the DOE provided adequate information regarding the PDP for NDA for LANL and Rocky
13 Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) at the time of inspections. The EPA confirmed
14 through inspections at LANL that the system of controls and the measurement techniques
15 described and implemented at LANL were adequate to characterize waste and ensure compliance
16 with the limits of waste components for disposal at the WIPP (CARD 22, Section 22.B-5 [pp.
17 22-7 through 22-8], U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b). RFETS was later certified
18 to ship waste to WIPP.

19 **24.3.10 40 CFR §§ 194.24(d) and (f)**

20 In accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR §§ 194.24(d) and (f), the DOE had (1) assumed
21 random waste loading and (2) evaluated the potential consequences resulting from the
22 nonrandom loading of the highest-activity waste stream containing at least 810 drums in WIPP.
23 As a result of the evaluation, the DOE determined that a final waste loading plan was in fact
24 unnecessary for the WIPP. The EPA therefore concluded that the DOE adequately cross-
25 referenced the resultant waste distribution assumptions from the waste loading plan with the
26 waste distribution assumptions used in the PA by random distribution of radioactive waste in the
27 repository (CARD 24, Section 24.J.6 [pp. 24-94 through 24-96], U.S. Environmental Protection
28 Agency 1998b).

29 **24.3.11 40 CFR § 194.24(g)**

30 In accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.24(g), the DOE identified the following
31 LWA limits to demonstrate compliance:

- 32 • Curie limits for remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-TRU) waste: 5.1 million Ci
33 (approximately 1.89×10^{17} becquerels).
- 34 • Total capacity of RH and contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU) waste that
35 may be disposed: 6.2 million ft³ (175,564 m³).
- 36 • RH-TRU waste will not exceed 1,000 rem per hour, no more than 5 percent (%) by volume
37 of RH-TRU will exceed 100 rem per hour, and RH-TRU will not exceed 23 Ci per liter
38 maximum activity level (averaged over the volume of the canister).

1 In addition, the DOE provided numerous tables that presented the WIPP waste inventory in
2 terms of activity (in Ci) and total volumes (in m³). The EPA reviewed this information,
3 including the process the DOE outlined for controlling the waste and the use of the WWIS, and
4 determined that the DOE had an adequate program for tracking and controlling the waste (CARD
5 24, Section 24.K.5 [pp. 24-98 through 24-99], U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

6 **24.3.12 40 CFR § 194.24(h)**

7 The EPA found the DOE in compliance with provisions of 40 CFR § 194.24(h). Discussion of
8 inspections and records, such as audits is addressed by the EPA in CARD 22 (U.S.
9 Environmental Protection Agency 1998d).

10 **24.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

11 **24.4.1 40 CFR § 194.24(a)**

12 To meet the requirements of section 194.24(a), the DOE described and categorized the TRU
13 waste currently emplaced in the WIPP and the waste that existed or was expected to be generated
14 at the DOE TRU waste sites in the CRA-2004. The DOE developed a descriptive methodology
15 for collecting and grouping waste information obtained from each TRU waste site. The DOE
16 also described and categorized the TRU waste that was currently emplaced in the WIPP and the
17 waste that existed or was expected to be generated at the DOE TRU waste sites. The emplaced
18 waste was tracked as reported in the WWIS and was included in the CRA-2004 inventory. The
19 details of the CRA-2004 inventory are presented in the CRA-2004, Chapter 4.0: Appendix TRU
20 WASTE; and Appendix DATA, Attachment F.

21 As a result of responses to questions from the EPA during their review of the CRA-2004 PA, the
22 DOE was directed to conduct a new PA for recertification to incorporate inventory changes as
23 well as other technical changes (Cotsworth 2005). The new inventory components and
24 radiological estimates were reported in TWBIR-2004 (U.S. Department of Energy 2006) and
25 subsequently summarized in the CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report (Leigh, Trone, and Fox
26 2005).

27 **24.4.1.1 Inventory Description**

28 The CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report, Table 4 (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) lists the volumes
29 of emplaced CH-TRU waste as of September 30, 2002 (the cutoff for inclusion in the CRA-2004
30 PA) and August 1, 2005 (the cutoff for inclusion in the CRA-2004 PABC). Table 5 of the same
31 report lists the stored and projected CH-TRU waste estimates used for the CCA, CRA-2004 PA,
32 and the CRA-2004 PABC. The projected inventory information is derived from the updated
33 waste stream profile forms, and reflects each site's best determination of the waste expected to
34 be generated and is originally presented in the CRA-2004, Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3. Leigh,
35 Trone, and Fox (2005), Tables 9 and 10, show the anticipated nonradioactive components of the
36 TRU waste inventory.

37 For PA to model a full repository, the DOE used a scaling factor in the same manner used in the
38 CCA. However, unlike in the CCA, the CRA-2004 also used this scaling methodology on RH-

1 TRU waste. The techniques of inventory scaling are presented in TWBIR 2004 (U.S.
2 Department of Energy 2006).

3 **24.4.1.2 Number of Curies**

4 The radionuclide activity expected to be placed in the WIPP decreased from the CCA estimate of
5 3.44 million Ci to 2.32 million Ci in the CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report (Leigh, Trone, and
6 Fox 2005, Section 4.4, p. 36). Table 14 of the CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report listed the
7 activity by radionuclide for the CCA PA, the CRA-2004 PA, and the CRA-2004 PABC.

8 Below are the new inventory items since 1998 that were included in the CRA-2004 PA and the
9 CRA-2004 PABC inventory.

- 10 • Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Buried Waste—DOE included the INL pre-1970 buried
11 waste in the CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) as a result of
12 an April 2003 Federal District Court judgment against the DOE on the buried waste. The
13 CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) estimated 17,998 m³ of
14 TRU waste in five waste streams from the pre-1970 buried waste at INL.
- 15 • Supercompacted Waste—Supercompacted waste from INL’s Advanced Mixed Waste
16 Treatment Facility (AMWTF) was included in the CRA-2004 PABC TRU waste inventory
17 estimate. After an extensive analysis of this waste (Marcinowski 2003), the EPA concluded
18 that the supercompacted waste could be considered within the existing waste envelope and
19 PA. The EPA approved the disposal of the supercompacted waste (Marcinowski 2004).
20 Prior to shipping this waste, the EPA conducted a waste characterization inspection of the
21 AMWTF (Gitlin 2005).
- 22 • Hanford Tank Waste—The DOE’s Office of River Protection determined that waste from 12
23 of the 177 tanks at the Hanford site was TRU waste or would be TRU waste after treatment.
24 A description of these tanks and their waste streams and generating process are shown in
25 CARD 24, Table 24-1 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b). Patterson (2005a)
26 and Patterson (2005b) present the DOE’s documentation for these TRU tanks.
- 27 • Hanford Waste from K-Basin—The DOE’s CRA-2004 PABC TRU waste inventory also
28 included two waste streams, RL-W445 and RL-W446, consisting of ~50 m³ of waste, from
29 the Hanford K-East and K-West Basins (Patterson 2005a and 2005b).
- 30 • Container Types—Container types new to the CRA-2004 PABC inventory included: ten-
31 drum overpack, 5 × 5 × 8 boxes, 100-gallon (gal) drums, and pipe overpacks within drums.
32 The container types were considered in the CRA-2004 PABC inventory development process
33 since it was important to estimate the amount of CPR in the WIPP (Leigh, Trone, and Fox
34 2005, Section 4.2, p. 30).
- 35 • Organic Ligands—Four organic ligands were included in the Fracture-Matrix Transport
36 (FMT) calculations of An solubilities: acetate, citrate, EDTA, and oxalate (Detwiler 2004a).
37 Further discussion on organic ligands for the CCA can be found in the CCA, Appendix
38 SOTERM, Section 5.0, and CARD 24, Section 24.C.5 [pp. 24-40 and 24-41] (U.S.

1 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b). Organic ligands are further discussed in the
2 CRA-2004 PA (Attachment SOTERM (Section 5.0, p. 42) and U.S. Environmental
3 Protection Agency 2006d).

4 Changes and details on the inventory process and description are discussed further in CARD 24
5 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

6 **24.4.2 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(1)**

7 There were no major changes to the waste characteristics between the CCA PAVT and the CRA-
8 2004 PABC, but the DOE did change some of the waste components used in the PA. These
9 changes are summarized in Table 24-2 of CARD 24 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
10 2006c) and are presented in Table 24-1 below.

11 **24.4.2.1 Assessment of Waste Characteristics and Waste Characteristic Input** 12 **Parameters**

13 In the CCA, the DOE identified several waste characteristics as being potentially important to
14 the PA (the CCA, Appendix WCA, Section WCA.6, pp. WCA-42 through WCA-43) based on
15 available information, including uncertainties and WIPP system characterization. These analyses
16 were summarized in the CCA, Appendices WCA, SOTERM, and MASS, and were augmented
17 by the DOE's responses to the EPA comments (CARD 24, Sections 24.B.5 and 24.B.6 [pp. 24-
18 12 through 24-31], U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b). The CRA-2004 identifies the
19 same important characteristics, and also states that organic ligands could be important to
20 solubility. The CRA-2004 PABC, therefore, includes the ligands in the solubility calculations
21 (Brush and Xiong 2005).

22 **24.4.2.2 Solubility**

23 The DOE originally stated in the CCA that solubility of actinides was among the major
24 characteristics of the radionuclides expected to affect disposal system performance (the CCA,
25 Appendix WCA, Section WCA.4, pp. WCA-30 through WCA-34). The DOE assessed the
26 solubility of thorium (Th), uranium (U), neptunium (Np), plutonium (Pu), and americium (Am)
27 (Appendix SOTERM, U.S. Department of Energy 1996a).

28 In addition, the DOE assumed that cesium (Cs) and strontium (Sr) were completely (100%)
29 soluble, therefore the concentrations of these two radionuclides were determined from the
30 quantities listed in the inventory (the CCA, Appendix WCA, p. 30).

31 The DOE used the FMT geochemical modeling code and its associated database to calculate
32 solubilities. No changes were made to the FMT code or conceptual models for the CRA-2004
33 PA or the CRA-2004 PABC. However, revisions were made to the input FMT database since
34 the CCA PAVT. These changes included the addition of new aqueous An species to the
35 database and revisions to existing species data because of the availability of new experimental
36 data. (See Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM, U.S. Department of Energy 2004.)

Table 24-1. Significance and Changes in Components and Characteristics

Waste Component or Characteristic Used in PA	Increase or Decrease From CCA to CRA-2004 PABC	Significance
Radioactivity (Ci/m ³)	Decrease	Used in calculating releases
Solubility	Increase and decrease, depending on oxidation state	Higher solubility can lead to higher releases
Organic ligands—complexing agents	Similar amounts	Increases solubility
Amount of Metals	Decrease	Maintains reducing environment, but also contributes to gas generation
Amount of CPRs	Increase	May increase gas generation from microbial processes
Oxyanions: nitrate, sulfate, and phosphate	Similar, but overall increase	Nutrients for microbes - affects gas generation
Cement	Decrease	Volume related component
Shear Strength	No change	Affects mechanical releases during low waste shear strength
Particle Diameter	The CRA-2004 PABC used the particle diameter determination from expert panel findings during the original certification.	Used to calculate spillings releases
Formation of colloidal suspensions	No change in parameterization	Colloids can facilitate transport of radionuclides in groundwater

1

2 The DOE used the generic weep brine (GWB) Salado brine chemistry formulation instead of the
 3 Brine A formulation used in the CCA PA and PAVT. The most significant differences between
 4 the brine formulations were the lower magnesium concentration and higher sulfate concentration
 5 in GWB relative to Brine A. Comparison of geochemical modeling results using the two brine
 6 formulations indicated that GWB brines had slightly lower predicted An(III) solubilities and
 7 higher An(V) solubilities compared to Brine A.

8 **24.4.2.3 Performance Assessment Parameters Related to Solubility**

9 The solubility of actinides in the III, IV, V, and VI oxidation states for both the Castile and
 10 Salado brines were calculated by the DOE with the assumption that pH and the fugacity of

1 carbon dioxide ($f(\text{CO}_2)$) were controlled by the brucite ($\text{Mg}(\text{OH})_2$)–hydromagnesite
2 ($\text{Mg}_5(\text{CO}_3)_4(\text{OH})_2 \cdot 4\text{H}_2\text{O}$) buffer. The solubilities from the CCA and the CRA-2004 are listed in
3 Table 24-3 of CARD 24 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

4 The uncertainty ranges for the actinides in the CRA-2004 PA were the same as those used in the
5 CCA (Bynum 1996). The uncertainties in the An solubilities were used to define the range for
6 Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) of the An concentrations in the PA, assuming a log cumulative
7 distribution (CARD 24, Section 24.B.5 [pp. 24-15 and 25-16], U.S. Environmental Protection
8 Agency 1998b).

9 **24.4.2.4 Formation of Colloidal Suspensions Containing Radionuclides**

10 Formation of colloidal suspensions was evaluated by the DOE as an important group of waste
11 characteristics. Actinides can be mobilized in colloidal form as intrinsic colloids or absorbed on
12 nonradioactive colloidal particles. In the CCA, the DOE determined that four types of colloids
13 may be present in the WIPP repository: intrinsic colloids, mineral fragment colloids, humic
14 colloids, and microbial colloids (the CCA, Appendix WCA, Section WCA. 4.2, pp. WCA-34
15 through WCA-36). These colloids were modeled in the CRA-2004 PABC and were unchanged
16 from the CCA (see CARD 24, Sections 24.B.5 and 24.B.6 [pp. 24-12 through 24-31], U.S.
17 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b, and CCA Appendix SOTERM, Section 6.0, U.S.
18 Department of Energy 1996a).

19 The DOE implemented the colloidal An source term differently in the CRA-2004 PA than in the
20 CCA. In the CCA, the DOE assumed all vectors would have a microbial colloid contribution to
21 the An source term. For the CRA-2004 PA, the DOE assumed there would be microbial colloid
22 transport only in vectors with microbial degradation. In the CRA-2004 PABC it was assumed
23 that all vectors included microbial activity and thus included microbial colloid transport.

24 **24.4.2.5 Production of Gas From the Waste (Including Microbial Substrate and** 25 **Nutrients)**

26 Gas generation included hydrogen gas generation as well as carbon dioxide (CO_2) and CH_4
27 generation by microbial degradation. Anoxic corrosion produces hydrogen gas and microbial
28 action on microbial substrates such as CPR, as well as other microbial nutrients (nitrate, sulfate
29 and phosphate), which produce CO_2 and CH_4 .

30 The same conceptual model was used for microbial gas generation in the WIPP repository for
31 both the CCA and the CRA-2004. Information about the models used for the CCA and the
32 CRA-2004 can be found in the CCA, Appendix SOTERM, Section SOTERM-8.2.2 and the
33 CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM, Section SOTERM-2.2.2, respectively.

34 Microbial gas generation rates used in the average stoichiometry model were based on
35 experimental data from microbial consumption of papers (cellulose) under inundated and humid
36 conditions (Wang and Brush 1996). A gas-generation rate is determined in BRAGFLO (fluid
37 flow code) for the humid and inundated rates based on the effective liquid saturation (CRA-
38 2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.3). These gas generation rates were calculated from the initial

1 linear part of the experimental curve of CO₂ as a function of time (the CRA-2004, Appendix PA,
2 Attachment PAR; Wang and Brush 1996).

3 For the CRA-2004 PABC, the DOE requested a change to the gas generation rate PA parameters
4 based on the DOE's review of additional experimental data collected over the last 10 years
5 (Nemer and Stein 2005; Nemer, Stein, and Zelinski 2005). The gas generation experiments
6 exhibited two rates: an initial higher rate, and a second lower rate. The DOE proposed to the
7 EPA that the long-term rate be the gas generation rate used in the PA calculations, with the initial
8 higher rate incorporated as an initial higher pressure.

9 The DOE used LHS in the CRA-2004 PA for the following gas-generation-related parameters:

- 10 • Inundated steel corrosion rate
- 11 • Probability of microbial degradation of plastics and rubbers (in the event of microbial gas
12 generation)
- 13 • Biodegradation rate of inundated and humic celluloses
- 14 • Factor β for microbial reaction

15 **24.4.2.6 Performance Assessment Parameters Related to Shear Strength,** 16 **Compactability (Compressibility), and Particle Diameter**

17 There were no changes in these parameters from the CCA PAVT through the CRA-2004 PABC.

18 **24.4.2.7 Radioactivity in Curies**

19 In the CCA (Sections 3.1 and 3.2; Appendix WCA), the DOE indicated that the radioactivity of
20 each isotope was important to the PA because it directly affected the waste unit factor (WUF)
21 (number of million Ci of TRU isotopes in the WIPP inventory) (see the CCA, Appendix WCA,
22 Table WCA-1). Since the same approach was used in the CRA-2004, the approach is
23 summarized here.

24 The following radionuclides were determined at the time of the CCA to be important by the DOE
25 (the CCA, Appendix WCA, Figure WCA-4):

- 26 • Cuttings/cavings/spallings release: ²³⁸Pu, ²³⁹Pu, ²⁴⁰Pu, ²⁴¹Pu, ²⁴¹Am, ²³³U, ²³⁴U, ⁹⁰Sr, ¹³⁷Cs,
27 ²⁴⁴Cm
- 28 • Direct Brine release (DBR): ²³⁸Pu, ²³⁹Pu, ²⁴⁰Pu, ²⁴¹Pu, ²⁴²Pu, ²⁴¹Am, ²⁴³Am, ²³³U, ²³⁴U, ²³⁵U,
29 ²³⁶U, ²³⁸U, ²²⁹Th, ²³⁰Th, ²³²Th, ²³⁷Np, ²⁴³Cm, ²⁴⁴Cm, ²⁴⁵Cm
- 30 • Long-term groundwater release: ²³⁹Pu, ²⁴⁰Pu, ²⁴²Pu, ²⁴¹Am, ²³³U, ²³⁴U, ²²⁹Th, ²³⁰Th

31 The DOE indicated that U and Th isotopes were required in DBR assessments because, although
32 they comprise negligible fractions of the total EPA unit, they did influence the total quantity of
33 dissolved radionuclides (the CCA, Appendix WCA, p. WCA-22). In addition, the DOE

1 indicated that although EPA units for ^{90}Sr and ^{137}Cs at the time of the WIPP's closure were
2 significant, they are not included in direct release of brine because they rapidly decay within the
3 first few hundred years after closure and result in "negligible impact on the PA" (the CCA,
4 Appendix WCA, p. WCA-26). In addition, the DOE indicated that if a DBR occurred early after
5 closure, the total brine released would be minimal and the ^{90}Sr and ^{137}Cs would still, therefore,
6 play a minor role in compliance (the CCA, Appendix WCA, p. WCA-26).

7 The DOE justified the radionuclide list for the long-term groundwater pathway (releases to the
8 Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation [hereafter referred to as Culebra]) in the
9 CCA, Appendix WCA, Section WCA.3.2.3, pp. WCA-26 through WCA-27.

10 In the CRA-2004 PABC, the selection of isotopes for modeling transport in the disposal system
11 with NUTS and PANEL was described in the CRA-2004, Appendix TRU WASTE, Section TRU
12 WASTE-2.0. PANEL runs included nearly all isotopes of the six actinides studied in the
13 Actinide Source Term Program: Th, U, Np, Pu, Am, and curium (Cm). NUTS runs explicitly
14 included five isotopes: ^{230}Th , ^{234}U , ^{238}Pu , ^{239}Pu , and ^{241}Am (Garner and Leigh 2005).

15 **24.4.2.8 PA Parameters Related to Radioactivity in Curies of Each Isotope**

16 The DOE used the information from the update of the CCA inventory to define the isotope
17 inventory for the CRA-2004 PA (the CRA-2004, Chapter 4.0). The CRA-2004 PABC Inventory
18 Report (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005, Table 14, p. 37) provides the radioactivity in Ci of each
19 isotope used in the CRA-2004 PABC.

20 **24.4.2.9 TRU Radioactivity at Closure**

21 The CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report, Table 14 (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) lists the DOE
22 inventory at closure, based upon the September 2002 cutoff and the CRA-2004 PABC update as
23 described in Section 24.4.1. The CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report indicated that the inventory
24 estimate was 2.32×10^6 Ci and the WUF was 2.32, with inventory activity decayed to the year
25 2033.

26 **24.4.2.10 PA Parameters Related to TRU Radioactivity at Closure**

27 The 2.32 WUF was the number of millions of curies of alpha-emitting TRU radionuclides with
28 half-lives longer than 20 years used in the calculation of the EPA normalized unit. Overall,
29 activity at 2033 for all TRU radionuclides has decreased from 2.55×10^6 Ci reported in the CCA
30 to 2.48×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2004 inventory estimate to 2.32×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2004 PABC
31 inventory estimate. The DOE discussed the WUF value in the CRA-2004 PABC Inventory
32 Report (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005, p. 36).

33 **24.4.3 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(2)**

34 The DOE indicated that ferrous metals, cellulose, organic chelating agents, radioactivity in curies
35 of each isotope, α -emitting TRU radionuclides with half-life greater than 20 years, solid waste
36 components (e.g., soils and cementitious materials), sulfates and nitrates were expected to have a
37 significant effect on disposal system performance and so were used in the CCA PA, CRA-2004

1 PA, and the CRA-2004 PABC. Most of the inventory amounts of the listed components changed
2 and were discussed in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM, Table SOTERM-4;
3 Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005; and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006e. The only
4 significant change was the incorporation of organic ligands in the An solubility PA calculations.
5 The DOE updated the FMT thermodynamic databases with information related to organics to
6 account for the organic ligands' affect on An solubility (the CRA-2004, Appendix PA,
7 Attachment SOTERM, Section SOTERM-5.0). Organic ligand inventories were recalculated for
8 the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush and Xiong 2005).

9 Changes and details on the effect of components on disposal system performance are discussed
10 further in CARD 24 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

11 **24.4.4 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(3)**

12 The DOE provided a list of waste characteristics and components that were excluded from
13 consideration in the PA for various reasons, such as negligible impact (the CCA, Appendix
14 WCA, Table WCA-4 and CRA-2004 Appendix TRU WASTE, Section TRU WASTE-6.0). The
15 effect of organic ligands, however, is incorporated into the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush and Xiong
16 2005).

17 **24.4.5 40 CFR §§ 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2)**

18 For the CRA-2004 PA, the DOE did not make any changes to the limits identified in the CCA or
19 their implementation in the CRA-2004 PA. In reviewing the CRA-2004 PA, the EPA identified
20 that the packaging materials for the INL supercompacted waste were omitted from the CPR total,
21 but these packaging materials were included in the CRA-2004 PABC as part of the inventory
22 estimate. See CARD 24 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c) for further discussion.

23 **24.4.6 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(2)**

24 As noted in 40 CFR § 194.24(b), the DOE did not modify the list of CCA components and
25 characteristics requiring quantification. Therefore, the CRA-2004 did not identify any
26 significant changes to the measurement techniques used in the waste characterization program
27 (i.e., VE, RTR, AK, and NDA). In addition, the CRA-2004 did not propose changes to the
28 current waste characterization program through use of different NDA and NDE characterization
29 methodologies. The CRA-2004 indicated that the location of NDA and NDE methodology
30 documentation and information regarding QAOs had changed since the CCA. There were also
31 several minor changes to the characterization program. The changes the EPA identified are
32 specified in CARD 24 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

33 **24.4.7 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3)**

34 The CRA-2004 was revised to show that the AK process was presented in the CH-TRU WAC.
35 The CH-TRU WAC was revised to include more discussion of AK with respect to radionuclides
36 (U.S. Department of Energy 2002). Modifications made to the CH-TRU WAC since the CCA
37 that were pertinent to AK included the use of existing AK collected prior to the implementation
38 of a QA program under 40 CFR § 194.22(a), methods for confirming isotopic ratios using AK,

1 required and supplemental AK documentation, discrepancy resolution and data limitation
2 identification, and AK-radioassay data measurement comparisons as a means to assess
3 comparability. Existing AK collected prior to the implementation of a QA program under
4 section 194.22(a) may be qualified by peer review, corroborating data, confirmatory testing, or
5 collection of data under an equivalent QA program. See CARD 24 (U.S. Environmental
6 Protection Agency 2006c) for further discussion.

7 **24.4.8 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(4)**

8 The DOE uses the WWIS to track data for emplaced waste in the WIPP. For the CCA, the
9 WWIS used Oracle (Version 7) and for the CRA-2004, the WWIS used Oracle (Version 9):
10 otherwise, there were no changes. In the CRA-2004, a statement was included, “additional
11 computing system upgrades may be implemented in the future.” See CARD 24 (U.S.
12 Environmental Protection Agency 2006c) for further discussion.

13 **24.4.9 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5)**

14 The DOE described the changes to the PDP in the CRA-2004, Chapter 4.0, Section 4.3.3.1 PDP
15 (p. 4-49). There were three significant changes in this section relative to the CCA: (1) the
16 QAPP is no longer referenced as the document defining the PDP QAO requirements, (2) the PDP
17 Plan was removed as a reference and replaced by the statement that “the NDA PDP plans are
18 revised as required,” and (3) the section no longer contains a detailed description of the isotopes
19 to be analyzed and the configuration of the PDP tests. Other minor changes are addressed in
20 CARD 24 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

21 The DOE also revised the quality document hierarchy for waste characterization activities by
22 making the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) Quality Assurance Program Document a higher-tier
23 document and the QAPP of lesser importance. This new document hierarchy is shown in the
24 CRA-2004, Chapter 4.0, Figure 4-3, which replaced the CCA, Chapter 4.0, Figure 4-6.

25 **24.4.10 40 CFR §§ 194.24(d) and (f)**

26 The DOE did not use a performance-based waste loading scheme for waste emplacement in
27 WIPP, and the DOE assumed random waste loading in its performance and compliance
28 assessments. Prior to the CRA-2004, the EPA requested that DOE analyze waste loading with
29 respect to supercompacted waste, and the DOE identified that clustering of waste would not
30 affect performance (Marcinowski 2003, Park and Hansen 2003, and Marcinowski 2004). See
31 CARD24 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c) for further discussion.

32 **24.4.11 40 CFR § 194.24(g)**

33 The DOE uses the WWIS to track the limitations on TRU waste disposal described in the WIPP
34 LWA. For the CCA, the WWIS used Oracle (Version 7) and for the CRA-2004, the WWIS used
35 Oracle (Version 9). Otherwise, there were no changes. In the CRA-2004, a statement was
36 included: “additional computing system upgrades may be implemented in the future.” See
37 CARD 24 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c) for further discussion.

1 **24.4.12 40 CFR § 194.24(h)**

2 The EPA found the DOE in compliance with provisions of section 194.24(h). Discussion of
3 inspections and records, such as audits, is addressed by EPA in CARD 22 (U.S. Environmental
4 Protection Agency 2006b).

5 **24.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

6 **24.5.1 40 CFR § 194.24(a)**

7 The EPA reviewed the CRA-2004 and supplemental information to determine whether it
8 provided a sufficiently complete description of the chemical, radiological, and physical
9 composition of the emplaced, existing, and to-be-generated waste proposed for disposal in the
10 WIPP. The EPA also reviewed the DOE's description of the approximate quantities of waste
11 components (for both existing and to-be-generated waste). The EPA considered whether the
12 DOE's waste descriptions were of sufficient detail to enable the EPA to conclude that the DOE
13 did not overlook any component that is present in TRU waste and has significant potential to
14 influence releases of radionuclides.

15 Based on the EPA's review and evaluation of this information and the consideration of public
16 comments, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements of
17 section 194.24(a) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2005d, 2006c, 2006e, 2006f).

18 **24.5.1.1 Chemical, Physical, and Radiological Description of Existing Waste**

19 The EPA reviewed descriptions of the chemical, radiological, and physical components of the
20 waste which were documented in the CRA-2004 and supporting documents. This information
21 was collected using similar methods as during the CCA and the process used was determined to
22 be reasonable by the EPA.

23 The EPA concluded on the basis of this information that the CRA-2004 and supplemental
24 information adequately described the chemical, radiological, and physical characteristics of each
25 waste stream proposed for disposal at the WIPP. The EPA further concluded that the
26 information presented by the DOE in the CRA-2004 provides adequate characterization of
27 existing WIPP waste for use in PA.

28 The EPA concluded that the DOE's development of the disposal inventory was sufficient for PA
29 purposes. The EPA agreed with the DOE that the use of projected waste inventory for scaling
30 the CH-TRU WIPP inventory to meet the total WIPP capacity was appropriate. The DOE's use
31 of the inventory scaling process was similar to that used in the CCA and was adequate for
32 projecting inventory estimates.

33 **24.5.1.2 Waste Forms and Packaging: Supercompacted Waste**

34 The EPA approved the disposal of supercompacted waste from AMWTF at the WIPP
35 (Marcinowski 2004). The DOE's CRA-2004 characterized, represented, and considered
36 supercompacted waste from INL in the recertification inventory.

1 **24.5.1.3 Waste Forms and Packaging: Container Types**

2 The DOE's assortment of containers was expected to meet the metal limit regardless of the
3 container type, because they all are metal containers. The EPA found the container types used in
4 the CRA-2004 PA to be reasonable.

5 **24.5.1.4 Waste Forms and Packaging: Inclusion of Waste Packaging in Inventory**

6 During the initial review of the recertification application, the EPA found that the DOE did not
7 include emplacement materials in the CRA-2004 PA calculations (Cotsworth 2004a). These
8 materials could contribute to gas generation. The DOE states (Detwiler 2004b) that this material
9 accounted for only a 12.7% increase in CPR if it is included in the PA and that there would be no
10 effect on compliance if it were included in the PA. However, the DOE did include the additional
11 emplacement material volume and mass in the CRA-2004 PABC (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005,
12 Section 1.3.3, p. 11), thus the emplacement materials are reflected in the release estimates. The
13 CRA-2004 PABC shows that the WIPP still complies with the new CPR amounts in the
14 inventory. Thus the use of increased CPR amounts was adequate, and the amount used in the
15 CRA-2004 PABC established a new limit.

16 **24.5.1.5 Number of Curies, Waste Streams, and Volume**

17 The DOE estimated the activity in curies in the inventory on a site-by-site, waste-stream-by-
18 waste-stream level. The EPA required that the DOE produce a "list of the waste components and
19 their approximate quantities." The EPA reviewed the estimate in the CRA-2004, Chapter 4.0
20 and Appendix TRU WASTE, and the TRU Waste Baseline Inventory Database (Los Alamos
21 National Laboratory 2005) and found these materials to contain sufficiently specific information
22 on the species and quantities of individual radioisotopes in the waste.

23 **24.5.1.6 Organic Ligands**

24 The EPA requested that the DOE provide additional information regarding the possible effects of
25 organic ligands concentrations on An solubilities in the WIPP repository (Cotsworth 2004b). In
26 their response, the DOE described the results of a series of calculations designed to determine the
27 sensitivity of An(III), An(IV), and An(V) solubilities to increases in organic ligand
28 concentrations and the possible effects of microbially produced acetate and lactate. The EPA
29 reviewed the updated calculations related to the effect of organic ligands on An solubility and
30 determined that organic ligands are potentially important (U.S. Environmental Protection
31 Agency 2006d). The DOE did include the effects of solubility of organic ligands in the CRA-
32 2004 PABC and the CRA-2004 and supplemental information: therefore, the EPA found that the
33 DOE appropriately included organic ligands in the CRA-2004 PABC (U.S. Environmental
34 Protection Agency 2006f).

35 **24.5.1.7 Hanford Waste**

36 In the CRA-2004, the DOE identified that it included waste from 12 tanks from Hanford. This
37 included nine tanks of CH-TRU waste and three tanks of RH-TRU waste. The volume of the
38 CH-TRU waste was estimated to be $\sim 3,932 \text{ m}^3$ ($\sim 2\%$ of the total CH-TRU waste and $\sim 2\%$ of the

1 total inventory) and the RH-TRU waste was estimated at ~4,469 m³ (~63% of total RH-TRU
2 waste, ~2.5% of the total inventory). The DOE stated that these 12 tanks were considered TRU
3 waste although the tanks were managed as high-level waste (HLW). Furthermore, the DOE
4 pointed out, if the waste was HLW, then by law it could not go to the WIPP. The DOE included
5 waste from the 12 tanks in the CRA-2004 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC and began discussion
6 about establishing a TRU waste determination process in the future.

7 The EPA allowed this waste to be included in the PA inventory for recertification and the DOE
8 demonstrated that with the Hanford tank waste, the WIPP continues to comply with the EPA's
9 disposal regulations. However, it was noted that before any Hanford tank waste could be
10 shipped to the WIPP, the DOE must demonstrate during characterization that the waste is, in
11 fact, TRU waste that can legally go to the WIPP (CARD 24; U.S. Environmental Protection
12 Agency 2006c).

13 **24.5.1.8 K-Basin Waste**

14 The sludges from the K-Basin storage pools consist of debris, silt, sand, and material from
15 operations of the pools at Hanford. The 50.4 m³ of sludges contaminated with radionuclides
16 associated with spent nuclear fuel that was exposed to water in the pools were included in the
17 CRA-2004 PABC.

18 The EPA allowed this waste in the PA inventory because the waste form was similar to other
19 waste going to the WIPP, was low in volume, and required processing and characterization
20 before being shipped to the WIPP. In addition, EPA stated the DOE must demonstrate that the
21 waste meets the technical and legal requirements prior to disposal.

22 **24.5.1.9 INL Waste**

23 The pre-1970 buried waste included in the CRA-2004 PABC (Leigh et. al. 2005) is found in the
24 CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment F, Annex I as waste stream IN-Z001. It was
25 designated as non-WIPP TRU waste, but the DOE decided to include it in the CRA-2004 PABC
26 because of a 2003 judgment against the DOE related to its removal at INL. This waste was not
27 included in the CRA-2004 PA because the court judgment came after the September 30, 2002
28 cutoff date for inventory development (see Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005; Lott 2004). This waste
29 appeared to be similar to other WIPP waste streams, but must still meet the WIPP WAC and
30 remains subject to the EPA's inspection and approval process before being disposed of at the
31 WIPP.

32 **24.5.1.10 Other Issues**

33 The DOE identified and corrected one error between the CRA-2004 PA and the CRA-2004
34 PABC: the LANL CH-TRU waste stream LA-TA-55-48. This waste stream was a low-volume,
35 high-radioactivity waste stream that skewed the results of the PA cumulative contamination
36 distribution factors upward. Upon further review, the DOE identified that this waste stream was
37 mischaracterized; the Pu fissile gram equivalent mass was greater than shipping requirements
38 allowed (Crawford 2004). The DOE reevaluated the waste stream, and modified the waste
39 stream radioactivity and volume for the CRA-2004 PABC. Since this was an estimate and the

1 waste will be characterized before going to the WIPP, the waste stream correction was found to
2 be reasonable.

3 **24.5.2 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(1)**

4 For the CCA, the EPA reviewed information on waste characteristics and components in a
5 number of technical documents. This review encompassed references, experimental programs,
6 logical arguments, and modeling. The EPA determined all relevant waste characteristics and
7 components were identified and evaluated. For the CRA-2004, the EPA focused on changes and
8 new information that could affect the DOE's analyses and findings.

9 The EPA concluded that, with the combination of the CRA-2004, supplemental information, and
10 the CRA-2004 PABC, the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for section
11 194.24(b)(1) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

12 **24.5.2.1 Solubility**

13 The EPA's review identified two areas in which the DOE did not adequately address solubility.
14 First, the DOE did not update the U(VI) solubility to incorporate new data that became available
15 since the certification decision. The data indicated that the U(VI) solubility should be higher
16 than that used by the DOE in the CRA-2004 PA. Second, the DOE did not update the solubility
17 uncertainty ranges used for An solubility oxidation states based on new data.

18 For the CRA-2004 PABC, the EPA stated that the solubility of U(VI) needed to be changed to a
19 fixed value of 1×10^{-3} molar (M) because of experimental data that became available after the
20 CCA. In addition, the EPA required that new solubility uncertainty ranges, based on the FMT
21 database and currently available experimental solubility data, be incorporated into the CRA-2004
22 PABC. The DOE made additional changes to the calculation of the An(III), An(IV), and An(V)
23 solubilities based on revised thermodynamic data for the An(IV) actinides, a different Salado
24 brine formulation, and revised concentrations of organic ligands. These changes were properly
25 implemented as discussed in Section 7 of *Technical Support Document for Section 194.24:*
26 *Evaluation of the Compliance Recertification Actinide Source Term and Culebra Dolomite*
27 *Distribution Coefficient Values* (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2005b).

28 A summary of changes and improvements incorporated into the calculation of An solubilities for
29 the CRA-2004 PABC that have been implemented since the CCA PAVT include the following:

- 30 • Organic ligand complexation data was incorporated into the FMT thermodynamic database
31 so the effects of organic ligands on An(III), An(IV) and An(V) solubilities can be calculated
32 directly. The organic ligand concentration changes, which in all cases but oxalate are defined
33 by the inventory, were the result of corrections to the masses of organic ligands identified in
34 the CRA-2004 PABC inventory (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) and the minimum estimated
35 brine volume required for a release from the repository.
- 36 • The TRU waste inventory data, including actinides, was updated.

- 1 • The FMT thermodynamic data base for actinides was updated and used to calculate the
2 An(III), An(IV), and An(V) solubilities. Most importantly, the free energy formation
3 constant value for thorium hydrate (Th(OH)₄(aq) was lowered, leading to better agreement
4 between experimental and modeling results (Xiong 2005).
- 5 • Magnesium oxide (MgO)-reacted Salado GWB and Castile (ERDA-6) brines were used to
6 calculate An solubilities. GWB, which has a lower magnesium (Mg) and higher sulfate
7 content, replaces Brine A as the Salado brine formulation for An solubility calculations
8 (Brush et al. 2006).
- 9 • Instantaneous equilibria among major GWB and ERDA-6 relevant minerals was assumed
10 and the chemical environment was made more uniform due to the elimination of
11 nonmicrobial vectors in PA.
- 12 • Correction of the minimum brine volume necessary for DBR (Stein 2005).
- 13 • Revision of the estimated U(VI) solubility to 0.001 M account for the new data (U.S.
14 Environmental Protection Agency 2005b).
- 15 • Recalculation of An solubility uncertainties based on a much larger number of solubility
16 measurements, with separate distributions developed for the An(III), An(IV), and An(V)
17 solubilities (Xiong, Nowak, and Brush 2005).

18 **24.5.2.2 Colloids**

19 The CCA PAVT included microbial colloid transport of actinides for all vectors. The CRA-2004
20 PA included different assumptions about the colloidal source term concentrations for microbial
21 and nonmicrobial vectors, with no microbial colloid transport of actinides assumed for
22 nonmicrobial vectors. However, for the CRA-2004 PABC, it was assumed that all vectors
23 included microbial activity. Therefore, the DOE included microbial colloid transport of actinides
24 for all CRA-2004 PABC vectors (Brush 2005). This approach was, therefore, the same for the
25 CCA PAVT and CRA-2004 PABC, and was consistent with the EPA's direction that all vectors
26 include microbial activity.

27 **24.5.2.3 Production of Gas from the Waste**

28 Microbial degradation of CPR may influence WIPP repository performance because of its effects
29 on repository chemistry and gas generation. The EPA reviewed the approach and assumptions
30 used by the DOE to model microbial degradation for the CRA-2004 PA. The EPA's comments
31 to the DOE focused on the probability of significant microbial degradation, the nature of the
32 microbial degradation reactions likely to occur in the repository, and microbial gas generation
33 rates. As a result of the EPA's review and comments, the DOE changed the modeling of
34 microbial degradation processes for the CRA-2004 PABC. Specifically, the EPA instructed the
35 DOE to assume that microbial degradation of CPR would occur in all CRA-2004 PABC vectors.

36 During the review of the CRA-2004 PA, the DOE informed the EPA that the microbial gas
37 generation experiments had continued and additional information related to microbial gas

1 generation rates in the WIPP repository had become available since the CCA PA and the CCA
 2 PAVT. In the letter (Cotsworth 2005) directing the DOE to perform the CRA-2004 PABC, the
 3 EPA allowed the DOE to propose a new gas generation rate scheme based on the new
 4 experimental data.

5 At the EPA's direction, the DOE changed the probability of microbial degradation to account for
 6 new evidence regarding the presence and viability of microbes capable of degrading CPR in the
 7 WIPP repository. The revised probability parameters resulted in microbial degradation in all
 8 vectors for the CRA-2004 PABC. However, the DOE asserted that uncertainties remained
 9 regarding the viability of microbes in the repository because of different conditions in the
 10 repository compared to the conditions in the experiments. The DOE therefore introduced an
 11 additional sampled parameter, BIOGENFC. This parameter, which has a uniform distribution
 12 from 0 to 1, was multiplied by the microbial gas generation rates to effectively reduce the humid
 13 and inundated microbial gas generation rates from the experimentally determined long-term
 14 rates.

15 **24.5.3 40 CFR §§ 194.24(b)(2) and (b)(3)**

16 The concentrations of organic ligands were reevaluated for the CRA-2004 PABC An solubility
 17 calculations based on a revised estimate of the minimum amount of brine that could lead to a
 18 release from the repository. In addition, new data regarding the possible complexation of An(IV)
 19 by EDTA were identified. These data were evaluated to determine the potential significance of
 20 EDTA to the An solubility calculations for WIPP repository conditions.

21 During the EPA's review of the important waste components, the EPA identified that only
 22 organic ligands had been addressed differently than in the CCA. Organic ligands could increase
 23 An solubility, but the EPA determined that the DOE had adequately included their effects in the
 24 CRA-2004 PABC (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

25 **24.5.4 40 CFR §§ 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2)**

26 In the CCA, the EPA found that the DOE identified those waste components that required limits,
 27 and that the limits were reasonable and quantifiable. The EPA's main concern was that the
 28 waste components be kept to levels that keep the repository in compliance with the disposal
 29 standards. The waste components of special concern were the amounts of CPR and their
 30 potential to generate gases that contribute to increased pressure in the repository.

31 As with the CCA, the DOE did not provide the associated uncertainty for the waste material
 32 component limits in the CRA-2004. The EPA identified two related issues regarding this claim
 33 of no uncertainty. The first was to ensure that the inventory remains within the waste component
 34 limits established by the DOE, and the second is that the performance of the repository was not
 35 compromised by the uncertainty in the inventory. This section required that the DOE identify
 36 the associated uncertainty for each limiting value. In the CRA-2004, as in the CCA, the DOE
 37 stated that the waste material component limits were fixed values with no associated
 38 uncertainties.

1 However, the EPA requested that the DOE review the issue of uncertainty. The DOE states
2 (Leigh 2006, p. 6) that the “sum of the weights of individual components in a container can at
3 most differ from the total weight of the container by 5 percent.” For the CCA, the EPA agreed
4 with this approach, since the limiting value could be used to represent the “upper end” of an
5 uncertainty value. However, the lack of information on the waste component inventory was of
6 concern for the future, especially with the CPR materials, since they had the greatest potential to
7 affect performance.

8 Since the inventory emplaced in the WIPP is currently at a fraction of the total inventory
9 expected in the future, and since a significant fraction of the inventory is still estimated and to be
10 emplaced in the future, the EPA found that the use of point estimates is acceptable for the waste
11 components and radionuclides for this recertification. In addition, the EPA found that, since
12 only a limited amount of waste has been emplaced, the inventory and its associated uncertainty is
13 below the respective limiting values. However, the EPA suggested the DOE improve its
14 knowledge of the measurement uncertainty for the next recertification and include these
15 uncertainties into the PA process (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

16 **24.5.5 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(2)**

17 Since the 1998 certification decision, the waste characterization program has been implemented
18 at several DOE waste generator sites. This represented a change in activities since approval of
19 the CCA, because only LANL was approved at that time. Since 1998, the EPA approved waste
20 characterization at the larger generator sites, namely the AMWTF, Hanford, INL, RFETS, and
21 Savannah River Site. In addition, characterization was approved at the small generator sites:
22 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Nevada Test Site. These sites continued to
23 characterize CH-TRU waste for disposal at the WIPP through the CRA-2004.

24 Based on the EPA’s review of the CRA-2004, including the new information and references
25 presented therein, the EPA agreed that the methods used to quantify the limits of waste
26 components had not changed substantially since the 1998 certification decision. The EPA kept
27 abreast of all the changes to the program, including information source document changes that
28 transpired after the EPA’s 1998 certification decision. Changes implemented up to the 2002 CH-
29 TRU WAC and Waste Analysis Plan (WAP) referenced in the CCA had not affected the site’s
30 abilities to adequately quantify waste components in individual containers. The DOE, therefore,
31 continued to require each waste site to characterize radiological contents of every container of
32 CH-TRU waste streams destined for WIPP disposal using the EPA-approved NDA systems.
33 Similarly, each site continued to examine each TRU waste container to ensure the absence of
34 prohibited items using the EPA-approved RTR and/or VE procedures (U.S. Environmental
35 Protection Agency 2006c).

36 **24.5.6 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3)**

37 The EPA’s WIPP regulations required the DOE to “provide information which demonstrates that
38 the use of process knowledge to quantify components in waste for disposal conforms with the
39 quality assurance requirements found in 40 CFR § 194.22” (U.S. Environmental Protection
40 Agency 1996, p. 5240).

1 The EPA found the information presented in section 194.24(c)(3) of the CRA-2004 adequate and
2 that the adherence of TRU waste sites to the CRA-2004-based AK process will allow them to
3 meet their regulatory obligation.

4 **24.5.7 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(4)**

5 The EPA determined that the general description of the WWIS in the CRA-2004 was adequate
6 (CARD 24, pp. 24-44, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c). Hardware modifications
7 and software upgrades described in the CRA-2004 were necessary to maintain system reliability,
8 security, and performance. The EPA reviewed the WWIS during its inspections of the WIPP and
9 TRU waste generator sites and was aware of the changes to the WWIS since the CCA. The EPA
10 determined that the WWIS adequately gathers, stores, and processes information pertaining to
11 TRU waste destined for or disposed of at the WIPP (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
12 2006c).

13 The DOE stated that a majority of the 130 WWIS data fields were pertinent to demonstrate
14 compliance with TRU waste transportation and disposal requirements. The EPA verified that the
15 DOE adequately tracked more than these 130 data fields in the WWIS. The DOE had not
16 changed its tracking methodology and in fact has added parameters to be tracked in the WWIS.

17 **24.5.8 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5)**

18 The QAPP and the Methods Manual were replaced by the WAC and the New Mexico
19 Environment Department (NMED) WAP for the CRA-2004. The EPA was aware of these
20 changes to the program requirements documents. The wording changes regarding the
21 description of the PDP test and the removal of the PDP plan did not affect the EPA's ability to
22 ensure that the DOE has implemented a series of intercomparability tests for NDA equipment
23 that develop similar results. The elimination of the PDP test description from the CRA-2004
24 requires that the DOE make available to the EPA the PDP plans and test descriptions so the EPA
25 could ensure that the program was indeed acting as a "true blind sample" program. The change
26 in PDP certification from the facility to the equipment was acceptable.

27 The EPA continued to ensure, through audits and inspections, that the waste characterization
28 program met QA requirements sufficiently. The inspection program was the primary method by
29 which the EPA determined the implementation of QA controls to the waste characterization
30 program.

31 The DOE's changes to the PDP program did not affect the EPA's ability to assess the
32 implementation of quality controls to the waste characterization program. The wording changes
33 allowed the DOE more flexibility in developing PDP tests. The changes to the QA document
34 hierarchy do not lessen the implementation of quality controls to the waste characterization
35 program.

36 Based on the EPA's review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information
37 provided by the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continues to comply with the
38 requirements for section 194.24(c)(5) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

1 **24.5.9 40 CFR §§ 194.24(d) and (f)**

2 In PAs, the DOE has assumed random waste emplacement. In the CCA, the EPA asked for
3 additional analysis assuming clustering of waste. The DOE performed an analysis and showed
4 that clustering waste streams would not significantly affect PA results. Indeed, RFETS waste
5 was eventually clustered in the WIPP (Park and Hansen 2003). In addition, the EPA required the
6 DOE to conduct another analysis assuming nonrandom waste emplacement as part of the review
7 of supercompacted waste from INL. The results showed that nonrandom placement of waste
8 was not significant (e.g., CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-21.0).
9 Thus, no waste loading assumptions were necessary in PA calculations for CRA-2004.

10 Based on the EPA's review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information
11 provided by the DOE, and because DOE showed that waste loading assumptions were not
12 necessary for use in PA, the EPA determined that the DOE continues to comply with the
13 requirements for sections 194.24(d) and (f) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

14 **24.5.10 40 CFR § 194.24(g)**

15 The DOE has several years of experience with the WWIS and, through the EPA's inspections,
16 the DOE has shown the WWIS to be effective in tracking and controlling waste disposed of at
17 the WIPP. The DOE had not characterized or shipped any RH-TRU waste at the time of the
18 CRA-2004.

19 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
20 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continues to comply with the requirements for
21 section 194.24(g) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

22 **24.5.11 40 CFR § 194.24(h)**

23 The EPA found the DOE in compliance with provisions of section 194.24(h). Discussion of
24 inspections and records, such as audits is addressed by the EPA in CARD 22 (U.S.
25 Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

26 **24.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

27 **24.6.1 40 CFR § 194.24(a)**

28 To meet the requirements of section 194.24(a) in CRA-2004, the DOE described and categorized
29 the TRU waste currently emplaced in the WIPP at that time and the waste that existed at various
30 DOE facilities. The details of the inventory used for CRA-2009 are presented in the CRA-2004,
31 Chapter 4.0 and Appendix TRU WASTE, and the CRA-2004 PABC inventory (see Appendix
32 BIR) was summarized in the CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005).
33 The combination of the inventory presented in the CRA-2004, Appendix TRU WASTE, and the
34 CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report is referred to as the CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report.
35 The inventory for the CRA-2009 PA is the same inventory used for the CRA-2004 PABC. Since
36 the CRA-2004 PABC was completed, the *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report-2007*
37 (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a) was published and provides updated inventory information.

1 The DOE anticipates this inventory update will have only a small impact on normalized releases
 2 relative to the CRA-2009 PA, and will not be significant for compliance. Therefore, the DOE is
 3 in compliance with section 194.24(a).

4 **24.6.2 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(1)**

5 There were no changes to the waste characteristics between the CRA-2004 PABC inventory and
 6 the CRA-2009 inventory, but the DOE did add inventory parameters used in the PA. Leigh,
 7 Trone, and Fox (2005) give a comprehensive description of the projected inventory used for the
 8 CRA-2004 PABC. The CRA-2009 PA used the CRA-2004 PABC inventory with one set of
 9 modifications. The CRA-2004 PABC included CPR materials in the waste and container
 10 (packaging) materials that were also used in the CRA-2009 PA, but the CPR contents in
 11 emplacement materials were erroneously omitted from the CRA-2004 PABC (Nemer 2007). To
 12 correct this omission, six new parameters representing the density of CPR materials in
 13 emplacement materials were created and used in the CRA-2009 PA. Four additional parameters,
 14 which represent the density of cellulose and rubber materials in container (packaging) materials,
 15 were also created for the CRA-2009 PA (Nemer 2007).

16 Table 24-2 lists the names and descriptions of the CPR parameters used in the CRA-2009 PA,
 17 including the 10 additional parameters. The addition of the four container (packaging) CPR
 18 parameters is done solely for bookkeeping purposes, since container (packaging) materials do
 19 not contain cellulose or rubber materials, as seen by the zero values in Table 24-2. The CRA-
 20 2009 PA used all the CPR parameters shown in Table 24-2.

21 There were no changes between the CRA-2004 PABC and CRA-2009 PA in the methodology
 22 and data used to calculate An solubilities or their colloidal concentration in the WIPP brine. The
 23 microbial assumptions and gas generation rates associated with this also remain unchanged in the
 24 CRA-2009 PA. Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with section 194.24(b)(1).

25 **24.6.3 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(2)**

26 The DOE determined that the components identified below were expected to have a significant
 27 effect on disposal system performance (see the CCA, Appendix WCA), and so were used in the
 28 CRA-2004 PABC.

- 29 • Ferrous metals
- 30 • Cellulose and chelating agents (i.e., organic ligands) as they pertain to enhanced An mobility
- 31 • Radioactivity in curies of each isotope
- 32 • α -emitting TRU radionuclides, $t_{1/2} > 20$ years ($t_{1/2}$ is the half-life)
- 33 • Radionuclides
- 34 • Solid waste components (e.g., soils and cementitious materials)

Table 24-2. CPR Parameters Used in the CRA-2009 PA

Name	Description	Value (kg/m ³)
WAS_AREA: DCELLCHW	Average density of cellulose in CH-TRU waste materials	60.0
WAS_AREA: DCELLRHW	Average density of cellulose in RH-TRU waste materials	9.3
WAS_AREA: DCELCCHW ^a	Average density of cellulose in CH-TRU waste container (packaging) materials	0.0
WAS_AREA: DCELCRHW ^a	Average density of cellulose in RH-TRU waste container (packaging) materials	0.0
WAS_AREA: DCELECHW ^a	Average density of cellulose in CH-TRU waste emplacement materials	1.22
WAS_AREA: DCELERHW ^a	Average density of cellulose in RH-TRU waste emplacement materials	0.0
WAS_AREA: DPLASCHW	Average density of plastic in CH-TRU waste materials	43.0
WAS_AREA: DPLASRHW	Average density of plastic in RH-TRU waste materials	8.0
WAS_AREA: DPLSCCHW	Average density of plastic in CH-TRU waste container (packaging) materials	17.0
WAS_AREA: DPLSCRHW	Average density of plastic in RH-TRU waste container (packaging) materials	3.1
WAS_AREA: DPLSECHW ^a	Average density of plastic in CH-TRU waste emplacement materials	8.76
WAS_AREA: DPLSERHW ^a	Average density of plastic in RH-TRU waste emplacement materials	0.0
WAS_AREA: DRUBBCHW	Average density of rubber in CH-TRU waste materials	13.0
WAS_AREA: DRUBBRHW	Average density of rubber in RH-TRU waste materials	6.7
WAS_AREA: DRUBCCHW ^a	Average density of rubber in CH-TRU waste container (packaging) materials	0.0
WAS_AREA: DRUBCRHW ^a	Average density of rubber in RH-TRU waste container (packaging) materials	0.0
WAS_AREA: DRUBECHW ^a	Average density of rubber in CH-TRU waste emplacement materials	0.0
WAS_AREA: DRUBERHW ^a	Average density of rubber in RH-TRU waste emplacement materials	0.0

^aNewly created for the CRA-2009 PA.

- 1
- 2 • Sulfates
- 3 • Nitrates
- 4 These components in the CRA-2009 inventory have not changed from the CRA-2004 PABC
- 5 inventory that was used for the CRA-2004 recertification decision. Therefore, the DOE is in
- 6 compliance with section 194.24(b)(2).

1 24.6.4 40 CFR § 194.24(b)(3)

2 The DOE provided a list of those waste characteristics and components that were excluded from
3 consideration in the PA for various reasons, such as negligible impact (the CRA-2004, Appendix
4 TRU WASTE, Section TRU WASTE-6.0 and in Appendix PA-2009). There were no changes in
5 the exclusion decisions for the important waste components and characteristics in the CRA-2009
6 PA since the CRA-2004 recertification decision. Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with
7 section 194.24(b)(3).

8 24.6.5 40 CFR §§ 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2)

9 The inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA is the same as the CRA-2004 PABC inventory.
10 Therefore, the waste components and their associated uncertainties for the CRA-2009 have not
11 changed since the CRA-2004 PABC. The only change from the CRA-2004 PABC is the change
12 of the emplaced MgO.

13 In April 2006, the DOE submitted a Planned Change Request for EPA approval to reduce the
14 MgO excess factor from 1.67 to 1.2 (Moody 2006). To justify its request, the DOE used
15 reasoned arguments regarding health-related transportation risks to the public, the cost of
16 emplacing MgO, and the uncertainties inherent in predicting the extent of microbial consumption
17 of CPR materials during the 10,000-yr WIPP regulatory period. The EPA responded that the
18 “DOE needs to address the uncertainties related to MgO effectiveness, the size of the
19 uncertainties, and the potential impact of the uncertainties on long-term performance” (Gitlin
20 2006).

21 The DOE carried out an uncertainty analysis (Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner 2006) and several
22 supporting analyses (Brush and Roselle 2006; Brush et al. 2006; Clayton and Nemer 2006; Deng
23 et al. 2006; Kanney and Vugrin 2006; Kirchner and Vugrin 2006) in response to the EPA’s
24 request for additional information on the uncertainties related to MgO effectiveness. Appendix
25 MgO-2009, Section MgO-6.2.4.4 provides a complete description of the DOE uncertainty
26 analyses. As part of this effort, Kirchner and Vugrin (2006) quantified the uncertainties in the
27 estimates of the CPR material quantities emplaced in WIPP disposal rooms. Their analysis was
28 based on the differences between the masses of CPR materials measured by RTR and VE, paired
29 by waste container. They assumed that the VE measurements were the more accurate values
30 and, because they observed no significant bias in the RTR measurements in a room, Kirchner
31 and Vugrin (2006) then used Monte Carlo methods “to simulate potential errors in the RTR
32 measurements and to construct a distribution representing the uncertainty in the CPR [materials]
33 in a room” and concluded that “the uncertainty [standard deviation] on the total mass of CPR
34 [materials] in a room would be less than 0.3%.”

35 Based on these results, measurement uncertainty in the mass of CPR materials is not expected to
36 significantly impact the expected mass of CPR materials in a room and consequently to have
37 little impact on repository performance. In addition, to date, a limited amount of waste has been
38 emplaced relative to total capacity of the repository. It follows that the inventory and its
39 associated uncertainty remains below the limiting value for the mass of CPR in the CRA-2009
40 PA, and the DOE remains in compliance with sections 194.24(c)(1), (e)(1), and (e)(2).

1 24.6.6 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(2)

2 As noted in section 194.24(b), the DOE did not modify the list of CRA-2004 components and
3 characteristics requiring quantification. Therefore, the CRA-2009 did not identify any
4 significant changes to the measurement techniques used in the waste characterization program
5 (i.e., VE, RTR, AK, NDA).

6 Since the CRA-2004, the WIPP has received RH-TRU waste. RH-TRU waste normally contains
7 more gamma emitting radionuclides than the CH-TRU waste (mostly ¹³⁷Cs), and the
8 characterization method used to determine radionuclide activity is a Dose-to-Curie methodology
9 as identified in *Remote-Handled TRU Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan*,
10 Revision 0D (U.S. Department of Energy 2003). RH-TRU waste normally contains more metal
11 container material parameters because the preferred method for hot-cell operation is to place the
12 waste into 30 or 55 gal drums before placement into the RH-TRU canister. The addition of RH-
13 TRU waste does not modify the list of components and characteristics requiring quantification.
14 Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with section 194.24(c)(2).

15 24.6.7 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(3)

16 Since CRA-2004, the AK process is now presented in the WIPP WAC, Revision 6.2 (U.S.
17 Department of Energy 2008b) for both the CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste. The WIPP WAC has
18 been revised to include more discussion of AK with respect to radionuclides (WAC, Appendix
19 A). Modifications made to the WAC since the CRA-2004 that are pertinent to AK include the
20 following:

- 21 • Use of existing AK collected prior to the implementation of a QA program under section
22 194.22(a) may be qualified in accordance with an alternative methodology and employs one
23 or more of the following methods: peer review, corroborating data, confirmatory testing, and
24 collection of data under an equivalent QA program for both the CH-TRU and RH-TRU
25 waste.
- 26 • Methods for confirming isotopic ratios using AK (i.e., methods pertinent to sites generating
27 weapons grade Pu vs. heat grade) for both the CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste.
- 28 • Required and supplemental AK documentation for both the CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste.
- 29 • Discrepancy resolution and data limitation identification for both the CH-TRU and RH-TRU
30 waste.
- 31 • AK radioassay data measurement comparisons as a means to assess comparability for both
32 the CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste.

33 These modifications effectively focused on the WIPP WAC to address specific allowances and
34 requirements with respect to AK needs for radionuclide data on both the CH-TRU and RH-TRU
35 waste. The revised WAP (New Mexico Environment Department 2008) retains AK
36 requirements of data assembly, compilation, etc., included in the CRA-2004 and CCA.
37 Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with section 194.24(c)(3).

1 24.6.8 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(4)

2 The WWIS used the Oracle (Version 9) database management system at the time of CRA-2004
3 as described in CRA-2004, Chapter 4.0, Section 4.3.2. The current computing system uses
4 Oracle (Version 10g). The CRA-2004, Appendix TRU WASTE, Section TRU WASTE-5.0,
5 briefly describes the WWIS as part of a system of controls that address sections 194.24(c)(4) and
6 (c)(5), requirements for computer software for nuclear facility applications. Since the submittal
7 of the CRA-2004, the WWIS has been updated to include data fields required for the disposal of
8 RH-TRU waste. WWIS was also modified by the addition of data fields to meet additional
9 tracking and control requirements imposed on RH-TRU waste by the LWA. The WWIS was
10 also updated since the CRA-2004 to track the amount of MgO emplaced in the repository. This
11 addition was added to ensure the excess factor of 1.2 is met throughout the repository. The
12 WWIS User's Manual, Appendix F (U.S. Department of Energy 2008c), contains the WWIS
13 Data Dictionary that defines each data field for CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste. Therefore, the
14 DOE is in compliance with section 194.24(c)(4).

15 24.6.9 40 CFR § 194.24(c)(5)

16 The DOE describes the PDP program in the CRA-2004, Chapter 4.0, Section 4.3.3.1 PDP (p. 4-
17 49). Both the *Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay of Boxed*
18 *Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program*, Revision 1 (U.S. Department of Energy
19 2008d) and *Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay of Drummed*
20 *Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program*, Revision 1 (U.S. Department of Energy
21 2005) have been revised since the CRA-2004. The most important changes to these documents
22 were implemented to better represent current practices, simplify and clarify the scoring section,
23 clarify the explanation of the derivation of scoring criteria, and update the two NDA PDP Plans
24 to be consistent with one another. The *Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Analysis*
25 *of Simulated Headspace Gases*, Revision 6.1 (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) has also been
26 revised since CRA-2004. The most important changes describe the relationship between the
27 Carlsbad Technical Assistance Contractor and the commercial suppliers of the HSG PDP
28 services, as well as the standard gases used to prepare the HSG PDP samples. Prior to this
29 revision, the HSG PDP sample preparation contractor was a DOE National Laboratory.
30 Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with section 194.24(c)(5).

31 24.6.10 40 CFR §§ 194.24(d) and (f)

32 The CRA-2009 has not changed in reference to provisions in sections 194.24(d) and (f) since the
33 CRA-2004 decision. Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with sections 194.24(d) and (f).

34 24.6.11 40 CFR § 194.25(g)

35 The CRA-2009 inventory is unchanged from the CRA-2004 PABC inventory. Since the CRA-
36 2004, the DOE has characterized and shipped RH-TRU waste. The WWIS was also modified by
37 the addition of data fields to meet additional tracking and control requirements imposed on RH-
38 TRU waste by the LWA. Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with section 194.24(g).

1 **24.6.12 40 CFR § 194.24(h)**

2 The DOE continues to comply with the inspection and records requirements. This is discussed in
3 Section 22 of this application. Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with section 194.24(h).

4 **24.7 References**

5 Brush, L.H. 2005. *Results of Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP Performance*
6 *Assessment Baseline Calculations* (May 18). ERMS 539800. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
7 Laboratories.

8 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2005. *Calculation of Organic-Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP*
9 *Performance-Assessment Baseline Calculations* (May 4). ERMS 539635. Carlsbad, NM:
10 Sandia National Laboratories.

11 Brush, L.H., and G.T. Roselle. 2006. Memorandum to E.D. Vugrin (Subject: Geochemical
12 Information for Calculation of the MgO Effective Excess Factor). 17 November 2006. U.S.
13 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.

14 Brush, L.H., Y. Xiong, J.W. Garner, A. Ismail, and G.T. Roselle. 2006. *Consumption of Carbon*
15 *Dioxide by Precipitation of Carbonate Minerals Resulting from Dissolution of Sulfate Minerals*
16 *in the Salado Formation In Response to Microbial Sulfate Reduction in the WIPP*. ERMS
17 544785. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

18 Bynum, R.V. 1996. *Analysis to Estimate the Uncertainty for Predicted Actinide Solubilities, WBS*
19 *1.1.10.1.1* (Revision 0, September 3). WPO41374. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National
20 Laboratories.

21 Clayton, D.J., and M.B. Nemer. 2006. Memorandum to E.D. Vugrin (Subject: Normalized
22 Moles of Castile Sulfate Entering the Repository and Fraction of MgO Lost Due to Brine Flow
23 Out of the Repository). 9 October 2006. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National
24 Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.

25 Cotsworth, E. 2004a. Letter to R.P. Detwiler (1 Enclosure). 20 May 2004. ERMS 535554.
26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

27 Cotsworth, E. 2004b. Letter to R. Paul Detwiler, Acting Manager. 12 July 2004. U.S.
28 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington DC.

29 Cotsworth, E. 2005. Letter to I. Triay (1 Enclosure). 4 March 2005. ERMS 538858. U.S.
30 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

31 Crawford, B. 2004. *Inventory Change/Addition Control Form* (November 12). SP9-6-3.
32 ERMS 537921. Carlsbad, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

33 Deng, H., S.R. Johnsen, G.T. Roselle, and M.B. Nemer. 2006. Analysis of Martin Marietta
34 MagChem 10 WTS-60 MgO. ERMS 544712. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories

- 1 Detwiler, R.P. 2004a. Letter to E. Cotsworth (Subject: Initial Response to Environmental
2 Protection Agency (EPA) September 2, 2004, Letter on Compliance Recertification Application;
3 6 Enclosures) 1 November 2004. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad,
4 NM.
- 5 Detwiler, R. P. 2004b. Letter to Elizabeth Cotsworth, Director (Subject: Partial Response to
6 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) May 20, 2004, Letter on CRA; 1 Enclosure). 15 July
7 2004. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 8 Dials, G.E. 1997. Memorandum (with attachments) to G. Thomas Todd, Area Manager. LAAO
9 (Subject: Site Certification of Los Alamos National Laboratory) 12 September 1997. U.S.
10 Department of Energy, Carlsbad Area Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 11 Garner, J., and C. Leigh. 2005. *Analysis Package for PANEL: CRA-2004 Performance*
12 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 540572. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
13 Laboratories.
- 14 Gitlin, B.C. 2005. Letter to I. Triay, Acting Manger. 12 May 2005. U.S. Environmental
15 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 16 Gitlin, B.C. 2006. Letter to D.C. Moody. 28 April 2006. ERMS 543319. U.S. Environmental
17 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 18 Kanney, J.F., and E.D. Vugrin. 2006. Memorandum to D.S. Kessel (Subject: Updated Analysis
19 of Characteristic Time and Length Scales for Mixing Processes in the WIPP Repository to
20 Reflect the CRA-2004 PABC Technical Baseline and the Impact of Supercompacted Mixed
21 Waste and Heterogeneous Waste Emplacement). 31 August 2006. U.S. Department of Energy,
22 Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 23 Kirchner, T.B., and E.D. Vugrin. 2006. Memorandum to D.S. Kessel (Subject: Uncertainty in
24 Cellulose, Plastic, and Rubber Measurements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Inventory). 12
25 June 2006. ERMS 543848. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories,
26 Carlsbad, NM.
- 27 Leigh, C., J. Kanney, L. Brush, J. Garner, G. Kirkes, T. Lowry, M. Nemer, J. Stein, E. Vugrin, S.
28 Wagner, and T. Kirchner. 2005. *2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance*
29 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 541521. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
30 Laboratories.
- 31 Leigh, C., J. Trone, and B. Fox. 2005. *TRU Waste Inventory for the 2004 Compliance*
32 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS
33 541118. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 34 Leigh, C. 2006. *Incorporation of Inventory Uncertainty in the CRA-2004 Performance*
35 *Assessment Baseline Calculation*. ERMS 542308. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
36 Laboratories.

- 1 Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). 2005. *Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory*
2 *Database* (Revision 2.1, Version 3.13, Data Version D.4.16). ERMS 538934. Carlsbad, NM:
3 Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 4 Lott, S. 2004. *Inventory Data Change/Addition Control Form* (November, Revision 2). SP9-6-
5 3. ERMS 537966. Carlsbad, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 6 Marcinowski, F. 2003. Letter to I. Triay, Manager. 21 March 2003. U.S. Environmental
7 Protection Agency, Office of Indoor Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 8 Marcinowski, F. 2004. Letter to R.P. Detwiler (2 Enclosures). 26 March 2004. U.S.
9 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 10 Moody, D.C. 2006. Letter to E.A. Cotsworth (Subject: Transmittal of Planned Change
11 Request; 1 Enclosure). 10 April 2006. ERMS 543262. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad
12 Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 13 Nemer, M., and J. Stein. 2005. *Analysis Package for BRAGFLO: 2004 Compliance*
14 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation*. ERMS 540527.
15 Carlsbad NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 Nemer, M., J. Stein, and W. Zelinski. 2005. *Analysis Report for BRAGFLO Preliminary*
17 *Modeling Results With New Gas Generation Rates Based on Recent Experimental Results*.
18 ERMS 539437. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Nemer, M.B. 2007. Memorandum to WIPP SNL Records Center (Subject: Effects of Not
20 Including Emplacement Materials in CPR Inventory on Recent PA Results). ERMS 545689.
21 U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 22 New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). 2008. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Hazardous*
23 *Waste Permit, Attachment B, Waste Analysis Plan* (March 25). Santa Fe: State of New Mexico.
- 24 Park, B-Y, and F.D. Hansen. 2003. *Determination of Porosity Surfaces of the Disposal Room*
25 *Containing Various Waste Inventories for WIPP PA* (Revision 0). ERMS 533216. Carlsbad,
26 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 Patterson, R. 2005a. Letter to Elizabeth Cotsworth (Subject: Hanford Tank and K-Basin
28 Wastes). 8 March 2005. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 29 Patterson, R. 2005b. Letter to Elizabeth Cotsworth (Subject: Hanford Tank and K-Basin
30 Wastes). 11 May 2005. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 31 Stein, J.S. 2005. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Estimate of Volume of Brine in
32 Repository That Leads to a Brine Release). 13 April 2005. ERMS 539372. U.S. Department of
33 Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 34 U.S. Congress. 1996. Public Law 102-579. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act of*
35 *1992*, as amended by Public Law 104-201, 1996.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1994. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Transuranic Waste*
2 *Baseline Inventory Report* (Revision 0, June). 2 vols. CAO-94-1005. ERMS 503921. Carlsbad,
3 NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 4 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1995a. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Transuranic Waste*
5 *Baseline Inventory Report* (Revision 1, February). DOE/CAO-94-1005. ERMS 243201.
6 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 7 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1995b. *Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report*
8 (Revision 2, December). DOE/CAO-95-1121. ERMS 531643. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area
9 Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996a. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
11 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
12 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 13 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996b. *Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report*
14 (Revision 3, June). DOE/CAO-95-1121. ERMS 242330. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 15 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997. *Supplemental Summary of EPA-Mandated*
16 *Performance Assessment Verification Test (All Replicates) and Comparison with the Compliance*
17 *Certification Application Calculations* (August 8). WPO 46702. ERMS 414879. Carlsbad,
18 NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2002. *Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance*
20 *Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. DOE/WIPP 02-3122. Carlsbad, NM. Carlsbad
21 Area Office.
- 22 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003. *Remote-Handled TRU Waste Characterization*
23 *Program Implementation Plan* (Revision 0D, October 30). DOE/WIPP 02-3214. Carlsbad, NM:
24 Carlsbad Field Office.
- 25 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
26 *Application 2004* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field
27 Office.
- 28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005. *Performance Demonstration Program Plan for*
29 *Nondestructive Assay of Drummed Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program*
30 (Revision 1, August). DOE/CBFO-01-1005. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006. *Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report–2004*
32 (September). DOE/TRU-2006-3344. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 33 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007. *Performance Demonstration Program Plan for*
34 *Analysis of Simulated Headspace Gases* (Revision 6.1, November). DOE/CBFO-95-1076.
35 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008a. *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report—2007*,
2 Revision 1 (April). DOE/TRU-2008-3379. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008b. *Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the*
4 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (Revision 6.2, May 30). DOE/WIPP 02-3122. Carlsbad, NM:
5 Carlsbad Field Office.
- 6 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008c. *WIPP Waste Information System User’s Manual—*
7 *WWIS Software Version 6.2* (May 15). DOE/CBFO-97-2273. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field
8 Office.
- 9 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008d. *Performance Demonstration Program Plan for*
10 *Nondestructive Assay of Boxed Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program* (Revision
11 1, April). DOE/CBFO-01-1006. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
13 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
14 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
15 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
17 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
18 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
19 5223–45.
- 20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
21 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
22 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
23 1998): 27353–406.
- 24 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “CARD No. 24: Waste
25 Characterization.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the*
26 *Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40*
27 *CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 24-1 through 24-102).
28 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998c. “CARD No. 23: Models and Computer
30 Codes.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
31 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
32 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 23-1 through 23-93). Washington, DC:
33 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998d. “CARD No. 22: Quality Assurance.”
35 *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
36 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
37 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 22-1 through 22-32). Washington, DC:
38 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2005a. “40 CFR Part 194: Notification of
2 Completeness of the Department of Energy’s Compliance Recertification Application for the
3 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.” *Federal Register*, vol. 70 (October 20, 2005): 61107–111.
- 4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2005b. Teleconference with U.S. Department of
5 Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory
6 (LANL) (Subject: Change in U(VI) Solubility Assumption to a Concentration to 1 M). 2 March
7 2005.
- 8 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
9 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
10 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision” (Final Notice). *Federal Register*, vol. 71 (April
11 10, 2006): 18010–021.
- 12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “Recertification CARD No. 22: Quality
13 Assurance.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification
14 and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191
15 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 22-1 through 22-17).
16 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006c. “Recertification CARD No. 24: Waste
18 Characterization.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the
19 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
20 CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 24-1 through 24-
21 50). Washington, DC: Office of Air and Radiation.
- 22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006d. *Technical Support Document for Section
23 194.24: Evaluation of the Compliance Recertification Actinide Source Term and Culebra
24 Dolomite Distribution Coefficient Values* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
25 Indoor Air.
- 26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006e. *Technical Support Document for Section
27 194.24: Review of the Baseline Inventory Used in the Compliance Recertification Application
28 and the Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Air
29 and Radiation.
- 30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006f. *Technical Support Document for Section
31 194.23: Review of the 2004 Compliance Recertification Performance Assessment Baseline
32 Calculation* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Air and Radiation.
- 33 Vugrin, E.D., M.B. Nemer, and S.W. Wagner. 2006. *Uncertainties Affecting MgO Effectiveness
34 and Calculation of the MgO Effective Excess Factor* (Rev. 0, November 17). Carlsbad, NM:
35 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 36 Wang, Y., and L. Brush. 1996. Memorandum to M. Tierney (Subject: Estimates of Gas-
37 Generation Parameters for the Long-Term WIPP Performance Assessment). 26 January 1996.
38 ERMS 231943. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.

- 1 Xiong, Y. 2005. E-mail to J.F. Kanney and J.J. Long (Subject: Release of
- 2 FMT_050405.CHEMDAT). 5 April 2005. ERMS 539304. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia
- 3 National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.

- 4 Xiong, Y., E.J. Nowak, and L.H. Brush. 2005. *Updated Uncertainty Analysis of Actinide*
- 5 *Solubilities For the Response to EPA Comment C-23-16, Rev. 1* (April 28). ERMS 539595.
- 6 (supersedes ERMS 538219). Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Future States Assumptions
(40 CFR § 194.25)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Future States Assumptions
(40 CFR § 194.25)**

Table of Contents

25.0 Future States Assumptions (40 CFR § 194.25) 25-1

 25.1 Requirements 25-1

 25.2 Background 25-1

 25.3 1998 Certification Decision 25-1

 25.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 25-2

 25.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 25-2

 25.5.1 40 CFR § 194.25(a)..... 25-3

 25.5.2 40 CFR § 194.25(b)(1) 25-3

 25.5.3 40 CFR § 194.25(b)(2) 25-3

 25.5.4 40 CFR § 194.25(b)(3)..... 25-3

 25.5.5 The 2006 Recertification Decision..... 25-3

 25.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 25-4

 25.6.1 40 CFR § 194.25(a)..... 25-4

 25.6.2 40 CFR § 194.25(b)..... 25-4

 25.7 References..... 25-7

List of Tables

Table 25-1. FEPs Screened Out Using the 40 CFR § 194.25(a) Criterion 25-5

Table 25-2. FEPs Screened In According to 40 CFR § 194.25(b) 25-5

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCA	Compliance Certification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEPs	feature, event, and process
PA	performance assessment
SO-C	screened out consequence
SO-R	screened out regulatory
T field	transmissivity field
UP	undisturbed performance
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **25.0 Future States Assumptions (40 CFR § 194.25)**

2 **25.1 Requirements**

§ 194.25 Future States Assumptions

(a) Unless otherwise specified in this part or in the disposal regulations, performance assessments and compliance assessments conducted pursuant to the provisions of this part to demonstrate compliance with § 191.13, § 191.15 and part 191, subpart C shall assume that characteristics of the future remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared, provided that such characteristics are not related to hydrogeologic, geologic or climatic conditions.

(b) In considering future states pursuant to this section, the Department shall document in any compliance application, to the extent practicable, effects of potential future hydrogeologic, geologic and climatic conditions on the disposal system over the regulatory time frame. Such documentation shall be part of the activities undertaken pursuant to § 194.14, Content of compliance certification application; § 194.32, Scope of performance assessments; and § 194.54, Scope of compliance assessments.

(1) In considering the effects of hydrogeologic conditions on the disposal system, the Department shall document in any compliance application, to the extent practicable, the effects of potential changes to hydrogeologic conditions.

(2) In considering the effects of geologic conditions on the disposal system, the Department shall document in any compliance application, to the extent practicable, the effects of potential changes to geologic conditions, including, but not limited to: Dissolution; near surface geomorphic features and processes; and related subsidence in the geologic units of the disposal system.

(3) In considering the effects of climatic conditions on the disposal system, the Department shall document in any compliance application, to the extent practicable, the effects of potential changes to future climate cycles of increased precipitation (as compared to the present conditions).

3

4 **25.2 Background**

5 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) purpose in issuing the Compliance
6 Criteria at 40 CFR § 194.25 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) was to minimize the
7 impact of inherently conjectural specifications of future states on the compliance application.
8 The EPA has found no acceptable methodology to predict the future state of society, science,
9 languages, or other characteristics of mankind. However, the EPA does believe that established
10 scientific methods can make plausible predictions regarding the future state of geologic,
11 hydrogeologic, and climatic conditions. Therefore, section 194.25 stipulates that the future
12 state will resemble present conditions except for those relating to hydrogeologic, geologic, and
13 climatic conditions. For example, the population density and land ownership patterns in the
14 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's (WIPP's) surrounding regions are assumed to remain consistent
15 with today's conditions for the next 10,000 years. However, section 194.25 requires that
16 performance and compliance assessments include dynamic analyses of changes in the geology,
17 hydrology, and climatic conditions during the regulatory time frame.

18 **25.3 1998 Certification Decision**

19 Future state assumptions that are relevant to 40 CFR § 194.25(a) and may affect the containment
20 of waste were identified by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in the Compliance
21 Certification Application (CCA), Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2 and Appendices SCR and MASS (U.S.
22 Department of Energy 1996). Many of these future state assumptions were derived from the

1 development of features, events, and processes (FEPs) that are potentially relevant to the
 2 performance of the waste disposal system, and can be found in the CCA, Appendix SCR (e.g.,
 3 solution mining and anthropogenic climate changes). FEPs are screened using specific criteria to
 4 determine what phenomena and components of the disposal system can and should be dealt with
 5 in PA calculations.

6 In its certification decision, the EPA first determined whether all FEPs and appropriate future
 7 state assumptions were identified and developed by the DOE. The EPA then evaluated the
 8 DOE's criteria to eliminate (screen out) inapplicable or irrelevant FEPs and associated
 9 assumptions. The EPA also analyzed whether there were potential variations in the DOE's
 10 assumed characteristics and determined whether the future state assumptions were in compliance
 11 with section 194.25(a).

12 The EPA's CCA review found no potentially significant omissions in the lists of FEPs, and no
 13 major inadequacies in the CCA's descriptions of FEPs and related future state assumptions. The
 14 EPA concluded that the DOE adequately described all the future state assumptions applicable
 15 under section 194.25(a) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

16 To comply with 40 CFR §§ 194.25(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), the DOE identified and described
 17 the hydrogeologic FEPs and related future state assumptions retained for further evaluation and
 18 inclusion in performance assessment (PA) calculations in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.
 19 The DOE describes the effects of potential changes to hydrogeologic conditions on the disposal
 20 system in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.4.6 and 6.4.9 and Appendices SCR, TFIELD, and
 21 MASS. The DOE describes the effects of potential changes to geologic conditions on the
 22 disposal system in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.2, 6.4.6, 6.5.4, and Appendices SCR and
 23 MASS. The DOE identifies and describes the effects of potential changes to future climate
 24 cycles of increased precipitation on the repository in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.9.

25 The EPA concluded that the DOE adequately addressed the impacts of potential hydrogeologic,
 26 geologic, and climate changes to the disposal system (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
 27 1998a). The EPA further stated that the CCA included all relevant elements of the PA and
 28 compliance assessments and was consistent with the requirements of section 194.25.

29 **25.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

30 For the CRA-2004, the DOE reevaluated all WIPP FEPs and made improvements and
 31 clarifications to several FEP descriptions, arguments, and screening decisions. The results of the
 32 FEPs reassessment were presented in the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-
 33 2004), Appendix PA, Attachment SCR (U.S. Department of Energy 2004). The CRA-2004,
 34 Appendix PA, Attachment SCR, Table SCR-1 summarizes these changes.

35 **25.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

36 To evaluate compliance with section 194.25 requirements, the EPA reviewed the CRA-2004
 37 documentation, including Chapters 2.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 9.0; Appendix PA, Attachment SCR;
 38 Attachment TFIELD; and Attachment MASS. As in the 1998 Certification Decision (U.S.
 39 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b), the EPA first determined whether all FEPs and

1 appropriate future state assumptions were identified and developed by the DOE. The EPA then
2 evaluated the DOE's criteria to eliminate (screen out) inapplicable or irrelevant FEPs and
3 associated assumptions. The EPA also analyzed whether there were potential variations in the
4 DOE's assumed characteristics and determined whether the future state assumptions were in
5 compliance with section 194.25(a).

6 **25.5.1 40 CFR § 194.25(a)**

7 The EPA verified that all appropriate FEPs were included in the list provided by the DOE for
8 section 194.25(a). The EPA reviewed any changes in FEPs, including all screened-in and
9 screened-out FEPs related to future states, to verify that their selections were made correctly.
10 The EPA's FEPs review is documented in the CRA-2004 Technical Support Document for
11 section 194.25, 40 CFR § 194.32, and 40 CFR § 194.33 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
12 2006a).

13 **25.5.2 40 CFR § 194.25(b)(1)**

14 The EPA reexamined any hydrogeologic conditions that may have changed since the CCA
15 review. The EPA determined that the DOE's review of FEPs related to hydrogeologic conditions
16 and screening arguments was complete and that the conclusions drawn were appropriate.
17 Changes in the hydrology at and around the WIPP site, such as water level changes in monitor
18 wells and changes in potash mining, were appropriately included in PA modeling by updated
19 changes in the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as the
20 Culebra) transmissivity fields (T fields). See the CRA-2004 Compliance Application Review
21 Document 25 for more information (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

22 **25.5.3 40 CFR § 194.25(b)(2)**

23 The EPA reexamined the DOE's characterization of future geologic conditions in the CRA-2004
24 documents (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a). The EPA reexamined issues that
25 were reviewed during the CCA, such as tectonics and deformation assumptions; fracture
26 development and fault movement; ground shaking and seismic assumptions; volcanic and
27 magmatic activity; metamorphic activity; shallow, lateral, and deep dissolution assumptions; and
28 mineralization assumptions. The EPA also reviewed the CRA-2004 screening arguments related
29 to geological screening decisions. The EPA determined that the DOE's geologic screening
30 arguments are reasonable and adequate.

31 **25.5.4 40 CFR § 194.25(b)(3)**

32 As in the CCA, the EPA's review of climatic condition changes focused on applicable FEPs. The
33 EPA found that new information since the CCA does not impact FEPs or screening decisions
34 related to climate change (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

35 **25.5.5 The 2006 Recertification Decision**

36 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004, Chapters 2.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 9.0; Appendix
37 PA, Attachment SCR; Attachment TFIELD; Attachment MASS; and an assessment of changes

1 since 1998, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements of
2 section 194.25 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c).

3 **25.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

4 **25.6.1 40 CFR § 194.25(a)**

5 The DOE has reevaluated the basis of the WIPP FEPs for the CRA-2009. The results of this
6 reevaluation are found in Appendix SCR-2009. Conclusions drawn from Appendix SCR-2009
7 are also summarized in Section 32.

8 As described in Appendix SCR-2009, no screening decisions previously made using the future
9 states assumption in section 194.25(a) have changed (although additional information may have
10 been added to their descriptions); there continue to be 16 FEPs screened out based on this
11 provision. Table 25-1 lists the 16 FEPs eliminated from PA calculations using the future states
12 assumption.

13 Because there have been no changes to the conditions and bases for FEPs screened out using the
14 future states assumption, the DOE continues to be in compliance with the requirements of
15 section 194.25(a).

16 **25.6.2 40 CFR § 194.25(b)**

17 40 CFR § 194.25(b) requires consideration of future hydrogeologic, geologic, and climate
18 conditions during the regulatory time frame. Table 25-2, below, lists those FEPs that are
19 screened into PA calculations according to the criteria in section 194.25(b). There have been no
20 changes to the screening decisions for those FEPs that represent the hydrogeologic, geologic, and
21 climatic conditions in the future; they continue to be represented in performance calculations.

22 Section 1 of Clayton (2008) lists the changes to the PA system used for the CRA-2009
23 calculations. None of the changes made for the CRA-2009 performance calculations affect the
24 implementation of the FEPs screened in according to section 194.25(b).

25 In summary, no changes have been made to screening decisions for those FEPs that represent the
26 hydrologic, geologic, and climate-related conditions for the WIPP, and no changes have been
27 made to the representation of these elements within the PA system. Therefore, the DOE remains
28 in compliance with the requirements of sections 194.25(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3).

1 **Table 25-1. FEPs Screened Out Using the 40 CFR § 194.25(a) Criterion^a**

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Change Summary
H6	Archeological investigations	None
H7	Drilling associated with thermal energy production	None
H10	Liquid waste disposal	None
H11	Hydrocarbon storage	None
H14	Mining for other resources (not potash)	None
H15	Excavation activities associated with tunneling	None
H16	Construction of underground facilities	None
H40	Changes in land use	None
H47	Anthropogenic climate change – Greenhouse gas effects	None
H48	Anthropogenic climate change – Acid rain	None
H49	Anthropogenic climate change – Damage to the ozone layer	None
H53	Changes in agricultural practices – Arable farming	None
H54	Changes in agricultural practices – Ranching	None
H55	Changes in agricultural practices – Fish farming	None
H56	Demographic change, urban developments, and technological developments	None
H58	Solution mining – Potash	None

^a These screening classifications are consistent with current screening arguments and classifications as presented in Appendix SCR-2009.

2

Table 25-2. FEPs Screened In According to 40 CFR § 194.25(b)^a

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Issue	Screening Classification	Method of Representation In PA
N1	<i>Stratigraphy</i>	Disposition and properties of geological formations in control of system performance.	Included in the Undisturbed Performance (UP) scenario	BRAGFLO grid incorporates relevant stratigraphic units.
N2	<i>Brine reservoirs</i>	Pressurized brine reservoirs may be present in the Castile beneath the controlled area.	Included in the Disturbed Performance scenarios	The potential for brine pocket intrusion is represented by the parameter PBRINE in the E1 scenario.
N16	<i>Shallow Dissolution</i>	Percolation of groundwater and dissolution in the Rustler may increase transmissivity.	UP	The effects of shallow dissolution, as in Nash Draw, on the transmissivity of the Culebra are represented in the Culebra T-field generation and calibration process.

^a There have been no technical changes to this information since the CRA-2004, other than the correction of errors.

3

Table 25-2. FEPs Screened In According to 40 CFR § 194.25(b)^a (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Issue	Screening Classification	Method of Representation In PA
N23	<i>Saturated Groundwater Flow</i>	Groundwater flow beneath the water table is important to disposal system performance.	UP	Groundwater flow is represented by the Culebra T fields.
N24	<i>Unsaturated Groundwater Flow</i>	The presence of air or other gas phases may influence groundwater flow.	UP	Unsaturated flow is a precursor to recharge to the Culebra, which is accounted for in the boundary conditions for the Culebra T fields.
N25	<i>Fracture Flow</i>	Groundwater may flow along fractures as well as through interconnected pore space.	UP	Fracture flow is represented by the dual-porosity Culebra transport model.
N27	<i>Effects of Preferential Pathways</i>	Groundwater flow may not be uniform, and may occur along particular pathways.	UP	Preferential pathways are accounted for in the calibration of Culebra T fields to transient hydraulic test responses.
N33	<i>Groundwater Geochemistry</i>	Groundwater geochemistry influences actinide retardation and colloid stability.	UP	Salado and Castile brine geochemistry are accounted for in actinide solubility values. Culebra brine geochemistry is accounted for in the retardation factors used in PA calculations of actinide transport.
N39	<i>Physiography</i>	The physiography of the area is a control on the surface water hydrology.	UP	Relevant aspects of the physiography are incorporated in the Culebra T fields.
N53	<i>Groundwater Discharge</i>	The amount of water leaving the groundwater system to rivers, springs, and seeps affects the groundwater hydrology.	UP	Groundwater discharge is accounted for in the boundary conditions for the Culebra T fields.
N54	<i>Groundwater Recharge</i>	The amount of water passing into the saturated zone affects the groundwater hydrology.	UP	Groundwater recharge is accounted for in the boundary conditions for the Culebra T fields.
N55	<i>Infiltration</i>	The amount of water entering the unsaturated zone controls groundwater recharge.	UP	Infiltration is accounted for in the boundary conditions for the Culebra T fields.

^a There have been no technical changes to this information since the CRA-2004, other than the correction of errors.

1

Table 25-2. FEPs Screened In According to 40 CFR § 194.25(b)^a (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.	FEP Name	Issue	Screening Classification	Method of Representation In PA
N56	<i>Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge</i>	Changes in climate and drainage pattern may affect the amount of water entering and leaving the groundwater system.	UP	Changes in groundwater recharge and discharge are accounted for in the Climate Index factor.
N59	<i>Precipitation (e.g., Rainfall)</i>	Rainfall is the source of water for infiltration and stream flow.	UP	Future variations in precipitation are accounted for in the Climate Index factor.
N60	<i>Temperature</i>	The temperature influences how much precipitation evaporates before it reaches streams or enters the ground.	UP	Future variations in temperature are accounted for in the Climate Index factor.
N61	<i>Climate Change</i>	Temperature and precipitation will vary as natural changes in the climate take place.	UP	Future climate change is accounted for in the Climate Index factor.

^a There have been no technical changes to this information since the CRA-2004, other than the correction of errors.

2

3 **25.7 References**

4 Clayton, D.J. 2008. *Analysis Plan for the Performance Assessment for the 2009 Compliance*
 5 *Recertification Application* (Revision 1). AP-137. ERMS 547905. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
 6 National Laboratories.

7 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
 8 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
 9 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
 11 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
 12 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
 14 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
 15 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
 16 5223–45.

17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “CARD No. 25: Future State
 18 Assumptions.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification*
 19 *and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191*

- 1 *Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 25-1 through 25-14).
2 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
4 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
5 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol.
6 63 (May 18, 1998): 27353–406.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. *Technical Support Documents for*
8 *Sections 194.25, 194.32, and 194.33: Compliance Recertification Application Review of*
9 *Features, Events, and Processes* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 10 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “Recertification CARD No. 25: Future
11 State Assumptions.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the*
12 *Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR*
13 *191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 25-1 through 25-5).
14 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006c. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
16 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
17 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision” (Final Notice). *Federal Register*,
18 vol. 71 (April 10, 2006): 18010-021.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Peer Review
(40 CFR § 194.27)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Peer Review
(40 CFR § 194.27)

Table of Contents

27.0 Peer Review (40 CFR § 194.27) 27-1

 27.1 Requirements 27-1

 27.2 Background 27-1

 27.3 1998 Certification Decision 27-2

 27.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 27-2

 27.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 27-2

 27.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification 27-4

 27.6.1 LANL Sealed Sources Peer Review 27-4

 27.6.2 LANL Remote-Handled TRU Waste Visual Examination Data
 Verification Peer Review 27-5

 27.6.3 WIPP Revised DRZ and Cuttings and Cavings Submodels Peer
 Review 27-6

 27.6.4 The RSI Expert Review of the DOE’s Use of MgO 27-6

 27.7 References 27-7

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CAO	Carlsbad Area Office
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CBFO	Carlsbad Field Office
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CMR	Chemistry and Metallurgical Research
CPR	cellulose, plastic, and rubber
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
CTAC	CBFO Technical Assistance Contractor
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DRZ	Disturbed Rock Zone
EEG	Environmental Evaluation Group
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
MP	Management Procedure
NAS	National Academy of Sciences
NEA/OECD	Nuclear Energy Agency/Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSR	Off-Site Source Recovery
QA	quality assurance
QAPD	Quality Assurance Program Document
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
RSI	Institute for Regulatory Science
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
TRU	transuranic
VE	visual examination
WAC	Waste Acceptance Criteria
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Am	americium
CO ₂	carbon dioxide
MgO	magnesium oxide
Pu	plutonium

1 **27.0 Peer Review (40 CFR § 194.27)**

2 **27.1 Requirements**

§ 194.27 Peer Review

(a) Any compliance application shall include documentation of peer review that has been conducted, in a manner required by this section, for:

- (1) Conceptual models selected and developed by the Department;
- (2) Waste characterization analyses as required in § 194.24(b); and
- (3) Engineered barrier evaluation as required in § 194.44.

(b) Peer review processes required in paragraph (a) of this section, and conducted subsequent to the promulgation of this part, shall be conducted in a manner that is compatible with NUREG-1297, “Peer Review for High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories,” published February 1988. (Incorporation by reference as specified in § 194.5.)

(c) Any compliance application shall:

(1) Include information that demonstrates that peer review processes required in paragraph (a) of this section, and conducted prior to the implementation of the promulgation of this part, were conducted in accordance with an alternate process substantially equivalent in effect to NUREG-1297 and approved by the Administrator or the Administrator’s authorized representative; and

(2) Document any peer review processes conducted in addition to those required pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section. Such documentation shall include formal requests, from the Department to outside review groups or individuals, to review or comment on any information used to support compliance applications, and the responses from such groups or individuals.

3

4 **27.2 Background**

5 According to 40 CFR § 194.27 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996), the U.S.
6 Department of Energy (DOE) is required to conduct peer review evaluations related to
7 conceptual models, waste characterization analyses, and a comparative study of engineered
8 barriers. A peer review involves an independent group of experts who perform an in-depth
9 critique of assumptions, calculations, extrapolations, alternative interpretations, methodology and
10 acceptance criteria employed, and conclusions drawn in the original work. Peer review confirms
11 the adequacy of the work (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1988). The required peer
12 reviews must be performed in accordance with NUREG-1297, *Peer Review for High-Level*
13 *Nuclear Waste Repositories* (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1988), which establishes
14 guidelines for the conduct of a peer review exercise. 40 CFR § 194.27(c)(2) also requires the
15 DOE to document in the compliance application any additional peer reviews beyond those
16 explicitly required. These additional peer reviews will be identified in this section as informal
17 peer reviews.

18 For the formal peer reviews performed before submitting the Compliance Certification
19 Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996a), the DOE developed Carlsbad Area
20 Office (CAO) Team Procedure 10.5, *Peer Review* (U.S. Department of Energy 1996b) to guide
21 all Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) peer reviews and to show a process compatible with
22 section 194.27 and NUREG-1297 requirements. For the Compliance Recertification Assessment
23 (CRA) of 2004 (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy 2004a), the DOE updated this
24 procedure to Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) Management Procedure (MP) 10.5, *Peer Review*
25 (U.S. Department of Energy 2002). MP 10.5 has been revised several times since 2002, and the

1 latest version (Rev. 7, 7/25/07) provides the criteria for selecting the peer review panel, peer
2 review process used, review plan development requirements, peer review report preparation
3 requirements, and many other aspects of the peer review process.

4 **27.3 1998 Certification Decision**

5 For the CCA, the DOE completed the required peer reviews and documented them in the CCA,
6 Chapter 9.0 and Appendix PEER. The CCA, Chapter 9.0 and Appendix PEER, also contains
7 documentation demonstrating that the DOE's procedures and plans for the required peer reviews
8 are compatible with NUREG-1297. Peer reviews conducted after promulgation of 40 CFR Part
9 194 and intended to demonstrate compliance with section 194.27 were subject to the
10 requirements of the pertinent procedures and plans. To assess the peer review process during the
11 CCA, the EPA conducted an audit of the DOE's quality assurance (QA) records for peer review
12 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1997). The audit consisted of an extensive review of the
13 DOE's records and interviews of DOE staff and contractors responsible for managing the
14 required peer reviews.

15 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) certification decision was published in
16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1998a). The EPA found the DOE in compliance with
17 the requirements of section 194.27. The EPA's independent audit established that the DOE had
18 conducted and documented the required peer reviews in a manner compatible with NUREG-
19 1297. The EPA also determined that the DOE adequately documented additional peer reviews in
20 the CCA (see Compliance Application Review Document [CARD] 27, U.S. Environmental
21 Protection Agency 1998b).

22 **27.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

23 The DOE performed two conceptual model peer reviews between the CCA and the CRA-2004.
24 These include the Salado Flow Conceptual Model Peer Review in March 2003 (see CRA-2004,
25 Chapter 9.0, Section 9.3.1.3.4) and the Spallings Model Peer Review in September 2003 (see
26 CRA-2004, Chapter 9.0, Section 9.3.1.3.5).

27 External informal peer reviews that fall under section 194.27(c)(2) requirements were also
28 performed during this period. Reviews conducted by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
29 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization
30 for Economic Cooperation and Development (NEA/OECD), Institute for Regulatory Science
31 (RSI), and the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) are described in the CRA-2004, Chapter
32 9.0, and the reports are included in the CRA-2004, Appendix PEER-2004.

33 **27.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

34 The following is the EPA's evaluation of the DOE's compliance with Section 194.27 (the
35 CRA-2004, Chapter 9.0 and Appendix PEER-2004) as contained in the EPA's Recertification
36 Decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2006a) and the accompanying CARD 27 (U.S.
37 Environmental Protection Agency, 2006b).

1 The EPA reviewed the new DOE MP 10.5, Rev. 5 (U.S. Department of Energy 2003a) and
2 determined that it was adequately comparable with section 194.27 requirements and NUREG-
3 1297 guidance. The DOE followed the MP 10.5, Rev. 5, for the Salado Flow Conceptual Model
4 Peer Review (U.S. Department of Energy 2003b) and the Spallings Model Peer Review (U.S.
5 Department of Energy 2003c). The EPA attended and reviewed each of the conceptual model
6 peer reviews as they were performed and reviewed all documents related to each peer review.
7 The EPA's review verified that the process used by the DOE to perform these peer reviews was
8 compatible with NUREG-1297 requirements. The EPA completed its Salado Flow Conceptual
9 Model Peer Review Report in June 2003 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2003a), and the
10 Spallings Model Peer Review in December 2003 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
11 2003b).

12 The Salado Flow Conceptual Model Peer Review was performed from April 2002 to March
13 2003. The final report was published in March 2003 (U.S. Department of Energy 2003d). This
14 peer review evaluated changes to 3 of 24 conceptual models: Disposal System Geometry,
15 Repository Fluid Flow, and Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ). The three conceptual models were
16 changed because of new information gained after the original certification or changes to
17 conceptual model assumptions mandated by the EPA in the final CCA decision, such as the
18 Option D panel closure condition. Changes included modification of the computational grid to
19 accommodate the new panel closure requirement, shaft simplification, changes in fluid flow
20 paths, and changing from a constant DRZ porosity to a range of values for the halite and
21 anhydrite layers (U.S. Department of Energy 2003d). The peer review panel accepted the
22 proposed changes. The EPA reviewed the peer review plan (U.S. Department of Energy 2003b)
23 and the final peer review report (U.S. Department of Energy 2003d) for the Salado Flow
24 Conceptual Model Peer Review. The EPA also observed the actual performance of the peer
25 review, evaluated the process for the selection of the review panel, observed the interaction of
26 the review panel with the DOE and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and reviewed the
27 documents produced during and as a result of the peer review. The EPA determined that the peer
28 review process and the implementation of MP 10.5 met the requirements of section 194.27 and
29 the guidance in NUREG-1297 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2003a).

30 The Spallings Model Peer Review was performed from July 2003 to October 2003. The final
31 report was published in October 2003 (U.S. Department of Energy 2003e). This model was
32 changed because the original conceptual peer review found the CCA's spallings model to be
33 inadequate (although the spallings volumes used in the CCA were found to be reasonable) and
34 the EPA expected the DOE to develop a new spallings model before the first recertification in
35 2004. The new spallings model includes three major elements: consideration of multiphase flow
36 processes in the intrusion borehole, consideration of fluidization and transport of waste
37 particulates from the intact waste mass to the borehole, and a numerical solution for the coupled
38 mechanical and hydrological response of the waste as a porous medium (U.S. Department of
39 Energy 2003e and 2004b). The DOE developed a new numerical code to implement the new
40 spallings conceptual model, which was written to calculate the volume of WIPP solid waste that
41 may undergo material failure and be transported to the surface as a result of a drilling intrusion.
42 The peer review panel accepted the proposed changes. The EPA reviewed the peer review plan
43 (U.S. Department of Energy 2003c) and the final peer review report (U.S. Department of Energy
44 2003e) and found them to adequately fulfill the requirements of section 194.27 and NUREG-
45 1297. The EPA observed the actual performance of the peer review, evaluated the process for

1 the selection of the panel, observed the interaction of the panel with the DOE and SNL, and
2 reviewed the documents produced during and as a result of the peer review. The EPA
3 determined the peer review process and the implementation of MP 10.5 met the requirements of
4 section 194.27 and the guidance in NUREG-1297 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
5 2003b).

6 The EPA conducted desktop evaluations of other reviews done since the CCA for compliance
7 with section 194.27(c)(2). These include those done by the NAS, IAEA, NEA/OECD, RSI, and
8 EEG from October 1996 to September 2003. The EPA found these reviews to be useful,
9 reasonable, and helpful to the WIPP project, and determined that they reasonably fulfilled the
10 requirements of section 194.27(c)(2).

11 The EPA did not receive any public comments on the DOE's continued compliance with the peer
12 review requirements of section 194.27. Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and
13 supplemental information provided by the DOE (U.S. Department of Energy 2004a, Chapter 9.0
14 and Appendix PEER-2004), the EPA (2006a and 2006b) determined that the DOE continued to
15 comply with the requirements for section 194.27.

16 **27.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification**

17 **27.6.1 LANL Sealed Sources Peer Review**

18 A peer review on "sealed sources" was conducted for the Off-Site Source Recovery (OSR)
19 Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in December 2003 (Los Alamos National
20 Laboratory 2003).

21 Actinide-containing sealed sources (those containing plutonium-238 [^{238}Pu], plutonium-239
22 [^{239}Pu], and americium-241 [^{241}Am]) were generated over the past 60 years. Due to radiological
23 risks posed by these materials, the OSR Project at LANL was responsible for gathering these
24 sources for proper control and disposal. To support disposal of these sources at the WIPP, the
25 OSR proposed using existing data from original production, transportation, or source control
26 documents as the basis for determining radiological information required by the EPA.

27 This peer review panel was convened to review the adequacy of the available data to reasonably
28 determine the radionuclide content for compliance with the WIPP Contact-Handled Transuranic
29 (TRU) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). These records include original manufacturing
30 records; shipping data sheets; source control information, such as the Nuclear Materials
31 Management and Safeguards System; and other corroborating sources of information, such as
32 sealed source engraved markings. Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Agreement State regulatory
33 approval data and U.S. Department of Transportation records were collected to support the
34 assignment of radiological properties.

35 The Peer Review Panel concluded the following (Los Alamos National Laboratory 2003):

36 The historical documents gathered by the OSR Project were originally prepared in a controlled
37 manner. Strict adherence to procedures under the oversight of quality assurance programs assured
38 that these sources and their associated production documents were prepared with a high degree of
39 care and certainty. The nature of the source production work itself and the historically successful

1 performance of these sources for their intended purposes support this observation. In addition, the
2 feed material batches to produce these sources were generated with close tolerances. These
3 narrow tolerances were necessary to satisfy Material Type (MT) requirements in the production of
4 defense materials, as well as the manufacture of sources to defined specifications.

5 The Peer Review Panel concluded that the various data records collected provide either uniquely,
6 or as the sum of several individual records, adequate documentation for determining the
7 radionuclide type, radionuclide content/activity, and either the date of manufacture or some other
8 more conservative date for the purpose of decay correction. The Peer Review Panel concluded
9 that these data were adequate for assigning, with a high degree of certainty, the radiological
10 information required for the disposal of this material at the WIPP.

11 The EPA did not observe or audit this peer review.

12 **27.6.2 LANL Remote-Handled TRU Waste Visual Examination Data** 13 **Verification Peer Review**

14 A peer review on *Los Alamos National Laboratory Remote-Handled Waste Visual Examination*
15 *Data Verification* was performed in April 2007. Details of this peer review are contained in
16 Time Solutions Corporation (2007a).

17 This peer review was an in-depth analysis and evaluation of visual examination (VE) data that
18 were originally created by technicians at LANL for remote-handled- (RH-) transuranic (TRU)
19 (RH-TRU) waste. The RH-TRU waste was derived from cleanup and decommissioning of hot
20 cells located in Wing 9 of the Chemistry and Metallurgical Research (CMR) building at LANL
21 during 1986-1992. During the cleanup process, LANL technicians recorded in CMR Laboratory
22 Notebook #23744 descriptions of activities conducted and waste materials packaged. Data
23 contained in that notebook were later used to assist in documenting the containerized waste so
24 that it could be transported and stored at an on-site facility. The RH-TRU waste generated at
25 Wing 9 of the CMR is intended for disposal at the WIPP. The data used by LANL for onsite
26 transportation and storage were not created under the requirements of the current WIPP Quality
27 Assurance Program Document (QAPD). Peer reviews are specifically recognized as a means for
28 qualifying data not generated under a WIPP-approved QA program. The purpose of this peer
29 review was to arrive at an expert opinion on whether the data are technically sufficient to
30 determine if current data quality objectives and quality assurance objectives can be met.

31 For this peer review, a Peer Review Plan was developed that met the requirements of DOE MP
32 10.5, Rev. 6 (U.S. Department of Energy 2005). A three-member Peer Review Panel of
33 independent, technically qualified experts was assembled to determine whether or not the VE
34 data were technically robust enough for decisions concerning the residual liquid content and
35 physical form of the waste. It was the unanimous opinion of the panel that the VE data may be
36 used for those purposes.

37 While a number of criteria must be met to assure waste acceptance at the WIPP, this peer review
38 was concerned with only two: (1) the volume of residual liquid content and (2) classifying the
39 physical form of the waste. The scope of the peer review was to evaluate whether the technical
40 information contained in the original data records prepared by LANL technicians is adequate for
41 evaluating the residual liquid content in the waste and for classifying the waste as either (1)

1 homogeneous solids, (2) soils/gravel, or (3) debris. The scope did not include determining the
2 residual liquid content of the waste or placing the waste into the correct physical form category,
3 nor did it include determining if other (or all) WAC have been met.

4 The peer review was held in Albuquerque, NM, April 9–12, 2007. Organizations represented at
5 the meeting included the DOE-CBFO, the EPA, Washington TRU Solutions, and the CBFO
6 Technical Assistance Contractor (CTAC). The peer review process and documents created
7 during the peer review are subject to all of the protocols described in the QAPD and MP 10.5.
8 The DOE-CBFO Office of Quality Assurance, with support from CTAC, conducted the audit of
9 the peer review process and found that it was satisfactorily performed and documented (see
10 Appendix AUD-2009, Table AUD-3, Audit # A-07-23).

11 As a result of a peer review conducted according to the procedures contained in MP 10.5 and
12 subject to the assumptions and limitations contained in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the peer review
13 report, the Peer Review Panel concluded without dissent that with respect to the LANL RH-TRU
14 Waste VE data:

- 15 • The data are sufficient for decision-making with respect to the volume of residual liquid
16 contained in the RH-TRU waste.
- 17 • The data are sufficient for decision-making with respect to classifying the physical form of
18 the RH-TRU waste.
- 19 • The data are complete with respect to the RH-TRU waste generated during hot cell cleaning
20 and decommissioning at Wing 9 of the CMR at LANL.

21 The EPA examined the Panel’s report in the context of its technical scope and results to
22 understand the process followed and its relevance to the EPA’s baseline inspection of the
23 RH-TRU waste characterization program conducted at LANL on May 8 – 10, 2007. The EPA
24 concluded that the results of the peer review were reasonable (U.S. Environmental Protection
25 Agency 2008, p. 44).

26 **27.6.3 WIPP Revised DRZ and Cuttings and Cavings Submodels Peer Review**

27 In 2007, the DOE proposed modifications that would affect 2 of the 24 conceptual models in the
28 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation, the EPA’s current performance assessment
29 baseline from the CRA-2004. It was determined that since these proposed modifications would
30 impact the conceptual models, an independent technical peer review on the adequacy of the
31 proposed changes to the approved conceptual models should be performed in accordance with
32 the requirements of section 194.27. Before the peer review was completed, the DOE decided in
33 October 2007 to postpone considering the proposed modifications. The peer review panel
34 prepared a report (Time Solutions Corporation 2007b) to document their interim findings.

35 **27.6.4 The RSI Expert Review of the DOE’s Use of MgO**

36 In 2005 and 2006, the RSI of Alexandria, VA, reviewed the DOE’s use of magnesium oxide
37 (MgO) in the WIPP disposal rooms, paying particular attention to the need to emplace additional

1 MgO in rooms with super-compacted waste. This review was conducted at the request of the
2 DOE and the results were submitted to the EPA in 2006 in support of the DOE's Planned
3 Change Request for reducing the MgO excess factor from 1.67 to 1.2. The RSI expert panel met
4 for two days in July 2005 in Carlsbad, NM, where the DOE scientists presented the technical
5 justification for reducing the MgO excess factor. The RSI expert panel met again for two days in
6 September 2005 in Albuquerque, NM, where the DOE scientists responded to several issues
7 raised by the panel. The panel's findings were published in Institute for Regulatory Science
8 (2006).

9 In its deliberations, the panel assessed the biodegradation potential of the WIPP waste,
10 particularly the cellulosics, plastics, and rubbers (CPRs) in the waste under the projected
11 physical and chemical conditions of the WIPP repository for the 10,000-year regulatory period.
12 It also examined the role of MgO in consuming the carbon dioxide (CO₂) expected to be
13 produced as a result of biodegradation. The panel concluded that most of the MgO will be
14 available for chemical reaction; only a small fraction of the CPR material is likely to be
15 biodegraded to produce CO₂, and it is therefore likely that the EPA release standards would be
16 met even if there is less MgO than the quantity required to consume all the CO₂ produced.
17 Therefore, the panel concluded that the 67% MgO excess factor is not necessary.

18 The EPA considered this review when evaluating the DOE request to reduce the quantity of
19 MgO required to be emplaced in the WIPP repository. More details on this expert review can be
20 found in Appendix MgO-2009 (Section MgO-6.2.4.1) (Reyes 2008).

21 The WIPP remains in compliance with the requirements of section 194.27.

22 **27.7 References**

23 Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI). 2006. *Application of Magnesium Oxide as an*
24 *Engineered Barrier at [the] Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: Report of the Expert Panel* (February
25 21). RSI-06-01. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Regulatory Science.

26 Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). 2003. *Sealed Sources Peer Review Report*
27 (December 5). WSMS-LOS-03-0065. Los Alamos: LANL Off-Site Source Recovery (OSR)
28 Project.

29 Reyes, J. 2008. Letter to D.C. Moody (5 Enclosures). 11 February 2008. U.S. Environmental
30 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

31 Time Solutions Corporation. 2007a. *Los Alamos National Laboratory Remote Handled Waste*
32 *Visual Examination Data Verification Peer Review Report* (April). Albuquerque.

33 Time Solutions Corporation. 2007b. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Interim Report for the Revised*
34 *DRZ and Cuttings & Cavings Sub-Models Peer Review* (December). Albuquerque.

35 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996a. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
36 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
37 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996b. *CAO Team Procedure: Peer Review* (Revision 0).
2 TP No. 10.5. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2002. *CBFO Management Procedure: Peer Review*
4 (Revision 4). MP No. 10.5. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 5 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003a. *CBFO Management Procedure: Peer Review*
6 (Revision 5). MP No. 10.5. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 7 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003b. *Salado Flow Peer Review Plan* (Revision 1).
8 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 9 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003c. *Spallings Peer Review Plan* (June 20). Carlsbad,
10 NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 11 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003d. *Salado Flow Conceptual Model Peer Final Review*
12 *Report* (March). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 13 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003e. *Spallings Conceptual Model Peer Review Report*
14 (October). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 15 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004a. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
16 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
17 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 18 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004b. *Spallings Conceptual Model Peer Review Report:*
19 *Errata* (February 20). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 20 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005. *Management Procedure: Peer Review* (Rev. 6,
21 Effective July 25, 2005 to July 25, 2007). CBFO MP 10.5. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field
22 Office.
- 23 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007. *Management Procedure: Peer Review* (Rev. 7,
24 Effective July 25, 2007 to July 25, 2009). CBFO MP 10.5. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field
25 Office.
- 26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
27 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
28 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
29 5223–45.
- 30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1997. *Audit of the Peer Review Process*
31 *Conducted by the Department of Energy* (Revision 0). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 32 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
33 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
34 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
35 1998): 27353–406.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. "CARD No. 27: Peer Review."
2 *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
3 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191*
4 *Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 27-1 through 27-11). EPA 402-
5 R-97-013. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2003a. *EPA Review of the U.S. Department of*
7 *Energy Salado Flow Conceptual Model Peer Review* (June). Washington, DC: Office of
8 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2003b. *EPA Review of the U.S. Department of*
10 *Energy Spallings Conceptual Model Peer Review* (December). Washington, DC: Office of
11 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. "40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
13 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the
14 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision" (Final Notice). *Federal Register*, vol. 71
15 (April 10, 2006): 18010–021.
- 16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. "Recertification CARD No. 27: Peer
17 Review." *Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's*
18 *Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision*
19 (March) (pp. 27-1 through 27-5). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2008. *EPA Baseline Inspection No. EPA-LANL-*
21 *CCP-RH-5.07-8 of the Central Characterization Project: Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste*
22 *Characterization Program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, May 8–10, 2007* (February).
23 Waste Characterization Inspection Report. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 24 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 1988. *Peer Review for High-Level Nuclear*
25 *Waste Repositories: Generic Technical Position*. NUREG-1297. Washington, DC.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Application of Release Limits
(40 CFR § 194.31)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Application of Release Limits
(40 CFR § 194.31)**

Table of Contents

31.0 Application of Release Limits (40 CFR § 194.31) 31-1
 31.1 Requirements 31-1
 31.2 Background..... 31-1
 31.3 1998 Certification Decision 31-1
 31.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 31-2
 31.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 31-4
 31.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification 31-5
 31.7 References..... 31-5

List of Tables

Table 31-1. Total Radioactivity Associated with CH-TRU and RH-TRU Wastes 31-3
Table 31-2. Radionuclides with Highest Activity in the CH-TRU Waste Inventory 31-3
Table 31-3. Radionuclides with Highest Activity in the RH-TRU Waste Inventory 31-3

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
Ci	curies
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
m ³	cubic meters
MCi	million-curie
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
TRU	transuranic
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WUF	waste unit factor

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Am	americium
Cs	cesium
Pu	plutonium
Sr	strontium
Y	yttrium
^{137m} Ba	metastable barium-137

This page intentionally left blank.

31.0 Application of Release Limits (40 CFR § 194.31)

31.1 Requirements

§ 194.31 Application of Release Limits

The release limits shall be calculated according to part 191, appendix A of this chapter, using the total activity, in curies that will exist in the disposal system at the time of disposal.

31.2 Background

The radioactive waste disposal regulations at 40 CFR Part 191 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) include requirements for the containment of radionuclides. The containment requirements specify that releases from a disposal system to the accessible environment must not exceed the release limits set forth in Part 191, Appendix A, Table 1. To calculate the applicable release limits for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), information is needed on the expected total curie content in the repository. However, because the inventory estimates are updated as part of the recertification effort, and because the curie content of the waste inventory in the repository will change over time as a result of natural decay and in-growth of radionuclides, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must establish an inventory for use in performance assessment (PA) and must determine a date for decay purposes to be used as a reference point for calculating the curie content of waste. 40 CFR § 194.31 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) specifies that release limits should be calculated based on the curie content at the time of disposal (that is, after the end of the operational period, when the shafts of the repository have been backfilled and sealed). This approach was used by DOE in all previous compliance applications and is also being used for the 2009 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2009). The inventory for the CRA-2009 PA is the same inventory used for the CRA-2004 PABC. Since the CRA-2004 PABC was completed, the *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report–2007* (U.S. Department of Energy 2008) was published and provides updated inventory information. The DOE anticipates this inventory update will have only a small impact on normalized releases relative to the CRA-2009 PA, and will not be significant for compliance. Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with section 194.24(a) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1994).

31.3 1998 Certification Decision

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stated in Compliance Application Review Document (CARD) 31 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998) that they expected the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996) to estimate curies of each radionuclide in the disposal system at the time of disposal, and provide sample calculations of release limits, including the relative contribution of each radionuclide to the normalized releases. The EPA later determined as part of their compliance determination that the CCA PA and the EPA-mandated Performance Assessment Verification Test (PAVT) were calculated using release limits developed in accordance with Part 1, Appendix A.

1 A complete description of EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for compliance with section
2 194.31 can be obtained from CARD 31 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998).

3 **31.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

4 In the CRA-2004, the DOE used updated versions of the same computer codes as those used in
5 the CCA and CCA PAVT to decay the radionuclide inventory and calculate EPA units per cubic
6 meter of waste (Fox 2003). The only change of note was the CRA-2004 inventory, which is
7 discussed in the CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment F, the CRA-2004, Appendix TRU
8 WASTE, and in CARD 24 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a).

9 Since the radioactivity in each waste stream is not measured at the same time, the waste stream
10 activities were decay-corrected to December 31, 2001, using the computer code ORIGEN2
11 Version 2.2 (Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2002). The total radioactivity in the repository is
12 based on contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU) waste volumes of each
13 radionuclide and then scaled to WIPP's maximum allowable CH-TRU volume (168,485 cubic
14 meters (m³)). The scaling factor for each type of waste is calculated by subtracting the stored
15 and emplaced waste volumes from the disposal limit value (for disposal volumes of CH-TRU
16 waste [168,485 m³] and remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-TRU) waste [7,079 m³])
17 and dividing this value by the projected waste volume.

18 The total radioactivity associated with CH-TRU and RH-TRU wastes from the CCA PAVT,
19 CRA-2004, and CRA-2004 PABC are shown in Table 31-1. These RH-TRU waste values are
20 substantially lower than the RH-TRU waste limit of 5.1 million-curie (MCi) specified in the
21 WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (PL102-579).

22 Table 31-2 shows that the 5 radionuclides with the highest activity in the waste—Americium
23 (Am)-241, Plutonium (Pu)-238, ²³⁹Pu, ²⁴⁰Pu, and ²⁴¹Pu—contribute 97% of the total CH-TRU
24 waste activity in the CRA-2004 PABC, 97% in the CRA-2004, and 99% in the CCA PAVT.

25 Similar information on the five radionuclides with the highest activity in the RH-TRU waste is
26 presented in Table 31-3.

27 For use in the PA, these inventories are decayed using the computer code to the year 2033, the
28 assumed closure date for the WIPP, and to various dates up to 10,000 years after closure to
29 obtain the radioactivity profiles as a function of time (e.g., see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA,
30 Attachment PAR, Table PAR-50).

1 **Table 31-1. Total Radioactivity Associated with CH-TRU and RH-TRU Wastes**

Analysis	CH-TRU Waste Total Activity (Ci)	RH-TRU Waste Total Activity (Ci)
CCA PAVT ^{a,c}	6.4×10^6	1.0×10^6
CRA-2004 ^{b,c}	5.3×10^6	1.3×10^6
CRA-2004 PABC ^{b,d}	4.7×10^6	1.6×10^6
^a Decayed through 1995 ^b Decayed through 2001 ^c Values from the CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment F, Annex B, Table DATA-F-B-27 ^d Values from Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report 2004, Table B.1-27 (U.S. Department of Energy 2006).		

2

3 **Table 31-2. Radionuclides with Highest Activity in the CH-TRU Waste Inventory**

Radionuclide	Radioactivity in CCA PAVT ^{a,c} (Ci)	Radioactivity in CRA-2004 ^{b,c} (Ci)	Radioactivity in CRA-2004 PABC ^{b,d} (Ci)
²⁴¹ Am	4.4×10^5	4.0×10^5	4.8×10^5
²³⁸ Pu	2.6×10^6	1.6×10^6	1.5×10^6
²³⁹ Pu	7.9×10^5	6.6×10^5	5.8×10^5
²⁴⁰ Pu	2.1×10^5	$(1.1 \times 10^5)^c$	9.4×10^4
²⁴¹ Pu	2.3×10^6	$(2.4 \times 10^6)^f$	2.0×10^6
Fraction of Total Inventory	99%	97%	97%

^a Decayed through 1995^b Decayed through 2001^c Values directly from the CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment F, Annex B, Table DATA-F-B-27^d Values directly from Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report 2004, Table B.1-27 (U.S. Department of Energy 2006).^e Value incorrectly reported in CARD 31 as 2.40×10^6 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).^f Value incorrectly reported in CARD 31 as 5.18×10^6 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

4

5 **Table 31-3. Radionuclides with Highest Activity in the RH-TRU Waste Inventory**

Radionuclide	Radioactivity in CCA PAVT ^{a,c} (Ci)	Radioactivity in CRA-2004 ^{b,c} (Ci)	Radioactivity in CRA-2004 PABC ^{b,d} (Ci)
^{137m} Ba	2.0×10^5	3.4×10^5	3.9×10^5
¹³⁷ Cs	2.2×10^5	3.7×10^5	4.3×10^5
²⁴¹ Pu	1.4×10^5	1.1×10^5	1.3×10^5
⁹⁰ Sr	2.1×10^5	2.5×10^5	3.2×10^5
⁹⁰ Y	2.1×10^5	2.4×10^5	3.2×10^5
Fraction of Total Inventory	96%	98%	98%

^a Decayed through 1995^b Decayed through 2001^c Values directly from the CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment F, Annex B, Table DATA-F-B-28^d Values directly from Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report 2004, Table B.1-28 (U.S. Department of Energy 2006).

6

1 According to Part 1, Appendix A, Table 1 (Note 1e), release limits for the radionuclides
2 specified in the rule are based on “an amount of TRU waste containing one million curies of
3 alpha-emitting TRU radionuclides with half-lives greater than 20 years.” To obtain release limits
4 for use in the PA, the release limits per MCi specified in Part 191, Appendix A, Table 1 must be
5 multiplied by a factor that defines the number of MCi of TRU radionuclides in the inventory.
6 For PA purposes, this factor, defined as the WUF or unit of waste, is expressed as

$$7 \quad f_w = \frac{\sum W_f}{10^6 \text{ Ci}} \quad (\text{Eq. 31.1})$$

8 where f_w is the WUF and W_f is the WIPP-scale inventory in curies of each alpha-emitting TRU
9 radionuclide with a half-life of 20 years or more. The DOE identified a total of 138
10 radionuclides expected to be present in the waste based on the CRA-2004 PABC inventory. Of
11 these, 17 meet the definition of TRU waste in Part 191, Appendix A, Table 1 for calculating the
12 WUF. Table 2 of Leigh and Trone (2005) identify these nuclides and determine that they
13 contribute 2.32×10^6 Ci at closure, resulting in a WUF of 2.32 in the CRA-2004 PABC. CRA-
14 2004, Appendix TRU WASTE, and the CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report (Leigh, Trone, and
15 Fox 2005) discuss in detail the waste unit factor (WUF) calculations and the radionuclides
16 important to the calculations.

17 **31.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

18 The CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2006) was completed
19 following the submittal of the CRA-2004 and was used in the CRA-2004 PABC calculations.
20 Though this inventory was issued following the CRA-2004, it was included in the EPA’s
21 evaluation of the CRA-2004. The EPA reviewed the information collected by the DOE related
22 to the waste inventory for the CRA-2004 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC, and conducted
23 verification calculations on the data used by the DOE in the CRA-2004 PA (CARD 24, U.S.
24 Environmental Protection Agency 2006a, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006c,
25 Sections 3.4 and 4.4). The methodologies for calculating the WUF and release limits in the
26 CRA-2004 PABC were unchanged from those used in the CCA and the CRA-2004, and the EPA
27 determined that the approach used was appropriate and acceptable for the CRA-2004 PA (U.S.
28 Environmental Protection Agency 2006d).

29 To verify whether the ORIGEN2 Version 2.2 decay calculations were performed correctly, the
30 EPA carried out independent calculations of the decay of the inventory. These calculations
31 showed that, on a spot-check basis, the ORIGEN2 values derived by the DOE and used in
32 EPAUNI¹ (Sandia National Laboratories 2003) were correct (CARD 31, U.S. Environmental
33 Protection Agency 2006b). During the CRA-2004 review, the EPA reviewed the codes and
34 determined that they adequately performed the decay calculations. The EPA determined that the
35 approach used by the DOE was appropriate and acceptable for the CRA-2004 PA (U.S.
36 Environmental Protection Agency 2006a).

¹ EPAUNI is a computer code that calculates the activity per m³ for each waste stream at a discrete set of times.

1 **31.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification**

2 The CRA-2009 PA maintains the same inventory and WUF values that were used in the CRA-
3 2004 PABC (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) and previously accepted by the EPA. The CRA-2004
4 PABC inventory was the last published inventory at the time the PA calculation for the CRA-
5 2009 commenced. Since the CRA-2004 PABC was completed, the *Annual Transuranic Waste*
6 *Inventory Report–2007* (U.S. Department of Energy 2008) was published and provides updated
7 inventory information. The DOE anticipates this inventory update will have only a small impact
8 on normalized releases relative to the CRA-2009 PA, and will not be significant for compliance.
9 The DOE’s approach to demonstrating compliance with the application of release limits has not
10 changed from that used in the CRA-2004 and CRA-2004 PABC, and therefore continues to
11 comply with section 194.31.

12 **31.7 References**

- 13 Fox, B. 2003. *Analysis of EPA Unit Loading Calculation, Compliance Recertification*
14 *Application* (Superceded ERMS 530304, Revision 1). ERMS 531582. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
15 National Laboratories.
- 16 Leigh, C., and J. Trone. 2005. *Calculation of the Waste Unit Factor for the Performance*
17 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 539613. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
18 Laboratories.
- 19 Leigh, C., J. Trone, and B. Fox. 2005. *TRU Waste Inventory for the 2004 Compliance*
20 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS
21 541118. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). 2002. *RSICC Computer Code Collection ORIGEN*
23 *2.2* (June). CCC371 ORIGEN 2.2. ERMS 525791. Oak Ridge, TN: Radiation Safety
24 Information Computational Center.
- 25 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2003. *User’s Manual for EPAUNI, Version 1.15A*. ERMS
26 530203. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
28 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
29 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 30 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
31 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
32 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 33 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006. *Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report–2004*.
34 DOE/TRU 2006-3344. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 35 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008. *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report–2007*
36 (Revision 1). DOE/TRU 2008-3379. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
2 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
3 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
4 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
6 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
7 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
8 5223–45.
- 9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998. “CARD No. 31: Application of Release
10 Limits.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and
11 Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal
12 Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 31-1 through 31-20). Washington, DC:
13 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 14 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
15 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance With the
16 Disposal Regulations; Alternative Provisions” (Final Rule). *Federal Register*, vol. 69 (July 16,
17 2004): 42571–583.
- 18 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. “Recertification CARD No. 24: Waste
19 Characterization.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the
20 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
21 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 24-1 through
22 24-50). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 23 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “Recertification CARD No. 31:
24 Application of Release Limits.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for
25 the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
26 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 31-1 through
27 31-4). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 28 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006c. *Technical Support Document for Section
29 194.24: Review of the Baseline Inventory Used in the Compliance Recertification Application
30 and the Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (March). Washington, DC: Office of
31 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 32 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006d. *Technical Support Document for Section
33 194.23: Review of WIPP Recertification Performance Assessment Computer Codes* (March).
34 CRA Code Review. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Scope of Performance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.32)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Scope of Performance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.32)**

Table of Contents

32.0 Scope of Performance Assessments..... 32-1

 32.1 Requirements 32-1

 32.2 Background..... 32-1

 32.3 1998 Certification Decision 32-3

 32.3.1 40 CFR § 194.32(a)..... 32-3

 32.3.2 40 CFR § 194.32(b) 32-3

 32.3.3 40 CFR § 194.32(c)..... 32-4

 32.3.4 40 CFR § 194.32(d) 32-5

 32.3.5 40 CFR § 194.32(e)..... 32-5

 32.3.5.1 40 CFR § 194.32(e)(1)..... 32-5

 32.3.5.2 40 CFR § 194.32(e)(2) 32-6

 32.3.5.3 40 CFR § 194.32(e)(3)..... 32-6

 32.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 32-6

 32.5 The EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 32-7

 32.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification..... 32-7

 32.6.1 40 CFR § 194.32(a)..... 32-8

 32.6.2 40 CFR § 194.32(b) 32-21

 32.6.3 40 CFR § 194.32(c)..... 32-22

 32.6.4 40 CFR § 194.32(d) 32-22

 32.6.5 40 CFR § 194.32(e)..... 32-22

 32.7 References..... 32-23

List of Tables

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary..... 32-8

Table 32-2. CRA-2009 FEPs Screened Out for Low Probability (SO-P) 32-23

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DP	disturbed performance
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EP	event and process
FEP	feature, event, and process
HCN	Historic, Current, and Near-Future
mi	mile
PA	Performance Assessment
QA	quality assurance
SKI	Statens Kärnkraftinspektion (Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate)
SO-C	screened out-consequence
SO-P	screened out-probability
SO-R	screened out-regulation
UP	undisturbed performance
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **32.0 Scope of Performance Assessments**

2 **32.1 Requirements**

§ 194.32 Scope of Performance Assessment

(a) Performance assessments shall consider natural processes and events, mining, deep drilling, and shallow drilling that may affect the disposal system during the regulatory time frame.

(b) Assessments of mining effects may be limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal system from excavation mining for natural resources. Mining shall be assumed to occur with a one in 100 probability in each century of the regulatory time frame. Performance assessments shall assume that mineral deposits of those resources, similar in quality and type to those resources currently extracted from the Delaware Basin, will be completely removed from the controlled area during the century in which such mining is randomly calculated to occur. Complete removal of such mineral resources shall be assumed to occur only once during the regulatory time frame.

(c) Performance assessments shall include an analysis of the effects on the disposal system of any activities that occur in the vicinity of the disposal system prior to disposal and are expected to occur in the vicinity of the disposal system soon after disposal. Such activities shall include, but shall not be limited to, existing boreholes and the development of any existing leases that can be reasonably expected to be developed in the near future, including boreholes and leases that may be used for fluid injection activities.

(d) Performance assessments need not consider processes and events that have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years.

(e) Any compliance application(s) shall include information which:

(1) Identifies all potential processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events that may occur during the regulatory time frame and may affect the disposal system;

(2) Identifies the processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events included in performance assessments; and

(3) Documents why any processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events identified pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section were not included in performance assessment results provided in any compliance application.

3

4 **32.2 Background**

5 Performance Assessment (PA) is a process that assesses the likelihood that the Waste Isolation
6 Pilot Plant (WIPP) will meet the release limits specified by 40 CFR § 191.13 (U.S.
7 Environmental Protection Agency 1993) for 10,000 years after disposal. The PA process must
8 consider both natural and man-made processes and events that have an effect on this disposal
9 system.

10 40 CFR § 194.32 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) requires that PAs include the
11 effects of excavation mining, drilling, fluid injection, and future development of leases. In
12 addition, PA must also include the effects of current activities such as secondary oil recovery
13 methods (waterflooding), disposal of natural brine, and solution mining to extract brine in the
14 vicinity of the repository. Section 194.32 requires identification of all features, events, and
15 processes (FEPs), or sequences or combinations of processes and events, that could occur during
16 the regulatory time frame that may affect the repository.

17 Therefore, the PA methodology for the WIPP includes compiling and screening a comprehensive
18 list of FEPs relevant to disposal system performance. Those FEPs with the potential to affect
19 performance are represented in scenarios and quantitative calculations using a system of linked

1 computer models. These models describe the interaction of the repository with the natural
2 system, both with and without human intrusion. For the Compliance Certification Application
3 (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) compiled a
4 comprehensive list of FEPs, which was subjected to a screening process leading to the set of
5 relevant FEPs used in PA to demonstrate the WIPP's compliance with the long-term disposal
6 standards.

7 The screening criteria shown below were used to determine whether to include FEPs in
8 conceptual models and performance scenarios:

- 9 • Screened Out-Regulation (SO-R): For example, future human-initiated events and processes
10 (EPs) may be excluded from consideration for regulatory reasons (e.g., deliberate drilling
11 intrusions). 40 CFR § 194.25(a) requires that characteristics of the future remain what they
12 are at the time the compliance application is prepared, provided that such characteristics are
13 not related to hydrogeologic, geologic, or climatic conditions.
- 14 • Screened Out-Probability (SO-P): 40 CFR § 194.32(d) states that PA need not consider
15 processes and events that have less than 1 in 10,000 chance of occurring over 10,000 years.
- 16 • Screened Out-Consequence (SO-C): The DOE eliminated some FEPs based on their
17 consequences according to the following two criteria:
 - 18 – Insignificant Consequences. The DOE eliminated FEPs where there was a reasonable
19 expectation that the remaining probability distribution of cumulative releases would not
20 be significantly changed by such omissions. These FEPs are designated SO-C.
 - 21 – Beneficial FEPs. FEPs that are potentially beneficial to disposal system or subsystem
22 performance were eliminated to simplify the analysis. This argument may be used when
23 there is uncertainty as to exactly how the FEP should be incorporated into assessment
24 calculations, or when incorporation would incur unreasonable difficulties. This is
25 considered a conservative decision. These FEPS are designated SO-C Beneficial (e.g.,
26 the accumulation of radioactive contaminants in soils).

27 The FEPs retained in the PA were accounted for under calculations of either the undisturbed
28 performance (UP) or disturbed performance (DP) (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.2.2.2
29 and 6.2.2.3).

- 30 • UP includes the predicted behavior of the disposal system assuming it is not disrupted by
31 human intrusion or the occurrence of unlikely natural events.
- 32 • DP includes the predicted behavior of the disposal system assuming disruption by human
33 intrusion or other actions, including future drilling and mining activities.

1 **32.3 1998 Certification Decision**

2 **32.3.1 40 CFR § 194.32(a)**

3 In the CCA, the DOE discusses the origin and development of the WIPP FEPs list, as well as
4 well-defined screening criteria in the CCA, Appendix SCR. A list of the WIPP-relevant FEPs is
5 also provided in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2. The DOE identified approximately 237 FEPs
6 in three major categories: natural (N), waste- and repository-induced (W), and human-initiated
7 (H). Of particular importance to the performance of the disposal system were those FEPs dealing
8 with mining, deep drilling, and shallow drilling. The CCA and supporting documents illustrated
9 the process used by the DOE to implement the FEPs in scenarios relevant to PA.

10 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) evaluated the adequacy of the natural FEPs
11 appropriate to the disposal system and how these were considered in the PA. The EPA also
12 evaluated the DOE's consideration of mining and drilling in the PA. The EPA performed a
13 critical review of each step in the DOE FEP selection process for the CCA, including
14 identification and listing of the potentially disruptive FEPs, screening of these FEPs,
15 combination of FEPs to form scenarios, screening of scenarios, and the final formation of
16 scenarios for use in the CCA PA.

17 The EPA concluded that the initial FEP list assembled by the DOE was sufficiently
18 comprehensive. This list appropriately screened out EPs on the basis of probability,
19 consequence, or regulatory requirements. The EPA concluded that the DOE considered and
20 incorporated into PA numerous natural EPs, mining, and deep drilling. The EPA concluded that
21 the DOE considered shallow drilling and appropriately screened it out on the basis of low
22 consequence. The DOE also appropriately followed regulatory requirements when it did not
23 consider future fluid injection activities (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

24 **32.3.2 40 CFR § 194.32(b)**

25 The CCA describes how mining is incorporated into the PA, including information on mining
26 rates and probabilities, the application of institutional controls, hydraulic conductivity variations
27 as a result of mining, and the extent of minable reserves (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section
28 6.4.6.2.3). The DOE identified potash as the only natural resource currently being mined near
29 the WIPP. The DOE used the EPA-specified frequency of mining and probability when
30 considering changes in hydraulic conductivity up to 1,000 times the base hydraulic conductivity
31 of the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as Culebra). In
32 its calculation of the potash area to be mined, the DOE considered minable reserves inside and
33 outside the controlled area (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.4.2.4).

34 In reviewing the DOE's compliance with 40 CFR § 194.32(b), the EPA considered whether the
35 CCA included a detailed, accurate, and comprehensive analysis of mined resources in the WIPP
36 area and sufficient information to demonstrate how mining probability was determined.
37 Specifically, the EPA examined the validity of the DOE's potash reserve estimates, including the
38 DOE's assumptions regarding potash reserve location, quality, and minable horizons. The EPA
39 also examined the CCA to determine how hydraulic conductivity in the supra-Salado units was

1 modified to address changes that could be caused by mining over the 10,000-year regulatory
2 period (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

3 The EPA's review of minable reserves found that the DOE identified current minable
4 thicknesses and horizons near the WIPP. The DOE's estimate roughly corresponds to that
5 identified in an EPA technical memorandum (Peake 1996). The EPA recognized that this is not
6 necessarily representative of the entire Delaware Basin, and it is conceivable that additional
7 reserves could be mined in the WIPP area. However, speculation of this nature would extend to
8 other horizons or reserves, which is beyond the intent of section 194.32(b). The EPA therefore
9 concurred with the DOE's approach.

10 The EPA also found that the DOE assumed mined resources will be completely removed from
11 the controlled area within the century in which mining occurs, and complete removal of mineral
12 resources was assumed to occur only once over the regulatory time frame, in accordance with
13 section 194.32(b). The DOE assumed that mining will be done via room and pillar or other
14 conventional methods, and solution mining of potash will not take place because of
15 mineralogical and economic constraints.

16 Finally, the EPA determined that mining was properly incorporated in PA through the
17 application of the 1 to 1,000 multiplier for hydraulic conductivity in the calculated transmissivity
18 field for the Culebra. The CCA, Appendix TFIELD and related documentation include
19 information pertinent to this application of the transmissivity multiplier.

20 **32.3.3 40 CFR § 194.32(c)**

21 In the CCA, the DOE identified appropriate events and analyses of their effects on the disposal
22 system, as well as the effects of existing boreholes. The EPA considered how these events
23 affected the disposal system and whether the DOE addressed the potential for slant drilling. The
24 EPA also examined whether the DOE addressed potentially exploitable existing leases.

25 The DOE concluded that oil and gas exploration and exploitation and water and potash
26 exploration are the only human-initiated activities that need to be considered for PA (see the
27 CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.2). The DOE divided human-initiated activities into two
28 categories: (1) those that have been Historic, Current, and Near-Future (HCN); and (2) those that
29 may happen in the future after disposal (Future). Human-initiated activities included three
30 different drilling-related intrusion scenarios used in PA based on the screening analysis,
31 designated by the DOE as E1, E2, and E1E2 (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.2). The E1
32 scenario assumed penetration of a panel by a borehole drilled through the repository, which then
33 strikes a brine pocket present in the underlying Castile. The E2 scenario included all future
34 boreholes that penetrate a panel but do not strike an underlying brine pocket within the Castile.
35 The E1E2 scenario was defined as the occurrence of multiple boreholes that intersect a single
36 waste panel, with at least one of the events being an E1 occurrence.

37 The EPA evaluated the DOE's compliance with 40 CFR § 194.32(c) and determined that the
38 DOE had used a reasonable approach to screen human-initiated activities that might impact the
39 repository. The EPA concluded that, based on the discussion in the CCA, Appendix SCR, the
40 DOE considered the appropriate issues, and the technical conclusions reached by the DOE

1 regarding screening of oil and gas exploration and extraction activities were valid (U.S.
2 Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

3 **32.3.4 40 CFR § 194.32(d)**

4 The DOE listed FEPs eliminated from PA based on probability, and described why they were not
5 included. The DOE used this requirement to screen out FEPs such as nuclear criticality, galvanic
6 coupling, formation of new faults, glaciation, and impact of large meteorites.

7 The EPA examined the screening arguments and information in the CCA, Appendix SCR to
8 assess the traceability of assumptions, approximations, and measures of uncertainties. The EPA
9 examined the DOE's approach to determine whether it was well documented and adequately
10 justified. The EPA examined assigned probabilities to determine whether they were appropriate,
11 documented, and in accordance with EPA regulatory requirements, and examined the sufficiency
12 of all data in terms of quantity and adequacy. In conclusion, the EPA concurred with the events
13 and processes that were screened out by the DOE using the low-probability criterion (U.S
14 Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

15 **32.3.5 40 CFR § 194.32(e)**

16 **32.3.5.1 40 CFR § 194.32(e)(1)**

17 40 CFR § 194.32(e)(1) specifies that all potential FEPs that may occur during the regulatory time
18 period be identified and considered. In this criterion, a time frame of interest is applied to FEPs
19 that may affect the disposal system. This criterion specifies "the regulatory time frame," which
20 begins at repository closure and continues for 10,000 years in the future. This is in contrast to
21 that specified in section 194.32(c), where the time period of interest is HCN.¹

22 The CCA, Appendix SCR, identified the processes and events, or sequences and combinations of
23 processes and events, included in PA, including natural and human-initiated processes and
24 events. The CCA, Appendix SCR provided a comprehensive analysis of all FEPs that may affect
25 WIPP performance. In addition, the CCA, Appendix SCR and its attachments document the
26 development of the WIPP FEPs list and describe its origin from over 1,200 FEPs identified
27 through various international repository programs. The broad and comprehensive beginning of
28 the WIPP FEPs list helps to assure that all potential WIPP-relevant FEPs can be properly
29 identified. After refinement of the initial list, the DOE's FEPs identification process resulted in
30 approximately 237 FEPs that were retained for screening.

31 The EPA reviewed the DOE's initial FEPs listings at each stage of development and review to
32 determine whether it was comprehensive. In addition, the EPA examined information sources
33 used by the DOE to compile the FEPs lists for completeness and accuracy of technical
34 information. The EPA concluded that the DOE identified those events and processes, and
35 sequences or combinations of events and processes, that may occur during the regulatory time
36 period and affect the repository. The EPA concluded that these FEPs represented those most

¹ Human-initiated FEPs are screened for both the HCN and Future time periods (i.e., sections 194.32(c) and 194.32(e)(1)).

1 critical in terms of affecting the disposal repository (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2 1998a).

3 **32.3.5.2 40 CFR § 194.32(e)(2)**

4 40 CFR § 194.32(e)(2) states that combinations of events and processes must be included in PA.
5 To accomplish this, the DOE formulated conceptual models and scenarios that incorporated each
6 of the FEPs screened in during the screening processes detailed in the CCA, Appendix SCR.
7 The DOE developed scenarios to represent both undisturbed and disturbed system performance.
8 FEPs were included into scenarios ranging from the effects of deep and shallow drilling and
9 mining to undisturbed disposal system performance. In the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2, Table
10 6-6, the DOE identifies the specific locations in the CCA where information on the modeling of
11 the individual FEP can be found.

12 The EPA reviewed the CCA to determine whether FEPs and subsequent scenarios were
13 appropriately screened, adequately justified, and completely supported. In addition, the EPA
14 examined combinations of FEPs and scenarios included in PA. The EPA concluded that DOE
15 used a process (i.e., the Statens Kärnkraftinspektion (SKI) [Stenhouse, Chapman, and Sumerling
16 1993] list modified to suit conditions at the WIPP site) that identified the processes, events, or
17 sequences or combinations of processes and events. As part of this process, the DOE adequately
18 addressed and evaluated the effects of mining, deep drilling, and shallow drilling. The DOE
19 evaluated the FEPs and sequences of FEPs through calculations, estimates of probability, and
20 comparisons to regulatory requirements. The EPA concluded that the DOE appropriately
21 identified, listed, and discussed the FEPs and the effects of the sequences and combinations of
22 FEPs that result in modeled scenarios (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

23 **32.3.5.3 40 CFR § 194.32(e)(3)**

24 40 CFR § 194.32(e)(3) requires that FEPs not included in PA calculations be adequately
25 documented and justified. The DOE identified approximately 237 FEPs in the CCA, Appendix
26 SCR and the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3. For each FEP, DOE provided a description and a
27 generalized rationale for screening classifications. Of the 237 FEPs analyzed, 154 were screened
28 out on the basis of regulations (SO-R), low consequence (SO-C), or probability (SO-P). The
29 CCA, Appendix SCR included the DOE's screening rationale for each of the 237 CCA FEPs.

30 To verify the DOE's compliance with this section, the EPA reviewed the information in the
31 CCA, Appendix SCR and also conducted audits to verify the proper execution of quality
32 assurance (QA) programs for all items and activities important to the containment of waste in the
33 repository, including items and activities related to FEPs. As a result of these EPA audits, the
34 EPA concluded that QA programs were properly executed for FEP-related items and activities,
35 and that the DOE had demonstrated compliance with the requirements of section 194.32 (U.S.
36 Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

37 **32.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

38 For the Compliance Recertification Application of 2004 (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of
39 Energy 2004) and the subsequent Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation, the DOE

1 reevaluated all WIPP FEPs to determine if any had changed or if new FEPs needed to be added.
2 The DOE's reevaluation resulted in only a few changes to the FEPs analysis. Wagner, Kirkes,
3 and Martell (2003) concluded that of the original 237 FEPs included in the CCA, 106 did not
4 change, 120 required updates to their FEP descriptions and/or screening arguments, and 7 of the
5 original baseline FEPs screening decisions required a change from their original screening
6 decision. Four of the original baseline FEPs were deleted or combined with other closely related
7 FEPs, and two new FEPs were added to the baseline. These two FEPs were previously
8 addressed in an existing FEP; they were separated for clarity. Therefore, for the CRA-2004,
9 reevaluation resulted in a new FEPs baseline consisting of 235 FEPs, but did not change the
10 CCA conceptual models or the scenarios developed for PA.

11 **32.5 The EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

12 For the CRA-2004, the DOE applied the same approach used for the CCA to develop and screen
13 the list of FEPs that may have an effect on the disposal system as that used for the CCA. Since
14 the WIPP FEPs were previously evaluated and approved in the initial certification process, the
15 EPA focused its recertification review on the FEPs that had changed since the 1998 Certification
16 Decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b). The EPA verified that the DOE's
17 FEP-development and review process was fundamentally the same as the CCA process, and
18 verified that the DOE's reevaluation properly considered changes since the original certification
19 decision in 1998. The EPA verified that any changes to FEP-screening arguments or FEPs-
20 related discussions were reasonable, appropriate, and complete.

21 The EPA received one public comment related to the scope of PA. Some stakeholders proposed
22 that karst (FEP N20) should be included in the PA conceptual model development. The EPA
23 reevaluated karst issues raised by stakeholders from the CCA as well as new information made
24 available since the original certification decision. The EPA's review is discussed in *Technical*
25 *Support Document for Section 194.14/15: Evaluation of Karst at the WIPP Site* (U.S.
26 Environmental Protection Agency 2006a). After a thorough review, the EPA determined that
27 karst should not be screened into the PA process.

28 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
29 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
30 section 194.32 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

31 **32.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification**

32 For the CRA-2009, the DOE has identified PA changes implemented since the CRA-2004 and
33 determined their impacts on the FEPs baseline. Changes that affect the FEPs basis are detailed
34 in Appendix SCR-2009. As a result of the reevaluation, 35 FEPs were updated with new
35 information, 1 screening argument has been changed to correct errors discovered during review,
36 and the screening decision for one FEP was changed from SO-R to SO-C. This latter change has
37 no impact on PA calculations because the FEP continues to be excluded from PA, albeit using a
38 different screening rationale. Finally, 10 FEPs have been split into 20 similar, but more specific,
39 FEPs. The following sections present information that demonstrates compliance with the
40 requirements of section 194.32.

1 **32.6.1 40 CFR § 194.32(a)**

2 Changes to the WIPP baseline since the CRA-2004 have been identified and evaluated to
 3 determine their impact upon the WIPP FEPs baseline. This reevaluation process is very similar
 4 to the process used for the CRA-2004. The FEPs baseline is maintained according to Sandia
 5 National Laboratories Specific Procedure 9-4, *Performing FEPS Baseline Impact Assessments*
 6 *for Planned and Unplanned Changes* (Kirkes 2006). For the CRA-2009, there are 70 natural
 7 FEPs, 61 human-initiated EPs, and 114 waste and repository FEPs, resulting in 245 WIPP FEPs.
 8 The current FEPs baseline is presented in Appendix SCR-2009. Table 32-1 lists the CRA-2009
 9 FEPs and their screening decisions, and summarizes any changes to related information since the
 10 CRA-2004.

11 **Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary**

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N1	Stratigraphy	No	No change.	UP
N2	Brine Reservoirs	No	No change.	DP
N3	Changes in Regional Stress	No	No change.	SO-C
N4	Regional Tectonics	No	No change.	SO-C
N5	Regional Uplift and Subsidence	No	No change.	SO-C
N6	Salt Deformation	No	No change.	SO-P
N7	Diapirism	No	No change.	SO-P
N8	Formation of Fractures	No	No change.	SO-P UP (Repository)
N9	Changes in Fracture Properties	No	No change.	SO-C UP (Near Repository)
N10	Formation of New Faults	No	No change.	SO-P
N11	Fault Movement	No	No change.	SO-P
N12	Seismic Activity	No	Updated with new seismic data.	UP
N13	Volcanic Activity	No	No change.	SO-P
N14	Magmatic Activity	No	No change.	SO-C
N15	Metamorphic Activity	No	No change.	SO-P
N16	Shallow Dissolution	No	No change.	UP
N18	Deep Dissolution	No	No change.	SO-P
N20	Breccia Pipes	No	No change.	SO-P
N21	Collapse Breccias	No	No change.	SO-P
N22	Fracture Infills	No	No change.	SO-C - Beneficial

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N23	Saturated Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	UP
N24	Unsaturated Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	UP
N25	Fracture Flow	No	No change.	UP
N27	Effects of Preferential Pathways	No	No change.	UP
N26	Density effects on Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	SO-C
N28	Thermal effects on Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	SO-C
N29	Saline Intrusion [Hydrogeological Effects]	No	No change.	SO-P
N30	Freshwater Intrusion [Hydrogeological effects]	No	No change.	SO-P
N31	Hydrological Response to Earthquakes	No	No change.	SO-C
N32	Natural Gas Intrusion	No	No change.	SO-P
N33	Groundwater Geochemistry	No	No change.	UP
N34	Saline Intrusion (Geochemical Effects)	No	No change.	SO-C
N38	Effects of Dissolution	No	No change.	SO-C
N35	Freshwater Intrusion (Geochemical Effects)	No	No change.	SO-C
N36	Changes in Groundwater Eh	No	No change.	SO-C
N37	Changes in Groundwater pH	No	No change.	SO-C
N39	Physiography	No	No change.	UP
N40	Impact of a Large Meteorite	No	Errors identified in screening argument corrected; no change in screening decision.	SO-P
N41	Mechanical Weathering	No	No change.	SO-C
N42	Chemical Weathering	No	No change.	SO-C
N43	Aeolian Erosion	No	No change.	SO-C
N44	Fluvial Erosion	No	No change.	SO-C
N45	Mass Wasting [Erosion]	No	No change.	SO-C
N46	Aeolian Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N47	Fluvial Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N48	Lacustrine Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N49	Mass Wasting [Deposition]	No	No change.	SO-C
N50	Soil Development	No	No change.	SO-C
N51	Stream and River Flow	No	No change.	SO-C
N52	Surface Water Bodies	No	No change.	SO-C
N53	Groundwater Discharge	No	No change.	UP
N54	Groundwater Recharge	No	No change.	UP
N55	Infiltration	No	No change.	UP
N56	Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge	No	No change.	UP
N57	Lake Formation	No	No change.	SO-C
N58	River Flooding	No	No change.	SO-C
N59	Precipitation (e.g. Rainfall)	No	No change.	UP
N60	Temperature	No	No change.	UP
N61	Climate Change	No	No change.	UP
N62	Glaciation	No	No change.	SO-P
N63	Permafrost	No	No change.	SO-P
N64	Seas and Oceans	No	No change.	SO-C
N65	Estuaries	No	No change.	SO-C
N66	Coastal Erosion	No	No change.	SO-C
N67	Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N68	Sea Level Changes	No	No change.	SO-C
N69	Plants	No	No change.	SO-C
N70	Animals	No	No change.	SO-C
N71	Microbes	No	No change.	SO-C (UP - for colloidal effects and gas generation)
N72	Natural Ecological Development	No	No change.	SO-C
H1	Oil and Gas Exploration	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H2	Potash Exploration	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H4	Oil and Gas Exploitation	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H8	Other Resources	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H9	Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H3	Water Resources Exploration	No	Updated with most recent monitoring information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H5	Groundwater Exploitation	No	Updated with most recent monitoring information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H6	Archaeological Investigations	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H7	Geothermal	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H10	Liquid Waste Disposal	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H11	Hydrocarbon Storage	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H12	Deliberate Drilling Intrusion	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H13	Conventional Underground Potash Mining	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H14	Other Resources (mining for)	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H15	Tunneling	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H16	Construction of Underground Facilities (for Example Storage, Disposal, Accommodation)	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H17	Archaeological Excavations	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H18	Deliberate Mining Intrusion	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H19	Explosions for Resource Recovery	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H20	Underground Nuclear Device Testing	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H21	Drilling Fluid Flow	No	Screening argument revised.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H22	Drilling Fluid Loss	No	Screening argument revised.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H23	Blowouts	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H24	Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H25	Oil and Gas Extraction	No	Screening argument updated.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H26	Groundwater Extraction	No	Screening argument updated.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H27	Liquid Waste Disposal–OB	No	FEP title has been modified to show that this event or process specifically applies to activities outside the WIPP boundary. Screening argument has also been updated with new information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H28	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production–OB	No	FEP title has been modified to show that this event or process specifically applies to activities outside the WIPP boundary. Screening argument has also been updated with new information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H29	Hydrocarbon Storage–OB	No	FEP title has been modified to show that this event or process specifically applies to activities outside the WIPP boundary. Screening argument has also been updated with new information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H60	Liquid Waste Disposal–IB	N/A – new FEP	This is a new FEP that is similar to H27, except that it specifically applies to activities inside the WIPP boundary.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H61	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production–IB	N/A – new FEP	This is a new FEP that is similar to H28, except that it specifically applies to activities inside the WIPP boundary.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H62	Hydrocarbon Storage–IB	N/A – new FEP	This is a new FEP that is similar to H29, except that it specifically applies to activities inside the WIPP boundary.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H30	Fluid-injection Induced Geochemical Changes	No	No change.	UP (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H31	Natural Borehole Fluid Flow	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future, holes not penetrating waste panels) DP (Future, holes penetrating panels)
H32	Waste-Induced Borehole Flow	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) DP (Future)
H34	Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H35	Borehole-Induced Mineralization	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H36	Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future) SO-C (for units other than the Culebra)
H37	Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H38	Changes in Geochemistry Due to Mining	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H39	Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H40	Land Use Changes	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H41	Surface Disruptions	Yes	Screening decision changed from SO-R to SO-C to remove inconsistency with rationale.	UP (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H42	Damming of Streams or Rivers	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H43	Reservoirs	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H44	Irrigation	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H45	Lake Usage	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H46	Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H47	Greenhouse Gas Effects	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H48	Acid Rain	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H49	Damage to the Ozone Layer	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H50	Coastal Water Use	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H51	Sea water Use	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H52	Estuarine Water Use	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H53	Arable Farming	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H54	Ranching	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H55	Fish Farming	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H56	Demographic Change and Urban Development	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H57	Loss of Records	No	No change.	NA (HCN) DP (Future)
H58	Solution Mining for Potash	No	Updated with information regarding solution activities and plans in the region.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H59	Solution Mining for Other Resources	No	Updated with new information regarding brine wells in the region.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
W1	Disposal Geometry	No	No change.	UP
W2	Waste Inventory	No	Updated to reflect the inventory data sources used for the CRA-2009 PA.	UP
W3	Heterogeneity of Waste Forms	No	Updated to reflect the inventory data sources used for the CRA-2009 PA.	DP
W4	Container Form	No	Updated to reflect the inventory data sources used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-C – Beneficial
W5	Container Material Inventory	No	No change.	UP
W6	Shaft Seal Geometry	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W7	Shaft Seal Physical Properties	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W109	Panel Closure Geometry	N/A – new FEP.	Split from W6 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W110	Panel Closure Physical Properties	N/A – new FEP	Split from W7 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W8	Shaft Seal Chemical Composition	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	SO-C Beneficial
W111	Panel Closure Chemical Composition	N/A – new FEP	Split from W8 to be specific to panel closures.	SO-C Beneficial
W9	Backfill Physical Properties	No	No change.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W10	Backfill Chemical Composition	No	No change.	UP
W11	Post-Closure Monitoring	No	No change.	SO-C
W12	Radionuclide Decay and In-Growth	No	No change.	UP
W13	Heat from Radioactive Decay	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-C
W14	Nuclear Criticality: Heat	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-P
W15	Radiological Effects on Waste	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA.	SO-C
W16	Radiological Effects on Containers	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA.	SO-C
W17	Radiological Effects on Shaft Seals	No	FEP title changed to be specific to shaft seals; screening argument updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA.	SO-C
W112	Radionuclide Effects on Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W17 to be specific to panel closures.	SO-C
W18	Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ)	No	No change.	UP
W19	Excavation-Induced Changes in Stress	No	No change.	UP
W20	Salt Creep	No	No change.	UP
W21	Changes in the Stress Field	No	No change.	UP
W22	Roof Falls	No	No change.	UP
W23	Subsidence	No	Source of subsidence monitoring data added.	SO-C
W24	Large Scale Rock Fracturing	No	Source of subsidence monitoring data added.	SO-P
W25	Disruption Due to Gas Effects	No	No change.	UP
W26	Pressurization	No	No change.	UP
W27	Gas Explosions	No	No change.	UP

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W28	Nuclear Explosions	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-P
W29	Thermal Effects on Material Properties	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W30	Thermally-Induced Stress Changes	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W31	Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository Components	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W72	Exothermic Reactions	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W73	Concrete Hydration	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W32	Consolidation of Waste	No	No change.	UP
W36	Consolidation of Shaft Seals	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W37	Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W39	Underground Boreholes	No	No change.	UP
W113	Consolidation of Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W36 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W114	Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W37 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W33	Movement of Containers	No	Updated to reference new inventory data.	SO-C
W34	Container Integrity	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial
W35	Mechanical Effects of Backfill	No	Screening argument updated to reflect reduction in MgO.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W40	Brine Inflow	No	No change.	UP
W41	Wicking	No	No change.	UP
W42	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production	No	No change.	UP
W43	Convection	No	No change.	SO-C
W44	Degradation of Organic Material	No	New thermal rise calculations referenced.	UP
W45	Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation	No	New thermal rise calculations referenced.	UP
W48	Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation	No	New thermal rise calculations referenced.	UP
W46	Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation	No	No change.	SO-C
W47	Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation	No	Screening argument updated with new radionuclide inventory.	SO-C
W49	Gases from Metal Corrosion	No	No change.	UP
W51	Chemical Effects of Corrosion	No	No change.	UP
W50	Galvanic Coupling (Within the Repository)	No	No change.	SO-C
W52	Radiolysis of Brine	No	No change.	SO-C
W53	Radiolysis of Cellulose	No	Screening argument updated with new radionuclide inventory.	SO-C
W54	Helium Gas Production	No	Screening argument updated with new radionuclide inventory.	SO-C
W55	Radioactive Gases	No	Reference made to CRA-2009 inventory data.	SO-C
W56	Speciation	No	No change.	UP in disposal rooms and Culebra. SO-C elsewhere, and SO-C Beneficial in cementitious seals

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W57	Kinetics of Speciation	No	No change.	SO-C
W58	Dissolution of Waste	No	No change.	UP
W59	Precipitation of Secondary Minerals	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial
W60	Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution	No	No change.	SO-C
W61	Actinide Sorption	No	No change.	UP in the Culebra and Dewey Lake; SO-C—Beneficial in the disposal room, shaft seals, panel closures, and other geologic units.
W62	Kinetics of Sorption	No	No change.	UP in the Culebra and Dewey Lake; SO-C—Beneficial in the disposal room, shaft seals, panel closures, and other geologic units.
W63	Changes in Sorptive Surfaces	No	No change.	UP
W64	Effects of Metal Corrosion	No	No change.	UP
W66	Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics	No	No change.	UP
W65	Reduction-Oxidation Fronts	No	No change.	SO-P
W67	Localized Reducing Zones	No	No change.	SO-C
W68	Organic Complexation	No	No change.	UP
W69	Organic Ligands	No	No change.	UP
W71	Kinetics of Organic Complexation	No	No change.	SO-C
W70	Humic and Fulvic Acids	No	No change.	UP
W74	Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W76	Microbial Growth on Concrete	No	No change.	UP
W115	Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W74 to be specific to panel closures.	UP

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W75	Chemical Degradation of Backfill	No	No change.	SO-C
W77	Solute Transport	No	No change.	UP
W78	Colloid Transport	No	No change.	UP
W79	Colloid Formation and Stability	No	No change.	UP
W80	Colloid Filtration	No	No change.	UP
W81	Colloid Sorption	No	No change.	UP
W82	Suspensions of Particles	No	No change.	DP
W83	Rinse	No	No change.	SO-C
W84	Cuttings	No	No change.	DP
W85	Cavings	No	No change.	DP
W86	Spallings	No	No change.	DP
W87	Microbial Transport	No	No change.	UP
W88	Biofilms	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial
W89	Transport of Radioactive Gases	No	Screening argument updated with CRA-2009 inventory data.	SO-C
W90	Advection	No	No change.	UP
W91	Diffusion	No	No change.	UP
W92	Matrix Diffusion	No	No change.	UP
W93	Soret Effect	No	New thermal values added for aluminum corrosion.	SO-C
W94	Electrochemical Effects	No	No change.	SO-C
W95	Galvanic Coupling (Outside the Repository)	No	No change.	SO-P
W96	Electrophoresis	No	No change.	SO-C
W97	Chemical Gradients	No	No change.	SO-C
W98	Osmotic Processes	No	No change.	SO-C
W99	Alpha Recoil	No	No change.	SO-C
W100	Enhanced Diffusion	No	No change.	SO-C
W101	Plant Uptake	No	No change.	SO-R (for section 191.13) SO-C (for section 191.15)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table 32-1. CRA-2009 FEPs Summary (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W102	Animal Uptake	No	No change.	SO-R (for section 191.13) SO-C (for section 191.15)
W103	Accumulation in Soils	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial (for section 191.13) SO-C (for section 191.15)
W104	Ingestion	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W105	Inhalation	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W106	Irradiation	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W107	Dermal Sorption	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W108	Injection	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

1
2 Those FEPs not separated by gridlines in the first column of Table 32-1 have been addressed by
3 group, due to close similarity with other FEPs within that group.

4 **32.6.2 40 CFR § 194.32(b)**

5 The requirements of section 194.32(b) specify assumptions regarding the implementation of
6 mining in PA calculations. The PA modeling system used for the mining scenario is similar to
7 that developed for the undisturbed repository scenario, but with a modified Culebra
8 transmissivity field in the controlled area to account for the mining effects. Minor changes were
9 made in the way mining is implemented in PA due to comments by the EPA in their review of
10 the CRA-2004 (Cotsworth 2004). These changes include redefining the mined area to include
11 0.8-kilometer- (0.5-mile [mi]) diameter exclusion zones around oil and gas wells (see Section 2.7
12 of Leigh et al. [2005]). The result of including the 0.8 kilometer- (0.5-mi) diameter exclusion
13 zone around oil and gas wells was to increase travels times in the Culebra (Lowry 2004). Details
14 regarding how mining processes are represented in PA models are described in Appendix PA-
15 2009, Section PA-2.3.2.2.1 and Appendix MASS-2009, Section MASS-15.1. FEPs related to the
16 presence of resources are described and considered in Appendix SCR-2009, Section SCR-5.0.

1 **32.6.3 40 CFR § 194.32(c)**

2 Section 194.32(c) provides specific time frames to evaluate activities that may affect the disposal
3 system. This requirement focuses on activities that have occurred in the past, are occurring, or
4 are expected to occur in the near future. The DOE classifies this time frame as HCN. Because
5 section 194.32(e)(1) requires the evaluation of human-initiated EPs during the regulatory time
6 period, the DOE also evaluates human-initiated FEPs for the period of time from closure of the
7 repository to 10,000 years into the future (Future) (see human-initiated EPs in Table 32-1).
8 Human-initiated EPs are described and screened for both the HCN and Future time frames in
9 Appendix SCR-2009, Section SCR-5.0. Therefore, the DOE is in compliance with the
10 requirements of section 194.32(c).

11 **32.6.4 40 CFR § 194.32(d)**

12 Low-probability events can be excluded on the basis of the criterion provided in 40 CFR
13 § 194.32(d), which states, “performance assessments need not consider processes and events that
14 have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years.” In practice, for most SO-P
15 FEPs, it has not been possible to estimate a meaningful quantitative probability. In the absence
16 of quantitative probability estimates, a qualitative argument was used. SO-P FEPs are listed in
17 Table 32-2.

18 **32.6.5 40 CFR § 194.32(e)**

19 The requirements in 40 CFR § 194.32(e) are met by the analyses of FEPs as documented in
20 Appendix SCR-2009. Table 32-1 lists the CRA-2009 FEPs and summarizes any changes to
21 screening decisions and arguments.

22 Section 194.32, “Scope of Performance Assessment” requires the identification, selection,
23 screening, and incorporation of all significant processes and events into PA. The DOE has taken
24 a comprehensive approach in meeting the requirements of the section as documented here and in
25 Appendix SCR-2009 of this CRA. The process used is consistent with evaluations of WIPP
26 FEPs in past compliance applications. Any new information that relates to WIPP FEPs is
27 identified and incorporated into PA as appropriate. Therefore, the DOE has met the
28 requirements of section 194.32.

1 **Table 32-2. CRA-2009 FEPs Screened Out for Low Probability (SO-P)**

FEP I.D.	FEP Name
N6	Salt Deformation
N7	Diapirism
N8	Formation of Fractures
N10	Formation of New Faults
N11	Fault Movement
N13	Volcanic Activity
N15	Metamorphic Activity
N18	Deep Dissolution
N20	Breccia Pipes
N21	Collapse Breccias
N29	Saline Intrusion (Hydrogeological Effects)
N30	Freshwater Intrusion (Hydrogeological Effects)
N32	Natural Gas Intrusion
N40	Impact of a Large Meteorite
N62	Glaciation
N63	Permafrost
W14	Nuclear Criticality: Heat
W24	Large Scale Rock Fracturing
W28	Nuclear Explosions
W65	Reduction-Oxidation Fronts
W95	Galvanic Coupling (Outside the Repository)

2
3 **32.7 References**

4 Cotsworth, E. 2004. Letter to L. Piper, Acting Manager (Subject: CRA Completeness
5 Comments, 4th Set). 17 December 2004. ERMS 540236. U.S. Environmental Protection
6 Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

7 Kirkes, R. 2006. *Performing FEPs Baseline Impact Assessment for Planned or Unplanned*
8 *Changes* (Revision 1, June 6). ERMS 543625. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

9 Leigh, C., J. Kanney, L. Brush, J. Garner, G. Kirkes, T. Lowry, M. Nemer, J. Stein, E. Vugrin, S.
10 Wagner, and T.B. Kirchner. 2005. *2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance*
11 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 541521. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
12 Laboratories.

13 Lowry, T.S. 2004. *Analysis Report for Inclusion of Omitted Areas in Mining Transmissivity*
14 *Calculations in Response to EPA Comment G-11*. ERMS 538218. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
15 National Laboratories.

- 1 Peake, T. 1996. Memorandum to Public Rulemaking Docket A-92-56 (Subject: WIPP—
2 Examination of Mining and Hydraulic Conductivity). 31 January 1996. ERMS 241239. U.S.
3 Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC.
- 4 Stenhouse, M.J., N.A. Chapman, and T.J. Sumerling. 1993. *SITE-94 Scenario Development*
5 *FEP Audit List Preparation: Methodology and Presentation*. SKI Technical Report 93:27.
6 ERMS 241371. Stockholm: Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate.
- 7 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
8 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
9 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
11 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
12 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
14 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
15 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
16 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
18 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
19 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
20 5223–45.
- 21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “CARD No. 32: Scope of Performance
22 Assessments.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification*
23 *and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191*
24 *Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 32-1 through 32-46).
25 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
27 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
28 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
29 1998): 27353–406.
- 30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. *Technical Support Document for Section*
31 *194.14/15: Evaluation of Karst at the WIPP Site* (March). Washington, DC: Office of
32 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 33 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “Recertification CARD No. 32: Scope
34 of Performance Assessments.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the*
35 *Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR*
36 *191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 32-1 through 32-10).
37 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 1 Wagner, S., R. Kirkes, and M.A. Martell. 2003. *Features, Events, and Processes:*
- 2 *Reassessment for Recertification Report*. ERMS 530184. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
- 3 Laboratories.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Consideration of Drilling Events in
Performance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.33)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Consideration of Drilling Events in
Performance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.33)**

Table of Contents

33.0 Consideration of Drilling Events in Performance Assessments (40 CFR § 194.33)..... 33-1

 33.1 Requirements 33-1

 33.2 Background 33-1

 33.3 1998 Certification Decision 33-2

 33.3.1 40 CFR § 194.33(a) DOE Methodology and Conclusions 33-2

 33.3.2 40 CFR § 194.33(a) EPA Compliance Review..... 33-4

 33.3.3 40 CFR § 194.33(b) DOE Methodology and Conclusions 33-5

 33.3.4 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1) EPA Compliance Review 33-5

 33.3.5 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(2) DOE Methodology and Conclusions..... 33-6

 33.3.6 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(2) EPA Compliance Review 33-7

 33.3.7 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(3) DOE Methodology and Conclusions..... 33-7

 33.3.8 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(3) EPA Compliance Review 33-8

 33.3.9 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(4) DOE Methodology and Conclusions..... 33-9

 33.3.10 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(4) EPA Compliance Review..... 33-10

 33.3.11 40 CFR § 194.33(c)(1) DOE Methodology and Conclusions..... 33-11

 33.3.12 40 CFR § 194.33(c)(1) EPA Compliance Review 33-12

 33.3.13 40 CFR § 194.33(c)(2) DOE Methodology and Conclusions..... 33-13

 33.3.14 40 CFR § 194.33(c)(2) EPA Compliance Review 33-15

 33.3.15 40 CFR § 194.33(d) DOE Methodology and Conclusions 33-17

 33.3.16 40 CFR § 194.33(d) EPA Compliance Review 33-18

 33.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 33-18

 33.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 33-18

 33.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 33-19

 33.6.1 New Information Related to 40 CFR § 194.33(a)..... 33-20

 33.6.2 New Information Related to 40 CFR § 194.33(b)..... 33-20

 33.6.3 New Information Related to 40 CFR § 194.33(c)..... 33-21

 33.6.4 New Information Related to 40 CFR § 194.33(d)..... 33-21

 33.7 References..... 33-21

List of Tables

Table 33-1. WIPP Project Changes and Cross References..... 33-18

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

%	percent
AIC	active institutional control
BLM	U.S. Bureau of Land Management
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
DBR	Direct Brine Release
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPs	event and process
FEP	feature, event, and process
ft	feet
in.	inch
km ²	square kilometer
m	meter
m ³	cubic meters
md	millidarcy
mi	mile
mi ²	square mile
NMOCD	New Mexico Oil Conservation Division
PA	performance assessment
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
PIC	passive institutional control
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

33.0 Consideration of Drilling Events in Performance Assessments (40 CFR § 194.33)

33.1 Requirements

§ 194.33 Consideration of Drilling Events in Performance Assessments

(a) Performance assessments shall examine deep drilling and shallow drilling that may potentially affect the disposal system during the regulatory time frame.

(b) The following assumptions and process shall be used in assessing the likelihood and consequences of drilling events, and the results of such process shall be documented in any compliance application:

(1) Inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for resources (other than those resources provided by the waste in the disposal system or engineered barriers designed to isolate such waste) is the most severe human intrusion scenario.

(2) In performance assessments, drilling events shall be assumed to occur in the Delaware Basin at random intervals in time and space during the regulatory time frame.

(3) The frequency of deep drilling shall be calculated in the following manner:

(i) Identify deep drilling that has occurred for each resource in the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years prior to the time at which a compliance application is prepared

(ii) The total rate of deep drilling shall be the sum of the rates of deep drilling for each resource.

(4) The frequency of shallow drilling shall be calculated in the following manner:

(i) Identify shallow drilling that has occurred for each resource in the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years prior to the time at which a compliance application is prepared.

(ii) The total rate of shallow drilling shall be the sum of the rates of shallow drilling for each resource.

(iii) In considering the historical rate of all shallow drilling, the Department may, if justified, consider only the historical rate of shallow drilling for resources of similar type and quality to those in the controlled area.

(c) Performance assessments shall document that in analyzing the consequences of drilling events, the Department assumed that:

(1) Future drilling practices and technology will remain consistent with practices in the Delaware Basin at the time a compliance application is prepared. Such future drilling practices shall include, but shall not be limited to: the types and amounts of drilling fluids; borehole depths, diameters, and seals; and the fraction of such boreholes that are sealed by humans.

(2) Natural processes will degrade or otherwise affect the capability of boreholes to transmit fluids over the regulatory time frame.

(d) With respect to future drilling events, performance assessments need not analyze the effects of techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of the borehole.

33.2 Background

40 CFR § 194.33 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) requires the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to make assumptions about future deep and shallow drilling in the Delaware Basin and the vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). These assumptions pertain to the timing and duration of drilling, frequency of drilling, drilling practices and technology, and the effects of natural processes on boreholes.

Drilling in the near future within the Delaware Basin will most likely be for oil and gas exploration/exploitation, which constitutes a deep drilling event. Shallow drilling may occur for other resources (e.g., water), but has been screened out of this and past analyses due to lack of consequence on the disposal system (Compliance Certification Application [CCA], U.S. Department of Energy 1996, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.5.2; Compliance Recertification

1 Application of 2004 [CRA-2004], U.S. Department of Energy 2004, Appendix PA, Attachment
2 SCR; Compliance Recertification Application of 2009 [CRA-2009], Appendix SCR-2009).
3 Drilling is incorporated in the performance assessment (PA) as a single event or combinations of
4 events based upon different scenarios. Deep and shallow drilling rates and related activities
5 directly affect the cumulative potential for radionuclide releases to the surface or to subsurface
6 geologic units around the WIPP.

7 Deep drilling is defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1996) as events that
8 terminate 655 meters (m) (2,150 feet [ft]) or more below ground surface, while shallow drilling
9 events terminate no deeper than 655 m (2,150 ft) below ground surface. (Note that the repository
10 level is 655 m (2,150 ft) below ground surface.)

11 **33.3 1998 Certification Decision**

12 **33.3.1 40 CFR § 194.33(a) DOE Methodology and Conclusions**

13 In the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.5, the DOE identified oil and gas exploration/exploitation
14 and water and potash exploration as the principal human activities that must be considered within
15 the PA. The remaining human initiated activities—such as exploration for geothermal energy,
16 water supplies, and sulfur and brine extraction (solution mining)—were eliminated based upon
17 low probability, low consequence, or for regulatory reasons.

18 **33.3.1.1 Deep Drilling Methods**

19 Descriptions of well drilling, plugging, and abandonment practices typically followed in the
20 Delaware Basin are provided in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.5 (the CCA, Appendix
21 DEL, pp. DEL-26 through DEL-46). Chapter IX of the New Mexico Bureau of Mines and
22 Mineral Resources (NMBMMR) Final Report (New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral
23 Resources 1995, pp. IX-1 through IX-69) includes a discussion of drilling targets and practices,
24 with typical casing designs presented in the CCA, Appendix DEL (Figure DEL-13). The typical
25 operation sequence for well installation was presented in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Attachment
26 1 (Delaware Basin). Oil and gas exploration, exploitation, and production comprise 99% of the
27 deep boreholes in the Delaware Basin, with the remainder being sulfur, potash, and stratigraphic
28 test boreholes (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Table DEL-4).

29 The CCA also provides extensive information pertaining to the deep drilling process, from
30 acquisition of leases to well completion and abandonment (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section
31 DEL.6.1). In the area near the WIPP site, deep drilling typically terminates between
32 approximately 5,000 to 15,400 ft (1,524 to 4,695 m) below ground surface. The DOE stated that
33 mud rotary drilling is the typical drilling method used in the Delaware Basin. A summary of
34 deep drilling activities is provided in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.5.1.

35 **33.3.1.2 Shallow Drilling Methods**

36 The CCA discusses shallow drilling methods in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.5.2
37 (Potash Coreholes) and DEL.5.3 (Water Wells). Although shallow drilling for hydrocarbons,
38 sulfur, and brine extraction (solution mining) also occur, the CCA did not explicitly discuss

1 drilling methods for hydrocarbons and brine extraction (solution mining) because they are
 2 comparable to those for deep drilling, while drilling methods for sulfur are comparable to those
 3 for potash drilling.

4 **33.3.1.3 Evaluation of Borehole Properties**

5 Typical borehole sizes and depths are evaluated in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.5 (pp.
 6 DEL-26 through DEL-42). These borehole properties are described as having the potential to
 7 affect the disposal system through radionuclide migration and transport, as detailed below. The
 8 CCA, Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.5 provide the results of calculations showing that
 9 actinides expelled from the WIPP by these release mechanisms would not exceed EPA release
 10 limits. In addition, the CCA shows that the properties and degradation history of borehole
 11 plugging material are very important to the containment capabilities of the WIPP (the CCA,
 12 Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2, pp. 6-156 through 6-161).

13 **33.3.1.4 Future Drilling Events Considered in the Performance Assessment**

14 Future shallow drilling events were not considered in the PA because they were determined to be
 15 of low consequence to the PA calculations.

16 The CCA describes three different combinations of drilling events considered in PA, referred to
 17 as E1, E2, and E1E2:

- 18 • The E1 Scenario (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Figure 6-11): one or more boreholes penetrate a
 19 Castile brine reservoir and also intersect a repository panel
- 20 • The E2 Scenario (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Figure 6-10): one or more boreholes intersect a
 21 repository panel and do not penetrate a Castile brine reservoir
- 22 • The E1E2 Scenario (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Figure 6-12): multiple penetrations of the
 23 same waste panel where at least one penetration must be of the E1 type

24 The following potential release mechanisms result from the intrusion scenarios listed above.
 25 Intrusions to the disposal system could affect radionuclide migration and transport via the
 26 following:

- 27 • Cuttings—material intersected by a rotary drilling bit
- 28 • Cavings—material eroded from a borehole wall during drilling
- 29 • Spallings—solid material carried into the borehole during rapid depressurization of the
 30 waste disposal region
- 31 • Direct Brine Releases (DBRs)—contaminated brine that may flow to the surface during
 32 drilling
- 33 • Long-Term Releases Following Drilling

1 Future drilling events are modeled through a random sampling procedure described in the CCA,
2 Appendix CCDFGF, Sections 2 and 3. Uncertainty relative to the time and location of drilling is
3 stochastic (i.e., derived from random processes, without knowledge about the future). Drilling is
4 incorporated into the PA by repeatedly generating independent sequences of drilling-related
5 events that could occur at the WIPP over the next 10,000 years. The defining parameters for the
6 occurrence of future drilling events include not only the interval of time between drilling events
7 and the location of drilling intrusions, but also the following four parameters:

- 8 • Activity of waste penetrated by each drilling intrusion (not related to deep or shallow
9 drilling, but included for completeness)
- 10 • Plug configuration in the borehole
- 11 • Penetration of the Castile brine reservoir
- 12 • Occurrence of mining (not related to deep or shallow drilling, but included for
13 completeness)

14 Random sampling from these distributions was used to calculate 10,000 different futures for the
15 WIPP (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13.9).

16 **33.3.2 40 CFR § 194.33(a) EPA Compliance Review**

17 The EPA reviewed the information presented by the DOE in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Chapter
18 DEL.6, Section 6.2, and Chapter IX of NMBMMR (New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral
19 Resources 1995) to determine how extensively deep and shallow drilling was considered and
20 whether the information provided was sufficiently comprehensive, accurate, and correctly
21 calculated. The EPA examined the list of references presented in the CCA relative to drilling
22 and conducted a literature search to evaluate the fluid injection study (U.S. Environmental
23 Protection Agency 1998a). The EPA determined that the DOE's scrutiny of resources to assess
24 deep and shallow drilling practices and frequencies was comprehensive. The EPA also
25 determined that the DOE's conclusions regarding representative drilling methods in the
26 Delaware Basin are consistent with available data.

27 During the public comment period on the EPA's proposed certification, commenters raised the
28 issue that both air and mud drilling might occur in the Delaware Basin and that releases from air
29 drilling could be greater than from mud drilling, potentially causing the WIPP to fail the release
30 limits of 40 CFR § 191.13 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993). The DOE did not
31 include air drilling in the CCA because it was not a technique commonly used in the area near
32 the WIPP. In response to issues raised by stakeholders, the DOE provided several reports (Dials
33 1998) that examined both the likelihood and consequence of drilling with air at and near the
34 WIPP. Likewise, the EPA examined the air drilling issue from several perspectives and
35 documented its findings in the Technical Support Document *EPA's Analysis of Air Drilling at*
36 *WIPP* (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b) and in *Response to Comments*, Section 8
37 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998c). The results of the EPA's analysis showed that
38 air drilling is not common practice in the Delaware Basin. In addition, even if air drilling were
39 to occur, the volume of spalled material released is within the range presented in the CCA.

1 The EPA evaluated the drilling-related information in the CCA to determine how both deep and
2 shallow drilling affect the WIPP disposal system, including but not limited to, pressurization of
3 the WIPP, brine/fluid removal, and circulation of brine within the panels. The EPA concluded
4 that the DOE appropriately excluded shallow drilling from PA based upon low consequence.
5 The EPA also concluded that the DOE appropriately simplified the intrusion scenarios to include
6 the three types of drilling occurrences that, alone or in combination, are representative of
7 potential future intrusion events in the WIPP.

8 **33.3.3 40 CFR § 194.33(b) DOE Methodology and Conclusions**

9 The CCA presents an analysis of all known wells, including hydrocarbon borehole exploratory
10 and development wells in the Delaware Basin, and determines that inadvertent and intermittent
11 drilling is the most severe human intrusion scenario. The CCA, Appendix DEL (Section
12 DEL.7.3) and Appendix PA, Attachment SCR, Section SCR.3 include the DOE's analyses of
13 drilling events in the WIPP area. The CCA, Chapter 6.0 identifies scenarios for human intrusion
14 and calculated cumulative radionuclide releases assuming different intrusion events and
15 combinations of events.

16 The CCA, Appendix DEL, Table DEL-3 presents a listing of the types and number of boreholes
17 encountered within the Delaware Basin. The hydrocarbon borehole category is broken down
18 into seven individual types, including oil, gas, oil/gas, dry, abandoned, injection, and service.
19 Both exploratory wells (boreholes drilled to locate hydrocarbons) and developmental wells
20 (boreholes drilled to exploit known reserves) are included within each category listed in the
21 table. For example, if a well was drilled to explore for natural gas or with the intent to extract
22 more gas by secondary recovery method, both will be classified as gas wells.

23 By evaluating borehole types and standard well installation practices, the DOE determined that
24 significant release of radionuclides from the disposal system can occur through only five
25 drilling-related mechanisms (see CCA Chapter 6.0, Section 6.0.2.3, p. 6-5) for both exploratory
26 and development wells.

27 **33.3.4 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1) EPA Compliance Review**

28 The EPA evaluated resources considered by the DOE when developing human intrusion
29 scenarios. The EPA examined resources identified by the DOE (the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section
30 2.3.1, pp. 2-146 through 2-156, the CCA; Appendix GCR, and the CCA Appendix DEL, Section
31 DEL.4) and compared them with potential resources available in the area. The EPA reviewed
32 the DOE's data pertaining to wells associated with the exploration and development related to
33 these resources (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.7) and concluded that the DOE
34 considered the full spectrum of inadvertent and intermittent human intrusion scenarios possible
35 in the Delaware Basin and incorporated them into the PA.

36 The EPA found that the DOE adequately demonstrated that it had considered inadvertent and
37 intermittent drilling into or through the repository as the most severe human intrusion scenario
38 (Compliance Application Review Document [CARD] 33, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
39 1998d). The EPA concluded that the DOE appropriately evaluated drilling in the Delaware
40 Basin for inclusion in PA and adequately considered the drilling locations, depths, completion

1 intervals, practices, history, and occurrence of resources. Finally, the EPA concluded that
2 exploratory and development wells were appropriately included in the DOE's analysis.

3 **33.3.5 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(2) DOE Methodology and Conclusions**

4 Based on the regulatory guidance and the historic rate of drilling in the Delaware Basin, the DOE
5 calculated the rate of future drilling as 46.8 boreholes per square kilometer (km²) per 10,000
6 years (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.0.2.3, p. 6-5). In accordance with 40 CFR §
7 194.33(c)(1), the DOE assumes that current drilling practices will continue unchanged into the
8 future.

9 The DOE discusses the drilling rate assumptions in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.0.2.3, p. 6-5
10 and Appendix DEL, Section DEL.7, pp. 80–84. The DOE assumed random drilling events, with
11 respect to both location and time, allocated among three time periods:

- 12 • A period when institutional controls are active (0 to 100 years), during which no
13 intrusions will occur
- 14 • A period when passive institutional controls (PICs) are effective (100 to 700 years), for
15 which the drilling rate is two orders of magnitude lower than the rate experienced during
16 the uncontrolled period
- 17 • An uncontrolled period (700 to 10,000 years)

18 In the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.2, pp. 182–83, the DOE outlines the process by which
19 the random drilling rate assumptions were implemented. The number and time of intrusions
20 were represented using a Poisson process to calculate the time period that elapsed between
21 intrusions based on historical drilling activity and assuming a rate of 46.8 boreholes/km² (for the
22 700 to 10,000 year period), and 0.486 boreholes/km² for the period when PICs are effective (100
23 to 700 years). Specifically, the DOE states in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.2, p. 182,
24 that both the number and time of intrusions are determined sequentially by sampling from a
25 cumulative distribution function that describes the time elapsed between a given intrusion and
26 the next intrusion. The potential time between intrusions varied from 0 to 9,900 years. Using
27 this process, the DOE concluded that the most likely number of intrusions into a waste panel is 5,
28 occurring with a probability of 0.1715. Zero intrusions occurred with a probability of 0.0041.
29 The DOE found the largest number of intrusions that occurred is 14, with a probability of 0.0011
30 (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.2, p. 183).

31 The DOE assigned drilling rates based on basin-wide borehole information. The drilling rate
32 calculated for the basin was then applied to the area of the repository by the DOE randomly
33 assigning intrusion borehole locations among 144 discrete regions in the repository. Each
34 hypothetical intrusion was assumed to penetrate only 1 of the 144 blocks, and the probability of
35 intersecting any given block was 1 in 144. Based on the ratio of excavated to undisturbed Salado
36 in each grid block, the DOE concludes that a borehole has a 20% probability of encountering
37 excavated Salado (i.e., waste-filled repository or experimental regions) and an 80% chance of
38 encountering unexcavated Salado (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.3, p. 184).

1 The DOE did not consider boreholes relevant to the potential for release outside the boundaries
2 of the repository, and therefore only calculated locations that could potentially intrude the
3 repository. Specific well locations in the remainder of the Delaware Basin were not calculated.
4 The CCA, Appendix CCDFGF presents details regarding how the probability of borehole
5 intrusion scenarios was implemented in the construction of future realizations.

6 **33.3.6 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(2) EPA Compliance Review**

7 The EPA reviewed the DOE's implementation of drilling rate and location assumptions, and
8 concluded that the DOE used appropriate methods to derive drilling rates and locations. The
9 EPA determined (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998e) that the DOE adequately
10 demonstrated that drilling events were assigned as occurring over random intervals of time and at
11 random locations. The EPA also reviewed the DOE's implementation of drilling assumptions
12 and determined that the method employed by the DOE in the calculations yields random drilling
13 rate and location results. Use of Poisson distribution to project the time period that will elapse
14 between intrusions was determined to be an acceptable approach. Division of the projected
15 future into three distinct time periods was determined to be appropriately justified. The EPA
16 disallowed PA credit for PICs. Nonetheless, the CCA Performance Assessment Verification
17 Test (PAVT) calculations demonstrated that the effects of the proposed credits for active
18 institutional controls (AICs) and PICs are insignificant, so that the PA results remain unaffected
19 whether or not the credits are allowed (U.S. Department of Energy 1997a).

20 **33.3.7 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(3) DOE Methodology and Conclusions**

21 In the CCA, Appendix DEL, Sections DEL.7.3 and DEL.7.4, the DOE identifies deep drilling
22 that has occurred during the past 100 years for each resource known to occur in the Delaware
23 Basin (hydrocarbons, potash, and sulfur) and calculates the total rate of deep drilling as the sum
24 of the rates for each resource (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.4.2). The DOE obtained
25 information on deep drilling from two industry sources, Petroleum Information and the Midland
26 Map Company, based on original records compiled by the New Mexico Oil Conservation
27 Division (NMOCD) and the Railroad Commission of Texas Oil and Gas Division.
28 Approximately 99% of the deep boreholes in the Delaware Basin were related to hydrocarbon
29 exploration and exploitation. Industry database information regarding the number of deep
30 drilling events/resource and information sources is presented in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Tables
31 DEL-3, DEL-4, DEL-6, and DEL-7.

32 The DOE stated that drilling for deep resources near the boundary of the WIPP site since 1974
33 has demonstrated that profitable quantities of oil and gas resources are present near, and likely
34 beneath, the WIPP site. The CCA, Appendix DEL, Figure DEL-6 shows oil and gas wells in the
35 area surrounding the WIPP site (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.4.2.2.4).

36 The DOE stated that three hydrocarbon exploration/exploitation deep wells have been drilled in
37 the WIPP land withdrawal area (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.4.2.3, p. DEL-20). Of
38 these, two were drilled prior to 1982 and were later plugged and abandoned. The third well,
39 drilled in 1982, is currently producing natural gas from a sandstone reservoir of Pennsylvanian
40 Atokan age. Condemnation actions 77-071-B and 77-776-B by the United States currently
41 withdraws all of Section 31, which is approximately 3.2 km (2 miles) to the southwest of the

1 repository, from the surface to a depth of 1,829 m (6,000 ft) (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section
 2 DEL.4.2.3). Leaseholders have mineral rights below 6,000 ft (1,829 m), which would be
 3 accessed by directional drilling from a surface location outside of Section 31.

4 The CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.7.4, p. DEL-81, presents the DOE’s calculated drilling
 5 rate in the Delaware Basin. The DOE calculated a rate of 46.8 deep holes per km² over 10,000
 6 years and is shown below:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Deep Drilling Rate} = \frac{(\text{Total \# of deep boreholes}) \times \text{Regulatory Period}}{\text{Area of the Delaware Basin}} \times \frac{1}{100 \text{ yrs}} \\
 & = \frac{(10,804) 10,000 \text{ yrs.}}{23102.1 \text{ km}^2} \times \frac{1}{100 \text{ yrs}} \\
 & = 46.765 \text{ deep boreholes per km}^2 \text{ per 10,000 years}
 \end{aligned}$$

17 The CCA contains tables that show the specific drilling rates for each type of well and for each
 18 type of resource (the CCA, Appendix DEL, pp. DEL-83 through DEL-84). The CCA, Chapter
 19 6.0, Table 6-5 includes deep drilling events. The DOE used the drilling rates calculated from all
 20 available historical data as a basis for assigning future rates. These values and related calculation
 21 methods are shown in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Table DEL.6 and Table DEL.7. Reductions
 22 were made to these rates for AICs and PICs credit in the DOE analysis. As discussed in the
 23 CCA, Chapter 6.0, p. 6-181, AICs were credited for completely preventing inadvertent human
 24 intrusion for the first 100 years following repository closure. PICs were credited with reducing
 25 inadvertent intrusion to 1% of the calculated level for the period from 100 to 700 years after
 26 closure.

27 **33.3.8 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(3) EPA Compliance Review**

28 The EPA examined the CCA to determine the adequacy and accuracy of drilling rate calculations
 29 presented by the DOE, as well as supporting assumptions and determinations. The EPA
 30 examined the comprehensiveness and adequacy of deep drilling information and compared the
 31 DOE data to information on standard industry practice that had been collected for the Delaware
 32 Basin. The EPA checked the DOE’s calculations regarding deep drilling frequency for accuracy
 33 and compared them with the EPA’s calculations based upon an independently derived database
 34 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

35 The EPA’s review determined that the DOE appropriately identified deep drilling that occurred
 36 in the Delaware Basin. The CCA identified resources for which deep drilling is used and
 37 estimated the number of drilling events that occurred over the past 100 years as 46.8
 38 boreholes/km². The EPA found that the DOE’s method was sufficiently explained and that DOE
 39 adequately documented sources of supporting information. The EPA concluded that the DOE’s
 40 results for the total rate of deep drilling are consistent with available data. The EPA disallowed
 41 credit for PICs. Therefore, the DOE did not take credit for PICs in the CCA PAVT calculations
 42 (U.S. Department of Energy 1997a and 1997b). The results of the PAVT were comparable to the

1 original CCA results, in which PICs credit was employed; therefore, the EPA concluded that the
2 PICs credit was not significant to the WIPP's compliance with the disposal standards.

3 The EPA found that the DOE's sources of information on deep drilling were reliable and that the
4 DOE's confidence in the industry database was appropriate, based on the EPA's independent
5 review of industry activity in the area (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a). The DOE
6 identified all resources relevant to deep drilling. Well databases are understood to contain all
7 well types possible in the area, including both exploratory and development wells. Public
8 comments on the proposed decision to certify the WIPP raised questions about the DOE's
9 calculated deep drilling rate because commenters believed that the drilling rate used by the DOE
10 was too low with respect to current drilling rates. The EPA concluded that the deep drilling rate
11 used by the DOE was consistent with the requirements of 40 CFR Part 194.

12 **33.3.9 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(4) DOE Methodology and Conclusions**

13 The DOE examined the resources present within the Delaware Basin and determined that the
14 shallow resources identified in the Delaware Basin are water, potash, sulfur, oil/gas, and brine
15 wells (salt water "wells") (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.4, Table DEL-5). Note: This
16 table also presents stratigraphic and core test holes, but these apply to investigations associated
17 with the five resources. The DOE examined these resources and determined that no shallow oil
18 or gas is present in the controlled area or near the WIPP, and no minable sulfur reserves are
19 present in the controlled area or near the WIPP (the CCA, Appendix DEL, p. DEL-81). The
20 DOE also examined the possibility of brine extraction (solution mining) but excluded it from
21 consideration in PA based upon low consequence. The DOE concluded that water and potash
22 are potential resources within the controlled area, but nevertheless included drilling for oil/gas,
23 brine extraction (solution mining), and stratigraphic test holes (exclusive of those installed as
24 part of the WIPP site characterization program) in its shallow drilling rate calculations.

25 The DOE identifies a total of 5,536 shallow boreholes that have been installed in the Delaware
26 Basin, including those for sulfur coreholes (495 coreholes) but excluding those boreholes
27 installed as part of the WIPP site characterization program (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Table
28 DEL-5, p. DEL-83).

29 The DOE's method for calculating the shallow drilling rate was first to collect comprehensive
30 information on shallow drilling in the Delaware Basin, including drilling for hydrocarbons,
31 sulfur, potash, stratigraphic tests, water, and brine extraction (solution mining) wells (the CCA,
32 Appendix DEL, Table DEL-5). The DOE stated that information regarding shallow drilling in
33 the Delaware Basin was obtained from commercial and government sources. The DOE collected
34 water well data from a commercial database developed by Whitestar Corporation of Englewood,
35 Colorado; potash well data from Bureau of Land Management (BLM) records; and sulfur
36 corehole data from a database developed jointly by Whitestar Corporation and Petroleum
37 Information Corporation of Denver, Colorado (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Tables DEL-3, DEL-4,
38 and DEL-7). Sources used to determine the type and quality of resources include those used to
39 determine the drilling rate.

40 The DOE calculated the total rate of shallow drilling as the sum of the rates for shallow drilling
41 of resources in the Delaware Basin of the type and quality similar to those in the WIPP-

1 controlled area. DOE excluded consideration of the 495 sulfur drill holes when calculating the
 2 drilling rate, since no economically extractible sulfur is located within the WIPP land withdrawal
 3 area (the CCA, Appendix DEL, pp. DEL-25 and DEL-81; New Mexico Bureau of Mines and
 4 Mineral Resources 1995). Also, following EPA guidance, the DOE excluded consideration of
 5 shallow drill holes created as part of the WIPP site characterization efforts (the CCA, Appendix
 6 DEL, p. DEL-81). However, the DOE included drilling for oil/gas and brine solution mining in
 7 its rate calculations, even though the DOE indicated that it was not necessary to do so. The DOE
 8 calculated a shallow drilling rate over the past 100 years of 21.8 shallow holes per km² per
 9 10,000 years (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.7.4, p. DEL-81).

10 The DOE presents the shallow drilling rate for each resource in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Table
 11 DEL-5, p. DEL-83. The DOE indicated in a footnote to the CCA, Appendix DEL, Table DEL-5,
 12 p. DEL-83 that the number of shallow holes per km² is calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Drilling Rate} &= \frac{(\text{Total \# of boreholes} - \text{Sulfur coreholes}) \times \text{Regulatory Period}}{\text{Area of the Delaware Basin}} \times \frac{1}{100 \text{ yrs}} \\
 &= \frac{(5536-495) 10,000 \text{ yrs.}}{23102.1 \text{ km}^2} \times \frac{1}{100 \text{ yrs}} \\
 &= 21.821 \text{ shallow holes per km}^2 \text{ per 10,000 years}
 \end{aligned}$$

23 The DOE concludes in the CCA, Appendix SCR that shallow drilling (Section SCR.3.2, Table
 24 SCR-3) could be screened from PA based on low consequence. As a result, the DOE did not
 25 include shallow drilling in its PA drilling rate calculations and did not include any reduction in
 26 shallow drilling rates during the AIC and PIC periods.

27 **33.3.10 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(4) EPA Compliance Review**

28 The EPA reviewed the CCA, Appendices DEL, SCR, GCR, FAC, HYDRO, and other references
 29 (e.g., New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources 1995) and determined that the DOE
 30 appropriately identified shallow drilling resources and the number of drilling events for each
 31 resource over the past 100 years (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998e). The EPA
 32 concluded that the DOE’s exclusion of sulfur coreholes from drilling was consistent with
 33 geologic data indicating that sulfur resources are not present in the area. In addition, the DOE’s
 34 exclusion of site-investigation coreholes is consistent with EPA guidance. The DOE adequately
 35 discussed the basis for and calculation of the frequency of shallow drilling. The EPA concluded
 36 that the DOE properly calculated both the frequency of shallow drilling (using the historical rate
 37 of shallow drilling) and the sum of shallow drilling for all resources (whichever are used in the
 38 area, such as potash and water only).

39 The EPA reviewed information in the CCA, Chapter 6.0 and Appendix DEL, but did not collect
 40 an independent database for comparison with the DOE’s data because the EPA concurred with
 41 the DOE’s screening of shallow drilling from PA calculations (as presented in the CCA,
 42 Appendix SCR, Section SCR.3, and summarized in Table SCR-3). The DOE states that since
 43 shallow boreholes would not penetrate the repository, the effects of boreholes on repository

1 performance, including hydraulic effects of drilling-induced flow (e.g., the CCA, Appendix
2 SCR, Section SCR.3.3.1.1.3, pp. SCR-113-14), could be excluded due to low consequence. This
3 exclusion precluded the need for a detailed evaluation of data used by the DOE to determine
4 shallow drilling rates including whether the DOE's rates included exploratory and development
5 wells (although assessments included both). The DOE states, "The effects of future shallow
6 drilling within the controlled area have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
7 consequence" (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.5.2, p. 6-61). As such, the shallow drilling rate
8 was not added to the deep drilling rate to obtain the total drilling rate used in the PA.

9 The EPA noted that the DOE took a combined approach relative to resources in the controlled
10 area. That is, the DOE considered all the resources present in the area in shallow drilling rate
11 calculations. Only drilling for potash and water wells fall in the shallow category (less than 655
12 m [2,150 ft] from the surface); thus, only these two resources were used in the calculation of
13 shallow drilling rate for the controlled area. The EPA concluded that the DOE adequately
14 discussed resources within the controlled area for those resources included, and justified the
15 exclusion of other resources from consideration.

16 **33.3.11 40 CFR § 194.33(c)(1) DOE Methodology and Conclusions**

17 In the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.5.1, p. 26, the DOE states that modern rotary drilling
18 techniques, with a variety of mud systems, have been used for well completions in the vicinity of
19 the WIPP. The DOE indicated that drilling depths range from 1,219 m (4,000 ft) to more than
20 4,267 m (14,000 ft), depending on the hydrocarbon producing formation targeted. As stated in
21 the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.4.2, the DOE took information regarding the depths of
22 wells and probable resources primarily from Chapter IX of New Mexico Bureau of Mines and
23 Mineral Resources (1995). The DOE stated that wells designed to penetrate the deeper Atokan
24 natural gas plays (over 4,267 m [14,000 ft] below ground surface) tend to start at the surface with
25 larger bits and conductor casings, and are completed with a long production string of 4 ½- to 5½-
26 in casing. In such wells, the larger casing string present through the lower salt sections tends to
27 be 8 in., 9 in., or larger in diameter.

28 The DOE indicated that wells intended for completion in the relatively shallower (approximately
29 1,524 m to 2,438 m [5,000 to 8,000 ft] deep) Delaware Group are drilled with similar technology
30 and mud systems through the salt sections. Long string casing present across the Bell Canyon
31 varies from 4 ½ to 13 in. Completions may use 2- or 3-in. tubing strings. Standard completion
32 technology for both the Delaware Group and Atokan wells includes perforation of the long string
33 casing with a hydraulic fracture treatment using a variety of gelled fluids to emplace sand
34 proppant into the fractures. The DOE indicates that acid treatments and acid fracture treatments
35 are frequently used, especially for Brushy Canyon completions (the CCA, Appendix DEL,
36 Section DEL.5.1.9, p. DEL-40).

37 The DOE assumed that all oil and gas related boreholes in the area will be plugged according to
38 current applicable regulations. The DOE based this assumption on records for wells drilled on
39 federal lands, for which the NMOCD data showed that all wells were either plugged or
40 scheduled to be plugged in accordance with regulatory requirements. A DOE study, provided in
41 the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment 16-1, indicated that 100% of wells drilled and

1 abandoned since 1988 were, or are in the process of being, plugged per applicable BLM or
2 NMOCD regulatory standards pertaining to technical requirements.

3 **33.3.12 40 CFR § 194.33(c)(1) EPA Compliance Review**

4 Based on review of data presented in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2 and Appendices
5 DEL and MASS, the EPA found that the DOE has assumed that future drilling practices and
6 technology will remain consistent with current practices in the Delaware Basin. In addition, the
7 EPA determined that the DOE performed appropriate assessments of future drilling practices and
8 technologies—including the types/amounts of drilling fluids and borehole dimensions—and that
9 the assessments were consistent with data presented in the above-referenced CCA appendices.
10 The EPA's evaluation of state files, private database records, and independent industry practice
11 information confirmed the DOE's assumptions regarding future drilling practices and
12 technologies, including the types/amounts of drilling fluids, and borehole dimensions (U.S.
13 Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

14 During the public comment period for the proposed certification decision, the EPA received
15 comments that stated air drilling is current practice in the Delaware Basin. As a result of these
16 questions, the EPA performed additional analyses of air drilling to determine whether it is
17 common practice in the Delaware Basin. See the EPA's Analysis of Air Drilling at the WIPP
18 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b) and Response to Comments, Section 8 (U.S.
19 Environmental Protection Agency 1998c). Based on this analysis, the EPA again determined
20 that the use of mud as the drilling fluid is the current practice for drilling through the salt section
21 (the Salado and Castile Formations) and that air drilling through the salt section is not consistent
22 with current drilling practices in the Delaware Basin. Thus, the DOE properly excluded air
23 drilling through the salt section from consideration in the WIPP PA.

24 The EPA informed the DOE in a letter dated December 19, 1996, that the DOE was required to
25 provide detailed information about the large number (7,428) of unaccounted boreholes (the CCA,
26 Appendix DEL, Table DEL-2) and about the inclusion of the effects of unplugged boreholes in
27 the PA (Nichols 1996). The EPA required this information because the unplugged/abandoned
28 borehole issue was not clearly presented in the CCA. The DOE's response to this comment is
29 presented in three subparts (Dials 1997, Enclosure 2):

- 30 • The total number of boreholes listed in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Table DEL-2 is not
31 consistent with the record keeping system of NMOCD (data source) because the
32 categorization of data does not take into consideration the temporarily abandoned
33 boreholes, service wells, injection wells, and dry wells. In addition, data came from
34 different sources and different assumptions were made.
- 35 • The current regulatory process was designed, in part, to address the issue of unplugged
36 boreholes. The EPA believes that the DOE appropriately identified that there are no
37 unaccounted wells within the land withdrawal area. Wells in the land withdrawal area
38 are either shallow or deep research boreholes drilled by the DOE, or several abandoned
39 but plugged wells (see the CCA, Appendix DEL, Figure DEL-6). The DOE plans to
40 follow State of New Mexico requirements in plugging boreholes drilled into the disposal
41 system.

- The DOE stated that considering the degradation in plug properties to those of silty sand over time accounted for the issue of unplugged holes. The changes in properties were included in PA. The EPA agrees that boreholes will degrade, but the EPA believes that the permeability range should be different than that selected by the DOE (see below).

The EPA found the DOE's discussion to be technically adequate, because the boreholes in question are outside of the land withdrawal area and are not expected to affect the disposal system's capability to contain radionuclides. The EPA concluded that the DOE appropriately screened out abandoned boreholes drilled just meters away from the waste because of the limited communication through the low-permeability halite between the waste and the boreholes (U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998f).

The DOE included in the PA boreholes drilled into the waste areas. The DOE assumed that abandoned boreholes would have the permeability of silty sand. The EPA agreed that the upper limit of permeability assumed by the DOE was appropriate. However, the EPA believes that it is possible for abandoned boreholes to have low permeability, similar to a recently plugged borehole (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998g). The EPA therefore required the DOE to include a larger range of long-term concrete plug permeability values in the CCA PAVT (Trovato 1997). This range in borehole permeability values is from 5×10^{-17} to $1 \times 10^{-11} \text{ m}^2$, which the EPA believes covers the behavior of plugs in the Delaware Basin. The PAVT findings indicated that even with these changes in the borehole permeability, the releases did not violate the containment requirements.

33.3.13 40 CFR § 194.33(c)(2) DOE Methodology and Conclusions

The CCA, Appendix DEL, Attachment 7 (Inadvertent Intrusion Borehole Permeability) addressed borehole permeability variation. The CCA, Appendix DEL used published literature, plugging field tests, and oil and gas companies' experience to assess borehole permeability. The CCA, Appendix DEL also addressed wells that were plugged since 1988, when the State of New Mexico adopted new drilling and plugging regulations. Boreholes existing prior to 1988 are extremely limited in number within the WIPP land withdrawal area. The DOE accounted for the risk and uncertainties associated with boreholes drilled prior to 1988 in the PA by using various behaviors of plugs in the Delaware Basin. Borehole plug life for a two-plug configuration was considered in PA calculations to be 200 years; beyond that period, permeability was equivalent to marine silty sand and was held constant for the remainder of the regulatory period. The DOE assumed that processes that affect boreholes include steel casing corrosion and concrete plug alteration.

The DOE described different portions of the borehole over which degradation would act by first assigning plugging configurations for deep drilling in the Delaware Basin to one of three categories: a two-plug configuration, a three-plug configuration, and a continuous cement plug. The DOE evaluated the frequency of plug configurations based on those of 188 Delaware Basin wells installed since 1988. This provides an adequate database for analysis. Based on this study, the DOE assigns the following frequencies for each configuration (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.7, p. 6-198):

- One continuous plug through the evaporite sequence: probability of 0.02.

- 1 • Two plugs—one in the Bell Canyon (below the potential brine reservoirs) and one in the
2 Rustler Formation (between the Culebra of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as
3 Culebra) aquifer and the repository): probability of 0.68.
- 4 • Three plugs—two as described for the two-plug form and a third plug in the Salado:
5 probability of 0.30.

6 The DOE estimated that this plug system was expected to have an initial permeability of
7 $5 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$. The DOE assumed that casings would corrode due to the saline groundwater
8 environment (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Attachment 7, Appendix B) and that concrete plugs
9 would degrade when sufficient water entered a plug to cause matrix degradation (the CCA,
10 Appendix DEL, Attachment 7, Appendix C). The DOE also assumed that shallower casing and
11 cement plugs will degrade in 200 years, allowing for more potential fluid flow earlier in the
12 regulatory period in shallower horizons compared to deeper casing, which was assumed to fail
13 approximately 5000 years after installation. The DOE assumes that the “corroded casing and
14 degraded plug will fill the hole with material with a permeability approximating that of silty sand
15 (10^{-11} to 10^{-14} m^2), and over time any of this material below the repository will compress through
16 creep closure of the borehole to a permeability about one order of magnitude lower” (the CCA,
17 Appendix DEL, Attachment 7, p. 19). Plug configurations do not apply explicitly to shallow
18 drilling, except that abandoned shallow boreholes typically are continuously cemented and “are
19 expected to have no effect on the performance of the WIPP” (the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section
20 DEL.5.2, p. DEL-41).

21 The DOE concludes in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Section DEL.7.4, that permeability for each of
22 the three types of plug systems never exceeded that of silty sand (10^{-11} to 10^{-14} m^2) over the
23 10,000-year regulatory period. The DOE offers the following borehole permeability changes
24 over time, with the higher permeabilities the result of natural borehole degradation that would
25 also potentially allow for increased fluid flow:

- 26 • One plug: $5 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$ for 10,000 years
- 27 • Two plugs:
 - 28 – Between the repository and the surface
 - 29 ➤ $5 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$ for 200 years
 - 30 ➤ 10^{-14} to 10^{-11} m^2 after 200 years
 - 31 – Between the Castile and the repository
 - 32 ➤ “very high” permeability to 200 years (10^{-9} m^2)
 - 33 ➤ 10^{-14} to 10^{-11} m^2 up to 1,200 years
 - 34 ➤ 10^{-15} to 10^{-12} m^2 after 1,200 years

- 1 • Three plugs:
 - 2 – Between the intermediate plug and the surface
 - 3 ➤ $5 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$ for 200 years
 - 4 ➤ 10^{-14} to 10^{-11} m^2 after 200 years
 - 5 – Intermediate plug
 - 6 ➤ $5 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$ for a median time of 5,000 years
 - 7 – Borehole between the Castile and the repository
 - 8 ➤ 10^{-14} to 10^{-11} m^2 for 1,000 years (after 5,000 years)
 - 9 ➤ 10^{-15} to 10^{-12} m^2 after 6,000 years.

10 Dimensions of cement plugs for the scenarios above were assumed by the DOE to be

- 11 • One plug: 3,000 ft (900 m), 50 tons of concrete (20 cubic meters [m^3]), and
- 12 • Other plugs: 150 ft (45.73 m), 2.5 tons of concrete (1 m^3).

13 The DOE assumed that plug system permeability will change over time in 98% of the
 14 configurations and will not change in 2% of the configurations. The DOE assumed that
 15 permeability change with time behaved according to the following relationship:

16
$$\Delta k = k_i \left(10^{7.39\Delta\eta-1} \right)$$

17 where

- 18 Δk = change in permeability
- 19 k_i = initial hydraulic conductivity
- 20 $\Delta\eta$ = change in porosity from mineral alterations.

21 The DOE assumed that the permeability of plug systems is never greater than 10^{-11} m^2 .
 22 Assumptions made by the DOE regarding borehole plug permeability and casing corrosion are
 23 presented in the CCA, Appendix DEL, Attachment 7.

24 **33.3.14 40 CFR § 194.33(c)(2) EPA Compliance Review**

25 The EPA reviewed the CCA, Appendices DEL and MASS and determined that the DOE
 26 sufficiently identified natural borehole degradation mechanisms that will affect boreholes over
 27 time. The EPA also examined the plug configurations presented by the DOE and compared
 28 these generalized configurations with those for oil/gas and potash resource boreholes in the
 29 WIPP vicinity, as evidenced by the resources targeted and necessary plugging techniques. The
 30 EPA determined that the DOE's plug configurations (which directly impact the portions of the

1 borehole over which degradation processes are expected to act) and plug probabilities are
2 adequate representations of the plugs in the WIPP area (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
3 1998g).

4 The EPA evaluated the effects that natural degradation of long-term borehole plugs would have
5 on the plug system and the potential for increased transmissivity of abandoned well plugs due to
6 such degradation. The EPA disagreed with the DOE's lower limit for borehole plug
7 permeability. Although the DOE's permeabilities assigned for the various plug configurations
8 were based on plausible data, the EPA believed the DOE assumed a low-end permeability that
9 was too high. For further discussion of EPA's analysis of borehole permeabilities, see the
10 Parameter Justification Report (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998g).

11 If degraded boreholes are assumed to be filled with materials analogous to unconsolidated silt or
12 silty sand, the permeabilities of 1×10^{-14} to 1×10^{-11} m² used by the DOE are not unreasonable
13 estimates of values per industry standards (Freeze and Cherry 1979). (For purposes of
14 comparison, the permeability range reported for shale and unweathered marine clay varies from
15 10^{-21} to 10^{-17} m². See the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment 16-3) (Thompson et al. 1996).
16 However, as discussed below, the EPA investigated this assumption and found that permeability
17 values could be lower than the DOE assumed. Lower values allow for greater gas pressurization
18 of the WIPP and a subsequent increase in releases due to mechanisms such as spallings (U.S.
19 Environmental Protection Agency 1998g, Section 5.17).

20 The EPA began by investigating the permeability of borehole materials and drilling fluids in the
21 petroleum industry. Literature values for permeability of cement used in borehole applications
22 can range from 9×10^{-21} to 1×10^{-16} m²; these values are also cited in some of the publications
23 referenced in the CCA. The EPA also investigated drilling muds. Filter cake and compacted
24 clay-based drilling muds can yield permeabilities of less than 9.9×10^{-22} m² from field data for
25 11 pounds per gallon mud (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998g, Section 5.17).

26 The EPA concludes that drilling mud circulated in Delaware Basin boreholes may not have the
27 degree of clay-based solids loading typically experienced elsewhere (as discussed in the CCA,
28 Appendix MASS, Attachment 16-3; Annex C); however, natural cuttings could contribute to
29 lower borehole permeability than that postulated by the DOE. Lower initial permeabilities, more
30 effective plug segments, mixed layers between plug components that would take time to degrade,
31 and lower fluid velocities than the DOE assumed in its calculations could significantly retard
32 plug degradation and could maintain the effective seal of the plug sequences for hundreds or
33 thousands of years beyond that assumed by the DOE in the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment
34 16-3.

35 The DOE provided a variety of plausible mechanisms to increase plug permeability, and the EPA
36 believes that this high range of permeability may be attained. However, the EPA also believes
37 there is a limited probability that the lower borehole permeability (over several hundred vertical
38 feet of borehole) would reach the relatively large permeabilities estimated by the DOE. Since
39 permeability through any given borehole will actually be controlled by the permeabilities of all
40 zones through which fluids must pass, the effective average permeability could be dominated by
41 small sections of remaining competent plug or other low permeability material. If complete
42 degradation does not occur throughout a well, or if natural materials and mud provide additional

1 layers with sealing properties, it is possible that the effective average permeability over several
2 hundred feet of abandoned borehole could remain in the range of 9×10^{-21} to 1×10^{-16} m² over a
3 period of hundreds, if not thousands, of years.

4 The EPA concludes that the borehole permeabilities assigned in the CCA (Appendix MASS,
5 Attachment 16-3) were consistent with the broad range of available permeability data, but the
6 DOE did not adequately consider the total range of permeability conditions that could exist in
7 boreholes. Permeabilities assigned by the DOE may therefore overestimate the degree to which
8 plugs would lose effectiveness. The EPA concluded that an alternative case could be made in
9 which many of the plugs would retain a larger degree of effectiveness. As such, a lower
10 maximum permeability value of approximately 1×10^{-17} m² (1×10^{-2} millidarcy) is quite
11 possible (particularly for long-term conditions) and may have an impact on PA results. As a
12 result, the EPA included both long- and short-term plug permeability changes in the CCA PAVT.
13 The EPA required that PA simulations be conducted with lower permeabilities (concrete element
14 of the borehole plug has a maximum of 10^{-19} m²; silty sand element of the borehole plug has a
15 maximum of 5×10^{-17} m²) to account for possible cases in which complete degradation does not
16 occur throughout a well, or natural materials and mud provide additional layers with sealing
17 properties. Results of the CCA PAVT indicate that lower borehole permeability allows greater
18 pressure buildup in the repository and, hence, greater release potential from mechanisms such as
19 spallings. However, releases predicted by the CCA PAVT were still well below the EPA's
20 release limits (U.S. Department of Energy 1997a 1997b).

21 In summary, the EPA agreed that the high permeabilities assumed by the DOE were generally
22 appropriate; however, the EPA believed it is also possible for abandoned boreholes to have a
23 lower permeability, similar to that of a recently plugged borehole (U.S. Environmental
24 Protection Agency 1998g). Therefore, the EPA required the DOE to include larger ranges of
25 undegraded concrete plug and long-term borehole filling permeability values in the CCA PAVT
26 (Trovato 1997). The range of 1×10^{-17} to 1×10^{-19} m² was used in the CCA PAVT for an
27 undegraded concrete plug, and the range of 1×10^{-11} to 5×10^{-17} m² was used in the CCA PAVT
28 for a degraded borehole filling. The EPA found that these ranges adequately cover the behavior
29 of plugs in the Delaware Basin. The results of the CCA PAVT indicated that even with these
30 changes in the range of permeabilities for degraded borehole plugs, releases did not violate the
31 EPA's containment requirements.

32 The EPA believes that its detailed review of the DOE's borehole plugging assumptions provided
33 an adequate basis for the EPA's conclusion that the DOE's assumptions were acceptable.
34 Although the EPA originally questioned many of those assumptions, further investigations
35 substantiated many of the DOE's assumptions, and the use of modified permeability ranges in
36 the CCA PAVT did not cause releases to exceed regulatory limits.

37 **33.3.15 40 CFR § 194.33(d) DOE Methodology and Conclusions**

38 The DOE assumed that future drilling practices will be the same as current practice in terms of
39 the type and rate of drilling, emplacement of casing in boreholes, and procedures for plugging
40 and abandonment. The DOE did not include the impact of resource recovery subsequent to
41 future drilling of boreholes on the basis of low consequence. The DOE did not include the
42 effects of resource recovery techniques in the PA analysis of future human intrusion. In

1 addition, in the deep drilling disturbed performance scenario, the DOE examined three drilling-
 2 only scenarios, but these did not incorporate resource recovery techniques. The DOE states in
 3 the CCA, Chapter 6.0, p. 6-60 that the PA did not analyze the effects of techniques used for
 4 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of the borehole.

5 **33.3.16 40 CFR § 194.33(d) EPA Compliance Review**

6 The EPA determined that the DOE was in accordance with the provisions of 40 CFR § 194.33(d)
 7 as the PA did not analyze the effects of resource recovery techniques in future drilling events
 8 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998e).

9 **33.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

10 Table 33-1 presents changes in the CRA-2004 PA that relate to drilling for resources. This
 11 represents the migration of the PA baseline from the CCA to the CRA-2004. As noted below,
 12 most changes result from adopting the CCA PAVT parameters as directed by the EPA. Also,
 13 unless noted below, all other aspects of compliance with section 194.33 are consistent with that
 14 presented in the CCA, and do not represent changed or updated information.

15 **Table 33-1. WIPP Project Changes and Cross References**

WIPP Project Change	CRA-2004 Cross Reference
Incorporation of 1997 CCA PAVT Parameters	
Probability of Encountering a Brine Reservoir	6.0.2.3.8, 6.4.8, 6.4.12.6
Brine Reservoir Rock Compressibility	6.4.8
Brine Reservoir Porosity	6.4.8
Drill String Angular Velocity	Appendix PA, Attachment MASS (Section 16) and Attachment PAR
Long-term Borehole Permeability	6.4.7.2
Borehole Plug Permeability	6.4.7.2
Waste Shear Strength and Erodability	Appendix PA, Attachment MASS (Section 16)
Operational Changes	
Spallings Model	6.0.2.3.2; Appendix PA (Section 4.6) and Attachment MASS-16
Drilling Rate	6.0.2.3, 6.2.5.2; Appendix DATA (Section 2 and Attachment A)
Borehole Plugs Configuration Probability	6.4.7.2

16

17 **33.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

18 The EPA reviewed the DOE’s CRA-2004 documentation of continuing compliance with section
 19 194.33 and concurred that little had changed since the CCA for the consideration of drilling
 20 events. The DOE adopted the EPA’s PAVT parameter values and updated a few parameters
 21 based on the data collected from the Delaware Basin Monitoring Program. The EPA also
 22 concurred that the features, events, and processes (FEPs) had changed little for the CRA-2004.

1 The EPA found the DOE adequately demonstrated that it had considered inadvertent and
2 intermittent drilling into the repository as the most severe human intrusion scenario for the CRA-
3 2004 PA. The EPA concludes that exploratory and development wells were appropriately
4 included in the DOE's CRA-2004 analysis (CARD 23, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
5 2006).

6 Since the original CCA, the EPA has annually inspected the DOE's site monitoring program, in
7 particular, the Delaware Basin drilling surveillance program. Each year, the EPA found the
8 DOE's monitoring program to be adequate. The EPA found the DOE's compliance with the
9 requirements of 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(4) related to shallow drilling to be adequate. The EPA
10 found the DOE's documentation adequate to support their conclusion that drilling practices have
11 not changed since the original CCA, that the DOE's basin surveillance program is sufficient to
12 evaluate and capture any changes in activities in the basin.

13 The EPA agreed that borehole plugging techniques used in the CCA and CRA-2004 PA
14 calculations have not changed, and therefore the way these are incorporated into the PA
15 calculations is appropriate. The EPA also agreed that the minor change in the occurrence
16 probability of plug configurations is appropriate and of no consequence to PA results.

17 Public comments expressed concern that the drilling rate was underestimated in the CRA-2004
18 PA given the amount of drilling currently taking place throughout the Delaware Basin.
19 Comments suggested that the drilling rate be doubled to demonstrate compliance. Although the
20 EPA determined that the DOE appropriately calculated and implemented a drilling rate of 52.2
21 boreholes/km²/year in compliance with 40 CFR § 194.33(b) for recertification, the EPA
22 requested that the DOE calculate the impacts of doubling the current drilling rate to respond to
23 stakeholder concerns.

24 The DOE performed the calculations for this analysis with the drilling rate increased to 105
25 boreholes/km²/year for 10,000 years. The results of computer modeling showed that doubling the
26 drilling rate would increase releases from the repository. However, this increase is relatively
27 small and still well below the EPA's regulatory release limits (CARD 23, U.S. Environmental
28 Protection Agency 2006).

29 **33.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

30 There are two changes in the CRA-2009 that relate to the consideration of drilling in PA. First,
31 the drilling rate has been updated based on drilling activities in the Delaware Basin since the
32 CRA-2004 in accordance with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(3) (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-3.3).
33 Second, the duration of DBR has been modified to reflect current industry practice, in
34 accordance with section 194.33(c)(1) (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.7.8). Furthermore,
35 because recertification applications are expected to include any relevant updated activities and
36 information since the most recent application, these changes are considered necessary to comply
37 with the provisions of 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(4).

38 The following sections describe how these two changes relate to a demonstration of compliance
39 with the provisions of section 194.33. Unless noted below, all other aspects of compliance with

1 section 194.33 are consistent with that presented in the CRA-2004, and do not represent changed
 2 or updated information.

3 **33.6.1 New Information Related to 40 CFR § 194.33(a)**

4 Potentially disruptive events and processes (EPs) that could affect the disposal system are
 5 identified, classified, and screened in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SCR. EPs that
 6 are screened into PA calculations are then incorporated into the appropriate scenarios and
 7 conceptual models. For the CRA-2009, there are no changes in the EPs screened into PA, or the
 8 scenarios and conceptual models that represent them. Therefore, the DOE continues to comply
 9 with 40 CFR § 194.33(a).

10 **33.6.2 New Information Related to 40 CFR § 194.33(b)**

11 There is no change in the implementation of the inadvertent human intrusion scenarios for this
 12 CRA-2009. PA continues to represent inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for
 13 resources as the most severe human intrusion scenario. Therefore, the DOE continues to comply
 14 with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1).

15 There is no change in the implementation of the location and timing of the intrusion borehole in
 16 the WIPP PA. Such events are assumed to occur randomly in space and time, as directed by the
 17 above criterion. These specific PA assumptions are implemented in the code CCDFGF, and
 18 described in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12. Additional details on the implementation of
 19 these assumptions are found in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA.3.2. Therefore, the DOE
 20 continues to comply with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(2).

21 The method for determining the deep drilling rate for the WIPP PA has not changed. However,
 22 the drilling rate for this CRA-2009 is different from that used in the CRA-2004. This is due to
 23 the addition of recently drilled wells since the last recertification application. Derivation of the
 24 drilling rate used in PA is found in the Delaware Basin Monitoring Report for 2007 (U.S.
 25 Department of Energy 2007). For this CRA, the drilling rate is 58.5 boreholes/km². Therefore,
 26 the DOE continues to comply with section 194.33(b)(3).

27 The method for determining the shallow drilling rate for the WIPP has not changed since CRA-
 28 2004. The current rate of shallow drilling is 22.87 boreholes/km² and is based on information
 29 provided by Hughes (2008). The current shallow drilling rate is determined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Drilling Rate} = \frac{\text{Total shallow boreholes} \times \text{Regulatory Period}}{\text{Area of the Delaware Basin}} \times \frac{1}{100 \text{ yrs}} \\
 & \text{Drilling Rate} = \frac{5,284^1 \times 10,000 \text{ yrs.}}{23102.1 \text{ km}^2} \times \frac{1}{100 \text{ yrs}} \\
 & = 22.87 \text{ shallow holes per km}^2 \text{ per } 10,000 \text{ years}
 \end{aligned}$$

¹ The total shallow borehole count is derived by taking the total shallow count (6,179) as reported in U.S. Department of Energy, Table 4 (1997), and removing Sulfer holes (502), WIPP wells (199), and those holes currently being drilled or pending paperwork (194).

1
2 However, shallow drilling continues to be screened out of PA calculations for the CRA-2009
3 because of low consequence. Therefore, there are no changes with regard to compliance with
4 this part of the compliance criteria and the DOE continues to comply with section 194.33(b)(4).

5 **33.6.3 New Information Related to 40 CFR § 194.33(c)**

6 The Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report for 2007 states that drilling practices have not
7 changed since previous reports (see U.S. Department of Energy 2007, Section 4). However, one
8 change has been made to the WIPP PA system since the CRA-2004 that relates to analyzing
9 drilling-related events: The maximum time a DBR can occur has been changed from 11 days to
10 4.5 days. The maximum DBR duration is represented in PA by the parameter MAXFLOW and
11 used in the code BRAGFLO. Kirkes (2007) documents that this change is in keeping with
12 current drilling practices within the Delaware Basin and the previous assumption of 11 days was
13 incorrect. Kirkes and Clayton (2008) document the impacts of reducing the maximum duration
14 of DBR and show that this change has a very minor impact upon performance predictions.
15 Appendix PA-2009, Section PA.9.3 discusses the contribution of DBR to total releases for the
16 CRA-2009 performance calculations. Therefore, the DOE continues to comply with 40 CFR §
17 194.33(c).

18 **33.6.4 New Information Related to 40 CFR § 194.33(d)**

19 No changes have occurred with respect to the WIPP's approach to compliance with this
20 requirement. As in previous applications, certain EPs that relate to the extraction and production
21 of resources can be screened out of PA calculations. Appendix SCR-2009 states that the human-
22 related FEPs H19, "Explosions for Resource Recovery," H25, "Oil and Gas Extraction," and
23 H26, "Groundwater Extraction," are screened out according to the exclusion afforded by the
24 provision of section 194.33(d), as these processes directly relate to the recovery of resources
25 subsequent to drilling. Three new FEPs for the CRA-2009 are also screened out according to the
26 criteria of section 194.33(d): H60, "Liquid Waste Disposal—inside the WIPP boundary (IB),"
27 H61, "Enhanced Oil and Gas Production—IB," and a "Hydrocarbon Storage—IB," are screened
28 out for the future time frame using this regulatory provision. Therefore, the DOE continues to
29 comply with section 194.33(d).

30 **33.7 References**

31 Dials, G. 1997. Letter to R. Trovato (Subject: Second Response Package Transmitting
32 Supplemental Information for the Compliance Certification Application in Response to the
33 December 19, 1996 EPA Request). 27 January 1997. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad
34 Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.

35 Dials, G. 1998. Letter to Mary Kruger (Subject: Regarding Certain Human Intrusion
36 Scenarios). 26 January 1998. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Area Office, Carlsbad, NM.

37 Freeze, R.A., and J.A. Cherry. 1979. *Groundwater*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

38 Hughes, D. 2008. *Shallow Drilling Rate for the Delaware Basin* (June). Carlsbad, NM:
39 Washington Regulatory and Environmental Services.

- 1 Kirkes, R. 2007. *Evaluation of the Duration of Direct Brine Release in WIPP Performance*
2 *Assessment* (Revision 0). ERMS 545988. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 3 Kirkes, G.R., and D.J. Clayton. 2008. *Impact Analysis of Decreased Duration of Directed*
4 *Brine Release in WIPP Performance Assessment, Revision 0* (March 10). 2008. ERMS 548313.
5 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad Programs Group.
- 6 New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources (NMBMMR). 1995. *Final Report:*
7 *Evaluation of Mineral Resources at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site* (March 31). 4
8 vols. ERMS 239149. Socorro, NM: New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources.
- 9 Nichols, M.D. 1996. Letter to A.L. Alm (1 Enclosure). 19 December 1996. U.S.
10 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 11 Thompson, T.W., W.E. Coons, J.L. Krumhansl, and F.D. Hansen, F.D. 1996. *Inadvertent*
12 *Intrusion Borehole Permeability* (July). ERMS 241131. Albuquerque: Sandia National
13 Laboratories.
- 14 Trovato, E.R. 1997. Letter to G. Dials (2 Enclosures). 25 April 1997. ERMS 247206. U.S.
15 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 16 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
17 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
18 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997a. *Summary of EPA-Mandated Performance*
20 *Assessment Verification Test (Replicate 1) and Comparison with the Compliance Certification*
21 *Application Calculations* (July 25). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 22 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997a. *Summary of EPA-Mandated Performance*
23 *Assessment Verification Test (Replicate 1) and Comparison with the Compliance Certification*
24 *Application Calculations*. WPO 46674. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 25 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997b. *Supplemental Summary of EPA-Mandated*
26 *Performance Assessment Verification Test (All Replicates) and Comparison with the Compliance*
27 *Certification Application Calculations* (August 8). WPO 46702. ERMS 414879. Carlsbad,
28 NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 29 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
30 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
31 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 32 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report*
33 (September). DOE/WIPP-07-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. "40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
35 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-

- 1 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
2 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
4 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
5 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61, (February 9, 1996).
6 5223–45.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. *Technical Support Document for 194.32:
8 Fluid Injection Analysis* (May). 3 vols. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. *Technical Support Document: EPA’s
10 Analysis of Air Drilling at WIPP* (Rev. 1). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor
11 Air.
- 12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998c. *Response to Comments: Criteria for the
13 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolations Pilot Plant’s Compliance with 40 CFR
14 Part 191 Disposal Regulations* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998d. “CARD No. 33: Consideration of
16 Drilling Events in Performance Assessments.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for
17 the Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s
18 Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp.
19 33-1 through 33-31). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998e. *Compliance Application Review
21 Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot
22 Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Certification
23 Decision* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 24 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998f. *Technical Support Document for Section
25 194.32: Scope of Performance Assessments* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
26 Indoor Air.
- 27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998g. *Technical Support Document for Section
28 194.23: Parameter Justification Report* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
29 Indoor Air.
- 30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006. “Recertification CARD No. 23: Models
31 and Computer Codes.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the
32 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
33 CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 23-1 through 23-
34 37). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Results of Performance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.34)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Results of Performance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.34)**

Table of Contents

34.0 Results of Performance Assessments (40 CFR § 194.34) 34-1

 34.1 Requirements..... 34-1

 34.2 40 CFR § 194.34(a)..... 34-1

 34.2.1 Background..... 34-1

 34.2.2 1998 Certification Decision 34-2

 34.2.3 Changes in the CRA-2004 34-2

 34.2.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 34-3

 34.2.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 34-3

 34.3 40 CFR § 194.34(b)..... 34-4

 34.3.1 Background..... 34-4

 34.3.2 1998 Certification Decision 34-4

 34.3.3 Changes in the CRA-2004 34-4

 34.3.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 34-5

 34.3.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 34-5

 34.4 40 CFR § 194.34(c)..... 34-5

 34.4.1 Background..... 34-5

 34.4.2 1998 Certification Decision 34-5

 34.4.3 Changes in the CRA-2004 34-6

 34.4.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 34-6

 34.4.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 34-6

 34.5 40 CFR § 194.34(d)..... 34-6

 34.5.1 Background..... 34-6

 34.5.2 1998 Certification Decision 34-6

 34.5.3 Changes in the CRA-2004 34-7

 34.5.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 34-7

 34.5.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 34-7

 34.6 40 CFR § 194.34(e)..... 34-8

 34.6.1 Background..... 34-8

 34.6.2 1998 Certification Decision 34-8

 34.6.3 Changes in the CRA-2004 34-8

 34.6.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 34-8

 34.6.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 34-9

 34.7 40 CFR § 194.34(f) 34-9

 34.7.1 Background..... 34-9

 34.7.2 1998 Certification Decision 34-9

 34.7.3 Changes in the CRA-2004 34-10

 34.7.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 34-10

 34.7.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 34-10

 34.8 References 34-11

List of Figures

Figure 34-1. 300 CCDFs for Total Normalized Releases: CRA-2009 PA 34-3
Figure 34-2. Mean and Confidence Interval CCDFs for Total Normalized Releases:
CRA-2009 PA 34-11

List of Tables

Table 34-1. CRA-2009 PA Statistics on the Overall Mean for Total Normalized
Releases at Probabilities of 0.1 and 0.001, All Replicates Pooled Compared
with Release Limits (from Table 6-1 in Clayton et al. [2008]) 34-11

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CCDF	complementary cumulative distribution function
CPR	cellulose, plastic, and rubber
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBR	direct brine release
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
LHS	Latin hypercube sampling
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **34.0 Results of Performance Assessments (40 CFR § 194.34)**

2 **34.1 Requirements**

§ 194.34 Results of Performance Assessments

(a) The results of performance assessments shall be assembled into complementary, cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) that represent the probability of exceeding various levels of cumulative release caused by all significant processes and events.

(b) Probability distributions for uncertain disposal system parameter values used in performance assessments shall be developed and documented in any compliance application.

(c) Computational techniques, which draw random samples from across the entire range of the probability distributions developed pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, shall be used in generating CCDFs and shall be documented in any compliance application.

(d) The number of CCDFs generated shall be large enough such that, at cumulative releases of 1 and 10, the maximum CCDF generated exceeds the 99th percentile of the population of CCDFs with at least a 0.95 probability. Values of cumulative release shall be calculated according to Note 6 of Table 1, Appendix A of Part 191 of this chapter.

(e) Any compliance application shall display the full range of CCDFs generated.

(f) Any compliance application shall provide information which demonstrates that there is at least a 95 percent level of statistical confidence that the mean of the population of CCDFs meets the containment requirements of 40 CFR 191.13.

3

4 **34.2 40 CFR § 194.34(a)**

5 **34.2.1 Background**

6 The radioactive waste disposal regulations of 40 CFR Part 191 Subparts B and C (U.S.
7 Environmental Protection Agency 1993) include containment requirements for radionuclides.
8 The containment requirements of 40 CFR § 191.13 specify that releases from a disposal system
9 to the accessible environment must not exceed the release limits set forth in Part 191 Appendix
10 A, Table 1. Assessment of the likelihood that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) will meet
11 the release limits is conducted through a process known as a performance assessment (PA). The
12 WIPP PA consists of a series of computer simulations that model the physical attributes of the
13 repository (site, geology, waste forms and quantities, engineered features) in a manner that
14 captures the expected behaviors and interactions among its various components over the 10,000-
15 year regulatory time frame.

16 The PA must consider all significant processes and events that may affect the disposal system
17 (see Section 32 of this application), and it must be structured and conducted in a way that (1)
18 demonstrates an adequate understanding of the physical conditions at the disposal system and its
19 surroundings and (2) shows that the future performance of the system can be predicted with
20 reasonable assurance. In addition, it must include simulations for both undisturbed conditions
21 and human intrusion scenarios. The results of the PA are used to demonstrate compliance with
22 the containment requirements of section 191.13.

23 The containment requirements place limits on the likelihood of radionuclide releases from a
24 disposal system. A radionuclide release to the accessible environment is defined in terms of the
25 location of the release and its magnitude. Any release of radionuclides to the ground surface,

1 atmosphere, or surface water is considered a release to the accessible environment. In addition,
2 any subsurface transport of radionuclides beyond the boundary of the WIPP controlled area is
3 also considered a release to the accessible environment.

4 The results of the WIPP PA are required to be expressed as complementary cumulative
5 distribution functions (CCDFs). A CCDF indicates the probability of exceeding various levels of
6 cumulative release. The CCDFs must be generated using random sampling techniques that draw
7 upon the full range of values established for each uncertain parameter.

8 **34.2.2 1998 Certification Decision**

9 To meet the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.34(a) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996),
10 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) expected the U.S. Department of Energy
11 (DOE) to demonstrate that

- 12 1. The results of the PA were assembled into CCDFs.
- 13 2. The CCDFs represent the probability of exceeding various levels of cumulative release
14 caused by all significant processes and events.
- 15 3. All significant processes and events that may affect the repository during the 10,000-year
16 period after closure have been incorporated into the CCDFs presented.

17 The EPA reviewed the features, events, and processes for WIPP and the construction of the
18 CCDFs for the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996).
19 The EPA concluded that the DOE appropriately captured the significant processes and events
20 that could occur during the regulatory period in the CCDFs and thus complied with the
21 requirements of section 194.34(a).

22 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.34(a) can be
23 obtained from Compliance Application Review Document (CARD) 34, Section 34.A.6 (U.S.
24 Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

25 **34.2.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

26 The DOE developed CCDFs for the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004)
27 (U.S. Department of Energy 2004) using the same methodology as used for the CCA and the
28 CCA Performance Assessment Verification Test (PAVT); the only changes were in the values of
29 some parameters and modeling assumptions. See the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Table 6-1.

30 The DOE used selected computer codes and input parameters to generate estimates of
31 radionuclides for a large number of scenarios. In total, 300 CCDFs (100 for each of the 3
32 replicates) were constructed and presented in the CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline
33 Calculation (PABC) Report (Leigh et al. 2005) for total normalized releases. Three hundred
34 realizations were needed to satisfy the criteria of 40 CFR § 194.34(d). Normalized release results
35 for 10,000 simulations of possible futures were used to calculate each of the 300 CCDF curves.
36 In addition, the DOE provided CCDFs for individual pathways.

1 **34.2.4 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**


2 The EPA’s analysis concluded that the DOE adequately presented the PA results in CCDFs,
 3 which show the probability of exceeding various levels of cumulative releases (U.S.
 4 Environmental Protection Agency 2006a, Section 12.0).

5 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
 6 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
 7 section 194.34(a) (see CARD 34, Section Recertification Decision [194.34(a)], U.S.
 8 Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

9 **34.2.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

10 There are changes in the CRA-2009 related to parameter updates, error corrections, and code
 11 improvements made since the CRA-2004 decision (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.1 for
 12 more details). The DOE developed CCDFs for the CRA-2009 using the same sampling process
 13 and CCDF computational technique as in the CCA and the CRA-2004 (see the CCA, Chapter
 14 6.0, Section 6.1).

15 In total, 300 CCDFs (100 for each of the 3 replicates) for total normalized releases were
 16 constructed and presented in Appendix PA-2009 (Figure 34-1). All of the 300 CCDFs lie below
 17 the limit of cumulative releases as defined in the containment requirements of section 191.13.
 18 Thus, the DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of section 194.34(a).



19
 20 **Figure 34-1. 300 CCDFs for Total Normalized Releases: CRA-2009 PA (from Figure 6-6**
 21 **in Clayton et al. [2008])**

1 **34.3 40 CFR § 194.34(b)**

2 **34.3.1 Background**

3 There is uncertainty associated with many of the parameters used in PA. 40 CFR § 194.34(b)
4 addresses the need for the uncertain parameters to be sampled from a probability distribution
5 (e.g., uniform, normal, etc.) that has been appropriately documented and justified.

6 **34.3.2 1998 Certification Decision**

7 To meet the criteria in section 194.34(b), the EPA expected the DOE to

- 8 1. Discuss the sources used and the methods by which each of the probability distributions was
9 developed (e.g., experimental data, field data, etc.)
- 10 2. Identify the functional form of the probability distribution (e.g., uniform, lognormal) used for
11 the sampled parameters
- 12 3. Describe the statistics of each probability distribution, including the values for lower and
13 upper ranges, mean (geometric mean when appropriate), and median
- 14 4. Identify the importance of the sampled parameters to the final releases
- 15 5. Demonstrate that the data used to develop the input parameter probability distribution were
16 qualified and controlled in accordance with 40 CFR § 194.22

17 Upon reviewing the DOE's parameters, the EPA found that the DOE adequately documented the
18 probability distributions in the CCA, Appendix PAR. In addition, the DOE discussed the data
19 and method used to create the probability distribution of each of the 57 sampled variables. The
20 DOE provided general information on probability distributions, data sources for parameter
21 distribution, forms of distributions, bounds, and importance of parameters to releases. The EPA
22 identified inconsistencies with some of the parameter values and probability distributions, but
23 these were resolved for the CCA PAVT the EPA required the DOE to conduct (U.S.
24 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b, Section 5.0).

25 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.34(b) can be
26 obtained from the CARD 34, Section 34.B.5 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

27 **34.3.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

28 There were some changes in parameter values and probability distributions in the CRA-2004 PA
29 from the CCA PAVT. Many of these changes are related to inventory changes, but some are
30 related to modeling assumption changes (see Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.0). However, the basic
31 process the DOE used to develop the parameter information and sample the parameters did not
32 change from the CCA methodology.

33 The DOE documented its selection of parameters and probability distributions for the key
34 parameters in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0 and Appendix PA, Attachment PAR; the CRA-2004

1 PABC report (Leigh et al. 2005); and associated references. The CRA-2004 PABC sampled 56
2 parameters whose values were obtained through random sampling in the PA (Kirchner 2005).
3 There were changes to several of the parameters from the CRA-2004 PA for the CRA-2004
4 PABC (Leigh et al. 2005). The ultimate goal of parameter sampling was to capture uncertainties
5 in the parameters and show their effects on the CCDFs, which the DOE discussed in the
6 CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Sections 6.4 and 6.5 and in the CRA-2004 PABC report (see Leigh
7 et al. 2005, Section 2.9).

8 **34.3.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

9 The EPA reviewed the DOE's parameter selection and probability distributions in several
10 technical support documents related to computer codes (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
11 2006c and 2006d), parameters (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006e, 2006f, and
12 2006g), and chemistry (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a, 2006f, and 2006g). The
13 EPA found that the DOE adequately documented the probability distributions. In addition, the
14 DOE discussed the data and method used to create the probability distribution of each sampled
15 variable.

16 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
17 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
18 section 194.34(b) (see CARD 34, Section Recertification Decision [194.34(b)]; U.S.
19 Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

20 **34.3.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

21 Although 15 parameters were modified and 90 were added (Fox 2008, Table 6), the process that
22 the DOE used to develop the parameter information and sample the parameters did not change
23 from the EPA-approved CCA methodology (see Fox 2008 for parameter sample distribution
24 information). Thus, the DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with provision of section
25 194.34(b).

26 **34.4 40 CFR § 194.34(c)**

27 **34.4.1 Background**

28 The intent of 40 CFR § 194.34(c) is to ensure that the sampled parameters were appropriately
29 selected for use in PA.

30 **34.4.2 1998 Certification Decision**

31 To demonstrate compliance with section 194.34(c), the EPA expected the DOE to do the
32 following:

- 33 1. Discuss the computational techniques used for random sampling
- 34 2. Demonstrate that sampling occurred across the entire range of each parameter

1 The EPA agreed it was appropriate to use the Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) method for the 57
2 sampled parameters described in the CCA, Appendix PAR. The CCDFGF code also sampled
3 stochastic variables with Monte Carlo sampling for each realization. The EPA concluded that the
4 DOE adequately discussed the computational techniques and sampling ranges.

5 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.34(c) can be
6 obtained from CARD 34, Section 34.C.5; (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

7 **34.4.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

8 In the CRA-2004, the DOE used the same LHS methodology for sampling uncertain parameters
9 as in the CCA. There was no change in the methodology.

10 **34.4.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

11 The EPA determined during the CCA review that the LHS method ensures parameter values will
12 be selected from the entire range of the probability distributions because LHS stratifies the
13 probability distributions into a number (100, in this case) of equal-probability regions and then
14 samples one value from each region. The EPA noted that the LHS method is appropriate for
15 generating random samples (CARD 34, Section 34.C.5; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
16 1998a). The DOE used the same approach in the CRA-2004.

17 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
18 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the criteria for section
19 194.34(c) (see CARD 34, Section Recertification Decision [194.34(c)]; U.S. Environmental
20 Protection Agency 2006b).

21 **34.4.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

22 In the CRA-2009, the DOE uses the same LHS methodology for sampling uncertain parameters
23 as in the CCA and CRA-2004. There is no change in the methodology. Thus, the DOE continues
24 to demonstrate compliance with provisions of section 194.34(c).

25 **34.5 40 CFR § 194.34(d)**

26 **34.5.1 Background**

27 The intent of 40 CFR § 194.34(d) is to ensure that PA modeling appropriately sampled uncertain
28 parameters and that future scenarios were appropriately used in PA.

29 **34.5.2 1998 Certification Decision**

30 To demonstrate compliance with section 194.34(d), the EPA expected the DOE to do the
31 following:

- 32 1. Identify the number of CCDFs generated

- 1 2. Discuss how the DOE determined the number of CCDFs to be generated
- 2 3. List the probabilities of exceeding cumulative releases of 1 and 10 for each CCDF generated
- 3 4. Demonstrate that the maximum CCDF generated, at cumulative normalized releases of 1 and
- 4 10, exceeds the 99th percentile with at least a 0.95 probability, including examples of
- 5 calculations

6 The EPA found the analysis presented in the CCA, Chapter 8.0, sufficient to show that 298
7 CCDF curves would satisfy the statistical criterion. The EPA's independent analysis also verified
8 that the 300 CCDF curves computed and presented in the CCA were sufficient (CARD 34,
9 Section 34.D.5; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a). The DOE correctly interpreted
10 the definition of the 99th percentile value, and applied standard mathematical expressions for
11 deriving the probability of an outcome of multiple events (i.e., the generation of multiple CCDF
12 curves). The probabilistic analysis was found to be appropriate for sampling with the LHS
13 method, which achieves better coverage than nonstratified random sampling of parameter ranges.

14 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.34(d) can be
15 obtained from the CARD 34, Section 34.D.5 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

16 **34.5.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

17 In the CRA-2004, the DOE used the same methodology as in the CCA to generate 300 CCDFs in
18 three sets (replicates) of 100. There was no change in the methodology.

19 **34.5.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

20 The EPA noted that the DOE generated 3 sets of 100 CCDFs each and discussed the statistical
21 confidence levels based on the entire set of CCDFs. Based on the analysis in the CCA and the
22 fact that the DOE used the same approach in the CRA-2004, the EPA concurred with the DOE's
23 CRA-2004 analyses.

24 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
25 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
26 section 194.34(d) (see CARD 34, Section Recertification Decision [194.34(d)]; U.S.
27 Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

28 **34.5.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

29 In the CRA-2009, the DOE is using the same methodology as in the CCA and CRA-2004 to
30 generate 300 CCDFs in 3 sets (replicates) of 100. There is no change in the methodology. Thus,
31 the DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with provisions of section 194.34(d).

1 **34.6 40 CFR § 194.34(e)**

2 **34.6.1 Background**

3 The intent of 40 CFR § 194.34(e) is to show the full range of CCDFs in order to provide an
4 indication of the nature of the releases.

5 **34.6.2 1998 Certification Decision**

6 To demonstrate compliance with section 194.34(e), the EPA expected the DOE to do the
7 following:

- 8 1. Display the full range of CCDFs generated
- 9 2. Present appropriate information to allow the EPA to confirm the DOE's PA analysis,
10 including the steps used to arrive at the result and the data values that are represented by the
11 CCDFs
- 12 3. Include descriptive statistics such as the range, mean, median, etc., for the estimated CCDFs
13 at cumulative releases of 1 and 10

14 The DOE employed LHS to create 3 independent replicates of 100 realizations each, yielding
15 300 CCDF curves. The DOE concluded that the requirement of section 194.34(e) was met. The
16 EPA concurred with this conclusion.

17 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.34(e) can be
18 obtained from CARD 34, Section 34.E.5 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

19 **34.6.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

20 There were no changes to the approach used by the DOE with regards to section 194.34(e) in the
21 CRA-2004. The DOE presented and discussed the results of the PA analysis in the CRA-2004,
22 Chapter 6.0 and the CRA-2004 PABC report (see Chapter 6 in Leigh et al. 2005), which display
23 the full range of CCDFs generated. Furthermore, appropriate information needed to confirm the
24 analysis and descriptive statistics for the estimated CCDFs were shown.

25 **34.6.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

26 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
27 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
28 section 194.34(e) (see CARD 34, Section Recertification Decision [194.34(e)]; U.S.
29 Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

1 **34.6.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

2 There are no changes to the approach used by the DOE with regards to section 194.34(e) in the
3 CRA-2009. The full range of CCDFs generated for the CRA-2009 PA is shown in Figure 34-1.
4 Thus, the DOE continues to demonstrate compliance with provisions of section 194.34(e).

5 **34.7 40 CFR § 194.34(f)**

6 **34.7.1 Background**

7 Because of the unique nature of the WIPP, the EPA wanted to ensure that the PA results could be
8 used to adequately support a certification decision. To this end, the EPA required the DOE to
9 demonstrate compliance with a high statistical confidence. For 40 CFR § 194.34(f), the DOE
10 must show, in effect, that the mean of its 300 CCDF curves, and the 95th percentile upper
11 confidence limit of the population mean, meet the containment requirements of section 191.13
12 for the cumulative releases at 1 and 10 times the quantities in Part 191 Appendix A, Table 1.

13 **34.7.2 1998 Certification Decision**

14 To demonstrate compliance with section 194.34(f), the EPA expected the DOE to do the
15 following:

- 16 1. Present appropriate information, including steps used to arrive at the result and the data used
17 in the analysis, allowing the EPA to confirm that the mean of the CCDF population meets the
18 containment requirements of section 191.13 with a 95% statistical confidence level
- 19 2. Identify the mean of the sample of CCDFs generated for the cumulative releases at 1 and 10
20 times the quantities in Part 191 Appendix A, Table 1
- 21 3. Identify the CCDF values associated with a 95% statistical confidence level of the population
22 mean for the cumulative releases at 1 and 10 times the quantities in Part 191 Appendix A,
23 Table 1

24 Upon analysis of the CCA PA, the EPA identified inconsistencies with some of the parameter
25 values and probability distributions, and so the EPA required the DOE to conduct the CCA
26 PAVT, which resolved the issues (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b, Section 5.0).
27 The Certification Decision was based on the CCA PAVT results. The CCA PAVT results
28 demonstrated that the mean of the CCDFs met the section 191.13 containment requirements and
29 that the level of statistical confidence is significantly greater than 95%. Therefore, the EPA
30 concluded that the final result of the CCA PAVT was in compliance with the containment
31 requirements of section 191.13 and that the results were presented in accordance with section
32 194.34(f) (see CARD 34, Section 34.F.5, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a).

1 **34.7.3 Changes in the CRA-2004**

2 In the CRA-2004, the DOE used the same general approach for calculating the statistical
3 confidence for release limits as was used in the CCA. The DOE provided the CCDFs and
4 uncertainty information in the CRA-2004 documentation.

5 **34.7.4 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**


6 The EPA's and the DOE's review of the CRA-2004 identified several errors that may have
7 affected the CRA-2004 PA's compliance with section 194.34(f) (Cotsworth 2005). Incorrect
8 LHS transfer files were used as input to PRECCDFGF for Replicates 2 and 3; thus, some of the
9 same parameter inputs were used multiple times instead of being appropriately sampled for each
10 replicate. A spallings release calculation for the volume fraction of contact-handled transuranic
11 waste was omitted from CCDFGF, and an error in the input control file for the computer code
12 SUMMARIZE affected spallings results. Finally, only 50 vectors for DRSPALL calculations
13 were run for the CRA-2004 PA, instead of a full set of 100 vectors for each of the three
14 replicates, thus potentially reducing the range of spallings releases.

15 Because of these problems, the EPA required the DOE to run a full set of DRSPALL vectors and
16 correct the problem with LHS transfer files in the CRA-2004 PABC. The results of the
17 CRA-2004 PABC are provided in the DOE's CRA-2004 PABC report (Leigh et al. 2005). In its
18 review of the CRA-2004 PABC, the EPA concurred that the errors were corrected (CARD 34,
19 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006b).

20 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
21 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements for
22 section 194.34(f) (CARD 34, Section Recertification Decision [194.34(f)], U.S. Environmental
23 Protection Agency 2006b).

24 **34.7.5 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

25 For the CRA-2009, the DOE is using the same approach to calculate the statistical confidence for
26 evaluation against the release limits. The mean of the 300 CCDFs, along with the 95%
27 confidence levels about the overall mean for the total normalized releases of the CRA-2009 PA,
28 are shown in Figure 34-2. Table 34-1 lists the overall mean total normalized release CCDF
29 values of the CRA-2009 PA at the compliance probabilities of 0.1 and 0.001, along with the
30 values of the upper and lower 95% confidence limit CCDFs at the same probabilities. More
31 details on the normalized release results of the CRA-2009 PA are discussed in Appendix PA-
32 2009, Section PA-9.0. As seen in Figure 34-2 and Table 34-1, the results of the PA demonstrate
33 a greater than 95% level of statistical confidence that the overall mean of the population of
34 CCDFs is in compliance with the containment requirements of section 191.13, and thus the DOE
35 continues to comply with provisions of section 194.34(f).



1
2 **Figure 34-2. Mean and Confidence Interval CCDFs for Total Normalized Releases:**
3 **CRA-2009 PA (from Figure 6-7 in Clayton et al. [2008])**

4 **Table 34-1. CRA-2009 PA Statistics on the Overall Mean for Total Normalized Releases at**
5 **Probabilities of 0.1 and 0.001, All Replicates Pooled Compared with Release**
6 **Limits (from Table 6-1 in Clayton et al. [2008])**

Probability	Mean Total Release	Lower 95% Confidence Limit	Upper 95% Confidence Limit	Regulatory ^a Limit
0.1	0.10	0.10	0.11	1
0.001	0.72	0.48	0.92	10

7 ^a Releases divided by the release limits in Part 191 Appendix A, Table 1.
8

9 The DOE believes that the information presented in this section and additional information in
10 Appendix PA-2009 demonstrates continued compliance with section 194.34.

11 **34.8 References**

12 Clayton, D.J., S. Dunagan, J.W. Garner, A.E. Ismail, T.B. Kirchner, G.R. Kirkes, and M.B.
13 Nemer. 2008. *Summary Report of the 2009 Compliance Recertification Application*
14 *Performance Assessment*. ERMS 548862. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

15 Cotsworth, E. 2005. Letter to I. Triay (1 Enclosure). 4 March 2005. ERMS 548357. U.S.
16 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

17 Fox, B. 2008. *Parameter Report for the CRA-2009 PA (Revision 0)*. ERMS 549747. Carlsbad,
18 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Kirchner, T.B. 2005. *Generation of the LHS Samples for the CRA 2004 PA Baseline*
2 *Calculations*. ERMS 540279. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 3 Leigh, C., J. Kanney, L. Brush, J. Garner, G. Kirkes, T. Lowry, M. Nemer, J. Stein, E. Vugrin, S.
4 Wagner, and T. Kirchner. 2005. *2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance*
5 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 541521. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
6 Laboratories.
- 7 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
8 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
9 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
11 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
12 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
14 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
15 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
16 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
18 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
19 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
20 5223–45.
- 21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “CARD No. 34: Results of Performance
22 Assessments.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification*
23 *and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191*
24 *Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (May) (pp. 34-1 through 34-29).
25 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. *Technical Support Document: Overview*
27 *of Major Performance Assessment Issues* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
28 Indoor Air.
- 29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. *Technical Support Document for Section*
30 *194.23: Review of the 2004 Compliance Recertification Performance Assessment Baseline*
31 *Calculation* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 32 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “Recertification CARD No. 34: Results
33 of Performance Assessments.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for*
34 *the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40*
35 *CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 34-1 through
36 34-12). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006c. *Technical Support Document for Section*
2 *194.23: Models and Computer Codes* (March). PABC Code Changes Review. Washington,
3 DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006d. *Technical Support Document for Section*
5 *194.23: Review of WIPP Recertification Performance Assessment Computer Codes* (March).
6 CRA Code Review. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006e. *Technical Support Document for Section*
8 *194.23: Review of Changes to the WIPP Performance Assessment Parameters from the*
9 *Compliance Recertification Application to Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation*
10 (March). PABC Parameter Review. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006f. *Technical Support Document for Section*
12 *194.24: Evaluation of the Compliance Recertification Actinide Source Term and Culebra*
13 *Dolomite Distribution Coefficient Values* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
14 Indoor Air.
- 15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006g. *Technical Support Document for Section*
16 *194.24: Review of the Baseline Inventory Used in the Compliance Recertification Application*
17 *and the Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (March). Washington, DC: Office of
18 Radiation and Indoor Air.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Active Institutional Controls
(40 CFR § 194.41)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Active Institutional Controls
(40 CFR § 194.41)**

Table of Contents

41.0 Active Institutional Controls (40 CFR § 194.41) 41-1

 41.1 Requirements..... 41-1

 41.2 Background 41-1

 41.3 1998 Certification Decision..... 41-1

 41.4 Changes in the CRA-2004..... 41-2

 41.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 41-2

 41.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification..... 41-3

 41.7 References 41-3

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIC	active institutional control
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
PA	performance assessment
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **41.1 Requirements**

§ 194.41 Active Institutional Controls

(a) Any compliance application shall include detailed descriptions of proposed active institutional controls, the controls' location, and the period of time the controls are proposed to remain active. Assumptions pertaining to active institutional controls and their effectiveness in terms of preventing or reducing radionuclide releases shall be supported by such descriptions.

(b) Performance assessments shall not consider any contributions from active institutional controls for more than 100 years after disposal.

2
3 **41.2 Background**

4 One of the six assurance requirements is found in 40 CFR § 194.41 (U.S. Environmental
5 Protection Agency 1996) which contains the compliance criteria. Assurance requirements are
6 included in the disposal regulations to compensate in a qualitative manner for the inherent
7 uncertainties in projecting the behavior of natural and engineered components of the Waste
8 Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for many thousands of years (U.S. Environmental Protection
9 Agency 1985, p. 38072, and Compliance Application Review Document [CARD] 41, U.S.
10 Environmental Protection Agency 1998a, Section 41.A.1). Section 194.41 is one of the six
11 assurance requirements in the Compliance Criteria. Active institutional controls (AICs) are
12 defined in 40 CFR § 191.12 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) as “controlling access
13 to a disposal site by any means other than passive institutional controls, performing maintenance
14 operations or remedial actions at a site, controlling or cleaning up releases from a site, or
15 monitoring parameters related to disposal system performance.” Section 194.41 requires AICs to
16 be maintained for as long a period of time as practicable after disposal; however, contributions
17 from AICs for reducing the rate of human intrusion in the performance assessment (PA) may not
18 be considered for more than 100 years after disposal.

19 **41.3 1998 Certification Decision**

20 To meet the requirements for section 194.41, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
21 expected the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996) to
22 describe in detail the proposed AICs and their location and function and to identify the period of
23 time they are expected to remain active. The EPA also expected the U.S. Department of Energy
24 (DOE) to provide detailed information regarding implementation of the controls, any
25 assumptions pertaining to the effectiveness of active controls, a justification for any credit for the
26 AICs used in the PA, and the method for determining the credit. The EPA specified that the PA
27 could not assume that the AICs would be effective for a period longer than 100 years after
28 disposal.

29 In the CCA, Chapter 7.0 and Appendix AIC, the DOE describes its plan for the AICs, including
30 constructing a fence and roadway around the surface footprint of the repository, posting warning
31 signs, and performing routine patrols and surveillance. The DOE states that the AICs will be
32 maintained for 100 years after closure of the WIPP facility and would effectively prevent human
33 intrusion during that time.

1 The EPA reviewed the DOE's proposed plans for the AICs in connection with the types of
2 activities (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a, Section 41.A.3) that may be expected
3 to occur in the vicinity of the WIPP site during the first 100 years after disposal (i.e., ranching,
4 farming, hunting, scientific activities, utilities and transportation, groundwater pumping, surface
5 excavation, potash exploration, construction, and hostile or illegal activities). The EPA also
6 examined the assumptions made by the DOE to justify the assertion that the AICs will be
7 completely effective for 100 years.

8 The EPA found that the DOE adequately described the proposed AICs and the basis for their
9 assumed effectiveness and did not assume in the PA that the AICs would be effective for more
10 than 100 years, and thus found the DOE to be in compliance with section 194.41.

11 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.41 can be
12 found in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1998b).

13 **41.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

14 The 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004), Chapter 7.0 contains the
15 changes related to AICs since 1998. The DOE reported that the CCA, Appendix AIC was
16 unchanged since 1998; however, the following changes were included in CRA-2004:

- 17 • A new timeline for implementation of AICs
- 18 • DOE's approach to maintaining and replacing AICs
- 19 • Minimum standards to apply during construction and maintenance of AICs

20 **41.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

21 Based on the EPA's review of the activities and conditions in and around the WIPP site, the EPA
22 did not identify any significant changes in the planning and execution of the DOE's AICs plan
23 since the 1998 Certification Decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a, p. 41-2,
24 paragraph 2 and paragraph 4).

25 The EPA concluded that the CRA-2004 adequately describes, in detail, the proposed AICs and
26 their location and function, and identifies the basis for the DOE's assumed effectiveness. The
27 EPA confirmed that the DOE's CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculations used
28 the maximum allowable credit for the AICs against human intrusion (100 years). The EPA
29 found reasonable the DOE's assertion that the AICs will completely prevent human intrusion for
30 100 years.

31 The EPA approved the removal of Appendix LMP from recertification applications. The EPA
32 found that information from Appendix LMP was not used as a basis for the EPA's 1998
33 Compliance Decision on section 194.41 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).
34 Because it does not directly support compliance demonstrations for the EPA's disposal
35 regulations, its removal from the CRA-2004 was not significant; nor did it affect the EPA's
36 evaluation of continued compliance.

1 During its review of the CRA-2004, the EPA received no public comments on the DOE's
2 continued compliance with the AICs requirements of section 194.41. The EPA found (U.S.
3 Environmental Protection Agency 2006c) the DOE to be in continued compliance with the
4 requirements of section 194.41.

5 **41.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

6 In the 2009 CRA (CRA-2009), the DOE is not proposing any changes to the AICs program for
7 the WIPP. Information pertaining to the program as provided in the CCA and the CRA-2004
8 remains unchanged. The DOE believes it has demonstrated continued compliance with the
9 provisions of section 194.41.

10 **41.7 References**

11 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
12 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
13 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

14 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
15 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
16 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1985. "40 CFR 191: Environmental Standards
18 for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic
19 Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule" *Federal Register*, vol. 50 (September 19, 1985): 38066–089.

20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. "40 CFR Part 191 Environmental
21 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
22 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule." *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
23 20, 1993): 66398–416.

24 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. "40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
25 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40
26 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Rule." *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
27 52234–45.

28 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. "CARD No. 41: Active Institutional
29 Controls." *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
30 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191*
31 *Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 41-1 through 41-6).
32 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

33 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. "40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
34 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the
35 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule." *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
36 1998): 27353–406.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. "Recertification CARD No. 41: Active
2 Institutional Controls." *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the*
3 *Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40 CFR*
4 *191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (pp. 41-1 through 41-3) (March).
5 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. "40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
7 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the
8 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision" (Final Notice). *Federal Register*, vol. 71 (April
9 10, 2006): 18010–021.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Monitoring
(40 CFR § 194.42)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Monitoring
(40 CFR § 194.42)

Table of Contents

42.0 Monitoring (40 CFR § 194.42) 42-1
42.1 Requirements 42-1
42.2 Background 42-1
42.3 1998 Certification Decision 42-2
42.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 42-2
42.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 42-3
42.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification 42-3
42.7 References 42-4

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CMP	Compliance Monitoring Program
COMP	Compliance Monitoring Parameter
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **42.0 Monitoring (40 CFR § 194.42)**

2 **42.1 Requirements**

§ 194.42 Monitoring

(a) The Department shall conduct an analysis of the effects of disposal system parameters on the containment of waste in the disposal system and shall include the results of such analysis in any compliance application. The results of the analysis shall be used in developing plans for pre-closure and post-closure monitoring required pursuant to paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section. The disposal system parameters analyzed shall include, at a minimum:

1. Properties of backfilled material, including porosity, permeability, and degree of compaction and reconsolidation;
2. Stresses and extent of deformation of the surrounding roof, walls, and floor of the waste disposal room;
3. Initiation or displacement of major brittle deformation features in the roof or surrounding rock;
4. Ground water flow and other effects of human intrusion in the vicinity of the disposal system;
5. Brine quantity, flux, composition, and spatial distribution;
6. Gas quantity and composition; and
7. Temperature distribution.

(b) For all disposal system parameters analyzed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, any compliance application shall document and substantiate the decision not to monitor a particular disposal system parameter because that parameter is considered to be insignificant to the containment of waste in the disposal system or to the verification of predictions about the future performance of the disposal system.

(c) Pre-closure monitoring. To the extent practicable, pre-closure monitoring shall be conducted of significant disposal system parameter(s) as identified by the analysis conducted pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section. A disposal system parameter shall be considered significant if it affects the system's ability to contain waste or the ability to verify predictions about the future performance of the disposal system. Such monitoring shall begin as soon as practicable; however, in no case shall waste be emplaced in the disposal system prior to the implementation of pre-closure monitoring. Pre-closure monitoring shall end at the time at which the shafts of the disposal system are backfilled and sealed.

(d) Post-closure monitoring. The disposal system shall, to the extent practicable, be monitored as soon as practicable after the shafts of the disposal system are backfilled and sealed to detect substantial and detrimental deviations from expected performance and shall end when the Department can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Administrator that there are no significant concerns to be addressed by further monitoring. Post-closure monitoring shall be complementary to monitoring required pursuant to applicable federal hazardous waste regulations at parts 264, 265, 268, and 270 of this chapter and shall be conducted with techniques that do not jeopardize the containment of waste in the disposal system.

(e) Any compliance application shall include detailed pre-closure and post-closure monitoring plans for monitoring the performance of the disposal system. At a minimum, such plans shall:

- (1) Identify the parameters that will be monitored and how baseline values will be determined;
- (2) Indicate how each parameter will be used to evaluate any deviations from the expected performance of the disposal system; and
- (3) Discuss the length of time over which each parameter will be monitored to detect deviations from expected performance.

3

4 **42.2 Background**

5 In 40 CFR §194.42 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996), the U.S. Environmental
6 Protection Agency (EPA) provides criteria to demonstrate compliance with the assurance
7 requirement at 40 CFR §191.14(b) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) to monitor the
8 disposal system. The purpose of this monitoring is “to detect substantial and detrimental
9 deviations from expected performance,” with the expected performance predicted by
10 performance assessment (PA). The criteria also require both a preclosure and postclosure

1 monitoring program using techniques that do not jeopardize the containment of waste in the
2 disposal system. Ten monitoring parameters were identified in an analysis performed to fulfill
3 the section 194.42 requirement during the original certification process. More detailed
4 information describing the section 194.42 monitoring program is located in the U.S. Department
5 of Energy (DOE) Compliance Monitoring Implementation Plan (U.S. Department of Energy
6 2005); the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of
7 Energy 2004), Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2; and Appendix MON-2009.

8 The 10 parameters, their associated monitoring programs, the frequency of data collection and
9 reporting, related PA parameters, and related screening decisions used to support the PA are
10 listed in Appendix MON-2009, Table MON-1. These parameters are periodically evaluated to
11 determine if there is an impact on the PA-related parameters, conceptual models, or features,
12 events, and processes screening decisions (Wagner 2008a).

13 **42.3 1998 Certification Decision**

14 Based on information in the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of
15 Energy 1996) and supplemental monitoring-related information for the CCA submitted to the
16 EPA in response to their request for additional information regarding the methodology of the
17 MONPAR analysis, the EPA determined that DOE was in compliance with the criteria of section
18 194.42 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a, Section VIII.D.2, Monitoring).
19 Additional details of the EPA's evaluation of compliance can be found in the Compliance
20 Application Review Document (CARD) 42, Monitoring (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
21 1998b).

22 **42.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

23 Since 1998, the DOE has monitored and evaluated the 10 monitoring parameters listed in
24 Appendix MON-2004, Table MON-1. For the CRA-2004, the DOE reassessed the CCA
25 monitoring parameter analysis in light of changes in the monitoring program. This reassessment
26 is documented in Kirkes and Wagner (2003), and described in the CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0,
27 Section 7.2. It was determined that the CCA, Appendix MON, Attachment MONPAR
28 monitoring parameter analysis performed to comply with section 194.42 requirements was
29 adequate and did not need to be redone for the CRA-2004. The 10 monitoring parameters
30 identified in the CCA were still sufficient to be included in the Compliance Monitoring Program
31 (CMP) to detect substantial deviations from performance expectations and to comply with the
32 requirements of section 194.42. Supplemental information was submitted to the EPA in
33 response to their request for compliance monitoring annual reports and monitoring data
34 references (Response C-42-1 through C-42-4; Detwiler [2004a], Response C-42-5 and C-42-6
35 Detwiler [2004b]). Since the CCA, the DOE found four monitoring parameters that either did
36 not fall within the set trigger values or indicated a change from values used in the CCA. These
37 parameters include

- 38 • Changes in the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as
39 Culebra) water level that may impact Culebra groundwater flow direction and/or composition
- 40 • A change in the probability of encountering a Castle brine reservoir

- 1 • A change in the drilling rate because of continued oil and gas drilling in the Delaware Basin
- 2 • Changes in the waste activity caused by changes in the waste inventory

3 The impacts of these changes were considered in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA and the EPA-
4 mandated CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (PABC) to assess their
5 impact on compliance; see CARD 23, Models and Computer Codes (U.S. Environmental
6 Protection Agency 2006a), which documents EPA's review of these impacts and their
7 determination of continued compliance with the disposal standards.

8 **42.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

9 In the EPA's CARD 42, the EPA stated that through their annual monitoring and waste
10 emplacement inspections they had determined that the DOE meets the requirements of section
11 194.42 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006b). The results of these inspections are
12 documented in CARD 21, Tables CARD 21-1 and 21-2 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
13 2006c).

14 **42.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification**

15 The CMP outlined in Section 42.2 was developed to implement the requirements of section
16 194.42; the program continues to monitor the WIPP to detect substantial and detrimental
17 deviations from expected performance. This program has not indicated such a condition. No
18 changes have been made to this program from that described in the CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0,
19 Section 7.2, and Attachment MON-2004. New information that supplements the information in
20 the CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2 includes the following:

- 21 1. Results of the CMP since 2004 (Appendix DATA-2009 contains these reports)
- 22 2. Assessment of the impact of changes on the CMP (Wagner 2008b)

23 The annual Compliance Monitoring Parameters (COMPs) report presents monitoring results and
24 determines whether the results are within PA expectations, whether they impact the assumptions
25 or parameters used in PA, or whether they impact the monitoring program. A review of the
26 conclusions in the last four annual COMPs reports (Wagner 2008b) shows the following:

- 27 • The results of the COMPs assessments concluded that there were no reportable conditions or
28 events.
- 29 • Water levels in the Culebra continue to rise across the monitored region. DOE continues
30 their investigation of these events. These investigations led to the inclusion of updated
31 water-level information during the CRA-2004 PABC (see preface to Appendix TFIELD-
32 2009). The CRA-2009 PA uses the CRA-2004 PABC transmissivity fields.
- 33 • The CMP is investigating sample collection and analytical laboratory techniques to reduce
34 uncertainties in water chemistry results.

- 1 • No changes to the COMPs or CMP were recommended.

2 The results of the COMPs reports validate the need to monitor groundwater and demonstrate the
3 importance of continued monitoring and the need to incorporate results into the PA (Sandia
4 National Laboratories 2004).

5 The CCA, Appendix MON, Attachment MONPAR documents an analysis that is used to
6 determine which monitoring parameters should be included in the CMP. A reassessment of this
7 analysis, documented in Wagner (2008b), determines whether changes to elements of the WIPP
8 program since the last certification affect the conclusions in the CCA, Appendix MON,
9 Attachment MONPAR analysis. The reassessment first determined which changes should be
10 considered, and then determined the impact of these changes on the conclusions drawn in the
11 CCA, Appendix MON, Attachment MONPAR analysis. Changes to the following disposal
12 system elements were evaluated:

- 13 1. Monitoring results
14 2. Experimental activities
15 3. PA changes: methodology, parameters, and implementation
16 4. WIPP operational changes
17 5. Proposed changes to activities and conditions approved by the EPA

18 Based on the review of operational activities, conditions, monitoring data, the PA, and
19 experimental programs that occurred since the CRA-2004, the reassessment concludes, “the
20 conclusions of the MONPAR analysis remain valid and its conclusions continue to be adequate
21 for inclusion in the CRA-2009” (Wagner 2008b).

22 The DOE believes the information presented in the CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2; the
23 CRA-2004, Attachment MON-2004; Appendix MON-2009; and the supplemental information
24 provided in this section continue to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of section
25 194.42.

26 **42.7 References**

27 Detwiler, R.P. 2004a. Letter to E. Cotsworth (Subject: Partial Response to Environmental
28 Protection Agency (EPA) May 20, 2004, Letter on CRA; 4 Enclosures). 15 July 2004. U.S.
29 Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.

30 Detwiler, R.P. 2004b. Letter to E. Cotsworth (Subject: Initial Response to Environmental
31 Protection Agency (EPA) September 2, 2004, Letter on Compliance Recertification Application;
32 6 Enclosures). 1 November 2004. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad,
33 NM.

34 Kirkes, R., and S. Wagner. 2003. *MONPAR Reassessment*. ERMS 533098. Carlsbad, NM:
35 Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Sandia National Laboratories. 2004. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
2 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2003* (Revision 1, June). ERMS 535825. Carlsbad, NM:
3 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
5 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
6 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 7 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
8 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
9 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005. *40 CFR Parts 191 and 194 Compliance Monitoring*
11 *Implementation Plan* (April, Revision 4). DOE/WIPP 99-3119. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field
12 Office.
- 13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
14 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
15 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
16 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
18 Certification and Re-Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
19 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
20 5223–45.
- 21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
22 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
23 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
24 1998): 27353–406.
- 25 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “CARD No. 42: Monitoring.”
26 *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
27 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
28 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 42-1 through 42-24). Washington, DC:
29 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. “Recertification CARD No. 23: Models
31 and Computer Codes.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the*
32 *Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40*
33 *CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 23-1 through 23-
34 37). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 35 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “Recertification CARD No. 42:
36 Monitoring.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification*
37 *and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191*
38 *Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 42-1 through 42-6).
39 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006c. "Recertification CARD No. 21:
2 Inspections." *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification
3 and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40 CFR 191
4 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 21-1 through 21-5).
5 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

- 6 Wagner, S.W. 2008a. *SP 9-8, Monitoring Parameter Assessment per 40 CFR 194.42*. ERMS
7 5483697. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 8 Wagner, S.W. 2008b. *Reassessment of MONPAR Analysis for Use in the 2009 Compliance
9 Recertification Application*. ERMS 548948. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Passive Institutional Controls
(40 CFR § 194.43)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Passive Institutional Controls
(40 CFR § 194.43)**

Table of Contents

43.0 Passive Institutional Controls (40 CFR § 194.43) 43-1
 43.1 Requirements 43-1
 43.2 Background 43-1
 43.3 1998 Certification Decision 43-2
 43.4 EPA’s Changes in the CRA-2004 43-2
 43.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 43-3
 43.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 43-3
 43.7 References 43-4

List of Tables

Table 43-1. Approved Schedule Changes for PICs Testing 43-4

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
PIC	passive institutional control
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **43.0 Passive Institutional Controls (40 CFR § 194.43)**

2 **43.1 Requirements**

§ 194.43 Passive Institutional Controls

(a) Any compliance application shall include detailed descriptions of the measures that will be employed to preserve knowledge about the location, design, and contents of the disposal system. Such measures shall include:

(1) Identification of the controlled area by markers that have been designed and will be fabricated and emplaced to be as permanent as practicable;

(2) Placement of records in the archives and land record systems of local, State, and Federal governments, and international archives, that would likely be consulted by individuals in search of unexploited resources. Such records shall identify:

(i) The location of the controlled area and the disposal system;

(ii) The design of the disposal system;

(iii) The nature and hazard of the waste;

(iv) Geologic, geochemical, hydrologic, and other site data pertinent to the containment of waste in the disposal system, or the location of such information; and

(v) The results of tests, experiments, and other analyses relating to backfill of excavated areas, shaft sealing, waste interaction with the disposal system, and other tests, experiments, or analyses pertinent to the containment of waste in the disposal system, or the location of such information.

(3) Other passive institutional controls practicable to indicate the dangers of the waste and its location.

(b) Any compliance application shall include the period of time passive institutional controls are expected to endure and be understood.

(c) The Administrator may allow the Department to assume passive institutional control credit, in the form of reduced likelihood of human intrusion, if the Department demonstrates in the compliance application that such credit is justified because the passive institutional controls are expected to endure and be understood by potential intruders for the time period approved by the Administrator. Such credit, or a smaller credit as determined by the Administrator, cannot be used for more than several hundred years and may decrease over time. In no case, however, shall passive institutional controls be assumed to eliminate the likelihood of human intrusion entirely.

3

4 **43.2 Background**

5 Regulations in 40 CFR Part 191 Subparts B and C (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993)
6 state that disposal systems shall be designed and built such that they provide a reasonable
7 expectation that for 10,000 years (1) the undisturbed performance of the system will not result in
8 an annual committed effective dose to any member of the public in excess of 15 millirem, (2) the
9 levels of radioactive contamination in groundwater will not exceed limits specified by the
10 standard in 40 CFR § 191.24, and (3) the probability of releases from all significant processes
11 and events acting on the disposal system will not exceed the specifications in 40 CFR §
12 191.13(a).

13 40 CFR Part 191 Appendix C states “that inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by exploratory
14 drilling for resources can be the most severe intrusion scenario assumed by the DOE.”
15 Subsequent to Part 191 requirements, 40 CFR § 194.32 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
16 1996) also requires that performance assessments include the effects of drilling. A goal of
17 passive institutional controls (PICs) is to minimize the likelihood of inadvertent human activities
18 that affect repository performance (U.S. Department of Energy 1996, Compliance Certification
19 Application [CCA], Appendix PIC).

1 **43.3 1998 Certification Decision**

2 To meet the requirements for 40 CFR § 194.43, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
3 (EPA) expected the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the markers that would be
4 placed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site to warn future generations about the
5 disposal system's design and contents, including the presence and hazards of radioactive waste.
6 The markers were to be as permanent as practicable using current technology. The DOE also
7 needed to describe individual markers in detail, including information demonstrating that the
8 markers were as permanent as practicable. Permanence refers to the markers' ability to
9 withstand both natural and human-initiated forces that could reasonably be expected to occur at
10 the site. Markers did not need to be designed to withstand catastrophic, low-probability events,
11 such as nuclear war or a comet strike, since any attempt to do so would undoubtedly strain the
12 practicability of the design. Practicability refers to the DOE's ability to emplace markers using
13 currently available resources and technology.

14 In addition to describing markers that would be fabricated and emplaced, the DOE was also
15 expected to provide a timeline for implementing the markers. Finally, the DOE was permitted to
16 propose a credit for PICs in the performance assessment. A credit must be based on the
17 proposed effectiveness of PICs over time, and would take the form of reduced likelihood in the
18 performance assessment of human intrusion over several hundred years.

19 The CCA, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.3.1.1 and Section 7.3.3.3; the CCA, Appendices PIC and
20 EPIC; and supplemental information requested by the EPA contains the information supporting
21 the DOE's compliance with this requirement.

22 The EPA determined that the DOE complied with the requirements of section 194.43 because the
23 measures proposed in the CCA are comprehensive, practicable, and likely to endure and be
24 understood for long periods of time. The EPA denied the DOE's request for credit for a 99%
25 reduction in the likelihood of human intrusion into the WIPP during the first 700 years after
26 closure. The EPA denied the credit because the DOE did not use an expert judgment elicitation
27 to derive the credit. The EPA also established as a condition of the 1998 Certification Decision
28 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998) that the DOE submit additional information
29 concerning the schedule for completing PICs, fabrication of granite markers, and commitments
30 by various recipients to accept WIPP records no later than the final recertification application.

31 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.43 can be
32 found in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1998).

33 **43.4 EPA's Changes in the CRA-2004**

34 In the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy
35 2004), Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.1 (Requirements for PICs), the DOE added language discussing
36 Condition 4 of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision. This condition requires the DOE to
37 submit the following items prior to the final recertification application, which will be submitted
38 before closure of the disposal system:

- 1 • A schedule for implementing PICs, which also describes the testing of all aspects of the
2 conceptual design
- 3 • Documentation regarding the granite pieces for the proposed monuments
- 4 • Documentation regarding the archives and record centers maintaining the WIPP docket
5 documents
- 6 • Documentation of a plan to ensure that the recipients of WIPP information continue to have
7 access to docket documents and supplementary information

8 New information pertaining to the permanent markers portion of the PICs program and
9 additional amendments to the planning process were also included in the CRA-2004, Chapter
10 7.0, Section 7.3.3 (Implementation of the PICs Program), which is documented in *Permanent*
11 *Markers Testing Program Plan* (U.S. Department of Energy 2000).

12 The CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.3.1.1 assured the EPA that the permanent markers will
13 be constructed of materials selected through an evaluation process; the berm design, including
14 the materials of construction, will be refined; and the final design specifications will be provided
15 to the EPA for approval prior to construction.

16 Examples of the types of files to be archived were added in the CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0, Section
17 7.3.3.1.2 (Records).

18 The CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.3.3 (PICs Timelines) discusses a new and revised
19 schedule under which the DOE will implement its PICs program. The DOE referenced a letter
20 sent to the EPA (Triay 2002) and the EPA's subsequent approval (Marcinowski 2002) of this
21 revised timeline.

22 The DOE claimed no credit for the effectiveness of PICs for the 2004 Performance Assessment
23 Baseline Calculation (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a). As indicated previously
24 by the EPA, the DOE has the right to claim such credit in future recertification applications.

25 **43.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

26 The EPA concluded that the DOE adequately described changes that had been made in the PICs
27 program and continued to comply with the requirements of section 194.43 (U.S. Environmental
28 Protection Agency 2006b).

29 **43.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

30 In a letter dated January 11, 2007 (Moody 2007), the DOE requested an extension to start testing
31 PICs 10 years before closure as identified in the DOE's letter of May 16, 2002 (Triay 2002), and
32 agreed to in the EPA's letter of November 7, 2002 (Marcinowski 2002). This request for
33 schedule extension by the DOE was to allow the maximum amount of time to determine the most
34 updated design and materials technologies for implementation of PICs based upon projected
35 closure dates. The EPA responded to the DOE's schedule extension request in a letter dated

1 March 7, 2008 (Reyes 2008). The EPA agreed to a modified schedule based on activities and
 2 current projections of the anticipated WIPP closure date. Table 43-1 is the revised list of
 3 approved schedule changes for PICs Testing.

4 **Table 43-1. Approved Schedule Changes for PICs Testing^a**

Activity	Original Time Frame	November 2002 Time Frame	New (December 2007) Time Frame
Identification of suitable source material	1999–2004	2007	2014, but with an annual progress report
Submit plans for test marker system to EPA	2003	2007	2016, but with an annual progress report
Construction of berm and begin testing of berm and markers	2004–2009	2008	2018
Monitor performance of test berm and test markers	2007–2083	2009–closure	2019–closure
Develop final design of markers	2083–2090	2033 (anticipated)	2033 (anticipated)
Finalize messages	n/a	2033 (anticipated)	2033 (anticipated)

^a Source: Reyes 2008.

5
 6 In this application the DOE is not proposing any changes to the PICs program for the WIPP.
 7 Information pertaining to the program as provided for the CCA and the CRA-2004 remains
 8 unchanged, with the exception of the PICs testing schedule. The DOE believes it has
 9 demonstrated continued compliance with the provisions of section 194.43.

10 **43.7 References**

11 Marcinowski, F. 2002. Letter to Dr. Inés Triay, Manager. 7 November 2002. U.S.
 12 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

13 Moody, D.C. 2007. Letter to Mr. Juan Reyes (Subject: Request for Extension). 11 January
 14 2007. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.

15 Reyes, J. 2008. Letter to Dave Moody, Ph.D., Manager. 7 March 2008. U.S. Environmental
 16 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

17 Triay, I.R. 2002. Letter to Mr. Frank Marcinowski. 16 May 2002. U.S. Department of Energy,
 18 Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.

19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
 20 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
 21 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2000. *Permanent Markers Testing Program Plan*
2 (September 28). DOE/WIPP 00-3175. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
4 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
5 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
7 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
8 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
9 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 10 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
11 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
12 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
13 5223–45.
- 14 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
15 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
16 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
17 1998): 27353–406.
- 18 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. *Technical Support Document for Section*
19 *194.23: Review of the 2004 Compliance Recertification Performance Assessment Baseline*
20 *Calculation* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
22 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
23 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision” (Final Notice). *Federal Register*, vol. 71 (April
24 10, 2006): 18010–021.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Engineered Barriers
(40 CFR § 194.44)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Engineered Barriers
(40 CFR § 194.44)**

Table of Contents

44.0 Engineered Barriers (40 CFR § 194.44) 44-1
 44.1 Requirements 44-1
 44.2 Background 44-1
 44.3 1998 Certification Decision 44-2
 44.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 44-2
 44.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 44-3
 44.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification 44-3
 44.6.1 Engineered Barrier 44-3
 44.6.2 Disposal System Barriers 44-5
 44.6.3 Compliance Summary 44-10
 44.7 References 44-11

List of Figures

Figure 44-1. Approximate Locations of Unplugged Boreholes 44-8

List of Tables

Table 44-1. Governing Regulations for Borehole Abandonment 44-9

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMWTP	Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project
An	actinide
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
CPR	cellulose, plastic, and rubber
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ft	feet
gal	gallon
in	inch
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
L	liter
m	meter
NMED	New Mexico Environment Department
OSE	New Mexico Office of the State Engineer
PA	performance assessment
TRU	transuranic
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WTS	Washington TRU Solutions, LLC

Elements and Chemical Compounds

CO ₂	carbon dioxide
MgO	magnesium oxide

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **44.0 Engineered Barriers (40 CFR § 194.44)**

2 **44.1 Requirements**

§ 194.44 Engineered Barriers

(a) Disposal systems shall incorporate engineered barrier(s) designed to prevent or substantially delay the movement of water or radionuclides toward the accessible environment.

(b) In selecting any engineered barrier(s) for the disposal system, DOE shall evaluate the benefit and detriment of engineered barrier alternatives, including but not limited to: cementation, shredding, supercompaction, incineration, vitrification, improved waste canisters, grout and bentonite backfill, melting of metals, alternative configurations of waste placements in the disposal system, and alternative disposal system dimensions. The results of this evaluation shall be included in any compliance application and shall be used to justify the selection and rejection of each engineered barrier evaluated.

(c)(1) In conducting the evaluation of engineered barrier alternatives, the following shall be considered, to the extent practicable:

- (i) The ability of the engineered barrier to prevent or substantially delay the movement of water or waste toward the accessible environment;
- (ii) The impact on worker exposure to radiation both during and after incorporation of engineered barriers;
- (iii) The increased ease or difficulty of removing the waste from the disposal system;
- (iv) The increased or reduced risk of transporting the waste to the disposal system;
- (v) The increased or reduced uncertainty in compliance assessment;
- (vi) Public comments requesting specific engineered barriers;
- (vii) The increased or reduced total system costs;
- (viii) The impact, if any, on other waste disposal programs from the incorporation of engineered barriers (e.g., the extent to which the incorporation of engineered barriers affects the volume of waste);
- (ix) The effects on mitigating the consequences of human intrusion.

(2) If, after consideration of one or more of the factors in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, DOE concludes that an engineered barrier considered within the scope of the evaluation should be rejected without evaluating the remaining factors in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, then any compliance application shall provide a justification for this rejection explaining why the evaluation of the remaining factors would not alter the conclusion.

(d) In considering the ability of engineered barriers to prevent or substantially delay the movement of water or radionuclides toward the accessible environment, the benefit and detriment of engineered barriers for existing waste already packaged, existing waste not yet packaged, existing waste in need of repackaging, and to-be-generated waste shall be considered separately and described.

(e) The evaluation described in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of this section shall consider engineered barriers alone and in combination.

3
4 **44.2 Background**

5 Assurance requirements are included in the disposal standard to provide the confidence needed
6 for long-term compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 191.13 (U.S. Environmental
7 Protection Agency 1993). 40 CFR § 194.44 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) is
8 one of the six assurance requirements in the Compliance Criteria. Section 194.44 implements
9 the assurance requirement of 40 CFR § 191.14(d) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993)
10 to incorporate one or more engineered barriers at radioactive waste disposal facilities. The
11 disposal regulations at 40 CFR § 191.12(d) define a barrier as “any material or structure that
12 prevents or substantially delays movement of water or radionuclides toward the accessible
13 environment.” Section 194.44 requires the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct a study
14 of available options for engineered barriers at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and submit
15 this study and evidence of its use with the compliance application. Consistent with the

1 containment requirement at section 191.13, the DOE analyzed the performance of the complete
2 disposal system, including the engineered barrier(s).

3 **44.3 1998 Certification Decision**

4 The analysis of potential engineered barriers, including a comparison of the benefits and
5 detriments of each was documented in the DOE's Compliance Certification Application (CCA)
6 (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), Appendix EBS. In the CCA, the DOE proposed multiple
7 barriers, including shaft seals, the panel closure system, magnesium oxide (MgO) backfill, and
8 borehole plugs.

9 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) evaluated the information regarding
10 engineered barriers provided by the DOE in the CCA, Chapter 3.0, pp. 3-14 through 3-45,
11 Chapter 6.0, pp. 6-105 through 6-114, and Chapter 7.0, pp. 7-89 through 7-96, as well as in the
12 CCA, Appendices BACK; EBS; SEAL; PCS; SOTERM, Section SOTERM-2.2; and WCA,
13 Section WCA.4.1. The DOE also provided supplemental information in the report
14 "Implementation of Chemical Controls Through a Backfill System for the Waste Isolation Pilot
15 Plant (WIPP)" (Sandia National Laboratories 1996).

16 The DOE specified the proposed method of incorporating the engineered barrier (MgO backfill)
17 into the disposal system in the CCA, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.3.3 and Appendix BACK. The DOE
18 identified MgO as an engineered barrier and provided the rationale for selecting the physical
19 form of MgO to be used, the approximate grain size of the MgO to be emplaced, and the type
20 and size of packages to be used to transport and emplace the MgO. The CCA also described
21 how the MgO minisacks and supersacks would be arranged around waste containers in the
22 disposal rooms and stated that the MgO backfill could be emplaced in the same manner and with
23 the same equipment as the waste containers.

24 The EPA found that the DOE conducted the requisite analysis of engineered barriers and selected
25 an engineered barrier designed to prevent or substantially delay the movement of water or
26 radionuclides toward the accessible environment. In the 1998 Certification Decision (U.S.
27 Environmental Protection Agency 1998), the EPA specified that only the MgO backfill met the
28 regulatory definition of an engineered barrier. The EPA determined that the DOE provided
29 sufficient documentation to show that MgO can effectively reduce actinide (An) solubility in the
30 disposal system.

31 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.44 can be
32 found in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998.

33 **44.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

34 In the CRA-2004, the DOE did not report any significant changes to the information on which
35 the EPA based the 1998 Certification Decision. The DOE submitted two planned change
36 requests and one planned change notice after the original certification decision. The DOE's
37 requests included a request to eliminate the MgO minisacks, the notification of a new MgO
38 vendor, and a request to emplace compressed waste from Idaho National Laboratory (INL;
39 formerly Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory). These changes were

1 approved by the EPA prior to the 2004 submission of the Compliance Recertification
2 Application (CRA-2004, U.S. Department of Energy 2004). Details of these submissions are
3 documented in Section 44.5. These changes are discussed in detail in Appendix MgO-2009 (see
4 Section MgO-2.1.2 for the minisack elimination change, Section MgO-2.2 for the vendor
5 change, and Section MgO-2.1.3 for the compressed waste change).

6 Since the final engineered barrier was selected by the DOE using the results of the section
7 194.44 analysis in the CCA, Appendix EBS, the DOE did not conduct a new analysis to evaluate
8 the benefit and detriment of engineered alternatives (originally required by 40 CFR §§ 194.44(b)
9 through (e)). The CRA-2004 reflected the EPA's determination that only the MgO backfill met
10 the EPA's requirements for an engineered barrier.

11 **44.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

12 The EPA did not identify any significant changes in the implementation of the requirement for
13 engineered barriers based on their review of the activities and conditions in and around the WIPP
14 site. The CRA-2004 did not reflect any changes to the analysis of engineered barrier
15 documented in the CCA, Appendix EBS. The CRA-2004 accurately reflected the 1998
16 Certification Decision and its conclusion that the MgO backfill is the only engineered barrier that
17 met the EPA's requirements (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998).

18 **44.6 Changes or New Information since the 2004 Recertification**

19 There are no significant changes in the factors on which the EPA based the determination of
20 compliance with section 194.44. The DOE did not change the engineered barrier type, form, or
21 function and therefore did not conduct a new analysis to evaluate the benefit and detriment of
22 engineered alternatives (originally required by sections 194.44(b) through (e)). The CRA-2009
23 follows the EPA's determination that only the MgO backfill met the EPA's requirements for an
24 engineered barrier at section 191.14(d).

25 The DOE had proposed shaft seals, borehole plugs, and panel closures as engineered barriers in
26 the CCA. Changes to the approved engineered barrier that have occurred since the last
27 recertification and changes to other disposal system design features originally proposed as
28 engineered barriers (termed disposal system barriers) will be discussed in the following
29 subsections for completeness.

30 **44.6.1 Engineered Barrier**

31 MgO is used in the WIPP to meet the requirements for multiple natural and engineered barriers.
32 MgO acts as an engineered barrier by decreasing An solubilities through the consumption of
33 essentially all carbon dioxide (CO₂) possibly produced by microbial activity. Since microbial
34 activity is an uncertain process, the MgO engineered barrier reduces uncertainty in the repository
35 chemical conditions by ensuring low CO₂ fugacity and by controlling pH (see Appendix MgO-
36 2009, Section MgO-5.0 and Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-2.3).

37 The description of the supersacks and their placement in the disposal system is described in the
38 CRA-2004, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.3.1. Minor emplacement changes were made as a result of an

1 EPA-approved planned change for disposal of compressed waste (Marcinowski 2004). This
 2 change was approved prior to the submittal of the CRA-2004, but was not described in that
 3 application. This change will be discussed in Section 44.6.1.2. The representation of the
 4 engineered barrier in performance assessment (PA) is described in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0,
 5 Section 6.4.6.4 (with minor editing in response to the EPA Comment C-23-5 [Detwiler 2004]),
 6 and Appendix PA-2009, Appendix MgO-2009 and Appendix SOTERM-2009. The edits correct
 7 the stated MgO excess factor to the EPA-approved 1.67 value. A detailed history of the MgO
 8 engineered barrier is presented in Appendix MgO-2009 and describes the placement, function,
 9 and experimental activities associated with the barrier since it was first proposed. This document
 10 (Appendix MgO-2009) describes in greater detail the changes that have occurred since the CRA-
 11 2004.

12 The developments associated with the MgO engineered barrier that have occurred since the
 13 EPA's Recertification Decision include information from additional analyses and the DOE's
 14 planned change requests. These developments include the following:

- 15 1. A change in MgO vendor
- 16 2. The EPA's approval of the DOE's planned change request to dispose of compressed waste
- 17 3. The EPA's approval of the DOE's planned change request to change the MgO excess factor
 18 from 1.67 to 1.20
- 19 4. Results of ongoing MgO experimental investigations

20 The following sections provide detail for these items.

21 **44.6.1.1 Change in MgO Vendors**

22 National Magnesia Chemicals of Moss Landing, CA, was the first vendor to provide MgO for
 23 the WIPP. National Magnesia supplied MgO from the opening of the WIPP in March 1999
 24 (Panel 1, Room 7) through mid-April 2000, at which time National Magnesia stopped producing
 25 MgO. Based on cost and the results of a technical evaluation, the DOE selected Premier
 26 Chemicals of Gabbs, NV, as the MgO supplier (see Section 44.5, above). Premier Chemicals
 27 supplied MgO from mid-April 2000 (Panel 1, Room 7) through 2004 (Panel 2, Room 2). In
 28 2004, Premier Chemicals informed WTS that it would soon be unable to provide MgO that met
 29 the requirement for the minimum concentration of MgO in the DOE's specification (Washington
 30 TRU Solutions [WTS] 2003). The DOE selected Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties LLC,
 31 which has supplied the MgO emplaced since January 2005 (Panel 2, Room 2). The DOE
 32 selected Martin Marietta's MgO based on cost and a technical evaluation of its suitability by
 33 Wall (2005). The results of this study and additional characterization of Martin Marietta's MgO
 34 are described in more detail in Appendix MgO-2009, Section MgO-4.3.

35 **44.6.1.2 Change to Allow Compressed Waste from the Advanced Mixed Waste**
 36 **Treatment Project**

37 In March 2004, the EPA approved the emplacement in the WIPP of compressed
 38 (supercompacted) waste from the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) at the

1 INL (Marcinowski 2004, Trinity Engineering Associates 2004, U.S. Environmental Protection
2 Agency 2004). However, the EPA specified that the DOE must maintain an MgO excess factor
3 (see Section 44.5) of 1.67. The AMWTP waste contains concentrations of CPR materials that
4 are higher than the average concentration of CPR materials in transuranic (TRU) waste,
5 necessitating the emplacement of additional MgO. Therefore, in addition to the one supersack
6 per stack configuration, the DOE has emplaced additional MgO supersacks on racks placed
7 among the waste containers. These additional supersacks are emplaced as required to meet the
8 excess factor. Each rack contains five supersacks identical to those placed on top of the waste
9 containers, and spans the same vertical distance normally occupied by three 7-packs of 55-gallon
10 (208-liter) drums, 3 Standard Waste Boxes, or various combinations of these and other waste
11 containers. Thus, emplacement of additional MgO in the repository has used space normally
12 occupied by contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU) waste.

13 **44.6.1.3 Change in Excess Factor from 1.67 to 1.20**

14 In April 2006, the DOE requested that the EPA approve a reduction in the MgO excess factor
15 from 1.67 to 1.2 (Moody 2006a). To justify its request, the DOE used reasoned arguments
16 regarding health-related transportation risks to the public, the cost of emplacing MgO, and the
17 uncertainties inherent in predicting the extent of microbial consumption of CPR materials during
18 the 10,000-year WIPP regulatory period. The EPA responded by requesting that the DOE
19 address the uncertainties related to MgO effectiveness, the size of the uncertainties, and the
20 potential impact of the uncertainties on long-term performance. In particular, the EPA instructed
21 the DOE to (1) identify all uncertainties related to the calculation of the MgO excess factor, and
22 (2) quantify these uncertainties, if possible (Gitlin 2006). The DOE responded to this request
23 with a detailed uncertainty analysis (Moody 2006b). In February 2008, the EPA approved the
24 reduction of the MgO excess factor to 1.2 (Reyes 2008, Langmuir 2007, Cohen and Associates
25 2008, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2008).

26 **44.6.1.4 MgO Investigations**

27 MgO investigations include characterization of the current vendor's (Martin Marietta) MgO,
28 hydration and carbonation experimental updates, and independent reviews of the use of MgO as
29 an engineered barrier at the WIPP. Deng et al. (2006) and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007)
30 investigated the characteristics and properties of a sample of Martin-Marietta-supplied MgO
31 identical to that emplaced in the WIPP. The analysis looked at the particle size and morphology;
32 the weight percentage of magnesium, calcium, aluminum, iron, and silica of the sample; and the
33 loss on ignition and gravimetric analysis of hydrated MgO. The investigation also included a
34 qualitative analysis using scanning electron microscope imaging and the associated energy
35 dispersive spectrum of the as-received MgO. The results of these investigations helped to
36 confirm that the MgO backfill will perform as expected in the WIPP environment (see Appendix
37 MgO-2009, Section MgO-3.0 and Section MgO-4.0, for a summary of these investigations and
38 their results).

39 **44.6.2 Disposal System Barriers**

40 The following sections discuss changes to other disposal system design features that were also
41 proposed as engineered barriers in the CCA: shaft seals, panel closures, and borehole plugs.

1 While shaft seals, panel closures, and borehole plugs are not considered engineered barriers by
2 the EPA, they are important physical elements of the WIPP disposal system. It is within this
3 context that they are discussed below.

4 **44.6.2.1 Shaft Seals**

5 No changes have been proposed by the DOE to the shaft seal information presented in the CRA-
6 2004, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.3.2. Material specifications and construction techniques for the
7 shaft seal system are given in the CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS, Section BARRIERS-3.2.2
8 and the CCA, Appendix SEAL, Section SEAL 5.0 and Section 6.0. Appendix PA-2009, Section
9 PA-4.2.7 summarizes the representation of the shafts in PA. Fox (2008, Table 19) provides
10 parameter values used in the modeling of shaft seals.

11 **44.6.2.2 Panel Closures**

12 The baseline panel closure design is termed “Option D.” The Option D panel closure design
13 presented in the CRA-2004, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.3.3 and the CRA-2004, Appendix
14 BARRIERS, Section BARRIERS-3.2.1 has not been modified since the last recertification.
15 Representation of the panel closures in PA is described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.8;
16 parameters relevant to the panel closures are provided in Fox (2008, Table 20).

17 The DOE submitted a planned change request to modify the panel closure design in 2002, prior
18 to submittal of the CRA-2004 (Triay 2002). Because the EPA determined the change would
19 require a rulemaking, they deferred their review until after the certification decision
20 (Marcinowski 2002). In January 2007, the DOE renewed their request for EPA approval of the
21 2002 panel closure planned change request (Moody 2007a). This letter also requested a delay in
22 permanent closure of panels to allow gas monitoring, through a substantial barrier, with the
23 installation of the permanent closure depending on the results of the monitoring. The proposed
24 monitoring was intended to develop an understanding of flammable gas generation rates in filled
25 panels of waste in order to optimize the final panel closure design. The DOE also requested that
26 the EPA modify Condition 1 of the original certification decision to acknowledge that the New
27 Mexico Environment Department (NMED) is responsible for regulating the design and
28 construction of the panel closure system, provided that the DOE demonstrates there are no long-
29 term impacts on performance. In their letter, the DOE provided a detailed justification for this
30 request and stated that the closure is an operational period requirement (Moody 2007a). The
31 purpose of the closure system is to control volatile organic compound emissions during
32 operations and protect the health and safety of the workers. The EPA responded in a subsequent
33 letter agreeing with the request to delay closure for gas monitoring, but denying the request to
34 modify Condition 1 of the certification decision (Reyes 2007). The EPA stated that the panel
35 closure design was a condition of the EPA’s 1998 certification decision and that a change in the
36 design is a significant departure from the most recent compliance application. The EPA also
37 stated that under 40 CFR §194.65, the EPA is required to address changes to the panel closure
38 design through a formal rulemaking process (Reyes 2007). Following a June 2007 panel closure
39 meeting between the NMED, the EPA, and the DOE, the DOE withdrew the request to modify
40 the panel closure design pending results of the gas monitoring and development of a final closure
41 design (Moody 2007b). Option D continues to be the WIPP baseline panel closure design.

1 **44.6.2.3 Borehole Plugs**


2 Over the life of the WIPP project, many exploratory, monitoring, and characterization-related
3 boreholes have been drilled by the DOE and its predecessors in the vicinity of the WIPP. In
4 addition to the DOE-drilled wells, water wells have been drilled for livestock and homesteads,
5 and wells have been drilled by oil, gas, and potash companies in their efforts to exploit resources
6 in the Delaware basin. Figure 44-1 identifies existing unplugged boreholes that lie within the WIPP
7 site boundary. Of these boreholes, two are deep boreholes that exceed the depth of the repository
8 (WIPP-13 and ERDA-9), and the remainder are shallow boreholes that do not reach the repository
9 horizon. There were two additional boreholes deeper than the repository that have been plugged
10 (DOE-1 and WIPP-12).

11 To mitigate the potential for contaminants to migrate toward the accessible environment, the
12 DOE uses established borehole plugging practices (Christensen and Peterson 1981) to limit the
13 volume of water that could be introduced to the repository from the overlying water-bearing
14 zones, and to limit the hypothetical volume of contaminated brine released from the repository to
15 the accessible environment. The governing regulations for plugging and/or abandonment of
16 boreholes are summarized in Table 44-1.

17 The CRA-2009 monitoring period was from 10/1/2002 through 9/30/2007. Appendix DATA-
18 2009, Attachment A lists the operational monitoring wells within the WIPP vicinity. During the
19 monitoring period, 19 new wells were drilled and put into service: 3 were for the shallow water
20 program and 16 were for the groundwater program. The shallow water wells were all less than
21 23.5 meters (m) (77 feet [ft]) in depth. The groundwater-monitoring wells varied from 68.3 m to
22 414.5 m (224 to 1,360 ft) in depth. There were 16 groundwater-monitoring wells plugged during
23 the monitoring period, and all were plugged solid with cement. During this monitoring period,
24 two monitoring wells were plugged back, converted to water wells, and turned over to local
25 ranchers for their use. In addition, one former potash borehole was converted to a groundwater-
26 monitoring well. See Appendix DATA-2009, Attachment A for a description of the wells in the
27 WIPP monitoring system.

28 Four deep wells (greater than 655.3 m [2,150 ft] in depth), DOE 1, ERDA 9, WIPP 12, and
29 WIPP 13 are required to be plugged in accordance with the State of New Mexico, Oil
30 Conservation Division, Order No. R-111-P. The key provisions of Order No. R-111-P are as
31 follows:

- 32 • A salt protection string of casing must be installed at least 100 ft (30 m) below and not
33 more than 600 ft (183 m) below the base of the salt section. Cementing requirements for
34 both shallow wells (above 5,000 ft [1,524 m]) and deep wells (below 5,000 ft [1,524 m])
35 above or below the Delaware Mountain Group are specified.
- 36 • All oil and gas wells drilled within the potash area must provide a solid cement plug
37 through the salt section and any water bearing horizon and prevent liquids or gases from
38 entering the hole above or below the salt section.



1
2

Figure 44-1. Approximate Locations of Unplugged Boreholes¹

¹ Modified from the CRA-2004, Chapter 3.0, Figure 3-10.

Table 44-1. Governing Regulations for Borehole Abandonment

Federal or State Land	Type of Well or Borehole	Governing Regulation	Summary of Requirements
Both	Groundwater Wells	Well Driller Licensing; Construction, Repair and Plugging of Wells (State of New Mexico 2005, Article 4-140)	Any specific plugging requirements and provisions made by the state engineer shall be set forth in the permit.
Federal	Oil and Gas Wells	Onshore Oil and Gas Operations (43 CFR 3160) (U.S. Department of the Interior 1983, p. 36583), Well Abandonment (43 CFR 3162.3-4) (U.S. Department of the Interior 1988a, p. 47765)	The operator shall promptly plug and abandon, in accordance with a plan first approved in writing or prescribed by the authorized officer.
Federal	Potash	Solid Minerals (Other than Coal) Exploration and Mining (43 CFR 3590) (U.S. Department of the Interior 1988b, p. 39461), Core or Test Hole Cores, Samples, Cuttings (43 CFR 3593.1) (U.S. Department of the Interior 1988c, p. 39461)	(b) Surface boreholes for development or holes for prospecting shall be abandoned to the satisfaction of the authorizing officer by cementing and/or casing or by other methods approved in advance by the authorized officer. The holes shall also be abandoned in a manner to protect the surface and not endanger any present or future underground operation, any deposit of oil, gas, or other mineral substances, or any aquifer.
State	Potash	Well Driller Licensing; Construction, Repair and Plugging of Wells (State of New Mexico 2005, Article 4-20.2)	In the event that the test or exploratory well is to be abandoned, the state engineer shall be notified. Such wells shall be plugged in accordance with Article 4-19.1 so that the fluids will be permanently confined to the specific strata in which they were originally encountered.
State	Oil and Gas Well Outside the Oil-Potash Area	Plugging and Permanent Abandonment (State of New Mexico 1996, Rule 202)	<p>B. Plugging</p> <p>(1) Before an operator abandons a well, the operator shall plug the well in a manner that permanently confines all oil, gas and water in the separate strata in which they are originally found. The operator may accomplish this by using mud-laden fluid, cement and plugs singly or in combination as approved by the division on the notice of intention to plug.</p> <p>(2) The operator shall mark the exact location of plugged and abandoned wells with a steel marker not less than 10.2 centimeters (4 inches) in diameter set in cement and extending at least 1.2 m (4 ft) above mean ground level. The operator name, lease name and well number and location, including unit letter, section, township and range, shall be welded, stamped or otherwise permanently engraved into the marker's metal.</p>

Table 44-1. Governing Regulations for Borehole Abandonment (Continued)

Federal or State Land	Type of Well or Borehole	Governing Regulation	Summary of Requirements
State	Oil and Gas Wells Inside the Oil-Potash Area	Order No. R-111-P (State of New Mexico 1988)	<p>F. Plugging and Abandonment of Wells</p> <p>(1) All existing and future wells that are drilled within the potash area shall be plugged in accordance with the general rules established by the Division. A solid cement plug shall be provided through the salt section and any water-bearing horizon to prevent liquids or gases from entering the hole above or below the salt selection.</p> <p>It shall have suitable proportions—but no greater than three percent of calcium chloride by weight—of cement considered to be the desired mixture when possible.</p>

1

- 2 • The fluid used to mix the (plugging) cement must be saturated with salts common to the
3 salt section penetrated, but not more than 3% of calcium chloride by weight of cement
4 wherever possible.

5 Two of the four deep wells (WIPP-12 and DOE-1) were plugged and abandoned. The New
6 Mexico Office of the State Engineer (OSE) regulates the drilling, operation, and abandonment of
7 groundwater wells. This agency has regulatory oversight of wells in the controlled area.
8 Although WIPP-12 was plugged with standard cement slurry (no salt), the OSE subsequently
9 agreed that the use of standard cement slurry was acceptable for this instance. DOE-1 was
10 plugged using a salt-saturated cement through the salt section, and a standard cement slurry
11 through the rest of the borehole.

12 The boreholes not used for monitoring will be plugged at decommissioning. See the CRA-2004,
13 Appendix BARRIERS, Chapter BARRIERS-3.0, Section BARRIERS-3.2.3 for a detailed
14 discussion of borehole plugs (excluding Section BARRIERS-3.2.3.2). Appendix PA-2009,
15 Section PA-4.2.9 summarizes the representation of the borehole plugs in PA. Fox (2008, Tables
16 13 through 17) provides parameter values used in the PA modeling. A listing of all wells drilled
17 in support of the WIPP and other boreholes located within the 16-section Land Withdrawal Area
18 was first included as the CCA, Appendix BH. The CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment G
19 provides updates on all of the monitoring wells used in the CCA, Appendix BH and the new
20 monitoring wells drilled since the initial certification (U.S. Department of Energy 2004).
21 Appendix DATA-2009, Attachment A lists updates to the borehole information since the CRA-
22 2004. A detailed discussion of the boreholes used in the groundwater monitoring at WIPP is in
23 Appendix HYDRO-2009, Section HYDRO-5.0.

24 **44.6.3 Compliance Summary**

25 The information provided in this section demonstrates continued compliance with the section
26 194.44 criteria.

1 44.7 References

- 2 Christensen, C.L., and E.W. Peterson. 1981. "Field-Test Programs of Borehole Plugs in
3 Southeastern New Mexico." *The Technology of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal Advantages*
4 *in the Science and Engineering of the Management of High-Level Nuclear Wastes* (vol. 1, pp.
5 354–69). P.L. Hofman and J.J. Breslin (eds.). SAND79-1634C. DOE/TIC-4621. Oak Ridge,
6 TN: Technical Information Center of the U.S. Department of Energy.
- 7 Cohen and Associates. 2008. *Review of MgO-Related Uncertainties in the Waste Isolation Pilot*
8 *Plant* (January 24). Vienna, VA: S. Cohen and Associates.
- 9 Deng, H., Y. Xiong, and M. Nemer. 2007. *Experimental Work Conducted on MgO*
10 *Characterization and Hydration, Milestone Report*. ERMS 546570. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
11 National Laboratories.
- 12 Deng, H., S. Johnsen, Y. Xiong, G.T. Roselle, and M. Nemer. 2006. *Analysis of Martin*
13 *Marietta MagChem 10 WTS-60 MgO*. ERMS 544712. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
14 Laboratories.
- 15 Detwiler, R.P. 2004. Letter to E. Cotsworth (Subject: Response to EPA May 20, 2004, Letter
16 on CRA; 2 Enclosures). 29 September 2004. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office,
17 Carlsbad, NM.
- 18 Fox, B. 2008. *Parameter Summary Report for the CRA-2009 (Revision 0)*. ERMS 549747.
19 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 Gitlin, B.C. 2006. Letter to D.C. Moody. 28 April 2006. ERMS 543319. U.S. Environmental
21 Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Washington, DC.
- 22 Langmuir, D. 2007. Memorandum to S.L. Ostrow (Subject: Letter Report Review of the
23 SC&A Draft Report "Review of MgO-Related Uncertainties in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant").
24 4 November 2007. Hydrochem Systems Corporation, Silverthorne, CO.
- 25 Marcinowski, F. 2002. Letter to I. Triay. 15 November 2002. U.S. Environmental Protection
26 Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 27 Marcinowski, F. 2004. Letter to R.P. Detwiler (2 Enclosures). 26 March 2004. ERMS 534327.
28 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 29 Moody, D.C. 2006a. Letter to E. Cotsworth (Subject: Transmittal of Planned Change Request;
30 1 Enclosure). 10 April 2006. ERMS 543262. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field
31 Office. Carlsbad, NM.
- 32 Moody, D.C. 2006b. Letter to J. Reyes (Subject: Uncertainty Analysis for Planned Change
33 Request on Magnesium Oxide (MgO) Emplacement; 4 Enclosures). 21 November 2006. U.S.
34 Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.

- 1 Moody, D.C. 2007a. Letter to J. Reyes (Subject: Modification to Condition 1 of Certification
2 Decision). 11 January 2007. ERMS 545491. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field
3 Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 4 Moody, D.C. 2007b. Letter to J. Reyes (Subject: Requesting Withdrawal of Panel Closure
5 Change Request). 9 October 2007. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office,
6 Carlsbad, NM.
- 7 Reyes, J. 2007. Letter to D. Moody (Subject: Response to DOE's letter dated January 11,
8 2007). 22 February 2007. ERMS 545394. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of
9 Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 10 Reyes, J. 2008. Letter to D.C. Moody (5 Enclosures). 11 February 2008. U.S. Environmental
11 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 12 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 1996. *Implementation of Chemical Controls Through a*
13 *Backfill System for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)*. SAND96-2656A. ERMS 242847.
14 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 State of New Mexico. 1988. *Order R-111-P: Potash Areas of Eddy and Lea Counties, NM*.
16 Case 9316, Revision to Order R-111-P. April 21, 1988. Oil Conservation Division, Energy,
17 Minerals, and Natural Resources Department.
- 18 State of New Mexico. 1996. *Title 19, Chapter 15, Part 4, Rule 202, Plugging and Permanent*
19 *Abandonment*. Oil Conservation Division, Energy, Minerals, and Natural Resources
20 Department. February 1, 1996.
- 21 State of New Mexico. 2005. *19.27.4 NMAC: Well Driller Licensing; Construction, Repair and*
22 *Plugging of Wells*. August 31, 2005.
- 23 Triay, I. 2002. Letter to F. Marcinowski (Subject: Request Planned Change to Panel Closure
24 System). 7 October 2002. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 25 Trinity Engineering Associates (TEA). 2004. *Review of Effects of Supercompacted Waste and*
26 *Heterogeneous Waste Emplacement on WIPP Repository Performance* (March 17). Cincinnati:
27 Trinity Engineering Associates.
- 28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
29 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
30 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
32 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
33 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 34 U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). 1983. "43 CFR 3160: Onshore Oil and Gas
35 Operations." *Federal Register*, vol. 48 (August 12, 1983).

- 1 U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). 1988a. “43 CFR 3162.3-4: Well Abandonment.”
2 *Federal Register*, vol. 53 (June 17, 1988).
- 3 U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). 1988b. “43 CFR 3590: Solid Minerals (Other than
4 Coal) Exploration and Mining Operations.” *Federal Register*, vol. 53 (October 7, 1988).
- 5 U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). 1988c. “43 CFR 3593.1; 43 CFR 3590: Core or Test
6 Hole Cores, Samples, Cuttings.” *Federal Register*, vol. 53 (October 7, 1988).
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191 Environmental
8 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
9 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes: Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
10 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
12 Certification and Re-Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance With the 40
13 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
14 5224–45.
- 15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998. “40 CFR Part 194 Criteria for the
16 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
17 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
18 1998): 27353–406.
- 19 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004. *Discussion of Major Issues Associated*
20 *with EPA’s Compressed Waste Review*. ERMS 534327. Washington, DC: Office of
21 Air and Radiation.
- 22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2008. *Overview Summary of Planned Change*
23 *Request Decision*. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 24 Wall, N.A. 2005. *Preliminary Results for the Evaluation of Potential New MgO* (January 27).
25 ERMS 538514. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Washington TRU Solutions (WTS). 2003. *Specification for Prepackaged MgO Backfill* (Rev.
27 5). D-0101. Carlsbad, NM: Washington TRU Solutions.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Consideration of the Presence of Resources
(40 CFR § 194.45)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Consideration of the Presence of Resources
(40 CFR § 194.45)**

Table of Contents

45.0 Consideration of the Presence of Resources (40 CFR § 194.45)..... 45-1
45.1 Requirements 45-1
45.2 Background 45-1
45.3 1998 Certification Decision 45-1
45.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 45-2
45.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification..... 45-2
45.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 45-2
45.7 References..... 45-3

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEP	feature, event, and process
PA	performance assessment
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

45.0 Consideration of the Presence of Resources (40 CFR § 194.45)

45.1 Requirements

§ 194.45 Consideration of the Presence of Resources

Any compliance application shall include information that demonstrates that the favorable characteristics of the disposal system compensate for the presence of resources in the vicinity of the disposal system and the likelihood of the disposal system being disturbed as a result of the presence of those resources. If performance assessments predict that the disposal system meets the containment requirements of §191.13 of this chapter, then the Agency will assume that the requirements of this section and §191.14(e) of this chapter have been fulfilled.

45.2 Background

40 CFR § 194.45 (2004) implements the assurance requirement that the disposal system be sited so that the benefits of the disposal system's natural barriers compensate for the increased probability of disruptions to the disposal system resulting from exploring and developing existing resources. In promulgating this requirement, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that performance assessment (PA) provides a rigorous analytical methodology to determine whether the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site has compensating features that outweigh the presence of resources (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996). In accordance with the compliance criteria, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must demonstrate that the PA has incorporated the potential effects of human activities near the WIPP prior to disposal, and of drilling and excavation mining over the regulatory time frame.

45.3 1998 Certification Decision

In the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), Chapter 7.0, Section 7.5, the DOE describes the measures taken to comply with the requirements of section 194.45. The CCA, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.5 states that the results of the PA, taking into account the potential for resource exploration, met the containment requirements of the EPA as dictated by the disposal regulations and compliance criteria. The CCA, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.5.2 states that the DOE concluded that the favorable characteristics of the WIPP compensate for any possible disturbance.

The EPA found that the information contained in the CCA, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.5, and portions of the CCA cross-referenced in Chapter 7.0, Section 7.5 demonstrates that the DOE accounted for potential resource exploration and met the EPA's requirements based on the results of the PA. Furthermore, the DOE's Final Environmental Impact Statement for the WIPP indicates that resource considerations were taken into account during the disposal system's site selection process (U.S. Department of Energy 1980, Volume 1, Section 7.3.7). Based on these factors, the EPA concluded that the DOE complied with the requirements of section 194.45. A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.45 can be obtained from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a and 1998b.

1 **45.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

2 The DOE did not report any significant changes to the information on which the EPA based the
3 1998 Certification Decision. The Compliance Recertification Application (CRA) of 2004 (CRA-
4 2004) (U.S. Department of Energy 2004), Chapter 7.0, Section 7.5, contains all the changes
5 related to resource considerations since 1998. The DOE made some minor changes to the list of
6 features, events, and processes (FEPs) considered in the CRA-2004, but the changes did not
7 affect the outcome of the PA. (See the CRA-2004, Appendix SCR, Table SCR-1.)

8 In the CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.5, the DOE demonstrates that:

- 9 • The effects of mining and drilling over the regulatory time frame have been incorporated into
10 PAs according to the requirements of 40 CFR §§ 194.32, 194.33, and 194.43.
- 11 • The PA incorporates the effects on the disposal system of any activities that occur in the
12 vicinity of the disposal system or are expected to occur in the vicinity of the disposal system
13 during the 10,000 year regulatory period, according to the requirements of section 194.32.
- 14 • The results of PA demonstrate compliance with the containment requirements of 40 CFR
15 § 191.13 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993).

16 The results of the recertification PA are documented in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.5,
17 and in supplemental information on the CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline
18 Calculation (Leigh et al. 2005). In addition, the impacts of resource development outside the
19 controlled area were considered in the development of the WIPP’s conceptual models, as well as
20 in the site selection process.

21 **45.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

22 The EPA’s review of the activities and conditions in and around the WIPP site did not identify
23 any significant changes since the 1998 Certification Decision related to the presence of
24 resources.

25 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004; supplemental information in the CCA,
26 Appendices GCR, IRL, and DEL provided by the DOE in the CRA-2004; and an assessment of
27 changes since 1998, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the
28 requirements in section 194.45.

29 **45.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

30 Section 194.45 states, “If performance assessments predict that the disposal system meets the
31 containment requirements of Section 191.13 of this chapter, then the Agency will assume that the
32 requirements of this section and §191.14(e) of this chapter have been fulfilled.” Therefore,
33 provided that the PA appropriately incorporates processes relating to resource discovery and
34 production, and predicts releases that are below limits established by the EPA, compliance with
35 section 194.45 has been demonstrated. This conditional logic relies heavily upon whether or not
36 the PA is structured to appropriately represent resource-related activities at the WIPP site. To

1 accomplish this, the DOE uses a structured methodology to identify and select FEPs that may
2 have an impact on the disposal system. This process is documented in “Scope of Performance
3 Assessment,” Section 32, and Appendix SCR-2009. There have been no changes in screening
4 decisions for resource related FEPs for the CRA-2009.

5 While there have been no screening changes for FEPs related to the presence of resources, there
6 have been two changes relating to the implementation of the presence of resources in PA models.
7 These changes include a new drilling rate (LAMBDA) (see Appendix DATA-2009 and
8 Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.1) and a change in the duration of direct brine releases
9 through the PA parameter MAXFLOW (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.1). These
10 changes are not significant, but have been made to incorporate the most recent information
11 available relating to the exploitation of resources (see “Consideration of Drilling Events in
12 Performance Assessment,” Section 33). Besides these two drilling-related parameters, there
13 have been no planned changes adopted by the DOE since the CRA-2004 that impact the previous
14 position and bases for demonstrating compliance with this section. The PA calculations
15 responsive to section 191.13 show predicted releases to be well within the regulated limits and
16 demonstrate that the favorable characteristics and isolating capability of the WIPP outweigh the
17 risks associated with the presence of resources at the site. Therefore, the requirements of section
18 194.45 are met.

19 **45.7 References**

20 Leigh, C., J. Kanney, L. Brush, J. Garner, R. Kirkes, T. Lowry, M. Nemer, J. Stein, E. Vugrin, S.
21 Wagner, and T. Kirchner. 2005. *2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance*
22 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 541521. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
23 Laboratories.

24 U.S. Department of Energy. 1980. *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Waste*
25 *Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 2 vols. DOE/EIS-0026. ERMS 238835 and ERMS 238838.
26 Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy.

27 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
28 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
29 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

30 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
31 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
32 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

33 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
34 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
35 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
36 20, 1993): 66398–416.

37 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. *Response to Comments: 40 CFR Part*
38 *194: Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s*

- 1 *Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations* (January 31). EPA 402-R-96-001.
2 Washington, DC: Office of Air and Radiation.
- 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
4 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
5 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
6 1998): 27353–406.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. *Compliance Application Review*
8 *Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot*
9 *Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision*
10 (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Removal of Waste
(40 CFR § 194.46)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Removal of Waste
(40 CFR § 194.46)**

Table of Contents

46.0 Removal of Waste (40 CFR § 194.46)	46-1
46.1 Requirements.....	46-1
46.2 Background	46-1
46.3 1998 Certification Decision.....	46-1
46.4 Changes in the CRA-2004.....	46-2
46.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification	46-2
46.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification.....	46-2
46.7 References	46-2

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **46.0 Removal of Waste (40 CFR § 194.46)**

2 **46.1 Requirements**

§ 194.46 Removal of Waste

Any compliance application shall include documentation which demonstrates that removal of waste from the disposal system is feasible for a reasonable period of time after disposal. Such documentation shall include an analysis of the technological feasibility of mining the sealed disposal system, given technology levels at the time a compliance application is prepared.

3

4 **46.2 Background**

5 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) 40 CFR § 194.46, "Removal of Waste"
6 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a), is one of the six assurance requirements in the
7 Compliance Criteria. The EPA states in the preamble to the 1985 promulgation of the disposal
8 standards 40 CFR Part 191 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) that the assurance
9 requirements were included in the disposal standards to compensate in a qualitative manner for
10 the inherent uncertainties in projecting the behavior of natural and engineered components of the
11 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for many thousands of years.

12 **46.3 1998 Certification Decision**

13 To meet the criteria of section 194.46, the EPA states in their Compliance Application Guidance
14 that compliance with the section 194.46 criteria is demonstrated by an analysis that includes (1)
15 procedures for removal of waste after disposal are complete, (2) descriptions of current
16 technology that could be used in implementing these procedures, and (3) an estimate of when it
17 will no longer be technologically feasible to remove the waste (U.S. Environmental Protection
18 Agency 1996b).

19 The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) demonstration of compliance with section 194.46
20 was included in the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy
21 1996), Chapter 7.0 and Appendix WRAC. The DOE presented a five-phased approach to
22 accomplish the removal of waste. This approach was supported by a discussion of techniques
23 that could be used to remove the waste, given repository conditions at the time of removal. The
24 EPA reviewed the material to assess the completeness of the strategy and the justification of the
25 proposed technology for removing the waste. The EPA states in their 1998 Certification
26 Decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a) for section 194.46 that the DOE has
27 demonstrated it is possible to remove waste from the repository for a reasonable period of time
28 after disposal; therefore, the EPA found the DOE in compliance with section 194.46. A
29 complete description of the EPA's decision can be found in U.S. Environmental Protection
30 Agency 1998a, Section VIII.D.6, and Compliance Application Review Document (CARD) 46
31 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

1 **46.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

2 The DOE did not report any changes in the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-
3 2004) (U.S. Department of Energy 2004) to the information on which the EPA based their 1998
4 Certification Decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a). The DOE maintained
5 their original position on waste removal after closure, which was presented in the CCA, Chapter
6 7.0, Section 7.6. Only editorial changes were made to the original text in the CCA, Chapter 7.0,
7 Section 7.6, pp. 7-90 through 7-91. The CRA-2004 included the CCA, Appendix WRAC by
8 reference; no changes were made to Appendix WRAC.

9 **46.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

10 Based on the EPA's review of the activities and conditions in and around the WIPP site, the EPA
11 did not identify any significant changes in the planning and execution of the DOE's strategy for
12 removal of waste since the 1998 Certification Decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
13 1998a). The CRA-2004 provides documentation that the removal of waste from the disposal
14 system is feasible for a reasonable period of time after disposal (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0,
15 Section 7.6.2).

16 The EPA did not receive any public comments on the DOE's continued compliance with the
17 removal-of-waste requirements of section 194.46 presented in the CRA-2004.

18 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and the CCA, Appendix WRAC, the EPA
19 determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements of section 194.46 (U.S.
20 Environmental Protection Agency 2006, Section V.E).

21 **46.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

22 The DOE has not changed its position on waste removal presented in the CCA, Chapter 7.0,
23 Section 7.6. There have been no design changes or changes to the disposal system in waste
24 emplacement within the disposal area since the CRA-2004. There have been no changes in the
25 planning or execution of the DOE's strategy for removal of waste since the EPA's 1998
26 Certification Decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a). Thus, there is no new
27 information to be provided as part of the CRA-2009, and the information presented in the CRA-
28 2004, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.6, pp. 7-90 through 7-91 and the CCA, Appendix WRAC, continues
29 to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of section 194.46.

30 **46.7 References**

31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
32 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
33 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

34 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
35 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
36 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
2 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
3 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
4 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
6 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
7 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
8 52234–45.
- 9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996b. *Compliance Application Guidance for*
10 *40 CFR 194* (March 29). EPA 402-R-95-014. ERMS 239159. Washington, DC: Office of
11 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
13 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
14 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
15 1998): 27353–406.
- 16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “CARD No. 46: Removal of Waste.”
17 *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
18 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
19 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 46-1 through 46-4). Washington, DC:
20 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006. “Recertification CARD No. 46: Removal
22 of Waste.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
23 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
24 *Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 46-1 through 46-2). Washington, DC:
25 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Consideration of Protected
Individual and Exposure Pathways
(40 CFR §§ 194.51 and 194.52)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Consideration of Protected
Individual and Exposure Pathways
(40 CFR §§ 194.51 and 194.52)**

Table of Contents

51.0 Consideration of Protected Individual and Exposure Pathways (40 CFR §§ 194.51 and 194.52)..... 1

51.1 Requirements..... 1

51.2 Background 1

51.3 1998 Certification Decision..... 2

51.4 Changes in the CRA-2004..... 3

51.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 3

51.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification..... 3

51.7 References 5

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
mrem	millirem
PA	performance assessment
pCi/L	picocuries per liter
USDW	underground source of drinking water
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Ra	radium
----	--------

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **51.0 Consideration of Protected Individual and Exposure Pathways**
2 **(40 CFR §§ 194.51 and 194.52)**

3 **51.1 Requirements**

§194.51 Consideration of Protected Individual and Exposure Pathways

Compliance assessments that analyze compliance with §191.15 of this chapter shall assume that an individual resides at the single geographic point on the surface of the accessible environment where that individual would be expected to receive the highest dose from radionuclide releases from the disposal system.

§194.52 Consideration of Protected Individual and Exposure Pathways

In compliance assessments that analyze compliance with §191.15 of this chapter, all potential exposure pathways from the disposal system to individuals shall be considered. Compliance assessments with part 191, subpart C and §191.15 of this chapter shall assume that individuals consume 2 liters per day of drinking water from any underground source of drinking water in the accessible environment.

4
5 **51.2 Background**

6 40 CFR §§ 194.51 and 194.52 (2004) of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) certification
7 criteria implement the individual protection requirements of 40 CFR § 191.15 (2000) and the
8 groundwater protection standards of 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart C. Section 194.51 requires the
9 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to assume in its compliance assessments that an individual
10 resides at the point where the dose from radionuclide releases from the WIPP would be greatest.
11 Section 194.52 requires the DOE to consider in its compliance assessments all the potential
12 exposure pathways for radioactive contaminants from the WIPP. Compliance with sections
13 194.51 and 194.52 is addressed in this single section because the criteria are closely related.

14 Assessment of the likelihood that the WIPP will meet the individual dose limits and radionuclide
15 concentration limits for groundwater is conducted through a process known as compliance
16 assessment. Compliance assessment uses methods similar to those of the performance
17 assessment (PA) for the containment requirements, but is required to address only undisturbed
18 performance of the disposal system. That is, compliance assessment does not include human
19 intrusion scenarios (i.e., drilling or mining for resources). Compliance assessment can be
20 considered a “subset” of PA.

21 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) incorporated requirements in 40 CFR Part
22 191 for the protection of individuals and groundwater. The individual protection requirements of
23 Part 191 limit annual committed effective doses of radiation to members of the public to no more
24 than 15 millirem (mrem). This requirement is concerned with human exposure to radionuclides
25 from disposal systems for 10,000 years. These criteria address the definition of a protected
26 individual, the consideration of exposure pathways, the consideration of underground sources of
27 drinking water (USDWs), the scope of compliance assessments, and the basis for determining
28 compliance with the Individual Protection Standards (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
29 1995, pp. 5780–81).

1 **51.3 1998 Certification Decision**

2 To obtain the EPA’s 1998 certification decision, the DOE was required to demonstrate a
3 reasonable expectation that the potential releases from the undisturbed repository will result in
4 radiation doses lower than the dose limit of 15 mrem per year, as established by section 191.15.
5 This demonstration incorporated the provisions of sections 194.51 and 194.52, which require the
6 DOE to identify the location of maximum potential exposure for an individual on the surface,
7 consider all potential exposure pathways, and assume that drinking water from any contaminated
8 underground source is consumed at the rate of two liters per day.

9 To demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the undisturbed performance of the WIPP will not
10 exceed 15 mrem per year, the DOE showed that even a highly improbable, conservative case will
11 meet the regulatory requirements, thereby suggesting that any more probable case must also be
12 in compliance. The DOE referred to this approach as a “bounding” dose calculation because it
13 identified an upper bound to possible exposures. The DOE’s analysis is presented in the
14 Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), Chapter 8.0,
15 Section 8.1.2.2. Supplemental analyses were also performed and are described in U.S.
16 Department of Energy 1997.

17 In the DOE’s analysis, an individual receives the highest dose if one assumes that the individual
18 consumes drinking water directly from a well in the Salado Formation located at the land
19 withdrawal boundary. The DOE assumed that an individual would receive the maximum
20 estimated dose regardless of location on the surface and calculated the resultant doses
21 accordingly. The EPA found this approach to be conservative and found the DOE in compliance
22 with section 194.51.

23 To demonstrate compliance with section 194.52, the DOE had to assume that an individual
24 consumes two liters per day of drinking water from any USDW from the Salado outside the
25 WIPP area. The DOE considered three ingestion pathways and one inhalation pathway:

- 26 • An individual consumes drinking water directly from the Salado.
- 27 • An individual ingests plants irrigated with contaminated water.
- 28 • An individual ingests milk and beef from cattle whose stock pond contained contaminated
29 water from the Salado.
- 30 • An individual inhales dust from soil irrigated with contaminated water from the Salado.

31 Intended to result in the maximum dose, the DOE’s assumption that water is ingested directly
32 from the Salado is conservative, because Salado water is highly saline and would have to be
33 greatly diluted to function as drinking or irrigation water.

34 The EPA determined that the DOE complied with section 194.52 because the DOE considered
35 all potential exposure pathways and assumed that an individual consumes two liters of Salado
36 water per day, following dilution to make the water usable (U.S. Environmental Protection
37 Agency 1998a).

1 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for sections 194.51 and 194.52
2 is provided in the EPA's final certification decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
3 1998a) and in U.S. EPA Compliance Application Review Document (CARD) 51/52 (U.S.
4 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

5 **51.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

6 In its 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy
7 2004), the DOE did not report any significant changes to the information on which the EPA
8 based its 1998 certification decision of compliance with the requirements of sections 194.51 and
9 194.52.

10 The compliance assessment combines the results of the PA (for the undisturbed case) with the
11 dose calculation. The DOE did not modify the CCA dose-bounding calculations for the
12 compliance assessment in the CRA-2004. Releases predicted by the CRA-2004 PAs are less
13 than or similar to those predicted by the CCA PA results; therefore, the EPA concurred that the
14 CCA dose bounding calculations did not need to be reexecuted for the CRA-2004 compliance
15 assessment.

16 **51.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

17 Based on the EPA's review of the activities and conditions in and around the WIPP site, the EPA
18 did not identify any significant changes in the consideration of the protected individual and
19 exposure pathways (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0). The EPA concluded that the CRA-2004
20 adequately describes the location of the protected individual and the potential exposure pathways
21 (CARD 51/52, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a).

22 During its review of the CRA-2004, the EPA received no public comments on the DOE's
23 continued compliance with the certification criteria of sections 194.51 and 194.52.

24 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
25 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements of
26 sections 194.51 and 195.52 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006a and 2006b).

27 **51.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

28 In support of the CRA-2009, the DOE has reviewed and updated information provided in the
29 CCA and the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Individual and Groundwater Protection Requirements.
30 The updated material is provided as Appendix IGP-2009. Changes or new information
31 pertaining to the update are listed below.

32 1. The CRA-2009 evaluation shows that with undisturbed performance, only 1 of the 300
33 modeling system realizations results in radionuclide concentrations greater than zero
34 reaching the accessible environment through the anhydrite interbeds in the Salado. The
35 remaining 299 realizations show no radionuclides reaching the accessible environment
36 during the 10,000-year period (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-7.2). In the case of the single
37 realization showing releases to the accessible environment, the resulting calculated dose is an

- 1 order of magnitude less than the value reported in the CCA (Appendix IGP-2009, Section
 2 IGP-2.1). Accordingly, the CCA calculations bound the CRA-2009 results and demonstrate
 3 continued compliance with the 40 CFR § 191.15(a) individual protection standard (see
 4 Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-1.0).
- 5 2. To update the evaluation of the presence of any USDW at or near the WIPP, information
 6 pertaining to several new boreholes is presented in Appendix IGP-2009. Relevant data
 7 pertaining to total dissolved solids concentration and water pumping rates are provided.
 8 Evaluating the data from the new boreholes has resulted in no new or changed conclusions
 9 regarding the presence of USDWs in the WIPP vicinity (see Appendix IGP-2009, Section
 10 IGP 3.2).
- 11 3. An updated evaluation of maximum potential radium-226 (^{226}Ra) and ^{228}Ra concentrations is
 12 provided in Appendix IGP-2009. The results of this evaluation indicate that the maximum
 13 concentration at the accessible environment boundary would be well below the 5-picoCurie-
 14 per-liter (pCi/L) regulatory limit; therefore, continued compliance with the 40 CFR §
 15 141.15(a) (2003) groundwater protection standard is demonstrated (see Appendix IGP-2009,
 16 Section IGP-3.3.2).
- 17 4. For the CRA-2009 evaluation, the gross alpha particle activity, including ^{226}Ra and excluding
 18 radon and uranium at the boundary of the accessible environment, is expected to be
 19 essentially 0.07 pCi/L (equivalent to the concentration calculated for the CRA-2004). This
 20 compares with the standard defined in 40 CFR § 141.15(b) of 15 pCi/L. Continued
 21 compliance with the section 141.15(b) groundwater protection standard is demonstrated (see
 22 Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-3.3.3).
- 23 5. For the CRA-2009 evaluation, the maximum radionuclide concentration in the accessible
 24 environment is one order of magnitude less than the maximum bounding CCA value
 25 (Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.1). As such, resulting doses for the CRA-2009 case
 26 would be correspondingly lower and continued compliance with the 40 CFR § 141.16(a)
 27 annual dose equivalent standard is demonstrated (see Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-
 28 3.3.4).
- 29 6. The CCA compliance assessments assumed that an individual resides at the single
 30 geographic point on the surface of the accessible environment where that individual would be
 31 expected to receive the highest dose of radionuclide releases from the disposal system.
 32 Potential releases calculated for the CRA-2009 compliance assessment are less than those
 33 calculated for the CCA. Therefore the CCA dose calculation is bounding, and a new dose
 34 calculation is unnecessary for the CRA-2009 (see Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP 4.0).
- 35 7. The CCA and CRA-2009 compliance assessments evaluate all potential exposure pathways
 36 from the disposal system to individuals. The assessments also include an assumption that
 37 individuals consume two liters per day of drinking water from any USDW in the accessible
 38 environment (see Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.2.2).
- 39 The DOE continues to comply with the provisions of sections 194.51 and 194.52 (see Appendix
 40 IGP-2009, Section IGP-4.0).

1 **51.7 References**

- 2 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
3 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
4 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 5 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997. *Analysis Report for Estimating Dose from Cattle,*
6 *Vegetable Consumption, and Inhalation Pathways Utilizing Contaminated Water from the Top of*
7 *the Salado, Culebra, and Selected Marker Beds for an Undisturbed Case Supporting Review of*
8 *the Compliance Certification Application* (Version 1.01). ERMS 243298. Albuquerque: Sandia
9 National Laboratories.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
11 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (March)*. 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
12 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1995. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
14 Certification and Determination of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with
15 Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level
16 and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Proposed Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 60 (January 30,
17 1995): 5765–91.
- 18 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
19 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
20 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
21 1998): 27353–406.
- 22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “CARD No. 51/52: Consideration of
23 Protected Individual/Exposure Pathways.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the*
24 *Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance*
25 *with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 51-1
26 through 51-11). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006a. “Recertification CARD Nos. 51/52:
28 Consideration of Protected Individual and Exposure Pathways.” *Compliance Application Review*
29 *Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot*
30 *Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision*
31 (March) (pp. 51/52-1 through 51/52-3). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 32 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006b. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
33 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
34 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision” (Final Notice). *Federal Register*, vol. 71 (April
35 10, 2006): 18010–021.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Consideration of Underground
Sources of Drinking Water
(40 CFR § 194.53)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Consideration of Underground
Sources of Drinking Water
(40 CFR § 194.53)**

Table of Contents

53.0 Consideration of Underground Sources of Drinking Water (40 CFR § 194.53) 53-1

 53.1 Requirements 53-1

 53.2 Background 53-1

 53.3 1998 Certification Decision 53-1

 53.4 Changes in the CRA-2004 53-3

 53.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 53-3

 53.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification 53-4

 53.7 References 53-4

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
gpm	gallons per minute
l	liters
MCL	maximum contamination level
mg/L	milligrams per liter
ppm	parts per million
TDS	total dissolved solids
USDW	Underground Source of Drinking Water
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **53.0 Consideration of Underground Sources of Drinking Water (40**
2 **CFR § 194.53)**

3 **53.1 Requirements**

§194.53 Consideration of Underground Sources of Drinking Water

In compliance assessments that analyze compliance with part 191, subpart C of this chapter, all underground sources of drinking water in the accessible environment that are expected to be affected by the disposal system over the regulatory time frame shall be considered. In determining whether underground sources of drinking water are expected to be affected by the disposal system, underground interconnections among bodies of surface water, groundwater, and underground sources of drinking water shall be considered.

4
5 **53.2 Background**

6 40 CFR § 194.53 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) requires the U.S. Department of
7 Energy (DOE) to consider, in compliance assessments, underground sources of drinking water
8 (USDWs) near the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and their interconnections. A USDW is
9 defined in 40 CFR §191.22 (2000) as “an aquifer or its portion that supplies a public water
10 system, or contains a sufficient quantity of ground water to do so and (i) currently supplies
11 drinking water for human consumption or (ii) contains fewer than 10,000 milligrams per liter
12 (mg/L) of total dissolved solids.” The groundwater protection requirements limit releases to the
13 maximum contamination level (MCL) established in the Safe Drinking Water Act Regulations at
14 40 CFR Part 141 (2003) as they existed on January 19, 1994.

15 **53.3 1998 Certification Decision**

16 The Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), Chapter
17 8.0, discusses the assumptions and approaches used to consider USDWs and the uncertainty
18 associated with the analyses. The DOE provided detailed information on the location and nature
19 of the USDWs, indicated the estimated concentrations of radionuclides in a hypothetical USDW
20 in the accessible environment, and showed that the MCLs for radionuclides will not be exceeded
21 during the regulatory time period.

22 In the CCA, the DOE presented an evaluation of the USDWs near the WIPP that could
23 potentially be affected by the disposal system over the regulatory time frame. This information
24 was included in the CCA, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2, and Appendix USDW, Section USDW.3.
25 Based on the definitions in section 191.22, the DOE identified three subcriteria to determine
26 whether a water-bearing horizon located within the WIPP-controlled area would qualify as a
27 USDW:

- 28 1. A minimum pumping rate of five gallons per minute (gpm)
29 2. A supply of water at a rate of five gpm for a 40-year period
30 3. A maximum of 10,000 mg/L (10,000 parts per million [ppm]) of total dissolved solids (TDS)

1 These requirements characterize the capacity and quality of a public water system. A public
2 water system is defined in section 191.22 as a system providing piped water for human
3 consumption to 25 individuals, or one that has at least 15 service connections.

4 Applying these criteria, the DOE identified the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler
5 Formation (hereafter referred to as Culebra), the Dewey Lake Formation, and the Santa Rosa
6 Formation as potential USDWs. The DOE conducted a bounding analysis of the contaminants'
7 concentrations to assess compliance with 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart C. In this analysis, the DOE
8 assumed 10,000 ppm TDS, which is much less than the observed concentration of brine derived
9 from the Salado anhydrite marker beds. A USDW was also assumed to be present at and beyond
10 the WIPP Land Withdrawal Boundary. The DOE indicated in the CCA, Chapter 8.0, Section
11 8.3, that the bounding analysis showed that the resulting radionuclide concentrations in the
12 USDWs would be less than half the maximum limit specified in Part 141 (the U.S.
13 Environmental Protection Agency's [EPA's] National Primary Drinking Water Standards), and
14 the dose to a receptor drinking from the USDW would be a factor of 10 less than the individual
15 protection standard.

16 The DOE believed the assumption that all contaminants reaching the accessible environment are
17 directly available to the receptor is not realistic but conservative, because this results in
18 overestimating potential doses to an individual. The DOE's findings indicated that even with
19 this conservative approach, the estimated potential dose to an individual was below the Part 191
20 requirements. The CCA analysis also assumed that all contaminants reaching the accessible
21 environment were directly available to the receptor so that the interconnections of surface,
22 ground, and underground drinking water were all considered and treated as a single source.

23 The EPA examined the DOE's approach and assumptions associated with the USDW
24 determination in the CCA. The EPA found the analyses to be well supported and accurate,
25 including the uncertainty associated with these analyses. In addition, the EPA assessed all
26 possible aquifers to determine how USDWs were identified and discussed in the CCA. The EPA
27 also examined whether the flow rates and directions were included in the description. The
28 modeling assumptions and specifications for the bounding analysis were examined to assess
29 reliability and assurance of safety. The EPA reviewed the estimated concentrations of
30 radionuclides to determine if they complied with the groundwater protection standard (see the
31 CCA Compliance Application Review Document [CARD] 53, U.S. Environmental Protection
32 Agency 1998, for details of the EPA's CCA review).

33 The EPA found that the DOE's determination of the USDWs was in accordance with definitions
34 contained in section 191.22 and with the compliance criteria in section 194.53. The bounding
35 analysis was performed with conservative assumptions for a hypothetical USDW to estimate
36 contamination and potential doses to a receptor.

37 A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.53 is provided
38 in EPA CARD 53 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998).

1 **53.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

2 In the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy
3 2004), Chapter 8.0, the DOE updated some aspects of the USDW analysis. The DOE updated
4 the data for groundwater quantity determination to define a USDW. In the CCA, the DOE used
5 1990 census data to determine the average water usage per person per day of 282 gallons (1067
6 L). In the CRA-2004, the DOE used 2000 census data to determine that the average water usage
7 per person per day had increased to 305 gallons (1154 L). The DOE did not believe it was
8 necessary to change the subcriterion of a 5 gpm rate of production from a well to define a USDW
9 (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2.1.1).

10 The DOE monitored and evaluated new wells drilled in the area since the completion of the
11 CCA. A new well, C-2737, was drilled to replace H-1 in 2001. Water sampled from the Dewey
12 Lake Formation showed 2,590 ppm TDS. Additional wells were drilled at the WIPP site to
13 investigate the extent of groundwater at the contact of the Santa Rosa and Dewey Lake
14 Formations. The groundwater samples indicate TDS at both below and above 10,000 ppm TDS.
15 The DOE was unable to pump water from any one of these boreholes at a rate of 5 gpm or more.

16 The updates and changes made by the DOE in the CRA-2004 did not significantly impact the
17 conclusions regarding USDWs in the CCA. In the CRA-2004, the DOE continued to identify the
18 Culebra, Dewey Lake, and Santa Rosa as the only potential USDWs. The DOE stated that the
19 conservative bounding analysis used for the 1998 Certification Decision compliance assessment
20 was still applicable (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2.1.1).

21 **53.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

22 The EPA evaluated the information on the USDWs contained in the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0 and
23 examined data from the new wells drilled within the study area since the 1998 Certification
24 Decision. The EPA determined that the DOE applied adequately conservative assumptions to
25 the data for a hypothetical USDW to determine compliance with section 194.53.

26 Because of the lack of significant changes to the parameters for the protected individual, the
27 potential exposure pathways, and the USDWs, the EPA agreed that the bounding analysis
28 performed for the dose calculation in the CCA still applied. See CRA-2004 CARD 55 (U.S.
29 Environmental Protection Agency 2006) for more information on the results of the compliance
30 assessment.

31 The EPA received no public comments on the DOE's continued compliance with the
32 consideration of USDW requirements in section 194.53.

33 Based on a review and evaluation of the CRA-2004 and supplemental information provided by
34 the DOE, the EPA determined that the DOE continued to comply with the requirements of
35 section 194.53.

1 **53.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

2 In support of the CRA-2009, the DOE has reviewed and updated information provided in the
3 CCA and the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Individual and Groundwater Protection Requirements.
4 The updated material is provided as Appendix IGP-2009. Changes or new information
5 pertaining to the update are as follows:

- 6 1. Updated information regarding average household water consumption in communities near
7 the WIPP has been obtained from the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer to assess the
8 continued appropriateness of criteria for making USDW determinations. The updated
9 information is included in Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-3.1.1. A review of these new
10 data indicates that no change in the criteria for making USDW determinations is warranted.
- 11 2. Several new boreholes have been drilled near the WIPP since the CRA-2004. These include
12 wells to further characterize flow characteristics in the Culebra and to better understand
13 shallow groundwater flow near the WIPP salt storage piles. Detail regarding these new wells
14 is included in Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-3.2. Data from these wells indicate that no
15 changes to the previous USDW determinations are warranted.
- 16 3. Based on the review of available data in support of the CRA-2009, the DOE concludes that
17 no modification of the USDW determinations reported in the CCA, Chapter 8.0 and
18 Appendix USDW is warranted (see Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-3.2). The DOE
19 continues to conclude that USDWs are present in the Culebra, and potential USDWs are
20 present in the Dewey Lake and the Santa Rosa. Based on this, the DOE concludes that all
21 USDWs in the accessible environment expected to be affected by the disposal system over
22 the regulatory time frame have been considered. In addition, the DOE approach ensures that
23 underground interconnections among bodies of surface water, groundwater, and USDWs are
24 considered.

25 Based on these considerations, the DOE believes that continued compliance with the provisions
26 of section 194.53 is demonstrated.

27 **53.7 References**

28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
29 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
30 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
32 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
33 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. "40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
35 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance With the 40
36 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule." *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
37 5223-45.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998. "CARD No. 53: Consideration of
2 Underground Sources of Drinking Water." *Compliance Application Review Documents for the*
3 *Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance*
4 *with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 53-1
5 through 53-6) Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006. "Recertification CARD No. 55: "Results
7 of Compliance Assessments." *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for*
8 *the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40*
9 *CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Recertification Decision* (March) (pp. 55-1 through 55-6).
10 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Scope of Compliance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.54)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Scope of Compliance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.54)**

Table of Contents

54.0 Scope of Compliance Assessments (40 CFR § 194.54) 54-1

 54.1 Requirements..... 54-1

 54.2 Background 54-1

 54.3 1998 Certification Decision..... 54-2

 54.4 Changes in the CRA-2004..... 54-3

 54.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 54-3

 54.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification..... 54-4

 54.7 References 54-4

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEP	feature, event, and process
PA	performance assessment
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **54.0 Scope of Compliance Assessments (40 CFR § 194.54)**

2 **54.1 Requirements**

§ 194.54 Scope of Compliance Assessments

(a) Any compliance application shall contain compliance assessments required pursuant to this part.

Compliance assessments shall include information which:

(1) Identifies potential processes, events, or sequences of processes and events that may occur over the regulatory time frame;

(2) Identifies the processes, events, or sequences of processes and events included in compliance assessment results provided in any compliance application; and

(3) Documents why any processes, events, or sequences of processes and events identified pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section were not included in compliance assessment results provided in any compliance application.

(b) Compliance assessments of undisturbed performance shall include the effects on the disposal system of:

(1) Existing boreholes in the vicinity of the disposal system, with attention to the pathways they provide for migration of radionuclides from the site; and

(2) Any activities that occur in the vicinity of the disposal system prior to or soon after disposal. Such activities shall include, but shall not be limited to: Existing boreholes and the development of any existing leases that can be reasonably expected to be developed in the near future, including boreholes and leases that may be used for fluid injection activities.

3

4 **54.2 Background**

5 The individual and groundwater protection requirements (40 CFR § 191.15 and 40 CFR Part 191
6 Subpart C [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993]) place limitations on both the potential
7 radiation exposure of individuals and the possible levels of radioactive contamination of
8 groundwater resulting from disposal of waste in the WIPP. The individual protection criteria of
9 40 CFR § 194.54 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) focuses on the annual radiation
10 dose of a maximally exposed hypothetical person living on the surface just outside the boundary
11 to the accessible environment.

12 In contrast to the containment requirements, the individual and groundwater protection
13 requirements apply to the potential doses received by an individual over a human lifespan.
14 Moreover, compliance assessments utilized to demonstrate compliance with the individual and
15 groundwater protection requirements consider performance of the repository in the “undisturbed
16 scenario,” that is, without any human intrusion.

17 As with performance assessments (PAs), compliance assessments must consider features, events,
18 and processes (FEPs) and the uncertainties associated with those FEPs. PAs are used to
19 demonstrate compliance with the containment requirements of 40 CFR § 191.13 (U.S.
20 Environmental Protection Agency 1993). Compliance assessments may be regarded as a
21 “subset” of PAs, inasmuch as the latter incorporates FEPs related to undisturbed conditions that
22 are necessary for the compliance assessment. The results of the PA are used as input values to
23 the compliance assessments. Section 194.54 contains the criteria for assessments of WIPP’s
24 compliance with the individual dose and groundwater protection requirements.

1 **54.3 1998 Certification Decision**

2 Per 40 CFR § 194.54(a), the DOE includes in the Compliance Certification Application (CCA)
3 (U.S. Department of Energy 1996) a comprehensive list of FEPs evaluated through the
4 compliance assessment. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reviewed the DOE's
5 initial FEP list to determine whether it was comprehensive in the CCA. The EPA examined
6 information sources used by the DOE to compile FEP lists for technical accuracy. The EPA also
7 examined FEP listings to determine whether the DOE's rationale for reducing the number of
8 FEPs was appropriately documented and technically sufficient. The EPA concluded that the
9 DOE adequately identified and considered any natural processes or events that may occur within
10 the regulatory time frame in the WIPP area.

11 The EPA reviewed the CCA, Appendix SCR; numerous references; and FEP screening record
12 packages. To evaluate compliance with 40 CFR § 194.54(b), the EPA reviewed the DOE's
13 arguments concerning natural flow through abandoned boreholes within the Land Withdrawal
14 Boundary, including natural fluid head conditions, abandonment techniques, and number and
15 location of abandoned boreholes. The EPA concluded that the DOE's screening arguments and
16 documentation were reasonable.

17 In accordance with section 194.54(b), the EPA's detailed review of the CCA indicated that the
18 DOE appropriately screened the FEPs, although the limited justification of some FEPs required
19 additional evaluation. The EPA ultimately concluded that the DOE appropriately identified and
20 screened FEPs pertaining to undisturbed performance. The EPA concluded that criteria for
21 screening FEPs were adequately described and implemented. Also, the EPA concluded that the
22 DOE appropriately identified and discussed the effects of the sequences and combinations of
23 FEPs that resulted in modeled scenarios.

24 In the CCA, the DOE screened out the possibility that oil and gas extraction would affect the
25 WIPP based upon low consequence. The EPA concurred with the DOE's decision and
26 concluded that the FEP screening appropriately considered the possibility of both subsidence and
27 pressure gradients due to oil and gas extraction. The EPA concludes that the DOE considered
28 the appropriate issues, and that the technical conclusions reached by the DOE regarding current
29 and near-future screening of oil and gas extraction activities were valid. (See *Technical Support*
30 *Document for 40 CFR § 194.32: Fluid Injection Analysis*, U.S. Environmental Protection
31 Agency 1998a, for detailed results of EPA's analysis. See Compliance Application Review
32 Document [CARD] 32, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b, for a discussion of the
33 EPA's analysis of fluid injection.) A complete description of the EPA's 1998 Certification
34 Decision for section 194.54 can be found in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998c.

35 Also in regard to section 194.54(b) for the CCA, the DOE screened out induced system changes
36 due to hydrocarbon storage operations that have occurred thus far in the vicinity of the WIPP
37 site, based on low consequence. The EPA concluded that this screening was appropriate.
38 Although the DOE did not specify oil and gas field lifetimes in detail for each field near the
39 WIPP in the CCA, Appendix DEL, the EPA found that it was possible to derive the expected
40 active lifetimes of oil and gas fields from information presented in that appendix. The EPA
41 agreed that the lease life estimation values presented in the CCA were reasonable, although the
42 EPA asked the DOE to consider the effects of longer injection periods (Trovato 1997). In

1 response, the DOE performed a second analysis applying more conservative assumptions
2 including longer injection periods. The second analysis supported the conclusion of the earlier
3 screening evaluations.

4 **54.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

5 The 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy
6 2004) did not report significant changes related to the section 194.54 criteria. In the CCA, the
7 DOE screened in 67 undisturbed performance FEPs. The DOE added three FEPs as a result of
8 its CRA-2004 FEPs reevaluation (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SCR). The
9 DOE added Organic Complexation (W68), Organic Ligands (W69), and Surface Disruptions
10 (H41). FEPs W68 and W69 were added because information acquired since the CCA indicates
11 that organic ligands may increase actinide solubilities and should be included in assessments at
12 the WIPP (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SCR, Section SCR-6.5.6.1.3). FEP
13 H41 was added because surface activities may impact infiltration, requiring its inclusion in
14 assessments (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SCR, Section SCR-5.3.1.2.3). All
15 other undisturbed performance FEPs were unchanged in the CRA-2004; therefore, except for
16 FEPs W68, W69, and H41, the DOE did not change the process, screening arguments, or final
17 decisions related to 67 FEPs in the CCA.

18 The CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1.1 documents that the DOE considered existing
19 boreholes and potential boreholes as required by 40 CFR §§ 194.52(b)(1) and 194.52(b)(2) (U.S.
20 Environmental Protection Agency 1996). In the CRA-2004, the DOE confirmed that the most
21 plausible undisturbed transport pathway is through the anhydrite marker beds as assumed in the
22 CCA. Therefore, the DOE's approach had not changed since the CCA.

23 In the CRA-2004, the DOE did not change its dose calculation methodology. The DOE
24 continued to assume an existing borehole (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1.2.1) and
25 continued to use a bounding analysis (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1.2.2) if needed.
26 The DOE determined that the maximum release concentrations predicted for undisturbed
27 performance were lower than the CCA predictions; therefore, the new bounding dose
28 calculations were not needed for the CRA-2004. The DOE reconsidered some parameters, such
29 as average water usage and its water quality determination, based on information acquired since
30 the CCA (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2). These parameter changes
31 did not change the DOE's analysis.

32 **54.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

33 The EPA reviewed DOE compliance with the section 194.54 criteria (CARD 54, U.S.
34 Environmental Protection Agency 1998c). The EPA verified that the DOE's FEP development
35 process has not changed since the CCA. The DOE reevaluated CCA FEPs in the CRA-2004, and
36 the EPA found the CRA-2004 process to be reasonable and adequately documented. The EPA
37 found that the DOE adequately identified FEPs that may occur over the regulatory time frame
38 (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1), identified FEPs included in the compliance
39 assessment (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1), and adequately documented why
40 FEPs were not selected (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SCR). The EPA also

1 found that the DOE adequately considered existing wells and activities that may occur in the
2 vicinity of the WIPP (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1.1).

3 The EPA received no public comments on the DOE's continued compliance with the scope of
4 compliance assessments requirements of section 194.54.

5 **54.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

6 There are no significant changes related to the section 194.54 requirements since the CRA-2004.

7 The screening decisions for the undisturbed performance FEPs have not changed for the CRA-
8 2009, but the justification for some screening decisions has changed (Appendix SCR-2009).

9 Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.1 demonstrates that the DOE continues to consider existing
10 boreholes and potential boreholes as required by sections 194.54(b)(1) and (b)(2). The CRA-
11 2009 PA analysis continues to confirm that the most plausible undisturbed transport pathway is
12 through the anhydrite marker beds, as assumed in the CRA-2004 and the CCA (Appendix IGP,
13 Section IGP-2.2.1). The DOE's approach has not changed.

14 The DOE has not changed its dose calculation methodology. The DOE continues to assume an
15 existing borehole (Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.2.1) and still applies PA results in a
16 bounding analysis (Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.2.2). The DOE continues to determine
17 that the maximum release concentrations predicted for undisturbed performance are lower than
18 the CCA predictions; therefore, new bounding dose calculations were not needed for the CRA-
19 2009 (Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.3). The DOE has also reconsidered some parameters,
20 such as average water usage and associated water-quantity determinations, based on acquired
21 information since the CRA-2004 (Appendix IGP-2009, Sections IGP-3.1 and IGP-3.2). The new
22 information provided by the DOE in this document does not warrant changes to the analyses.

23 Based on this information, the DOE believes continued compliance with the requirements of
24 section 194.54 is demonstrated.

25 **54.7 References**

26 Trovato, E.R. 1997. Letter to A. Alm (6 Enclosures). 19 March 1997. ERMS 245835. U.S.
27 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
29 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
30 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
32 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
33 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. "40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
35 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-

- 1 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
2 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
4 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
5 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
6 5223–45.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. *Technical Support Document for Section*
8 *194.32: Fluid Injection Analysis* (May). 3 vols. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
9 Indoor Air.
- 10 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “CARD No. 32: Scope of Performance
11 Assessments.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
12 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
13 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (pp. 32-1 through 32-46) (May). Washington, DC: Office
14 of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998c. “CARD No. 54: Scope of Compliance
16 Assessments.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
17 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
18 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (pp. 54-1 through 54-17) (May). Washington, DC: Office
19 of Radiation and Indoor Air.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Results of Compliance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.55)**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Results of Compliance Assessments
(40 CFR § 194.55)**

Table of Contents

55.0 Results of Compliance Assessments (40 CFR § 194.55) 55-1

 55.1 Requirements..... 55-1

 55.2 Background 55-1

 55.3 1998 Certification Decision..... 55-1

 55.3.1 40 CFR § 194.55(a)..... 55-1

 55.3.2 40 CFR § 194.55(b) 55-2

 55.3.3 40 CFR § 194.55(c)..... 55-2

 55.3.4 40 CFR § 194.55(d) 55-3

 55.3.5 40 CFR § 194.55(e)..... 55-3

 55.3.6 40 CFR § 194.55(f)..... 55-4

 55.4 Changes in the CRA-2004..... 55-5

 55.5 EPA’s Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification 55-5

 55.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification..... 55-6

 55.7 References 55-6

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
LHS	Latin Hypercube Sampling
mrem	millirem
PA	performance assessment
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
pCi/L	picocuries per liter
USDW	underground source of drinking water
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Pu	plutonium
Ra	radium
Rn	radon
U	uranium

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **55.0 Results of Compliance Assessments (40 CFR § 194.55)**

2 **55.1 Requirements**

§ 194.55 Results of Compliance Assessments
(a) Compliance assessments shall consider and document uncertainty in the performance of the disposal system.
(b) Probability distributions for uncertain disposal system parameter values used in compliance assessments shall be developed and documented in any compliance application.
(c) Computational techniques which draw random samples from across the entire range of values of each probability distribution developed pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section shall be used to generate a range of:
(1) Estimated committed effective doses received from all pathways pursuant to § 194.51 and § 194.52;
(2) Estimated radionuclide concentrations in USDWs pursuant to § 194.53; and
(3) Estimated dose equivalent received from USDWs pursuant to § 194.52 and § 194.53.
(d) The number of estimates generated pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section shall be large enough such that the maximum estimates of doses and concentrations generated exceed the 99th percentile of the population of estimates with at least a 0.95 probability.
(e) Any compliance application shall display:
(1) The full range of estimated radiation doses; and
(2) The full range of estimated radionuclide concentrations.
(f) Any compliance application shall document that there is at least a 95 percent level of statistical confidence that the mean and the median of the range of estimated radiation doses and the range of estimated radionuclide concentrations meet the requirements of § 191.15 and part 191, subpart C of this chapter, respectively.

3

4 **55.2 Background**

5 The individual and groundwater protection requirements of 40 CFR § 191.15 and 40 CFR Part
6 191 Subpart C (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) place limitations on both the
7 potential radiation exposure of individuals and the possible levels of radioactive contamination
8 of groundwater caused by disposal of waste in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The
9 criteria for compliance are provided in 40 CFR §§ 194.51 through 194.55 (U.S. Environmental
10 Protection Agency 1996). The individual protection requirement focuses on the annual radiation
11 dose of a maximally exposed person living on the surface just outside the Land Withdrawal Act
12 boundary. In particular, section 191.15 requires that the WIPP be constructed in such a manner
13 as to provide a reasonable expectation that, for 10,000 years after disposal, undisturbed
14 performance of the disposal system will not cause the annual committed effective dose
15 equivalent (hereafter simply called “dose”) to exceed 15 millirems (mrem) (150 microsieverts) to
16 any member of the public in the accessible environment. Part 191 Subpart C also requires that
17 underground sources of drinking water (USDWs) be protected at least to the extent prescribed by
18 the Safe Drinking Water Act regulations at 40 CFR Part 141 as they existed on January 19, 1994
19 (per 40 CFR § 191.24(a)(1)).

20 **55.3 1998 Certification Decision**

21 **55.3.1 40 CFR § 194.55(a)**

22 In the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), the U.S.
23 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
24 considered uncertainty in two ways: (1) by assigning probability distributions to 57 of the key

1 parameters that describe the repository, and sampling from those distributions to carry out the
2 performance assessment (PA) (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, pp. 6-21 to 6-23 and 6-173 to 6-199;
3 and the CCA, Appendix PAR) and (2) by translating from groundwater contaminant level to
4 doses by means of the bounding analysis (see the CCA, Chapter 8.0 and Dials 1997).

5 The DOE's method of evaluation of uncertainty in the amounts of contaminants transported
6 underground was essentially the same as that for the 300 scenarios involving human intrusion in
7 the PA, as presented in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.1.2, except that those uncertainties
8 introduced by the borehole drilling process can be ignored. The EPA found this aspect of the
9 treatment of uncertainties to be satisfactory.

10 The EPA reviewed the bounding calculation as presented in the CCA, Chapter 8.0 and
11 supplementary information regarding models and computer codes, parameter values, dose
12 calculations and related topics (Dials 1997) and reported the results of that evaluation in
13 Compliance Application Review Document (CARD) 51/52 (U.S. Environmental Protection
14 Agency 1998a). The EPA determined that the DOE's conceptual model and the use of the
15 GENII-A computer code to calculate radiation doses were appropriate. The EPA found this
16 bounding calculation to be acceptable in lieu of further uncertainty analysis (CARD 55, U.S.
17 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

18 **55.3.2 40 CFR § 194.55(b)**

19 The probability distributions for uncertain disposal system parameter values used for
20 demonstrating compliance with the individual dose and groundwater criteria of section 194.55
21 are identical to those used for the containment requirements in 40 CFR § 194.34 (U.S.
22 Environmental Protection Agency 1996). The EPA concluded that the DOE provided general
23 information in the CCA on probability distributions, data sources for parameter distribution,
24 forms of distributions, bounds, and importance of parameters to releases.

25 The EPA initially raised concerns about the completeness of the list of PA parameters in the
26 CCA, the descriptions and justifications that support the development of some code input
27 parameters, and the traceability of data reduction and analysis of parameter records. The DOE
28 improved the documentation regarding the basis of parameters, and also developed better
29 "roadmaps" that link parameter documentation and parameter development. Upon subsequent
30 review of records, the EPA determined that the DOE adequately provided the required
31 information for probability distributions of code input parameters (CARD 55, U.S.
32 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

33 **55.3.3 40 CFR § 194.55(c)**

34 The EPA examined the DOE's use of the Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) procedure and found
35 that the LHS technique draws samples from the entire range of each sampled parameter, was
36 appropriate for use in assessing the concentrations of radionuclides in groundwater, and was
37 implemented correctly by the DOE.

38 The DOE's evaluation of individual doses and groundwater radionuclide contamination and
39 assessment of USDWs were described in the CCA, Chapter 8.0. The EPA evaluated the

1 conceptual model that the DOE used to estimate a maximum individual exposure in its bounding
2 calculation. The EPA determined that the DOE's conceptual model and the use of the GENII-A
3 computer code to calculate the radiation doses were appropriate (CARD 55, U.S. Environmental
4 Protection Agency 1998b).

5 **55.3.4 40 CFR § 194.55(d)**

6 Compliance with 40 CFR § 194.55(d) is described in detail in Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-
7 2.4. A summary is provided here.

8 The number of estimates generated must be large enough that the probability is at least 0.95 that
9 the maximum estimate exceeds the 99th percentile of the population of estimates. If the 300
10 realizations were statistically independent, then the probability that the maximum estimate
11 exceeded the 99th percentile of the population of estimates would equal $1 - (0.99)^{300} = 0.951$, and
12 the section 194.55(d) criterion would be satisfied. On that basis, the probability that the
13 maximum estimate exceeds the 99th percentile of the population of estimates exceeded 0.95, and
14 the section 194.55(d) criterion was satisfied.

15 The determination of the groundwater concentration and individual dose was based on the PA
16 analysis of releases to the Salado Formation interbeds. Therefore, the number of estimates of
17 concentrations and doses caused by releases to the interbeds was the same as the number in the
18 PA and was dependent on the same calculations. The EPA concluded that the assessment of 300
19 realizations of the modeling system meets the requirements of 194.55(d) (CARD 55, U.S.
20 Environmental Protection Agency, 1998b).

21 **55.3.5 40 CFR § 194.55(e)**

22 40 CFR § 194.55(e) requires the DOE to display the full ranges of estimated doses and
23 concentrations. The EPA found that:

- 24 • The estimated doses caused by ingesting water from the USDW were reported in the CCA,
25 Chapter 8.0, Table 8-2. The maximum estimated dose rate from the other relevant pathways
26 (0.46 mrem per year) was reported in the DOE response document (Dials 1997). The all-
27 pathway individual doses were obtained by adding 0.46 mrem per year to those values. The
28 maximum annual dose obtained in this fashion was less than 1 mrem per year (0.93 mrem per
29 year).
- 30 • The CCA, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2.3, pp. 8-15 to 8-16, states that the maximum estimated
31 radium (Ra) concentration across the 9 non-zero realizations was 2.0 picocuries per liter
32 (pCi/L).
- 33 • The CCA, Chapter 8.0, Table 8-1 contains the 300 estimated concentrations for the 5
34 radionuclides americium-241, plutonium-239 (²³⁹Pu), plutonium-238 (²³⁸Pu), uranium-234
35 (²³⁴U), and thorium-230, of which only 9 were above the selection criteria. The 9 radium-
36 226 (²²⁶Ra) concentrations were not separately recorded, but the maximum gross alpha-
37 particle concentration, including Ra and excluding radon (Rn) and U, was reported as 7.81
38 pCi/L. The confidence interval analysis described below under 40 CFR § 194.55(f) used a

1 more conservative approach that added the total radium concentration bound (2.0 pCi/L) to
2 the total of the 5 radionuclide concentrations, including U.

- 3 • The USDW dose estimates were reported in the CCA, Chapter 8.0, Table 8-2.

4 The EPA found the DOE's calculations to be conservative and therefore acceptable (CARD 55,
5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

6 **55.3.6 40 CFR § 194.55(f)**

7 The EPA required the DOE to perform a Performance Assessment Verification Test (PAVT)
8 using modifications to the parameters and codes used in PA. The DOE performed additional
9 compliance assessment calculations of individual dose and radioactivity concentration as part of
10 the CCA PAVT. The mean dose calculated in the CCA PAVT from all pathways was an order
11 of magnitude below the limit of section 191.15. Because all radionuclides contributing to the
12 dose were alpha-emitting, the CCA PAVT also demonstrated compliance with the annual dose
13 equivalent to the total body or any internal organ from beta particle and photon radioactivity in
14 USDWs. The mean radionuclide concentrations calculated in the CCA PAVT for alpha-emitting
15 radionuclides (including Ra but excluding Rn and U) and for ²²⁶Ra and ²²⁸Ra were below the
16 limits of 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart C (U.S. Department of Energy 1997a).

17 The DOE was required to demonstrate that there was at least a 95% level of statistical confidence
18 that the mean and the median of the range of estimated radiation doses were less than 15 mrem
19 per year, and that the range of estimated radionuclide concentrations was compatible (after
20 dilution, as discussed above) with the regulations developed under the Safe Drinking Water Act.
21 The DOE's bounding analysis indirectly verified these requirements by showing that the
22 maximum estimated dose or concentration was always lower than the maximum allowable value.

23 As with the CCA, the CCA PAVT involved groundwater modeling simulations for the
24 undisturbed repository. The results of this modeling projected nonzero groundwater
25 concentrations for 13 of the 300 modeling simulations (as opposed to 9 in the CCA, Appendix
26 PA). The projected groundwater concentrations from the CCA PAVT are found in *Summary of*
27 *EPA-Mandated Performance Assessment Verification Test (Replicate 1) and Comparison with*
28 *the Compliance Certification Application Calculations* (U.S. Department of Energy 1997b) and
29 *Supplemental Summary of EPA-Mandated Performance Assessment Verification Test (All*
30 *Replicates) and Comparison with the Compliance Certification Application Calculations* (U.S.
31 Department of Energy 1997c). The EPA found that the mean and median radionuclide
32 concentrations in groundwater calculated in the CCA PAVT complied with the requirements of
33 Part 191, Subpart C both for gross alpha particle radioactivity (including Ra but excluding Rn
34 and U) and for radioactivity concentration for ²²⁶Ra and ²²⁸Ra (U.S. Environmental Protection
35 Agency 1998c).

36 Drinking-water and all-pathways doses corresponding to projected groundwater concentrations
37 in the CCA PAVT were estimated using the modeling methodology established for the CCA.
38 The DOE initially submitted results for the drinking-water pathway only, where the largest dose
39 value was 3.2×10^{-2} mrem per year (U.S. Department of Energy 1997a, Table 3). Later, in its
40 *Summary of the EPA-Mandated Performance Assessment Verification Test Results for Individual*

1 *Protection Requirements*, the DOE calculated 3.1×10^{-2} mrem per year for all other pathways
2 combined (U.S. Department of Energy 1997d, Table 5). This calculation again resulted in a
3 value two orders of magnitude less than the 15 mrem per year requirement. The EPA's
4 calculation of the total body dose from the DOE's concentrations for the 13 nonzero realizations
5 yielded a maximum value of 3.1×10^{-1} mrem per year (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
6 1998d).

7 The DOE's PAVT analysis of beta, electron, and photon doses to the whole body and to
8 individual internal organs is shown in its *Summary of the EPA Mandated Performance*
9 *Assessment Verification Test Results for Individual Protection Requirements* (U.S. Department
10 of Energy 1997d, Table 3). The DOE demonstrated that the largest organ dose is 2.9×10^{-4}
11 mrem per year on the bone surface. The analysis also showed that the maximum effective dose
12 from beta, electron, and photon emissions is 1.5×10^{-5} mrem per year.

13 Results of the CCA PAVT thus showed that the mean dose contributions from both alpha-
14 emitting radionuclides and from photon- and beta-emitting radionuclides were below the limits
15 in section 191.15 and Part 191 Subpart C.

16 Based on its review of the material provided by the DOE, the EPA concluded that the DOE
17 demonstrated compliance with the requirements of section 194.55. A complete description of
18 the EPA's 1998 Certification Decision for section 194.55 is found in U.S. Environmental
19 Protection Agency 1998e.

20 **55.4 Changes in the CRA-2004**

21 The DOE's methodology for demonstrating compliance with section 194.55 did not change since
22 the CCA. The CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0 described the DOE's compliance with the individual and
23 groundwater protection requirements. The DOE considered and documented uncertainty as
24 required by 40 CFR § 194.55(a), in the CRA-2004, Section 6.1.2. As noted in the CRA-2004,
25 Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1.5, parameter uncertainty was discussed in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA,
26 Attachment PAR to verify compliance with 40 CFR § 194.55(b). The CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0
27 describes how the DOE calculated the effective dose and dose equivalent as required by section
28 194.55(c). The CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1.4 also noted that the DOE's selection of
29 more than 298 sampled vectors fulfills the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.55(d). The DOE also
30 noted in the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1.4 that their bounding analysis adequately
31 fulfilled the requirements of section 194.55(f). The CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1 showed
32 how the DOE considered the full range of estimated radiation doses and radionuclide
33 concentrations as required by section 194.55(e).

34 **55.5 EPA's Evaluation of Compliance for the 2004 Recertification**

35 The EPA reviewed the DOE's CRA-2004 documents, in particular Chapter 8.0. The EPA found
36 that little had changed since the original certification decision. The EPA did not receive any
37 public comments on the DOE's continued compliance with the compliance assessments
38 requirements of section 194.55. The EPA concluded that DOE continued to demonstrate
39 compliance with the requirements of section 194.55 (CARD 55, U.S. Environmental Protection
40 Agency 2006).

1 **55.6 Changes or New Information Since the 2004 Recertification**

2 The DOE's methodology for demonstrating compliance with section 194.55 has not changed
3 since the CRA-2004 or the CCA. Appendix IGP-2009 is an updated version of the CCA,
4 Chapter 8.0 and the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0. It documents the DOE's continued compliance
5 with the individual and groundwater protection requirements. Compliance with the various
6 subsections of section 194.55 is demonstrated as follows:

- 7 • As indicated in Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.1, parameter uncertainty is discussed in
8 Fox 2008 which demonstrates compliance with section 194.55(b).
- 9 • Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.2 describes how the DOE calculates the effective dose
10 and dose equivalent as required by 40 CFR § 194.55(c).
- 11 • Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.4 also explains that the DOE's selection of more than
12 298 sampled vectors fulfills the requirements of section 194.55(d).
- 13 • Appendix IGP-2009, Sections IGP-2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate that the DOE considered the full
14 range of estimated radionuclide concentrations and radiation doses as required by section
15 194.55(e).
- 16 • Appendix IGP-2009, Section IGP-2.4 demonstrates that the DOE's bounding analysis
17 approach meets the requirements of section 194.55(f).

18 Based on this information, the DOE believes that continued compliance with the provisions of
19 section 194.55 is demonstrated.

20 **55.7 References**

21 Dials, G. 1997. Letter to R. Trovato (1 Enclosure). 26 February 1997. U.S. Department of
22 Energy, Carlsbad Area Office, Carlsbad, NM.

23 Fox, B. 2008. *Parameter Summary Report for the CRA-2009* (Revision 0). ERMS 549747.
24 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

25 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
26 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
27 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997a. *Summary of the EPA-Mandated Performance*
29 *Assessment Verification Test Results for the Individual and Groundwater Protection*
30 *Requirements* (September 12). WPO 47258. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997b. *Summary of EPA-Mandated Performance*
32 *Assessment Verification Test (Replicate 1) and Comparison with the Compliance Certification*
33 *Application Calculations*. WPO 46674. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997c. *Supplemental Summary of EPA-Mandated*
2 *Performance Assessment Verification Test (All Replicates) and Comparison with the Compliance*
3 *Certification Application Calculations* (August 8). WPO 46702. ERMS 414879. Carlsbad,
4 NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 5 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997d. *Summary of the EPA-Mandated Performance*
6 *Assessment Verification Test Results for Individual Protection Requirements: Estimated Doses*
7 *to Internal Organs and Total Body from Groundwater Ingestion and to the Total Body from Beef*
8 *Consumption, Vegetable Consumption and Inhalation of Soil* (September 22). WPO#47309.
9 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
11 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
12 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191 Environmental
14 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
15 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
16 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
18 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
19 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
20 5223–45.
- 21 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “CARD No. 51/52: Consideration of
22 Protected Individual and Exposure Pathways.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the*
23 *Criteria for the Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191*
24 *Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 51-1 through 51-11). Washington,
25 DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “CARD No. 55: Results of Compliance
27 Assessments.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification of*
28 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final*
29 *Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 55-1 through 55-25). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
30 Indoor Air.
- 31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998c. *Technical Support Document for Section*
32 *194.55: Compliance Assessment Statistics* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
33 Indoor Air.
- 34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998d. *Technical Support Document for*
35 *Sections 194.51, 19.52, and 194.55: Dose Verification Evaluation* (May). Washington, DC:
36 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 37 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998e. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
38 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the

- 1 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
- 2 1998): 27353–406.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix AUD-2009
Audits and Surveillances**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix AUD-2009
Audits and Surveillances

Table of Contents

AUD-1.0 Introduction..... AUD-1
AUD-2.0 References..... AUD-36

List of Tables

Table AUD-1. Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory AssessmentsAUD-2
Table AUD-2. Idaho National Laboratory Assessments AUD-3
Table AUD-3. Los Alamos National Laboratory Assessments AUD-7
Table AUD-4. Los Alamos National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations Assessments AUD-10
Table AUD-5. Nevada Test Site Assessments..... AUD-11
Table AUD-6. Hanford-Richland Site Assessments..... AUD-12
Table AUD-7. Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site Assessments..... AUD-15
Table AUD-8. Washington TRU Solutions Assessments..... AUD-16
Table AUD-9. Sandia National Laboratories Assessments AUD-22
Table AUD-10. Savannah River Site Assessments AUD-23
Table AUD-11. Carlsbad Field Office Assessments AUD-25
Table AUD-12. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Assessments AUD-27
Table AUD-13. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Assessments AUD-28
Table AUD-14. Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility Assessments..... AUD-29
Table AUD-15. Argonne National Laboratory – East Assessments..... AUD-33
Table AUD-16. Supplier Assessments..... AUD-35

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

A	Audit
AK	acceptable knowledge
AMWTF	Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility
ANL-E	Argonne National Laboratory-East
ARP	Accelerated Retrieval Project
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAO	Carlsbad Area Office
CAR	Corrective Action Report
CAST	CAST Specialty Transportation, Inc.
CBFO	Carlsbad Field Office
CCP	Central Characterization Project
CEMRC	Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring and Research Center
CH	contact-handled
CH-TRU WAC	CH-TRU Waste Acceptance Criteria
CMR	Central Monitoring Room
CMS	Central Monitoring System
CO	Carlsbad Operations
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
CTAC	Carlsbad Field Office Technical Assistance Contractor
CTI	Consonant Technologies, Inc.
DOE	Department of Energy
DQO	data quality objective
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERA	Environmental Resource Associates
GC/MS	Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer
GGTP	Gas Generation Testing Program
HGAS	Health Effects Research Laboratory Gas/Aerosol System
HSG	headspace gas
HWFP	Hazardous Waste Facility Permit
I	indeterminate
INEEL	Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory

INL	Idaho National Laboratory
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LANL-CO	Los Alamos National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations
LLC	Limited Liability Corporation
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
M	marginal
MGSS	mobile gas generation testing sampling system
N/A	not applicable
NDA	nondestructive assay
NQA	nuclear quality assurance
NTS	Nevada Test Site
NWMP	Nuclear Waste Management Program
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
PDP	Performance Demonstration Program
QA	quality assurance
QAP	Quality Assurance Program
QAPD	Quality Assurance Program Document
QAPjP	Quality Assurance Project Plan
RADCON	Radiological Control
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RFETS	Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
RH	remote-handled
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
RL	Hanford-Richland
RTR	real-time radiography
S	1. satisfactory 2. Surveillance
S/RID	Standards/Requirements Identification Document
SCG	Summary Category Group
SDW	Safe Drinking Water
SGS	segmented gamma scanner
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SQA	software quality assurance
SRS	Savannah River Site

SWB	standard waste box
TMP	Transportation Management Plan
TRAMPAC	Transuranic Authorized Methods for Payload Control
TRU	transuranic
TRUPACT-II	Transuranic Package Transporter-II
TSMT	Tri-State Motor Transit Company
TWCP	Transuranic Waste Certification Program
U	unsatisfactory
V&V	verification and validation
VE	visual examination
VOC	volatile organic compound
WAC	Waste Acceptance Criteria
WAP	Waste Analysis Plan
WCPIP	Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WTS	Washington TRU Solutions, LLC
WWIS	WIPP Waste Information System

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **AUD-1.0 Introduction**

2 Tables AUD-1 through AUD-16 of this appendix summarize assessments performed between
3 January 11, 2003 and January 15, 2008 of transuranic (TRU) waste sites, Sandia National
4 Laboratories (SNL), Washington TRU Solutions (WTS), Limited Liability Corporation (LLC),
5 suppliers performing quality-affecting work, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO), and Los Alamos
6 National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations (LANL-CO), and supplement the information
7 contained in the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of
8 Energy 2004a). The summaries are grouped in order of assessment number by the auditing
9 agency (A – Audit, S – Surveillance). Some assessments were performed prior to the end of the
10 CRA-2004, Appendix AUD-2004 reporting date; however, the assessments were not considered
11 complete until the final report and associated regulatory approvals (if required) were
12 documented. Each assessment entry outlines the assessment scope and results. Results of the
13 assessment normally determine the adequacy, implementation, and effectiveness of the auditee’s
14 quality assurance (QA) program. Adequacy addresses the migration of requirements from
15 upper-tier program documents into implementing procedures. Effectiveness addresses whether
16 the controls established in the implementing procedures produce the desired results or end
17 product. For ease of reference, CBFO is used throughout this appendix to mean CAO (Carlsbad
18 Area Office) or CBFO, as appropriate. All assessments were performed to the current
19 requirements in place at the time of the activity.

20 The summary tables include the organization that was assessed, the assessment number, the
21 scope of the assessment, and the results of the assessment expressed as “satisfactory” (S),
22 “marginal” (M), “unsatisfactory” (U), “not applicable” (N/A), or “indeterminate” (I) for the three
23 factors considered during an assessment (i.e., “adequacy,” “implementation,” and
24 “effectiveness”). Indications of M, U, and I are addressed through the corrective action program
25 to bring them up to S. Assessment findings of M, U, and I at TRU waste sites have been
26 corrected or satisfactorily addressed and verified through subsequent audits, surveillances,
27 corrective action reports (CARs), or other means prior to initial certification or continued
28 certification for shipping to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).

29 Only those CBFO assessment activities directly related to 40 CFR Parts 191 (2000) and 194
30 (2004) are included in this appendix. Additional CBFO assessments are performed in other
31 critical areas. In addition, each participant performs internal assessments of their own activities.

1
Table AUD-1. Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
INEEL	A-03-15	5/19 – 5/22/03	Technical and QA activities related to INEEL analytical laboratory, which functions as an independent sampling and analysis laboratory.	S	S	S
				The defined QA program was satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CBFO contract and statement of work, as well as the INEEL implementing procedures. Technical areas evaluated were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
INEEL	A-04-17	05/25 – 05/27/04	Technical and QA activities related to the INEEL analytical laboratory, which functions as an independent sampling and analysis laboratory.	S	S	S
				The defined QA program was satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CBFO contract and statement of work, as well as the INEEL implementing procedures. Technical areas evaluated were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
INEEL	S-04-09	02/10 – 02/11/04	Continued implementation and effectiveness of technical and QA activities related to the INEEL analytical laboratory functioning as an independent sampling and analysis laboratory.	S	S	S
				INEEL technical and QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) (U.S. Department of Energy 2007); the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) (State of New Mexico 1999); and the Contact-Handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) for the WIPP (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a). The QA program was satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CBFO contract and statement of work, as well as the INEEL implementing procedures. The INEEL technical areas evaluated were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		

Table AUD-2. Idaho National Laboratory Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
INL	A-05-12	05/03 – 05/06/05	INL TRU waste characterization activities performed by or for INL by the Central Characterization Project (CCP).	S	S	S
				The defined QA and Technical programs and processes for these activities were satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CCP TRU Waste Characterization Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPjP) and its implementing procedures.		
INL	A-05-13	05/02 – 05/04/05	Technical and QA activities related to the INL Transuranic Waste Certification Program (TWCP) analytical laboratory functioning as an independent sampling and analysis laboratory.	S	S	S
				The defined QA program was satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CBFO contract and statement of work, as well as the INL-TWCP implementing procedures. Technical areas evaluated were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
INL	A-06-14	04/18 – 04/21/06	INL/CCP TRU waste characterization and certification activities as they relate to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) for Summary Category Group (SCG) S3000 homogeneous solids, S4000 soil/gravel, and S5000 debris waste.	S	S	S
				The INL/CCP technical areas evaluated were satisfactorily implemented and are effective.		
INL	A-06-15	04/25 – 04/27/06	INL/CCP TRU waste characterization activities performed by CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the CH-TRU Waste Acceptance Criteria (CH-TRU WAC) for the WIPP (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), and the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), as related to QA and nondestructive assay (NDA) activities.	S	S	S
				The INL/CCP technical NDA and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
INL	A-06-16	06/05 – 06/08/06	Technical and QA activities related to the INL TWCP, which functions as an independent sampling and analysis laboratory.	S	S	S
				The INL technical and QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007); the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999); and the CH-TRU WAC for the WIPP (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a). The defined QA program was still satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CBFO contract and statement of work, as well as the INL implementing procedures. INL technical areas evaluated were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		

Table AUD-2. Idaho National Laboratory Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
INL	A-06-17	01/12 – 01/13/06	INL TWCP for Small Container Sampling activities as they are related to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) and the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007).	S	S	S
				TWCP Small Container Sampling technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
INL	A-06-21	06/13 – 06/16/06	INL TRU waste characterization activities performed for INL by the CCP.	S	S	S
				The INL/CCP QA program, as applicable to audited activities, was satisfactory in addressing established requirements.		
INL	A-07-06	05/08 – 05/10/07	Technical and QA activities related to the INL TWCP. Review of the transition of INL TWCP to the CCP QA Program.	S	S	S
				INL TWCP technical and QA procedures remain adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) Waste Analysis Plan (WAP).		
INL	A-07-07	04/24 – 04/27/06	INL TRU waste characterization activities.	S	S	S
				The INL/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, was satisfactory in addressing established requirements.		
INL	A-07-16	11/16 – 11/17/06	INL TRU waste characterization activities performed for INL by the CCP.	S	S	S
				INL/CCP Remote-handled (RH)-TRU technical procedures and QA program activities evaluated were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
INL	A-07-19	05/08 – 05/10/07	INL/CCP TRU waste characterization and certification activities as they relate to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) for characterization and recertification of CH-TRU SCG S3000 homogeneous solids, S5000 debris, and S4000 soils/gravel wastes, and RH-TRU SCG S5000 debris waste stream ID-ANL-E-S5000.	S	S	S
				INL/CCP technical procedures and QA program activities were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
INL	A-08-10	10/30 – 11/1/07	TRU waste characterization activities performed for INL by the CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WIPP TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), the RH-TRU Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan and the Transuranic Authorized Methods for Payload Control	S	S	S
				INL/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		

Table AUD-2. Idaho National Laboratory Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
			(TRAMPAC) (U.S. Department of Energy 2005a).			
INL	A-08-11	01/29 – 01/30/08	INL/CCP TRU waste characterization activities as they relate to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) and the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) for characterization of SCG S4000 soils/gravel waste.	S	S	S
				The INL/CCP program for characterization and certification activities related to SCG S4000 (soil/gravel) was adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
INL	S-05-13	07/06/05	Technical and QA activities at the INL conducted by the CCP.	S	S	S
				Activities evaluated were satisfactorily implemented.		
INL	S-06-07	10/11 – 10/13/05	Transfer of the real-time radiography (RTR) Unit 5 system for nondestructive examination, which was transferred from the Nevada Test Site (NTS) CCP to the INL/CCP site for TRU waste characterization activities. System operability and the implementation of associated procedures were also evaluated.	S	S	S
				Activities and procedures evaluated were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
INL	S-06-32	08/09/06	Documentation establishing that a QA program equivalent in effect to the nuclear quality assurance (NQA) standards was applied to mass spectroscopy measurements used to develop the isotopic scaling factors used for characterizing RH-TRU waste.	S	S	S
				The mass spectroscopy measurements were conducted in accordance with a QA program equivalent in effect to the NQA standards applicable to the WIPP.		
INL	S-07-11	10/11 – 10/12/06	Installation, setup, and use of the Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer (GC/MS) VOA-5 system for analysis of solidified waste samples for volatile organic compounds (VOCs); system operability and the implementation of associated procedures.	S	S	S
				The GC/MS VOA-5 system was installed properly and initial activities were completed successfully. The VOA-5 system was performing acceptably for TRU waste characterization activities. The applicable implementing procedures for this system and activity were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
INL	S-07-15	01/23 – 01/25/07	Policies, plans, and procedures related to the operation of the INL/CCP RH-TRU RTR and CH-TRU NDA SuperHENC (High Efficiency Neutron Counter) characterization equipment.	S	S	S
				INL/CCP NDA activities, RH-TRU radiography process, CCP software procedures, and software quality assurance (SQA) process were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective for operation of the INL/CCP SuperHENC NDA equipment.		
INL	S-07-33	09/18 – 09/19/07	Policies, plans, and procedures related to the Accelerated Retrieval Project (ARP) sampling	S	S	S
				INL/CCP activities had adequate procedures that were effectively		

Table AUD-2. Idaho National Laboratory Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
			activities for S3000 and S5000 wastes conducted at INL by the CCP.	implemented.		
INL	S-08-05	11/06 – 11/07/07	INL/CCP QA program activities related to headspace gas (HSG) analysis; sampling and analysis of homogeneous solids and soil/gravel waste; and generation-level data verification and validation (V&V).	S	S	S
				INL/CCP procedures were satisfactorily implemented and evaluated processes were effective.		
INL	S-08-07	01/15 – 01/17/08	Policies, plans, and procedures related to the ARP visual examination (VE) process for newly generated wastes performed at INL by the CCP.	S	S	S
				INL/CCP VE activities were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		

Table AUD-3. Los Alamos National Laboratory Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
LANL	A-03-07	07/08 – 07/10/03	HSG sampling, analysis, and associated activities utilizing the Entech/Agilent system.	S	S	S
				The LANL process for obtaining manual HSG samples was adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999). LANL technical processes were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
LANL	A-03-27	09/22 – 09/26/03	LANL TWCP, including QA and WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) activities.	S	S	S
				LANL technical and QA processes and procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
LANL	A-04-05	04/26 – 04/30/04	CCP TRU waste characterization and certification activities related to S3000 (homogeneous solid waste) and S5000 (debris waste) and the adequacy, implementation, and effectiveness of the technical and QA activities.	S	S	S
				CCP technical and QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WAP of the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), and the WIPP WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).		
LANL	A-05-09	04/11 – 04/15/05	CCP TRU waste characterization and certification activities related to SCG S3000 (retrievably stored homogeneous solid waste) and S5000 (retrievably stored, newly generated, and repackaged retrievably stored debris waste), and the adequacy, implementation, and effectiveness of the technical and QA activities.	S	S	S
				Assessed activities were satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CCP QAPjP and the implementing procedures. The established technical processes and the QA program were effective.		

Table AUD-3. Los Alamos National Laboratory Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
LANL	A-06-11	05/15 – 05/18/06	LANL TRU waste characterization activities performed for LANL by the CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				LANL/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements. The defined QA and technical programs for SCG S3000 (homogeneous solids) and S5000 (debris waste) were satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CCP QAPjP and its implementing procedures, and the processes were effective.		
LANL	A-06-12	05/22 – 05/25/06	LANL TRU waste characterization and transportation activities performed for LANL by the CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				LANL/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements. The defined QA and technical programs for SCG S3000 (homogeneous solids) and S5000 (debris waste) were satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CCP QAPjP and its implementing procedures, and the processes were effective.		
LANL	A-07-12	05/22 – 05/24/07	LANL TRU waste characterization activities performed for LANL by the CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				LANL/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to the audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
LANL	A-07-13	05/15 – 05/17/07	LANL TRU waste characterization and transportation activities performed for LANL by the CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), and the RH-TRU Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan (WCPIP).	S	S	S
				LANL/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements. The defined QA and technical programs for SCGs S3000 (homogeneous solids) and S5000 (debris waste) (including RH-TRU waste) were satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the CCP QAPjP and its implementing procedures, and the processes were effective.		
LANL	A-07-23	04/9 – 04/11/07	The peer review process conducted for the qualification of VE characterization data to the data quality objectives (DQOs) and QA objectives as defined in the WIPP WCPIP.	S	S	S
				The peer review process was satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
LANL	S-03-17	08/05 – 08/07/03	Implementation of the technical requirements contained in the RH-TRU waste WCPIP as applied to RH-TRU waste packaged in RH-72B canisters. Implementation and effectiveness of using "equivalent	N/A	N/A	N/A
				Because the requirements for RH-TRU waste characterization were not issued at the time of the surveillance, and the work presented at the demonstration was not performed in accordance with the QA		

Table AUD-3. Los Alamos National Laboratory Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
			quality assurance program” as a method of qualifying characterization data for the waste contained in these canisters.	requirements specified in the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the information reviewed during S-03-17 could not be used for waste certification purposes. Therefore, no report was issued for this surveillance.		
LANL	S-04-05	10/27 – 10/31/03	Adequacy and effectiveness of the Sealed Source Peer Review process conducted by the Offsite Source Recovery Project, LANL.	S	S	S
				The overall process was adequate and effective.		
LANL	S-04-13	09/21 – 09/23/04	LANL 2010 Project characterization and certification activities performed after CBFO Audit A-03-27. Project records disposition and turnover activities, including preparation and turnover of applicable software programs for continued access and use, disposition and turnover of acceptable knowledge (AK) records for waste to be characterized and certified by the LANL/CCP.	S	S	S
				The areas evaluated were satisfactorily implemented.		

Table AUD-4. Los Alamos National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
LANL-CO	A-04-11	01/12 – 01/14/04	Implementation of requirements in the LANL/Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring and Research Center (CEMRC) Memorandum of Understanding, the CEMRC Quality Assurance Plan (QAP), and the QAP Addendum A.	U	U	U
				The QA program for the Actinide Chemistry and Repository Science Program in support of the WIPP, as implemented by LANL-CO in accordance with CEMRC procedures, was unsatisfactory. The following CARs were issued as a result of the assessment: 04-011, CEMRC procedures do not adequately meet the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007); 04-012, LANL management has not developed an effective Quality Assurance Program (QAP); 04-013, Records packages and records disposition do not meet requirements; 04-014, Inadequate implementation of management assessments; and 04-015, Use of chain-of-custody forms (U.S. Department of Energy 2008b). Corrective actions were verified on May 19, 2004, and the CARs were closed on June 6, 2004.		
LANL-CO	A-05-06	02/22 – 02/24/05	Implementation of requirements in the LANL-CO/CEMRC Interface Document, LANL-CO QAP, and LANL-CO implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				The LANL-CO QA program, as implemented by LANL-CO in accordance with LANL-CO procedures, was adequate and effective with the exception of procurement, which was indeterminate.		
LANL-CO	A-06-08	02/27 – 03/01/06	Implementation of requirements in the LANL-CO/CEMRC Interface Document, LANL-CO QAP, and LANL-CO implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				The audit team concluded that the LANL-CO QA program was adequate and effective.		
LANL-CO	A-07-08	02/20 – 02/22/07	Implementation of requirements in the LANL-CO/CEMRC Interface Document, LANL-CO QAP, and LANL-CO implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				The LANL-CO QA program was adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
LANL-CO	S-05-15	07/26 – 07/27/05	Procurement activities, including training of personnel implementing the procurement procedure, procurement of items for both Quality Level 1 (QL1) and Quality Level 2 (QL2), receipt of QL1 procurement, supplier qualification, determination of quality levels for procurement, and identification of items for procurement.	S	S	S
				Overall, the LANL/CO Procurement program and implementing procedure were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007).		
LANL-CO	S-07-09	07/10 – 07/11/07	Policies, plans, and procedures related to the Actinide Chemistry Program at the LANL-CO/CEMRC.	S	S	S
				LANL-CO/CEMRC activities had appropriate procedures and were effectively implemented.		

Table AUD-5. Nevada Test Site Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
NTS	A-04-04	10/06 – 10/09/03	Reevaluate the NTS/CCP.	S	S	S
				Technical processes and the QA program and procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the CCP QAPjP and implementing procedures, and the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) WAP.		
NTS	A-05-02	10/05 – 10/08/04	NTS TRU waste characterization activities performed by NTS or for NTS by the CCP, including S5000 debris waste, relative to the requirements of the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).	S	S	S
				The NTS/CCP technical processes and QA programs met requirements contained in the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), CCP QAPjP, and related NTS/CCP implementing procedures.		
NTS	S-04-11	08/03 – 08/04/04	Technical and QA activities related to the redeployment of characterization equipment at the NTS by the CCP in support of Bechtel Nevada characterization activities.	S	S	S
				The NTS/CCP areas evaluated were satisfactorily implemented.		
NTS	S-06-02	12/05 – 12/07/05	Characterization and certification activities performed since CBFO Audit A-05-02, conducted on October 5 – 8, 2004, NTS/CCP project records disposition, and turnover activities between NTS and CCP.	S	S	S
				The project records and service activities of CCP were procedurally adequate, and the procedures were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		

Table AUD-6. Hanford-Richland Site Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
RL	A-03-14	06/16 – 06/20/03	Reevaluate the adequacy, implementation, and effectiveness of the RL TRU waste characterization, transportation, and certification activities.	S	S	S
				RL technical and QA procedures continued to be adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WAP of the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) Safety Analysis Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2005b), the TRAMPAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2005a), and the TRUPACT-II Certificate of Compliance (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission).		
RL	A-03-25	09/08 – 09/11/03	RL/CCP waste characterization activities relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).	S	S	S
				RL/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to the audited activities, met the requirements contained in the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
RL	A-04-06	11/04 – 11/05/03	RL processes for sample design, reconciliation of DQOs and the administrative processes ensuring project-level V&V, and the subsequent confirmation of AK. Technical and selected QA activities.	S	S	S
				Technical and QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WAP of the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), and the WIPP WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).		
RL	A-04-07	11/11 – 11/13/03	HSG sampling, analysis, and associated activities utilizing the CCP single-sample manifold HSG sampling and analysis system.	S	S	S
				The single-sample manifold HSG sampling and analysis system and process employed by CCP for obtaining and analyzing HSG samples was adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999). CCP technical processes were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		

Table AUD-6. Hanford-Richland Site Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
RL	A-04-19	06/15 – 06/18/04	RL TRU waste characterization, transportation, and certification activities.	S	S	S
				RL technical and QA procedures continued to be adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WAP of the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2005b), the TRAMPAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2005a), and the TRUPACT-II Certificate of Compliance (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission).		
RL	A-05-14	06/20 – 06/24/05	RL TRU waste characterization, transportation, and certification activities.	S	S	S
				RL technical and QA procedures continued to be adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2005b), the TRAMPAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2005a), and the TRUPACT-II Certificate of Compliance (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission).		
RL	A-05-18	06/13 – 06/16/05	RL TRU waste characterization, transportation, and certification activities.	S	S	S
				RL technical and QA procedures continued to be adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the WAP of the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
RL	A-06-18	06/19 – 06/22/06	RL TRU waste characterization and certification activities.	S	S	S
				RL technical and QA procedures continued to be adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the WAP of the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
RL	A-06-19	06/26 – 06/29/06	RL TRU waste characterization, transportation, and certification activities.	S	S	S
				RL technical and QA procedures continued to be adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2005b), the TRAMPAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2005a), and the TRUPACT-II Certificate of Compliance (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission).		

Table AUD-6. Hanford-Richland Site Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
RL	A-07-10	06/19 – 06/21/07	RL TRU waste characterization and certification activities.	S	S	S
				RL technical and QA procedures continued to be adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the WAP of the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
RL	A-07-11	06/04 – 06/07/07	RL TRU waste characterization, transportation, and certification activities.	S	S	S
				RL technical and QA programs and procedures continued to be adequate and effectively implemented relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2005b), the TRAMPAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2005a), and the TRUPACT-II Certificate of Compliance (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission).		
RL	S-03-14	04/29/03	Technical activities related to the RL TRU waste characterization activities for HSG sampling and gastight (a.k.a. airtight) seal of pipe overpack containers at the Waste Receiving and Processing facility, as applied to SCGs S3000, homogeneous solids, and S5000, debris waste.	S	S	S
				RL technical procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a). The RL QA Program met the requirements of the QAPD and WAC.		

Table AUD-7. Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
RFETS	A-03-04	10/01 – 10/02/02	RFETS TRU waste characterization activities relative to the requirements contained in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), and QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007).	S	S	S
				RFETS technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
RFETS	A-03-22	07/22 – 07/24/03	RFETS TRU waste characterization activities relative to the requirements contained in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), and QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007).	S	S	S
				RFETS technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
RFETS	A-04-08	10/28 – 10/29/03	RFETS TRU waste characterization activities for SCG S4000 soils/gravels, relative to the requirements of the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) and the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007).	S	S	S
				RFETS technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
RFETS	A-04-10	03/30 – 04/02/04	RFETS TRU waste characterization activities for debris and solid waste relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).	S	S	S
				RFETS technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements contained in the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
RFETS	S-03-12	01/11/03	Life-cycle documentation, configuration management, and change control for software related to RFETS Health Effects Research Laboratory Gas/Aerosol System (HGAS) analysis systems provided by LANL.	S	S	S
				Software for the HGAS systems was classified in accordance with procedures and the life-cycle documentation and software control were acceptable.		
RFETS	S-05-03	12/20 – 12/21/04	Technical and QA activities at RFETS.	S	S	S
				The activities evaluated were satisfactorily implemented.		
RFETS	S-05-10	04/26 – 04/27/05	Technical and QA activities at RFETS at the end of project.	S	S	S
				The activities evaluated were satisfactorily implemented.		

Table AUD-8. Washington TRU Solutions Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
WTS	A-04-28	06/02 – 06/03/04 and 06/07/04	WTS data processing activities over the last seven years as related to selected portions of the Environmental Monitoring program.	S	S	S
				WTS procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of data processing requirements from the Compliance Certification Application and CRA-2004.		
WTS	A-03-17	03/17 – 03/20/07	WTS Repository Development Project procedures and implementation of applicable QA requirements defined in American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NQA-1, 1989, and the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and WTS QAPD.	S	S	S
				WTS Repository Development Project QA Program was adequate and the implementing procedures were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
WTS	A-03-19	05/27 – 05/29/03	WTS Surface Operations and Maintenance activities, procedures, and implementation of the applicable WTS QA requirements as defined in ASME NQA-1, 1989 edition, and the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and WTS QAPD.	S	S	S
				WTS Surface Operations and Maintenance QA program was adequate and the implementing procedures were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
WTS	A-03-20	07/14 – 07/16/03	WTS Waste Operations activities and implementation of the applicable WTS QA requirements defined in ASME NQA-1, 1989 edition, and the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and WTS QAPD. WTS Waste Handling Operation implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				WTS Waste Handling Operation QA program and implementing procedures were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	A-03-23	09/08 – 09/09/03	Verify that the WTS Safety and Health QA Program met applicable requirements as defined in ASME NQA-1-1989 edition; NQA-2a-1990 addenda, part 2.7, to ASME NQA-2-1989 edition and ASME NQA-3-1989 edition (excluding Sections 2.1 (b) and (c) and Section 17.1); and the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007). The adequacy, implementation, and effectiveness of the WTS Safety and Health implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				WTS Safety and Health QA program and implementing procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the ASME NQA documents.		

Table AUD-8. Washington TRU Solutions Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
WTS	A-04-13	02/23 – 02/26/04	WTS continued implementation of the QA requirements defined in the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), NQA-1 elements, and applicable WTS implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				WTS QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and WTS implementing procedures and processes are effective.		
WTS	A-04-21	08/02 – 08/05/04	Technical and QA processes related to the WTS QA program and waste handling activities.	S	S	S
				The WTS QA Program was adequate relative to the flow down of selected requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), ASME NQA-1, 1989 edition, the WTS QAPD, ASME NQA-1, 1989 edition, the WTS QAPD, and WTS implementing procedures. Implementing procedures were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
WTS	A-05-07	04/18 – 04/21/05	WTS QA program as applied to waste processing activities.	S	S	S
				The WTS QA Program was adequate relative to the flow down of selected requirements from the WTS QAPD, ASME NQA-1, 1989 edition, and the WTS QAPD and implementing procedures. Implementing procedures were satisfactorily implemented and are effective.		
WTS	A-05-19	07/05 – 07/06/05	WTS continued implementation of the QA requirements defined in the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and applicable WTS implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				WTS QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the QA program was effective.		
WTS	A-05-20	09/26 – 09/29/05	WTS continued implementation of NQA-1 Criteria 3, 5, 8 through 14, NQA-2 Part 2.7, and applicable WTS implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				WTS QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the QA program was effective.		
WTS	A-06-13	05/09 – 05/15/06	WTS continued implementation of NQA-1 Criteria 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, and 18, and applicable WTS implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				WTS QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the QA program was effective.		
WTS	A-06-22	08/07 – 08/10/06	WTS continued implementation of Waste Handling Operations procedures.	S	S	S
				WTS waste handling operations procedures contained adequate flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and U.S. Department of Energy		

Table AUD-8. Washington TRU Solutions Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
				(DOE) documents, and the Waste Handling Operations program was effective.		
WTS	A-06-26	09/18 – 09/20/06	WTS continued implementation of DOE/CBFO-94-1012, QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007).	S	S	S
				WTS QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007).		
WTS	A-07-09	03/20 – 03/22/07	WTS continued implementation of a QA Program related to Criteria 1 through 9 of the QAP Requirements for Nuclear Facilities.	S	S	S
				WTS QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the upper-tier documents.		
WTS	A-07-18	04/09 – 04/17/07	QA and technical activities related to waste handling operations at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				WTS waste handling operations procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the upper-tier documents.		
WTS	A-07-25	09/18 – 09/20/07	WTS continued implementation of a QA program in relation to ASME NQA-1, 1989 Edition.	S	S	S
				WTS QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the upper-tier documents.		
WTS	S-05-19	08/17 – 08/18/05	The adequacy, implementation and effectiveness of the WTS Seismic Monitoring Operations.	S	S	S
				WTS Seismic Monitoring Operations for the surface and underground process and associated activities were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
WTS	S-05-21	09/26 – 09/28/05	The adequacy, implementation and effectiveness of WTS Ground Control and Mine Safety.	S	S	S
				WTS Ground Control and Mine Safety processes and associated activities were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
WTS	S-06-01	10/11 – 10/13/05	Fire protection activities in both the surface and underground operations at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				WTS Fire Protection processes and associated activities were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
WTS	S-06-03	11/15 – 11/17/05	Dosimetry activities in both the surface and underground operations at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The WTS Dosimetry Program was adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-06-04	12/12 – 12/15/05	Subsidence monitoring activities at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The WTS Subsidence Monitoring Program and associated activities were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		

Table AUD-8. Washington TRU Solutions Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
WTS	S-06-08	01/10 – 01/12/06	The Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) change and update process and the requirements document impact analysis process.	S	S	S
				The WTS S/RID change and update process and the requirements document impact assessment process and implementing procedures was adequate, implementation was satisfactory, and the process was effective.		
WTS	S-06-10	02/14/06	The Receipt Inspection Process, as implemented by WTS at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The Receipt Inspection Process was adequately described in the WTS QAPD and implementing procedures. The WTS receipt inspection procedures were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
WTS	S-06-12	09/26 – 09/27/06	Graded approach documentation and use in work processes, associated independent assessments of the graded approach, and training of personnel making graded approach decisions.	S	S	S
				The WTS and CCP Graded Approach activities were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-06-13	03/14/06	The WTS TRUPACT-III procurement activities being conducted at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				Implementation of the WTS activities involved in the TRUPACT-III procurement and QA oversight were effective and adequate to comply with regulatory and CBFO requirements.		
WTS	S-06-15	06/13 – 06/14/06	The WTS QAP with respect to the discharge permit activities and CBFO documents. WTS discharge permit implementing procedures.	S	S	S
				WTS activities evaluated were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-06-17	04/04 – 04/05/06	Policies, plans and procedures related to the operation, inspection/verification and maintenance of the WTS Mine Ventilation System.	S	S	S
				Activities associated with the operation and maintenance of the mine ventilation system were appropriately proceduralized and effectively implemented. Personnel had received the training appropriate to their assigned task. Records were maintained as required.		
WTS	S-06-22	07/31 – 08/3/06	WTS Radiological Control (RADCON) Program for the entire site operations at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The WTS RADCON Program is adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-06-27	09/11 – 09/12/06	WTS Central Monitoring Room (CMR) operations at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				WTS CMR operations were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		

Table AUD-8. Washington TRU Solutions Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
WTS	S-06-28	08/29 – 08/30/06	The WTS Safe Drinking Water (SDW) process at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The WTS SDW process was adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-06-30	09/18 – 09/21/06	SQA controls applied to the WIPP Waste Information System (WWIS).	S	S	S
				WTS SQA controls applied to the WWIS are adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007). Implementation of software controls is satisfactorily performed in compliance with WTS implementing procedures. The SQA control program is effective with respect to WWIS software.		
WTS	S-06-31	09/19 – 09/20/06	The Groundwater Monitoring Program, as implemented by WTS at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The WTS Groundwater Monitoring Program was adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-06-34	08/07 – 08/10/06	Procedure steps for the standing orders process as found in procedure WP 04-CO, Conduct of Operations procedure.	S	S	S
				WTS standing order process procedures were adequate and procedure implementation, documentation, and training were effective.		
WTS	S-06-35	09/13/06	This surveillance was a follow-up to CBFO Surveillance S-06-04, Subsidence Monitoring, conducted December 12-15, 2005. This surveillance evaluated the Subsidence Survey Data Acquisition process not evaluated during Surveillance S-06-04.	S	S	S
				The WTS Subsidence Survey Data Acquisition process was adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-07-02	11/06 – 11/07/07	Policies, plans, and procedures related to the procurement process (requisition through purchase order and placement).	S	S	S
				Procurement activities are performed as required. Procedures were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-07-04	10/25/06	WTS processes that allow for the off-site shipment of WTS hazardous waste to permitted disposal sites.	S	S	S
				WTS processes are adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-07-06	01/16 – 01/18/07	WTS VOC monitoring program for site operations at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The VOC monitoring program is adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		

Table AUD-8. Washington TRU Solutions Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
WTS	S-07-07	02/05 – 02/06/07	WTS policies, plans, and procedures related to the electrical safety program at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The electrical safety program was adequately described in the WTS QAPD and implementing procedures. The WTS electrical safety program and procedures were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
WTS	S-07-08	03/06 – 03/08/07	WTS activities associated with the WTS maintenance program at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The WTS maintenance program is adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-07-14	06/12/07	The WTS Monitoring Program – Delaware Basin operations at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				WTS Monitoring Program – Delaware Basin operations were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-07-24	06/19 – 06/20/07	Fire protection activities in both the surface and underground operations at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				WTS Fire Protection processes and associated activities were satisfactorily implemented and effective.		
WTS	S-07-31	09/05/07	Software activities in association with the Central Monitoring System (CMS) at the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The WTS CMS software activities were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
WTS	S-07-32	07/19/07	Procedures describing software back-up activities applied to safety-related software such as the CMS and other software applications used for design and modeling of possible release of material from the WIPP.	S	S	S
				WTS software QA activities related to safety software applications were acceptable, and procedure implementation and software QA documentation were effective.		

Table AUD-9. Sandia National Laboratories Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
SNL	A-04-02	11/17 – 11/20/03	SNL NWMP QA Program for the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The SNL NWMP QA program for the WIPP remained adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
SNL	A-05-05	11/15 – 11/18/04	SNL NWMP QA Program for the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The SNL NWMP QA program for the WIPP remained adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
SNL	A-06-05	11/28 – 12/2/05	SNL NWMP QA Program for the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The SNL NWMP QA program for the WIPP remains adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
SNL	A-07-04	11/27 – 11/30/06	SNL NWMP QA Program for the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The SNL NWMP QA program for the WIPP was adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
SNL	A-08-05	11/13 – 11/15/07	SNL WIPP QA Program for the WIPP.	S	S	S
				The SNL WIPP QA program for the WIPP was adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		

Table AUD-10. Savannah River Site Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
SRS	A-03-16	03/25 – 03/27/03	The CCP IQ3 NDA at the SRS relative to TRU waste characterization activities for waste shipped to the WIPP.	S	S	S
				CCP technical processes and procedures associated with the IQ3 NDA System and selected QA program elements were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
SRS	A-04-01	10/21 – 10/24/03	SRS TRU waste characterization activities performed by SRS or for SRS by the CCP for debris waste relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).	S	S	S
				The defined QA and technical processes for the audited activities were implemented in accordance with the CCP TRU waste QAPjP and related SRS/CCP implementing procedures. Audited processes were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
SRS	A-05-01	10/26 – 10/29/04	SRS TRU waste characterization activities performed by SRS or for SRS by the CCP for debris waste, relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).	S	S	S
				SRS/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to the audited activities, met requirements contained in the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
SRS	A-06-01	10/24 – 10/28/05	SRS TRU waste characterization activities performed by SRS or for SRS by the CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the CH-TRU WAC for the WIPP (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				SRS technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
SRS	A-07-01	10/24 – 10/26/06	SRS TRU waste characterization activities performed by the SRS CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the CH-TRU WAC for the WIPP (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				The SRS/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
SRS	A-07-02	10/31 – 11/02/07	SRS TRU waste characterization activities performed for SRS by the CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				The SRS/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		

Table AUD-10. Savannah River Site Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
SRS	A-07-24	07/31 – 08/02/07	SRS TRU waste characterization activities of the Battelle Columbus RH-TRU SCG S5000 (debris waste) performed for SRS by the CCP, relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				SRS/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to the audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
SRS	A-08-01	10/30 – 11/01/07	SRS TRU waste characterization activities performed by the SRS CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the WAC for the WIPP (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				SRS/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
SRS	S-03-10	01/14/03	Characterization and certification activities for CCP shipment of overpack containers from the SRS to the WIPP.	S	S	S
				Procedures and associated data for characterization and certification of the standard waste box (SWB) overpacks were reviewed and were found acceptable. The selection process of overpack candidate drums complied with the WIPP WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a). Input of overpack documentation into the CCP database was correct for the sampled fields. WIPP WAC limits were acceptable for the overpack shipment payload.		
SRS	S-06-21	04/18/06	RTR and VE activities being conducted at the SRS.	S	S	S
				Implementation of the SRS/CCP activities involved in the RTR and VE activities were effective and adequate to comply with regulatory and CBFO requirements.		
SRS	S-07-28	08/07 – 08/08/07	SRS Mobile segmented gamma scanner (SGS) operations performed by CCP relative to the requirements detailed in DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Rev. 6, WIPP WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				SGS activities were determined to be adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		

Table AUD-11. Carlsbad Field Office Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
CBFO	A-04-16	05/10 – 05/13/04 and 05/26/04	The adequacy, implementation, and effectiveness of selected CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) requirements in accordance with selected criteria of ASME NQA-1, 1989 edition.	S	S	S
				CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and applicable implementing procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from NQA-1 selected criteria, with the exception of CBFO Management Procedure 2.1, Personnel Qualification and Training, which was determined to be unsatisfactory. Corrective actions continued to be effective for selected CARs (U.S. Department of Energy 2008b) generated during CBFO Surveillance S-03-08.		
CBFO	A-04-24	09/07 – 09/09/04	Selected CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) sections addressing selected criteria of the ASME NQA-1, 1989 edition and NQA-2-1990a, part 2.7, and the associated QAPD implementing procedures.	I	I	I
				Although the CBFO organizational structure appeared to meet the intent of ASME/NQA-1-1989, the implementation and effectiveness of the organization were indeterminate because of the lack of implementing procedures reflecting the new organization.		
CBFO	A-06-06	12/13– 12/20/05	Selected sections of DOE-CBFO-94-1012, CBFO QAPD, Rev. 7, and implementing procedures, addressing selected criteria of the ASME NQA-1-1989 edition.	S	S	S
				The CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) was adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the applicable NQA-1 criteria, and the CBFO QA implementing procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD.		
CBFO	A-07-05	02/20 – 02/22/07	Selected sections of DOE-CBFO-94-1012, CBFO QAPD, Rev. 8, and associated implementing procedures, addressing selected criteria of the ASME NQA-1-1989 edition.	S	S	S
				The CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) was adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the applicable NQA-1 criteria, and the CBFO QA implementing procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD.		
CBFO	A-07-20	06/04 – 06/05/07	Selected sections of DOE-CBFO-94-1012, CBFO QAPD, Rev. 8, and associated implementing procedures, addressing selected criteria of the ASME NQA-1-1989 edition.	S	S	S
				The CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) was adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the applicable NQA-1 criteria, and the CBFO QA implementing procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD.		

Table AUD-11. Carlsbad Field Office Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
CBFO	S-03-16	06/09 – 06/10/03	The effectiveness of the CBFO corrective action reporting and tracking system.	S	S	S
				The CAR tracking information, CBFO Management Assessment finding information, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finding information was being gathered, reported, and distributed adequately to facilitate prompt completion of corrective actions and closure of related CARs and findings.		

1

Table AUD-12. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
LLNL	A-04-25	05/04 – 05/07/04	LLNL/CCP TRU waste characterization and certification activities related to SCG S5000 (debris waste), including technical and QA activities (U.S. Department of Energy 2004b).	S	S	S
				CCP technical and QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
LLNL	S-05-11	07/19/05	Characterization and certification activities performed after the CBFO Audit A-04-25, which was conducted on May 4 – 7, 2004, and LLNL/CCP project records disposition and turnover activities between LLNL and CCP.	S	S	S
				CCP project records service activities were adequately proceduralized, procedures were satisfactorily implemented and effective. Characterization and certification activities ensured continuing processing to implementing procedures.		

Table AUD-13. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
ORNL	A-08-04	12/04 – 12/06/07	ORNL TRU waste characterization activities performed for ORNL by the CCP relative to the requirements detailed in the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).	S	S	S
				ORNL/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to the audited activities, were adequate and satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
ORNL	A-08-06	11/13 – 11/15/07	ORNL technical processes related to the CCP program as applied to AK and NDA.	S	S	S
				The procedures, processes, and controls in place were adequate, efficient, and effectively implemented to comply with the technical and QA processes to control the work and waste certification.		

Table AUD-14. Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
AMWTF	A-03-05	08/18 – 08/22/03	Technical processes of INEEL AMWTF TRU waste characterization activities as they relate to the addition of the Consonant Technologies, Inc. (CTI) headspace sampling system for S3000 (solids) waste.	S	S	S
				The AMWTF technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
AMWTF	A-04-12	04/12 – 04/15/04	The technical processes of INEEL AMWTF TRU waste characterization activities as they relate to the addition of the CTI HSG sampling and analysis system for SCG S3000 (solids) waste.	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, was satisfactory in meeting the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007) and the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999). Defined QA and technical programs for these activities were implemented in accordance with applicable requirement documents and the implementing procedures.		
AMWTF	A-04-22	08/16 – 08/20/04	Technical and QA processes related to the INEEL AMWTF TRU waste characterization and certification activities as they relate to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) for SCG S3000 homogenous solids waste.	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical and QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) WAP, and CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a). The defined QA Program was being satisfactorily implemented in accordance with the AMWTF QAPjP (Arbon 2003), and the Certification Plan.		
AMWTF	A-05-08	03/05 – 03/04/05	Technical and QA processes related to INL AMWTF TRU waste characterization and certification activities as they relate to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) for SCG S5000 debris waste, including supercompacted waste.	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical activities and QA Program and procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) WAP, and the AMWTF QAPjP (Arbon 2003).		

Table AUD-14. Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
AMWTF	A-05-17	08/23 – 08/25/05	Technical and QA processes related to the INL AMWTF TRU waste characterization and certification activities as they relate to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) for SCG S3000 homogeneous solids waste.	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical procedures and the QA Program and procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) WAP, the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), the AMWTF QAPjP (Arbon 2003), the Certification Plan, and implementing procedures.		
AMWTF	A-05-21	08/30 – 09/01/05	INL AMWTF TRU waste characterization and certification activities as they relate to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) for SCG S3000 (homogeneous solids waste).	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the WAP of the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), and the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).		
AMWTF	A-06-09	03/21 – 03/24/06	INL AMWTF TRU waste characterization and certification activities as they relate to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) for SCG S5000 (debris waste).	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the WAP of the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), and the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).		
AMWTF	A-06-10	03/28 – 03/31/06	AMWTF TRU waste characterization activities performed by AMWTF, relative to the requirements detailed in the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WIPP CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), the CH-TRAMPAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2005a), and the WIPP HWFP(State of New Mexico 1999), as related to SCG 5000 QA and transportation activities.	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements. The audit team verified that the AMWTF QA program for characterization and certification activities related to SCG S5000 (debris waste) was adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
AMWTF	A-06-24	08/15 – 08/17/06	INL AMWTF TRU waste characterization and certification activities as they relate to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) for SCGs S3000 (homogeneous solids) and S5000 (debris waste).	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the WAP of the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), and the CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).		
AMWTF	A-06-25	08/21 –	AMWTF TRU waste characterization activities	S	S	S

Table AUD-14. Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
		08/24/06	performed by AMWTF relative to the requirements detailed in the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WIPP CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), the CH-TRAMPAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2005a), and the WIPP HWFP(State of New Mexico 1999), as related to QA, NDA, and transportation activities.	AMWTF technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
AMWTF	A-07-14	08/28 – 08/30/07	INL AMWTF TRU waste characterization and certification activities as they relate to the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) for SCG S3000 (homogeneous solids) and S5000 (debris) wastes, and drum coring of homogeneous solids (S3000) and soils/gravel (S4000) wastes.	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the WAP of the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), and the WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a).		
AMWTF	A-07-15	08/20 – 08/23/07	AMWTF TRU waste characterization activities relative to the requirements of the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the CH-TRU WAC for the WIPP (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), and the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), as related to QA and NDA.	S	S	S
				AMWTF technical and QA programs, as applicable to audited activities, were satisfactory in meeting requirements.		
AMWTF	S-04-10	04/12 – 04/15/04	Identification and correction of recent nonconforming conditions in the waste certification process at the AMWTF. Specific areas evaluated included waste certification, payload certification, WWIS certification, project-level review, nonconformance control, and training.	I	I	I
				AMWTF was in the process of implementing short-term corrective actions that would assure compliance with program requirements. AMWTF was in the process of establishing long-term corrective actions that would preclude recurrence of the issues. No new conditions adverse to quality that required the issuance of a CAR were identified.		
AMWTF	S-05-12	05/10 – 05/11/05	Specific elements of the contract transition that recently occurred. The evaluation examined objective evidence relating to the AMWTF contract transition process.	I	I	I
				AMWTF was still in the process of contract transition. The transition had not impacted personnel, equipment, and procedures that had been previously evaluated.		
AMWTF	S-07-16	01/10 – 01/11/07	Policies, plans, and procedures related to solids sampling activities.	S	S	S
				Activities associated with coring operations at the AMWTF continued to comply with the requirements of the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		

Table AUD-14. Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
AMWTF	S-07-21	04/04 – 04/05/07	Equipment, sample collection, sample chain-of-custody, sample storage, and shipment of waste samples using the AMWTF manual coring system. System operability and the implementation of associated procedures.	S	S	S
				The manual coring system for collection of samples for waste analysis was installed properly and initial activities were completed successfully. The system was performing acceptably for TRU waste characterization activities. The applicable implementing procedures for this system and activity were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		

1
2

Table AUD-15. Argonne National Laboratory – East Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
ANL-E	A-02-03 and A-03-13	09/09 – 09/13/02 and 02/10 – 02/13/03	ANL-E/CCP TRU waste characterization and certification activities related to SCGs S5000 (debris waste) and S3000 (homogeneous solid waste). Audit A-02-03 assessed HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) WAP-related QA activities and technical processes for characterization and certification of SCG S5000 retrievably stored CH-TRU debris waste. Audit A-03-13 assessed the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) WAP technical processes related to characterization and certification of SCG S3000 retrievably stored CH-TRU homogeneous solid waste.	S	S	S
				ANL-E/CCP technical and QA programs, as applicable to the audited activities, met the requirements contained in the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999).		
ANL-E	A-03-18	06/24 – 06/25/01	ANL-E QA and technical support activities for the preparation of samples needed to support the WIPP HSG Performance Demonstration Program (PDP).	S	S	S
				The activities evaluated relating to QA were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
ANL-E	A-03-26	08/26 – 08/27/03	CCP characterization and certification activities related to ANL-E solid wastes.	S	S	S
				The technical and QA procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) WAP, the WIPP WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a), and the CCP QAPjP (Arbon 2003) and implementing procedures.		
ANL-E	A-04-03	10/06 – 10/09/03	ANL-E/CCP TRU technical processes and QA program and procedures for waste characterization and certification activities related to SCG S3000 homogeneous solid waste and S5000 retrievably stored debris waste streams.	S	S	S
				CCP technical processes and the QA program and procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999) WAP, and the CCP QAPjP (Arbon 2003).		
ANL-E	A-04-18	06/08 – 06/09/04	ANL QA and technical support activities for the preparation of samples needed to support the WIPP HSG PDP.	S	S	S
				Activities relating to QA were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective. HSG PDP implementing procedures and activities for sample preparation, verification and distribution remained adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		

Table AUD-15. Argonne National Laboratory – East Assessments (Continued)

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
ANL-E	A-05-11	09/13 – 09/14/05	ANL-E QA and technical support activities for the preparation of samples needed to support the WIPP HSG PDP.	S	S	S
				Activities evaluated relating to QA were adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective. HSG PDP implementing procedures and activities for sample preparation, verification and distribution remained adequate, satisfactorily implemented, and effective.		
ANL-E	A-06-27	Phase 1: 08/29 – 08/31/06 Phase 2: 09/11 – 09/14/06	ANL TRU waste characterization activities performed for ANL by the CCP.	S	S	S
				The ANL/CCP QA program, as applicable to audited activities, was satisfactory in addressing established requirements. The technical elements assessed were adequate in addressing the established requirements for the activities observed.		
ANL-E	A-07-03	08/14 – 08/16/07	ANL TRU waste characterization activities performed for ANL by the CCP.	S	S	S
				ANL/CCP technical procedures were adequate relative to the flow down of requirements from the HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), and the WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a). ANL/CCP technical areas evaluated were satisfactorily implemented and are effective.		
ANL-E	S-05-04	12/07 – 12/08/04	Characterization and certification activities for the period between CBFO Audit A-04-03 and the last shipment of TRU waste to the WIPP.	S	S	S
				ANL-E/CCP areas evaluated were adequately proceduralized, procedures were satisfactorily implemented, and implementation was effective.		

Table AUD-16. Supplier Assessments

Organization Assessed	Assessment Number	Assessment Dates	Scope of Assessments	Adequacy	Implementation	Effectiveness
CEMRC	A-07-21	02/13 – 02/16/07	Technical and QA activities related to the CEMRC/CCP, which functions as an independent HSG analysis laboratory.	S	S	S
				CEMRC/CCP technical and QA procedures contained adequate flow down of requirements from the CBFO QAPD (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), the WIPP HWFP (State of New Mexico 1999), and the WIPP CH-TRU WAC (U.S. Department of Energy 2008a). The defined QA program was implemented in accordance with the CEMRC/CCP contract and statement of work documents, as well as the CEMRC/CCP implementing procedures and interface documents. The HSG analysis program was effective.		
Environmental Resource Associates (ERA)	A-05-03	11/10/04	Adequacy of previous work performed for Cycles 10A and 11A of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) PDP, and to verify capability to perform work required for Cycle 12A.	S	S	S
				The adequacy of past work was acceptable. ERA facilities were adequate and the ERA quality program was adequate and effectively implemented for performing RCRA PDP Cycle 12A.		
L&M Technologies, Project Records Services	S-05-14	07/11 – 07/12/05	Project Records Services performed by L&M Technologies, with emphasis on the records retrieval process.	S	S	S
				The project records service activities of L&M Technologies were adequately proceduralized, procedures were satisfactorily implemented and implementation was effective.		
Portage Environmental, Inc.	A-05-04	03/14/05, 03/16/05, 03/18/05, and 03/22 – 03/23/05	WIPP RCRA PDP management and oversight activities.	S	M	S
				QA and technical activities of the PDP were adequate, marginally implemented, and effective. Programmatic direction and oversight activities by the DOE/CBFO and Carlsbad Field Office Technical Assistance Contractor (CTAC)/Portage, as specified in the PDP plans and CTAC implementing procedures, were adequate, marginally implemented, and effective.		

1 **AUD-2.0 References**

- 2 Arbon, R. 2003. *Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory Advanced Mixed-*
3 *Waste Treatment Project Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPjP)* (Revision 2). MP-TRUW-
4 8.2. Idaho Falls: BNFL, Inc.
- 5 State of New Mexico. 1999. *Hazardous Waste Facility Permit* (Permit NM4890139088-TSDF).
6 Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Environment Department.
- 7 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004a. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
8 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
9 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004b. *Final Audit Report of the Lawrence Livermore*
11 *National Laboratory Utilizing the Central Characterization Project: Audit Number A-04-25,*
12 *May 4–7, 2004.* Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 13 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005a. *CH-TRAMPAC [CH-TRU Waste Authorized*
14 *Methods for Payload Control]* (Revision 9, May). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 15 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005b. *TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report* (Revision 21,
16 May). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 17 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006. *RH-TRAMPAC [RH-TRU Waste Authorized Methods*
18 *for Payload Control]* (Revision 0, June). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007. *Quality Assurance Program Document* (Revision 9,
20 November). DOE/CBFO-94-1012. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 21 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008a. *Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the*
22 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (Revision 6.2, May 30). DOE/WIPP 02-3122. Carlsbad, NM:
23 Carlsbad Field Office.
- 24 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008b. *Listing of Selected CARS (Grouped by Responsible*
25 *Organization)* (August 11). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 26 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 2005. *Certificate of Compliance for Radioactive*
27 *Material Packages* (Certificate 9218, Revision 18). Form 618. Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear
28 Regulatory Commission.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix DATA-2009
Monitoring Data and Reports**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix DATA-2009

Monitoring Data and Reports

Table of Contents

DATA-1.0 Introduction DATA-1
 DATA-1.1 Reported Data DATA-1

DATA-2.0 Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program DATA-3
 DATA-2.1 Program Overview DATA-3
 DATA-2.2 Reported Data DATA-3

DATA-3.0 Subsidence Monitoring Program DATA-5
 DATA-3.1 Program Overview DATA-5
 DATA-3.2 Reported Data DATA-5

DATA-4.0 Geotechnical Monitoring Program DATA-6
 DATA-4.1 Program Overview DATA-6
 DATA-4.2 Reported Data DATA-7

DATA-5.0 Groundwater Monitoring Program DATA-8
 DATA-5.1 Program Overview DATA-8
 DATA-5.2 Reported Data DATA-8

DATA-6.0 Meteorological Monitoring Program DATA-9
 DATA-6.1 Program Description DATA-9
 DATA-6.2 Reported Data DATA-9

DATA-7.0 Waste Information DATA-10
 DATA-7.1 Program Overview DATA-10
 DATA-7.2 Reported Data DATA-10

DATA-8.0 WIPP Boreholes DATA-11
 DATA-8.1 Program Overview DATA-11
 DATA-8.2 Reported Data DATA-11

DATA-9.0 Repository Investigations Program DATA-12
 DATA-9.1 Program Overview DATA-12
 DATA-9.2 Reported Data DATA-12

DATA-10.0 Compliance Monitoring Program DATA-23
 DATA-10.1 Program Overview DATA-23
 DATA-10.2 Reported Data DATA-23

DATA-11.0 Hydrological Investigation DATA-24
 DATA-11.1 Program Overview DATA-24
 DATA-11.1.1 Shallow Subsurface Investigation DATA-24
 DATA-11.1.2 Culebra Water-Level Rise Investigation DATA-24
 DATA-11.2 Reported Data DATA-24
 DATA-11.2.1 Shallow Subsurface Investigation DATA-24
 DATA-11.2.2 Culebra Water-Level Rise Investigation DATA-25

DATA-12.0 Waste Containers and Emplacement DATA-28
DATA-12.1 Program Overview DATA-28
DATA-12.2 Reported Data DATA-28
DATA-13.0 References DATA-29

Attachments

- Attachment A: WIPP Borehole Update
- Attachment B: WIPP Waste Containers and Emplacement

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
CMP	Compliance Monitoring Program
COMP	compliance monitoring parameter
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBDSP	Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ft	foot
GMP	Geotechnical Monitoring Program
GWMP	Groundwater Monitoring Program
m	meter
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
SMP	Subsidence Monitoring Program
TRU	transuranic
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WWIS	WIPP Waste Information System

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **DATA-1.0 Introduction**

2 Appendix DATA-2009 provides references to the data used to develop the 2009 Compliance
 3 Recertification Application (CRA-2009). Interpretation and analysis of those data are provided
 4 in the appropriate sections of CRA-2009.

5 40 CFR § 194.15(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996), Content
 6 of Recertification Applications, require that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provide
 7 information obtained since the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of
 8 Energy 1996) related to site geology, hydrology, and meteorology. Additional monitoring
 9 results and the results of laboratory investigations completed after the CRA-2004 (U.S.
 10 Department of Energy 2004) must also be provided, as well as information regarding the waste
 11 emplaced in the disposal system.

12 In the initial U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certification of compliance for the
 13 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998), the EPA
 14 agreed that 10 compliance monitoring parameters (COMPs) would be monitored during the
 15 operational period of the project.

16 The DOE uses various programs to capture and analyze all relevant information. These programs
 17 and the information they collect are discussed in the appropriate sections of this appendix.

18 **DATA-1.1 Reported Data**

19 This document also provides monitoring data related to the COMPs. The locations, in this
 20 appendix, of the data for the COMPs are listed below:

COMP	Location in Appendix DATA-2009
Change in the Culebra groundwater flow	Section DATA-5.0, Section DATA-10.0, and Section DATA-11.0
Creep closure and stresses	Section DATA-4.0 and Section DATA-10.0
Culebra groundwater composition	Section DATA-5.0, Section DATA-10.0, and Section DATA-11.0
Displacement of deformation features	Section DATA-4.0 and Section DATA-10.0
Drilling rate	Section DATA-2.0 and Section DATA-10.0
Extent of brittle deformation	Section DATA-4.0, Section DATA-9.0, and Section DATA-10.0
Initiation of brittle deformation	Section DATA-4.0 and Section DATA-10.0
Probability of encountering a Castile brine reservoir	Section DATA-2.0 and Section DATA-10.0
Subsidence measurement	Section DATA-3.0 and Section DATA-10.0
Waste activity	Section DATA-7.0 and Section DATA-10.0

- 1 Monitoring is performed to detect substantial deviations from the assumptions used in the CCA.
- 2 The above COMPs are being monitored during the preclosure period. Parameters not being
- 3 monitored but used by performance assessment (PA) can be found in Fox 2008.

1 **DATA-2.0 Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program**

2 The Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program (DBDSP) monitors drilling activities in the
3 vicinity of the WIPP. This section provides a brief discussion of the program and identifies the
4 relevant data reports.

5 **DATA-2.1 Program Overview**

6 The EPA requires the DOE to demonstrate the expected containment performance of the disposal
7 system using a PA. The PAs documented in the CCA and CRA-2004 demonstrated that the
8 WIPP complies with the EPA's containment standards for undisturbed and human intrusion
9 scenarios.

10 The criteria in 40 CFR § 194.33 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) require the use of
11 historic drilling information to derive the drilling rate for PA intrusion scenarios. The DBDSP
12 continues to monitor drilling-related activities, providing data used to determine whether the
13 assumptions and scenarios used in PA remain valid, and uses the monitoring data to determine
14 the drilling rate. These monitoring activities will continue until the DOE and the EPA agree that
15 no additional benefit can be gained by further monitoring.

16 **DATA-2.2 Reported Data**

17 The two COMP parameters monitored by the DBDSP are the drilling rate (58.5 boreholes per
18 square kilometer) and the probability of encountering a Castile brine reservoir (0.05%), which
19 are discussed in the annual reports for this program and also in the COMPS assessments
20 described in Section DATA-10.0. Other information collected by this program include drilling
21 related data, mining information, and seismic information.

22 Relevant data generated through the Delaware Basin Monitoring Program are provided in the
23 following reports:

- 24 • Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report; DOE/WIPP-99-2308 Rev. 4, September 2003.
- 25 • Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report; DOE/WIPP-99-2308 Rev. 5, September 2004.
- 26 • Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report; DOE/WIPP-99-2308 Rev. 6, September 2005.
- 27 • Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report; DOE/WIPP-06-2308, September 2006.
- 28 • Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report; DOE/WIPP-07-2308, September 2007.
- 29 • Calliccoat, J., Calculation of Shallow Drilling for 2007, Memo to File, Washington
30 Regulatory and Environmental Services, Carlsbad, NM, July 2, 2008. WRES:08:251.
- 31 • Hughes, D., Status of Potash Activities – 2007, Memo to File, Washington Regulatory and
32 Environmental Services, Carlsbad, NM, July 2, 2008. WRES:08:250.

- 1 • Hughes, D., Castile Brine Encounters. 2007, Memo to File, Washington Regulatory and
2 Environmental Services, Carlsbad, NM, WRES:08:302.
- 3 • Hughes, D., Seismic Activity within the Delaware Basin, Memo to File, Washington
4 Regulatory and Environmental Services, Carlsbad, NM, WRES:08:303.

1 **DATA-3.0 Subsidence Monitoring Program**

2 Subsidence monitoring measures vertical movement of the land surface relative to a reference
3 location. This section provides a brief discussion of the Subsidence Monitoring Program (SMP)
4 and identifies the relevant data reports.

5 **DATA-3.1 Program Overview**

6 The SMP uses a leveling survey to measure the relative vertical height differences between
7 benchmarks. A level survey consists of taking one benchmark as having a constant elevation and
8 determining the elevation of all other benchmarks relative to it. Comparison between level
9 surveys allows vertical movement patterns to be established over time. These comparative
10 surveys would allow substantial deviation of actual subsidence from expected subsidence to be
11 detected.

12 **DATA-3.2 Reported Data**

13 Each year approximately 15 miles of leveling surveying was completed utilizing nine vertical
14 control loops consisting of 48 subsidence monuments and 14 National Geodetic Survey vertical
15 control points. Subsidence rates are small and are approximately at the resolution level of the
16 survey accuracy. The benchmarks with the highest rates are seen above the mined panels. All
17 subsidence rates fall within the predicted values. Data generated through the SMP are provided
18 in the following reports. Each report includes previous years' data as well.

- 19 • WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey 2003, DOE/WIPP 04-2293, October 2003.
- 20 • WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey 2004, DOE/WIPP 05-2293, December 2004.
- 21 • WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey 2005, DOE/WIPP 06-2293, December 2005.
- 22 • WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey 2006, DOE/WIPP 07-2293, December 2006.
- 23 • WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey 2007, DOE/WIPP 08-2293, December 2007.

1 **DATA-4.0 Geotechnical Monitoring Program**

2 The geotechnical monitoring program (GMP) measures in situ geotechnical data in the WIPP
3 repository. This section provides a brief discussion of the GMP and identifies the relevant data
4 reports.

5 **DATA-4.1 Program Overview**

6 The GMP obtains in situ data to support the continuous assessment of underground facilities. A
7 detailed description of the geotechnical programs and procedures is presented in WP07-1,
8 Geotechnical Engineering Program Plan. Specifically, the program provides for

- 9 • Early detection of conditions that could affect operational safety
- 10 • Guidance for design modifications and remedial actions
- 11 • Data for interpreting the behavior of underground openings compared to established design
12 criteria

13 The GMP collects data from instruments and observation. These data are used to confirm the
14 understanding of geomechanical characteristics, and aid in assessing the stability and
15 performance of the underground facility. Constituent programs, described below, include the
16 Geosciences Program, the Geomechanics Program, and the Rock Mechanics Program.

17 The Geosciences Program includes the collection of underground data used to assess the
18 repository by documenting the existing geologic conditions and characteristics and monitoring
19 excavation response. Activities associated with this program include geologic and fracture
20 mapping of the excavation surface, core logging, and borehole observations.

21 The Geomechanics Program monitors the geomechanical response of the underground openings
22 after mining using instrumentation installed in the shafts and drifts of the facility. Geotechnical
23 instrumentation installed underground in the shafts and drifts includes tape extensometer points,
24 convergence meters, borehole extensometers, piezometers, strain gauges, load cells, and crack
25 meters. The instrumentation is sensitive enough to detect small changes in rock displacements
26 and stresses.

27 To determine significant deviations from expected conditions, the Rock Mechanics Program
28 assesses the performance of the underground excavation for safety and stability during the
29 operational phase. The results from these assessments allow the identification of potentially
30 instable areas and the application of remedial actions, if necessary. Field data are used to
31 compare the actual mechanical performance of the excavations to expected results. Analytical
32 methods, such as numerical modeling, determine the potential effects of mining new
33 excavations, excavation sequence, and long-term behavior of the repository. Extensive
34 experimental work and observations have established an understanding of time-dependent
35 geomechanical properties of the salt that are used to predict its in situ mechanical performance.
36 These assessments rely heavily on the in situ instrumentation data and field observations from
37 the geosciences and geomechanics programs.

1 **DATA-4.2 Reported Data**

2 Data generated through the GMP are reported annually in the Geotechnical Analysis Report.
3 References for reports prepared since the development of the CRA-2004 are provided below.
4 Each report includes previous years' data as well. Four parameters the DOE is required to
5 monitor and assess were identified relating to the information collected by the GMP are creep
6 closure, extent of deformation, initiation of brittle deformation, and displacement of deformation
7 features. Creep closure and displacement of deformation features can be quantified. The other
8 two are qualitative. These four parameters are discussed and analyzed in the COMPs reports
9 listed in Section DATA-10.2.

- 10 • Washington TRU Solutions, LLC, 2004, Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2002–June
11 2003, DOE/WIPP 04-3177, Carlsbad, NM.
- 12 • Washington TRU Solutions, LLC, 2005, Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2003–June
13 2004, DOE/WIPP 05-3177, Carlsbad, NM.
- 14 • Washington TRU Solutions, LLC, 2006, Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2004–June
15 2005, DOE/WIPP 06-3177, Carlsbad, NM.
- 16 • Washington TRU Solutions, LLC, 2007, Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2005–June
17 2006, DOE/WIPP 07-3177, Carlsbad, NM.
- 18 • Washington TRU Solutions, LLC, 2008, Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2006–June
19 2007, DOE/WIPP 08-3177, Carlsbad, NM.

1 **DATA-5.0 Groundwater Monitoring Program**

2 The Groundwater Monitoring Program (GWMP) collects and analyzes data for various wells at
3 or near the WIPP site. This section briefly describes the GWMP and identifies relevant reports.

4 **DATA-5.1 Program Overview**

5 One function of the GWMP is the collection of Culebra groundwater data, such as water levels
6 and water quality, from numerous wells located at and near the facility. The Culebra Dolomite
7 Member of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as the Culebra) was selected as the focus
8 of the GWMP. It has been extensively studied during past hydrologic characterization programs
9 and was found to be the most likely hydrologic pathway to the accessible environment for any
10 potential human-intrusion-caused release scenario. Data obtained through this program are used
11 to generate the Culebra groundwater composition and the Culebra groundwater flow COMPs.
12 Details on how the program is implemented are provided in Appendix MON-2009.

13 **DATA-5.2 Reported Data**

14 The water quality data collected by the GWMP is discussed and analyzed in the reports listed
15 below and also in the COMPs reports listed in Section DATA-10.2. This analysis provides
16 validation of the various CCA models. Appendix HYDRO-2009 and the COMPs reports provide
17 analysis of the water levels and the fluid density of the water columns in the various wells used
18 in gathering data for the WIPP hydrological model.

- 19 • U.S. Department of Energy, 2003, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental Report for
20 Calendar Year 2002, DOE/WIPP 03-2225, Carlsbad, NM.
- 21 • U.S. Department of Energy, 2004, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental Report for
22 Calendar Year 2003, DOE/WIPP 04-2225, Carlsbad, NM.
- 23 • U.S. Department of Energy, 2005, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental Report for
24 Calendar Year 2004, DOE/WIPP 05-2225, Carlsbad, NM.
- 25 • U.S. Department of Energy, 2006, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental Report for
26 Calendar Year 2005, DOE/WIPP 06-2225, Carlsbad, NM.
- 27 • U.S. Department of Energy, 2007, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental Report for
28 Calendar Year 2006, DOE/WIPP 07-2225, Carlsbad, NM.

1 **DATA-6.0 Meteorological Monitoring Program**

2 The Meteorological Monitoring Program measures atmospheric data for the WIPP site. This
3 section provides a brief description of the program and a list of relevant reports.

4 **DATA-6.1 Program Description**

5 The primary WIPP meteorological station is located 600.5 meters (m) (1,970 feet (ft)) northeast
6 of the Waste Handling Building. The main function of the station is to provide data for
7 atmospheric modeling. The station measures and records wind speed, wind direction, and
8 temperature at elevations of 2, 10, and 50 m (6.5, 33, and 165 ft). The station records ground-
9 level measurements of barometric pressure, relative humidity, precipitation, and solar radiation.

10 **DATA-6.2 Reported Data**

11 The annual site environmental reports listed in Section DATA-5.2 provide data relevant to the
12 Meteorological Monitoring Program. The CCA, Appendix CLI provides information on past
13 (long-term) climatic conditions and predicted future conditions at the WIPP site. A discussion of
14 the wind, rainfall, and temperature variation can be found in 40 CFR § 194.15.

1 **DATA-7.0 Waste Information**

2 Two types of information related to waste characteristics are collected: (1) information
3 regarding waste that has been emplaced in the WIPP underground repository and (2) information
4 regarding future inventory that will be emplaced in the WIPP underground repository during the
5 entire lifetime of the project. This section provides a brief description of the programs and a list
6 of relevant reports.

7 **DATA-7.1 Program Overview**

8 Information concerning waste that has been emplaced in the repository is tracked and recorded
9 using the WIPP Waste Information System (WWIS). Information concerning future wastes is
10 developed through periodic updates of the Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report (the
11 CCA, Appendix BIR). The inventory for the CRA-2009 PA is the same inventory that was used
12 for the CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (PABC). This approach is
13 consistent with the fact that the CRA-2009 PA is based on the CRA-2004 PABC. Since the
14 CRA-2004 PABC was completed, the *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report–2007* (U.S.
15 Department of Energy 2008) was published and provides updated inventory information. The
16 DOE anticipates that these inventory updates will have only a small impact on normalized
17 releases relative to the CRA-2009 PA, and therefore have no significant impact on compliance.

18 **DATA-7.2 Reported Data**

19 Summary information on emplaced waste and radionuclides generated through the WWIS are
20 provided in the following reports. See page 25 of the Annual Change Report 2006/2007,
21 DOE/WIPP-07-3317 for a detailed listing of the emplaced waste in the repository.

- 22 • U.S. Department of Energy, Letter to EPA dated November 13, 2003, 2003 Annual Change
23 Report.
- 24 • U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Change Report 2003/2004, DOE/WIPP 04-3317,
25 November 10, 2004.
- 26 • U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Change Report 2004/2005, DOE/WIPP 05-3317,
27 November 10, 2005.
- 28 • U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Change Report 2005/2006, DOE/WIPP 06-3317,
29 October 2006.
- 30 • U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Change Report 2006/2007, DOE/WIPP 07-3317,
31 November 16, 2007.

32 Information regarding future inventories planned for emplacement in the WIPP are provided in
33 U.S. Department of Energy, *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report–2007*, DOE/TRU-
34 2008-3379, Revision 1 (U.S. Department of Energy 2008).

1 **DATA-8.0 WIPP Boreholes**

2 Information regarding WIPP monitoring wells is identified in this section and relevant data are
3 provided.

4 **DATA-8.1 Program Overview**

5 Information provided in this section was reported in DOE/WIPP 95-2092, Rev. 1, Waste
6 Isolation Pilot Plant Borehole Data Report (the CCA, Appendix BH). The CCA, Appendix BH
7 serves as a central document providing data on boreholes. The report contains a comprehensive
8 database of wells drilled in support of the WIPP and boreholes that were located within the 16-
9 section land withdrawal area.

10 **DATA-8.2 Reported Data**

11 Attachment A to this appendix provides updates on all of the monitoring wells used in the CCA,
12 Appendix BH and the new monitoring wells drilled since the initial certification. The attachment
13 also adds wells that were in use, but inadvertently omitted from the CCA, Appendix BH. There
14 were 21 wells drilled and 19 old wells plugged during the CRA monitoring period from October
15 1, 2002, through September 30, 2007.

1 **DATA-9.0 Repository Investigations Program**

2 The WIPP Repository Investigations Program conducts research activities to confirm
3 assumptions, reduce uncertainty, and resolve issues regarding the conceptual models and
4 parameters used in PA. The program is briefly described in this section and references to
5 relevant reports are provided.

6 **DATA-9.1 Program Overview**

7 The DOE has implemented and/or continued several experimental activities designed to address
8 specific issues and needs of the WIPP repository. In addition, other investigations have been
9 initiated to examine impacts of planned changes. The general areas covered under these
10 investigations include

- 11 • Geochemistry
- 12 • Actinide chemistry
- 13 • Engineered barriers
- 14 • Rock mechanics

15 **DATA-9.2 Reported Data**

16 Data acquired by the DOE from the repository investigations are available in the following
17 reports published since the CRA-2004:

- 18 • Borkowski, M., D.T. Reed, J.F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann. “Solubility of Neodymium in
19 Simulated WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) Brines.” Poster, 24th Rare Earth Research
20 Conference, June 26-30, 2005, Keystone, CO –LAUR-05-3916.
- 21 • Borkowski, M., J.F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed, “Neodymium Analog Study
22 of An(III) Solubility in WIPP Brine,” poster presented at Plutonium Futures 2006
23 Conference, July 2006, Monterey, CA. LA-UR 06-2900.
- 24 • Borkowski, M., J.F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. “Actinide Chemistry and
25 Repository Science Program in support of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).” Oral
26 Communication presented at the American Nuclear Society’s 14th Biennial Topical Meeting
27 of the Radiation Protection and Shielding Division, April 3–6, 2006, Carlsbad, NM, USA–
28 LAUR-05-9615.
- 29 • Borkowski, M., J.F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann, S. Ballard, and D.T. Reed, “Effect of
30 carbonate and borate complexation on Nd^{3+} and UO_2^{2+} solubility in WIPP brine,” presented
31 at the National American Chemical Society Meeting, Chicago, IL, March 2007. LAUR-06-
32 8317.

- 1 • Borkowski, M., J.F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann, and D.T Reed. 2008. Actinide (III)
2 Solubility in WIPP Brine: Data Summary and Recommendations. LCO-ACP-08,
3 LANL\ACRSP Report. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 4 • Borkowski, M., D.T. Reed, and M.K. Richmann, “Plutonium Speciation in a Salt-Based
5 Repository,” presented at American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting “Nuclear Science and
6 Technology: Now Arriving on Main Street,” Anaheim, CA, June 8–12, 2008. LA-UR 08-
7 03605.
- 8 • Brush, L.H. 2004b. “Review of the Calculations of the Quantity of MgO That Could Be
9 Lost from the WIPP By Dissolution in Brine: Mg Solubility in Castile Brine.” Analysis
10 report, September 1, 2004. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 536580.
- 11 • Brush, L.H., H. Deng, J.W. Garner; C.D. Leigh, M.B. Nemer, E.J. Nowak, D.E. Wall,
12 N.A. Wall, and Y.-L. Xiong. 2006. “Overview of Long-Term, Near-Field WIPP
13 Geochemistry,” Invited presentation at the 14th Biennial Topical Meeting of the American
14 Nuclear Society Radiation Protection and Shielding and Protection, April 4, 2006, Carlsbad,
15 NM. ERMS 543167. SAND2006-2167C.
- 16 • Brush, L.H., H. Gao, A.C. Snider, D.E. Wall, N.A. Wall, and Y.-L. Xiong. 2004.
17 “Overview of Near-Field Geochemical Processes and Conditions Expected in the WIPP,”
18 Abstracts with Programs, Geological Society of America 2004 Annual Meeting, Denver, CO,
19 November 7-10, 2004. 108. ERMS 536288. SAND2004-2728A.
- 20 • Brush, L.H., and J.W. Garner. 2005. “Additional Justification of the Insignificant Effect of
21 Np on the Long-Term Performance of the WIPP.” Memorandum to D.S. Kessel,
22 February 1, 2005. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 538533.
- 23 • Brush L.H. 2005. “Results of Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP
24 Performance-Assessment Baseline Calculations,” Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
25 Laboratories Carlsbad Programs Group. May 18, 2005. ERMS 539800.
- 26 • Brush, L.H. and Y. Xiong. 2003. “Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP
27 Compliance Recertification Application.” Unpublished analysis report. May 8, 2003.
28 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 529131.
- 29 • Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003. “Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP
30 Compliance Recertification Application.” Analysis Plan AP-098, Rev 1. Unpublished
31 analysis plan. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 527714.
- 32 • Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003. “Calculation of Organic Ligand Concentrations for the
33 WIPP Compliance Recertification Application.” Unpublished analysis report. Carlsbad, NM:
34 Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 527567.
- 35 • Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003. “Calculation of Organic Ligand Concentrations for the
36 WIPP Compliance Recertification Application and for Evaluating Assumptions of

- 1 Homogeneity in WIPP PA.” Unpublished analysis report. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
2 Laboratories. ERMS 531488.
- 3 • Brush, L.H., and Y.-L. Xiong, 2005. “Calculation of Organic-Ligand Concentrations for the
4 WIPP Performance-Assessment Baseline Calculations.” Analysis report. May 4, 2005.
5 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 539635.
- 6 • Brush, L.H., J.W. Garner and E. Vugrin. 2005. “PA Implementation of Uncertainties
7 Associated with Calculated Actinide Solubilities.” Memorandum to D.S. Kessel, February 2,
8 2005. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 538537.
- 9 • Brush, L.H. A.C. Snider, Y.-L. Xiong, and C.D. Leigh. 2004. “Use of MgO as the
10 Engineered Barrier in the WIPP,” Abstracts with Programs, Geological Society of America
11 2004 Annual Meeting, Denver, CO, November 7-10, 2004. 296. ERMS 536279.
12 SAND2004-2729A.
- 13 • Brush, L.H., and G.T. Roselle. 2006. “Geochemical Information for Calculation of the MgO
14 Effective Excess Factor.” Memorandum to E.D. Vugrin, November 17, 2006. Carlsbad,
15 NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 544840.
- 16 • Brush, L.H., and Y.-L. Xiong. 2004. “Sensitivities of the Solubilities of +III, +IV, and
17 +V Actinides to the Concentrations of Organic Ligands in WIPP Brines, Rev. 0.” Analysis
18 report, December 15, 2004. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 538203.
- 19 • Brush, L.H., Y.-L. Xiong, J.W. Garner, A. Ismail, and G.T. Roselle. 2006. “Consumption of
20 Carbon Dioxide by Precipitation of Carbonate Minerals Resulting from Dissolution of
21 Sulfate Minerals in the Salado Formation in Response to Microbial Sulfate Reduction in the
22 WIPP.” Analysis report, November 17, 2006. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
23 ERMS 544785.
- 24 • Callahan, G.D. “Disposal Room Calculations with Alternative TRUE Waste Models,” 2004.
25 Topical Report RSI-1783.
- 26 • Clayton, D.J. 2006. “Update of the Minimum Brine Volume for a Direct Brine Release and
27 New Maximum Castile and Salado Brine Volumes in a Waste Panel.” Memorandum to L.H.
28 Brush, October 11, 2006. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 544453.
- 29 • Clayton, D.J., and M.B. Nemer. 2006. “Normalized Moles of Castile Sulfate Entering the
30 Repository and Fraction of MgO Lost Due to Brine Flow Out of the Repository.”
31 Memorandum to E.D. Vugrin, October 9, 2006. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
32 Laboratories. ERMS 544385.
- 33 • Clayton, D., “Justification of Relative Permeability and Capillary Pressure Model Parameters
34 for Use by BRAGFLO Version 6.0,” 2007. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
35 ERMS 545764.

- 1 • Clayton, D., “Corrections to Input Files for DBR PABC Calculations,” 2007. Carlsbad NM:
2 Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 546311.
- 3 • Crawford, B.A., and C.D. Leigh. 2003. “Estimate of Complexing Agents in TRU Waste for
4 the Compliance Recertification Application.” Analysis report, August 28, 2003. Carlsbad,
5 NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory. ERMS 531107.
- 6 • Deng, H., S.R. Johnsen, G.T. Roselle, and M.B. Nemer. 2006. “Analysis of Martin Marietta
7 MagChem 10 WTS-60 MgO.” Analysis report, November 14, 2006. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
8 National Laboratories. ERMS 544712.
- 9 • Deng, H., M.B. Nemer, and Y. Xiong. 2007. “Experimental Study of MgO Reaction
10 Pathways and Kinetics, Rev. 1.” TP 06-03, Rev. 1, January 10, 2007. Carlsbad, NM:
11 Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 545182.
- 12 • Deng, H., Y. Xiong, and M.B. Nemer. 2007. “Experimental Work Conducted on MgO
13 Characterization and Hydration.” Milestone report, August 7, 2007. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
14 National Laboratories. ERMS 546570.
- 15 • Downes, P.S. 2003. “Spreadsheet Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP
16 Compliance Recertification Application.” Unpublished memorandum to L.H. Brush, April
17 23, 2003. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 528395.
- 18 • Downes, P.S. 2003. “Spreadsheet Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP
19 Compliance Recertification Application in Support of AP-098, ‘Calculation of Actinide
20 Solubilities for the WIPP Recertification Application, Analysis Plan AP-098, Rev 1.’”
21 Unpublished analysis report. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 530441.
- 22 • Dunagan, S., C. Hansen, and W. Zelinski, “Effect of Increasing Cellulosics, Plastics, and
23 Rubbers on WIPP Performance Assessment,” 2005. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National
24 Laboratories. ERMS 538445.
- 25 • Giambalvo, E.R. 2002. “Recommended μ^0 /RT Values for Modeling the Solubility of
26 Oxalate Solids in WIPP Brines.” Unpublished memorandum to L.H. Brush, July 31, 2002.
27 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 523057.
- 28 • Giambalvo, E.R. 2003. “Release of FMT Database FMT_021120.CHEMDAT.”
29 Memorandum to L.H. Brush, March 10, 2003. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories,
30 ERMS 526372.
- 31 • Hansen, F.D., “A Revisit of Waste Shear Strength,” 2005. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National
32 Laboratories. ERMS 541354.
- 33 • Hansen, F.D., and J.S. Stein, “WIPP Room Evolution and Performance Assessment
34 Implications,” 2005. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 538870.

- 1 • Herrick, C.G., M. Riggins, and B.Y. Park, “Recommendation for the Lower Limit of the
2 Waste Shear Strength (Parameter BOREHOLE: TAUFAIL),” 2007. Carlsbad NM: Sandia
3 National Laboratories. ERMS 546033.
- 4 • Herrick, C.G., M. Riggins, B.Y. Park, and E.D. Vugrin, “Recommendation for the Lower
5 Limit of the Waste Shear Strength (Parameter BOREHOLE: TAUFAIL),” Revision 1, 2007.
6 Carlsbad NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 546343.
- 7 • Holcomb, D., and R. Hardy, “Status of Ultrasonic Wave Speed Measurements Undertaken to
8 Characterize the DRZ in the Access Drift to Q Room,” 2001. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National
9 Laboratories. ERMS 545575.
- 10 • Ismail, A.E., “Revised Porosity Estimates for the DRZ,” 2007. Carlsbad NM: Sandia
11 National Laboratories. ERMS 545755.
- 12 • Ismail, A.E., and B.Y. Park, “Revised Permeability Estimates for the Disturbed Rock Zone
13 (DRZ),” 2007. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 545746.
- 14 • Kanney, J.F., and E.D. Vugrin. 2006. “Updated Analysis of Characteristic Time and Length
15 Scales for Mixing Processes in the WIPP Repository to Reflect the CRA-2004 PABC
16 Technical Baseline and the Impact of Supercompacted Mixed Waste and Heterogeneous
17 Waste Emplacement.” Memorandum to D.S. Kessel, August 31, 2006. Carlsbad, NM:
18 Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 544248.
- 19 • Kanney, J.F., and W. Zelinski. 2004. “Input for CaCO₃ precipitation Modeling.”
20 Memorandum to Y.-L. Xiong, September, 9, 2004. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
21 Laboratories. ERMS 536665.
- 22 • Kirchner, T.B., and E.D. Vugrin. 2006. “Uncertainty in Cellulose, Plastic, and Rubber
23 Measurements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Inventory.” Memorandum to D.S. Kessel,
24 June 12, 2006. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 543848.
- 25 • Leigh, C.D. 2005. “Organic Ligand Masses TRU Waste Streams from TWBID Revision 2.1,
26 Version 3.13, Data Version D4.15, Revisions 1.” Memorandum to L.H. Brush, April 18,
27 2005, Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 539550.
- 28 • Lucchini, J.F. , D.T. Reed, M. Borkowski, A. Rafalski, and J. Conca. “Influence of
29 Radiolytic Products on the Chemistry of Uranium VI in Brines.” Oral Communication, 227th
30 ACS National Meeting, March 28-April 1, 2004, Anaheim, CA, USA–Poster, International
31 Conference ATALANTE 2004, June 21-24, 2004, Nimes, France. LAUR-03-9026.
- 32 • Lucchini, J.F., M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. “Solubility of Uranium (VI)
33 in Brine.” Poster, International Conference MIGRATION 05, September 18–23, 2005,
34 Avignon, France–LAUR-05-7011.

- 1 • Lucchini, J.F., M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. “Interactions and Stability of
2 Hypochlorite, Hydrogen Peroxide and Uranium (VI) in Brine.” Poster, International
3 Conference MIGRATION 05, September 18-23, 2005, Avignon, France—LAUR-05-7009.
- 4 • Lucchini, J.F. , M. Borkowski, M. K. Richmann, and D. T. Reed, “Uranium (VI) Solubility
5 from Over-saturation in Carbonate-free Brines,” poster presented at Plutonium Futures 2006
6 Conference, July 2006, Monterey, CA. LAUR-06-1307.
- 7 • Lucchini, J.F., “Review of spent fuel matrix alteration with respect to alpha-radiolysis,”
8 presented at the American Nuclear Society’s 14th Biennial Topical Meeting of the Radiation
9 Protection and Shielding Division, Carlsbad, NM, USA. April 3-6, 2006. LAUR-05-9617.
- 10 • Lucchini, J-F, M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, S. Ballard, and D.T. Reed. 2007. “Solubility
11 of Nd³⁺ and UO₂²⁺ in WIPP Brine as Oxidation-State Invariant Analogs for Plutonium.”
12 *Journal of Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 444/445: 506–11. LAUR-06-7222.
- 13 • Lucchini, J.F., S. Ballard, H. Khaing, M. Borkowski, S. Pepper, M.K. Richmann, and D.T.
14 Reed, “Effect of Carbonate on U(VI) Solubility in WIPP Brine,” presented at the
15 International Conference MIGRATION 07, August 26–31, 2007, Munchen, Germany—
16 LAUR-07-5377.
- 17 • Lucchini, J.F. , H. Khaing, M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2008. *Actinide
18 (VI) Solubility in Carbonate-free WIPP Brine: Data Summary and Recommendations*. LCO-
19 ACP-10, LANL\ACRSP Report. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 20 • Lucchini, Jean Francois, Hnin Khaing, Michael K. Richmann, Marian Borkowski, Donald T.
21 Reed, “Plutonium (VI) and Uranium (VI) Reduction by Iron (II) at High pH under
22 Subsurface Conditions,” presented at the International Conference Plutonium Futures—The
23 Science, July 7–11, 2008, Dijon, France—LAUR-08-04292.
- 24 • Nemer, M.B. 2006. “Expected Brine volumes, Cumulative Brine Inflow, and MgO-to-Brine
25 Solid-to-Liquid Ratio from PABC BRAGFLO Results.” Memorandum to the SNL/WIPP
26 Records Center, March 3, 2006. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
27 ERMS 542612.
- 28 • Nemer, M.B., J.S. Stein, and W. Zelinski. 2005. “Analysis Report for BRAGFLO
29 Preliminary Modeling Results with New Gas Generation Rates Based on Recent
30 Experiments.” Analysis report, April 20, 2005. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
31 Laboratories. ERMS 539437.
- 32 • Nowak, E.J., 2005. “Recommended Change in the FMT Thermodynamic Data Base.”
33 Memorandum to L. H. Brush, April 1, 2005. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
34 ERMS 539227.
- 35 • Nowak, E.J., and D.J. Clayton. 2007. “Analysis of MgO Hydration Laboratory Results and
36 Calculation of Extent of Hydration and Resulting Water Uptake versus Time under

- 1 Postulated WIPP Conditions.” Analysis report, September 5, 2007. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
2 National Laboratories. ERMS 546769.
- 3 • Olive, Daniel, Marian Borkowski, Jean Francois Lucchini, Hnin Khaing, Michael Richmann,
4 Donald Reed, and Jeff Terry, “Physicochemical Properties of Neodymium WIPP Solids,”
5 presented at the 2008 Argonne Advanced Photon Source Users Meeting, May 4–8, 2008,
6 Argonne, IL–LAUR-08-2288.
- 7 • Park, B.Y., and J.F. Holland, “Error in DRZ Calculation in the Clay Seam G Analysis,”
8 2006. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 545053.
- 9 • Park, B.Y., A.E. Ismail, D.J. Holcomb, and C.G. Herrick, “Analysis Report for Prediction of
10 the Extent and Permeability of the Disturbed Rock Zone around a WIPP Disposal Room,”
11 Revision 0, 2007. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 546370.
- 12 • Pepper, Sarah E., Marian Borkowski, and Donald T. Reed, “The Analysis of Ferric and
13 Ferrous Iron in Actinide Redox Systems using Solvent Extraction,” presented on 31st Annual
14 Actinide Separations Conference in Las Vegas, NV, 2007.
- 15 • Reed, D. T., M. Borkowski, and J. F. Lucchini, “Reduction of Higher-Valent Actinides in the
16 WIPP,” presented at the GSA WIPP session, Denver, CO, November 7, 2004. LAUR-04-
17 7954.
- 18 • Reed, D.T., J.-F. Lucchini, S.B. Aase, and A.J. Kropf. 2006. “Reduction of Plutonium (VI)
19 in Brine under Subsurface Conditions.” *Radiochim. Acta*, vol. 94: 591–97.
- 20 • Reed, D.T., G. Smith, R. Deo, B. Rittmann, J.F. Lucchini, M. Borkowski, and M.K.
21 Richmann. “Subsurface Bio-mediated Reduction of Higher-Valent Uranium and Plutonium.”
22 Presentation, Plutonium Futures – The Science 2006 Conference, July 9-13, 2006, Pacific
23 Grove, CA.
- 24 • Reed, D.T., M. Borkowski, J.F. Lucchini, and M.K. Richmann, “Actinide Solubility and
25 Speciation in the WIPP,” Los Alamos Earth and Environmental Sciences Frontiers in
26 Geoscience Colloquium, August 8, 2006.
- 27 • Reed, D.T., M. Borkowski, J.F. Lucchini, and M.K. Richmann, “Subsurface
28 Biogeochemistry of Plutonium in the WIPP,” Poster presented at the Los Alamos National
29 Laboratory, Earth and Environmental Sciences Division review, April 2006.
- 30 • Reed, D.T., S.E. Pepper, and B.E. Rittmann. 2007. “Subsurface Bio-Mediated Reduction of
31 Higher-Valent Uranium and Plutonium.” *Journal of Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 444/445:
32 376–82.
- 33 • Reed, D.T., Invited Presentation, “Key Interactions and Speciation of Plutonium under
34 Subsurface Conditions,” University of Texas at El Paso, chemistry department, March 23,
35 2007.

- 1 • Reed, D.T., S.E. Pepper, B.E. Rittmann, and R. Deo, “Role of Fe (II) in the abiotic and biotic
2 reduction of higher-valent uranium and plutonium,” presented at the National American
3 Chemical Society Meeting, Chicago, IL, March 2007.
- 4 • Reed, D.T., invited presentation, “WIPP Actinide Chemistry Research Project,” New Mexico
5 State University, chemistry department seminar, April 26, 2007.
- 6 • Reed, D.T., invited presentation, “Key Interactions and Speciation of Plutonium under
7 Subsurface Conditions,” Valparaiso University chemistry department, March 30, 2007.
- 8 • Reed, D.T., D. Moody, and R. Patterson. “Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Transuranic
9 Repository,” Invited talk at Migration 2007, Munich, Germany, September 2007.
- 10 • Reed, D.T., H. Boukhalfa, G.A. Icopini, S.D. Reilly, and M. Neu, “Plutonium Reduction By
11 Metal-Reducing Bacteria,” presented at Migration 2007, Munich, Germany, September 2007.
- 12 • Reed, D.T., J.-F. Lucchini; M. Borkowski, and M.K. Richmann. 2008. *Pu(VI) Reduction by
13 Iron under WIPP-Relevant Conditions: Data Summary and Recommendations*. LCO-ACP-
14 09, LANL\ACRSP Report. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 15 • Reed, D.T., M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, Jean-Francois Lucchini, and Hnin Khaing,
16 “Plutonium Speciation in a Salt-Based Repository,” presented at Plutonium Futures “The
17 Science” Conference—Dijon, France, July 2008.
- 18 • Reed, D.T., “Actinide Speciation in the WIPP,” D.T. Reed. Invited talk as part of technical
19 exchange with the INE German salt repository program, Karlsruhe, Germany, July 4, 2008.
- 20 • Richmann, M.K., J.F. Lucchini, M. Borkowski, S.E. Pepper, S. Ballard, H. Khaing, and D.T
21 Reed, “Actinide Speciation in the WIPP,” presented at the International Conference
22 MIGRATION 07, August 26–31, 2007, Munchen, Germany—LAUR-07-1903.
- 23 • Snider, A.C. 2003. Verification of the Definition of Generic Weep Brine and the
24 Development of a Recipe for This Brine. Unpublished Report. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
25 National Laboratories. ERMS 527505.
- 26 • Snider, A.C. 2003. Calculation of MgO Safety Factors for the WIPP Compliance
27 Recertification Application and for Evaluating Assumptions of Homogeneity in WIPP PA.
28 Unpublished analysis report. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 531508.
- 29 • Snider, A.C., and Y.-L. Xiong. 2004. “Continuing Investigations of the Hydration and
30 Carbonation of Premier Chemical MgO.” Milestone report, October 12, 2004. Carlsbad,
31 NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 537188.
- 32 • Snider, A.C., Y.-L. Xiong, and N.A. Wall. 2004. “Experimental Study of WIPP Engineered
33 Barrier MgO at Sandia National Laboratories Carlsbad Facility.” TP 00-07, Rev. 3, August
34 26, 2004. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 536591.

- 1 • Stein, J.S., and M.B. Nemer. 2005. "Analysis Plan for Updating the Microbial Degradation
2 Rates for Performance Assessment." AP-116, Rev. 0, February 3, 2005. Carlsbad, NM:
3 Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 538596.
- 4 • Stein, J.S. 2005. "Estimate of Volume of Brine in Repository That Leads to a Brine Release."
5 Memorandum to L.H. Brush, April 19, 2005. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
6 ERMS 539372.
- 7 • Vugrin, E.D., M.B. Nemer, and S.W. Wagner. 2006. "Uncertainties Affecting MgO
8 Effectiveness and Calculation of the MgO Effective Excess Factor," Rev. 0. Analysis report,
9 November 17, 2006. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 544781.
- 10 • Wall, D.E., N.A. Wall, and L.H. Brush. 2006. "Speciation and Solubility Modeling of
11 Actinides in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant," Separations for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in the
12 21st Century. Eds. G.J. Lumetta, K.L. Nash, S.B. Clark, and J.L. Friese. Washington, DC:
13 American Chemical Society. ACS Symposium Series, Vol. 933, 313-334. ERMS 541051.
14 SAND2004-6355J.
- 15 • Wall, N.A. 2005. "Preliminary Results for the Evaluation of Potential New MgO." January
16 27, 2005. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 538514.
- 17 • Wall, N.A., and D. Enos. 2006. "Iron and Lead Corrosion in WIPP-Relevant Conditions,
18 TP 06-02, Rev. 1." April 24, 2006. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS
19 543238.
- 20 • Wall, N.A. and D.E. Wall. 2004. "Discussion on the Influence of Organic Ligands on the
21 Solubility of U(VI)." Memorandum to Records, November 30, 2004. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
22 National Laboratories. ERMS 537938.
- 23 • Xiong, Y.-L. 2004a. "A Correction of the Molecular Weight of Oxalate in FMT_021120.
24 CHEMDAT, and Incorporation of Calcium Oxalate Monohydrate (Whewellite) into
25 CHEMDAT with Its Recommended Dimensionless Standard Chemical Potential (μ^0/RT)
26 Value." Memorandum to L.H. Brush, June 8, 2004. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
27 Laboratories. ERMS 535813.
- 28 • Xiong, Y.-L. 2004. "Incorporation of Six Solid Phases Including Hydromagnesite (5424)
29 and Hydromagnesite (4323) into EQ3/6 HMW Database and Its Modified Version HMP."
30 Memorandum to L. H. Brush, August 4, 2004. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
31 ERMS 536321.
- 32 • Xiong, Y.-L. 2004. "An Update on the Dimensionless Standard Chemical Potential of
33 NpO₂Ac(aq) in FMT CHEMDAT." Memorandum to L.H. Brush, November 11, 2004.
34 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 537838.
- 35 • Xiong, Y.-L. 2004. "A Correction of the Dimensionless Standard Chemical Potential of
36 NpO₂Ac(aq) in FMT_041116. CHEMDAT." Memorandum to L.H. Brush, December 10,
37 2004. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 538162.

- 1 • Xiong, Y.-L. 2005. "Release of FMT_050405.CHEMDAT." E-mail to J.F. Kanney and J.J.
2 Long, April 5, 2005. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 539304.
- 3 • Xiong, Y.-L. 2006. "Incorporation of Calcium Citrate Hydrate, Earlandite; Calcium Oxalate
4 Monohydrate, Whewellite; and Aqueous Species of Citrate and Oxalate into the EQ3/6 HMP
5 Database and Its Modified Version HMY." Memorandum to L.H. Brush, October 18, 2006.
6 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 544529.
- 7 • Xiong, Y.-L. 2006. "Incorporation of Amorphous Calcium Carbonate into the EQ3/6 HMY
8 Database and Its Modified Version HML." Memorandum to L.H. Brush, October 26, 2006.
9 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 544629.
- 10 • Xiong, Y.-L. 2007. "Incorporation of Amorphous Calcium Carbonate with Higher
11 Solubility (CaCO₃(am-cpa)), Aqueous Complexes of Magnesium and Calcium with Acetate,
12 Citrate, EDTA, and Oxalate, and Aqueous Species of Acetate and EDTA into the EQ3/6
13 HML Database and its Modified Version HMO". Memorandum to L.H. Brush, February 7,
14 2007. Carlsbad, NM. Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 545276.
- 15 • Xiong, Y.-L. 2007. "Analysis Plan for Derivation of Pitzer Parameters in Support of
16 Experimental Work at LANL-CO." June 7, 2007. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
17 Laboratories. ERMS 546249.
- 18 • Xiong, Y.-L. In prep. "Thermodynamic Properties of Brucite Determined by Solubility
19 Studies and Their Significance to Nuclear Waste Isolation," accepted by Aquatic
20 Geochemistry, with minor revisions. ERMS 546279. SAND2007-3373J.
- 21 • Xiong, Y.-L., L.H. Brush, D.E. Wall, and N.A. Wall. 2004. "Predictions of Actinide
22 Solubilities under Near-Field Conditions Expected in the WIPP," Abstracts with Programs,
23 Geological Society of America 2004 Annual Meeting, Denver, CO, November 7–10, 2004.
24 108. ERMS 536297. SAND2004-2730A.
- 25 • Xiong, Y.-L., and A.C.S. Lord. In press. "Experimental Investigations of the Reaction Path
26 in the MgO–CO₂–H₂O System in Solutions with Various Ionic Strengths, and Their
27 Applications to Nuclear Waste Isolation," Applied Geochemistry. ERMS 544728.
28 SAND2006-7185J.
- 29 • Xiong, Y.-L., E.J. Nowak, and L.H. Brush. 2004. "Updated Uncertainty Analysis of
30 Actinide Solubilities for the Response to EPA Comment C-23-16." Analysis report,
31 December 17, 2004. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 538219.
- 32 • Xiong, Y.-L., E.J. Nowak, and L.H. Brush. 2005. "Updated Uncertainty Analysis of
33 Actinide Solubilities for the Response to EPA Comment C-23-16 (Supersedes ERMS
34 538219)." Analysis report, April 29, 2005. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
35 ERMS 539595.
- 36 • Xiong, Y.-L., E.J. Nowak, and L.H. Brush. 2005. "Predicting Actinide Solubilities in
37 Concentrated Brines: The Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT) Code." Presentation at the 15th

- 1 Goldschmidt International Conference, May 20–25, 2005, Moscow, ID. Carlsbad, NM:
- 2 Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 541555. SAND2005-2836C.

1 **DATA-10.0 Compliance Monitoring Program**

2 Annually, the Compliance Monitoring Program (CMP) extracts data from the repository
3 investigations and five of the monitoring programs described above (DBDSP, SMP, GMP,
4 GWMP, and WWIS) to derive values for the 10 COMPs described in Section DATA-1.0 and to
5 evaluate whether significant changes in the parameters have occurred. The CMP activities are
6 briefly described in this section. Data generated under the CMP are also identified.

7 **DATA-10.1 Program Overview**

8 The objective of the CMP is to provide assurance that any deviations from the expected long-
9 term performance of the repository are identified at the earliest possible time. The CMP is
10 implemented in accordance with DOE/WIPP-99-3119, 40 CFR Parts 191 and 194, Compliance
11 Monitoring Implementation Plan. Annual evaluations of the compliance parameters follow the
12 requirements found in Sandia Analysis Plan AP-069, An Analysis Plan for Annually Deriving
13 Compliance Monitoring Parameters and their Assessment Against Performance Expectations to
14 Meet the Requirements of 40 CFR § 194.42 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996).

15 **DATA-10.2 Reported Data**

16 The data and the results of the annual COMPs assessments performed in accordance with the
17 requirements of the CMP are provided in the reports cited below. There are no COMPs data or
18 results that indicate a reportable event or condition adverse to predicted performance.

- 19 • Sandia National Laboratories, "Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance Monitoring
20 Parameter Assessment for 2003, WBS 1.3.1, Revision 1, June 2004," Carlsbad, NM.
- 21 • Sandia National Laboratories, "Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance Monitoring
22 Parameter Assessment for 2004, WBS 1.3.1, February 2005," Carlsbad, NM.
- 23 • Sandia National Laboratories, "Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance Monitoring
24 Parameter Assessment for 2005, WBS 1.3.1, November 2005," Carlsbad, NM.
- 25 • Sandia National Laboratories, "Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance Monitoring
26 Parameter Assessment for 2006, WBS 1.3.1, October 2006," Carlsbad, NM.
- 27 • Sandia National Laboratories, "Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance Monitoring
28 Parameter Assessment for 2007, WBS 1.3.1, January 2008," Carlsbad, NM.

1 **DATA-11.0 Hydrological Investigation**

2 The Exhaust Shaft Hydraulic Assessment, now the Shallow Subsurface Investigation, was
3 initiated in September 1996 to investigate the source and extent of water seepage into the exhaust
4 shaft at the WIPP, and an investigation of rising water levels in the Culebra was initiated in
5 1999. These hydrologic investigations are briefly described in this section. Sources of data
6 generated from the investigations are also identified.

7 **DATA-11.1 Program Overview**

8 **DATA-11.1.1 Shallow Subsurface Investigation**

9 Investigations of water entering the exhaust shaft led to the observation of a shallow perched
10 groundwater horizon in a saturated layer within the lower Santa Rosa Formation and the upper
11 Dewey Lake Redbeds Formation, about 15 m (49 ft) below ground surface. During the original
12 drilling and geological mapping of the shaft, no water was encountered at that horizon, indicating
13 that the presence of water may be related to site activities subsequent to shaft drilling. Three
14 wells and 12 piezometers were installed over an 80-acre area between September 1996 and July
15 1997 (INTERA 1997). In 2007, three more piezometers were installed. Water level and water
16 quality parameters have been monitored and reported on a regular basis since installation.

17 **DATA-11.1.2 Culebra Water-Level Rise Investigation**

18 During the 1999 annual COMPs assessment, Culebra water levels in many of the WIPP
19 monitoring wells exceeded the CCA ranges of uncertainty established for equilibrium freshwater
20 heads to calibrate transmissivity fields needed for Culebra flow and transport calculations.
21 Culebra water-level rises had also been observed at the time of the CCA submittal in 1996, but
22 were attributed to natural recovery of water levels following years of hydraulic well testing at the
23 WIPP site and grouting of the WIPP shafts. Subsequent to the 1999 COMPs assessment,
24 Culebra water levels showed a continued rise even though water levels at the WIPP site were
25 thought to have fully recovered from hydraulic testing and shaft grouting. In response to this
26 observation, the DOE initiated an investigation into the cause of the water-level rise and the
27 impact of the rise on the long-term performance of the WIPP, which is discussed in Appendix
28 HYDRO-2009.

29 **DATA-11.2 Reported Data**

30 Data acquired from the two hydrologic investigations are provided in the reports cited below for
31 the Shallow Subsurface Investigation and the Culebra water-level rise investigation.

32 **DATA-11.2.1 Shallow Subsurface Investigation**

33 The Geotechnical Analysis Reports listed in Section DATA-4.2 provide data relevant to the
34 Shallow Subsurface Investigation. In addition, the following two reports contain detailed
35 information on this subject:

1 • U.S. Department of Energy, Basic Data Report for Piezometers PZ-13, PZ-14, and PZ-15 and
2 Shallow Subsurface Water, Revision 1, DOE-WIPP 08-3375, April 2008.

3 • Daniel B. Stephens & Associates, Inc. 2003. Water Budget Analysis of the Shallow
4 Subsurface Water at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Carlsbad, NM.

5 **DATA-11.2.2 Culebra Water-Level Rise Investigation**

6 The following reports are related to Culebra water-level investigations:

7 • Beauheim, R.L. 2002b. Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 3 of AP-088,
8 Calculation of Culebra Freshwater Heads in 1980, 1990, and 2000 for Use in T-Field
9 Calibration. ERMS 522580. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Records
10 Center.

11 • Beauheim, R.L. 2003. Analysis Report for AP-100 Task 1: Development and Application
12 of Acceptance Criteria for Culebra Transmissivity (T) Fields. ERMS 531136. Carlsbad,
13 NM: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Records Center.

14 • Beauheim, R.L. 2003. Analysis Plan for Evaluation of Culebra Water-Level-Rise Scenarios,
15 AP-110. ERMS 532799. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records
16 Center.

17 • Beauheim, R.L. 2004. Analysis Plan for Evaluation and Recalibration of Culebra
18 Transmissivity Fields, AP-114. ERMS 537208. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
19 Laboratories WIPP Records Center.

20 • Beauheim, R.L. 2008. Analysis Plan for Evaluation and Recalibration of Culebra
21 Transmissivity Fields, AP-114, Revision 1. ERMS 548162. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
22 Laboratories WIPP Records Center.

23 • Beauheim, R.L., and B.L. Fox. 2003. Records Package for AP-088 Task 4, Conditioning of
24 Base T Fields to Transient Heads: Compilation and Reduction of Transient Head Data.
25 ERMS 527572. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Records Center.

26 • Beauheim, R.L., and S.A. McKenna. 2003. Analysis Plan for Optimization and
27 Minimization of the Culebra Monitoring Network for the WIPP, AP-111. ERMS 533092.
28 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.

29 • Johnson, P.B. 2005. Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 6 of AP-114,
30 Potentiometric Surface, Adjusted to Equivalent Freshwater Heads, of the Culebra Dolomite
31 Member of the Rustler Formation near the WIPP Site, March–April 2004. ERMS 541154.
32 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.

33 • Johnson, P.B. 2008. Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 6 of AP-114,
34 Potentiometric Surface, Adjusted to Equivalent Freshwater Heads, of the Culebra Dolomite

- 1 Member of the Rustler Formation near the WIPP Site, May 2007. ERMS 548227. Carlsbad,
2 NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.
- 3 • Kanney, J.F. 2003. Analysis Report for AP-100 Tasks 4-6: Extraction of Flow Field Values
4 for SECOTP2D, Scaling of Flow Field for Climate Change, and Radionuclide Transport
5 Calculations. ERMS 532320. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Records
6 Center.
- 7 • Klise, K.A., and R.L. Beauheim. 2005. Task 3 of AP-114, Evaluation of Alternatives to the
8 Southwestern No-Flow Boundary Condition. ERMS 542147. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
9 National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.
- 10 • Leigh, C., R. Beauheim, and J. Kanney. 2003. Analysis Plan for Calculations of Culebra
11 Flow and Transport: Compliance Recertification Application, AP-100. ERMS 530172.
12 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Records Center.
- 13 • Lowry, T.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2004. Analysis Report, Task 2 of AP-110, Evaluation of
14 Water-Level Rise in the Culebra Due to Recharge from Refining Process Water Discharged
15 onto Potash Tailings Piles. ERMS 536239. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories
16 WIPP Records Center.
- 17 • Lowry, T.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2005. Analysis Report, Task 3 of AP-110, Evaluation of
18 Water-Level Rise in the Culebra Due to Leakage Through Poorly Plugged and Abandoned
19 Potash Boreholes. ERMS 540187. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP
20 Records Center.
- 21 • McKenna, S.A. 2004. Analysis Report, AP-111, Culebra Water Level Monitoring Network
22 Design. ERMS 540477. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records
23 Center.
- 24 • Powers, D.W. 2004. Analysis Report, Task 1A of AP-110, Identify Potash Holes Not
25 Sealed Through the Culebra with Cement, and Units to Which the Culebra Might Be
26 Connected. ERMS 535377. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records
27 Center.
- 28 • Powers, D.W. 2004. Analysis Report, Task 1B of AP-110, Identify Plugged and Abandoned
29 Oil or Gas Wells Not Sealed Through the Culebra with Cement, and Units to Which the
30 Culebra Might Be Connected. ERMS 538279. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories
31 WIPP Records Center.
- 32 • Powers, D.W. 2007. Analysis Report for Task 1A of AP-114: Refinement of Rustler Halite
33 Margins Within the Culebra Modeling Domain. ERMS 547559. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
34 National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.
- 35 • Powers, D.W. 2006. Analysis Report, Task 1B of AP-114, Identify Possible Area of
36 Recharge to the Culebra West and South of WIPP. ERMS 543094. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
37 National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.

- 1 • Powers, D.W. 2006. Analysis Report, Task 1D of AP-114, Collect Current and Historic
2 Information on Water Levels and Specific Gravity in Potash Tailings Ponds within the
3 Culebra Modeling Domain. ERMS 543124. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories
4 WIPP Records Center.
- 5 • Toll, N.J., and P.B. Johnson. 2006. Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 6 of
6 AP-114, SNL-14 August 2005 Pumping Test Observation Well Data Processing, Summary
7 of Files. ERMS 543371. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records
8 Center.
- 9 • Toll, N.J., and P.B. Johnson. 2006. Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 6 of
10 AP-114, WIPP-11 February 2005 Pumping Test Observation Well Data Processing–
11 Summary of Files. ERMS 543651. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP
12 Records Center.

1 **DATA-12.0 Waste Containers and Emplacement**

2 Information regarding WIPP waste emplacement containers and underground waste
3 emplacement layouts are provided in this section. Approved containers that are inside other
4 containers, such as pipe overpacks, will not be discussed.

5 **DATA-12.1 Program Overview**

6 Information provided in this section was compiled from several sources to serve as a central
7 document describing both waste emplacement containers and waste emplacement layouts. Both
8 contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU) and remote-handled (RH) transuranic
9 (TRU) (RH-TRU) waste containers are described along with CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste
10 emplacement layouts in a typical panel in the repository. Only containers approved for disposal
11 in the repository will be discussed.

12 **DATA-12.2 Reported Data**

13 Attachment B to this appendix provides detailed information on the various waste containers and
14 their emplacement in the underground repository.

1 DATA-13.0 References

- 2 Beauheim, R.L. 2002. *Routine Calculations Report in Support of Task 3 of AP-088:*
3 *Calculation of Culebra Freshwater Heads in 1980, 1990, and 2000 for Use in T-Field*
4 *Calibration* (June 13). ERMS 522580. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 5 Beauheim, R.L. 2003a. *Analysis Plan for Evaluation of Culebra Water-Level-Rise Scenarios*
6 *(Revision 0)*. AP-110. ERMS 532799. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Beauheim, R.L. 2003b. *Analysis Report for AP-100, Task 1: Development and Application of*
8 *Acceptance Criteria for Culebra Transmissivity (T) Fields*. ERMS 531136. Carlsbad, NM:
9 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Beauheim, R.L. 2004. *Analysis Plan for Evaluation and Recalibration of Culebra*
11 *Transmissivity Fields (Revision 0)*. AP-114. ERMS 537208. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
12 Laboratories.
- 13 Beauheim, R.L. 2008. *Analysis Plan for Evaluation and Recalibration of Culebra*
14 *Transmissivity Fields (Revision 1)*. AP-114. ERMS 548162. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
15 Laboratories WIPP Records Center.
- 16 Beauheim, R.L., and B.L. Fox. 2003. *Records Package for AP-088, Task 4; Conditioning of*
17 *Base T Fields to Transient Heads: Compilation and Reduction of Transient Head Data*. ERMS
18 527572. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Beauheim, R.L., and S.A. McKenna. 2003. *Analysis Plan for Optimization and Minimization of*
20 *the Culebra Monitoring Network for the WIPP (Revision 0)*. AP-111. ERMS 533092.
21 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 Borkowski, M., D.T. Reed, and M.K. Richmann. 2008. "Plutonium Speciation in a Salt-Based
23 Repository." American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting. June 8–12. LA-UR 08-03605.
24 Anaheim, CA.
- 25 Borkowski, M., D.T. Reed, J.F. Lucchini, and M.K. Richmann. 2005. "Solubility of
26 Neodymium in Simulated WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) Brines." Poster. 24th Rare Earth
27 Research Conference. June 26–30. Keystone, CO.
- 28 Borkowski, M., J.F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2006a. "Actinide Chemistry
29 and Repository Science Program in support of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)." Oral
30 Communication. American Nuclear Society's 14th Biennial Topical Meeting of the Radiation
31 Protection and Shielding Division. April 3–6. LAUR-05-9615. Carlsbad, NM.
- 32 Borkowski, M., J.F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2006b. "Neodymium Analog
33 Study of An(III) Solubility in WIPP Brine." Poster. Plutonium Futures 2006 Conference. July.
34 LA-UR 06-2900. Monterey, CA.

- 1 Borkowski, M., J.F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2008. *Actinide (III) Solubility in*
2 *WIPP Brine: Data Summary and Recommendations*. LCO-ACP-08. LANL\ACRSP Report.
3 Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 4 Borkowski, M., J.F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann, S. Ballard, and D.T. Reed. 2007. *Effect of*
5 *carbonate and borate complexation on Nd³⁺ and UO₂²⁺ solubility in WIPP brine*. National
6 American Chemical Society Meeting. March. LAUR-06-8317. Chicago, IL.
- 7 Brush, L.H. 2004. *Review of the Calculations of the Quantity of MgO That Could Be Lost from*
8 *the WIPP By Dissolution in Brine: Mg Solubility in Castile Brine*. Analysis report. September
9 1, 2004. ERMS 536580. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Brush, L.H. 2005. *Results of Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP Performance-*
11 *Assessment Baseline Calculations*. ERMS 539800. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
12 Laboratories.
- 13 Brush, L.H., A.C. Snider, Y. Xiong, and C.D. Leigh. 2004. "Use of MgO as the Engineered
14 Barrier in the WIPP," Abstracts with Programs, Geological Society of America 2004 Annual
15 Meeting. November 7–10. ERMS 536279. SAND2004-2729A. Denver, CO.
- 16 Brush, L.H., and G.T. Roselle. 2006. Memorandum to E.D. Vugrin (Subject: Geochemical
17 Information for Calculation of the MgO Effective Excess Factor). 17 November 2006. ERMS
18 544840. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 19 Brush, L.H., and J.W. Garner. 2005. Letter to D. Kessel. (Subject: Additional Justification for
20 the Insignificant Effect of Np on the Long-Term Performance of the WIPP). 1 February 2005.
21 ERMS 538533. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003a. *Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
23 *Compliance Recertification Application* (May 8). ERMS 529131. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
24 National Laboratories.
- 25 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003b. *Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
26 *Compliance Recertification Application, Analysis Plan AP-098, Rev. 1* (Revision 1). AP-098.
27 ERMS 527714. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 28 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003c. *Calculation of Organic Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP*
29 *Compliance Recertification Application and for Evaluating Assumptions of Homogeneity in*
30 *WIPP PA*. ERMS 531488. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003b. *Calculation of Organic Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP*
32 *Compliance Recertification Application*. ERMS 527567. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
33 Laboratories.
- 34 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2004. *Sensitivities of the Solubilities of +III, +IV, and +V Actinides*
35 *to the Concentrations of Organic Ligands in WIPP Brines*, Rev. 0. Analysis report. December
36 15. ERMS 538203. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2005. *Calculation of Organic-Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP*
2 *Performance-Assessment Baseline Calculations* (May 4). ERMS 539635. Carlsbad, NM:
3 Sandia National Laboratories. Brush, L.H., H. Deng, J.W. Garner, C.D. Leigh, M.B. Nemer, E.J.
4 Nowak, D.E. Wall, N.A. Wall, and Y.L. Xiong. 2006. "Overview of Long-Term, Near-Field
5 WIPP Geochemistry." 14th Biennial Topical Meeting of the American Nuclear Society
6 Radiation Protection and Shielding and Protection. April 4. ERMS 543167. SAND2006-
7 2167C. Carlsbad, NM.
- 8 Brush, L.H., H. Gao, A.C. Snider, D.E. Wall, N.A. Wall, and Y.L. Xiong. 2004. "Overview of
9 Near-Field Geochemical Processes and Conditions Expected in the WIPP," Abstracts with
10 Programs. Geological Society of America 2004 Annual Meeting. November 7–10. ERMS
11 536288. SAND2004-2728A. Denver, CO.
- 12 Brush, L.H., J.W. Garner and E. Vugrin. 2005. Memorandum to D.S. Kessel (Subject: PA
13 Implementation of Uncertainties Associated with Calculated Actinide Solubilities). 2 February
14 2005. ERMS 538537. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 Brush, L.H., Y. Xiong, J.W. Garner, A. Ismail, and G.T. Roselle. 2006. *Consumption of Carbon*
16 *Dioxide by Precipitation of Carbonate Minerals Resulting from Dissolution of Sulfate Minerals*
17 *in the Salado Formation in Response to Microbial Sulfate Reduction in the WIPP* (November
18 17). ERMS 544785. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Callahan, G.D. 2004. *Disposal Room Calculations with Alternative TRUE Waste Models*.
20 Topical Report RSI-1783.
- 21 Callicoat, J. 2008. Memorandum to File (Subject: Calculation of Shallow Drilling for 2007). 2
22 July 2008. WRES:08:251. Carlsbad, NM: Washington Regulatory and Environmental Services.
- 23 Clayton, D.J. 2006. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Update of the Minimum Brine
24 Volume for a Direct Brine Release and New Maximum Castile and Salado Brine Volumes in a
25 Waste Panel). 11 October 2006. ERMS 544453. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Clayton, D.J. 2007a. *Justification of Relative Permeability and Capillary Pressure Model*
27 *Parameters for Use by BRAGFLO Version 6.0*. ERMS 545764. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National
28 Laboratories.
- 29 Clayton, D.J. 2007b. Memorandum to E. Vugrin, M. Lee, and D. Kessel (Subject: Corrections
30 to Input Files for DBR PABC Calculations). 6 June 2007. ERMS 546311. U.S. Department of
31 Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 32 Clayton, D.J., and M.B. Nemer. 2006. Memorandum to E.D. Vugrin (Subject: Normalized
33 Moles of Castile Sulfate Entering the Repository and Fraction of MgO Lost Due to Brine Flow
34 Out of the Repository). 9 October 2006. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories,
35 Carlsbad, NM.
- 36 Crawford, B.A., and C.D. Leigh. 2003. *Estimate of Complexing Agents in TRU Waste for*
37 *the Compliance Recertification Application* (August 28). ERMS 531107. Carlsbad, NM: Los
38 Alamos National Laboratory.

- 1 Daniel B. Stephens & Associates, Inc. 2003. *Water Budget Analysis of the Shallow Subsurface*
2 *Water at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. Carlsbad, NM.
- 3 Deng, H., M.B. Nemer, and Y. Xiong. 2007. *Experimental Study of MgO Reaction Pathways*
4 *and Kinetics* (Rev. 1, January 10). TP 06-03. ERMS 545182. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
5 Laboratories.
- 6 Deng, H., S. Johnson, Y. Xiong, G.T. Roselle, and M. Nemer. 2006. *Analysis of Martin*
7 *Marietta MagChem 10 WTS-60 MgO* (November 14). ERMS 544712. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
8 National Laboratories.
- 9 Deng, H., Y. Xiong, and M. Nemer. 2007. *Experimental Work Conducted on MgO*
10 *Characterization and Hydration, Milestone Report*. ERMS 546570. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
11 National Laboratories.
- 12 Downes, P.S. 2003a. Memorandum to L.H. Brush. Subject: Spreadsheet Calculations of
13 Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP Compliance Recertification Application. 21 April 2003.
14 ERMS 528395. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 Downes, P.S. 2003b. *Spreadsheet Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
16 *Compliance Recertification Application in Support of AP-098*, Calculation of Actinide
17 Solubilities for the WIPP Compliance Recertification Application, Analysis Plan AP-098,
18 Rev. 1. ERMS 530441. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Dunagan, S., C. Hansen, and W. Zelinski. 2005. *Effect of Increasing Cellulosics, Plastics, and*
20 *Rubbers on WIPP Performance Assessment*. ERMS 538445. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National
21 Laboratories.
- 22 Fox, B. 2008. *Parameter Summary Report for the CRA-2009* (Revision 0). ERMS 549747.
23 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 24 Giambalvo, E.R. 2002. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Recommended μ^0 /RT Values for
25 Modeling the Solubility of Oxalate Solids in WIPP Brines). 31 July 2002. ERMS 523057. U.S.
26 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 27 Giambalvo, E.R., 2003. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Release of FMT Database
28 FMT_021120.CHEMDAT). 10 March 2003. ERMS 526372. U.S. Department of Energy,
29 Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 30 Hansen, F.D. 2005. *A Revisit of Waste Shear Strength*. ERMS 541354. Carlsbad NM: Sandia
31 National Laboratories.
- 32 Hansen, F.D., and J.S. Stein. 2005. *WIPP Room Evolution and Performance Assessment*
33 *Implications*. ERMS 538870. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 34 Herrick, C.G., M. Riggins, and B.Y. Park. 2007. *Recommendation for the Lower Limit of the*
35 *Waste Shear Strength (Parameter BOREHOLE: TAUFAIL)*. ERMS 546033. Carlsbad NM:
36 Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Herrick, C.G., M. Riggins, B.Y Park, and E.D. Vugrin. 2007. *Recommendation for the Lower*
2 *Limit of the Waste Shear Strength (Parameter BOREHOLE:TAUFAIL)* (Rev. 1). ERMS 546343.
3 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Holcomb, D., and R. Hardy. 2001. *Status of Ultrasonic Wave Speed Measurements Undertaken*
5 *to Characterize the DRZ in the Access Drift to Q Room*. ERMS 545575. Carlsbad NM: Sandia
6 National Laboratories.
- 7 Hughes, D. 2007. Memorandum to File (Subject: Castile Brine Encounters). WRES:08:302.
8 Washington Regulatory and Environmental Services, Carlsbad, NM.
- 9 Hughes, D. 2008a. Memorandum to File (Subject: Seismic Activity within the Delaware
10 Basin). WRES:08:303. Washington Regulatory and Environmental Services, Carlsbad, NM.
- 11 Hughes, D. 2008b. Memorandum to File: (Subject: Status of Potash Activities – 2007). 2 July
12 2008. WRES:08:250. Washington Regulatory and Environmental Services, Carlsbad, NM.
- 13 INTERA. 1997. *Exhaust Shaft Hydraulic Assessment Data Report*. DOE-WIPP 97-2219.
14 Carlsbad, NM: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
- 15 Ismail, A.E. 2007. Memorandum to File (Subject: Revised Porosity Estimates for the DRZ).
16 10 April 2007. ERMS 545755. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories,
17 Carlsbad, NM.
- 18 Ismail, A.E., and B.Y. Park. 2007. *Revised Permeability Estimates for the Disturbed Rock Zone*
19 *(DRZ)*. ERMS 545746. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 Johnson, P.B. 2005. *Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 6 of AP-114,*
21 *Potentiometric Surface, Adjusted to Equivalent Freshwater Heads, of the Culebra Dolomite*
22 *Member of the Rustler Formation near the WIPP Site, March–April 2004*. ERMS 541154.
23 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.
- 24 Johnson, P.B. 2008. *Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 6 of AP-114,*
25 *Potentiometric Surface, Adjusted to Equivalent Freshwater Heads, of the Culebra Dolomite*
26 *Member of the Rustler Formation near the WIPP Site, May 2007*. ERMS 548227. Carlsbad,
27 NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.
- 28 Kanney, J. 2003. *Analysis Report for AP-100 Tasks 4-6: Extraction of Flow Field Values for*
29 *SECOTP2D, Scaling of Flow Field for Climate Change, and Radionuclide Transport*
30 *Calculations*. ERMS 532320. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Records
31 Center.
- 32 Kanney, J.F., and E.D. Vugrin. 2006. Memorandum to D.S. Kessel (Subject: Updated Analysis
33 of Characteristic Time and Length Scales for Mixing Processes in the WIPP Repository to
34 Reflect the CRA-2004 PABC Technical Baseline and the Impact of Supercompacted Mixed
35 Waste and Heterogeneous Waste Emplacement). 31 August 2006. ERMS 544248. U.S.
36 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.

- 1 Kanney, J.F., and W. Zelinski. 2004. Memorandum to Y. Xiong (Subject: Input for CaCO₃
2 precipitation Modeling). 9 September 2004. ERMS 536665. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
3 Laboratories.
- 4 Kirchner, T., and E. Vugrin. 2006. Memorandum to D.S. Kessel (Subject: Uncertainty in
5 Cellulose, Plastic, and Rubber Measurements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Inventory). 12
6 June 2006. ERMS 543848. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories,
7 Carlsbad, NM.
- 8 Klise, K.A., and R.L. Beauheim. 2005. *Task 3 of AP-114, Evaluation of Alternatives to the*
9 *Southwestern No-Flow Boundary Condition*. ERMS 542147. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
10 Laboratories WIPP Records Center.
- 11 Leigh, C., R. Beauheim, and J. Kanney. 2003. *Analysis Plan for Calculations of Culebra Flow*
12 *and Transport: Compliance Recertification Application*. AP-100. ERMS 530172. Carlsbad,
13 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Leigh, C.D. 2005. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Organic Ligand Masses TRU Waste
15 Streams from TWBID Revision 2.1, Version 3.13, Data Version D4.15, Revisions 1). 18 April
16 2005. ERMS 539550. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 17 Lowry, T.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2004. *Analysis Report: Task 2 of AP-110; Evaluation of*
18 *Water-Level Rise in the Culebra Due to Recharge from Refining Process Water Discharged onto*
19 *Potash Tailings Piles*. ERMS 536239. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 Lowry, T.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2005. *Analysis Report: Task 3 of AP-110; Evaluation of*
21 *Water-Level Rise in the Culebra Due to Leakage through Poorly Plugged and Abandoned*
22 *Potash Boreholes*. ERMS 540187. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 Lucchini, J.F. 2006. "Review of spent fuel matrix alteration with respect to alpha-radiolysis."
24 American Nuclear Society's 14th Biennial Topical Meeting of the Radiation Protection and
25 Shielding Division. April 3–6. LAUR-05-9617. Carlsbad, NM.
- 26 Lucchini, J.F., D.T. Reed, M. Borkowski, A. Rafalski, and J. Conca. 2004. "Influence of
27 Radiolytic Products on the Chemistry of Uranium VI in Brines." Oral Communication. 227th
28 ACS National Meeting. March 28–April 1. Anaheim, CA. LAUR-03-9026. Poster.
29 International Conference ATALANTE 2004. June 21-24. Nimes, France.
- 30 Lucchini, J.F., H. Khaing, M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2008. *Actinide (VI)*
31 *Solubility in Carbonate-free WIPP Brine: Data Summary and Recommendations*. LCO-ACP-10,
32 LANL\ACRSP Report. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 33 Lucchini, J.F., H. Khaing, M.K. Richmann, M. Borkowski, D.T. Reed. 2008. *Plutonium (VI)*
34 *and Uranium (VI) Reduction by Iron (II) at High pH under Subsurface Conditions*. International
35 Conference Plutonium Futures–The Science. July 7–11. LAUR-08-04292. Dijon, France.

- 1 Lucchini, J.F., M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2005. "Interactions and
2 Stability of Hypochlorite, Hydrogen Peroxide and Uranium (VI) in Brine." Poster. International
3 Conference MIGRATION 05. September 18–23. LAUR-05-7009. Avignon, France.
- 4 Lucchini, J.F., M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2005. "Solubility of Uranium
5 (VI) in Brine". Poster. International Conference MIGRATION 05. September 18–23. LAUR-
6 05-7011. Avignon, France.
- 7 Lucchini, J.F., M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2006. "Uranium (VI) Solubility
8 from Over-saturation in Carbonate-free Brines." Poster. Plutonium Futures 2006 Conference.
9 July. LAUR-06-1307. Monterey, CA.
- 10 Lucchini, J.F., M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, S. Ballard, and D.T. Reed. 2007. "Solubility of
11 Nd^{3+} and UO_2^{2+} in WIPP Brine as Oxidation-State Invariant Analogs for Plutonium." Journal of
12 Alloys and Compounds, vol. 444/445: 506–11.
- 13 Lucchini, J.F., S. Ballard, H. Khaing, M. Borkowski, S. Pepper, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed.
14 2007. *Effect of Carbonate on U(VI) Solubility in WIPP Brine*. International Conference
15 MIGRATION 07. August 26–31. LAUR-07-5377. Munchen, Germany.
- 16 McKenna, S.A. 2004. *Analysis Report: AP-111; Culebra Water-Level Monitoring Network*
17 *Design*. ERMS 540477. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 Nemer, M., J. Stein, and W. Zelinski. 2005. *Analysis Report for BRAGFLO Preliminary*
19 *Modeling Results With New Gas Generation Rates Based on Recent Experimental Results*.
20 ERMS 539437. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 21 Nemer, M.B. 2006. Memorandum to the SNL/WIPP Records Center (Subject: Expected Brine
22 volumes, Cumulative Brine Inflow, and MgO-to-Brine Solid-to-Liquid Ratio from PABC
23 BRAGFLO Results). 3 March 2006. ERMS 542612. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
24 Laboratories.
- 25 Nowak, E.J. 2005. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Recommended Change in the FMT
26 Thermodynamic Data Base). 1 April 2005. ERMS 539227. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
27 Laboratories.
- 28 Nowak, E.J., and D.J. Clayton. 2007. *Analysis of MgO Hydration Laboratory Results and*
29 *Calculation of Extent of Hydration and Resulting Water Uptake versus Time under Postulated*
30 *WIPP Conditions*. Analysis report. September 5. ERMS 546769. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
31 National Laboratories.
- 32 Olive, D., M. Borkowski, J.F. Lucchini, H. Khaing, M. Richmann, D. Reed, and J. Terry. 2008.
33 *Physicochemical Properties of Neodymium WIPP Solids*. 2008 Argonne Advanced Photon
34 Source Users Meeting. May 4–8. LAUR-08-2288. Argonne, IL.
- 35 Park, B.Y., A.E. Ismail, D.J. Holcomb, and C.G. Herrick. 2007. *Analysis Report for Prediction*
36 *of the Extent and Permeability of the Disturbed Rock Zone around a WIPP Disposal Room*
37 (Revision 0). ERMS 546370. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Park, B.Y., and J.F. Holland. 2006. Error in DRZ Calculation in the Clay Seam G Analysis.
2 ERMS 545053. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 3 Pepper, S.E., M. Borkowski, and D.T. Reed. 2007. *The Analysis of Ferric and Ferrous Iron in*
4 *Actinide Redox Systems using Solvent Extraction*. 31st Annual Actinide Separations Conference.
5 Las Vegas, NV.
- 6 Powers, D.W. 2004a. *Analysis Report: Task 1A of AP-110: Identify Potash Holes Not Sealed*
7 *Through the Culebra with Cement, and Units to Which the Culebra Might Be Connected*. ERMS
8 535377. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Powers, D.W. 2004b. *Analysis Report: Task 1B of AP-110: Identify Plugged and Abandoned*
10 *Oil or Gas Wells Not Sealed Through the Culebra with Cement, and Units to Which the Culebra*
11 *Might Be Connected*. ERMS 538279. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Powers, D.W. 2006a. *Analysis Report: Task 1B of AP-114; Identify Possible Area of Recharge*
13 *to the Culebra West and South of WIPP* (April 1). ERMS 543094. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
14 National Laboratories.
- 15 Powers, D.W. 2006b. *Analysis Report: Task 1D of AP-114; Collect Current and Historic*
16 *Information on Water Levels and Specific Gravity in Potash Tailings Ponds within the Culebra*
17 *Modeling Domain* (March 31). ERMS 543124. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 Powers, D.W. 2007. *Analysis Report for Task 1A of AP-114: Refinement of Rustler Halite*
19 *Margins within the Culebra Modeling Domain* (October 5). ERMS 547559. Carlsbad, NM:
20 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 21 Reed, D.T. 2007a. “Key Interactions and Speciation of Plutonium under Subsurface
22 Conditions.” March 30. Valparaiso University chemistry department.
- 23 Reed, D.T. 2007b. “Key Interactions and Speciation of Plutonium under Subsurface
24 Conditions.” Oral. March 23. University of Texas at El Paso, chemistry department.
- 25 Reed, D.T. 2007. “WIPP Actinide Chemistry Research Project.” Oral. April 26. New Mexico
26 State University, chemistry department.
- 27 Reed, D.T. 2008. “Actinide Speciation in the WIPP.” Oral. INE German salt repository
28 program. July 4. Karlsruhe, Germany.
- 29 Reed, D.T., D. Moody, and R. Patterson. 2007. “Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
30 Transuranic Repository.” Oral. Migration 2007. September. Munich, Germany.
- 31 Reed, D.T., G. Smith, R. Deo, B. Rittmann, J.F. Lucchini, M. Borkowski, and M.K. Richmann.
32 2006. “Subsurface Bio-mediated Reduction of Higher-Valent Uranium and Plutonium.”
33 Presentation. Plutonium Futures – The Science 2006 Conference. July 9–13. Pacific Grove,
34 CA.

- 1 Reed, D.T., H. Boukhalfa, G.A. Icopini, S.D. Reilly, and M. Neu. 2007. "Plutonium Reduction
 2 By Metal-Reducing Bacteria." Presentation. Migration 2007. September. Munich,
 3 Germany. Reed, D.T., J.F. Lucchini, M. Borkowski, and M.K. Richmann. 2009. *Pu(VI)*
 4 *Reduction by Iron under WIPP-Relevant Conditions: Data Summary and Recommendations.*
 5 LCO-ACP-09, LANL\ACRSP Report. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 6 Reed, D.T., J.F. Lucchini, S.B. Aase, and A.J. Kropf. 2006. "Reduction of Plutonium (VI) in
 7 Brine under Subsurface Conditions." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 94: 591–97.
- 8 Reed, D.T., M. Borkowski, and J. F. Lucchini. 2004. *Reduction of Higher-Valent Actinides in*
 9 *the WIPP*. GSA WIPP session. November 7. LAUR-04-7954. Denver, CO.
- 10 Reed, D.T., M. Borkowski, J.F. Lucchini, and M.K. Richmann. 2006a. "Actinide Solubility and
 11 Speciation in the WIPP". Los Alamos Earth and Environmental Sciences Frontiers in
 12 Geoscience Colloquium. August 8.
- 13 Reed, D.T., M. Borkowski, J.F. Lucchini, and M.K. Richmann. 2006b. "Subsurface
 14 Biogeochemistry of Plutonium in the WIPP." Poster. Los Alamos National Laboratory, Earth
 15 and Environmental Sciences Division review. April.
- 16 Reed, D.T., M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, J.F. Lucchini, and H. Khaing. 2008. "Plutonium
 17 Speciation in a Salt-Based Repository". Plutonium Futures "The Science" Conference. July.
 18 Dijon, France.
- 19 Reed, D.T., S.E. Pepper, B.E. Rittmann, and R. Deo. 2007. "Role of Fe (II) in the abiotic and
 20 biotic reduction of higher-valent uranium and plutonium." National American Chemical Society
 21 Meeting. March. Chicago, IL.
- 22 Reed, D.T., S.E. Pepper, M.K. Richmann, G. Smith, R. Deo, and B.E. Rittmann. 2007.
 23 "Subsurface Bio-Mediated Reduction of Higher-Valent Uranium and Plutonium." *Journal of*
 24 *Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 444/445: 376–82.
- 25 Richmann, M.K., J.F. Lucchini, M. Borkowski, S.E. Pepper, S. Ballard, H. Khaing, and D.T
 26 Reed. 2007. "Actinide Speciation in the WIPP." International Conference MIGRATION 07.
 27 August 26–31. LAUR-07-1903. Munchen, Germany.
- 28 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2004. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
 29 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2003* (Revision 1, June). ERMS 535825. Carlsbad, NM:
 30 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2005a. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
 32 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2004* (February). ERMS 538645. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
 33 National Laboratories.
- 34 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2005b. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
 35 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2005* (November). ERMS 541759. Carlsbad, NM:
 36 Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2006. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
2 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2006* (October). ERMS 544616. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
3 National Laboratories.
- 4 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2008. *Sandia National Laboratories Compliance*
5 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2007* (January). ERMS 548041. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
6 National Laboratories.
- 7 Snider, A.C. 2003a. *Calculation of MgO Safety Factors for the WIPP Compliance*
8 *Recertification Application and for Evaluating Assumptions of Homogeneity in WIPP PA*
9 (September 11). ERMS 531508. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Snider, A.C. 2003b. *Verification of the Definition of Generic Weep Brine and the Development*
11 *of a Recipe for This Brine* (April 8). ERMS 527505. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
12 Laboratories.
- 13 Snider, A.C., and Y. Xiong. 2004. *Continuing Investigations of the Hydration and Carbonation*
14 *of Premier Chemical MgO* (October 12). ERMS 537188. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
15 Laboratories.
- 16 Snider, A.C., Y. Xiong, and N.A. Wall. 2004. Experimental Study of WIPP Engineered Barrier
17 MgO at Sandia National Laboratories Carlsbad Facility (Rev. 3, August 26). TP 00-07. ERMS
18 536591. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Stein, J.S. 2005. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Estimate of Volume of Brine in
20 Repository That Leads to a Brine Release). 13 April 2005. ERMS 539372. Albuquerque, NM:
21 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 Stein, J.S., and M.B. Nemer. 2005. *Analysis Plan for Updating the Microbial Degradation*
23 *Rates for Performance Assessment*. AP-116, Rev. 0. February 3. ERMS 538596. Carlsbad,
24 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Toll, N.J., and P.B. Johnson. 2006. *Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 6 of AP-*
26 *114, SNL-14 August 2005 Pumping Test Observation Well Data Processing, Summary of Files*.
27 ERMS 543371. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.
- 28 Toll, N.J., and P.B. Johnson. 2006. *Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 6 of AP-*
29 *114, WIPP-11 February 2005 Pumping Test Observation Well Data Processing—Summary of*
30 *Files*. ERMS 543651. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories WIPP Records Center.
- 31 Triay, I.R. 2003. Letter to F. Marcinowski (Subject: 2003 Annual Change Report; 3
32 Enclosures). 13 November 2003. U.S. Department of Energy. Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad,
33 NM.
- 34 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
35 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
36 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003a. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Program*
2 *Report* (Rev. 4, September). DOE/WIPP-99-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003b. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental*
4 *Report: Calendar Year 2002* (Rev. 1, September). DOE/WIPP 03-2225. Carlsbad, NM:
5 Carlsbad Field Office.
- 6 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003c. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey*
7 (October). DOE/WIPP-04-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 8 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004a. *Annual Change Report 2003/2004* (November 10).
9 DOE/WIPP 04-3317. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004b. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Program*
11 *Report* (Rev. 5, September). DOE/WIPP-99-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 12 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004c. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2002–June*
13 *2003* (March; vol. 1). DOE/WIPP 04-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 14 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004d. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
15 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
16 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 17 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004e. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2003 Site Environmental*
18 *Report*. DOE/WIPP 04-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004f. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey*
20 (December). DOE/WIPP-05-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 21 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005a. *Annual Change Report 2004/2005* (November 10).
22 DOE/WIPP 05-3317. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 23 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005b. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Program*
24 *Report* (Rev. 6, September). DOE/WIPP-99-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 25 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005c. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2003–June*
26 *2004* (March; vol. 1). DOE/WIPP 05-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 27 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005d. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental*
28 *Report*. DOE/WIPP 05-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 29 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005e. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey*
30 (December). DOE/WIPP-06-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006a. *Annual Change Report 2005/2006* (October).
32 DOE/WIPP 06-3317. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006b. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Program*
2 *Report* (September). DOE/WIPP-06-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006c. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2004–June*
4 *2005* (April; vol. 1). DOE/WIPP 06-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 5 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006d. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site*
6 *Environmental Report for 2005* (September). DOE/WIPP 06-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad
7 Field Office.
- 8 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006e. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey 2006*
9 (December 2006). DOE/WIPP 07-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007a. *Annual Change Report 2006/2007: From July 1,*
11 *2006, to June 30, 2007* (November 16). DOE/WIPP 07-3317. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field
12 Office.
- 13 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007b. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report*
14 (September). DOE/WIPP 07-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 15 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007c. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2005–June*
16 *2006* (March; vol. 1). DOE/WIPP 07-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 17 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007d. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site*
18 *Environmental Report for 2006* (September). DOE/WIPP 07-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad
19 Field Office.
- 20 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007e. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey*
21 (December). DOE/WIPP-08-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 22 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008a. *Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report—2007*
23 (Revision 1). DOE/TRU 2008-3379. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 24 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008b. *Basic Data Report for Piezometers PZ-13, PZ-14,*
25 *and PZ-15 and Shallow Subsurface Water* (Revision 1, April). DOE/WIPP 08-3375. Carlsbad,
26 NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 27 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008c. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2006–June*
28 *2007* (March). 2 vols. DOE/WIPP 08-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
30 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
31 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
32 52234–45.
- 33 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
34 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the

- 1 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” Federal Register, vol. 63 (May 18,
2 1998): 27353–406.
- 3 Vugrin, E.D., M.B. Nemer, and S.W. Wagner. 2006. *Uncertainties Affecting MgO Effectiveness*
4 *and Calculation of the MgO Effective Excess Factor* (Rev. 0, November 17). ERMS 544781.
5 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 6 Wall, D.E., N.A. Wall, and L.H. Brush. 2006. “Speciation and Solubility Modeling of Actinides
7 in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.” *Separations for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in the 21st Century*.
8 Eds. G.J. Lumetta, K.L. Nash, S.B. Clark, and J.L. Friese. ACS Symposium Series,
9 Vol. 933, 313-334. ERMS 541051. SAND2004-6355J. Washington, DC: American Chemical
10 Society.
- 11 Wall, N.A. 2005. *Preliminary Results for the Evaluation of Potential New MgO* (January 27).
12 ERMS 538514. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 13 Wall, N.A. and D.E. Wall. 2004. Memorandum to Records (Subject: Discussion on the
14 Influence of Organic Ligands on the Solubility of U(VI)). 30 November 2004. ERMS 537938.
15 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 Wall, N.A., and D. Enos. 2006. *Iron and Lead Corrosion in WIPP-Relevant Conditions, TP 06-*
17 *02, Rev. 1*. April 24. ERMS 543238. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 Xiong, Y. 2004a. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: A Correction of the Dimensionless
19 Standard Chemical Potential of NpO₂Ac(aq) in FMT_041116. CHEMDAT). 10 December
20 2004. ERMS 538162. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 21 Xiong, Y. 2004b. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: A Correction of the Molecular Weight
22 of Oxalate in FMT_021120. CHEMDAT, and Incorporation of Calcium Oxalate Monohydrate
23 (Whewellite) into CHEMDAT with Its Recommended Dimensionless Standard Chemical
24 Potential (μ_0/RT) Value). 8 June 2004. ERMS 535813. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
25 Laboratories.
- 26 Xiong, Y. 2004c. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Incorporation of Six Solid Phases
27 Including Hydromagnesite (5424) and Hydromagnesite (4323) into EQ3/6 HMW Database and
28 Its Modified Version HMP). 4 August 2004. ERMS 536321. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
29 Laboratories.
- 30 Xiong, Y. 2004d. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: An Update on the Dimensionless
31 Standard Chemical Potential of NpO₂Ac(aq) in FMT CHEMDAT). 11 November 2004. ERMS
32 537838. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 33 Xiong, Y. 2005. E-mail to J.F. Kanney and J.J. Long (Subject: Release of
34 FMT_050405.CHEMDAT). 5 April 2005. ERMS 539304. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
35 Laboratories.

- 1 Xiong, Y. 2006a. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Incorporation of Amorphous Calcium
2 Carbonate into the EQ3/6 HMY Database and Its Modified Version HML). 26 October 2006.
3 ERMS 544629. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Xiong, Y. 2006b. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Incorporation of Calcium Citrate
5 Hydrate, Earlandite; Calcium Oxalate Monohydrate, Whewellite; and Aqueous Species of Citrate
6 and Oxalate into the EQ3/6 HMP Database and Its Modified Version HMY). 18 October 2006.
7 ERMS 544529. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 8 Xiong, Y. 2007a. *Analysis Plan for Derivation of Pitzer Parameters in Support of Experimental*
9 *Work at LANL-CO*. June 7. ERMS 546249. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Xiong, Y. 2007b. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Incorporation of Amorphous Calcium
11 Carbonate with Higher Solubility (CaCO₃(am-cpa)), Aqueous Complexes of Magnesium and
12 Calcium with Acetate, Citrate, EDTA, and Oxalate, and Aqueous Species of Acetate and EDTA
13 into the EQ3/6 HML Database and its Modified Version HMO). 7 February 2007. ERMS
14 545276. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 Xiong, Y. In prep. *Thermodynamic Properties of Brucite Determined by Solubility Studies and*
16 *Their Significance to Nuclear Waste Isolation*. ERMS 546279. SAND2007-3373J. Carlsbad,
17 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 Xiong, Y., and A.S. Lord. 2008. "Experimental Investigations of the Reaction Path in the MgO-
19 CO₂-H₂O System in Solution with Various Ionic Strengths, and Their Applications to Nuclear
20 Waste Isolation." *Applied Geochemistry*, vol. 23: 1634–59. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
21 Laboratories.
- 22 Xiong, Y., E.J. Nowak, and L.H. Brush. 2004. *Updated Uncertainty Analysis of Actinide*
23 *Solubilities for the Response to EPA Comment C-23-16*. Analysis report. December 17. ERMS
24 538219. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Xiong, Y., E.J. Nowak, and L.H. Brush. 2005. "Predicting Actinide Solubilities in Concentrated
26 Brines: The Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT) Code." Presentation. 15th Goldschmidt
27 International Conference. May 20–25. Moscow, ID. ERMS 541555. SAND2005-2836C.
28 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 29 Xiong, Y., E.J. Nowak, and L.H. Brush. 2005. *Updated Uncertainty Analysis of Actinide*
30 *Solubilities For the Response to EPA Comment C-23-16, Rev. 1* (April 28). ERMS 539595.
31 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 32 Xiong, Y., L.H. Brush, D.E. Wall, and N.A. Wall. 2004. "Predictions of Actinide Solubilities
33 under Near-Field Conditions Expected in the WIPP." Abstracts with Programs. Geological
34 Society of America 2004 Annual Meeting. November 7–10. ERMS 536297. SAND2004-
35 2730A. Denver, CO.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix DATA
Attachment A: WIPP Borehole Update**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix DATA
Attachment A: WIPP Borehole Update

Table of Contents

DATA-A-1.0 WIPP Boreholes DATA-A-1

DATA-A-2.0 Individual Well Reports DATA-A-8

 DATA-A-2.1 New Wells (since CRA-2004)..... DATA-A-8

 DATA-A-2.2 Plugged Wells DATA-A-10

List of Tables

Table DATA-A-1. Status of WIPP Boreholes October 2007 WIPP DATA-A-1

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronym List

BLM	Bureau of Land Management
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	Department of Energy
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **DATA-A-1.0 WIPP Boreholes**

2 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared DOE/WIPP 95-2092, Rev. 1, Waste Isolation
 3 Pilot Plant (WIPP) Borehole Data Report (the Compliance Certification Application [CCA],
 4 Appendix BH) to serve as a central document, providing data on boreholes used in characterizing
 5 the site. The report contains a comprehensive database on wells drilled in support of the Waste
 6 Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and boreholes located within the 16-section land withdrawal area.

7 The CCA, Appendix BH describes seven groups of boreholes: commercially drilled boreholes,
 8 DOE wells, geologic exploration boreholes, hydrologic test boreholes, potash boreholes,
 9 subsurface exploration boreholes, and Water Quality Sampling Program boreholes. There are
 10 179 boreholes listed in the report. At the time of the CCA, 80 of those boreholes were being
 11 used as monitoring wells. The rest of the boreholes were plugged and abandoned after being
 12 drilled for their specific purpose, i.e., potash information, hydrocarbon information, or WIPP site
 13 characterization information.

14 The 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004), Appendix DATA, Attachment
 15 G, WIPP Borehole Update, was provided to add the new monitoring wells drilled since the initial
 16 certification and wells that were in use but omitted from the CCA, Appendix BH. The CRA-
 17 2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment G provided information on 112 boreholes.

18 For the CRA-2009, a thorough search was performed to define the number of boreholes
 19 associated with the WIPP site characterization and monitoring. Currently, there are 215
 20 boreholes that were either specifically drilled to support the WIPP site characterization process
 21 or obtained for monitoring purposes. This update provides the status for those boreholes.

22 Table DATA-A-1 provides the status of all 215 boreholes, including the name of the formation
 23 being monitored, whether the borehole is currently configured as a water or observation well,
 24 and whether it has been plugged and abandoned. A status of “N/A” means the borehole was not
 25 being used or had not yet been drilled at the time of the status report. “Observation” means the
 26 borehole was drilled for site characterization, but left unplugged for future monitoring purposes.

27 **Table DATA-A-1. Status of WIPP Boreholes October 2007 WIPP**

Well Name	CCA Status	CRA-04 Status	CRA-09 Status	Original Depth	Year Drilled
AEC-7	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	4,734 ft.	1974
AEC-8	Bell Canyon	Bell Canyon	Plugged	4,922 ft.	1974
B-1	Observation	Observation	Observation	58 ft.	1978
B-1A	Observation	Observation	Observation	13 ft.	1978
B-2	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	34 ft.	1978
B-3	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	29 ft.	1978
B-4	Observation	Observation	Observation	39 ft.	1978
B-4A	Observation	Observation	Observation	14 ft.	1978
B-5	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	32 ft.	1978

28

Table DATA-A-1. Status of WIPP Boreholes October 2007 WIPP (Continued)

Well Name	CCA Status	CRA-04 Status	CRA-09 Status	Original Depth	Year Drilled
B-6	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	26 ft.	1978
B-7	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	35 ft.	1978
B-8	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	100 ft.	1979
B-9	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	38 ft.	1978
B-10	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	32 ft.	1978
B-11	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	30 ft.	1978
B-12	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	41 ft.	1978
B-13	Observation	Observation	Observation	28 ft.	1978
B-14	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	25 ft.	1978
B-15	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	57 ft.	1978
B-16	Observation	Observation	Observation	31 ft.	1978
B-17	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	26 ft.	1978
B-18	Observation	Observation	Observation	33 ft.	1978
B-19	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	39 ft.	1978
B-20	Observation	Observation	Observation	14 ft.	1978
B-20A	Observation	Observation	Observation	34 ft.	1978
B-21	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	40 ft.	1978
B-22	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	28 ft.	1978
B-23	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	41 ft.	1978
B-24	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	29 ft.	1978
B-25	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	902 ft.	1978
B-26	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	28 ft.	1979
B-27	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	26 ft.	1979
B-28	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	27 ft.	1979
B-29	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	29 ft.	1978
B-30	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	28 ft.	1978
B-31	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	31 ft.	1978
B-32	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	100 ft.	1979
B-33	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	31 ft.	1978
B-34	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	100 ft.	1979
B-35	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	32 ft.	1979
B-36	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	28 ft.	1979
B-37	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	28 ft.	1979
B-37A	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	22 ft.	1979
B-38	Observation	Observation	Observation	50 ft.	1979
B-39	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	28 ft.	1979
B-40	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	28 ft.	1979

Table DATA-A-1. Status of WIPP Boreholes October 2007 WIPP (Continued)

Well Name	CCA Status	CRA-04 Status	CRA-09 Status	Original Depth	Year Drilled
B-41	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	100 ft.	1979
B-42	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	100 ft.	1979
B-43	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	100 ft.	1979
B-44	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	100 ft.	1979
B-45	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	100 ft.	1979
B-46	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	100 ft.	1979
B-47	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	18 ft.	1979
B-48	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	16 ft.	1979
B-49	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	19 ft.	1979
B-50	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	24 ft.	1979
B-51	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	15 ft.	1979
B-52	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	30 ft.	1979
B-53	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	30 ft.	1979
B-54	Observation	Observation	Observation	210 ft.	1979
B-301	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	40 ft.	1979
B-302	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	39 ft.	1979
B-303	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	39 ft.	1979
B-304	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	42 ft.	1979
B-305	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	41 ft.	1979
B-306	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	38 ft.	1979
B-307	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	40 ft.	1979
B-308	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	40 ft.	1979
B-309	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	39 ft.	1979
C-2505	N/A	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	97 ft.	1996
C-2506	N/A	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	69 ft.	1996
C-2507	N/A	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	73 ft.	1996
C-2737	N/A	Culebra/Magenta	Culebra/Magenta	800 ft.	2001
C-2811	N/A	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	80 ft.	2001
CB-1	Culebra	Culebra/Bell Canyon	Bell Canyon	4,299 ft.	1974
D-268	Culebra	Rancher's Water Well	Rancher's Water Well	1,411 ft.	1984
DOE-1	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	4,057 ft.	1982
DOE-2	Culebra	Magenta	Bell Canyon	4,325 ft.	1984
ERDA-6	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	2,775 ft.	1975
ERDA-9	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	2,886 ft.	1976
ERDA-10	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	4,430 ft.	1977
ERDA-11	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	40 ft.	1977
ES-001	N/A	Plugged	Plugged	54 ft.	1996

Table DATA-A-1. Status of WIPP Boreholes October 2007 WIPP (Continued)

Well Name	CCA Status	CRA-04 Status	CRA-09 Status	Original Depth	Year Drilled
ES-002	N/A	Plugged	Plugged	19 ft.	1996
H-1	Culebra/Magenta	Plugged	Plugged	856 ft.	1976
H-2A	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	672 ft.	1977
H-2B1	Magenta	Magenta	Magenta	661 ft.	1977
H-2B2	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	660 ft.	1983
H-2C	Magenta	Culebra	Plugged	795 ft.	1977
H-3B1	Magenta	Magenta	Magenta	902 ft.	1976
H-3B2	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	725 ft.	1983
H-3B3	Magenta	Culebra	Plugged	730 ft.	1983
H-3D	Dewey Lake	Dewey Lake/Forty-niner	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	554 ft.	1987
H-4A	N/A	Plugged	Plugged	532 ft.	1978
H-4B	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	529 ft.	1978
H-4C	Magenta	Magenta	Magenta	661 ft.	1978
H-5A	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	930 ft.	1978
H-5B	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	925 ft.	1978
H-5C	Magenta	Magenta	Not in Use	1,076 ft.	1978
H-6A	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	637 ft.	1978
H-6B	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	640 ft.	1978
H-6C	Culebra	Culebra	Magenta	741 ft.	1978
H-7A	N/A	Plugged	Plugged	154 ft.	1979
H-7B1	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	286 ft.	1979
H-7B2	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	295 ft.	1983
H-7C	N/A	N/A	Rancher's Water Well	420 ft.	1979
H-8A	Magenta	Magenta	Magenta	505 ft.	1979
H-8B	N/A	Rancher's Water Well	Rancher's Water Well	624 ft.	1979
H-8C	Rustler	Rustler	Rancher's Water Well	808 ft.	1979
H-9A	Culebra	Plugged	Plugged	692 ft.	1979
H-9B	Culebra	Culebra	Not in Use	708 ft.	1979
H-9C	Culebra	Magenta	Culebra/Magenta	816 ft.	1979
H-10A	Magenta	Magenta	Magenta	1,318 ft.	1979
H-10B	Magenta	Plugged	Plugged	1,398 ft.	1979
H-10C	N/A	Culebra	Culebra	1,550 ft.	1979
H-11B1	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	785 ft.	1983
H-11B2	Culebra	Magenta	Magenta	776 ft.	1983
H-11B3	Culebra	Plugged	Plugged	789 ft.	1983
H-11B4	N/A	Culebra	Culebra	765 ft.	1988
H-12	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	1,001 ft.	1983

Table DATA-A-1. Status of WIPP Boreholes October 2007 WIPP (Continued)

Well Name	CCA Status	CRA-04 Status	CRA-09 Status	Original Depth	Year Drilled
H-14	Culebra	Magenta	Magenta	589 ft.	1986
H-15	Culebra	Magenta	Culebra/Magenta	900 ft.	1986
H-16	Dewey Lake	N/A	Rustler	851 ft.	1987
H-17	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	880 ft.	1987
H-18	Culebra	Magenta	Magenta	840 ft.	1987
H-19B	N/A	N/A	N/A	40 ft.	1995
H-19B0	N/A	Culebra	Culebra	779 ft.	1995
H-19B1	N/A	Plugged	Plugged	733 ft.	1995
H-19B2	N/A	Culebra	Culebra	785 ft.	1995
H-19B3	N/A	Culebra	Culebra	785 ft.	1995
H-19B4	N/A	Culebra	Culebra	782 ft.	1995
H-19B5	N/A	Culebra	Culebra	786 ft.	1995
H-19B6	N/A	Culebra	Culebra	788 ft.	1995
H-19B7	N/A	Culebra	Culebra	785 ft.	1995
IMC-461	N/A	N/A	Culebra	1,316 ft.	2004
P-1	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,591 ft.	1976
P-2	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,895 ft.	1976
P-3	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,676 ft.	1976
P-4	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,857 ft.	1976
P-5	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,830 ft.	1976
P-6	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,573 ft.	1976
P-7	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,574 ft.	1976
P-8	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,660 ft.	1976
P-9	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,796 ft.	1976
P-10	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	2,009 ft.	1976
P-11	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,940 ft.	1976
P-12	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,598 ft.	1976
P-13	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,576 ft.	1976
P-14	Culebra	Plugged	Plugged	1,545 ft.	1976
P-15	Culebra	Plugged	Plugged	1,465 ft.	1976
P-16	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,585 ft.	1976
P-17	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	1,660 ft.	1976
P-18	Culebra	Plugged	Plugged	1,998 ft.	1976
P-19	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	2,000 ft.	1976
P-20	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,995 ft.	1976
P-21	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,915 ft.	1976
PZ-1	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	68 ft.	1997

Table DATA-A-1. Status of WIPP Boreholes October 2007 WIPP (Continued)

Well Name	CCA Status	CRA-04 Status	CRA-09 Status	Original Depth	Year Drilled
PZ-2	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	65 ft.	1997
PZ-3	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	71 ft.	1997
PZ-4	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	65 ft.	1997
PZ-5	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	72 ft.	1997
PZ-6	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	66 ft.	1997
PZ-7	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	72 ft.	1997
PZ-8	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	68 ft.	1997
PZ-9	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	82 ft.	1997
PZ-10	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	57 ft.	1997
PZ-11	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	82 ft.	1997
PZ-12	N/A	Santa Rosa	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	72 ft.	1997
PZ-13	N/A	N/A	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	77 ft.	2007
PZ-14	N/A	N/A	Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake	73 ft.	2007
PZ-15	N/A	N/A	Gatuña/Santa Rosa	56 ft.	2007
SNL-1	N/A	N/A	Culebra	644 ft.	2004
SNL-2	N/A	N/A	Culebra	614 ft.	2003
SNL-3	N/A	N/A	Culebra	970 ft.	2003
SNL-5	N/A	N/A	Culebra	687 ft.	2004
SNL-6	N/A	N/A	Culebra	1,360 ft.	2005
SNL-8	N/A	N/A	Culebra	981 ft.	2005
SNL-9	N/A	N/A	Culebra	845 ft.	2003
SNL-10	N/A	N/A	Culebra	651 ft.	2006
SNL-12	N/A	N/A	Culebra	905 ft.	2003
SNL-13	N/A	N/A	Culebra	480 ft.	2005
SNL-14	N/A	N/A	Culebra	719 ft.	2005
SNL-15	N/A	N/A	Culebra	950 ft.	2005
SNL-16	N/A	N/A	Culebra	224 ft.	2006
SNL-17A	N/A	N/A	Culebra	375 ft.	2006
SNL-17	N/A	N/A	Plugged	365 ft.	2006
SNL-18	N/A	N/A	Culebra	566 ft.	2006
SNL-19	N/A	N/A	Culebra	381 ft.	2006
WIPP-11	N/A	N/A	Culebra	3,580 ft.	1978
WIPP-12	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	3,928 ft.	1978
WIPP-13	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	3,856 ft.	1978
WIPP-14	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,000 ft.	1981
WIPP-15	Water Well	Rancher's Water Well	Rancher's Water Well	810 ft.	1978
WIPP-16	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,300 ft.	1980

Table DATA-A-1. Status of WIPP Boreholes October 2007 WIPP (Continued)

Well Name	CCA Status	CRA-04 Status	CRA-09 Status	Original Depth	Year Drilled
WIPP-18	Culebra	Magenta	Magenta	1,060 ft.	1978
WIPP-19	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	1,038 ft.	1978
WIPP-21	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	1,045 ft.	1978
WIPP-22	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	1,450 ft.	1978
WIPP-25	Culebra/Magenta	Culebra/Magenta	Culebra/Magenta	650 ft.	1978
WIPP-26	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	503 ft.	1978
WIPP-27	Culebra/Magenta	Culebra	Plugged	592 ft.	1978
WIPP-28	Rustler	Plugged	Plugged	801 ft.	1978
WIPP-29	Culebra	Culebra	Plugged	377 ft.	1978
WIPP-30	Culebra/Magenta	Culebra/Magenta	Culebra/Magenta	913 ft.	1978
WIPP-31	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,982 ft.	1980
WIPP-32	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	390 ft.	1979
WIPP-33	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	840 ft.	1979
WIPP-34	Plugged	Plugged	Plugged	1,820 ft.	1979
WQSP-1	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	737 ft.	1994
WQSP-2	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	846 ft.	1994
WQSP-3	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	879 ft.	1994
WQSP-4	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	800 ft.	1994
WQSP-5	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	681 ft.	1994
WQSP-6	Culebra	Culebra	Culebra	617 ft.	1994
WQSP-6A	Dewey Lake	Dewey Lake	Dewey Lake	225 ft.	1994

1

1 **DATA-A-2.0 Individual Well Reports**

2 This section provides basic data on the new wells drilled (21) and the wells plugged (19) during
3 the CRA-2009 monitoring period (October 2002 through September 2007).

4 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) controls the drilling, operation, and abandonment of
5 hydrocarbon wells on federal land in New Mexico. The New Mexico Oil Conservation Division
6 controls the drilling, operation, and abandonment of hydrocarbon wells on state and patented
7 lands in New Mexico. The New Mexico Office of the State Engineer regulates the drilling,
8 operation, and abandonment of groundwater wells (this includes mineral exploration,
9 monitoring, and observation wells) in the State of New Mexico. This agency has regulatory
10 oversight of wells in the WIPP land withdrawal area. All WIPP monitoring wells have been
11 permitted through this agency and drilled according to the regulations in place at the time of
12 drilling. Right-of-way permits have been acquired from the BLM when monitoring wells are
13 located on federal lands.

14 **DATA-A-2.1 New Wells (since CRA-2004)**

15 IMC-461

16 Location: T22S-R30E-22 Year Drilled: 2004 Total Depth: 1316 ft (401 m)
17 Status: Culebra Monitoring Well Elevation: 3281 ft (1000 m)

18 PZ-13

19 Location: T22S-R31E-21 Year Drilled: 2007 Total Depth: 77 ft (23 m)
20 Status: Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake Monitoring Well Elevation: 3422 ft (1043 m)

21 PZ-14

22 Location: T22S-R31E-21 Year Drilled: 2007 Total Depth: 73 ft (22 m)
23 Status: Santa Rosa/Dewey Lake Monitoring Well Elevation: 3420 ft (1042 m)

24 PZ-15

25 Location: T22S-R31E-21 Year Drilled: 2007 Total Depth: 56 ft (17 m)
26 Status: Santa Rosa Monitoring Well Elevation: 3431 ft (1046 m)

27 SNL-1

28 Location: T21S-R31E-16 Year Drilled: 2004 Total Depth: 644 ft (196 m)
29 Status: Culebra Monitoring Well Elevation: 3510 ft (1070 m)

30 SNL-2

31 Location: T22S-R30E-12 Year Drilled: 2003 Total Depth: 614 ft (187 m)
32 Status: Culebra Monitoring Well Elevation: 3321 ft (1012 m)

33 SNL-3

34 Location: T21S-R31E-34 Year Drilled: 2003 Total Depth: 970 ft (296 m)
35 Status: Culebra Monitoring Well Elevation: 3488 ft (1063 m)

1	<u>SNL-5</u>		
2	Location: T22S-R31E-06	Year Drilled: 2004	Total Depth: 687 ft (209 m)
3	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3377 ft (1029 m)
4	<u>SNL-6</u>		
5	Location: T21S-R32E-07	Year Drilled: 2005	Total Depth: 1360 ft (414 m)
6	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3643 ft (1110 m)
7	<u>SNL-8</u>		
8	Location: T22S-R31E-14	Year Drilled: 2005	Total Depth: 981 ft (299 m)
9	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3552 ft (1083 m)
10	<u>SNL-9</u>		
11	Location: T22S-R30E-23	Year Drilled: 2003	Total Depth: 845 ft (257 m)
12	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3358 ft (1024 m)
13	<u>SNL-10</u>		
14	Location: T22S-R31E-30	Year Drilled: 2006	Total Depth: 651 ft (198)
15	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3374 ft (1028 m)
16	<u>SNL-12</u>		
17	Location: T23S-R31E-20	Year Drilled: 2003	Total Depth: 905 ft (275 m)
18	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3337 ft (1017 m)
19	<u>SNL-13</u>		
20	Location: T23S-R30E-01	Year Drilled: 2005	Total Depth: 480 ft (146 m)
21	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3291 ft (1003 m)
22	<u>SNL-14</u>		
23	Location: T23S-R31E-04	Year Drilled: 2005	Total Depth: 719 ft (219 m)
24	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3365 ft (1026 m)
25	<u>SNL-15</u>		
26	Location: T22S-R31E-26	Year Drilled: 2005	Total Depth: 950 ft (290 m)
27	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3477 ft (1060 m)
28	<u>SNL-16</u>		
29	Location: T22S-R30E-33	Year Drilled: 2006	Total Depth: 224 ft (68 m)
30	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3132 ft (955 m)
31	<u>SNL-17</u>		
32	Location: T22S-R30E-12	Year Drilled: 2006	Total Depth: 375 ft (114 m)
33	Status: Plugged		Elevation: 3235 ft (986 m)
34	<u>SNL-17A</u>		
35	Location: T22S-R30E-12	Year Drilled: 2006	Total Depth: 365 ft (111 m)
36	Status: Culebra Monitoring Well		Elevation: 3235 ft (986 m)

1 SNL-18
 2 Location: T21S-R31E-20 Year Drilled: 2006 Total Depth: 566 ft (172 m)
 3 Status: Culebra Monitoring Well Elevation: 3372 ft (1028 m)

4 SNL-19
 5 Location: T21S-R30E-35 Year Drilled: 2006 Total Depth: 381 ft (116 m)
 6 Status: Culebra Monitoring Well Elevation: 3219 ft (981 m)

7 **DATA-A-2.2 Plugged Wells**

8 AEC-8
 9 Location: T22S-R31E-11 Year Drilled: 1974 Total Depth: 4922 ft (1500 m)
 10 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3532 ft (1077 m)
 11 Notes: Plugged solid with Class C neat cement.

12 DOE-1
 13 Location: T22S-R31E-28 Year Drilled: 1982 Total Depth: 4057 ft (1237 m)
 14 Status: Plugged in 2006 Elevation: 3466 ft (1056 m)
 15 Notes: Hole was plugged with a salt-saturated cement to the top of the salt formation, and Class
 16 C neat cement from there to the surface.

17 H-2A
 18 Location: T22S-R31E-29 Year Drilled: 1977 Total Depth: 672 ft (204 m)
 19 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3378 ft (1030 m)
 20 Notes: During a sampling event, a pump and packer assembly was dropped into the well and
 21 jammed at the bottom of the casing. Retrieval attempts proved unsuccessful. The regulating
 22 agency approved leaving the gear in the hole. The well was cemented to the surface using Class
 23 C neat cement.

24 H-2C
 25 Location: T22S-R31E-29 Year Drilled: 1977 Total Depth: 795 ft (242 m)
 26 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3378 ft (1030 m)
 27 Notes: The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

28 H-3B3
 29 Location: T22S-R31E-29 Year Drilled: 1983 Total Depth: 730 ft (222 m)
 30 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3389 ft (1033 m)
 31 Notes: The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

32 H-5A
 33 Location: T22S-R31E-15 Year Drilled: 1978 Total Depth: 930 ft (283 m)
 34 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3506 ft (1069 m)
 35 Notes: Attempts were made to remove packer assembly. Retrieval attempts proved unsuccessful.
 36 The regulating agency approved leaving the packer in the well but driving it as far down the well
 37 bore as possible. The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

1 H-6A

2 Location: T22S-R31E-18 Year Drilled: 1978 Total Depth: 637 ft (194 m)

3 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3348 ft (1020 m)

4 Notes: Attempts were made to remove packer assembly. Retrieval attempts proved unsuccessful.
5 The regulating agency approved leaving the packer in the well but driving it as far down the well
6 bore as possible. The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

7 H-7C

8 Location: T23S-R30E-14 Year Drilled: 1979 Total Depth: 420 ft (128 m)

9 Status: Water Well Elevation: 3162 ft (964 m)

10 Notes: The well was converted to a water well for local rancher use and removed from the WIPP
11 monitoring well system.

12 H-7B2

13 Location: T23S-R30E-14 Year Drilled: 1983 Total Depth: 295 ft (90 m)

14 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3164 ft (964 m)

15 Notes: Prior to plugging, circulation was lost due to split casing while the well was being
16 cleaned out. To allow sufficient cementing, Baro-Seal® was used to assist in plugging open
17 spaces. The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

18 H-8C

19 Location: T24S-R30E-23 Year Drilled: 1979 Total Depth: 808 ft (246 m)

20 Status: Water Well Elevation: 3433 ft (1046 m)

21 Notes: The well was converted to a water well for local rancher utilization and removed from
22 the WIPP monitoring well system.

23 H-11B1

24 Location: T22S-R31E-33 Year Drilled: 1983 Total Depth: 785 ft (239 m)

25 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3411 ft (1040 m)

26 Notes: The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

27 P-17

28 Location: T23S-R31E-04 Year Drilled: 1976 Total Depth: 1660 ft (505 m)

29 Status: Plugged in 2006 Elevation: 3336 ft (1017 m)

30 Notes: The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

31 SNL-17

32 Location: T22S-R30E-12 Year Drilled: 2006 Total Depth: 365 ft (111 m)

33 Status: Plugged in 2006 Elevation: 3235 ft (986 m)

34 Notes: Well was plugged after being drilled due to the failure of the bottom plug.

35 WIPP-12

36 Location: T22S-R31E-17 Year Drilled: 1978 Total Depth: 3928 ft (1197 m)

37 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3472 ft (1058 m)

38 Notes: During the deepening of this well in 1982, a pressurized brine pocket in the Castile was
39 encountered. In 1983, the brine reservoir was sealed from the upper part of the well bore by
40 installing a borehole plug. During plugging, extra precautions were taken to protect workers and

1 the environment from the possible release of brine or H₂S. None was encountered. The well was
2 cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

3 WIPP-21

4 Location: T22S-R31E-20 Year Drilled: 1978 Total Depth: 1045 ft (318 m)

5 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3419 ft (1042 m)

6 Notes: The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

7 WIPP-22

8 Location: T22S-R31E-20 Year Drilled: 1978 Total Depth: 1450 ft (441 m)

9 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 3428 ft (1045 m)

10 Notes: The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

11 WIPP-26

12 Location: T22S-R30E-29 Year Drilled: 1978 Total Depth: 503 ft (153 m)

13 Status: Plugged in 2006 Elevation: 3150 ft (960 m)

14 Notes: The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

15 WIPP-27

16 Location: T21S-R30E-21 Year Drilled: 1978 Total Depth: 592 ft (180 m)

17 Status: Plugged in 2006 Elevation: 3179 ft (969 m)

18 Notes: The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

19 WIPP-29

20 Location: T22S-R29E-34 Year Drilled: 1978 Total Depth: 377 ft (114 m)

21 Status: Plugged in 2005 Elevation: 2978 ft (908 m)

22 Notes: The well was cemented to the surface using Class C neat cement.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix DATA
Attachment B: WIPP Waste
Containers and Emplacement**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix DATA
Attachment B: WIPP Waste
Containers and Emplacement

Table of Contents

DATA-B-1.0 Authorized Waste Emplacement Containers..... DATA-B-1
 DATA-B-1.1 Container Descriptions DATA-B-1
 DATA-B-1.2 Dunnage Containers DATA-B-1
 DATA-B-1.3 Payload Descriptions DATA-B-1
 DATA-B-1.4 Emplacement Configurations DATA-B-9

List of Figures

Figure DATA-B-1. 55-gal Drum Components and Emplacement Configuration..... DATA-B-2
 Figure DATA-B-2. 85-gal Drum (Short) Components and Emplacement
 Configuration DATA-B-3
 Figure DATA-B-3. 85-gal Drum (Tall) Components and Emplacement
 Configuration DATA-B-4
 Figure DATA-B-4. 100-gal Drum Components and Emplacement
 Configuration DATA-B-5
 Figure DATA-B-5. Illustration of an SWB DATA-B-6
 Figure DATA-B-6. TDOP Components DATA-B-7
 Figure DATA-B-7. RH-TRU Waste Canister Components DATA-B-8
 Figure DATA-B-8. CH-TRU Waste Emplacement Layout DATA-B-9
 Figure DATA-B-9. CH-TRU Waste Emplacement..... DATA-B-10
 Figure DATA-B-10. RH-TRU Waste Emplacement..... DATA-B-11

List of Tables

Table DATA-B-1. 55-gal Drum Specifications..... DATA-B-2
 Table DATA-B-2. 85-gal Drum (Short) Specifications DATA-B-3
 Table DATA-B-3. 85-gal Drum (Tall) Specifications..... DATA-B-4
 Table DATA-B-4. 100-gal Drum Specifications..... DATA-B-5
 Table DATA-B-5. SWB Specifications..... DATA-B-6
 Table DATA-B-6. TDOP Specifications DATA-B-7
 Table DATA-B-7. RH-TRU Waste Canister Specifications DATA-B-8

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronym List

CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
gal	gallon
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
SWB	Standard Waste Box
TDOP	10-Drum Overpack
TRU	transuranic

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **DATA-B-1.0 Authorized Waste Emplacement Containers**

2 **DATA-B-1.1 Container Descriptions**

3 The Compliance Certification Application to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
4 identified the following containers as outer containment vessels for waste emplacement in the
5 repository:

- 6 • 55-gallon (gal) Drum
- 7 • 85-gal Drum (Short)
- 8 • 85-gal Drum (Tall)
- 9 • 100-gal Drum
- 10 • Standard Waste Box (SWB)
- 11 • Ten-Drum Overpack (TDOP)
- 12 • Remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-TRU) 72B Cask Removable Lid Canister
13 (RH-TRU Waste Canister)


14 **DATA-B-1.2 Dunnage Containers**

15 Dunnage containers are empty containers used to complete a shipping configuration, such as the
16 seven-pack, if too few containers that meet transportation requirements are available. Dunnage
17 containers are clearly marked “Empty.” The TDOP and the RH-TRU Waste Canister are not
18 used as dunnage containers for shipping purposes. For emplacement purposes in the repository,
19 the 55-, 85-, and 100-gal drums can be used as dunnage containers only if they arrive in a shrink-
20 wrapped package assembly, such as the seven-pack, four-pack, or three-pack. To date, only 55-
21 gal drums and several SWBs have been emplaced in the repository as dunnage containers.

22 **DATA-B-1.3 Payload Descriptions**

23 This section gives a brief description of each payload container and its configuration for
24 emplacement. This description also includes a figure and a table for each container.

1 The 55-gal drum is shipped in a seven-pack configuration and is normally emplaced in the
 2 repository in the same configuration, but can be emplaced as an individual unit should the need
 3 arise. A single drum can be used for collecting and storing site-derived waste. An illustration of
 4 the 55-gal drum components and emplacement configuration is provided in Figure DATA-B-1.
 5 The drum specifications are provided in Table DATA-B-1.




6
 7 **Figure DATA-B-1. 55-gal Drum Components and Emplacement Configuration**

8 **Table DATA-B-1. 55-gal Drum Specifications**

Dimension	Approximate Measurement			
	Inside Dimension (inches)	Outside Dimension (inches)	Inside Dimension (mm)	Outside Dimension (mm)
Height	33 ¼	35	845	889
Diameter	22 ½	24	572	610
—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—

9

1 The 85-gal drum (short) is shipped in a four-pack configuration and will be emplaced in the
 2 repository in the same configuration, but can be emplaced as an individual unit should the need
 3 arise. A single drum can be used for collecting and storing site-derived waste or for overpacking
 4 a 55-gal drum. An illustration of the 85-gal drum (short) components and emplacement
 5 configuration is provided in Figure DATA-B-2. The drum specifications are provided in Table
 6 DATA-B-2.




7
 8 **Figure DATA-B-2. 85-gal Drum (Short) Components and Emplacement Configuration**

9 **Table DATA-B-2. 85-gal Drum (Short) Specifications**

Dimension	Approximate Measurement			
	Inside Dimension (inches)	Outside Dimension (inches)	Inside Dimension (mm)	O.D. (mm)
Height	33 ¼	35	845	889
Diameter	27 ⅛	29 ¾	689	756
—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—

10

1 The 85-gal drum (tall) is shipped in a four-pack configuration and will be emplaced in the
 2 repository in the same configuration. It is also used for overpacking 55-gal drums that are
 3 individually emplaced in the repository. A single drum can be used for collecting and storing
 4 site-derived waste. An illustration of the 85-gal drum (tall) components and emplacement
 5 configuration is provided in Figure DATA-B-3. The drum specifications are provided in Table
 6 DATA-B-3.




7
 8 **Figure DATA-B-3. 85-gal Drum (Tall) Components and Emplacement Configuration**

9 **Table DATA-B-3. 85-gal Drum (Tall) Specifications**

Dimension	Approximate Measurement			
	Inside Dimension (inches)	Outside Dimension (inches)	Inside Dimension (mm)	Outside Dimension (mm)
Height	38 ¼	40 ¼	972	1,022
Diameter	26	28 ⅝	660	728
—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—

10

1 The 100-gal drum is shipped in a three-pack configuration and will be emplaced in the repository
 2 in the same configuration. The 100-gal drum can be emplaced as an individual unit should the
 3 need arise. An illustration of the 100-gal drum components and emplacement configuration is
 4 provided in Figure DATA-B-4. The drum specifications are provided in Table DATA-B-4.




5
 6 **Figure DATA-B-4. 100-gal Drum Components and Emplacement Configuration**

7 **Table DATA-B-4. 100-gal Drum Specifications**

Dimension	Approximate Measurement			
	Inside Dimension (inches)	Outside Dimension (inches)	Inside Dimension (mm)	Outside Dimension (mm)
Height	33	35	838	889
Diameter	30	32	762	813
—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—

8

- 1 The SWB is shipped and emplaced as an individual unit. Typically, two SWBs are shipped in a
- 2 TRUPACT-II shipping container. An illustration of the SWB is provided in Figure DATA-B-5.
- 3 The box specifications are provided in Table DATA-B-5.



4
5
6


Figure DATA-B-5. Illustration of an SWB

Table DATA-B-5. SWB Specifications

Dimension	Approximate Measurement			
	Inside Dimension (inches)	Outside Dimension (inches)	Inside Dimension (mm)	Outside Dimension (mm)
Height	36 ⁹ / ₁₆	36 ⁷ / ₈	929	937
Length	68 ³ / ₄	71	1,746	1,803
Width	52	54 ¹ / ₂	1,321	1,384
—	—	—	—	—

7

1 The TDOP is shipped as an individual unit and emplaced as an individual unit. An illustration of
 2 the TDOP's components is provided in Figure DATA-B-6. The TDOP specifications are
 3 provided in Table DATA-B-6.




4
 5 **Figure DATA-B-6. TDOP Components**

6 **Table DATA-B-6. TDOP Specifications**

Dimension	Approximate Measurement			
	Inside Dimension (inches)	Outside Dimension (inches)	Inside Dimension (mm)	Outside Dimension (mm)
Height	72 5/8	73 1/8	1845	1,858
Diameter	68 3/4	71 1/4	1,746	1,810
—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—

7

- 1 The RH-TRU Waste Canister is shipped as a single unit and emplaced as a single unit.
- 2 Illustrations of the canister's components are provided in Figure DATA-B-7. The canister
- 3 specifications are provided in Table DATA-B-7.



- 4
- 5
- 6

Figure DATA-B-7. RH-TRU Waste Canister Components


Table DATA-B-7. RH-TRU Waste Canister Specifications

Dimension	Approximate Measurement			
	Inside Dimension (inches)	Outside Dimension (inches)	Inside Dimension (mm)	Outside Dimension (mm)
Height	108	120 ½	2,743	3,061
Diameter	25 ½	26	648	660
—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—

- 7

1 **DATA-B-1.4 Emplacement Configurations**

2 Shown in Figure DATA-B-8 is the typical position for waste emplacement containers randomly
 3 emplaced in the room of a panel. TDOPs are only emplaced on the bottom position with another
 4 assembly stacked on top. All of the other assemblies can be stacked three high before the MgO
 5 supersack is emplaced on the top of the stack. Contact-handled (CH) transuranic TRU (CH-
 6 TRU) waste emplacement within the repository panels is shown in Figure DATA-B-9. The
 7 planned RH-TRU waste emplacement is shown in Figure DATA-B-10.



8
9

Figure DATA-B-8. CH-TRU Waste Emplacement Layout





Figure DATA-B-9. CH-TRU Waste Emplacement



1
2
3

Figure DATA-B-10. RH-TRU Waste Emplacement

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Appendix HYDRO-2009
Hydrological Investigations**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix HYDRO-2009
Hydrological Investigations

Table of Contents

HYDRO-1.0 Hydrological Studies HYDRO-1

HYDRO-2.0 Optimization of Culebra Monitoring Well Network HYDRO-5

HYDRO-3.0 Drilling of New Wells HYDRO-9

HYDRO-4.0 P&A and Recompletion of Old Wells HYDRO-13

HYDRO-5.0 Monitoring HYDRO-16

 HYDRO-5.1 Culebra Monitoring HYDRO-16

 HYDRO-5.2 Magenta Monitoring HYDRO-28

 HYDRO-5.3 Dewey Lake Monitoring HYDRO-34

 HYDRO-5.4 Bell Canyon Monitoring HYDRO-34

 HYDRO-5.5 Monitoring Summary HYDRO-36

HYDRO-6.0 Hydraulic Testing HYDRO-38

 HYDRO-6.1 Qualitative Analysis of Diagnostic Plots HYDRO-39

 HYDRO-6.2 Distribution of Transmissivity and Correlation with Depth HYDRO-41

 HYDRO-6.3 Large-Scale Tests with Distant Observation Wells HYDRO-45

 HYDRO-6.4 Evidence for Fracture Interconnections from Diffusivity
 Analysis HYDRO-46

 HYDRO-6.5 Other Testing HYDRO-47

 HYDRO-6.6 Summary HYDRO-50

HYDRO-7.0 Geological Investigations HYDRO-51

 HYDRO-7.1 Halite Margins HYDRO-51

 HYDRO-7.2 Karst HYDRO-51

HYDRO-8.0 Water-Quality Sampling and Evaluation HYDRO-56

 HYDRO-8.1 Culebra Groundwater Chemistry HYDRO-56

 HYDRO-8.2 Groundwater Chemistry of Other Units HYDRO-61

 HYDRO-8.3 Summary HYDRO-62

HYDRO-9.0 Modeling of Culebra Water-Level Rise HYDRO-64

 HYDRO-9.1 Option A HYDRO-69

 HYDRO-9.2 Option B HYDRO-69

 HYDRO-9.3 Option C HYDRO-72

 HYDRO-9.4 Conclusions HYDRO-73

HYDRO-10.0 Summary and Conclusions HYDRO-76

HYDRO-11.0 References HYDRO-78

List of Figures

Figure HYDRO-1. Locations of WIPP Wells..... HYDRO-3

Figure HYDRO-2. General Stratigraphic Column of Geologic Units at the
WIPP Site..... HYDRO-4

Figure HYDRO-3. Detailed Rustler Formation Stratigraphy HYDRO-4

Figure HYDRO-4. Combined-Score Values Map From McKenna (2004)
Including Estimation Variance, Number of Three-Point
Estimators, and Sensitivity of Travel Time to Head HYDRO-6

Figure HYDRO-5. Combined-Score Values Map From McKenna (2004)
Including Estimation Variance, Number of Three-Point
Estimators, and Sensitivity of Travel Time to Transmissivity..... HYDRO-7

Figure HYDRO-6. Air-Photo Map From Sandia National Laboratories (2003,
Figure 8) Showing Locations Proposed for SNL-and WTS-
Series Wells..... HYDRO-12

Figure HYDRO-7. Locations of Plugged and Abandoned and Recompleted
Wells..... HYDRO-15

Figure HYDRO-8. Locations of Culebra Monitoring Wells Outside the WIPP
Site as of 1/1/2008..... HYDRO-17

Figure HYDRO-9. Locations of Culebra Monitoring Wells Within the WIPP
Site as of 1/1/2008..... HYDRO-18

Figure HYDRO-10. Locations of Non-Culebra Monitoring Wells as of 1/1/2008..... HYDRO-19

Figure HYDRO-11. Time Periods During Which Culebra Wells Have Been
Monitored Using TROLL[®] Gauges..... HYDRO-20

Figure HYDRO-12. WIPP-26 Culebra TROLL[®] and Water-Level Data..... HYDRO-20

Figure HYDRO-13. WIPP-26 Culebra Fluid Pressure With Daily Rainfall
Measured at the WIPP HYDRO-21

Figure HYDRO-14. SNL-16 and SNL-19 Culebra Fluid Pressures With Daily
Rainfall Measured at SNL-9..... HYDRO-21

Figure HYDRO-15. SNL-1 and SNL-2 Culebra Water Levels With Daily
Rainfall Measured at the WIPP HYDRO-22

Figure HYDRO-16. SNL-2, H-6b, and WIPP-19 Culebra Water Levels With
Cumulative Rainfall Measured at the WIPP HYDRO-22

Figure HYDRO-17. Map of Culebra Lag-Time Response to Major Rainfall
Events (from Hillesheim, Hillesheim, and Toll 2007) HYDRO-23

Figure HYDRO-18. Water Levels in Seven Culebra Wells North of the WIPP
Site..... HYDRO-24

Figure HYDRO-19. Water Levels in Seven Culebra Wells in the Northern
Portion of the WIPP Site HYDRO-24

Figure HYDRO-20. Water Levels in Eight Culebra Wells in the Central WIPP
Site..... HYDRO-26

Figure HYDRO-21. Water Levels in Six Culebra Wells South of the WIPP Site..... HYDRO-26

Figure HYDRO-22. Water Levels in Six Culebra Wells in and Near the
Southeastern Arm of Nash Draw..... HYDRO-27

Figure HYDRO-23. Water Levels in Three Culebra Wells West of the WIPP Site.... HYDRO-27

Figure HYDRO-24. Water Levels in Culebra Wells SNL-6 and SNL-15..... HYDRO-28

Figure HYDRO-25.	H-10c Culebra and H-10a Magenta Water Levels With Spud Dates for Oil Wells Within 1.0 km.....	HYDRO-29
Figure HYDRO-26.	H-5b Culebra Water Levels.....	HYDRO-29
Figure HYDRO-27.	Water Levels in Nine Magenta Wells	HYDRO-30
Figure HYDRO-28.	Magenta Water Levels in Wells H-2b1, H-14, and H-18.....	HYDRO-32
Figure HYDRO-29.	Magenta Water Levels in Wells DOE-2, H-6c, H-8a, and WIPP-25	HYDRO-32
Figure HYDRO-30.	Time Periods During Which Magenta Wells Have Been Monitored Using TROLL [®] Gauges.....	HYDRO-33
Figure HYDRO-31.	WIPP-25 Culebra and Magenta Fluid Pressures from October 2004 Through January 2006 with Daily Rainfall Measured at the WIPP	HYDRO-33
Figure HYDRO-32.	WIPP-25 Culebra and Magenta Fluid Pressures from March 2006 Through January 2007 with Daily Rainfall Measured at SNL-9	HYDRO-34
Figure HYDRO-33.	WQSP-6A Dewey Lake Water Levels.....	HYDRO-35
Figure HYDRO-34.	DOE-2 Bell Canyon Water Levels.....	HYDRO-35
Figure HYDRO-35.	CB-1 Bell Canyon Water Levels.....	HYDRO-37
Figure HYDRO-36.	Log-Log Diagnostic Plot Showing Different Aquifer Conditions	HYDRO-40
Figure HYDRO-37.	Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of C-2737 Recovery	HYDRO-40
Figure HYDRO-38.	Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of SNL-3 Recovery	HYDRO-42
Figure HYDRO-39.	Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of WIPP-11 Recovery	HYDRO-42
Figure HYDRO-40.	Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of SNL-5 Recovery	HYDRO-43
Figure HYDRO-41.	Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of SNL-17A Recovery.....	HYDRO-43
Figure HYDRO-42.	log ₁₀ Transmissivity (m ² /s) Values of Culebra Wells Around the WIPP Site	HYDRO-44
Figure HYDRO-43.	New Transmissivity Data Added to Correlation of Holt and Yarbrough (2002).....	HYDRO-46
Figure HYDRO-44.	Observation Wells Responding to 2004–2005 Long-Term Pumping Tests	HYDRO-48
Figure HYDRO-45.	log ₁₀ D Values Observed for Pumping Well-Observation Well Pairs (modified from Beauheim 2007)	HYDRO-49
Figure HYDRO-46.	Revised Rustler Halite Margins	HYDRO-52
Figure HYDRO-47.	Catchment Basins (color coded) Mapped in Southeastern Nash Draw	HYDRO-55
Figure HYDRO-48.	Piper Plots for Water Samples from Culebra Wells WQSP-1 Through WQSP-6 Showing Both Historical Data from 1995 Through 2002 (Gray Areas) and Results from 2003 Through 2007 (Blue Stars).....	HYDRO-58
Figure HYDRO-49.	Culebra Hydrochemical Facies	HYDRO-60
Figure HYDRO-50.	Piper Plot for Culebra Water Samples Categorized by Hydrochemical Facies	HYDRO-61
Figure HYDRO-51.	Piper Plot of WQSP-6A and Opportunistic Samples	HYDRO-63
Figure HYDRO-52.	Annual Water Pumped for Intrepid East Potash Mill Location.....	HYDRO-65

Figure HYDRO-53.	Cementing Categorization for Potash Exploration Holes Within and Near the Culebra Modeling Domain	HYDRO-66
Figure HYDRO-54.	Plugged and Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells Within and Near the Culebra Modeling Domain	HYDRO-68
Figure HYDRO-55.	Modeling Domain Showing Boundary Features, Monitoring Well Locations, Nash Draw Area, WIPP Boundary, and the Grouping of the Leaky Boreholes for Use in the Calibration Process.....	HYDRO-70
Figure HYDRO-56.	Histogram of the Maximum Additional Water-Level Rise for the Last 100 Years of the Long-Term Option C Simulations.....	HYDRO-73

List of Tables

Table HYDRO-1.	Test and Analysis Plans Guiding Hydrological Studies, 2003–2007	HYDRO-2
Table HYDRO-2.	Purposes of New Culebra Wells.....	HYDRO-10
Table HYDRO-3.	Wells Plugged and Abandoned or Recompleted from 2004 to 2006.....	HYDRO-13
Table HYDRO-4.	Hydraulic Testing in Culebra Wells from December 2003 through January 2008	HYDRO-38
Table HYDRO-5.	Analytical Results for Water Samples Collected by SNL.....	HYDRO-57
Table HYDRO-6.	Culebra Hydrochemical Facies	HYDRO-59
Table HYDRO-7.	Cementing Categories for Potash and Other Drillholes in the Modeling Domain.....	HYDRO-65
Table HYDRO-8.	Options Used to Recalibrate T Fields to Leaking Boreholes	HYDRO-71
Table HYDRO-9.	Option A Total Leakage Rates for Each Group of Leaky Boreholes.....	HYDRO-71
Table HYDRO-10.	Option B Total Leakage Rates for Each Group of Leaky Boreholes.....	HYDRO-71
Table HYDRO-11.	Option C Total Leakage Rates for Each Group of Leaky Boreholes and S_s values	HYDRO-72
Table HYDRO-12.	Comparison of Mean Calibration Parameters for All Three Options	HYDRO-73

Acronyms and Abbreviations

µmhos/cm	micromhos per centimeter
acre-ft	acre-foot
amsl	above mean sea level
AP	analysis plan
ASER	Annual Site Environmental Report
bgs	below ground surface
BLM	U.S. Bureau of Land Management
CB	Cabin Baby
cm	centimeter
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
D	diffusivity
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ft	feet
ft ² /day	square feet per day
gpm	gallons per minute
HCl	hydrochloric
high-T	high transmissivity
hr	hour
in.	inch
km	kilometer
L/s	liters per second
low-T	low transmissivity
m	meter
m ² /s	square meters per second
m ³	cubic meters
m ³ /s	cubic meters per second
mg/L	milligrams per liter
mi	mile
mm	millimeter
molal	moles per kilogram

NR	no response
P&A	plugging and abandonment
PIP	production-injection packer
S	storativity
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
S _s	specific storage
T field	transmissivity field
TD	total depth
TDS	total dissolved solids
TP	test plan
T/S	transmissivity and storativity
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WQSP	Water Quality Sampling Program
WTS	Washington TRU Solutions
yr	year

1 **HYDRO-1.0 Hydrological Studies**

2 This appendix provides a summary of the new information on Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
3 hydrology collected since the September 2002 data-cutoff date for the 2004 Compliance
4 Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy 2004a) through 2007, in
5 accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR § 194.15 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
6 1996). Over that period, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) collected a significant amount of
7 new information on WIPP hydrogeology, both in response to various requests from the U.S.
8 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and as a result of ongoing monitoring programs. The
9 EPA's November 15, 2002, letter (Marcinowski 2002) requested that the DOE drill new
10 monitoring wells completed to the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation
11 (hereafter referred to as the Culebra) both north and south of the WIPP site to improve the
12 understanding of flow properties and the causes of water-level changes. The EPA's May 20,
13 2004 letter (Cotsworth 2004a) requested that a new well be drilled in the vicinity of the
14 southeastern part of the WIPP site to establish whether high or low Culebra transmissivity
15 existed in that area. The EPA's September 2, 2004 letter (Cotsworth 2004b) requested that the
16 DOE update the groundwater basin modeling and groundwater chemistry interpretations for the
17 units above the Salado Formation.

18 The new hydrogeologic studies were initially laid out in a multiyear program plan for fiscal years
19 03-09 (Sandia National Laboratories [SNL] 2003). The overall program evolved as activities
20 progressed, with specific activities being added and subtracted as conditions and new
21 information warranted and as new requests were received from the EPA. A variety of test plans
22 (TPs) and analysis plans (APs) were also written for specific activities (Table HYDRO-1). The
23 activities performed under these plans are described in the following sections. The reader is
24 referred to the reports cited in each section for additional, more detailed information on the work
25 performed.


26 Section HYDRO-2.0 describes a modeling study used to optimize the number and locations of
27 wells in the Culebra monitoring network. Section HYDRO-3.0 describes new wells that have
28 been drilled and Section HYDRO-4.0 describes wells that have been plugged and abandoned
29 since the CRA-2004. Section HYDRO-5.0 describes the water-level monitoring performed since
30 the CRA-2004 and the changes in water levels that have been observed. Hydraulic testing and
31 test analyses performed since the CRA-2004 are described in Section HYDRO-6.0. Section
32 HYDRO-7.0 describes the geologic studies that have been performed since 2003, and Section
33 HYDRO-8.0 describes the groundwater sampling and water-quality analyses performed over the
34 same period. Section HYDRO-9.0 describes modeling exercises aimed at understanding what
35 might be causing the observed rise in Culebra water levels. Section HYDRO-10.0 provides an
36 integration of all the new hydrological information collected since the CRA-2004.

37 For general reference, Figure HYDRO-1 provides a map showing the locations of all wells
38 discussed below. Figure HYDRO-2 and Figure HYDRO-3 are stratigraphic columns showing
39 the geologic units discussed below.

1 **Table HYDRO-1. Test and Analysis Plans Guiding Hydrological Studies, 2003–2007**


Plan	Title	Author	Effective Date
TP 00-03	Compliance Monitoring Program: Recompletion and Testing of Wells for Evaluation of Monitoring Data from the Magenta Member of the Rustler Formation (Fm.) at the WIPP Site, Revision 1	Chace	2/18/03
TP 03-01	Test Plan for Testing of Wells at the WIPP Site, Revision 2	Chace and Beauheim	1/18/06
TP 06-01	Monitoring Water Levels in WIPP Wells, Revision 1	Hillesheim	4/9/07
AP-070	Analysis Plan for Non-Salado Hydraulic-Test Interpretations, Revision 1	Beauheim	10/20/04
AP-110	Analysis Plan for Evaluation of Culebra Water-Level-Rise Scenarios	Beauheim	11/11/03
AP-111	Analysis Plan for Optimization and Minimization of the Culebra Monitoring Network for the WIPP	Beauheim and McKenna	11/24/03
AP-114	Analysis Plan for Evaluation and Recalibration of Culebra T-Fields	Beauheim	10/11/04
AP-125	Analysis Plan for the Evaluation of Culebra Brine Compositions	Domski and Beauheim	8/18/05

2



1
2


Figure HYDRO-1. Locations of WIPP Wells



1

2

Figure HYDRO-2. General Stratigraphic Column of Geologic Units at the WIPP Site



3

4

Figure HYDRO-3. Detailed Rustler Formation Stratigraphy

1 **HYDRO-2.0 Optimization of Culebra Monitoring Well Network**


2 McKenna (2004) performed a well-network minimization and optimization study under *AP-111*,
3 *Analysis Plan for Optimization and Minimization of the Culebra Monitoring Network for the*
4 *WIPP*, developed by Beauheim and McKenna (2003). This study used the 100 transmissivity
5 fields (T fields) developed for the CRA-2004 by McKenna and Hart (2003) to identify the
6 locations where head and transmissivity data from new wells would cause the greatest reduction
7 in uncertainty associated with calculating groundwater travel times in the Culebra from a point
8 above the center of the WIPP disposal panels to the site boundary. McKenna (2004) used three
9 different methods to determine the value of a well or potential well location, and then integrated
10 the results to create “combined-score values” maps showing the relative value of additional head
11 and transmissivity data at points throughout the modeling domain. The three methods used were
12 geostatistical variance reduction, three-point estimation of local gradients, and spatial sampling-
13 based sensitivity analysis.

14 Geostatistical variance reduction involves the use of ordinary kriging to interpolate head values
15 between measurement points (Rouhani 1985). In addition to estimating head at a location,
16 ordinary kriging also provides a variance about that estimate. Because the estimation variance is
17 based on the spatial distribution of measurements, and not directly on the measurements
18 themselves, the change in variance caused by adding an additional measurement point can be
19 mapped over the area of interest (assuming that the underlying variogram model remains valid).

20 Hydraulic gradients can be estimated from head measurements at three points. Given some
21 amount of noise (uncertainty) in the head measurements, the accuracy of the estimated gradient
22 is dependent on the size, shape, and orientation of the triangle formed by the three measurement
23 points. McKenna (2004) developed criteria for triangles that would provide accurate gradient
24 estimates, and then calculated for each cell in the model grid how many new suitable triangles
25 would be created, when combined with existing wells, by adding a well in that cell.


26 Spatial sampling-based sensitivity analysis was possible because 100 calibrated T fields were
27 available for the CRA-2004, along with a calculated groundwater travel time from a point above
28 the center of the WIPP disposal panels to the site boundary for each. By sampling on all 100 T
29 fields, McKenna (2004) was able to calculate the sensitivity of the travel time to the head and
30 transmissivity in every cell of the model grid. These sensitivities, however, are specific to the set
31 of T fields used in the calculations. They do not show what the effects on travel time would be
32 of high-T or low-T areas that are not present in any of the 100 T fields used.

33 By normalizing the results from each of these analysis methods, McKenna (2004) was able to
34 add the “scores” from each to create a combined score for each model cell, which he then
35 mapped and contoured to show relative sensitivities. He first performed the analysis using the 30
36 wells for which head data were available in August 2003 (shown by the unlabeled + symbols in
37 Figure HYDRO-4 and Figure HYDRO-5). He then included the locations of the first six “SNL”
38 wells and IMC-461 drilled in 2003 and January 2004 (see Section HYDRO-3.0) in the
39 geostatistical estimation variance and three-point gradient estimation procedures to produce
40 revised combined-score values maps that were used to guide the locations of wells installed in



1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Figure HYDRO-4. Combined-Score Values Map From McKenna (2004) Including Estimation Variance, Number of Three-Point Estimators, and Sensitivity of Travel Time to Head. The Wells Used in the Study are Shown as + Symbols. Wells Sited Since this Map was Created are Shown as x Symbols. White Areas are Inactive Parts of Modeling Domain.



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-5. Combined-Score Values Map From McKenna (2004) Including**
 3 **Estimation Variance, Number of Three-Point Estimators, and**
 4 **Sensitivity of Travel Time to Transmissivity. The Wells Used in the**
 5 **Study are Shown as + Symbols. Wells Sited Since this Map was**
 6 **Created are Shown as x symbols. White Areas are Inactive Parts of**
 7 **Modeling Domain or Areas Where Transmissivity Did Not Vary.**

1 2005 and 2006 (Figure HYDRO-4 and Figure HYDRO-5). Figure HYDRO-4 combines the
2 geostatistical variance, three-point estimation, and sensitivity of travel time to head while Figure
3 HYDRO-5 combines the geostatistical variance, three-point estimation, and sensitivity of travel
4 time to transmissivity.

5 Figure HYDRO-4 and Figure HYDRO-5 are qualitatively similar, with the differences reflecting
6 the difference between travel-time sensitivity to head and sensitivity to transmissivity. Both
7 figures show that additional wells in the center of the WIPP site, where many wells are already
8 clustered, would be of little value (low sensitivity). Figure HYDRO-4 shows that the areas with
9 the most travel-time sensitivity to head lie southwest of the WIPP. Based on these results, as
10 well as geological and logistical considerations, new wells SNL-13, SNL-17A, and SNL-16 were
11 drilled and now provide head information in that region, while others of the new wells provide
12 head information in regions of moderate sensitivity. Figure HYDRO-5 shows that travel-time
13 sensitivity to transmissivity does not differ greatly in regions distant from existing wells. SNL-8,
14 SNL-13, SNL-15, SNL-16, SNL-17, SNL-18, SNL-19, and WIPP-11 have provided useful
15 transmissivity information.

16 In something of a reversal of the process by which optimal positions for new wells were found,
17 McKenna (2004) evaluated which wells could be eliminated without losing hydraulic head
18 information needed to model flow through the Culebra, and which wells should be maintained in
19 the Culebra monitoring network. He calculated the increase in head estimation variance and the
20 decrease in the number of three-point estimators that would result from removal of each well in
21 the existing network, and ranked the wells in order of value to the network. Wells WIPP-12 and
22 WIPP-22 were identified as being of least value to the monitoring network, and hence candidates
23 for plugging and abandonment (P&A), because their removal resulted in the smallest increase in
24 head estimation variance and the smallest decrease in the number of three-point estimators. With
25 those two wells removed from the network, the next candidates for P&A were WIPP-21 and
26 ERDA-9. These four wells, along with a fifth well, WIPP-19, were situated along a north-south
27 line extending about 1.6 kilometers (km) (1 mile [mi]) north from the center of the WIPP site
28 (Figure HYDRO-1), and effectively provided an overabundance of head information within a
29 small region. The wells identified as of most value to the monitoring network, as it then existed,
30 were AEC-7, H-5b, WIPP-30, H-9c, and H-10c.

31 In summary, the monitoring network optimization study identified areas where new wells would
32 be of value and where existing wells could be removed from the network with little loss of
33 information. The study provided input for subsequent drilling and P&A decisions that also took
34 factors such as costs of road construction, geologic objectives, well casing deterioration, and
35 modeling data needs into account. The following two sections of this appendix describe the
36 wells that were drilled (Section HYDRO-3.0) and plugged and abandoned (Section HYDRO-4.0)
37 on the basis of the monitoring network optimization study in conjunction with these other
38 considerations.

1 **HYDRO-3.0 Drilling of New Wells**

2 Eighteen new Culebra wells (Table HYDRO-2) were added to the monitoring network described
3 in Section HYDRO-2.0 and shown in the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0, Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4
4 between April 2003 and October 2006. No additional Culebra wells were drilled between
5 October 2006 and the data cutoff date for the CRA-2009 (12/31/2007). Drilling of these new
6 wells began under a program plan (Sandia National Laboratories 2003) that included a
7 preliminary design for a 41-well, long-term Culebra monitoring network. Twelve new wells
8 given “SNL-#” designations were proposed in specific locations to confirm the correlations
9 described in Powers et al. (2003) between Culebra transmissivity and various geologic
10 conditions, provide information needed for numerical modeling, and provide information
11 relevant to possible scenarios explaining the rise in Culebra water levels (see Section HYDRO-
12 9.0). In addition, 21 proposed well locations given Washington TRU Solutions (“WTS-#”)
13 designations were laid out in a geometric pattern to provide the long-term monitoring network
14 required for the WIPP. Five of the “WTS” locations coincided with “SNL” locations, 12
15 coincided with existing (or previous) well locations, and 4 represented new locations. Seven
16 existing “far-field” wells and the six Water Quality Sampling Program (WQSP) Culebra wells
17 required by the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit were also planned to be retained. The
18 remaining existing Culebra wells would be plugged and abandoned over time. The 35 proposed
19 well locations exclusive of the WQSP wells are shown in Figure HYDRO-6 (originally
20 published as Figure 8 in Sandia National Laboratories 2003), along with the Rustler halite
21 margin information available at that time (see Figure HYDRO-3 and Section HYDRO-7.1).

22 The drilling program began in 2003, as SNL-2, 9, 12, and 3 were successively drilled between
23 April and September of that year (Powers and Richardson 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, and 2004b). An
24 unplanned well, IMC-461 (see Figure HYDRO-1), was completed in January 2004 when Mosaic
25 Potash Carlsbad, Inc. (then known as IMC Potash Carlsbad, Inc) offered an exploratory borehole
26 to the DOE west of the WIPP site (Beauheim 2005). SNL-1 and SNL-5 were then drilled
27 between March and May 2004 (Powers and Richardson 2004c and 2004d) after preliminary
28 results of the McKenna (2004) study were used to shift the final location of SNL-5 west of its
29 originally planned location shown in Figure HYDRO-6 to an area where transmissivity
30 information would be of more value (see Figure HYDRO-1). In September 2004, WIPP-11, an
31 exploration hole originally drilled in 1978 (Sandia National Laboratories and U.S. Geological
32 Survey 1982) that had lain sealed and dormant for decades, was completed in the Culebra by
33 perforating the well casing across the Culebra interval.

34 Based on the work of McKenna (2004), six areas were identified for installation of new wells:
35 SNL-13, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19. The precise locations of these wells were selected to minimize
36 the need for new road construction. SNL-13 is approximately 1150 meters (m) (3773 feet [ft])
37 south and 226 m (741 ft) west of the proposed WTS-4 (which was to be on the old P-15 well
38 pad) and takes the place of that proposed long-term monitoring well. SNL-15 is the same as the
39 proposed WTS-3, situated on the old P-18 well pad. SNL-17 is effectively the proposed WTS-6,
40 shifted 763 m (2503 ft) to the east and 1274 m (4180 ft) to the south. SNL-16, 18, and 19 were
41 sited at entirely new locations in or on the edge of Nash Draw. SNL-14 was sited based on
42 detailed geologic information, independently of the work of McKenna (2004), in response to a
43 direct request from EPA for a well in that vicinity (Cotsworth 2004a). SNL-13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19
44

1

Table HYDRO-2. Purposes of New Culebra Wells

Well	Purposes
SNL-1	Look for potentiometric and geochemical evidence of leakage from Intrepid East tailings pile; test Culebra near margin of Salado dissolution
SNL-2	Test Culebra near margin of Salado dissolution
SNL-3	Confirm presence of inferred Salado dissolution reentrant and test Culebra
SNL-5	Provide data in area of high sensitivity identified by McKenna (2004)
SNL-6	Confirm high heads and very low-T expected in area east of M2-H2 and M3-H3 halite margins; provide head estimate for northern numerical model boundary condition
SNL-8	Confirm low-T east of the WIPP site and look for evidence of dissolution along M3-H3 boundary
SNL-9	Confirm presence of inferred Salado dissolution reentrant and test Culebra; provide pumping well for large-scale test west of the WIPP site
SNL-10	Provide transmissivity data in western WIPP site near M1-H1 margin
SNL-12	Confirm high-T expected south of WIPP site and look for evidence of Salado dissolution; provide potential pumping well for large-scale test south of the WIPP site
SNL-13	Provide transmissivity data SW of the WIPP site near the edge of Nash Draw
SNL-14	Specific request from EPA to confirm/disprove high-T zone extending from SE WIPP site to the south; provide pumping well for large-scale test south of the WIPP site
SNL-15	Confirm high heads and very low-T expected in area east of M2-H2 and M3-H3 halite margins
SNL-16	Evaluate effects of Salado dissolution on Culebra transmissivity and confinement
SNL-17A	Evaluate effects of Salado dissolution on Culebra transmissivity and confinement
SNL-18	Evaluate effects of Salado dissolution on Culebra transmissivity and confinement; look for geochemical evidence of leakage from Intrepid East tailings pile
SNL-19	Evaluate effects of Salado dissolution on Culebra transmissivity and confinement
IMC-461	Well of opportunity near Nash Draw and edge of Salado dissolution
WIPP-11	Well of opportunity that could serve as a replacement for DOE-2 and provide a pumping well for a large-scale test north of the WIPP site

2

3 were drilled between April and September 2005 (Powers and Richardson 2008a, 2008b, and
4 2008c; Powers 2009a and [In progress]a) and SNL-16, 19, 10, 18, and 17A (the original SNL-17
5 had to be abandoned and redrilled) were drilled between April and July 2006 (Powers 2009b, [In
6 progress]b, 2009c, [In progress]c, and [In progress]d).


7 Most of the new wells encountered geologic conditions typical for boreholes drilled at the WIPP.
8 Six wells, however, encountered atypical (although not necessarily unpredicted) conditions.
9 SNL-6 and SNL-15, the only two wells drilled on the eastern (halite) side of the Rustler M2-H2
10 and M3-H3 halite margins (see Figure HYDRO-3) (Powers 2007, Section HYDRO-7.1),
11 encountered halite in the Culebra (Powers et al. 2006a), as predicted by Holt (1997). At SNL-1,
12 a 0.6-m (2-ft) drilling bit drop occurred while drilling through the Culebra, and drilling fluid
13 circulation was temporarily lost (Powers and Richardson 2004c). In addition, brine was
14 encountered at a depth of approximately 11 m (36 ft) in the upper Dewey Lake in this drillhole
15 located immediately south of the Intrepid (formerly Mississippi) East tailings pile (see
16

1 Figure HYDRO-6). High brine flows were encountered in a sandy, poorly indurated section of
2 the M1 unit of the Los Medaños Member of the Rustler Formation in SNL-13, a first-of-its-kind
3 encounter (Powers and Richardson 2008a). None of these conditions affected proper completion
4 of the wells.

5 At SNL-17, sulfate beds of the Forty-niner Member of the Rustler were not distinguishable in
6 either cuttings or geophysical logs, and the Magenta dolomite was altered. The cuttings indicate
7 Dewey Lake above this zone, and the uppermost Rustler was apparently altered and partially
8 dissolved along the Nash Draw escarpment that marks upper Salado dissolution. A 0.6-m (2-ft)
9 drilling bit drop occurred while drilling through the lower Tamarisk in SNL-17 (Powers [In
10 progress]d). High water production from the Culebra and problems with the core barrel sticking
11 below the Culebra led to the decision to stop drilling and complete SNL-17 without drilling to
12 the top of Salado as planned. Several cubic meters (m³) of gravel were required to fill voids in
13 the Tamarisk (and possibly Culebra) when gravel-packing the well screen. SNL-17 could not be
14 completed with certain isolation of the Culebra, so it was plugged and abandoned. A
15 replacement well (SNL-17A) was drilled on the pad and successfully completed for monitoring.

16 SNL-18 (Powers [In progress]c) was drilled along the escarpment in the northeast arm of Nash
17 Draw. Water was encountered while drilling the Dewey Lake. The Forty-niner Member of the
18 Rustler is represented by poorly preserved gypsite in a zone of very poor core recovery; a tool
19 drop of 0.3 m (1 ft) also occurred near the contact with the Dewey Lake. Short recovered
20 intervals of the Magenta revealed high dips to the bedding. Little, if any, of the upper Tamarisk
21 sulfate (A3) was recovered, as circulation of drilling fluid was limited or lost. The lower
22 Tamarisk and upper Culebra were partially recovered in cores. A large amount of drilling mud
23 was lost when drilling the well. Sections above the Culebra were cemented and redrilled to
24 provide additional hole stability. An earlier attempt by Intrepid (then known as New Mexico
25 Potash) to drill a potash exploration hole at the location of SNL-18 encountered drilling
26 difficulties and was abandoned before reaching the Rustler.

27 SNL-4, 7, and 11 and WTS-7 and 9 are not currently planned to be drilled because McKenna
28 (2004) did not show them to be in high-value locations. WTS-18 (planned replacement for
29 WIPP-30 when that well has to be plugged and abandoned) and WTS-20 (planned replacement
30 for H-7) will also likely never be drilled because of the presence of SNL-18 and SNL-17A,
31 respectively. Final decisions on replacement of these wells and the wells designated as “Far
32 Field” on Figure HYDRO-6 have not been made. In addition, use of the “WTS” designation has
33 been abandoned—all wells at new locations are given “SNL” designations, while replacement
34 wells will be given the original well name with an “R” appended (e.g., H-15R).



1
2

Figure HYDRO-6. Air-Photo Map From Sandia National Laboratories (2003, Figure 8) Showing Locations Proposed for SNL- and WTS-Series Wells

1 **HYDRO-4.0 P&A and Recompletion of Old Wells**

2 Until 1994, all wells installed for WIPP were constructed with steel well casing. Exposure to
3 brine caused the steel casing to deteriorate, necessitating the P&A of many wells. In addition,
4 having multiple Culebra wells on the same drilling pad (which were originally installed for now-
5 completed testing purposes) is of little value for long-term monitoring. Hence, casing integrity
6 was evaluated in all wells on the multiple-well drilling pads, and the most deteriorated wells
7 were scheduled for P&A. Finally, the network optimization study performed by McKenna
8 (2004) identified WIPP-12, WIPP-21, and WIPP-22 as being of little value to the monitoring
9 network, and hence candidates for P&A.

10 Since the CRA-2004, 17 wells have been plugged and abandoned (Salness 2006 and 2007).
11 Three other wells have been permanently recompleted to monitor different horizons (Salness
12 2005a, 2005b, and 2006). Eight wells monitoring the Magenta, but with the capability to also
13 monitor the Culebra, were plugged back to provide simpler, and irreversible, Magenta
14 completions (Salness 2006). In addition, the lower uncased Salado-Castile portion of AEC-7
15 was plugged back so that a bridge plug would no longer be required in the well to monitor the
16 Culebra (Salness 2005c). Well H-7c, completed to the Culebra, and well H-8c, completed across
17 the Rustler-Salado contact, were transferred to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for use
18 in their range-management program. These well activities are summarized in Table HYDRO-3,
19 and the well locations are shown in Figure HYDRO-7.


Table HYDRO-3. Wells Plugged and Abandoned or Recompleted from 2004 to 2006

Well	Interval(s) Previously Monitored	Activity	Date of Activity	Current Interval Monitored
AEC-7	Culebra	Plugback	Mar.-Apr. 2004	Culebra
AEC-8	Bell Canyon	P&A	April 2005	—
CB-1	Culebra and Bell Canyon	Recompleted	Jan.-Feb. 2004	Bell Canyon
DOE-1	Culebra	P&A	September 2006	—
DOE-2	Culebra and Magenta	Recompleted	Feb.-Mar. 2004	Bell Canyon
H-2a	Culebra	P&A	April 2005	—
H-2b1	Culebra and Magenta	Plugback	April 2005	Magenta
H-2c	Culebra	P&A	April 2005	—
H-3b1	Culebra and Magenta	Plugback	June 2005	Magenta
H-3b3	Culebra	P&A	June 2005	—
H-3d	Forty-niner and Dewey Lake	Recompleted	June 2005	Santa Rosa-Dewey Lake
H-4c	Culebra and Magenta	Plugback	May 2005	Magenta
H-5a	Culebra	P&A	June 2005	—
H-5c	Culebra & Magenta	Plugback/P&A	June 2005	(inadvertently plugged Magenta too)
H-6a	Culebra	P&A	May 2005	—
H-6c	Culebra and Magenta	Plugback	May 2005	Magenta

**Table HYDRO-3. Wells Plugged and Abandoned or Recompleted from 2004 to 2006
(Continued)**

Well	Interval(s) Previously Monitored	Activity	Date of Activity	Current Interval Monitored
H-7b2	Culebra	P&A	May 2005	—
H-7c	Culebra	Transferred to BLM	August 2005	—
H-8c	Rustler-Salado	Transferred to BLM	September 2005	—
H-11b1	Culebra	P&A	May 2005	—
H-11b2	Culebra and Magenta	Plugback	May 2005	Magenta
H-14	Culebra and Magenta	Plugback	April 2005	Magenta
H-18	Culebra and Magenta	Plugback	May 2005	Magenta
P-17	Culebra	P&A	August 2006	—
WIPP-12	Culebra	P&A	July 2005	—
WIPP-18	Culebra and Magenta	Plugback	May 2005	Magenta
WIPP-21	Culebra	P&A	May 2005	—
WIPP-22	Culebra	P&A	May 2005	—
WIPP-26	Culebra	P&A	October 2006	—
WIPP-27	Culebra	P&A	August 2006	—
WIPP-29	Culebra	P&A	May 2005	—

1



1

2

Figure HYDRO-7. Locations of Plugged and Abandoned and Recompleted Wells

1 **HYDRO-5.0 Monitoring**


2 Groundwater monitoring activities at the WIPP are carried out under the *Waste Isolation Pilot*
3 *Plant Environmental Monitoring Plan* (U.S. Department of Energy 2004b) and under *Test Plan*
4 *TP 06-01, Monitoring Water Levels in WIPP Wells* (Hillesheim 2007). The first monitoring
5 program consists of monthly water-level measurements in all accessible wells, with results
6 reported in the Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs) (U.S. Department of Energy, 2004c,
7 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008). The second monitoring program involves both periodic water-
8 level measurements and continuous measurement (typically at one-hour [hr] intervals) of fluid
9 pressure in wells instrumented with downhole pressure gauges (TROLL[®]).

10 Water-level monitoring provides a general picture of the changes in hydraulic head occurring in
11 the formations being monitored. Water levels are currently being monitored in the Culebra and
12 Magenta Members of the Rustler, the Dewey Lake (Redbeds), and the Bell Canyon. The
13 monitored well locations are shown in Figure HYDRO-8, Figure HYDRO-9, and Figure
14 HYDRO-10. Wells in which monitoring has ceased since January 2004 are listed in Table
15 HYDRO-3.

16 **HYDRO-5.1 Culebra Monitoring**

17 In addition to monitoring Culebra water levels, DOE monitors the fluid pressure in many wells
18 with TROLL[®] gauges. The Culebra wells instrumented with TROLL[®] gauges are listed in
19 Figure HYDRO-11, which shows the periods of time from October 2002 through 2007 during
20 which the TROLL[®] gauges were installed. The continuous fluid-pressure measurements made
21 using TROLL[®] gauges provide a clearer, more complete record of the changes in hydraulic head
22 occurring in the wells than is provided by monthly water-level measurements.


23 Figure HYDRO-12 shows the TROLL[®] and water-level data from Culebra well WIPP-26 in
24 Nash Draw from November 2003 through October 2006. The TROLL[®] pressure data show that
25 what previously appeared to be random noise in the water-level data actually has a consistent
26 underlying structure. Furthermore, the pressure data show a series of downward spikes and rapid
27 recoveries, with the recoveries exceeding the prespike levels in many cases. Having a high
28 temporal level of resolution in the head data is essential in understanding the causes of these
29 head changes. By plotting daily rainfall measured at the WIPP rain gauge near the center of the
30 WIPP site in parallel with the TROLL[®] pressure data from WIPP-26 (Figure HYDRO-13), it was
31 discovered that the spikes in pressure correlate with rainfall events of approximately 10
32 millimeters (mm) (0.4 inches [in.]) or more in 24 hours (hrs). (Note that thunderstorms can be
33 highly localized, and that any individual rain gauge may not always reflect rain that falls at
34 remote wells.) It is hypothesized that rainfall accumulates in a localized area in Nash Draw,
35 increasing the load on the Culebra at that location. The strata above the Culebra appear to act as
36 a lever, with the increased load at the accumulation location causing a decreased load at WIPP-
37 26. This effect seems to dissipate within approximately one day, usually followed by an increase
38 in Culebra head related to the precipitation event, and then a gradual falloff in head. This
39 phenomenon of precipitation causing an initial drop in pressure is also observed at well IMC-461
40 at approximately the same magnitude as at WIPP-26, and sometimes at WIPP-25 at a much
41 smaller magnitude. No other wells show this response to rainfall.



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-8. Locations of Culebra Monitoring Wells Outside the WIPP Site as of**
 3 **1/1/2008**

4 The high-resolution TROLL[®] pressure data have shown that two other wells in Nash Draw,
 5 SNL-16 and SNL-19 (Figure HYDRO-14), respond rapidly to rainfall events without showing
 6 the initial pressure decrease evident at WIPP-26 and IMC-461. (Note that the measured pressure
 7 is relative to the position of a TROLL[®] in a well, which differs among wells.) Two wells on the
 8 edge of Nash Draw, SNL-1 and SNL-2, show more gradual responses to major storms (Figure
 9 HYDRO-15). Thus, the Culebra appears to be unconfined in at least parts of Nash Draw,
 10 probably because of a combination of dissolution, collapse, and fracturing of the overlying units
 11 that act as confining beds under Livingston Ridge. This is not to say, however, that present-day
 12 rainfall actually enters the Culebra wherever a pressure response to rainfall is observed. Rather,
 13 the rainfall reaches a water table in a higher stratigraphic unit that is in sufficient hydraulic
 14 communication with the Culebra to transmit a pressure response rapidly.


15 Once the head in the Culebra is increased in Nash Draw, a pressure transient propagates through
 16 the confined Culebra under Livingston Ridge and across the WIPP site over the following days
 17 to months (Hillesheim, Hillesheim, and Toll 2007), decreasing in magnitude as it goes. This can
 18 be seen in Figure HYDRO-16, which shows water levels measured in three wells with discrete
 19 rises associated with rainfall events becoming less distinct with increasing distance from Nash
 20



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-9. Locations of Culebra Monitoring Wells Within the WIPP Site as of**
 3 **1/1/2008**


4 Draw (top to bottom in Figure HYDRO-16; see Figure HYDRO-8 and Figure HYDRO-9 for
 5 well locations). Unlike the responses seen in wells in Nash Draw, however, where the water
 6 level declines with time after rainfall-induced rises, the water levels in wells outside of Nash
 7 Draw show little decline but instead seem to show a sustained, long-term rise (compare Figure
 8 HYDRO-14 with Figure HYDRO-15 and Figure HYDRO-16). This may indicate that
 9 something in addition to rainfall in Nash Draw is affecting these wells. Section HYDRO-9.0
 10 describes the modeling of different scenarios to explain this long-term rise in water levels.

11 Hillesheim, Hillesheim, and Toll (2007) evaluated the lag time between major rainfall events and
 12 water-level (or pressure) responses in wells around WIPP. They determined lag times for 34
 13 wells after a large September 25, 2004, rainfall and for 27 wells after an August 15, 2006, storm,
 14 both of which occurred over extensive areas in and around Nash Draw, grouping them into five
 15 time ranges. Figure HYDRO-17 shows the spatial distribution of wells in the different lag-time
 16 ranges, along with the \log_{10} transmissivity (square meters per second [m^2/s]) values for all
 17 Culebra wells. Also shown is a dashed line indicating the approximate contour of where the
 18 Culebra \log_{10} transmissivity is -5.4, which is the approximate dividing line between fractured
 19 (double-porosity) and porous-medium hydraulic behavior in the Culebra (Holt, Beauheim, and
 20 Powers 2005). The lag-time ranges generally parallel this contour, and lag times are particularly
 21 long where the Culebra is unfractured and has a \log_{10} transmissivity less than -5.4. This pattern
 22 is consistent with diffusive propagation of a pressure wave from Nash Draw to the east.




1
2 **Figure HYDRO-10. Locations of Non-Culebra Monitoring Wells as of 1/1/2008**


3 Figure HYDRO-18, Figure HYDRO-19, Figure HYDRO-20, Figure HYDRO-21, Figure
 4 HYDRO-22, Figure HYDRO-23, and Figure HYDRO-24 show the hydrographs from almost all
 5 Culebra wells monitored by the WIPP for the period from 2003 through 2007. No representative
 6 data were collected from AEC-7 over this period because of a leaking plug in the well, and H-15
 7 was usually configured in such a way as to preclude Culebra water-level measurements. Figure
 8 HYDRO-18 and Figure HYDRO-19 show the hydrographs from seven Culebra wells north of
 9 the WIPP site and from seven Culebra wells in the northern portion of the WIPP site,
 10 respectively. The hydrographs from these 14 wells generally parallel one another, as well as the
 11 hydrograph from SNL-1 shown in Figure HYDRO-15. The seven wells with data going back to
 12 the beginning of 2003 show an early rise in 2003 followed by a decline that lasted until the
 13 second half of 2004, after which water levels again began to rise and generally showed more
 14 inflections than had been previously observed. These inflections are also seen in the
 15 hydrographs of the seven newer wells. The most pronounced of these inflections is the rise that
 16 occurred after the major rainstorms of mid-August and early September 2006. As discussed
 17 above, the inflections are more subtle in the wells farther from Nash Draw: WIPP-19 and H-2b2
 18 (Figure HYDRO-19). Of the wells shown that existed at the time of the WIPP-11 19-day
 19 pumping test (February 1–20, 2005; see Section HYDRO-6.0), all but SNL-2 and H-2b2 showed
 20 drawdowns in response to the pumping. From late 2006 through 2007, SNL-2 (on the edge of
 21 Nash Draw) and SNL-19 (in Nash Draw) showed erratic behavior in contrast to the sustained
 22 water-level rise seen in the other wells (see also Figure HYDRO-14 and Figure HYDRO-15).




1
2 **Figure HYDRO-11. Time Periods During Which Culebra Wells Have Been Monitored**
3 **Using TROLL® Gauges**




4
5 **Figure HYDRO-12. WIPP-26 Culebra TROLL® and Water-Level Data**




1
2 **Figure HYDRO-13. WIPP-26 Culebra Fluid Pressure With Daily Rainfall Measured at**
3 **the WIPP**




4
5 **Figure HYDRO-14. SNL-16 and SNL-19 Culebra Fluid Pressures With Daily Rainfall**
6 **Measured at SNL-9**




1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-15. SNL-1 and SNL-2 Culebra Water Levels With Daily Rainfall**
 3 **Measured at the WIPP**




4
 5 **Figure HYDRO-16. SNL-2, H-6b, and WIPP-19 Culebra Water Levels With Cumulative**
 6 **Rainfall Measured at the WIPP**



1
2 **Figure HYDRO-17. Map of Culebra Lag-Time Response to Major Rainfall Events (from**
3 **Hillesheim, Hillesheim, and Toll 2007). “NR” Denotes No Response.**



1
2 **Figure HYDRO-18. Water Levels in Seven Culebra Wells North of the WIPP Site**



3
4 **Figure HYDRO-19. Water Levels in Seven Culebra Wells in the Northern Portion of the**
5 **WIPP Site**


1 Figure HYDRO-20 and Figure HYDRO-21 show hydrographs from eight Culebra wells in the
2 central portion of the WIPP site and six Culebra wells to the south of the WIPP site, respectively.
3 The hydrographs from these 14 wells parallel one another, and are similar to the hydrograph for
4 H-2b2 shown in Figure HYDRO-19. These wells did not respond to the WIPP-11 pumping test
5 as the northern wells did, but (with the exception of WQSP-3) responded instead to the 22-day
6 pumping test conducted at SNL-14 from August 4–26, 2005 (see Section HYDRO-6.0). Water
7 levels in these 14 wells were generally more stable than the water levels in the northern wells, in
8 particular showing less rise in 2006 and 2007.

9 Figure HYDRO-22 shows hydrographs from six Culebra wells in or near the southeastern arm of
10 Nash Draw. With the exception of a possible rise in SNL-13, these wells show no consistent
11 water-level trends. As described in the discussion of Figure HYDRO-14, SNL-16 responds to
12 major rainfall events. The seemingly erratic behavior of H-9c in 2003 is ascribed to pumping of
13 the nearby Engle stock well. Some sustained pumping appears to have occurred in that vicinity
14 in the latter part of 2006 as well, seen most clearly in the H-9c hydrograph but also recognizable
15 in the hydrographs from SNL-12, H-17, H-11b4, and H-4b (Figure HYDRO-21). SNL-12 and
16 H-9c also responded to the August 2005 SNL-14 pumping test.

17 Figure HYDRO-23 shows hydrographs from three Culebra wells west of the WIPP site;
18 IMC-461, SNL-9, and WIPP-25. The Culebra was not accessible for water-level measurements
19 in WIPP-25 after January 2006 because of Magenta testing activities. The major upturns in
20 water levels represent delayed responses to major rainfall events (see also Figure HYDRO-31
21 and Figure HYDRO-32 for WIPP-25). The general water-level trends are upward, but from late
22 2006 through 2007, water levels at IMC-461 and SNL-9 followed the pattern observed at SNL-2
23 and SNL-19 (Figure HYDRO-14 and Figure HYDRO-15) of rising after major storms followed
24 by falloffs of similar magnitude.


25 Figure HYDRO-24 shows hydrographs from Culebra wells SNL-6 and SNL-15. These wells
26 were drilled in areas where the Culebra contains halite cements (Powers et al. 2006a), and are
27 recovering very slowly from well-development activities (and a March 30, 2007, slug test in
28 SNL-15). At the rates at which these wells are recovering, water levels will not be representative
29 of undisturbed Culebra conditions for many years. SNL-15 is on the old P-18 well pad. The
30 Culebra water level in P-18 was monitored for 25 years (1977–2001) and rose from an elevation
31 of approximately 741 m (2432 ft) above mean sea level (amsl) (Mercer and Orr 1979) to 964.4 m
32 (3164 ft) amsl (Westinghouse TRU Solutions, LLC 2002) before the well was plugged and
33 abandoned without the water level stabilizing.

34 Water levels are also locally affected by human activities around WIPP. For instance, water
35 levels in well H-10c are affected by the drilling of nearby oil wells (Figure HYDRO-25).
36 Invasion of drilling fluid as oil wells penetrate the Culebra briefly causes water levels at H-10c to
37 rise. The water level then falls when the Rustler interval is cased and cemented. Similar
38 responses have been observed in well H-6b (Hillesheim and Beauheim 2007). Water levels in
39 H-5b were apparently affected by the P&A of H-5a and H-5c approximately 30 m away. The
40 P&A activities caused the water level in H-5b to rise by nearly 2 m (6.7 ft) (Figure HYDRO-26).
41 (Note that the subsequent sustained rise in water level is consistent with the water-level behavior
42 observed in most other wells at the WIPP site, such as H-6b and WIPP-19 [Figure HYDRO-16],
43 and is probably not, therefore, related to the P&A activities.) Water levels in other wells were




1
2

Figure HYDRO-20. Water Levels in Eight Culebra Wells in the Central WIPP Site




3
4


Figure HYDRO-21. Water Levels in Six Culebra Wells South of the WIPP Site



1
2 **Figure HYDRO-22. Water Levels in Six Culebra Wells in and Near the Southeastern Arm**
3 **of Nash Draw**



4
5 **Figure HYDRO-23. Water Levels in Three Culebra Wells West of the WIPP Site**




1
2 **Figure HYDRO-24. Water Levels in Culebra Wells SNL-6 and SNL-15**

3 affected by cleaning and rehabilitation activities (scraping scale from casing, removing sloughed
4 materials from the bottom of a well, etc.).


5 **HYDRO-5.2 Magenta Monitoring**

6 Magenta water levels were monitored in 17 wells during some or all of the period from 2003
7 through 2007. The 15 wells still being monitored at the end of 2007 are shown in Figure
8 HYDRO-10. The Magenta is no longer being monitored in DOE-2 and H-5c (see Table
9 HYDRO-3). Water levels in most of the Magenta wells were significantly disrupted by a variety
10 of activities at one time or another between 2003 and 2007.


11 Figure HYDRO-27 shows hydrographs from nine of the Magenta wells. Of these wells, H-9c
12 was disturbed the least over the period shown, as the only activity in the well was the
13 replacement of a bridge plug set below the Magenta with a production-injection packer (PIP) on
14 tubing to allow simultaneous monitoring of the Magenta and Culebra in March 2003. Over the
15 5-yr period shown, the Magenta water level in H-9c rose by approximately 1 m (3.2 ft). C-2737
16 and H-15 are also dual-completion (Magenta and Culebra) wells that were disrupted by
17 removing or replacing bridge plugs and PIPs for a variety of testing and water-quality sampling
18 exercises. Changes in fluid density are often associated with replacement of bridge plugs and
19 PIPs. The Magenta water level in C-2737 appeared to be rising slightly, while that in H-15
20 declined in 2007. A variety of activities occurred in WIPP-30 from 2003 through early 2006
21 preventing measurement of Magenta water levels. When monitoring resumed, water levels rose
22 slightly until mid-2007.



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-25. H-10c Culebra and H-10a Magenta Water Levels With Spud Dates**
 3 **for Oil Wells Within 1.0 km**



4
 5 **Figure HYDRO-26. H-5b Culebra Water Levels**



1

2

Figure HYDRO-27. Water Levels in Nine Magenta Wells

3 H-3b1, H-4c, H-5c, H-11b2, and WIPP-18 had similar configurations in 2003—they had all been
 4 drilled past the Magenta, were open to both the Magenta and Culebra (and also the Rustler-
 5 Salado contact in the case of H-3b1, H-4c, and H-5c), and had bridge plugs set below the
 6 Magenta to isolate the interval(s) below. In mid-2005, the bridge plugs were removed from
 7 these wells, and the lower portions of the holes were cemented up to depths 3.7 to 8.5 m (12 to
 8 28 ft) below the Magenta (Salness 2006). (In the case of H-5c, the entire Magenta interval of the
 9 well was also cemented by mistake, ending its usefulness as a monitoring well.) The cementing
 10 operations displaced the water in the wells to higher levels. This caused water to enter the
 11 Magenta thereby dissipating the excess head. Several months later, before pressure equilibration
 12 was reached, the wells were bailed to remove the cement-contaminated water, and water flowed
 13 back out of the Magenta to reestablish equilibrium. For H-4c, H-11b2, and WIPP-18, the water
 14 flowing into the well had a lower specific gravity than the water that had been in the well
 15 previously, causing the water level to stabilize at a higher elevation. All four of the plugged-
 16 back wells showed slight increases in Magenta water levels in 2006 and 2007.

17 Figure HYDRO-28 shows hydrographs of Magenta water levels in H-2b1, H-14, and H-18.
 18 These wells were plugged back and then bailed in a similar fashion to the five wells discussed
 19 above (Salness 2006). In H-2b1 and H-14, the recovery from bailing took over a year to
 20 complete, reflecting the low-T of the Magenta. The postplugback water-level behavior in H-18
 21 was quite different from the preplugback behavior. Postplugback, the water level quickly
 22 reached a level ~16 m (53 ft) higher than it was preplugback, and then continued to rise steadily
 23 through 2006 and 2007. A 16-m (53 ft) change in water levels cannot be explained by a change
 24 in the specific gravity of the water in the well. The most likely explanation for the change is that


1 the inflatable bridge plug set in the well in 2001 to isolate the Culebra from the Magenta was
2 leaking, allowing Magenta head to bleed into the Culebra. Magenta water levels from 2001
3 through 2004 were within 6 m (20 ft) of the last water level measured in the Culebra in 2001, an
4 unusually small difference between Magenta and Culebra water levels. The difference between
5 the Magenta water levels observed since the Culebra portion of the hole was plugged with
6 cement and the 2001 Culebra water level is much more consistent with the differences typically
7 observed at locations such as the H-2 hydropad or WIPP-18. Hence, water levels representative
8 of the Magenta at H-18 may only now be measured.

9 Figure HYDRO-29 shows Magenta water levels in DOE-2, H-6c, H-8a, and WIPP-25. The
10 period of record in DOE-2 is short, and shows only a rising trend. Water levels in H-6c show a
11 steady rising trend, little affected by the plugback and subsequent bailing that occurred in 2005.
12 The Magenta water level in H-8a was stable for the entire period shown. Measurement of
13 Magenta water levels in WIPP-25 was repeatedly interrupted by various activities in the well.
14 Water levels rose steadily through 2005, the longest continuous period of measurement.

15 Magenta water levels measured in well H-10a are shown in Figure HYDRO-25. Water levels
16 clearly increased in response to drilling of nearby oil and gas wells.


17 TROLL[®] downhole pressure gauges were installed in 13 of the Magenta wells during the periods
18 shown in Figure HYDRO-30. The TROLL[®] data are consistent with the water-level
19 measurements made in those wells. The TROLL[®] data provide a more complete record of
20 pumping, water-quality sampling, and other activities in the wells than the water-level data
21 alone.

22 In WIPP-25, the TROLL[®] data also show that the Magenta there responds to some major rainfall
23 events. Figure HYDRO-31 and Figure HYDRO-32 show the TROLL[®] records from both the
24 Magenta and Culebra in WIPP-25 from October 2004 through January 2006 and March 2006
25 through January 2007, respectively, along with daily rainfall measured at the WIPP and at the
26 SNL-9 pad (Figure HYDRO-32 only). (Note that the pressures measured are relative to the
27 TROLL[®] positions and do not imply anything about the hydraulic gradient between the Culebra
28 and Magenta.) Whereas the Culebra clearly responded to the rainfall events in November 2004
29 (which occurred when the Culebra was being drawn down by the 32-day pumping test at SNL-9;
30 see Section HYDRO-6.0) and August 2005 (Figure HYDRO-31), the Magenta showed only
31 delayed increases in the rate of pressure rise. The Magenta pressure clearly responded, however,
32 to the rainfall events that occurred in mid-August 2006 and the first four days of September
33 2006, as did the Culebra pressure (Figure HYDRO-32). Neither zone, however, appears to have
34 responded to the storm on June 1, 2006, and the Magenta appears to have responded little if at all
35 to the series of rainfall events beginning on October 9, 2006, and to the rainfall on July 31, 2006.
36 This may indicate that less rain fell near WIPP-25 than at the measurement locations. No other
37 TROLL[®] data from Magenta wells indicate a response to rainfall.




1
2

Figure HYDRO-28. Magenta Water Levels in Wells H-2b1, H-14, and H-18




3
4


Figure HYDRO-29. Magenta Water Levels in Wells DOE-2, H-6c, H-8a, and WIPP-25



1
2 **Figure HYDRO-30. Time Periods During Which Magenta Wells Have Been Monitored**
3 **Using TROLL® Gauges**



4
5 **Figure HYDRO-31. WIPP-25 Culebra and Magenta Fluid Pressures from October 2004**
6 **Through January 2006 with Daily Rainfall Measured at the WIPP**




1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-32. WIPP-25 Culebra and Magenta Fluid Pressures from March 2006**
 3 **Through January 2007 with Daily Rainfall Measured at SNL-9**

4 **HYDRO-5.3 Dewey Lake Monitoring**

5 The DOE monitors Dewey Lake water levels in only one well, WQSP-6A (Figure HYDRO-10).
 6 Figure HYDRO-33 is a hydrograph of Dewey Lake water levels in WQSP-6A from 2003
 7 through 2007. The hydrograph shows that water levels were stable within an approximately 20-
 8 centimeter (cm) (8-in.) band over that period, with perhaps a slight downward trend. Note that
 9 some of the fluctuations in the water levels are probably related to the water-quality sampling
 10 performed in the well twice a year (e.g., U.S. Department of Energy 2007).


11 **HYDRO-5.4 Bell Canyon Monitoring**

12 Bell Canyon monitoring wells are situated at the northern (DOE-2) and southern (Cabin Baby
 13 [CB]-1) WIPP site boundaries (see Figure HYDRO-10). The primary purpose of this monitoring
 14 is to determine if oil production, secondary recovery, and/or brine-disposal activities in the Bell
 15 Canyon are affecting the hydraulic head of the Bell Canyon at the WIPP site. Bell Canyon water
 16 levels had been monitored in DOE-2 between August 1985 and March 1986 through tubing
 17 attached to a PIP set at the base of the Castile Formation (Beauheim 1986) before the well was
 18 recompleted as a Culebra monitoring well. After swabbing ~22 m³ (775 ft³) of brine from the
 19 tubing to develop the open Bell Canyon interval, the Bell Canyon fluid specific gravity was
 20 approximately 1.1 and the water level stabilized at approximately 925 m (3033 ft) amsl. DOE-2
 21 was converted to a single-completion Bell Canyon well in February and March 2004 (Salness
 22 2005b), and water-level monitoring began in July 2004. Figure HYDRO-34 shows the water-
 23



1
2

Figure HYDRO-33. WQSP-6A Dewey Lake Water Levels



3
4


Figure HYDRO-34. DOE-2 Bell Canyon Water Levels

1 level data collected since that time. Although some of the water left in the well after
2 recompletion was removed by bailing, the remaining water in the well was drilling brine having
3 a specific gravity of approximately 1.2. Consequently, the water levels shown in Figure
4 HYDRO-34 are not comparable to those measured between 1985–1986. Fluid-density issues
5 notwithstanding, the Bell Canyon water level is steadily rising. Whether this is caused by
6 gradual dilution of the heavy brine in the bottom of the hole by flowing groundwater or by some
7 other factor cannot be determined until all of the water in the well is more nearly representative
8 of Bell Canyon fluid. DOE-2 will be developed in 2008 to establish a specific gravity and water
9 levels more representative of the Bell Canyon.

10 CB-1 was temporarily completed to the Bell Canyon shortly after drilling in September 1983 by
11 setting a PIP on tubing in the lower anhydrite of the Castile Formation. After swabbing 16.8 m³
12 (595 ft³) of brine from the tubing to develop the open Bell Canyon interval, the Bell Canyon
13 fluid-specific gravity was approximately 1.128 (Beauheim, Hassinger, and Klaiber 1983). Bell
14 Canyon water levels were monitored in CB-1 through September 1986, and the water level
15 stabilized at ~920 m (3020 ft) amsl (Intera Technologies, Inc. 1986). Monitoring of the Bell
16 Canyon was suspended in late 1986 when CB-1 was converted to a Culebra monitoring well. In
17 August 1999, a double-packer assembly was installed in the well to allow simultaneous
18 monitoring of the Bell Canyon and Culebra (Beauheim 1999). After swabbing ~22 m³ (775 ft³)
19 of fluid from the tubing connected to the Bell Canyon, the specific gravity stabilized at 1.126 and
20 the water level subsequently stabilized at ~919 m (3015 ft) amsl. In January and February of
21 2004, CB-1 was reconfigured as a single-completion Bell Canyon monitoring well (Salness
22 2005a). As at DOE-2, some of the water left in the well after recompletion was removed by
23 bailing, but the remaining water in the well was drilling brine with a specific gravity of
24 approximately 1.2. Consequently, the water levels measured since that time are not comparable
25 to those measured previously (Figure HYDRO-35). Like DOE-2, the Bell Canyon water level in
26 CB-1 is steadily rising, albeit more slowly. Whether this is caused by gradual dilution of the
27 heavy brine in the bottom of the hole by flowing groundwater or by some other factor cannot be
28 determined until all of the water in the well is more nearly representative of Bell Canyon fluid.
29 CB-1 will be developed in 2008 to establish a specific gravity and water levels more
30 representative of the Bell Canyon.

31 **HYDRO-5.5 Monitoring Summary**

32 Water-level monitoring provides a general picture of the changes in hydraulic head occurring in
33 the formations being monitored. Water levels are currently being monitored in the Culebra,
34 Magenta, Dewey Lake, and Bell Canyon. From 2003 through 2007, Culebra water levels
35 generally rose by 1 to 3 m (3 to 10 ft), with most of the rise occurring between late 2004 and the
36 end of 2007. Water levels rose more in Nash Draw and north of the WIPP site than they did
37 elsewhere. Water levels in most Magenta wells generally rose over the same period, although
38 only by ~1 m (3 ft) or less. The Dewey Lake water level (measured only in well WQSP-6A) was
39 stable within a ~20-cm (8-in.) band over the 5-yr period. Bell Canyon water levels rose steadily
40 as a recovery response to well recompletion, and were well below historic levels because the
41 water left in the wells after recompletion was much denser than the native Bell Canyon water.



1

2

Figure HYDRO-35. CB-1 Bell Canyon Water Levels

3 In addition to monitoring water levels, fluid pressures in most Culebra and Magenta wells were
 4 monitored on an hourly basis using TROLL[®] gauges. These continuous fluid-pressure
 5 measurements provide a clearer, more complete record of the changes in hydraulic head
 6 occurring in the wells than that provided monthly water-level measurements. When coupled
 7 with rainfall data, the TROLL[®] data show that wells in and on the edge of Nash Draw respond to
 8 rainfall events of ~10 mm (0.4 in.) or more in 24 hr. Wells more distant from Nash Draw show
 9 smaller responses delayed by days to months for rainfall events of several cm, reflecting pressure
 10 propagation from Nash Draw to the east.

1 HYDRO-6.0 Hydraulic Testing

2 Hydraulic testing provides data to generate Culebra T fields for performance assessment (PA).
 3 Between the September 2002 data-cutoff date for the CRA-2004 and January 2008, hydraulic
 4 testing was performed in 20 Culebra wells. The wells tested, the types of tests performed, the
 5 dates of the tests, and the pumping rates during pumping tests are summarized in Table
 6 HYDRO-4. The testing was performed under *TP 03-01, Test Plan for Testing of Wells at the*
 7 *WIPP Site* (Chace and Beauheim 2006) and is documented in Johnson (2008).

**Table HYDRO-4. Hydraulic Testing in Culebra Wells from December 2003 through
 January 2008**

Well	Test Type	Test Date(s)	Pumping Rate (L/s)	Transmissivity (m ² /s)
C-2737	Pumping	3/4-5/2004	0.019	6.6×10^{-7}
IMC-461	Slug	1/25-26/2005	Not applicable	1.9×10^{-4}
SNL-1	Pumping	5/25-29/2004	0.69	Not calculated
	Pumping	3/7-10/2005	2.2	6.2×10^{-4}
SNL-2	Pumping	1/13-17/2004	0.047	Not calculated
	Pumping	1/20-24/2005	0.76	1.1×10^{-4}
SNL-3	Pumping	4/14-16/2004	0.63	9.9×10^{-4}
SNL-5	Pumping	7/20-24/2004	0.22	4.9×10^{-6}
SNL-6	Slug	1/16/2008	Not applicable	8.7×10^{-12}
SNL-8	Slug	12/14/2006	Not applicable	2.4×10^{-7}
SNL-9	Pumping	12/2-6/2003	0.79	3.9×10^{-5}
	Pumping	10/22-11/23/2004	1.0	Not calculated
SNL-10	Pumping	10/30-11/3/2006	0.016	3.3×10^{-7}
SNL-12	Pumping	8/10-14/2004	1.3	5.0×10^{-4}
SNL-13	Pumping	7/17/2006	Variable	3.8×10^{-7}
SNL-14	Pumping	8/4-26/2005	1.9	4.9×10^{-5}
SNL-15	Slug	3/30/2007	NA	1.4×10^{-13}
SNL-16	Pumping	6/5-9/2006	1.6	1.3×10^{-3}
SNL-17A	Pumping	9/11-15/2006	2.0	3.4×10^{-4}
SNL-18	Pumping	8/14-18/2006	1.9	1.4×10^{-4}
SNL-19	Pumping	7/24-28/2006	1.9	4.3×10^{-4}
WIPP-11	Pumping	2/1-20/2005	2.2	4.3×10^{-4}
WIPP-25	Pumping	9/22/2004	1.9	2.5×10^{-4}

8

9 The initial attempts at pumping SNL-1, SNL-2, and WIPP-11 revealed that the wells were poorly
 10 connected to the Culebra. Subsequently, the wells were acidized to improve the connections.
 11 SNL-1 was acidized on March 3, 2005, by injecting 7.6 m^3 (270 ft³) of a 15% hydrochloric (HCl)
 12 acid solution followed by 7.6 m^3 (270 ft³) of fresh water into the well. SNL-2 was acidized in a


1 similar fashion on January 19, 2005. WIPP-11 was acidized on January 5, 2005, by injecting
2 6.8 m^3 (241 ft^3) of a 15% HCl acid solution charged with liquid nitrogen followed by 9.2 m^3
3 (326 ft^3) of fresh water into the well. All three wells could sustain much higher pumping rates
4 after acidization.

5 The Culebra hydraulic-test data have been analyzed by Roberts (2006 and 2007) and Bowman
6 and Roberts (2009) under *AP-070, Analysis Plan for Non-Salado Hydraulic-Test Interpretations*
7 (Beauheim 2004a) using techniques described in Beauheim and Roberts (2004). The
8 transmissivity values inferred by Roberts (2006 and 2007) and Bowman and Roberts (2009)
9 from the tests are also listed in Table HYDRO-4.

10 **HYDRO-6.1 Qualitative Analysis of Diagnostic Plots**


11 In addition to the quantitative information on transmissivity obtained from the Culebra pumping
12 tests, qualitative information on Culebra heterogeneity can also be inferred. A log-log plot of
13 pressure change and the derivative of the pressure change with respect to log time during a
14 pumping or recovery period is the standard “diagnostic” plot used by the petroleum industry to
15 develop a conceptual model of the formation being tested (Bourdet, Ayoub, and Pirard 1989). At
16 early time, both the pressure change and pressure derivative curves have a unit slope (Figure
17 HYDRO-36), indicating that water is coming predominantly from storage in the wellbore rather
18 than the formation. The duration of this wellbore-storage period is increased if the formation is
19 poorly connected to the well, as can result from drilling mud buildup on the wall of the hole or
20 mud invasion of the formation (referred to as a positive “skin”). If the formation is directly
21 connected to the well by open fractures, very little wellbore storage may be observed and the
22 well may have a negative skin. A minimum observed in the derivative after the wellbore-storage
23 period is indicative of double-porosity (fractured) conditions, with the amplitude of the minimum
24 increasing if flow between the fractures and rock matrix is inhibited by mineralization or some
25 other coating on the fracture surface. In a homogeneous, isotropic system (whether single or
26 double porosity), flow to a pumping well is radial and the pressure derivative takes on a constant
27 value at late time, forming a horizontal line on the diagnostic plot. A decline in the derivative at
28 late time indicates that transmissivity is increasing with distance from the pumping well or that
29 some higher-T region (in the extreme, a constant-pressure boundary) has been encountered by
30 the expanding pressure transient from the test. A rise in the derivative indicates that
31 transmissivity is decreasing or that flow is being constrained by a lower-T region (in the extreme,
32 a no-flow boundary). Referring to these basic characteristics of the pressure derivative on a
33 diagnostic plot, information on Culebra heterogeneity can be inferred from the diagnostic plot of
34 each pumping test.

35 Figure HYDRO-37 shows the diagnostic plot of the pressure recovery following the C-2737
36 pumping test. Wellbore storage and single-porosity, radial flow are readily apparent in the
37 derivative. Note that the late-time derivative is erratic because the signal-to-noise ratio decreases
38 as the rate of pressure change decreases. The diagnostic plot shows that the transmissivity of the
39 Culebra varies little within the area interrogated by the 10.4-hr pumping test. Similar uniform
40 transmissivity conditions were found from the SNL-9, SNL-10, SNL-13, SNL-16, and WIPP-25
41 pumping tests, with SNL-9 and SNL-16 also providing clear indications of double-porosity
42 conditions (Roberts 2006 and 2007).



1
2

Figure HYDRO-36. Log-Log Diagnostic Plot Showing Different Aquifer Conditions



3
4

Figure HYDRO-37. Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of C-2737 Recovery

1 Figure HYDRO-38 shows the diagnostic plot from the pressure recovery following the SNL-3
2 pumping test. The SNL-3 response shows much more wellbore storage and (positive) skin effect
3 than the C-2737 response shown in Figure HYDRO-37. The minimum in the derivative may
4 reflect either double porosity or simply a highly positive skin. In either case, the minimum is not
5 followed by a stabilized derivative representing radial flow through a region of uniform
6 transmissivity. Instead, the derivative steadily climbs, which reflects either decreasing
7 transmissivity or channelization of flow through a quasi-linear region with higher T than the
8 surrounding rock. Similar, steadily rising late-time derivatives were observed in the tests of
9 SNL-1 and SNL-12 (Roberts 2006). The SNL-12 diagnostic plot also showed apparent double-
10 porosity effects.

11 The log-log diagnostic plot of the recovery from the WIPP-11 pumping test (Figure HYDRO-39)
12 shows a more complicated pattern of heterogeneity. After a brief period of wellbore storage, the
13 derivative appears to stabilize for nearly one log cycle of time, then rises for another log cycle,
14 stabilizes (or drops slightly) for another log cycle, and then begins a final sustained rise. This
15 pattern could indicate a series of rings around WIPP-11 with progressively lower T or, more
16 likely, regions of lower T encountered at different distances in different directions. A similar
17 derivative was seen in the diagnostic plot for the SNL-14 pumping test with the addition of
18 apparent double-porosity effects (Roberts 2006).

19 The log-log diagnostic plot of the recovery from the SNL-5 pumping test (Figure HYDRO-40)
20 shows yet another type of heterogeneity. After the wellbore storage and skin period, the
21 derivative hints at a radial-flow stabilization at ~2-3 hr elapsed time, but then begins a steady
22 decline. This decline indicates that the transmissivity of the Culebra increases with distance
23 from SNL-5. Similar late-time declines were observed in the pressure derivatives from the tests
24 at SNL-2, SNL-18, and SNL-19 (Roberts 2006 and 2007). The SNL-18 diagnostic plot also
25 showed apparent double-porosity effects.

26 The log-log diagnostic plot of the recovery from the SNL-17A pumping test (Figure HYDRO-
27 41) provides a final example of the heterogeneity observed in Culebra testing. After a brief
28 wellbore-storage period, the derivative displays a double-porosity minimum, rises and begins to
29 stabilize, then rises again before rolling over into a sustained decline. This behavior is indicative
30 of a double-porosity system with homogeneous properties in the near-well region and then lower
31 T at some distance in one direction followed by much higher T in another direction.

32 **HYDRO-6.2 Distribution of Transmissivity and Correlation with Depth**

33 The changes in transmissivity implied by the Culebra pumping test diagnostic plots are
34 consistent with knowledge of the Culebra transmissivity distribution. Figure HYDRO-42 shows
35 the \log_{10} transmissivity (m^2/s) values for all of the Culebra wells around the WIPP site. Those
36 wells at which the Culebra was observed to be fractured and/or where double-porosity hydraulic
37 responses were observed are shown as red dots, while those wells at which few (or no) open
38 fractures were observed and only single-porosity hydraulic responses were observed are shown
39 as blue stars. C-2737 is seen to be at the southern end of an area with \log_{10} transmissivity values
40 between -7 and -6. The effects of the short (10.4-hr), low-rate (0.019 liters per second [L/s] [0.3
41 gallons per minute (gpm)]) pumping test conducted at C-2737 appear to have been confined
42




Figure HYDRO-38. Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of SNL-3 Recovery






Figure HYDRO-39. Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of WIPP-11 Recovery



1
2


Figure HYDRO-40. Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of SNL-5 Recovery



3
4

Figure HYDRO-41. Log-Log Diagnostic Plot of SNL-17A Recovery

1



2

3 **Figure HYDRO-42. \log_{10} Transmissivity (m^2/s) Values of Culebra Wells Around the WIPP**
 4 **Site**


1 to this low-T region. A longer test would be expected to show the effects of the higher T (\log_{10}
2 transmissivity = -4.7) seen at H-3 to the south. SNL-3 can be seen to be in a region with lower T
3 to both the east and west, leading to the derivative behavior seen in Figure HYDRO-38. The
4 derivative behavior seen at the other tested Culebra wells can be similarly explained by referring
5 to Figure HYDRO-42.

6 The transmissivity values inferred from the hydraulic tests listed in Table HYDRO-4 are
7 generally consistent with a correlation between Culebra transmissivity and overburden thickness,
8 taking other geologic factors into consideration. This correlation was developed by Holt and
9 Yarbrough (2002) and was used to generate the CRA-2004 T fields. Figure HYDRO-43 shows
10 the results listed in Table HYDRO-4 added to the data and correlation of Holt and Yarbrough
11 (2002). The data are divided into three categories: wells where upper Salado dissolution has
12 occurred, wells where no Salado dissolution has occurred and \log_{10} transmissivity (m^2/s) is
13 greater than -5.4, and wells where no Salado dissolution has occurred and \log_{10} transmissivity is
14 less than -5.4. \log_{10} transmissivity = -5.4 is the cutoff used by Holt and Yarbrough (2002) to
15 differentiate wells showing double-porosity hydraulic behavior indicative of fractures from wells
16 showing single-porosity (porous medium) hydraulic behavior. SNL-5 (\log_{10} transmissivity =
17 -5.3, single porosity) had not yet been drilled at the time of this demarcation. Not shown are the
18 results from SNL-6 and SNL-15, which are from a different geologic domain (Culebra bounded
19 by and containing halite [see Section HYDRO-7.1]) than the data shown on the plot and have
20 much lower transmissivities.

21 Most of the new transmissivity data are in good agreement with the correlation of Holt and
22 Yarbrough (2002). SNL-12 and WIPP-11 have higher transmissivities than would have been
23 expected. The evidence for upper Salado dissolution at SNL-9 is tenuous (Powers and
24 Richardson 2003b), and SNL-9 might be more properly assigned to the middle population
25 (shown in green) on Figure HYDRO-43. SNL-5 is shown as belonging to the middle (green)
26 group only because its \log_{10} transmissivity value falls above the cutoff used by Holt and
27 Yarbrough (2002). Some fracturing was observed in the core from SNL-5 (Powers and
28 Richardson 2004d), but no indication of double-porosity hydraulic behavior is seen in the
29 diagnostic plot of the pumping test recovery (Figure HYDRO-40). The cutoff could perhaps be
30 redefined (as was done in Beauheim 2007) and SNL-5 assigned to the lower (blue) group. In
31 either category, it would represent an end member.

32 **HYDRO-6.3 Large-Scale Tests with Distant Observation Wells**

33 Most of the tests performed since 2003 were single-well tests, meaning that the test was only
34 intended to produce a response in the well being tested. Three longer-term pumping tests were
35 conducted in 2004 and 2005, however, that were designed to produce responses in surrounding
36 observation wells that could be used to calibrate the groundwater-flow model of the Culebra.
37 Total production from these tests was limited to the 3700 m^3 (3 acre-feet [acre-ft]) the New
38 Mexico Office of the State Engineer specifies as the maximum amount that can be pumped from
39 a well in a calendar year without obtaining additional water rights. These tests were conducted
40 at SNL-9, WIPP-11, and SNL-14, and lasted 32 days, 19 days, and 22 days, respectively (Table
41 HYDRO-4). The observation wells that responded to these tests are shown in Figure HYDRO-
42 44.



1

2 **Figure HYDRO-43. New Transmissivity Data Added to Correlation of Holt and**
 3 **Yarbrough (2002)**

4 **HYDRO-6.4 Evidence for Fracture Interconnections from Diffusivity**
 5 **Analysis**

6 Beauheim (2007) compiled hydraulic diffusivity data from observation-well responses to 15
 7 Culebra pumping tests to identify the areas that are, and are not, interconnected by fractures. In a
 8 highly heterogeneous medium such as the Culebra, only hydraulic diffusivity, the ratio of
 9 transmissivity and storativity (S), can be determined from the responses of observation wells to
 10 pumping tests. Independent estimation of transmissivity and S requires knowledge of the areal
 11 distribution of flow during pumping, which is not known in a heterogeneous system. Generally
 12 speaking, higher values of diffusivity reflect higher degrees of connectivity between wells.

13 The diffusivity data represent tests in which the observation-well-to-pumping-well distances
 14 ranged from 398 m (1304 ft) to 9472 m (31075 ft) (Beauheim 2007). All Culebra pumping tests
 15 that have produced observable responses at wells over 100 m (330 ft) away were performed at
 16 wells showing high T ($\text{log}_{10} T \geq -5.4$) and evidence of fracturing. (Indeed, lower-T locations
 17 typically cannot sustain pumping rates of at least 0.25 L/s (4 gpm) required to produce
 18 observable responses over great distances in the Culebra.) Thus, the pressure responses observed
 19 at distant wells all involve some amount of propagation through fractures before, perhaps,
 20 encountering unfractured dolomite. The objective, therefore, was to distinguish pressure-
 21 transient propagation entirely through fractures from that which starts in fractures but ends in
 22 unfractured rock (Beauheim 2007). This was accomplished by comparing the diffusivities (D)

1 calculated for each pumping well/observation well pair in the context of the other information
2 available about fracturing in the Culebra.


3 Beauheim (2007) found that all of the well pairs showing $\log_{10} D$ (m^2/s) values of 1.0 or greater
4 involve wells already known to have high-T ($\log_{10} T \geq -5.4$) and other evidence of fracturing.
5 Thus, these wells are likely directly interconnected by fractures. At the other extreme, all well
6 pairs showing $\log_{10} D$ values less than 0 involve an observation well known to have low-T and
7 no evidence of fracturing. Thus, these wells are probably not directly interconnected by
8 fractures. The well pairs showing $\log_{10} D$ values between 0 and 1 required more detailed
9 attention because they involved wells with and wells without evidence of fracturing. Based
10 largely on the response of H-15 to the H-11b1 pumping test, which produced a $\log_{10} D$ estimate
11 of 0.21 (Beauheim 1989), Beauheim (2007) concluded that a $\log_{10} D$ value of approximately
12 0.20 appears to represent the cut-off between well pairs connected by fractures from those that
13 are not. H-15 encountered little fracturing in the Culebra, with most fractures filled with gypsum
14 (Mercer and Snyder 1990) but, as suggested by Beauheim (1989), it must be near to
15 hydraulically significant fractures to have responded to the pumping at H-11b1 (and later at
16 SNL-14) as it did.

17 The spatial pattern of estimated D s is shown in Figure HYDRO-45. A red line shows the
18 separation between regions with $\log_{10} D$ values greater and less than 0.20. The regions
19 containing high-T wells show $\log_{10} D$ values greater than 0.20, reflecting fracture
20 interconnections. The high-T region in the southeastern part of the WIPP site clearly seems to be
21 interconnected to high T s farther to the south. The swath of Culebra running roughly NE to SW
22 across the WIPP site that encompasses only low-T wells generally shows $\log_{10} D$ values less than
23 0.20. Combining this information with the fact that no responses to pumping in a high-T well on
24 one side of this swath have ever been observed in high-T wells on the other side of the swath,
25 Beauheim (2007) inferred that a continuous band of low-T Culebra lacking hydraulically
26 significant fractures separates the high-T Culebra found in the northwestern part of the WIPP site
27 from the high-T Culebra found in the southeastern part of the site.


28 **HYDRO-6.5 Other Testing**

29 Hydraulic testing of Magenta wells was performed under *TP 00-03, Compliance Monitoring*
30 *Program: Recompletion and Testing of Wells for Evaluation of Monitoring Data from the*
31 *Magenta Member of the Rustler Formation at the WIPP Site* (Chace 2003). Slug tests of the
32 Magenta were performed in well C-2737 in January 2007. Bowman and Roberts (2009) inferred
33 a transmissivity of $1.5 \times 10^{-7} \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$ (0.14 square feet (ft^2)/day) from these tests.

34 Tests of the Magenta were also attempted in WIPP-25, where Mercer (1983) reported the
35 transmissivity of the Magenta to be $4.0 \times 10^{-4} \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$ (375 ft^2/day), higher than the $2.9 \times 10^{-4} \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$
36 (270 ft^2/day) reported for the Culebra at that location. Lambert and Robinson (1984) reported
37 maintaining a pumping rate of 2.1 L/s (33 gpm) when they sampled the Magenta at WIPP-25 in
38 1980. Two attempts were made to pump the well in February 2006 and September 2007, but
39 even a pumping rate of 0.08 L/s (1.25 gpm) was more than the well could sustain, and the well
40 was rapidly dewatered. Pressure recovery to the prepumping level then took several months.
41 Video inspection inside the well showed that the casing perforations across the Magenta interval
42



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-44. Observation Wells Responding to 2004–2005 Long-Term Pumping**
 3 **Tests**



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-45. $\log_{10} D$ Values Observed for Pumping Well-Observation Well Pairs**
 3 **(modified from Beauheim 2007)**
 4

1 were open. It is surmised that the packer separating the Culebra and Magenta in WIPP-25 was
2 leaking when Lambert and Robinson (1984) sampled the well, because they reported virtually
3 identical water chemistries for the Culebra and Magenta. The Magenta transmissivity

4 value reported by Mercer (1983) was derived from the same pumping test as the water-quality
5 samples; hence, the transmissivity value is not representative of the Magenta. Based on the rapid
6 dewatering and slow recovery observed in 2006 and 2007, the true Magenta transmissivity value
7 at WIPP-25 may be two or more orders of magnitude lower than the value reported by Mercer
8 (1983).

9 As a historical note, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) performed hydraulic tests in wells H-1,
10 H-2a, H-2b, H-2c, and H-3 (later referred to as H-3b1) in 1979 and 1980 that provided data for
11 transmissivity estimates for the Magenta, Culebra, and Rustler-Salado contact interval reported
12 in Mercer (1983). However, the data from those tests were not published at that time. The
13 USGS completed documentation of the data from those tests in Huff and Gregory (2006).

14 **HYDRO-6.6 Summary**

15 Extensive hydraulic testing has been performed in the new wells. This testing has involved both
16 single-well tests, which provide information on local transmissivity and heterogeneity, and long-
17 term (19 to 32 days) pumping tests that have created observable responses in wells up to 9.5 km
18 (5.9 mi) away. The transmissivity values inferred from the single-well tests support the
19 correlation between geologic conditions and Culebra transmissivity developed by Holt and
20 Yarbrough (2002) and elucidated by Holt, Beauheim, and Powers (2005). The types of
21 heterogeneities indicated by the diagnostic plots of the pumping-test data are consistent with the
22 known spatial distribution of transmissivity in the Culebra. Mapping of diffusivity values
23 obtained from analysis of observation-well responses to pumping tests shows areas north, west,
24 and south of the WIPP site connected by fractures, and also a wide area that includes a NE-to-
25 SW swath across the WIPP site where hydraulically significant fractures are largely absent
26 (Beauheim, 2007). This mapping, combined with the responses observed to the long-term SNL-
27 14 pumping test, has confirmed the presence of a high-T area extending from the SE quadrant of
28 the WIPP site to at least 10 km (6.2 mi) to the south.

29 The data from hydraulic testing provide the basis for developing T fields that are used for PA to
30 describe radionuclide transport in the Culebra. However, the T fields for the CRA-2009 PA are
31 the same T fields as were used for the CRA-2004 PABC. New T fields based on the data
32 presented in Section HYDRO-6.0 are undergoing peer review.

1 **HYDRO-7.0 Geological Investigations**

2 Geological investigations conducted from 2003 through 2007 focused on two major topics:
3 delineation of halite margins in the nondolomite members of the Rustler and karst. Separate
4 karst studies were performed to (1) evaluate the potential for karst at the WIPP site, and (2)
5 increase understanding of karst in Nash Draw.

6 **HYDRO-7.1 Halite Margins**


7 A reexamination of Rustler halite margins using geophysical log data from new and/or additional
8 oil and gas wells and other boreholes around the WIPP was performed under *AP-114, Analysis*
9 *Plan for Evaluation and Recalibration of Culebra Transmissivity Fields* (Beauheim 2004b), as
10 part of refining the WIPP conceptual hydrology model and Culebra T fields. Mudstone and
11 halite are lateral facies equivalents in the nondolomite members of the Rustler (Powers and Holt
12 2000). Holt and Powers (1988) recognized the facies equivalency, and defined the informal
13 stratigraphic nomenclature for the Rustler shown in Figure HYDRO-3. Powers (2002)
14 delineated the halite margins based on the then-available data for CRA-2004.

15 As described by Holt, Beauheim, and Powers (2005), deposition (and preservation) of halite in
16 units adjacent to the Culebra is related to the hydraulic properties of the Culebra in several ways.
17 First, when halite was deposited above the Culebra, high-salinity fluids circulated through the
18 Culebra, depositing halite in Culebra pores as well, resulting in extremely low-T. Second, if the
19 Culebra is fractured, allowing high flux, halite immediately below or above the Culebra would
20 probably not survive for millions of years. Therefore, the presence of halite below or above the
21 Culebra can indicate the lack of open fractures in the Culebra. Third, if halite is dissolved from
22 below the Culebra, it could cause fracturing of the Culebra (as Salado dissolution has caused in
23 Nash Draw). As halite is most likely to be dissolved along its depositional margin, the M2-H2
24 margin below the Culebra should be evaluated as a potential location of high Culebra
25 transmissivity.

26 Thus, mapping the occurrence of halite in the Rustler members allows inferences about Culebra
27 transmissivity in areas where there are no Culebra wells. Powers (2007) completed this
28 investigation and produced the revised halite-margin map shown in Figure HYDRO-46. The
29 revised map shows more detail and complexity than the previous version, made possible by the
30 data available from newly drilled oil and gas wells. The revised halite margins will be used in
31 developing new Culebra T fields.

32 **HYDRO-7.2 Karst**

33 In response to WIPP stakeholder comments about the potential effects of karst on WIPP
34 regulatory compliance and a request from EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006, p.
35 18015), the DOE initiated a comprehensive review of all claims and information pertaining to
36 karst in the WIPP vicinity. This review (Lorenz 2006a and 2006b) supported the previous DOE
37 position on karst, concluding that most of the geological evidence offered for the presence of
38 karst in the subsurface at the WIPP site “has been used uncritically and out of context, and



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Figure HYDRO-46. Revised Rustler Halite Margins

does not form a mutually supporting, scientifically defensible framework. ... The remaining evidence is more readily interpreted as primary sedimentary features” (Lorenz 2006b, p. 243). Lorenz (2006b, p. 250) summarized his findings as follows:

Analysis of primary data suggests that the overwhelming majority of data support an interpretation of unkarsted strata in the Rustler Formation at and near the WIPP site. There is some evidence for local dissolution at the top of the Magenta horizon in the WIPP-33 drillhole, but extrapolation of the known karst features in Nash Draw eastward to the WIPP site is unwarranted. The arguments offered for karst in the Rustler Formation at the WIPP site are speculative, and what evidence

1 exists for karst is inconsistent and contradictory, and subject to other, more plausible
2 interpretations.

3 Interpretations of ‘insoluble residues’ in the cores were based on undeveloped theory, faulty
4 analogy, and severely limited exposures. These early interpretations have been erroneously cited
5 as evidence for karst in the Rustler Formation. More recently, better exposures of these strata, and
6 their interpretation by analogy to modern depositional environments, have documented the
7 presence of primary sedimentary structures including the disruption of bedding related to
8 syndepositional desiccation and cracking, proving that they are primary deposits that have not
9 been subjected to post-burial dissolution.

10 Topographic depressions near the WIPP site that have been cited as being the probable locations
11 of sinkholes are few, and the data that have been cited to interpret these depressions as sinkholes
12 have been taken out of context and have other, more scientifically valid and better supported
13 interpretations. The characteristics of these depressions are not similar to the characteristics of the
14 unambiguous sinkholes which pirate drainage systems in Nash Draw to the west. The
15 stratigraphic thinning commonly cited as evidence of dissolution of the Rustler Formation at the
16 WIPP site is in fact related to dissolution only in the immediate vicinity of Nash Draw. This
17 dissolution-related thinning overlaps with and obscures the depositional thinning and thickening
18 that is common to the Rustler Formation across the Delaware Basin. Rustler halites were
19 deposited in shallow depressions at the same time that muddy deposits were accumulating at the
20 margins of the pans, and this lateral facies equivalency, a well-documented and founding principle
21 of stratigraphy, caused most of the sedimentary patterns that are mistakenly cited as evidence for
22 post-depositional dissolution and removal of halite from the thinner parts of the Rustler Formation
23 in the vicinity of the WIPP site. The laterally extensive and uniform dolomite layers are not
24 evidence for the original extents of the halite layers. Finally, it would be impossible to obtain the
25 observed thicknesses of the muddy and silty deposits that have been called “residues” by
26 dissolving the limited available volumes of muddy and silty halite.

27 While Lorenz (2006a and 2006b) focused on evidence for karst at the WIPP site, Powers et al.
28 (2006b) provided new details on karst in Nash Draw. Quoting from their discussion,

29 Nash Draw is a complicated geological feature whose origins, history, and processes have been
30 broadly outlined by previous investigations. Powers and Owsley (2003) provided additional
31 details of karst features in the southeastern arm of Nash Draw, and many of the features reported
32 there are discussed or described further here. Some of the approaches taken here will be extended
33 elsewhere in the draw.

34 Upper Salado halite was dissolved to form a distinct margin along Livingston Ridge and the
35 eastern margin of Nash Draw. Drillhole control is not as dense, however, in most other areas, and
36 the precise control and details of the history would be more difficult to extract elsewhere. We can
37 be reasonably confident that, by analogy, much of the eastern margin of Nash Draw develops by
38 similar processes, although perhaps at differing rates and times. Sulfate was also removed from
39 the Rustler in Nash Draw, although data on structure and well logs indicate this is not the
40 dominant process along the Livingston Ridge at the Cabin Lake Field. Data on upper Salado
41 halite have not been developed in comparable detail along the western margin of Nash Draw, and
42 we cannot evaluate the relationship between upper Salado halite dissolution and that very
43 distinctive margin. The fact that the western margin can be drawn along different escarpments
44 suggests an even more complicated history. Nevertheless, based on additional data, we feel more
45 confident than Vine (1963) about the relationship between Nash Draw topography and upper
46 Salado halite dissolution.

47 The data on upper Salado halite around Laguna Grande are consistent with a low along a north-
48 south axis of the lake that may provide, or have provided, a pathway for brine movement
49 southward out of the area under the lake before migrating further south and southwest toward the
50 Pecos River. The elevation on the top of halite, as shown by a few wells in this area, indicates


1 more halite removal, and the rocks at the surface have developed internally-drained, elongate
2 valleys as well as small, circular basins over this area in response. There are some indications that
3 more localized topography, including some drainages east of Laguna Grande, have developed in
4 response to local differences in halite dissolution. This inference will likely remain very tentative
5 since it is unlikely that significantly closer spacing of drillhole data will be obtained.

6 The array of surface karst features that developed on gypsum beds and gypsite in the southeastern
7 arm of Nash Draw show evidence of stratigraphic control and reveal some aspects of their
8 evolution. Sharply defined, vertical-walled collapse sinks are more common on upper Rustler
9 beds, but they also are more recently exposed by erosion. Similar beds, lower stratigraphically
10 and exposed farther from the edge of the draw, show more collapse and fill. These features likely
11 show some steps in the evolution of karst with time in this setting. Blind valleys are, at least now,
12 associated with the Magenta Dolomite and upper Tamarisk gypsum. They do not resemble
13 collapse sink development; rather it appears that the less-soluble carbonate over gypsum is an
14 important factor in maintaining the cave system instead of collapsing. The features we call karst
15 valleys, however, may be a later step in collapse sink development, where they coalesce into a
16 longer feature. Because the karst valleys developed in lower stratigraphic units than do the more
17 individual collapse sinks described here, it is not certain what role stratigraphy plays in the
18 evolutionary timing of these features.

19 Springs near the mouth of the southeastern arm of Nash Draw are dominated by sulfate-rich water.
20 Moderate specific gravity and gypsum formation from the evaporating water differentiate these
21 springs from those with high specific gravity and brines that precipitate halite. The brines
22 precipitating halite undoubtedly flow through very shallow gypsum karst, but the brine source is a
23 lake maintained by potash refinery effluent. The sulfate-rich springs are part of the karst hydraulic
24 system in the southeastern arm of Nash Draw, which is developed mainly on beds of sulfate and
25 gypsite. Given the year-round flow in an area with strong seasonal differences in rainfall, the
26 system has considerable storage. Because we cannot quantify what proportion of the fluid flow in
27 this arm of Nash Draw goes to this spring, and have not quantified flow from the springs into
28 Laguna Cinco, it is not practical to estimate how storage occurs there. Subsurface fluids are likely
29 stored in the alluvium that fills some sinks and valleys. Thin (~3–5 m thick) mudstones between
30 Rustler gypsum beds and Rustler dolomites may also provide storage. Hillesheim, Beauheim, and
31 Richardson (2006) suggest recharge reaches the Culebra Dolomite (which is significantly deeper
32 than the near-surface features described here). The Culebra is not storage for these springs,
33 however, as the hydraulic heads for the Culebra are not sufficient to reach the surface here. The
34 systems that discharge to the springs are quite likely feeding open porosity that is locally strata-
35 bound. The degree to which the shallow system in the southeastern arm of Nash Draw is
36 connected to deeper beds, such as the Culebra, is not yet established. Hillesheim et al. (2006)
37 show that heavier precipitation across Nash Draw does affect water levels in the Culebra. Local
38 gradients and flow toward the springs at Laguna Grande, as described here, is not evidence that the
39 Culebra follows a similar local flow path.

40 The investigations of springs in the southeastern arm of Nash Draw discussed above are
41 documented by Powers (2006a). Powers (2006b) also mapped numerous closed catchment
42 basins in southeastern Nash Draw (Figure HYDRO-47). The basins drain to holes in Rustler
43 gypsum units above the Culebra. Some of the water entering this gypsum karst discharges into
44 brine ponds (“lagunas”) in Nash Draw, such as Laguna Cinco (Powers 2006a). Some water must
45 also reach a water table in the gypsum units with which the Culebra is in hydraulic
46 communication, at least locally, because Culebra wells in Nash Draw show water-level responses
47 to major rainfall events (e.g., Figure HYDRO-14).

48



1
2 **Figure HYDRO-47. Catchment Basins (color coded) Mapped in Southeastern Nash Draw**

1 **HYDRO-8.0 Water-Quality Sampling and Evaluation**

2 Water-quality sampling has been performed under two programs at WIPP. Culebra wells
3 WQSP-1 through WQSP-6 and Dewey Lake well WQSP-6A are sampled twice a year under the
4 WIPP Water Quality Sampling Program (WQSP). Sample analysis results are published in the
5 ASERs (U.S. Department of Energy 2004c, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008). Water-quality samples
6 are collected in conjunction with pumping tests, as well as during dedicated sampling events
7 under TP 03-01 (Chace and Beauheim 2006) or TP 00-03 (Chace 2003). Most Culebra samples
8 were collected after repeated field measurements showed that pH, specific gravity, and electrical
9 conductivity had stabilized while several wellbore volumes were pumped.

10 Two exceptions were the samples from SNL-6 and SNL-15. Because of the very low Culebra
11 transmissivity at these two locations (Table HYDRO-4), these wells could not be pumped at any
12 sustainable rate. The wells had been drilled using compressed air as the circulation medium
13 (Powers [In progress]a, Powers and Richardson 2008c), and very little water had accumulated in
14 the holes by the time the wells were completed. Thus, almost all of the water in the wells came
15 from the Culebra. The SNL-6 sample was collected at the depth of the Culebra after ~140 m
16 (460 ft) of water had accumulated in the well, and the SNL-15 sample was collected ~43 m
17 (150 ft) below the water surface in the well.

18 A few samples from various formations were collected opportunistically during drilling of new
19 wells. No purging or well cleanup was performed before collecting these samples—the waters
20 were representative of what flowed into the borehole after drilling through the sampled interval
21 using compressed air as the circulation medium. These samples cannot be considered as reliable
22 as those collected during pumping tests or dedicated sampling events, but should provide
23 qualitative indications of the waters in the sampled formations.

24 The non-WQSP samples are analyzed only for major ions and general chemical parameters (pH,
25 specific gravity, and specific conductance). The non-WQSP wells sampled and the analytical
26 results are listed in Table HYDRO-5. All these samples were analyzed by Hall Environmental
27 Analysis Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM. Evaluation of the water-chemistry data is being
28 performed under *AP-125, Analysis Plan for the Evaluation of Culebra Brine Compositions*
29 (Domski and Beauheim 2005).

30 **HYDRO-8.1 Culebra Groundwater Chemistry**

31 Repeated sampling of the WQSP wells has demonstrated how stable the Culebra water chemistry
32 is in these wells. Figure HYDRO-48 presents Piper plots (Piper 1944) for each well showing
33 that the groundwater composition between 2003 and 2007 was consistent with that measured
34 since the WQSP program began in 1995.

Table HYDRO-5. Analytical Results for Water Samples Collected by SNL

Well ID	Unit	Sample Date	Cl ⁻ (mg/L)	SO ₄ ²⁻ (mg/L)	HCO ₃ ⁻ (mg/L)	Br ⁻ (mg/L)	F ⁻ (mg/L)	Ca ²⁺ (mg/L)	Mg ²⁺ (mg/L)	K ⁺ (mg/L)	Na ⁺ (mg/L)	Sr ²⁺ (mg/L)	Specific Conductance (µmhos/cm@ 25°C)	pH ^a	Specific Gravity ^a	Charge Balance Error (%) ^j
C-2737	C	3/4/2004	44000	6000	71	65	0.7	1600	770	320	28000	NA	140000	7.16	1.064	0.03
H-19b0	C	8/31/2006	47000	4800	46	50	ND	1600	1100	680	27000	23	170000	7.25	1.068	-2.33
IMC-461	C	8/4/2006	3900	2300	100	ND	2.3	1000	250	30	1800	15.4	14000	6.80	1.008	-3.45
SNL-1	C	5/29/2004	19000	3700	76	17	ND	1400	730	340	10000	NA	150000	7.04	1.027	-3.5
SNL-2	C	1/17/2004	4800	2400	90	3.1	2	930	230	46	2600	NA	19000	7.32	1.010	-2.2
SNL-3	C	4/16/2004	26000	4700	63	32	ND	1400	740	360	14000	NA	140000	7.36	1.036	-5.31
SNL-5	C	7/24/2004	7000	1700	64	17	1.5	1400	510	67	1900	NA	19000	7.02	1.011	-8.89
SNL-6 ^b	C	1/16/2008	220000	1800	170	5100	ND	5500	22000	4800	97000	140	580000	6.17 ^d	1.21 ^d	1.24
SNL-8	C	8/2/2007	77000	6400	49	100	ND	2000	3100	1500	47000	33	280000	6.95	1.097	2.74
SNL-9	C	11/19/2004	14000	1600	140	16	2.5	3100	810	44	4700	NA	50000	6.73	1.021	-0.52
SNL-10	C	11/3/2006	1100	4400	46	2.3	2.7	500	170	72	1900	9.3	11000	8.11	1.008	-0.12
SNL-12	C	8/14/2004	740	1900	92	1.7	3.3	610	120	15	440	NA	5000	7.07	1.004	-2.15
SNL-13	C	7/17/2006	8500	3300	50	31	3.2	990	330	190	5200	16.9	40000	8.42	1.017	-0.39
SNL-14	C	8/21/2007	47000	6900	48	40	2.5	1500	1100	620	30000	22	130000	7.81	1.061	0.51
SNL-15 ^b	C	3/30/2007	180000	1600	200	1100	6.2	4800	12000	6800	90000	130	610000	6.64 ^d	1.205 ^d	1.79
SNL-16	C	6/9/2006	8600	2500	97	ND	2.5	1400	430	290	4400	18.2	35000	7.01	1.014	1.22
SNL-17A	C	9/15/2006	250	1800	94	ND	1.3	620	150	5.3	130	7.8	3500	7.26	1.003	2.5
SNL-18	C	8/18/2006	8700	3700	75	5.6	1.7	1100	360	120	5200	15.9	38000	7.44	1.016	-1.62
SNL-19	C	7/28/2006	2700	2300	90	1.6	1.5	850	220	43	1600	11.4	12000	7.19	1.007	1.88
USGS-4	C	7/19/2006	1100	1800	35	ND	2.3	530	120	15	540	7.24	5900	6.80 ^d	NA	-7.05
WIPP-11	C	2/20/2005	26000	6300	78	37	ND	1600	810	360	15000	NA	160000	7.07	1.038	-3.49
WIPP-25	C	9/23/2004	14000	2600	100	ND	ND	1800	660	720	8000	NA	130000	6.92	1.023	6.12
WIPP-30	C	5/6/2005	18000	3900	44	12	3.3	1300	320	170	13000	NA	130000	8.58	1.030	5.66
SNL-1 ^c	DL ^c	3/25/2004	190000	15000	290	440	ND	540	4500	21000	91000	NA	>199900	6.82 ^d	1.210	-7.45
SNL-13 ^c	DL ^f	4/12/2005	440	2200	58	1.3	1.6	680	150	5.7	270	NA	4300	8.02 ^d	1.000	-1.42
SNL-14 ^c	DL ^g	5/3/2005	54	160	180	ND	1.1	74	51	6.1	29	NA	860	7.98 ^d	1.026	1.25
SNL-14 ^c	DL ^h	5/5/2005	350	1300	140	0.86	1.4	430	150	4.9	240	NA	3100	7.68 ^d	1.003	4.91
SNL-13 ^c	LM ⁱ	4/26/2005	190000	5300	76	1400	ND	3700	10000	2300	95000	NA	NA	6.55 ^d	1.190	-2.72
C-2737	M	1/30/2007	4100	2400	38	6	3.4	910	290	26	2200	17	14000	8.32	1.011	-0.3

C – Culebra
DL – Dewey Lake
LM – Los Medaños
M – Magenta
NA – Not analyzed
mg/L – milligrams per liter

ND – Not detected above detection limit

^a Denotes measurement made in the field; pH values uncorrected for ionic strength

^b Denotes sample collected by bailing/pumping with little purging

^c Denotes opportunistic sample collected during drilling

^d Denotes laboratory value instead of field measurement; pH values uncorrected for ionic strength

^e open hole 11 m deep


^f open hole 64 m deep

^g open hole 63.4 m deep

^h open hole 92.7 m deep

ⁱ open hole 146.3 m deep

^j
$$\left(\frac{\text{sum of cation milliequivalents} - \text{sum of anion milliequivalents}}{\text{sum of cation milliequivalents} + \text{sum of anion milliequivalents}} \right) \times 100$$



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-48. Piper Plots for Water Samples from Culebra Wells WQSP-1 Through**
 3 **WQSP-6 Showing Both Historical Data from 1995 Through 2002**
 4 **(Gray Areas) and Results from 2003 Through 2007 (Blue Stars)**

1 Using data from only 22 wells, Siegel, Robinson, and Myers (1991) originally defined four
 2 hydrochemical facies (A, B, C, and D) for Culebra groundwater based primarily on ionic
 3 strength and major constituents (Table HYDRO-6). With the data now available from 59 wells,
 4 Domski and Beauheim (2008) defined transitional A/C and B/C facies, as well as a new facies E
 5 for high- moles per kilogram (molal) Na-Mg Cl brines. The spatial distribution of these wells
 6 and facies is shown in Figure HYDRO-49, along with the ionic strength of the Culebra water at
 7 each well. Note especially the position of facies E with respect to the Rustler halite margins.
 8 Figure HYDRO-50 presents a Piper plot showing how the facies differ in the relative percentages
 9 of major ions.

10

Table HYDRO-6. Culebra Hydrochemical Facies


Increasing Salinity ↓	Facies	Siegel, Robinson, and Myers (1991)	Domski and Beauheim (2008)
	B	Dilute (ionic strength ≤ 0.1 molal) CaSO_4 -rich groundwater, from southern high-T area	Same as Siegel, Robinson, and Myers (1991), Mg/Ca molar ratio 0.32 to 0.52
	B/C	Not differentiated	Ionic strength 0.18 to 0.29 molal, Mg/Ca molar ratio 0.4 to 0.6
	C	Variable composition waters, Mg/Ca molar ratio 0.3 to 1.2 for waters with ionic strength < 1.25 molal	Ionic strength 0.3 to 1.0 molal, Mg/Ca molar ratio 0.4 to 1.1
	A/C	Not differentiated	Ionic strength 1.1 to 1.6 molal, Mg/Ca molar ratio 0.5 to 1.2
	A	Ionic strength ~ 2 to 3 molal, Mg/Ca molar ratio 1.2 to 2	Ionic strength > 1.66 molal, up to 5.3 molal, Mg/Ca molar ratio 1.2 to 2.4
	D	Defined based on inferred contamination related to potash refining operations. Ionic strength 3 molal, K/Na weight ratios of ~ 0.2	Same as Siegel, Robinson, and Myers (1991)
	E	Not sampled	Wells east of the mudstone-halite margins, ionic strength 6.4 to 8.6, Mg/Ca molar ratio 4.1 to 6.6

11

12 The low-ionic-strength (≤ 0.1 molal) facies B waters contain more sulfate than chloride, and are
 13 found southwest and south of the WIPP site within and down the Culebra hydraulic gradient
 14 from the southernmost closed catchment basins mapped by Powers (2006b) in the southwest arm
 15 of Nash Draw (Figure HYDRO-47). These waters reflect relatively recent recharge through
 16 gypsum karst overlying the Culebra. However, with total dissolved solids (TDS) concentrations
 17 in excess of 3000 mg/L, the facies B waters do not in any way represent modern-day
 18 precipitation rapidly reaching the Culebra. They must have residence times in the Rustler sulfate
 19 units of thousands of years before reaching the Culebra.


20 The higher-ionic-strength (0.3–1 molal) facies C brines have differing compositions,
 21 representing meteoric waters that have dissolved CaSO_4 , overprinted with mixing and localized
 22 processes. Facies A brines (ionic strength 1.6–5.3 molal) are high in NaCl and are clustered
 23 along the M3-H3 halite margin (Figure HYDRO-49). Facies A represents old waters (long flow
 24 paths) that have dissolved halite and/or mixed with connate brine from facies E. The facies D

Culebra Hydrochemical Facies



1
2

Figure HYDRO-49. Culebra Hydrochemical Facies



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-50. Piper Plot for Culebra Water Samples Categorized by Hydrochemical**
 3 **Facies**

4 brines, as identified by Siegel, Robinson, and Myers (1991), are high-ionic-strength solutions
 5 found in western Nash Draw with high K/Na ratios representing waters contaminated with
 6 effluent from potash refining operations. Similar water is found at shallow depth (<11 m [36 ft])
 7 in the upper Dewey Lake at SNL-1, just south of the Intrepid East tailings pile (see below). The
 8 newly defined facies E waters are very high ionic strength (6.4–8.6 molal) NaCl brines with high
 9 Mg/Ca ratios. The facies E brines are found east of the WIPP site, where Rustler halite is present
 10 above and below the Culebra, and halite cements are present in the Culebra. They represent
 11 primitive brines present since deposition of the Culebra and immediately overlying strata.

12 **HYDRO-8.2 Groundwater Chemistry of Other Units**

13 Five “opportunistic” groundwater samples are listed in Table HYDRO-5. A sample was
 14 collected during the drilling of SNL-1 when the hole was at a depth of 11 m (36 ft) in the upper
 15 Dewey Lake (Powers and Richardson 2004c). The water level in the hole at the time of
 16 sampling was approximately 9.5 m (31 ft) below ground surface (bgs). Another sample was
 17 collected during drilling of SNL-13 when the hole was at a depth of 64 m (210 ft), 5.5 m (18 ft)


1 past the Dewey Lake-Rustler contact in the upper anhydrite of the Forty-niner (Powers and
2 Richardson 2008a). The water level in the hole at the time of sampling was approximately
3 45.9 m (151 ft) bgs. Two samples were collected during drilling of SNL-14 when the hole was
4 at different depths in the Dewey Lake: 63.4 m (208 ft) and 92.7 m (304 ft) bgs (Powers and
5 Richardson 2008b). When the first sample was collected, the water level was at approximately
6 53.8 m (176.6 ft) bgs, and was at approximately 51.2 m (167.9 ft) bgs when the second sample
7 was collected. The fifth sample was collected during drilling of SNL-13 when the hole was at a
8 depth of 146.3 m (480 ft) in the Los Medaños Member of the Rustler (Powers and Richardson
9 2008a). The lower ~4 m (12 ft) of the hole produced 1.6 to 1.9 L/s (25 to 30 gpm) of brine,
10 preventing continuation of the hole using compressed air as the circulation medium. The sample
11 was collected from a container used to hold the brine blown from the hole. Considering how
12 little water was produced to the hole from other zones (e.g., Culebra, Magenta, Dewey Lake), the
13 sample should be largely representative of the Los Medaños brine.

14 Figure HYDRO-51 shows a Piper plot of the relative solute concentrations for the five
15 opportunistic groundwater samples and also for Dewey Lake water from well WQSP-6A (Round
16 17; U.S. Department of Energy 2004c). The Dewey Lake samples from SNL-13, SNL-14, and
17 WQSP-6A fall in approximately the same region as Culebra facies B samples (Figure HYDRO-
18 50), except that the SNL-14 sample collected when the hole was only 63.4 m (208 ft) deep
19 contained more magnesium and bicarbonate than the other samples. These are all low-TDS
20 waters originating from meteoric recharge. The Dewey Lake sample from SNL-1, in contrast, is
21 a high-TDS brine with a K/Na weight ratio of 0.23, similar to the Culebra facies D brines. This
22 brine appeared to be perched in the upper Dewey Lake and probably comes from the Intrepid
23 potash tailings pile, which is only a few hundred meters north of SNL-1 (see Figure HYDRO-6).
24 The Los Medaños sample from SNL-13 is also a high-TDS brine, but it lacks a high K/Na ratio.
25 It appears to be similar to the Culebra facies E brines, which occur where halite is present above,
26 below, and within the Culebra (Figure HYDRO-49). While no halite was noted in the Los
27 Medaños at SNL-13 during drilling (Powers and Richardson 2008a), the hole is adjacent to the
28 margin of halite in the Los Medaños (M1-H1) identified by Powers 2007, Figure HYDRO-49.
29 Halite may be dissolving, or have been dissolved, along this margin.

30 **HYDRO-8.3 Summary**

31 Biannual sampling of wells WQSP-1 through 6 has shown that Culebra water chemistry has
32 remained stable for over 12 years at these wells, as expected. Groundwater sampling over the
33 entire Culebra well network has greatly expanded on the database used by Siegel, Robinson, and
34 Myers (1991) to delineate four Culebra groundwater facies. Five primary facies and two
35 transitional facies are now recognized. The new facies (E) is a high ionic strength (6.4-8.6
36 molal) Na-Mg Cl brine found in new wells east of all the Rustler M-H boundaries where halite is
37 present in the Culebra. It is thought to represent primitive brine present since deposition of the
38 Culebra and immediately overlying strata. The definition of transitional A/C and B/C facies
39 adds detail to the original conclusions of Siegel, Robinson, and Myers (1991).

40 A brine sample collected from the Los Medaños in SNL-13 near the M1-H1 boundary is very
41 similar to the Culebra facies E brine, and may have a similar Permian origin. A sample collected
42 at shallow depth in SNL-1 is a high-TDS brine similar to the Culebra facies D brines that have



1
2

Figure HYDRO-51. Piper Plot of WQSP-6A and Opportunistic Samples

3 been contaminated by potash processing. The SNL-1 brine probably originates from the Intrepid
 4 East tailings pile a few hundred meters to the north. Dewey Lake samples from SNL-13,
 5 SNL-14, and WQSP-6A are low-TDS waters similar to, but fresher than, the Culebra facies B
 6 waters. The Dewey Lake water originates from meteoric recharge of undetermined age.

1 **HYDRO-9.0 Modeling of Culebra Water-Level Rise**

2 Since 1989, a general long-term rise in Culebra and Magenta water levels has been observed in
3 WIPP wells. As the rise in water levels continued through the 1990s and early 2000s, observed
4 heads exceeded the ranges of uncertainty established for the steady-state heads in most of the 32
5 wells used to calibrate the T fields for the CCA, necessitating an investigation into the cause(s)
6 and consequences of the rise. In *AP-110, Analysis Plan for Evaluation of Culebra Water-Level-
7 Rise Scenarios*, Beauheim (2003) postulated three scenarios that could account for the long-term
8 water-level rise. The scenarios were (1) leakage into the Culebra of refining process water
9 discharged onto potash tailings piles or into ponds, probably through subsidence-induced
10 fractures and/or leaky boreholes; (2) leakage into the Culebra of water from units above the
11 Culebra (Magenta and/or Dewey Lake) or below the Culebra (e.g., Salado, Bell Canyon) through
12 poorly plugged and abandoned boreholes; and (3) leakage into the Culebra of water being
13 injected at depth (e.g., into the Bell Canyon Formation) through leaky boreholes. Note that this
14 analysis plan and the strategy it defined to evaluate the three scenarios were developed before the
15 wells and new data showing Culebra water-level responses to rainfall discussed in Section
16 HYDRO-5.0 were available.

17 Three tasks defined in AP-110 have been completed to date:


18 Task 1—Data assembly and screening

19 Task 2—Simulate leakage from tailings pile

20 Task 3—Simulate leakage through poorly plugged and abandoned potash boreholes

21 The Intrepid East tailings pile located 10 to 12 km (6 to 7.5 mi) due north of the WIPP site
22 (Figure HYDRO-6) is the tailings pile most likely to affect water levels north of and on the
23 WIPP site. Disposal of mine tailings and refining-process effluent at that location began in 1965.
24 Records obtained from the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer show how much water has
25 been pumped from local aquifers (Ogallala or Capitan) each year from 1973 through 1999 for
26 use in the potash-refining process at the Intrepid East facility (Figure HYDRO-52). Over that
27 period, an average of 2400 acre-ft ($3.0 \times 10^6 \text{ m}^3$) of water per year was pumped. Geohydrology
28 Associates (1978) estimated that approximately 90% of this water is discharged onto the tailings
29 pile, and that approximately half of the brine discharged seeps into the ground annually, while
30 the remainder evaporates. Therefore, on average, approximately 1100 acre-ft ($1.4 \times 10^6 \text{ m}^3$) of
31 brine may infiltrate each year. Brine from this tailings pile may enter the Rustler through leaky
32 boreholes and/or by first moving laterally into Nash Draw and then downward through
33 subsidence fractures that have opened over potash mine workings.

34 For Task 1 of AP-110 (data assembly and screening), Powers (2004a) examined the P&A
35 records filed with the BLM for 576 potash exploration holes within (or very near to) the Culebra
36 modeling domain, and divided the holes among the categories given in Table HYDRO-7. The
37 spatial distribution of these holes is shown in Figure HYDRO-53. Twenty-six holes within the
38 active portion of the Culebra modeling domain were found to belong to Categories 4 or 5,
39 indicating the potential for communication between the Culebra and other units.




1
2 **Figure HYDRO-52. Annual Water Pumped for Intrepid East Potash Mill Location**

3 **Table HYDRO-7. Cementing Categories for Potash and Other Drillholes in the Modeling**
4 **Domain**

Cementing Category	Characteristics
1	Data indicate drillhole was cemented from total depth to surface
2	Data indicate Culebra interval is completely cemented, with a high degree of certainty
3	Culebra intercepted by drillhole; cement intervals in drillhole; data not clear regarding cementing across Culebra interval
4	Culebra intercepted by drillhole; cement interval in drillhole does not match Culebra interval
5	Apparent open hole
6	Plugging information not available for drillhole
7	Drillhole is too shallow to intercept Culebra; plugging not considered
10	Drillhole is completed to Culebra for monitoring or water well; plugging not considered

5



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-53. Cementing Categorization for Potash Exploration Holes Within and**
 3 **Near the Culebra Modeling Domain. (See Table HYDRO-7 for Key to**
 4 **Categories.)**

1 Powers (2004b) also evaluated cementing and casing records for all plugged and abandoned oil
2 and gas wells within or near the Culebra modeling domain. He found records for 92 plugged and
3 abandoned wells, of which 57 were clearly plugged through the Culebra, 24 were clearly not
4 plugged through the Culebra, 8 lacked information to evaluate plugging through the Culebra, and
5 3 were possibly open to at least part of the Culebra (Figure HYDRO-54).


6 For Task 2 of AP-110 (simulate leakage from tailings pile), Lowry and Beauheim (2004) used
7 MODFLOW (Harbaugh et al. 2000) and PEST (Doherty 2002) to model the amount of water that
8 would have to infiltrate into the Culebra at the Intrepid East tailings pile north of the WIPP site
9 to cause water levels to rise as much as has been observed. The modeling was performed using
10 the 100 calibrated T fields from McKenna and Hart (2003) found in CRA-2004. Each T field
11 was recalibrated using PEST to match the average rates of water-level rise in 13 monitoring
12 wells (AEC-7, D-268, DOE-2, H-4b, H-5b, H-6b, H-7b1, P-14, P-15, WIPP-13, WIPP-25,
13 WIPP-26, and WIPP-30) close to the tailings pile or Nash Draw over the last 10 to 25 years of
14 record. The recalibration was performed using three calibration parameters: specific storage (S_s)
15 in the Nash Draw area, S_s outside the Nash Draw area, and a constant leakage or recharge rate
16 from the Intrepid East tailings pile to the Culebra. The calibration was transient using a
17 simulation time of 27 years, 1977 through 2003, which goes back to the beginning of water-level
18 monitoring for the WIPP. The simulations did not attempt to match transient aspects of the
19 water-level rise in a well, but only the average rise over the period showing a consistent rise.
20 Simple linear regression was used to calculate the average slopes of both the observed and
21 simulated water-level changes.

22 Inverse modeling using PEST only guarantees that an objective function reaches a minimum
23 value. It does not guarantee that the calibrated values will reflect reality, or other observations
24 not included in the calibration process. Thus, the recalibrated T fields were filtered using the
25 following criteria:

- 26 1. If the calibrated value of any parameter reached its allowable maximum or minimum, or if
27 the total recharge was greater than the amount applied to the tailings pile, the T field was not
28 included
- 29 2. If the value for S_s in the Nash Draw area was lower than that elsewhere in the model domain,
30 the T field was not included

31 Filtering the 100 original T fields resulted in 53 left for analysis.

32 The calibrated recharge through the Intrepid East tailings pile to the Culebra ranged from
33 2.17×10^{-4} to 1.47×10^{-2} cubic meters per second (m^3/s) (5.5 to 376 acre-ft/yr), with a mean
34 value of $2.88 \times 10^{-3} m^3/s$ (73.5 acre-ft/yr). Thus, only 0.5 to 34% of the 1100 acre-ft/yr
35 estimated to be infiltrating from the tailings pile, with a mean of 6.7%, would have to reach the
36 Culebra to cause water levels to rise as much as has been observed in the various wells. This
37 may indicate that the majority of the infiltrating water may be reaching only shallower strata,
38 such as the Dewey Lake and/or Magenta.



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-54. Plugged and Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells Within and Near the**
 3 **Culebra Modeling Domain**

1 For Task 3 of AP-110 (simulate leakage through poorly plugged and abandoned potash
2 boreholes), Lowry and Beauheim (2005) used the information compiled by Powers (2004a) on
3 plugged and abandoned potash boreholes to model the effects that leakage into the Culebra
4 through these holes might have on Culebra water levels. Specifically, using each of the 100 T
5 fields developed for CRA-2004, they attempted to calibrate the T fields to the observed rates of
6 water-level rise at 12 wells (those used for Task 2, excluding DOE-2) by adjusting the leakage
7 rates in the 26 holes identified by Powers (2004a) as being in Categories 4 and 5. To simplify
8 the calibration, the 26 potentially leaky holes were divided into 4 groups based on their locations,
9 as shown in Figure HYDRO-55, and the same leakage rate was applied to all holes within a
10 group.

11 Lowry and Beauheim (2005) tried three ways of matching the observed water-level rises. All
12 three methods involved linearizing the observation-well hydrographs over the last 10 to 25 years
13 of record to calculate an average rate of water-level rise. Information about the three options is
14 summarized in Table HYDRO-8. The calibration attempted to adjust the calibration variables to
15 minimize the difference between the linearized observed and simulated water-level change at
16 each of the 12 wells. The values of variables kept fixed during the calibrations are shown in
17 parentheses in Table HYDRO-8.


18 **HYDRO-9.1 Option A**

19 In the first method (Option A), the leakage (injection) rates in the four groups of boreholes were
20 varied in an attempt to match the amount (not rate) of water-level rise that would be produced by
21 injecting water into the Culebra at the leaky borehole locations for 15 years to the amount of rise
22 given by the linearized observed rate over the same period. Of the 100 T fields, 66 completed
23 the calibration process. The calibrated leakage rates for the groups of boreholes are shown in
24 Table HYDRO-8.

25 On average, a total of 4.41×10^{-4} m³/s (11.3 acre-ft/yr or 7 gpm) of leakage was required to
26 match the observed water-level rises, with 66.5% leaking through the Upper group of holes,
27 0.1% from the Mid group, 16.1% from the Nash Draw group, and 17.3% from the Lower group.
28 However, the Option A method tended to produce higher rates of water-level rise at the start of
29 the 15-year simulation and lower rates at the end than the linearized observed rates. On average,
30 the Option A fits tended to be worst at wells P-14, WIPP-25, H-4b, and P-15, and best at wells
31 H-5b and AEC-7.

32 **HYDRO-9.2 Option B**

33 For Option B, rather than attempting to match the amount of water-level rise over 15 years, only
34 the rise over the last 6 years of the 15-year simulation period was compared to the rise produced
35 by the linearized observed rate. In addition, the Mid and Nash Draw groups of boreholes were
36 combined into a single group for this option. T fields were disqualified if the calibration
37 produced a total water-level rise in any well over the 15-year simulation period exceeding 50 m,
38 because that would put the head above that of the potential sources of leakage in the Magenta
39 and Dewey Lake. With this exclusion criterion, 77 of the 100 T fields produced acceptable
40 results. The calibrated leakage rates for Option B for the groups of boreholes are shown in Table
41 HYDRO-10.



1
 2 **Figure HYDRO-55. Modeling Domain Showing Boundary Features, Monitoring Well**
 3 **Locations, Nash Draw Area, WIPP Boundary, and the Grouping of**
 4 **the Leaky Boreholes for Use in the Calibration Process. Well**
 5 **Categories are Defined in Table HYDRO-7.**

Table HYDRO-8. Options Used to Recalibrate T Fields to Leaking Boreholes

Option	A	B	C
Calibration Parameter			
—	Total head rise over length of simulation	Head rise over last six years of simulation	Head rise over last six years of simulation
Calibration Variables			
Leakage in Upper Group	Yes	Yes	Yes
Leakage in Mid Group	Yes	Yes (Mid and ND groups combined)	Yes
Leakage in Nash Draw Group	Yes		Fixed (2.36×10^{-5} m ³ /s per borehole)
Leakage in Lower Group	Yes	Yes	Yes
S _s within Nash Draw	Fixed (1.29×10^{-6} m ⁻¹)	Fixed (1.29×10^{-6} m ⁻¹)	Yes
S _s outside of Nash Draw	Fixed (1.29×10^{-6} m ⁻¹)	Fixed (1.29×10^{-6} m ⁻¹)	Yes

Table HYDRO-9. Option A Total Leakage Rates for Each Group of Leaky Boreholes

Statistic	Leakage by Group (m ³ /s)				
	Upper	Mid	Nash Draw	Lower	Total
Average	2.93×10^{-4}	6.39×10^{-7}	7.09×10^{-5}	7.63×10^{-5}	4.41×10^{-4}
Median	2.31×10^{-4}	3.00×10^{-9}	5.95×10^{-5}	6.47×10^{-5}	3.55×10^{-4}
Maximum	3.17×10^{-3}	4.94×10^{-6}	2.56×10^{-4}	3.10×10^{-4}	3.28×10^{-3}
Minimum	1.33×10^{-5}	6.00×10^{-10}	5.19×10^{-9}	7.60×10^{-6}	8.10×10^{-5}
Std. Dev.	4.01×10^{-4}	1.34×10^{-6}	6.56×10^{-5}	5.64×10^{-5}	4.05×10^{-4}

1

2

Table HYDRO-10. Option B Total Leakage Rates for Each Group of Leaky Boreholes

Statistic	Leakage by Group (m ³ /s)				
	Upper	Mid	Nash Draw	Lower	Total
Average	8.00×10^{-4}	7.24×10^{-8}	3.62×10^{-8}	2.32×10^{-3}	3.12×10^{-3}
Median	8.85×10^{-5}	5.78×10^{-8}	2.89×10^{-8}	1.63×10^{-3}	2.26×10^{-3}
Maximum	1.22×10^{-2}	5.65×10^{-7}	2.82×10^{-7}	1.02×10^{-2}	1.22×10^{-2}
Minimum	7.54×10^{-8}	6.33×10^{-10}	3.17×10^{-10}	2.50×10^{-6}	2.46×10^{-4}
Std. Dev.	1.80×10^{-3}	9.18×10^{-8}	4.59×10^{-8}	2.33×10^{-3}	2.60×10^{-3}

3

1 As expected, more leakage was required under Option B than under Option A. On average, a total
 2 of $3.12 \times 10^{-3} \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ (80 acre-ft/yr or 49 gpm) of leakage was required to match the observed water-
 3 level rises, with 25.6% leaking through the Upper group of holes and 74.4% through the Lower
 4 group. The leakages through the Mid and Nash Draw groups of holes were comparatively
 5 negligible. On average, the Option B fits tended to be worst at wells P-14, WIPP-25, H-4b, and P-
 6 15, the same as for Option A, but best at wells H-7b1 and WIPP-13, different from Option A.

7 **HYDRO-9.3 Option C**

8 For Option C, modeling attempted to match only the rise over the last 6 years of the 15-year
 9 calibration period, as was done for Option B, but the leakage rate for the Nash Draw group of
 10 boreholes was fixed at $7.09 \times 10^{-5} \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ (1.8 acre-ft/yr or 1.12 gpm) (the average rate from Option
 11 A), and S_s was allowed to vary between Nash Draw and the area outside of Nash Draw. T-fields
 12 were disqualified if the water-level rise at any well exceeded 50 m (164 ft), if the calculated S_s
 13 reached either the upper or lower calibration limit (1×10^{-4} and $1 \times 10^{-8} \text{ m}^{-1}$, respectively), or if
 14 the S_s calculated for Nash Draw was lower than that calculated for the region outside of Nash
 15 Draw. As a result, only 65 of the 100 T fields produced results considered acceptable. The
 16 calibrated leakage rates and S_s values for Option C are shown in Table HYDRO-11.


17 Less total leakage was required under Option C than under Option B, but more than under
 18 Option A. On average, a total of $1.28 \times 10^{-3} \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ (33 acre-ft/yr or 20 gpm) of leakage was
 19 required to match the observed water-level rises, with 28.5% leaking through the Upper group of
 20 holes, 1.9% through the Mid group, 5.5% (fixed) through the Nash Draw group, and 64.1%
 21 through the Lower group. The average S_s in Nash Draw was $4.9 \times 10^{-5} \text{ m}^{-1}$, while that outside of
 22 Nash Draw was $6.4 \times 10^{-6} \text{ m}^{-1}$. On average, the Option C fits tended to be worst at wells H-7b1,
 23 WIPP-13, WIPP-25, and P-14, and best at wells AEC-7 and WIPP-26, and generally better than
 24 the fits from either Option A or Option B. Overall, the Option C fits were better than those from
 25 the other options.

26 **Table HYDRO-11. Option C Total Leakage Rates for Each Group of Leaky Boreholes**
 27 **and S_s values. S_s^{ND} is the Specific Storage in Nash Draw, S_s is the**
 28 **Specific Storage Elsewhere.**

Statistic	Leakage by Group (m^3/s)				Specific Storage (m^{-1})	
	Upper	Mid	Lower	Total ^a	S_s^{ND}	S_s
Average	3.64×10^{-4}	2.42×10^{-5}	8.18×10^{-4}	1.28×10^{-3}	4.91×10^{-5}	6.40×10^{-6}
Median	2.30×10^{-4}	9.10×10^{-6}	6.57×10^{-4}	1.18×10^{-3}	4.72×10^{-5}	3.02×10^{-6}
Maximum	1.59×10^{-3}	3.07×10^{-4}	2.98×10^{-3}	3.85×10^{-3}	9.99×10^{-5}	5.55×10^{-5}
Minimum	8.23×10^{-7}	6.65×10^{-8}	7.19×10^{-5}	2.73×10^{-4}	3.28×10^{-6}	1.02×10^{-8}
Std. Dev.	4.07×10^{-4}	4.55×10^{-5}	6.04×10^{-4}	7.08×10^{-4}	2.51×10^{-5}	8.91×10^{-6}

29

1 The calibrated Option C T fields were then used to evaluate the continuing effects of leakage.
 2 Simulations were run for an additional 100-yr period holding the leakage rates constant at their
 3 calibrated values to see how much water levels might continue to rise. For most wells and T
 4 fields, the additional rise is less than 8 m (26 ft). Figure HYDRO-56 shows a histogram of the
 5 results.



6
 7 **Figure HYDRO-56. Histogram of the Maximum Additional Water-Level Rise for the Last**
 8 **100 Years of the Long-Term Option C Simulations. The Vertical**
 9 **Green and Red Lines Represent the Median (1.53 m [5.01 ft]) and**
 10 **Mean (2.02 m [6.62 ft]) Values, Respectively.**

11 **HYDRO-9.4 Conclusions**

12 Comparisons of the leakage rate in each group of boreholes for each option are shown in Table
 13 HYDRO-12. For all three options, the leakage rate for the Upper group of boreholes was the
 14 most consistent, ranging from 2.93×10^{-4} to 8.00×10^{-4} m³/s (7.5 to 20.5 acre-ft/yr or 4.64 to
 15 12.7 gpm). Leakage rates for the other three groups show a variability of two to three orders of
 16 magnitude among the different options. The total leakage rate was about one order of magnitude
 17 higher for Options B and C than for Option A, primarily because the early transient period, in
 18 which most of the head rise occurred, was excluded from the calibration process for Options B
 19 and C. With this early period excluded, more leakage was required to match the late-time head
 20 rise.

21 The contribution to the total leakage from the Upper group of boreholes for Option A was much
 22 higher than for Options B or C (66.5% for Option A versus 25.6% and 28.5 % for Options B and
 23

Table HYDRO-12. Comparison of Mean Calibration Parameters for All Three Options. Percentages Show Percent of Leakage from That Group to the Total Leakage

Parameter	Option		
	A	B	C
Leakage in Upper Group (m ³ /s)	2.93×10^{-4} (66.5%)	8.00×10^{-4} (25.6%)	3.64×10^{-4} (28.5%)
Leakage in Mid Group (m ³ /s)	6.39×10^{-7} (0.1%)	7.24×10^{-8} (0.0%)	2.42×10^{-5} (1.9%)
Leakage in Nash Draw Group (m ³ /s)	7.09×10^{-5} (16.1%)	3.62×10^{-8} (0.0%)	7.09×10^{-5a} (5.5%)
Leakage in Lower Group (m ³ /s)	7.63×10^{-5} (17.3%)	2.32×10^{-3} (74.4%)	8.18×10^{-4} (64.1%)
Total Leakage (m ³ /s)	4.41×10^{-4}	3.12×10^{-3}	1.28×10^{-3}

^a Fixed as the average from Option A

C, respectively). Conversely, the contribution by the Lower group was 17.3%, 74.4%, and 64.1% for Options A, B, and C, respectively. This highlights the difference between the two conceptual models (full-time calibration and late-time calibration) and means that if the water-level rise is in quasi-steady-state, a significant amount of leakage must be entering the Culebra from a source south of the WIPP site.

The amounts of leakage listed in Table HYDRO-12 are not large, and are not unreasonable when compared to the capacities of the potential sources. Taking the Option C results as an example, the average total leakage through the Upper group of boreholes is only 3.64×10^{-4} m³/s (5.8 gpm or 9.3 acre-ft/yr), distributed among 16 boreholes. The 1100 acre-ft/yr of water that may be infiltrating from the Intrepid East tailings pile into the upper groundwater system in the vicinity of the Upper group is over 100 times the amount calculated to be leaking through the Upper group boreholes. The average total leakage through the Mid group of boreholes is only 2.42×10^{-5} m³/s (0.6 acre-ft/yr or 0.38 gpm), distributed among 6 boreholes. This is within the capacity of the Magenta in this area (but see the discussion in the next paragraph). The fixed leakage through the 3 boreholes in the Nash Draw group totaled 7.09×10^{-5} m³/s (1.8 acre-ft/yr or 1.12 gpm). Considering the fractured nature of most of the geologic section in Nash Draw due to subsidence and collapse, the Magenta (or Dewey Lake where saturated) could easily be the source of the leakage through the Nash Draw group of boreholes. The average total leakage through the single borehole in the Lower group is 8.18×10^{-4} m³/s (20.9 acre-ft/yr or 13.0 gpm). A Dewey Lake water table is present in this area (Powers and Richardson 2004a). Beauheim and Ruskauff (1998) report that the Dewey Lake could be pumped at a rate of 7.57×10^{-4} m³/s (19.4 acre-ft/yr or 12 gpm) in well WQSP-6A with only 2 m of drawdown. Hence, the Dewey Lake could plausibly be providing 8.18×10^{-4} m³/s to a leaky borehole.

With respect to the Mid group of boreholes, monitoring points on the nearby NW and NE corners of the WIPP site (wells H-6 and H-5, respectively) show Magenta heads rising in a manner similar to those in the Culebra, the opposite of what would be expected if Magenta water were leaking into the Culebra. The Dewey Lake does not appear to be saturated in any zone with significant permeability in this region, so no driving force seems to be present above the Magenta. Given these observations and the low leakage rates calculated by the model, the boreholes in the Mid group may not, in fact, be leaking. The observed rises in both Culebra and

1 Magenta heads in the vicinity of the Mid group of boreholes may be explained by pressure
2 propagation from the Upper group of boreholes, or by pressure propagation from recharge
3 reaching the Magenta and Culebra in Nash Draw.

4 The modeling results show that a balance must be achieved between leakage in the Upper group
5 of boreholes and in the Lower and (to a much lesser extent) Nash Draw groups of boreholes in
6 order to produce the observed head rise in the 12 monitoring wells. If no water is leaking
7 through the Lower borehole, then heads to the south of the WIPP site are too low and the
8 observed water-level rise cannot be reproduced in the middle part of the modeling domain. As
9 discussed above, the required amount of leakage could plausibly be coming from the Dewey
10 Lake to the Culebra through the Lower group borehole. As a conceptual model alternative to the
11 potentially leaking Lower group borehole, however, the Culebra could instead (or also) be
12 receiving natural recharge southwest of the WIPP site, where it is believed to be unconfined.
13 This hypothesis is consistent with the recent observations of Culebra wells responding to rainfall
14 in Nash Draw discussed in Section HYDRO-5.0.

15 Lowry and Beauheim (2005) expected the leaky-borehole scenario to require less water to match
16 the observed water-level rise than the tailings-pile scenario investigated by Lowry and Beauheim
17 (2004) because it distributes the source, allowing head rises to occur in the south without the
18 water having to come from the north. The tailings-pile scenario, on the other hand, relied only
19 on inflow from the northern portion of the model domain. The mean leakage rate from the
20 tailings-pile recharge scenario from Lowry and Beauheim (2004) is $2.88 \times 10^{-3} \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ (73.6 acre-
21 ft/yr or 45.6 gpm). This value is similar to the total leakage rates from Options B and C for the
22 leaky-borehole scenario. However, the tailings-pile-scenario modeling used the Option A
23 method of trying to match the head rise over the entire simulation period to the linearized
24 hydrographs. Had that modeling used the Option B or Option C method of fitting to only the last
25 six years' data, an order of magnitude more leakage may well have been required. Note that the
26 tailings-pile scenario introduces water into the Culebra at essentially the same location as the
27 Upper group of boreholes in the leaky-borehole scenario. Even using the Option A method of
28 calibration, the tailings-pile scenario required an order of magnitude more leakage at the north
29 end of the model domain than the leaky-borehole scenario.

30 Given the uncertainties and limitations in the model and available data, Lowry and Beauheim
31 (2005) concluded that leakage from units above the Culebra through poorly plugged and
32 abandoned boreholes is a plausible explanation for the long-term rise in water levels observed on
33 and around the WIPP site. The Intrepid East tailings pile may well be the source of the water
34 leaking through a northern group of boreholes, so a combination of the tailings-pile and leaky-
35 borehole scenarios is probably the best explanation for the water-level rises. Natural recharge
36 south of the WIPP where the Culebra is unconfined (or leakage through poorly plugged oil and
37 gas wells) could provide the water ascribed to the southern borehole in the Task 3 calculations.
38 The objective of the water-level rise investigation is considered to have been met by the
39 completion of Tasks 2 and 3. Consequently, modeling the effects of leakage through poorly
40 plugged oil and gas wells and simulation of leakage from injection wells (Task 4 of AP-110) are
41 no longer considered necessary—they would only provide further confirmation that some
42 physically reasonable amount of leakage through unconfirmed, but realistic, pathways is
43 consistent with the observed rising water levels.

1 **HYDRO-10.0 Summary and Conclusions**

2 Hydrological investigations conducted from 2003 through 2007 provided a wealth of new
3 information, some of it confirming long-held assumptions and some offering new insight into the
4 hydrological system around the WIPP site. A Culebra monitoring-network optimization study
5 was completed by McKenna (2004) to identify the locations where new Culebra monitoring
6 wells would be of most value, and to identify wells that could be removed from the network with
7 little loss of information. Eighteen new wells have been completed, guided by the optimization
8 study, geologic motivations, and/or unique opportunities. Seventeen unneeded wells have been
9 plugged and abandoned, and two others have been transferred to the BLM.

10 The WIPP groundwater monitoring program has augmented monthly water-level measurements
11 in wells with continuous (~hourly) fluid-pressure measurements using downhole programmable
12 pressure gauges (TROLL[®]). The most significant new finding arising from the high-frequency
13 measurements has been the observation of Culebra water-level responses to rainfall in Nash
14 Draw. The Culebra has long been suspected of being unconfined in at least portions of Nash
15 Draw because of dissolution of the upper Salado, subsidence and collapse of the overlying
16 Rustler, and karst in Rustler gypsum units (e.g., Beauheim and Holt 1990). Continuous
17 monitoring with TROLL[®] gauges, however, has provided the first direct evidence of Culebra
18 water levels responding to rainfall. Furthermore, the rainfall-induced head changes originating
19 in Nash Draw are now observed to propagate under Livingston Ridge and across the WIPP site
20 over periods of days to months (Hillesheim, Hillesheim, and Toll 2007), explaining some of the
21 changes in Culebra water levels that have occurred from one month to the next. Other water-
22 level changes that appear to occur quite suddenly can now be conclusively related to drilling of
23 nearby oil and gas wells.

24 Extensive hydraulic testing has been performed in the new wells. This testing has involved both
25 single-well tests, which provide information on local transmissivity and heterogeneity, and long-
26 term (19 to 32 days) pumping tests that have created observable responses in wells up to 9.5 km
27 (5.9 mi) away. The transmissivity values inferred from the single-well tests support the
28 correlation between geologic conditions and Culebra transmissivity developed by Holt and
29 Yarbrough (2002) and elucidated by Holt, Beauheim, and Powers (2005). The types of
30 heterogeneities indicated by the diagnostic plots of the pumping-test data are consistent with the
31 known spatial distribution of transmissivity in the Culebra. Mapping of diffusivity values
32 obtained from analysis of observation-well responses to pumping tests shows areas north, west,
33 and south of the WIPP site connected by fractures, and also a wide area that includes a NE-to-
34 SW swath across the WIPP site where hydraulically significant fractures are largely absent
35 (Beauheim 2007). This mapping, combined with the responses observed to the long-term SNL-
36 14 pumping test, has confirmed the presence of a high-T area extending from the SE quadrant of
37 the WIPP site to at least 10 km to the south.

38 Geologic studies between 2003 and 2007 focused on Rustler halite margins and karst. The map
39 of Rustler halite margins delineated by Powers (2002) for CRA-2004 was revised by Powers
40 (2007) to incorporate data from recent drilling around the WIPP site. Lorenz (2006a and 2006b)
41 reviewed all historical data and arguments on karst at WIPP, concluding that most of the
42 geological evidence offered for the presence of karst in the subsurface at the WIPP site “has been
43 used uncritically and out of context, and does not form a mutually supporting, scientifically

1 defensible framework. The remaining evidence is more readily interpreted as primary
2 sedimentary features” (Lorenz 2006b, p. 243). Powers et al. (2006b) provided new details on the
3 gypsum karst present in the Rustler in Nash Draw. Powers (2006a) studied some of the natural
4 brine lakes in Nash Draw, finding some of them to be fed by a shallow gypsum karst system with
5 enough storage to sustain year-round flow, while others were fed by the potash processing
6 effluent discharged by Mosaic Potash Carlsbad into Laguna Uno. Powers (2006a) also mapped
7 closed catchment basins in the southwestern arm of Nash Draw that drain internally to karst
8 features.

9 Extensive groundwater sampling has been performed in the new wells and selected older wells.
10 The last major geochemical evaluation of Culebra groundwater was performed by Siegel,
11 Robinson, and Myers (1991) based on samples from 22 wells. Samples are now available from
12 59 wells, allowing refinement and deepening of the conceptual understanding provided by Siegel
13 et al. (1991). Whereas Siegel, Robinson, and Myers (1991) identified only four hydrochemical
14 facies based primarily on ionic strength and major constituents, two transitional facies and one
15 entirely new facies can now be delineated (Domski and Beauheim 2008). The spatial
16 distribution of these facies is consistent with the locations of the Rustler halite margins, the
17 distribution of transmissivity in the Culebra, and the areas of known or suspected recharge to the
18 Culebra.

19 Combining the Culebra monitoring data with the mapping of catchment basins in southwestern
20 Nash Draw and with groundwater geochemistry data provides insight into Culebra recharge.
21 While some of the water entering gypsum karst in Nash Draw discharges into brine ponds such
22 as Laguna Cinco, some portion of it must come into hydraulic communication with the Culebra,
23 at least locally, because Culebra wells in Nash Draw show water-level responses to major
24 rainfall events (e.g., Figure HYDRO-14). However, these responses do not mean that the
25 precipitation reached the Culebra. Rather, they indicate that the Culebra cannot be completely
26 confined, but must be in hydraulic communication with a water table in a higher unit that does
27 receive direct recharge from precipitation. Some of this water must eventually reach the
28 Culebra, where it is recognized as hydrochemical facies B, but it must first have spent a
29 considerable period in the Rustler gypsum beds to have as high a TDS as it does. As a further
30 indication of the indirect nature of recharge, the water from SNL-16 (located within the small
31 catchment basin shown in yellow in Figure HYDRO-47) does not even fall in the domain of
32 facies B, but is instead facies C water, even though SNL-16 shows a clear pressure response to
33 major rainfall events (Figure HYDRO-14). This shows conclusively that rainfall is not flushing
34 the Culebra rapidly in this area.

35 Lowry and Beauheim (2004 and 2005) concluded from two modeling studies that leakage from
36 units above the Culebra through poorly plugged and abandoned boreholes is a plausible
37 explanation for the long-term rise in water levels observed on and around the WIPP site. The
38 Intrepid East tailings pile may well be the primary source of leaking water north of the WIPP
39 site, while natural recharge where the Culebra is unconfined southwest of the site could provide
40 the leaking water ascribed to a southern borehole in one of the modeling studies. The studies
41 showed that a physically reasonable amount of leakage through unconfirmed but realistic
42 pathways is consistent with the observed rising water levels.

1 **HYDRO-11.0 References**

- 2 Beauheim, R.L. 1986. *Hydraulic-Test Interpretations for Well DOE-2 at the Waste Isolation*
3 *Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site*. SAND86-1364. ERMS 227656. Albuquerque: Sandia National
4 Laboratories.
- 5 Beauheim, R.L. 1989. *Interpretation of H-11b4 Hydraulic Tests and the H-11 Multipad*
6 *Pumping Test of the Culebra Dolomite at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site*.
7 SAND89-0536. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 8 Beauheim, R.L. 1999. Memo to Bryan Howard (Subject: Recompletion of Cabin Baby-1). 20
9 October 1999. ERMS 507982. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Beauheim, R.L. 2003. *Analysis Plan for Evaluation of Culebra Water-Level-Rise Scenarios*.
11 AP-110. ERMS 532799. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Beauheim, R.L. 2004a. *Analysis Plan for Non-Salado Hydraulic-Test Interpretations (Revision*
13 *1)*. AP-070. ERMS 537479. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Beauheim, R.L. 2004b. *Analysis Plan for Evaluation and Recalibration of Culebra*
15 *Transmissivity Fields*. AP-114. ERMS 537208. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 Beauheim, R.L. 2005. Memo to file (Subject: IMC-461, 462, and 463). 24 October 2005.
17 ERMS 541654. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 Beauheim, R.L. 2007. "Diffusivity Mapping of Fracture Interconnections." *Proceedings of the*
19 *2007 U.S. EPA/NGWA Fractured Rock Conference* (pp. 235–49). Westerville, OH: National
20 Ground Water Association.
- 21 Beauheim, R.L., and R.M. Holt. 1990. "Hydrogeology of the WIPP Site." *GSA Field Trip #14*
22 *Guidebook: Geological and Hydrological Studies of Evaporites in the Northern Delaware Basin*
23 *for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), New Mexico* (pp. 131–79). Dallas: Dallas
24 Geological Society.
- 25 Beauheim, R.L., and S.A. McKenna. 2003. *Analysis Plan for Optimization and Minimization of*
26 *the Culebra Monitoring Network for the WIPP*. AP-111. ERMS 533092. Carlsbad, NM:
27 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 28 Beauheim, R.L., and R.M. Roberts. 2004. "Well-Test Analysis Techniques Developed for the
29 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant." *Proceedings: 66th EAGE Conference and Exhibition, Paris,*
30 *France, 7–10 June 2004* (Paper H005). Houten, the Netherlands: European Association of
31 Geoscientists and Engineers.
- 32 Beauheim, R.L., and G.J. Ruskauff. 1998. *Analysis of Hydraulic Tests of the Culebra and*
33 *Magenta Dolomites and Dewey Lake Redbeds Conducted at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site*.
34 SAND98-0049. ERMS 251839. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Beauheim, R.L., B.W. Hassinger, and J.A. Klaiber. 1983. *Basic Data Report for Borehole Cabin*
2 *Baby-1 Deepening and Hydrologic Testing, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project,*
3 *Southeastern New Mexico.* WTSD-TME-020. ERMS 241315. Carlsbad, NM: Westinghouse
4 Electric Corporation.
- 5 Bourdet, D., J.A. Ayoub, and Y.M. Pirard. 1989. "Use of Pressure Derivative in Well-Test
6 Interpretation." *SPE Formation Evaluation*, vol. 4: 293–302.
- 7 Bowman, D.O., and R.M. Roberts. 2008. *Analysis Report for AP-070: Analysis of Hydraulic*
8 *Tests Performed in Wells IMC-461, SNL-6, H-11b2, H-15, and C-2737.* ERMS Package #
9 539221. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Chace, D.A. 2003. *Compliance Monitoring Program: Recompletion and Testing of Wells for*
11 *Evaluation of Monitoring Data from the Magenta Member of the Rustler Formation at the WIPP*
12 *Site, Test Plan TP 00-03 (Rev. 1).* ERMS 525860. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
13 Laboratories.
- 14 Chace, D.A., and R.L. Beauheim. 2006. *Test Plan for Testing of Wells at the WIPP Site, TP 03-*
15 *01, Revision 2.* ERMS 542262. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 Cotsworth, E. 2004a. Letter to R. P. Detwiler (1 Enclosure). 20 May 2004. ERMS 535554.
17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 18 Cotsworth, E. 2004b. Letter to R. Paul Detwiler, Acting Manager, Carlsbad Field Office, U.S.
19 DOE. 2 September 2004. U.S Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and
20 Indoor Air. Washington, DC.
- 21 Doherty, J. 2002. *PEST Model-Independent Parameter Estimation User Manual.* 4th ed.
22 Brisbane: Watermark Numerical Computing.
- 23 Domski, P.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2005. *Analysis Plan for the Evaluation of Culebra Brine*
24 *Compositions.* AP-125. ERMS 540680. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Domski, P.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2008. *Evaluation of Culebra Brine Chemistry.* AP-125.
26 ERMS 549336. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 Geohydrology Associates, Inc. 1978. *Ground-Water Study Related to Proposed Expansion of*
28 *Potash Mining near Carlsbad, New Mexico.* Contractor report to Bureau of Land Management,
29 Denver, CO, Contract No. YA-512-CT7-217. Albuquerque, NM: Geohydrology Associates, Inc.
- 30 Harbaugh, A.W., E. Banta, M.C. Hill, and M. McDonald. 2000. *MODFLOW 2000: The U.S.*
31 *Geological Survey Modular Ground-Water Model—User Guide to Modularization Concepts and*
32 *the Ground-Water Flow Process.* Open-File Report 00-92. Reston, VA: U.S. Geological
33 Survey.
- 34 Hillesheim, M.B. 2007. *Test Plan TP 06-0: Monitoring Water Levels in WIPP Wells, Rev. 1.*
35 ERMS 545770. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Hillesheim, M.B., and R.L. Beauheim. 2007. "Hydrologic Monitoring and Data Assessment."
2 *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline Report (TBR) 2004–2005*. ERMS 548259.
3 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Hillesheim, M.B., R.L. Beauheim, and R.G. Richardson. 2006. "Overview of the WIPP
5 Groundwater Monitoring Programs with Inferences about Karst in the WIPP Vicinity." *Caves
6 and Karst of Southeastern New Mexico* (pp. 277–86). L. Land, V.W. Lueth, W. Raatz, P.
7 Boston, and D.L. Love (eds.). 57th Annual Fall Field Conference Guidebook. Socorro, NM:
8 New Mexico Geological Society.
- 9 Hillesheim, M.B., L.A. Hillesheim, and N.J. Toll. 2007. "Mapping of Pressure-Head Responses
10 of a Fractured Rock Aquifer to Rainfall Events." *Proceedings of the 2007 U.S. EPA/NGWA
11 Fractured Rock Conference* (pp. 522–36). Westerville, OH: National Ground Water
12 Association.
- 13 Holt, R.M. 1997. *Conceptual Model for Transport Processes in the Culebra Dolomite Member,
14 Rustler Formation*. SAND97-0194. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 Holt, R.M., and D.W. Powers. 1988. *Facies Variability and Post-Depositional Alteration
16 Within the Rustler Formation in the Vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Southeastern
17 New Mexico*. DOE/WIPP 88-004. ERMS 242145. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 18 Holt, R.M., and L. Yarbrough. 2002. *Analysis Report: Task 2 of AP-088; Estimating Base
19 Transmissivity Fields* (July 8). ERMS 523889. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 Holt, R.M., R.L. Beauheim, and D.W. Powers. 2005. "Predicting Fractured Zones in the
21 Culebra Dolomite." *Dynamics of Fluids and Transport in Fractured Rock* (pp. 103–16). B.
22 Faybishenko, P.A. Witherspoon, and J. Gale, eds. Geophysical Monograph Series, 162.
23 Washington, DC: American Geophysical Union.
- 24 Huff, G.F., and A. Gregory. 2006. *Aquifer-Test Data for Wells H-1, H-2A, H-2B, H-2C, and
25 H-3 at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Southeastern New Mexico*. Open File Report 2006-1129.
26 Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey.
- 27 Intera Technologies, Inc. 1986. *WIPP Hydrology Program, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,
28 Southeastern New Mexico, Hydrologic Data Report #3*. SAND86-7109. Albuquerque, NM:
29 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Johnson, P.B. 2008. *Hydrologic Data Reports: Post-2003*. ERMS 549162. Carlsbad, NM:
31 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 32 Lambert, S.J., and K.L. Robinson. 1984. *Field Geochemical Studies of Groundwaters in Nash
33 Draw, Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND83-1122. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National
34 Laboratories.
- 35 Lorenz, J.C. 2006a. *Assessment of the Potential for Karst in the Rustler Formation at the WIPP
36 Site*. SAND2005-7303. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Lorenz, J.C. 2006b. "Assessment of the Geological Evidence for Karst in the Rustler Formation
2 at the WIPP Site." *Caves and Karst of Southeastern New Mexico* (pp. 243–51). L. Land, V.W.
3 Lueth, W. Raatz, P. Boston, and D.L. Love, eds. 57th Annual Fall Field Conference Guidebook.
4 Socorro, NM: New Mexico Geological Society.
- 5 Lowry, T.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2004. *Analysis Report: Task 2 of AP-110; Evaluation of*
6 *Water-Level Rise in the Culebra Due to Recharge from Refining Process Water Discharged onto*
7 *Potash Tailings Piles*. ERMS 536239. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 8 Lowry, T.S., and R.L. Beauheim. 2005. *Analysis Report: Task 3 of AP-110; Evaluation of*
9 *Water-Level Rise in the Culebra Due to Leakage Through Poorly Plugged and Abandoned*
10 *Potash Boreholes*. ERMS 540187. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 11 Marcinowski, F. 2002. Letter to I.R. Triay. 15 November 2002. U.S. Environmental Protection
12 Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 13 McKenna, S.A. 2004. *Analysis Report: AP-111; Culebra Water Level Monitoring Network*
14 *Design*. AP-111. ERMS 540477. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 McKenna, S.A., and D.B. Hart. 2003. *Analysis Report: Task 4 of AP-088; Conditioning of*
16 *Base T Fields to Transient Heads*. ERMS 531124. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
17 Laboratories.
- 18 Mercer, J.W. 1983. *Geohydrology of the Proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site, Los*
19 *Medaños Area, Southeastern New Mexico*. Water-Resources Investigations Report 83-4016.
20 Albuquerque: U.S. Geological Survey.
- 21 Mercer, J.W., and B.R. Orr. 1979. *Interim Data Report on the Geohydrology of the Proposed*
22 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site, Southeast New Mexico*. Water-Resources Investigations 79-98.
23 Albuquerque, NM: U.S. Geological Survey.
- 24 Mercer, J.W., and R.P. Snyder. 1990. *Basic Data Report for Drillholes H-14 and H-15 (Waste*
25 *Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)*. SAND89-0202. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Piper, A.M. 1944. "A Graphic Procedure in the Geochemical Interpretation of Water-
27 Analyses." *Transactions, American Geophysical Union*, vol. 25: 914–23.
- 28 Powers, D.W. 2002. *Analysis Report: Task 1 of AP-088; Construction of Geologic Contour*
29 *Maps*. ERMS 522086. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Powers, D.W. 2004a. *Analysis Report: Task 1A of AP-110: Identify Potash Holes Not Sealed*
31 *Through the Culebra with Cement, and Units to Which the Culebra Might Be Connected*. ERMS
32 535377. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 33 Powers, D.W. 2004b. *Analysis Report: Task 1B of AP-110: Identify Plugged and Abandoned*
34 *Oil or Gas Wells Not Sealed Through the Culebra with Cement, and Units to Which the Culebra*
35 *Might Be Connected*. ERMS 538279. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Powers, D.W. 2006a. *Analysis Report: Task 1D of AP-114; Collect Current and Historic*
2 *Information on Water Levels and Specific Gravity in Potash Tailings Ponds within the Culebra*
3 *Modeling Domain* (March 31). ERMS 543124. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Powers, D.W. 2006b. *Analysis Report: Task 1B of AP-114; Identify Possible Area of Recharge*
5 *to the Culebra West and South of WIPP* (April 1). ERMS 543094. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
6 National Laboratories.
- 7 Powers, D.W. 2007. *Analysis Report for Task 1A of AP-114: Refinement of Rustler Halite*
8 *Margins Within the Culebra Modeling Domain* (October 5). ERMS 547559. Carlsbad, NM:
9 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Powers, D.W. 2009a. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-8 (C-3150) (Waste Isolation Pilot*
11 *Plant)* (February). DOE/WIPP 05-3324. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 12 Powers, D.W. 2009b. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-16 (C-3220) (Waste Isolation Pilot*
13 *Plant)* (February). DOE/WIPP 07-3364. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 14 Powers, D.W. 2009c. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-10 (C-3221) (Waste Isolation Pilot*
15 *Plant)* (February). DOE/WIPP 07-3363. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 16 Powers, D.W. [In progress]a. *Basic Data Report for Drillholes SNL-6 and -6A (C-3151) (Waste*
17 *Isolation Pilot Plant)*. (Copy on file with author; to be published as DOE/WIPP 05-3323.
18 Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.)
- 19 Powers, D.W. [In progress]b. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-19 (C-3234) (Waste*
20 *Isolation Pilot Plant)*. (Copy on file with author; to be published as DOE/WIPP 07-3367.
21 Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.)
- 22 Powers, D.W. [In progress]c. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-18 (C-3233) (Waste*
23 *Isolation Pilot Plant)*. (Copy on file with author; to be published as DOE/WIPP 07-3366.
24 Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.)
- 25 Powers, D.W. [In progress]d. *Basic Data Report for Drillholes SNL-17 and -17A (C-3222)*
26 *(Waste Isolation Pilot Plant)*. (Copy on file with author; to be published as DOE/WIPP 07-3365.
27 Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.)
- 28 Powers, D.W., and R.M. Holt. 2000. "The Salt that Wasn't There: Mudflat Facies Equivalents
29 to Halite of the Permian Rustler Formation, Southeastern New Mexico." *Journal of Sedimentary*
30 *Research*, vol. 70: 29–36. ERMS 532369.
- 31 Powers, D.W., and D. Owsley. 2003. "Field Survey of Evaporite Karst along New Mexico
32 Highway 128 Realignment Routes," *Evaporite Karst and Engineering/Environmental Problems*
33 *in the United States* (pp. 233–40). Circular 109. K.S. Johnson and J.T. Neal (eds.). Norman,
34 OK: Oklahoma Geological Survey.
- 35 Powers, D.W., and R.G. Richardson. 2003a. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-2 (C-2948)*
36 *(Waste Isolation Pilot Plant)*. DOE/WIPP 03-3290. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.

- 1 Powers, D.W., and R.G. Richardson. 2003b. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-9 (C-2950)*
2 (*Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*). DOE/WIPP 03-3291. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 3 Powers, D.W., and R.G. Richardson. 2004a. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-12 (C-2954)*
4 (*Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*). DOE/WIPP 03-3295. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 5 Powers, D.W., and R.G. Richardson. 2004b. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-3 (C-2949)*
6 (*Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*). DOE/WIPP 03-3294. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 7 Powers, D.W., and R.G. Richardson. 2004c. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-1 (C-2953)*
8 (*Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*). DOE/WIPP 04-3301. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 9 Powers, D.W., and R.G. Richardson. 2004d. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-5 (C-3002)*
10 (*Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*). DOE/WIPP 04-3305. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 11 Powers, D.W., and R.G. Richardson. 2008a. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-13 (C-3139)*
12 (*Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*). DOE/WIPP 05-3319. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 13 Powers, D.W., and R.G. Richardson. 2008b. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-14 (C-3140)*
14 (*Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*). DOE/WIPP 05-3320. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 15 Powers, D.W., and R.G. Richardson. 2008c. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole SNL-15 (C-3152)*
16 (*Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*). DOE/WIPP 05-3325. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 17 Powers, D.W., R.M. Holt, R.L. Beauheim, and S.A. McKenna. 2003. "Geological Factors
18 Related to the Transmissivity of the Culebra Dolomite Member, Permian Rustler Formation,
19 Delaware Basin, Southeastern New Mexico," *Evaporite Karst and Engineering/Environmental*
20 *Problems in the United States* (pp. 211–218). Circular 109. K.S. Johnson and J.T. Neal, eds.
21 Norman, OK: Oklahoma Geological Survey.
- 22 Powers, D.W., R.M. Holt, R.L. Beauheim, and R.G. Richardson. 2006a. "Advances in
23 Depositional Models of the Permian Rustler Formation, Southeastern New Mexico." *Caves and*
24 *Karst of Southeastern New Mexico* (pp. 267–76). L. Land, V.W. Lueth, W. Raatz, P. Boston,
25 and D.L. Love (eds.) *57th Annual Fall Field Conference Guidebook*. Socorro, NM: New
26 Mexico Geological Society.
- 27 Powers, D.W., R.L. Beauheim, R.M. Holt, and D.L. Hughes. 2006b. "Evaporite Karst Features
28 and Processes at Nash Draw, Eddy County, New Mexico." *Caves and Karst of Southeastern*
29 *New Mexico* (pp. 253–65). L. Land, V.W. Lueth, W. Raatz, P. Boston, and D.L. Love, eds. *57th*
30 *Annual Fall Field Conference Guidebook*. Socorro, NM: New Mexico Geological Society.
- 31 Roberts, R.M. 2006. *Analysis Report for AP-070: Analysis of Culebra Pumping Tests*
32 *Performed Between December 2003 and August 2005*. ERMS 543901. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
33 National Laboratories.
- 34 Roberts, R.M. 2007. *Analysis Report for AP-070: Analysis of Culebra Hydraulic Tests*
35 *Performed Between June 2006 and September 2007*. ERMS 547418. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
36 National Laboratories.

- 1 Rouhani, S. 1985. "Variance Reduction Analysis." *Water Resources Research*, vol. 21, no. 6:
2 837–846.
- 3 Salness, R.A. 2005a. *Basic Data Report for Monitor Well Cabin Baby 1 (CB-1)*
4 *Reconfiguration Activities*. DOE/WIPP 04-3306. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 5 Salness, R.A. 2005b. *Basic Data Report for Monitor Well DOE-2 Reconfiguration Activities*.
6 DOE/WIPP 04-3307. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 7 Salness, R.A. 2005c. *Basic Data Report for Monitor Well AEC-7 (C-2742) Reconfiguration*
8 *Activities*. DOE/WIPP 04-3308. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 9 Salness, R.A. 2006. *Basic Data Report for Well Plugging and Abandonment and*
10 *Reconfiguration Activities for Fiscal Year 2005*. DOE/WIPP 05-3326. Carlsbad, NM: U.S.
11 Department of Energy.
- 12 Salness, R.A. 2007. *Basic Data Report for Well Plugging and Abandonment Activities for*
13 *Fiscal Year 2006*. DOE/WIPP 07-3326. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 14 Sandia National Laboratories. 2003. *Program Plan: WIPP Integrated Groundwater Hydrology*
15 *Program, FY03-09 (Revision 0)*. ERMS 526671. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 Sandia National Laboratories and U.S. Geological Survey. 1982. *Basic Data Report for*
17 *Drillhole WIPP 11 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant—WIPP)*. SAND79-0272. Albuquerque, NM:
18 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Siegel, M.D., K.L. Robinson, and J. Myers. 1991. "Solute Relationships in Groundwaters from
20 the Culebra Dolomite and Related Rocks in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Area, Southeastern
21 New Mexico." *Hydrogeochemical Studies of the Rustler Formation and Related Rocks in the*
22 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Area, Southeastern New Mexico* (Chapter 2). M.D. Siegel, S.J.
23 Lambert, and K.L. Robinson, eds. SAND88-0196. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 24 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004a. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
25 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004 3231.
26 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 27 U.S. Department of Energy. 2004b. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environmental Monitoring*
28 *Plan*. DOE/WIPP 99-2194. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 29 U.S. Department of Energy. 2004c. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2003 Site Environmental*
30 *Report*. DOE/WIPP 04-2225. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 31 U.S. Department of Energy. 2005. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental Report*.
32 DOE/WIPP 05-2225. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 33 U.S. Department of Energy. 2006. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental*
34 *Report for 2005*. DOE/WIPP 06-2225. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy. 2007. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental*
2 *Report for 2006*. DOE/WIPP 07-2225. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy. 2008. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site Environmental*
4 *Report for 2007*. DOE/WIPP 08-2225. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
6 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
7 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
8 5223–45.
- 9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
10 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
11 CFR part 191 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision” (Final Notice). *Federal Register*,
12 vol. 71 (April 10, 2006): 18010–021. Washington, D.C.: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 13 Vine, J.D. 1963. *Surface Geology of the Nash Draw Quadrangle, Eddy County, New Mexico*.
14 Bulletin 1141-B. Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey.
- 15 Westinghouse TRU Solutions LLC. 2002. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2001 Site Environmental*
16 *Report*. DOE/WIPP 02-2225. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix IGP-2009
Individual and Groundwater
Protection Requirements**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix IGP-2009
Individual and Groundwater
Protection Requirements

Table of Contents

IGP-1.0 IntroductionIGP-1

IGP-2.0 Individual Protection Requirements.....IGP-2

 IGP-2.1 Compliance Assessment of Undisturbed PerformanceIGP-3

 IGP-2.2 Dose CalculationIGP-6

 IGP-2.2.1 Transport Pathway.....IGP-7

 IGP-2.2.2 Bounding AnalysisIGP-8

 IGP-2.3 Dose Calculation ResultsIGP-9

 IGP-2.4 Statistical AssessmentIGP-10

 IGP-2.5 Parameter ValuesIGP-11

 IGP-2.6 Summary of Compliance with the Individual Protection StandardIGP-11

IGP-3.0 Groundwater Protection RequirementsIGP-12

 IGP-3.1 Criteria for USDW DeterminationIGP-13

 IGP-3.1.1 Groundwater QuantityIGP-13

 IGP-3.1.2 Groundwater QualityIGP-16

 IGP-3.2 Comparison with USDW Determination CriteriaIGP-16

 IGP-3.3 Comparison with the National Primary Drinking Water Standards.....IGP-20

 IGP-3.3.1 Transport Pathway.....IGP-20

 IGP-3.3.2 Combined ²²⁶Ra and ²²⁸Ra.....IGP-20

 IGP-3.3.3 Gross Alpha Particle Activity Including ²²⁶Ra But Excluding
 Radon and UIGP-22

 IGP-3.3.4 Annual Dose Equivalent to the Total Body or Any Internal
 Organ from the Average Annual Concentration of Beta Particle
 and Photon Radioactivity from Man-Made RadionuclidesIGP-23

IGP-4.0 Compliance SummaryIGP-24

IGP-5.0 ReferencesIGP-25

List of Figures

Figure IGP-1. Conceptual Transport PathwayIGP-7

Figure IGP-2. Locations of Recent Culebra Wells and Shallow Piezometers.....IGP-18

List of Tables

Table IGP-1. Maximum Concentrations of Radionuclides Within the Salado Interbeds
at the Disposal System Boundary for the CCA AnalysisIGP-5

Table IGP-2. Maximum Concentrations of Radionuclides Within the Salado Interbeds
at the Disposal System Boundary for the CRA-2004 AnalysisIGP-5

Table IGP-3. Maximum Concentrations of Radionuclides Within the Salado Interbeds
at the Disposal System Boundary for the CRA-2009 AnalysisIGP-6

Table IGP-4. Calculated Maximum Annual Committed Effective Doses for the CCA
EvaluationIGP-9

Table IGP-5. Persons Per Household and Water Consumption Values Used in the CCA	IGP-14
Table IGP-6. Persons Per Household and Water Consumption Values Used in the CRA-2004	IGP-15
Table IGP-7. Persons Per Household and Water Consumption Values Used in the CRA-2009	IGP-16
Table IGP-8. Data Obtained from Recent Culebra Wells	IGP-19
Table IGP-9. Total Inventory and Mass Loading of ²²⁶ Ra and ²²⁸ Ra Reported in the CRA-2004	IGP-21

Acronyms and Abbreviations

%	percent
An	actinide
CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
Ci	curies
Ci/L	curies per liter
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEPs	features, events, and processes
gpd	gallons per day
gpm	gallons per minute
IMC	International Minerals and Chemical
kg/m ³	kilogram per cubic meter
km	kilometer
LWB	Land Withdrawal Boundary
MB	Marker Bed
mg/L	milligrams per liter
mi	mile
mrem	millirem
PA	performance assessment
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
pCi/L	picocuries per liter
ppm	parts per million
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
TDS	total dissolved solids
TRU	transuranic
UP	undisturbed performance
USDW	underground source of drinking water

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WQSP water quality sampling program

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Am americium
Pu plutonium
Ra radium
Th thorium
U uranium

1 IGP-1.0 Introduction

2 The quantitative release limits set forth in the Containment Requirements provisions of 40 CFR
3 § 191.13 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) are one of three long-term numerical
4 performance requirements contained in 40 CFR Part 191 Subparts B and C. The Waste Isolation
5 Pilot Plant (WIPP) must also comply with two other quantitative performance standards
6 contained in the individual protection requirements (40 CFR § 191.15, U.S. Environmental
7 Protection Agency 1993) and groundwater protection requirements (Part 191 Subpart C). This
8 appendix describes the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) demonstration of compliance for
9 the WIPP with both the individual and groundwater protection requirements.

10 In performing the compliance assessment for the Compliance Certification Application (CCA)
11 (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), the CCA Performance Assessment Verification Test (PAVT)
12 (Dials 1997a), the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department
13 of Energy 2004), and the CRA-2009, the DOE applied a bounding-analysis approach using
14 conservative assumptions that overestimate potential doses and contaminant concentrations. To
15 provide added assurance, the DOE assumed the presence of an underground source of drinking
16 water (USDW) in close proximity to the WIPP Land Withdrawal Boundary (LWB), even though
17 available data indicate that none exists near the boundary. Using this very conservative
18 approach, the maximum potential dose to an individual is 0.032 millirems (mrem) in the CCA
19 PAVT and 0.93 mrem for the CCA evaluation (as revised, consistent with EPA direction). Both
20 values are well below the individual protection standard [40 CFR § 191.15(a)] of 15 mrem as an
21 annual committed effective dose. In addition, the estimated potential maximum combined
22 radium-226 (^{226}Ra) and ^{228}Ra concentration in groundwater is 0.49 picocuries per liter (pCi/L) in
23 the CCA PAVT and 0.14 pCi/L in the CCA Performance Assessment, both well below the
24 acceptable standard of 5 pCi/L required by 40 CFR § 191.24(a)(1) (Dials 1997a).

25 This conservative approach also assumes that all contaminants reaching the accessible
26 environment are directly available to a receptor. The analysis bounds potential impacts of
27 underground interconnections among bodies of surface water, groundwater, and any USDW.

28 In support of its initial recertification effort (the CRA-2004), the DOE reexamined
29 concentrations of radionuclides that could potentially reach the accessible environment under
30 undisturbed conditions. The CRA-2004 evaluation shows that the maximum concentration of
31 radionuclides reaching the boundary is projected to be six orders of magnitude less than the
32 maximum concentration projected in the CCA, as discussed in Section IGP-2.1. Based on this
33 and additional, updated information presented in the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, the DOE
34 concluded that the project continued to comply with the individual and groundwater protection
35 provisions of Part 191 Subparts B and C.

36 In support of the CRA-2009, the DOE has reexamined concentrations of radionuclides that could
37 potentially reach the accessible environment under undisturbed conditions. The CRA-2009
38 analysis shows that the maximum concentration of radionuclides reaching the boundary is
39 projected to be an order of magnitude less than the maximum concentration projected in the
40 CCA. Based on this and additional information updated for the CRA-2009 evaluation, the DOE
41 concludes that the WIPP continues to comply with the individual and groundwater protection
42 provisions of Part 191 Subparts B and C.

1 **IGP-2.0 Individual Protection Requirements**

2 The individual protection requirements are contained in section 191.15 of the long-term disposal
3 regulations. Section 191.15(a) requires

4 Disposal systems for waste and any associated radioactive material shall be designed to provide a
5 reasonable expectation that, for 10,000 years after disposal, undisturbed performance of the
6 disposal system shall not cause the annual committed effective dose, received through all potential
7 pathways from the disposal system to any member of the public in the accessible environment, to
8 exceed 15 mrem (150 microsieverts).

9 Undisturbed performance (UP) is defined in Part 191 Subpart B to mean “the predicted behavior
10 of a disposal system, including consideration of the uncertainties in predicted behavior, if the
11 disposal system is not disrupted by human intrusion or the occurrence of unlikely natural events”
12 (40 CFR § 191.12, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993). The CCA and CRA-2004
13 Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.1 provide a description of UP, the conceptual models associated with
14 UP, and the screening of features, events, and processes (FEPs) that are important to UP.

15 The method used to evaluate compliance with the individual protection requirements is related to
16 that developed for assessing compliance with the containment requirements. If the evaluation of
17 the UP scenario considered for the containment requirements shows contaminants will reach the
18 accessible environment, the resulting dose to exposed individuals must be calculated and
19 compared to the 15-mrem annual committed effective dose specified in section 191.15.

20 Further guidance on the implementation of the individual protection requirements is found in 40
21 CFR Part 194. 40 CFR § 194.51 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) states,

22 Compliance assessments that analyze compliance with § 191.15 of this chapter shall assume that
23 an individual resides at the single geographic point on the surface of the accessible environment
24 where that individual would be expected to receive the highest dose from radionuclide releases
25 from the disposal system.

26 40 CFR § 194.52 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) states,

27 In compliance assessment that analyze compliance with § 191.15 of this chapter, all potential
28 exposure pathways from the disposal system to individuals shall be considered. Compliance
29 assessments with part 191, subpart C and § 191.15 of this chapter shall assume that individuals
30 consume 2 liters per day of drinking water from any underground sources of drinking water in the
31 accessible environment.

32 In addition, 40 CFR § 194.25(a) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) provides criteria
33 related to the assumptions that should be made when undertaking dose calculations:

34 Unless otherwise specified in this part or in the disposal regulations, performance assessments and
35 compliance assessments conducted pursuant to the provisions of this part to demonstrate
36 compliance with § 191.13, § 191.15 and part 191, subpart C shall assume that characteristics of
37 the future remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared, provided that
38 such characteristics are not related to hydrogeologic, geologic or climatic conditions.

1 IGP-2.1 Compliance Assessment of Undisturbed Performance

2 Section 194.52 specifies that compliance assessments shall consider “all potential pathways from
3 the disposal system to individuals.” The DOE has considered the following potential pathways
4 for groundwater flow and radionuclide transport:

- 5 • Existing boreholes, as required by 40 CFR § 194.55(b)(1) (U.S. Environmental Protection
6 Agency 1996)
- 7 • Potential boreholes, including those that may be used for fluid injection, as required by 40
8 CFR § 194.32(c) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) and 40 CFR § 194.54(b)(2)
9 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996)

10 After considering all of these pathways, the DOE found that contaminated brine may migrate
11 away from the waste-disposal panels if pressure within the panels is elevated by gas generated
12 from corrosion or microbial degradation. Two credible pathways by which radionuclides could
13 reach the accessible environment have been identified.

- 14 1. Radionuclide transport may occur laterally, through the anhydrite interbeds toward the
15 subsurface boundary of the accessible environment in the Salado Formation.
- 16 2. Transport may occur through access drifts or anhydrite interbeds (primarily Marker Bed
17 [MB] 139) to the base of the shafts. If the pressure in the panels is greater than the lithostatic
18 pressure of the overlying strata, contaminated brine may migrate up the shafts. As a result,
19 radionuclides may be transported directly to the ground surface or laterally away from the
20 shafts, through permeable strata, such as the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler
21 Formation (hereafter referred to as Culebra), toward the subsurface boundary of the
22 accessible environment.

23 These conceptual release pathways for UP are illustrated in Appendix PA-2009, Figure PA-8.
24 The modeling system described in the CCA; the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4; and
25 Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.3.1 does not preclude potential radionuclide transport along
26 other pathways, such as migration through Salado halite. However, the natural properties of the
27 undisturbed system make radionuclide transport to the accessible environment via these other
28 pathways unlikely.

29 Although both pathways are possible, the PA modeling indicates that under undisturbed
30 conditions, only the first is a potential pathway during the 10,000-year period of interest
31 specified in the regulation (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-7.2).

32 The DOE has used the modeling system applied to the PA to make this determination. Scenario
33 screening for the UP is described in Appendix SCR-2009. As specified by section 194.54(b)(2),
34 Appendix SCR-2009 identifies activities that may occur in the vicinity of the disposal system
35 prior to or soon after disposal, and documents which of these are included in the compliance
36 assessment calculations. The CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2, Table 6-8 identifies FEPs
37 included in the UP modeling; these FEPs remain unchanged for the CRA-2009. The CRA-2004,
38 Appendix PA, Attachment SCR also identifies FEPs that were considered, but are not included,

1 in the modeling evaluation and the reasons for their elimination; this information is also
2 unchanged for the CRA-2009.

3 As specified by 40 CFR § 194.55(a), uncertainty in the performance of the compliance
4 assessment is documented in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.1.2. Probability distributions
5 for uncertain disposal system parameter values used in the compliance assessment were
6 developed and are documented in Fox (2008), which identifies sampled parameters used in the
7 compliance assessment for the CRA-2009.

8 For the CCA compliance assessment, the CRA-2004 compliance assessment, and the CRA-2009
9 compliance assessment, 300 realizations of the modeling system were generated to evaluate UP.
10 These 300 realizations are composed of three sets of 100 realizations, each generated using the
11 Latin hypercube sampling method. In all three of the evaluations, none of the 300 realizations
12 show any radionuclides reaching the top of the Salado through the sealed shafts.

13 In the CCA evaluation, 9 of the 300 realizations show concentrations of radionuclides greater
14 than 0 reaching the accessible environment through the anhydrite interbeds. None of the
15 remaining 291 realizations show radionuclides reaching the accessible environment through the
16 anhydrite interbeds during the 10,000-year period (a realization is considered to have a 0 release
17 if it is less than 1×10^{-18} curies per liter [Ci/L]). The maximum concentrations of radionuclides
18 calculated by the modeling evaluation as reaching the accessible environment in the nine
19 nonzero CCA realizations are shown in Table IGP-1. The full range of estimated values for
20 radionuclide concentrations in the CCA evaluation is from zero to the values shown in Table
21 IGP-1. The maximum concentration values shown in Table IGP-1 occur 10,000 years after the
22 time of decommissioning.

23 The maximum concentrations of radionuclides calculated by the CRA-2004 evaluation to reach
24 the accessible environment are shown in Table IGP-2. In the CRA-2004 evaluation, only 1 of
25 the 300 realizations shows concentrations of radionuclides greater than 0 reaching the accessible
26 environment through the anhydrite interbeds (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Section PA-7.2).
27 The remaining 299 realizations show no radionuclides reaching the accessible environment
28 during the 10,000-year period. The reduction in the number of realizations showing
29 radionuclides reaching the accessible environment is due to changes in the BRAGFLO grid and
30 enhancements to the PA modeling system that increased model accuracy and decreased
31 numerical dispersion.

32 In this single CRA-2004 realization, only one radionuclide has a nonzero concentration reaching
33 the accessible environment. The radionuclide plutonium-239 (^{239}Pu) has a concentration of 2.53
34 $\times 10^{-18}$ Ci/L (Garner 2003). This compares with the maximum concentration of ^{239}Pu calculated
35 for the CCA evaluation of 5.85×10^{-12} Ci/L. The concentration of ^{239}Pu in the CRA-2004
36 evaluation is six orders of magnitude lower than that shown for the CCA evaluation. In the
37 CRA-2004 evaluation, no other radionuclides are calculated in concentrations greater than the
38 10^{-18} cutoff, whereas americium-241 (^{241}Am), uranium-234 (^{234}U), and thorium-230 (^{230}Th) all
39 had concentrations exceeding the cutoff in the CCA. Because the CRA-2004 evaluation shows
40 only one radionuclide contributing to a potential dose, and the concentration is six orders of
41 magnitude lower than that shown for the CCA evaluation, the CCA dose estimates are bounding.
42 No new dose calculations were necessary.

1 **Table IGP-1. Maximum Concentrations of Radionuclides Within the Salado Interbeds at**
 2 **the Disposal System Boundary for the CCA Analysis**

CCA Realization No.	Maximum Concentrations (Ci/L)					
	Vector No. ^a	²⁴¹ Am	²³⁹ Pu	²³⁸ Pu	²³⁴ U	²³⁰ Th
1	Replicate 1 Vector 46	1.36×10^{-17}	4.33×10^{-12}	Negligible ^b	5.82×10^{-13}	2.10×10^{-14}
2	Replicate 2 Vector 16	Negligible	5.13×10^{-14}	Negligible	6.77×10^{-15}	1.89×10^{-17}
3	Replicate 2 Vector 25	Negligible	1.35×10^{-15}	Negligible	1.65×10^{-16}	7.00×10^{-18}
4	Replicate 2 Vector 33	1.32×10^{-17}	7.18×10^{-14}	Negligible	9.76×10^{-15}	9.36×10^{-16}
5	Replicate 2 Vector 81	Negligible	6.23×10^{-18}	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible
6	Replicate 2 Vector 90	Negligible	5.20×10^{-16}	Negligible	7.40×10^{-17}	Negligible
7	Replicate 3 Vector 3	3.50×10^{-18}	3.08×10^{-13}	Negligible	4.32×10^{-14}	1.07×10^{-16}
8	Replicate 3 Vector 60	5.98×10^{-17}	7.41×10^{-14}	Negligible	9.09×10^{-15}	2.30×10^{-15}
9	Replicate 3 Vector 64	5.42×10^{-17}	5.85×10^{-12}	Negligible	7.61×10^{-13}	4.68×10^{-15}
10-300	—	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible

^a Parameter values applied to each vector may be found in the CCA, Appendix IRES, Table IRES-2, Table IRES-3, and Table IRES-4.

^b Values less than 10^{-18} Ci/L are considered negligible relative to the other values and are not reported.

3

4 **Table IGP-2. Maximum Concentrations of Radionuclides Within the Salado Interbeds at**
 5 **the Disposal System Boundary for the CRA-2004 Analysis**

CRA-2004 Realization No.	Vector No. ^a	Maximum Concentrations (Ci/L)				
		²⁴¹ Am	²³⁹ Pu	²³⁸ Pu	²³⁴ U	²³⁰ Th
1	Replicate 1 Vector 82	Negligible ^b	2.53×10^{-18}	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible
2-300	—	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible

^a Parameter values applied to each vector may be found in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment PAR.

^b Values less than 10^{-18} Ci/L are considered negligible relative to the other values and are not reported.

6

7 As with the CRA-2004 evaluation, the CRA-2009 evaluation shows that 1 of the 300 realizations
 8 results in concentrations of radionuclides greater than 0 reaching the accessible environment
 9 through the anhydrite interbeds (Ismail 2008a). All of the remaining 299 realizations show no
 10 radionuclides reaching the accessible environment during the 10,000-year period. The maximum
 11 concentrations of radionuclides calculated by the CRA-2009 evaluation to reach the accessible
 12 environment are shown in Table IGP-3.

1 **Table IGP-3. Maximum Concentrations of Radionuclides Within the Salado Interbeds at**
 2 **the Disposal System Boundary for the CRA-2009 Analysis^{a,b}**

CRA-2009 Realization No.	Vector No. ^c	Maximum Concentrations (Ci/L)				
		²⁴¹ Am	²³⁹ Pu	²³⁸ Pu	²³⁴ U	²³⁰ Th
1	Replicate 1 Vector 53	1.71×10^{-18}	3.83×10^{-13}	Negligible	1.14×10^{-15}	1.83×10^{-16}
2-300	—	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible

^a Ismail and Garner 2008.

^b Values less than 10^{-18} Ci/L are considered negligible relative to the other values and are not reported.

^c Parameter values applied to each vector may be found in Fox 2008.

3
 4 The increase in the maximum concentration of radionuclides reaching the accessible boundary in
 5 the CRA-2009 PA compared with the CRA-2004 PA is due to an error correction in the halite
 6 porosity parameter (Ismail 2007). In undisturbed conditions, pressure strongly influences the
 7 extent to which contaminated brine might migrate from the repository to the accessible
 8 environment. In general, pressure increased in the CRA-2009 PA compared with the CRA-2004
 9 PA (see Nemer and Clayton, Table 6-10 [2008]). The increase was attributed to the correction in
 10 the halite porosity. The upper bound of the halite porosity distribution was increased from 0.03
 11 to 0.05, while the lower bound and the mean remained the same. Halite porosity is positively
 12 correlated with pressure, so the increase in porosity resulted in an increase in pressure (Nemer
 13 and Clayton 2008).

14 As with the CRA-2004, the CCA dose calculations are bounding for the CRA-2009 evaluation.
 15 All of the radionuclide concentrations resulting from the CRA-2009 analysis are at least one
 16 order of magnitude smaller than the concentrations derived from the CCA analysis; no new dose
 17 calculations are necessary.


18 It is important to understand that the magnitude of the computed releases reported in Table IGP-
 19 1 through Table IGP-3 is smaller than the effective numerical precision of the transport
 20 calculations. As explained in Lowry (2005), the values for the single vector showing nonzero
 21 concentrations are believed to be the result of numerical dispersion inherent in the NUTS finite-
 22 difference solution method. The magnitude of the nonzero releases is indicative of numerical
 23 dispersion resulting from the coarse grid spacing between the repository and the LWB, rather
 24 than containment transport.

25 IGP-2.2 Dose Calculation

26 As quoted earlier, section 194.51 states that doses must be estimated for an individual who
 27 resides at the location in the accessible environment where that individual would be expected to
 28 receive the highest exposure to radionuclide releases from the disposal system. All potential
 29 pathways for exposure associated with the UP of the repository must be assessed (section
 30 194.52).

1 **IGP-2.2.1 Transport Pathway**

2 To perform the required dose calculation for the CCA, it was necessary to select possible
 3 pathways for the transport of the contaminants from the anhydrite interbeds to a receptor. The
 4 chosen pathway is an abandoned, deep borehole that intersects the contaminant plume in the
 5 accessible environment. Consistent with assumptions described in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0,
 6 Section 6.4.7.2 and the information provided in the CCA, Appendix DEL, the hole is assumed to
 7 have the permeability of an uncased hole filled with silty sand after the degradation of a borehole
 8 plug in the Rustler Formation. A pressure gradient is assumed to exist because of the pressures
 9 in the anhydrite resulting from gas generation in the repository. The pressures are assumed to be
 10 greater than hydrostatic to force contaminants up the abandoned hole to the Culebra or the
 11 Dewey Lake Formation. The contaminants would then be available to a receptor through a well
 12 used to supply drinking water. This conceptual transport pathway is shown in Figure IGP-1.
 13 This is the only credible pathway that the DOE has been able to identify.



CCA-176-0

14
15

Figure IGP-1. Conceptual Transport Pathway

1 As specified in 40 CFR § 194.54(b), this pathway considers the presence of an existing borehole.
2 As discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.5, the influence of other existing
3 boreholes has been evaluated in the FEPs screening for UP.

4 **IGP-2.2.2 Bounding Analysis**

5 Uncertainty in calculating radionuclide concentrations in the anhydrite interbeds is described in
6 the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.1.2 and updated for the CRA-2009 by Ismail and Garner
7 (2008). Additional uncertainty is involved in the calculation of doses resulting from the
8 specified exposure pathway. Given this uncertainty, the DOE elected for the CCA evaluation to
9 perform a bounding analysis using assumptions that do not represent reality, but that would
10 result in a bounding estimate much greater than any reasonably expected dose to a receptor. If
11 this bounding analysis results in calculated doses to the receptor that are below the regulatory
12 limit, compliance with the standard is demonstrated. If subsequent analyses, such as those
13 performed to support this application, have lower initial concentrations than the bounding CCA
14 analysis, recalculating the doses is unnecessary because the results of the original bounding
15 analysis are below regulatory limits.

16 The bounding analysis used for the CCA assessment was based on the following factors and
17 assumptions:

- 18 1. No specific transport mechanism was postulated. Instead, it was assumed that all
19 contaminants reaching the accessible environment within the anhydrite interbeds during the
20 year of maximum releases (that is, year 10,000) were available to a receptor.
- 21 2. Brine derived from the anhydrite interbeds had total dissolved solids (TDS) concentrations of
22 about 324,000 parts per million (ppm); this represents a concentration that could not be
23 consumed by humans. For the bounding analysis, the calculation includes the dilution of this
24 brine by a factor of 32.4 to a TDS concentration of 10,000 ppm, which is the upper limit for
25 potable water.
- 26 3. The resulting annual committed effective dose was calculated based on a 50-year dose
27 commitment. A 50-year dose commitment was selected because this period is specified in
28 Part 191, Appendix B and because it is the duration for which published external dose-rate
29 conversion factors are readily available in the literature (U.S. Department of Energy 1988).
- 30 4. The individual receptor was assumed to drink two liters of water each day (as specified in
31 section 194.52) for one year (in accordance with the specification of an annual committed
32 effective dose in Part 191, Appendix B).

33 Section 194.51 states that DOE shall assume an individual resides at the single geographic point
34 where that individual would receive the highest dose. With the bounding analysis, the DOE
35 complies with the intent of this criterion, but the specific location of the receptor is not identified
36 because all contaminants reaching the accessible environment within the anhydrite interbeds
37 during the year of maximum releases are assumed to be directly available to the receptor,
38 regardless of the receptor's location. The well from which the receptor drinks is assumed to be

1 located where the contaminants reaching the anhydrite interbeds are delivered directly to the
2 well.

3 The bounding analysis dose calculation was performed using the GENII-A code. The CCA,
4 Appendix GENII describes the modeling method. GENII-A incorporates dose-calculation
5 guidance provided in Part 191, Appendix B.

6 IGP-2.3 Dose Calculation Results

7 The maximum doses calculated from the releases listed in Table IGP-1, after applying the factors
8 and assumptions listed above, are shown in Table IGP-4. These doses are greater than any
9 realistic doses that could be delivered to a receptor. The calculated doses are well below the
10 regulatory standard, which is an annual committed effective dose of 15 mrem.

11 **Table IGP-4. Calculated Maximum Annual Committed Effective Doses for the CCA**
12 **Evaluation**

Realization No.	Vector No. ^a	Maximum Annual Committed Effective Dose (mrem)
1	Replicate 1 Vector 46	3.4×10^{-1}
2	Replicate 2 Vector 16	4.3×10^{-3}
3	Replicate 2 Vector 25	1.1×10^{-4}
4	Replicate 2 Vector 33	5.8×10^{-3}
5	Replicate 2 Vector 81	5.1×10^{-7}
6	Replicate 2 Vector 90	4.3×10^{-5}
7	Replicate 3 Vector 3	2.5×10^{-2}
8	Replicate 3 Vector 60	6.2×10^{-3}
9	Replicate 3 Vector 64	4.7×10^{-1}
10-300	—	Negligible ^b

^a Parameter values applied to each vector may be found in the CCA, Appendix IRES, Table IRES-2, Table IRES-3, and Table IRES-4.

^b Doses derived from Table IGP-1 concentration values of less than 10^{-18} Ci/L are considered negligible and are not reported.

13
14 On February 26, 1997, the DOE submitted supplementary information to the EPA in response to
15 an EPA request for additional information (Dials 1997b, Enclosure 2h). The supplementary
16 information describes how the DOE extended its initial bounding analysis to account for
17 exposure pathways other than direct ingestion of contaminated water by humans. Specifically,
18 the analysis was expanded to include consumption of contaminated water by cattle (leading to

1 the receptor's consumption of contaminated milk and beef), consumption of crops irrigated with
2 contaminated water, and inhalation of airborne dust from soil contaminated by irrigation. The
3 DOE found that the contribution of these pathways added 0.46 mrem per year to the calculated
4 groundwater dose associated with the realization showing the highest concentration of
5 radionuclides reaching the boundary of the accessible environment under undisturbed conditions
6 of 0.47 mrem per year. Thus, the maximum total dose calculated from all pathways was 0.93
7 mrem per year, well below the 15-mrem-per-year standard.

8 Given that the maximum concentration of radionuclides shown to reach the accessible
9 environment for the CRA-2004 analysis is six orders of magnitude less than the maximum value
10 calculated for the CCA evaluation, resulting potential doses to the receptor would also be well
11 below the 15-mrem standard. As such, the CCA dose calculation bounded any possible dose to a
12 receptor for the CRA-2004 evaluation, and new dose calculations were not needed to
13 demonstrate compliance.

14 The CRA-2009 calculations show that radionuclides reach the accessible environment at a
15 maximum concentration one order of magnitude smaller than the maximum concentration shown
16 for the CCA analysis. As such, the CCA results continue to be bounding for the CRA-2009;
17 continued compliance with the individual protection standard is demonstrated.

18 **IGP-2.4 Statistical Assessment**

19 40 CFR § 194.55(d) specifies that the "number of estimates generated pursuant to paragraph (c)
20 of this section shall be large enough such that the maximum estimates of doses and
21 concentrations generated exceed the 99th percentile of the population of estimates with at least a
22 0.95 probability." The probability that an individual estimate is below the 99th percentile is, by
23 definition, 0.99. This means that only 1 in 100 estimates would have a value exceeding the 99th
24 percentile, or conversely, 99 times out of 100 the estimate would have a value below the 99th
25 percentile. It follows that for 2 independent estimates, the probability of both estimates having a
26 value below the 99th percentile is equal to the product $(0.99)(0.99)$, or $(0.99)^2$, and that for n
27 estimates, the probability that all estimates have a value below the 99th percentile is equal to
28 $(0.99)^n$. To ensure a value exceeds the 99th percentile with a specified probability, the
29 complement $(1 - 0.99^n)$ is used to calculate the number of estimates required.

30 The probability specified by section 194.55(d) is 0.95, or 95% confidence, that the maximum
31 estimates of doses and concentrations generated exceed the 99th percentile of the population of
32 estimates. Therefore, the following equation can be solved for n , and the number of estimates
33 required is

$$34 \quad 1 - 0.99^n = 0.95 \text{ or } (n)\log(0.99) = \log(0.05) \quad (\text{IGP.1})$$

35 which implies $n > 298$.

36 The solution requires n to be greater than 298 and was used to determine that 300 realizations of
37 the modeling system is a sufficient number to meet the confidence level specified in section
38 194.55(d).

1 The 300 realizations of the modeling system (as described in Section IGP-2.1) report
2 concentrations of radionuclides reaching the accessible environment within the Salado anhydrite
3 interbeds and not doses to a receptor, as specified by section 194.55(d). Nevertheless, the
4 maximum possible resulting annual dose to an individual for the CCA analysis is 0.93 mrem, the
5 sum of 0.47 mrem (as reported in Table IGP-4) plus the additional value of 0.46 mrem
6 determined to be contributed through additional dose pathways. All other calculated doses
7 resulting from the 300 realizations of the modeling system for the CCA, CRA-2004, and CRA-
8 2009 evaluations are below this value.

9 40 CFR § 194.55(f) specifies that the DOE shall

10 document that there is at least a 95 % level of statistical confidence that the mean and the median
11 of the range of estimated radiation doses and the range of estimated radionuclide concentrations
12 meet the requirements of § 191.15 and part 191, subpart C of this chapter, respectively.

13 The DOE has developed a bounding analysis that exceeds the mean and median doses, providing
14 greater than 95% confidence that all potential doses will be below the 0.93 mrem value.

15 **IGP-2.5 Parameter Values**

16 Parameter values applied to the CCA modeling assessment for UP are described in the CCA,
17 Appendix PAR and Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1.5. Parameters used in the PA and compliance
18 assessment modeling program for the CRA-2004 are described in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA,
19 Attachment PAR. As provided by 40 CFR § 194.55(b), the CRA-2004, Appendix PA,
20 Attachment PAR also identifies the probability distributions for these parameters, their units, the
21 models and codes in which the parameters are used, the functional form of the probability
22 distributions used for the sampled parameters, and associated input data. This same information
23 is provided in support of the CRA-2009 in Fox (2008).

24 **IGP-2.6 Summary of Compliance with the Individual Protection Standard**

25 In performing the compliance assessment, the DOE applied a bounding-analysis approach using
26 conservative assumptions that overestimate potential doses and contaminant concentrations.
27 This conservative approach assumes that all contaminants reaching the accessible environment
28 are directly available to a receptor. Using this very conservative approach, the calculated
29 maximum potential dose to an individual from the CCA evaluation would be about one-sixteenth
30 of the individual protection standard. Given that modeled maximum radionuclide concentrations
31 in the accessible environment for the CRA-2004 and the CRA-2009 evaluations are well below
32 those of the CCA evaluation, the CCA results are bounding and continued compliance with the
33 individual protection standard is demonstrated.

1 **IGP-3.0 Groundwater Protection Requirements**

2 The groundwater protection requirements are contained in Part 191 Subpart C. In particular, 40
3 CFR § 191.24(a)(1) requires the following:

4 *General.* Disposal systems for waste and any associated radioactive material shall be designed to
5 provide a reasonable expectation that 10,000 years of undisturbed performance after disposal shall
6 not cause the levels of radioactivity in any underground source of drinking water, in the accessible
7 environment, to exceed the limits specified in 40 CFR Part 141 as they exist on January 19, 1994.

8 40 CFR Part 141 specifies the National Primary Drinking Water Standards. The levels of
9 radioactivity (and dose equivalent, in the case of 40 CFR § 141.16(a)) specified as of January 19,
10 1994 were

- 11 1. Combined ^{226}Ra and ^{228}Ra (40 CFR § 141.15(a)): 5 pCi/L
- 12 2. Gross alpha particle activity, including ^{226}Ra but excluding radon and uranium (40 CFR
13 § 141.15(b)): 15 pCi/L
- 14 3. Annual dose equivalent to the total body or any internal organ from the average annual
15 concentration of beta particle and photon radioactivity from man-made radionuclides (section
16 141.16(a)): 4 mrem per year

17 In addition, 40 CFR § 194.53 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) applies to DOE's
18 consideration of USDWs. The criterion specifies

19 In compliance assessments that analyze compliance with part 191, subpart C of this chapter, all
20 underground sources of drinking water in the accessible environment that are expected to be
21 affected by the disposal system over the regulatory time frame shall be considered. In determining
22 whether underground sources of drinking water are expected to be affected by the disposal system,
23 underground interconnections among bodies of surface water, groundwater, and underground
24 sources of drinking water shall be considered.

25 To assess compliance with these provisions of the regulations, it is first necessary to identify any
26 USDW that may be located near the WIPP. The DOE's evaluation of whether any USDW is
27 located near the WIPP is provided in the CCA, Appendix USDW and is summarized in the CCA,
28 Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2.2. In developing the CRA-2004, the DOE reevaluated the presence of
29 USDWs near the WIPP and supplemented the information presented in the CCA, Appendix
30 USDW. The supplemental information is provided in the CRA-2004, Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2.2.
31 Based on the CRA-2004 review, the DOE concluded that no deviation from the findings and
32 conclusions of the 1996 evaluation was warranted.

33 For the CRA-2009, the DOE has again reevaluated the presence of USDWs near the WIPP.
34 Supplemental information is provided in Section IGP-3.2. Based on this reevaluation, the DOE
35 again concludes that no deviation from the CCA findings and conclusions is warranted.

1 IGP-3.1 Criteria for USDW Determination

2 In evaluating the presence of any USDW, it is necessary to establish criteria for water quality
3 and quantity data from wells in the vicinity of the WIPP. The criteria must be based on the
4 regulatory definition of a USDW, as provided in 40 CFR § 191.22 (U.S. Environmental
5 Protection Agency 1993). A USDW is defined in section 191.22 to mean an aquifer or its
6 portion that

- 7 (1) Supplies any public water system; or
 - 8 (2) Contains a sufficient quantity of groundwater to supply a public water system; and
 - 9 (i) Currently supplies drinking water for human consumption; or
 - 10 (ii) Contains fewer than 10,000 milligrams of total dissolved solids per liter.
- 11 “Public water system” means a system for the provision to the public of piped water for
12 human consumption, if such system has at least fifteen service connections or regularly serves at
13 least twenty-five individuals. Such term includes:
- 14 (1) Any collection, treatment, storage, and distribution facilities under control of the operator
15 of such system and used primarily in connection with such system; and
 - 16 (2) Any collection or pretreatment storage facilities not under such control which are used
17 primarily in connection with such system.
- 18 “Total dissolved solids” means the total dissolved (filterable) solids in water as determined by
19 use of the method specified in 40 CFR Part 136.

20 Criteria based on these definitions were developed by the DOE and are used to assess the
21 presence of any USDW near the WIPP. These criteria are defined in the sections that follow.

22 IGP-3.1.1 Groundwater Quantity

23 Two subcriteria have been identified by the DOE and applied to the groundwater quantity
24 definition.

- 25 1. An aquifer or its portion must be capable of producing water at an adequate rate.
- 26 2. An aquifer or its portion must be capable of producing water for a sufficient duration.

27 Water-consumption information was evaluated by the DOE to define the first subcriterion (the
28 ability to produce at an adequate rate). The value to be applied is determined by obtaining the
29 following information:

- 30 1. The rate, over a 24-hour period, at which water is consumed by 15 service connections
- 31 2. The rate, over a 24-hour period, at which water is consumed by 25 individuals

32 To define a USDW, the lower of these two values is assigned by the DOE to the first
33 subcriterion. Based on calculations presented in the CCA, Appendix USDW and updated in
34 support of the CRA-2004, a quantity of 5 gallons per minute (gpm) is assigned as the first
35 subcriterion. Details on the derivation of the five-gpm value is provided below.

36 For the CCA evaluation, the rate of consumption by 15 service connections was calculated using
37 the data provided in Table IGP-5. These are 1990 U.S. Bureau of the Census data for the
38 number of persons per household in southeastern New Mexico communities, and water-

1 consumption data for the same communities. The water-consumption data were obtained from
2 the New Mexico State Engineer's Office (Wilson and Lucero 1997).

3 **Table IGP-5. Persons Per Household and Water Consumption Values Used in the CCA**

Community	Persons Per Household, 1990 ^a	Gallons Per Capita Per Day ^b
Artesia	2.69	285
Carlsbad	2.63	307
Hobbs	2.81	267
Lovington	2.96	264
Roswell	2.66	285
Average	2.75	282

4 Sources: a. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990, pp. 15–16); b. Wilson and Lucero (1997).

5 As reported in Wilson and Lucero (1997), the average water usage in these communities was 282
6 gallons per person per day. The 1990 census statistics for these communities show an average of
7 2.75 people per household. One household equals one service connection.

8 Therefore,

- 9 • $2.75 \text{ people} \times 282 \text{ gallons per person, per day} = 775.5 \text{ gallons per service connection, per day}$
- 10 • $775.5 \text{ gallons per day (gpd), per service connection} \times 15 \text{ connections} = 11,633 \text{ gpd}$
- 11 • $11,633 \text{ gpd} / 1,440 \text{ minutes per day} = 8.08 \text{ gpm}$

12 The rate of consumption by 15 service connections, based on the 1990 and 1992 statistics, is
13 calculated to be 8.08 gpm.

14 The rate at which water would be consumed by 25 individuals over a 24-hour period may be
15 calculated using these same data. The average water usage was 282 gallons per person, per day
16 in area communities. The consumption of water by 25 people equals

- 17 • $282 \text{ gallons per person, per day} \times 25 \text{ people} = 7,050 \text{ gpd}$
- 18 • $7,050 \text{ gpd} / 1,440 \text{ minutes per day} = 4.89 \text{ gpm}$

19 Based on these two calculations, the quantity consumed by 25 individuals (4.89 gpm; nominally
20 5 gpm) is smaller than the quantity consumed by 15 service connections (8.08 gpm). Therefore,
21 the 5-gpm value was applied to the CCA evaluations.

22 In updating this calculation for the CRA-2004, more current census data and water consumption
23 data were obtained (Wilson et al. 2003). These more current data are provided in Table IGP-6.

1 The average water usage in these communities is 305 gallons per person per day, and the 2000
 2 census statistics for these communities show an average of 2.64 people per household (Table
 3 IGP-6). One household equals one service connection.

4 **Table IGP-6. Persons Per Household and Water Consumption Values Used in the**
 5 **CRA-2004**

Community	Persons Per Household, 2001 ^a	Gallons Per Capita Per Day, 2000 ^b
Artesia	2.61	390
Carlsbad	2.51	277
Hobbs	2.72	284
Lovington	2.80	289
Roswell	2.58	283
Average	2.64	305

Sources: a. U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001); b. Wilson et al. (2003).

6

7 Therefore,

- 8 • 2.64 people × 305 gallons per person, per day = 805.2 gallons per service connection, per day
- 9 • 805.2 gpd, per service connection × 15 connections = 12,078 gpd
- 10 • 12,078 gpd/1,440 minutes per day = 8.39 gpm

11 Using updated data, the rate of consumption by 15 service connections is calculated to be
 12 8.39 gpm.

13 The rate at which water would be consumed by 25 individuals over a 24-hour period may be
 14 calculated using these same data. The current average water usage is 305 gallons per person, per
 15 day in area communities. The consumption of water by 25 people equals

- 16 • 305 gallons per person, per day × 25 people = 7,625 gpd
- 17 • 7,625 gpd/1,440 minutes per day = 5.30 gpm

18 Based on these two calculations, the quantity consumed by 25 individuals (5.30 gpm; nominally
 19 5 gpm) is smaller than the quantity consumed by 15 service connections (8.39 gpm). To
 20 conservatively determine the quantity derived from a well that meets the quantity subcriterion,
 21 the 5-gpm value is applied. No change in this subcriterion is warranted as a result of applying
 22 current census and water consumption data to the calculation.

23 In updating this information for the CRA-2009, more recent water consumption data were
 24 obtained from the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer (Longworth et al. 2008). More
 25 recent persons-per-household data were not available. The water consumption data show that the
 26 average per capita consumption decreased to 273 gpd (Table IGP-7). When the calculation
 27 above is repeated with the updated average consumption value, the rate of consumption for 15

1 service connections is 7.51 gpm. For 25 people, the value is 4.74 gpm. Based on this rate, it is
 2 concluded that applying the 5-gpm subcriterion is still valid for a bounding analysis. No change
 3 in this subcriterion is warranted as a result of applying more current water-consumption data to
 4 the calculation.

5 **Table IGP-7. Persons Per Household and Water Consumption Values Used in the**
 6 **CRA-2009**

Community	Persons Per Household, 2001 ^a	Gallons Per Capita Per Day, 2005 ^b
Artesia	2.61	344
Carlsbad	2.51	271
Hobbs	2.72	257
Lovington	2.80	235
Roswell	2.58	256
Average	2.64	273

Sources: a. U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001); b. Longworth et al. (2008).

7
 8 The definition of the second quantity subcriterion (the acceptable production duration of a well)
 9 is more subjective. Because the creation of a public water supply system involves considerable
 10 capital expense, it is reasonable to assume that such a water system would not be constructed
 11 unless the water source would continue to be available for some time, at least long enough to
 12 recover the capital expense. The Rural Utility Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
 13 provides loans to fund new rural water supply systems. The loan periods are generally 40 years
 14 in duration. Based on this, a duration of 40 years is applied by the DOE to the second quantity
 15 subcriterion.

16 **IGP-3.1.2 Groundwater Quality**

17 A criterion of 10,000 milligrams per liter (mg/L) of TDS is specified in section 191.22. Any
 18 aquifer or its water-producing portion with TDS concentrations below this level is determined to
 19 produce water that meets the quality criterion for a USDW. Any aquifer or its water-producing
 20 portion with TDS concentrations at or above this level is determined to produce water that does
 21 not meet the quality criterion and the regulatory definition of a USDW.

22 **IGP-3.2 Comparison with USDW Determination Criteria**

23 For the CCA evaluation, current conditions and available hydrogeologic data were reviewed by
 24 the DOE to assess the presence of USDWs near the WIPP. This assessment compares current
 25 conditions and available data to the groundwater quantity and quality criteria described above.
 26 The results of this comparison are summarized below and provided in detail in the CCA,
 27 Appendix USDW.

28 Five geologic units within the vicinity of the WIPP could potentially meet the definition of a
 29 USDW under Part 191, Subpart C:

- 1 1. The Capitan Aquifer of the Guadalupian reef complex
- 2 2. The Culebra
- 3 3. The Magenta
- 4 4. The Dewey Lake
- 5 5. The Santa Rosa


6 Investigations conducted in the vicinity of the WIPP to characterize the hydrology of these
7 formations are described in the CCA, Appendix USDW. Important sources of relevant
8 information are identified and findings or conclusions related to the presence of USDWs are
9 provided. Based on this work and the updates performed to support the CRA-2004 and the
10 CRA-2009, the DOE has concluded that USDWs are present in the Culebra, and, because of
11 inconclusive groundwater production data, possible USDWs are present in the Dewey Lake and
12 the Santa Rosa. USDWs in the Culebra are located at WIPP water quality sampling program
13 (WQSP) wells H-07b1, H-08b, and H-09b about 4.8, 14.5, and 10.5 kilometers (km) (3, 9, and
14 6.5 miles (mi)) to the south/southwest of the controlled area boundary, respectively. Possible
15 USDWs may occur in the Dewey Lake, about 1.6 km (1 mi) south of the controlled area
16 boundary, and the Santa Rosa, 12.4 to 14.5 km (7.7 to 9 mi) to the east of the controlled area
17 boundary, where private wells (used predominantly for supplying water to livestock) have not
18 generated sufficient available groundwater production data to assess their potential to meet
19 section 191.22 requirements. In the absence of such data, these wells are designated as being
20 located in possible USDWs.

21 In reevaluating the conclusions presented in the CCA, Appendix USDW for the CRA-2004, the
22 DOE reviewed available groundwater quality and quantity data for the wells identified in the
23 appendix to determine if any data collected since 1996 were available. In addition, a review was
24 performed to determine if any wells not reported in the CCA, Appendix USDW were drilled that
25 could provide groundwater quality (i.e., TDS concentrations) and groundwater quantity data.
26 The CRA-2004 reports that one new well, identified as well C-2737, was developed at the WIPP
27 site. This well was drilled during February and March of 2001 to replace well H-1, which was
28 plugged and abandoned. In February of 2001, a water sample from the upper Dewey Lake
29 Formation was obtained from this well. Laboratory analysis of this sample showed a TDS
30 concentration of 2,590 ppm (Powers 2002).

31 The CRA-2004 also reports that additional wells were installed across the WIPP site to
32 investigate the extent of anthropogenic groundwater at the contact of the Santa Rosa and Dewey
33 Lake. Four monitoring wells and 12 piezometer wells were emplaced. The results of multiple
34 rounds of sampling and analyses from these wells are reported in Duke Engineering Services
35 (1997). Samples from several of these wells show TDS concentrations both below and above
36 10,000 ppm, although it was not possible to pump water from any of these wells at rates of 5
37 gpm or more.

38 In addition, State of New Mexico records indicate that several new wells were drilled in the
39 southwestern portion of the study area evaluated in the CCA, Appendix USDW. These records,
40 however, include no TDS or production data.

1 In developing the CRA-2009, available groundwater data were reviewed again to determine if
 2 any data from new or existing wells might influence USDW determinations. Since the submittal
 3 of the CRA-2004, 18 new wells have been completed in the Culebra. The locations of these
 4 wells are shown in Figure IGP-2. TDS concentrations and pumping rates observed from these



5
 6 **Figure IGP-2. Locations of Recent Culebra Wells and Shallow Piezometers**

7 wells are provided in Table IGP-8. The table also shows USDW determinations based on the
 8 determination criteria. These data support the earlier conclusion that a USDW occurs in parts of
 9 the Culebra in the vicinity of the WIPP.

10 In 2007, three shallow (77 feet deep) piezometer wells were drilled on the WIPP site in the
 11 vicinity of the Site and Preliminary Design Validation salt pile to determine if shallow
 12 subsurface water exists in this area (U.S. Department of Energy 2008). Water samples from
 13 PZ-13 and PZ-14 showed TDS concentrations significantly in excess of 10,000 mg/L; PZ-15
 14 showed levels below that concentration. Results from the first two samples are believed to
 15 indicate that this shallow water is associated with the salt pile, whereas the source of PZ-15
 16 perched water is believed to be shallow infiltration from a topographic depression east of the salt
 17 pile. Despite the fact that the PZ-15 well showed a low TDS concentration, none of these wells

1 meet the pumping rate subcriterion; all wells pumped dry within the sampling period. Therefore,
2 none of these wells indicates the presence of a USDW.

3 Recent TDS data are also available through the WIPP WQSP, which is a detection monitoring
4 program operated under the provisions of the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit. One
5 WQSP well, WQSP-6A, shows TDS concentrations below 10,000 mg/L. This well is completed

6 **Table IGP-8. Data Obtained from Recent Culebra Wells**

Well	Date Sample Collected	TDS (mg/L)	Pumping Test Dates	Pumping Rate (gpm)	Meets USDW Criteria? (Y, N)
SNL-1 ^a	5/29/2004	36,000	5/24-5/29/2004	12.00	N
—	3/10/2005	34,000	—	—	N
SNL-2	1/17/2004	11,000	1/19-1/24/2005	12.00	N
—	1/24/2005	9,500	—	—	Y
SNL-3	4/16/2004	47,000	4/13-4/16/2004	10.00	N
SNL-5	7/24/2004	130,000	7/19-7/24/2004	3.50	N
SNL-6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
SNL-8	8/2/2007	140,000	7/31-8/3/2007	0.50	N
SNL-9	11/19/2004	25,000	10/22-11/23/2004	16.00	N
SNL-10	11/3/2006	8,500	10/30-11/3/2006	0.25	N
SNL-12	8/14/2004	4,200	8/9-8/14/2004	20.00	Y
SNL-13	7/17/2006	21,000	NA	NA	N
SNL-14	8/26/2005	83,000	8/4-8/26/2005	30.00	N
—	7/30/2007	86,000	—	—	N
WIPP-15	3/30/2007	280,000	NA	NA	N
WIPP-16	6/9/2006	18,000	6/5-6/9/2006	25.00	N
WIPP-17	9/15/2006	3,200	9/11-9/15/2006	32.00	Y
WIPP-18	8/18/2006	19,000	8/14-8/18/2006	30.00	N
WIPP-19	7/28/2006	8,100	7/24-7/28/2006	30.00	Y
WIPP-11	12/15/2004	50,000	2/1-2/20/2005	35.00	N
—	2/20/2005	49,000	—	—	N
IMC-461 ^b	8/4/2006	9,900	NA	NA	Possible

7 Source: CRA-2009, Appendix HYDRO-2009

8 ^a SNL = Sandia National Laboratories

9 ^b IMC = International Minerals and Chemical

10

11 in the Dewey Lake. All of the other WQSP wells, Wells 1 through 6, are completed in the
12 Culebra. All of the recent data for the Culebra wells show TDS concentrations above 10,000
13 mg/L. All of the recent data from the WQSP wells are consistent with earlier data in the context
14 of USDW determinations. No changes to the earlier USDW determinations are warranted based
15 on the recent data.

16 As with the CRA-2004, it was found that State of New Mexico records indicate that several new
17 wells were drilled in the study area evaluated in the CCA, Appendix USDW. These records,
18 however, include no TDS or production data.

1 Based on this review, no modification of the USDW determinations reported in the CCA,
2 Appendix USDW is warranted. The DOE concludes that in the vicinity of the WIPP, USDWs
3 are present in the Culebra, and potential USDWs are present in the Dewey Lake and the Santa
4 Rosa.

5 During its review of the CCA, the EPA requested that the DOE provide a map or maps showing
6 the location of USDWs. The DOE responded to this request with supplementary information
7 dated February 26, 1997 (Dials 1997b, Enclosure 1j). The supplementary information includes a
8 map showing the boundaries of known USDWs nearest the WIPP in the Culebra and potential
9 USDWs in the Santa Rosa and Dewey Lake. The EPA found the map sufficient for purposes of
10 compliance assessment because it identifies potential USDWs near the WIPP (see Compliance
11 Application Review Document [CARD] 53, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998).

12 **IGP-3.3 Comparison with the National Primary Drinking Water Standards**

13 To provide additional assurance of the safety of the WIPP, the DOE prepared a bounding
14 assessment of the concentrations of contaminants that could occur in a nearby USDW.
15 Bounding doses that could be received by drinking from the USDW are also calculated. As with
16 the individual protection standard, the analysis is bounding; the results illustrate the maximum,
17 yet unrealistic, concentrations of contaminants in a hypothetical USDW and the maximum, yet
18 unrealistic, resulting doses. As with the dose calculations, maximum concentrations were
19 summed to develop concentrations for comparison with the National Primary Drinking Water
20 Standards. The conclusions of this work, provided below, illustrate that the consequences of the
21 undisturbed repository are negligible, even when conservative assumptions are applied to the
22 performance evaluation. Because a hypothetical USDW is assumed to exist at the site boundary
23 in these analyses, the results of the bounding analysis support the position that additional
24 characterization of groundwater near the WIPP to make a more definitive USDW determination
25 is not warranted.

26 **IGP-3.3.1 Transport Pathway**

27 Section IGP-2.2.1 describes the transport pathway assumed for the bounding analysis performed
28 to evaluate compliance with the individual protection standard. This same transport pathway is
29 assessed to evaluate compliance with the groundwater protection standard.

30 This pathway assumes that a hypothetical USDW is located where the maximum possible
31 concentration of radionuclides could be realized in the USDW and the maximum possible dose
32 to an individual who drinks from the USDW could be delivered to the individual. As such, the
33 analysis bounds the section 194.53 criterion specifying that the DOE must consider underground
34 interconnections among bodies of surface water, groundwater, and USDWs.

35 **IGP-3.3.2 Combined ^{226}Ra and ^{228}Ra**

36 The modeling system employed to simulate the performance of the undisturbed repository tracks
37 the transport of the most important radionuclides to releases in the accessible environment (see
38 the CCA, Appendix WCA and the CRA-2004, Appendix TRU WASTE). These radionuclides,
39 listed in Table IGP-1, are ^{241}Am , ^{239}Pu , ^{238}Pu , ^{234}U , and ^{230}Th . They do not include ^{226}Ra or

1 ²²⁸Ra because these radionuclides are not a prevalent component of the projected inventory (Fox
 2 2003a). However, an analysis of ²²⁶Ra and ²²⁸Ra is required to evaluate compliance with the
 3 groundwater protection standard.

4 To perform the bounding analysis for the CRA-2004, the results of a NUTS code tracer exercise
 5 were used to scale the anticipated releases of ²²⁶Ra and ²²⁸Ra. The tracer exercise shows that an
 6 initial 1 kilogram/cubic meter (kg/m³) concentration of radionuclides in the repository results in
 7 a concentration at the accessible environment boundary of 1.025×10^{-7} kg/m³. By applying this
 8 scaling factor to the quantity of ²²⁶Ra and ²²⁸Ra projected to be emplaced in the repository, it was
 9 determined and reported in the CRA-2004 that the maximum concentration of these
 10 radionuclides in the accessible environment is 0.07 pCi/L (Wagner 2003), which is below the
 11 section 141.15(a) standard of 5 pCi/L.

12 This concentration was calculated by transporting the passive tracer in the flow field generated
 13 using the BRAGFLO code for Realization 1 (Replicate 1, Vector 82), shown in Table IGP-2.
 14 The calculation uses the mass and activity loads for ²²⁶Ra and ²²⁸Ra in the radionuclide inventory
 15 at closure and at 10,000 years. These values are provided in Table IGP-9. The ORIGEN 2.2
 16 code was used to calculate the activity loads at 10,000 years; these loads are 51.43 curies (Ci) of
 17 ²²⁶Ra in contact-handled (CH-) and remote-handled- (RH-) transuranic (TRU) waste and 7.95 Ci
 18 of ²²⁸Ra in CH- and RH-TRU waste. The calculated concentration is based on the volume of
 19 brine, 5,577 cubic meters (m³) (169,924 ft³), in the repository at time zero in the BRAGFLO
 20 calculation.

21 **Table IGP-9. Total Inventory and Mass Loading of ²²⁶Ra and ²²⁸Ra Reported in the**
 22 **CRA-2004**

Radionuclide	Waste Type	Total Inventory at Closure (Ci)	Total Inventory at 10,000 Years (Ci)	Mass Loading (kilograms)
²²⁶ Ra	CH	6.28×10^0	4.98×10^1	6.35×10^{-3}
²²⁶ Ra	RH	4.99×10^{-5}	1.63×10^0	5.05×10^{-8}
²²⁸ Ra	CH	7.63×10^0	7.70×10^0	2.81×10^{-5}
²²⁸ Ra	RH	2.51×10^{-1}	2.54×10^{-1}	9.23×10^{-7}

Source: Fox (2003b)

23

24 The total concentration (CH- and RH-TRU) of either ²²⁶Ra or ²²⁸Ra at 10,000 years at the
 25 accessible environment boundary was calculated using the following steps:

- 26 1. Calculate the total mass load at 10,000 years by multiplying the total mass load at
 27 decommissioning by the ratio of activity loadings at 10,000 years and decommissioning,
 28 respectively.
- 29 2. Calculate the total mass concentration at the accessible environment boundary by dividing by
 30 the value of brine from the BRAGFLO simulation and multiplying by the scaling factor.

1 3. Convert to total concentration of activity at the accessible environment boundary by
2 multiplying by the ratio of activity loading to mass loading at decommissioning.

3 4. Divide the concentration by the dilution factor 32.4 (see Section IGP-2.2.2).

4 The 0.07 pCi/L maximum concentration calculated for the CRA-2004 occurs in the anhydrite
5 interbeds within the Salado and not in a zone that could realistically be a source of drinking
6 water.

7 In the CCA, this value is reported as 2 pCi/L. During the PAVT (U.S. Department of Energy
8 1997), it was determined that the CCA calculation used an inappropriate brine volume value and
9 failed to account for the dilution factor. Accordingly, the PAVT analysis shows that the correct
10 value that should have been reported in the CCA is 0.14 pCi/L (Dials 1997).

11 For the CRA-2009, a new derivation concept is applied to demonstrate that the combined ^{226}Ra
12 and ^{228}Ra concentrations are below the regulatory limit of 5 pCi/L over the 10,000-year
13 performance period (Ismail and Nemer 2008). The new method better represents the actinide
14 (An) concentration at the LWB because it does not use the cumulative tracer scaling factor.
15 Current PA calculations do not explicitly track Ra concentrations in the groundwater, so an
16 alternate method was first used in the CCA to derive conservative estimates of potential Ra
17 concentrations at the LWB. This method was also used in the CRA-2004. The original method
18 overestimated the potential Ra concentration because the estimates used a cumulative scaling
19 factor. An alternate method was chosen that is more consistent with the methods used to
20 calculate An concentrations in PA.

21 As described in Section IGP-2.1, Ismail (2008) identifies only one vector in the CRA-2009 PA
22 that has nonzero releases at the LWB. Replicate 1, Vector 53 showed a tracer concentration in
23 the MB at the LWB of $1.24 \times 10^{-4} \text{ kg/m}^3$ (Ismail 2008). The maximum concentrations of
24 radionuclides at the LWB during the 10,000-year regulatory period are shown in Table IGP-3.

25 As stated above, the Ra concentration was not previously calculated in PA. However, a new
26 analysis was performed using the current PA methods and including Ra. The analysis shows a
27 maximum ^{226}Ra concentration of $1.7 \times 10^{-5} \text{ pCi/L}$ for the CRA-2009 PA and 6.5×10^{-7} for the
28 CRA-2004 PABC. These concentrations of ^{226}Ra are more than five orders of magnitude below
29 the regulatory limit of 5 pCi/L (Ismail 2008b).

30 Based on this updated analysis, continued compliance with the combined ^{226}Ra and ^{228}Ra
31 standard is demonstrated.

32 **IGP-3.3.3 Gross Alpha Particle Activity Including ^{226}Ra But Excluding** 33 **Radon and U**

34 For the CCA evaluation, compliance with the section 141.15(b) standard was assessed by
35 summing the maximum concentration values provided in Table IGP-1 for ^{241}Am , ^{239}Pu , ^{238}Pu ,
36 and ^{230}Th and adding the CCA value for ^{226}Ra obtained to perform the section 141.15(a)
37 assessment. The value obtained by this method is 7.81 pCi/L, which is below the section

1 141.15(b) standard of 15 pCi/L. This concentration occurs in the anhydrite interbeds within the
2 Salado and not in a zone that could realistically be a source of drinking water.

3 For the CRA-2004 evaluation, the only contributing radionuclide is ^{239}Pu , with a concentration
4 of 2.53×10^{-6} pCi/L (Table IGP-2). This value, summed with the 0.07-pCi/L value derived for
5 the section 141.15(a) assessment, is essentially 0.07 pCi/L, well below the 15-pCi/L standard.

6 For the CRA-2009 evaluation, there are four contributing radionuclides with a total
7 concentration of 3.84×10^{-1} pCi/L (Table IGP-3). As with the CRA-2004 analysis, this value,
8 when summed with the 1.7×10^{-5} pCi/L value derived for the section 141.15(a) assessment,
9 remains essentially 3.84×10^{-1} pCi/L, well below the 15-pCi/L standard.

10 As described above, no contribution from ^{226}Ra is expected. The gross alpha particle activity
11 including ^{226}Ra and excluding radon and U is expected to be zero. Continued compliance with
12 the section 141.15(b) standard is demonstrated.

13 **IGP-3.3.4 Annual Dose Equivalent to the Total Body or Any Internal Organ** 14 **from the Average Annual Concentration of Beta Particle and** 15 **Photon Radioactivity from Man-Made Radionuclides**

16 To assess compliance with the section 141.16(a) standard, an annual dose equivalent of 4 mrem
17 per year, the transport of the following radionuclides was evaluated: ^{239}Pu , ^{238}Pu , ^{234}U , and
18 ^{230}Th . The maximum annual committed effective dose calculated for the CCA evaluation from
19 any of these radionuclides is 0.93 mrem, which is the value reported for transport through MB
20 139 and is well below the regulatory standard. The 0.93 mrem value includes alpha particle
21 radioactivity, as well as beta particle and photon radioactivity. Thus, the value is very
22 conservative, as the 4-mrem annual dose equivalent limit is only for beta particle and photon
23 radioactivity.

24 By comparison, the maximum radionuclide concentration in the accessible environment
25 calculated for the CRA-2004 evaluation is six orders of magnitude less than the maximum
26 bounding value calculated for the CCA. Resulting doses for the CRA-2004 case would be
27 correspondingly lower, as well.

28 For the CRA-2009 evaluation, the maximum radionuclide concentration in the accessible
29 environment is one order of magnitude less than the maximum bounding CCA value. As such,
30 resulting doses for the CRA-2009 case would be correspondingly lower, and continued
31 compliance with the section 141.16(a) standard is demonstrated.

1 **IGP-4.0 Compliance Summary**

2 In performing the compliance assessment, the DOE applied a bounding-analysis approach using
3 assumptions that overestimate potential doses and contaminant concentrations. To provide
4 added assurance, the DOE assumed the presence of a USDW in close proximity to the WIPP
5 LWB, even though available data indicate that none currently exists near the boundary. Using
6 this conservative approach, the calculated maximum potential dose to an individual determined
7 for the CCA evaluation would be about one-sixteenth of the individual protection standard.

8 For the CRA-2004 evaluation, this concentration is well below the CCA value. In addition, the
9 maximum concentrations of contamination in the hypothetical USDW would be much less than
10 half of the EPA groundwater protection limits, and the maximum potential dose to a receptor
11 who drinks from the hypothetical USDW would be well below one-quarter of the standard.

12 For the CRA-2009 evaluation, the maximum potential dose remains below the CCA value and
13 continued compliance with the individual protection standard is maintained. The potential
14 concentrations of contaminants in the hypothetical USDW and the maximum potential dose to a
15 receptor who drinks from the hypothetical USDW continue to be bounded by the CCA analysis.

16 This approach also conservatively assumes that all contaminants reaching the accessible
17 environment are directly available to a receptor. The analysis bounds any potential impacts of
18 underground interconnections among bodies of surface water, groundwater, and USDWs.

1 IGP-5.0 References

- 2 Dials, G.E. 1997a. Letter to L. Weinstock (Subject: Summary of the EPA-Mandated
3 Performance Assessment Verification Test Results for the Individual and Groundwater
4 Protection Requirements). 15 September 1997. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Area
5 Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 6 Dials, G.E. 1997b. Letter to R. Trovato (1 Enclosure). 26 February 1997. U.S. Department of
7 Energy, Carlsbad Area Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 8 Duke Engineering Services. 1997. *Exhaust Shaft: Phase 2 Hydraulic Assessment Data Report*
9 *Involving Drilling, Installation, Water-Quality Sampling, and Testing of Piezometers 1–12*.
10 DOE/WIPP 97-2278. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 11 Fox, B. 2003a. *Radionuclides Expected to Dominate Potential Releases in the Compliance*
12 *Recertification Application* (Revision 1, August 26). ERMS 531086. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
13 National Laboratories.
- 14 Fox, B. 2003b. *Calculation of Decayed Radionuclide Inventories for the Compliance*
15 *Recertification Application* (Revision 1, August 22). ERMS 530992. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
16 National Laboratories.
- 17 Fox, B. 2008. *Parameter Summary Report for the CRA-2009* (Revision 0). ERMS 549747.
18 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Garner, J.W. 2003. Memorandum to record (Subject: CRA Marker Bed Concentrations).
20 16 October 2003. ERMS 532402. Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 21 Ismail, A.E. 2007. *Parameter Problem Report PPP-2007-002 for S_HALITE, DRZ_0*. ERMS
22 545713. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 Ismail, A.E. 2008. Memorandum to the Records Center (Subject: Markerbed Concentrations
24 for Undisturbed NUTS Scenarios in AP-132). 13 February 2008. ERMS 548150. Sandia
25 National Laboratories. Carlsbad, NM.
- 26 Ismail, A.E., and J.W. Garner. 2008. *Analysis Package for Salado Transport Calculations,*
27 *Compliance Recertification Application 2009*. ERMS 548845. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
28 Laboratories.
- 29 Ismail, A.E., and M.B. Nemer. 2008. *Radium-226 Concentrations in the CRA-2009 PA*. ERMS
30 549387. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 Longworth, J.W., J.M. Valdez, M.L. Magnuson, E.S. Albury, and J. Keller. 2008. *New Mexico*
32 *Water Use by Category 2005* (June). Technical Report 52. Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Office
33 of the State Engineer.

- 1 Lowry, T.S. 2005. *Analysis Package for Salado Transport Calculations: CRA-2004 PA*
2 *Baseline Calculations* (Revision 0). ERMS 541084. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
3 Laboratories.
- 4 Nemer, M.B., and D.J. Clayton. 2008. *Analysis Package for Salado Flow Modeling, 2009*
5 *Compliance Recertification Application Calculation*. ERMS 548607. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
6 National Laboratories.
- 7 Powers, D.W. 2002. *Basic Data Report for Drillhole C-2737*. DOE/WIPP 01-3210. Carlsbad,
8 NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 9 U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1992. *Population and Housing Unit Counts: New Mexico*. 1990
10 CPH-2-33. 1990 Census of Population and Housing. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
11 Commerce.
- 12 U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2001. American FactFinder. New Mexico by Place. Table GCT-
13 PH1. Population, Housing Units, Area, and Density: 2000. <[http://factfinder.census.gov/
14 servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=04000US35&-_box_head_nbr=GCT-PH1&-ds_name=
15 DEC_2000_SF1_U&-format=ST-7](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=04000US35&-_box_head_nbr=GCT-PH1&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-format=ST-7)>.
- 16 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1988. *Internal Dose-Rate Conversion Factors for*
17 *Calculation of Dose to the Public*. DOE/EH-0071. Washington, DC: Office of Environmental
18 Guidance and Compliance.
- 19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
20 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
21 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 22 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997. *Summary of the EPA Mandated Performance*
23 *Assessment Verification Test Results for Individual and Groundwater Protection Requirements*
24 (September 12). WPO 47258. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
26 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
27 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008. *Basic Data Report for Piezometers PZ-13, PZ-14,*
29 *and PZ-15 and Shallow Subsurface Water* (Revision 1, April). DOE/WIPP 08-3375. Carlsbad,
30 NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
32 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
33 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
34 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 35 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
36 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40

- 1 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
2 5223–45.
- 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998. “CARD No. 53: Consideration of
4 Underground Sources of Drinking Water.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the*
5 *Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance*
6 *with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 53-1
7 through 53-6). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 8 Wagner, S.W. 2003. Memorandum to Cliff Hansen (Subject: Calculation of Combined ²²⁶Ra
9 and ²²⁸Ra Concentrations at Boundary for Chapter 8 Compliance Assessment). 6 November
10 2003. ERMS 532804. Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 11 Wilson, B.C., and A.A. Lucero. 1997. *Water Use by Categories in New Mexico Counties and*
12 *River Basins, and Irrigated Acreage in 1995 (September)*. Technical Report 49. Santa Fe, NM:
13 New Mexico State Engineer Office.
- 14 Wilson, B.C., A.A. Lucero, J.T. Romero, and P.J. Romero. 2003. *Water Use by Categories in*
15 *New Mexico Counties and River Basins, and Irrigated Acreage* (February). Technical Report 51.
16 Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Office of the State Engineer.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix MASS-2009
Performance Assessment
Modeling Assumptions**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

**Appendix MASS-2009
Performance Assessment
Modeling Assumptions**

Table of Contents

MASS-1.0 Introduction..... MASS-1

MASS-2.0 Summary of Changes in Performance Assessment MASS-2

 MASS-2.1 FEPs Assessment MASS-3

 MASS-2.2 Monitoring MASS-3

 MASS-2.3 Experimental Activities MASS-4

 MASS-2.3.1 Magnesium Oxide Investigations MASS-4

 MASS-2.3.2 Actinide Investigations MASS-4

 MASS-2.4 Performance Assessment Models and Systems MASS-4

 MASS-2.5 PABC MASS-5

 MASS-2.5.1 Conceptual Model Changes MASS-5

 MASS-2.5.2 Recalculation of Culebra T Fields MASS-7

 MASS-2.5.3 Waste Inventory Update MASS-8

 MASS-2.6 CRA-2009 Changes MASS-8

 MASS-2.7 Operational Considerations MASS-8

MASS-3.0 General Assumptions in PA Models..... MASS-10

 MASS-3.1 Darcy’s Law Applied to Fluid Flow Calculated by BRAGFLO,
 MODFLOW-2000, and DRSPALL MASS-10

 MASS-3.2 Hydrogen Gas as Surrogate for Waste-Generated Gas Physical
 Properties in BRAGFLO and DRSPALL MASS-33

 MASS-3.3 Salado Brine as Surrogate for Liquid-Phase Physical Properties in
 BRAGFLO MASS-36

MASS-4.0 Model Geometries MASS-37

 MASS-4.1 Disposal System Geometry as Modeled in BRAGFLO MASS-37

 MASS-4.2 Change to Disposal System Geometry since the CCA MASS-37

 MASS-4.2.1 CCA to CRA-2004 Baseline Grid Changes..... MASS-39

 MASS-4.2.2 CRA-2004 Simplified Shaft Seal Model MASS-39

 MASS-4.2.3 CRA-2004 Implementation of Option D-Type Panel Closure . MASS-40

 MASS-4.2.4 Increased Segmentation of Waste Regions in Grid MASS-42

 MASS-4.2.5 CRA-2004 Redefined and Simplified Grid Flaring Method.... MASS-43

 MASS-4.2.6 CRA-2004 Refinement of the X-Spacing Outside the
 Repository MASS-43

 MASS-4.2.7 CRA-2004 Refinement of the Y-Spacing MASS-44

MASS-5.0 BRAGFLO Geometry of the Repository MASS-45

 MASS-5.1 Historical Context of the Repository Model MASS-45

 MASS-5.2 CRA-2009 Repository Model MASS-46

MASS-6.0 Creep Closure MASS-47

MASS-7.0 Repository Fluid Flow MASS-48

 MASS-7.1 Flow Interactions with the Creep Closure Model MASS-50

 MASS-7.2 Flow Interactions with the Gas Generation Model MASS-51

MASS-7.3 CRA-2009 Flow Interactions with the Gas-Generation Model Changes.....	MASS-51
MASS-8.0 Gas Generation	MASS-53
MASS-8.1 Historical Context of Gas Generation Modeling.....	MASS-53
MASS-9.0 Chemical Conditions	MASS-54
MASS-10.0 Dissolved Actinide Source Term.....	MASS-55
MASS-11.0 Colloidal Actinide Source Term.....	MASS-56
MASS-12.0 Shafts and Shaft Seals.....	MASS-57
MASS-13.0 Salado	MASS-58
MASS-13.1 High Threshold Pressure for Halite-Rich Salado Rock Units	MASS-59
MASS-13.2 Historical Context of the Salado Conceptual Model	MASS-60
MASS-13.3 The Fracture Model	MASS-60
MASS-13.4 Flow in the DRZ	MASS-61
MASS-13.5 Actinide Transport in the Salado	MASS-62
MASS-14.0 Geologic Units above the Salado.....	MASS-65
MASS-14.1 Historical Context of the Units above the Salado Model	MASS-66
MASS-14.2 Groundwater-Basin Conceptual Model	MASS-66
MASS-15.0 Flow Through the Culebra.....	MASS-67
MASS-15.1 Historical Context of the Culebra Model.....	MASS-67
MASS-15.2 Dissolved Actinide Transport and Retardation in the Culebra	MASS-67
MASS-15.3 Colloidal Actinide Transport and Retardation in the Culebra	MASS-68
MASS-15.4 Subsidence Caused by Potash Mining in the Culebra	MASS-68
MASS-16.0 Intrusion Borehole	MASS-69
MASS-16.1 Cuttings, Cavings, and Spallings Releases during Drilling.....	MASS-69
MASS-16.1.1 Historical Context of Cuttings, Cavings, and Spallings Models	MASS-70
MASS-16.1.2 Waste Mechanistic Properties.....	MASS-70
MASS-16.1.3 Mechanistic Model for Spall.....	MASS-71
MASS-16.1.4 Calculation of Cuttings, Cavings, and Spall Releases	MASS-72
MASS-16.2 Direct Brine Releases during Drilling	MASS-73
MASS-16.3 Long-Term Properties of the Abandoned Intrusion Borehole.....	MASS-74
MASS-17.0 Climate Change	MASS-75
MASS-18.0 Castile Brine Reservoir.....	MASS-76
MASS-18.1 Historical Context of the Castile Brine Reservoir Model.....	MASS-77
MASS-19.0 Option D Panel Closure	MASS-78

MASS-20.0 Summary of Clay Seam G Modeling Assumptions..... MASS-80

MASS-21.0 Evaluation of Waste Structural Impacts, Emplacement and Homogeneity.. MASS-81

MASS-22.0 References..... MASS-84

List of Figures

Figure MASS-1. Gas Viscosity as a Function of Mole Fraction H₂ at 7 MPa and 15 MPa Pressure MASS-35

Figure MASS-2. Gas Compressibility as a Function of Mole Fraction H₂ MASS-36

Figure MASS-3. Logical Grid Used for the CRA-2004 and 2009 PA BRAGFLO Calculations..... MASS-38

Figure MASS-4. Logical Grid Used for the CCA PA BRAGFLO Calculations MASS-40

Figure MASS-5. Comparison of the Simplified Shaft (CRA-2004 and CRA-2009) and the Detailed Shaft (CCA) Models MASS-41

Figure MASS-6. Logical Grid Representation of the Option D Panel Closures for the CRA MASS-42

Figure MASS-7. Schematic Comparison of the Representation of Panel Closures in the CCA PAVT and CRA-2004..... MASS-43

Figure MASS-8. Repository-Scale Horizontal BRAGFLO Mesh Used for DBR Calculations..... MASS-74

List of Tables

Table MASS-1. CRA-2009 PA Codes MASS-6

Table MASS-2. CRA-2009 PA Hardware..... MASS-6

Table MASS-3. Changes Incorporated in the CRA-2004 PABC MASS-7

Table MASS-4. Changes Incorporated in the CRA-2009 MASS-9

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions MASS-11

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

An	actinide
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CCDF	complementary cumulative distribution function
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
cm	centimeters
CPR	cellulosic, plastic, and rubber
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBR	direct brine release
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DRZ	disturbed rock zone
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEIS	Final Environmental Impact Statement
FEP	feature, event, and process
ft	foot
gal	gallon
in.	inch
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
km	kilometer
LHS	Latin hypercube sample
m	meter
MB	marker bed
MPa	megapascals
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS	operating system
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
PR	productivity ratio
QA	quality assurance
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
RoR	rest of repository

SMC	Salado Mass Concrete
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
T field	transmissivity field
TRU	transuranic
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Elements and Chemical Compounds

CaCO_3	calcite
CH_4	methane
CO_2	carbon dioxide
H_2	hydrogen
H_2O	water
H_2S	hydrogen sulfide
$\text{Mg}(\text{OH})_2$	brucite, magnesium hydroxide
$\text{Mg}_5(\text{CO}_3)_4(\text{OH})_2 \cdot 4\text{H}_2\text{O}$	hydromagnesite
MgO	magnesium oxide

1 **MASS-1.0 Introduction**

2 This appendix presents supplementary information to Appendix PA-2009 regarding the
3 assumptions, simplifications, and approximations used in the models of the second recertification
4 performance assessment (PA) of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) called the 2009
5 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2009) PA. Within this appendix, relevant issues
6 in the formulation or development of the various types of models (for example, conceptual,
7 mathematical, numerical, or computer code) used for the topic under consideration in each
8 section are discussed, and references to relevant historical information are included where
9 appropriate. The CRA-2009 PA is similar to the CRA-2004 PA used in the first recertification
10 of the WIPP. The technical baseline for the first recertification includes the modifications
11 required by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during their review of the
12 CRA-2004 PA (Cotsworth 2005). These required modifications resulted in a PA called the
13 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (PABC), or the CRA-2004 PABC. The
14 CRA-2009 PA is not significantly different than the CRA-2004 PABC. The differences include
15 error corrections, updated parameters, and new software code versions. This appendix
16 references the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996)
17 and the CRA-2004 (U.S. Department of Energy 2004) when the information discussed has not
18 changed from past demonstrations of compliance with the EPA's disposal standards. Some of
19 the information important to PA methodology has been repeated from the CRA-2004, Appendix
20 PA, Attachment MASS for completeness.

21 Section MASS-2.0 contains a summary of changes in PA since the CRA-2004. Section MASS-
22 3.0 includes a discussion of general modeling assumptions applicable to the disposal system as a
23 whole, including a table of assumptions made in PA models, with cross-references. The
24 remainder of this appendix discusses assumptions specific to the conceptual models used in the
25 CRA-2009 PA. Historical development of the WIPP conceptual models that led to the PA used
26 in the CCA is documented in the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS-2.0. Historical
27 development of the modeling assumptions for the CRA-2004 PA is documented in the
28 CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS.

1 **MASS-2.0 Summary of Changes in Performance Assessment**

2 Since the CCA, there have been changes to a number of the conceptual models and processes
3 important in assessing the performance of the WIPP. Changes for the first recertification were
4 discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 9.0, Section 9.3.1.3, and Appendix PA, Attachment MASS.
5 Other recertification-related, EPA-mandated changes were documented in the CRA-2004 PABC
6 (Leigh et al. 2005). The technical baseline used to demonstrate continued compliance with the
7 EPA's disposal standards was documented in these two documents. Since this time, ongoing
8 confirmatory experiments, monitoring results, and operational practices have generated
9 information relevant to the features, events, and processes (FEPs), modeling assumptions, and
10 conceptual models for PA, and provided additional support to the conceptual basis of PA. The
11 results of these investigations are included in a new PA for this recertification. Appendix
12 MASS-2009 has been updated to include the impacts of these ongoing investigations and results.
13 Included in the CRA-2009 PA are changes that have occurred since the CRA-2004 PA and new
14 information that is important to PA. These changes are

- 15 1. Reassessment of FEPs
- 16 2. Compliance monitoring
- 17 3. Experimental activities
- 18 4. Assessment of model and systems changes and updates
- 19 5. Incorporation of CRA-2004 PABC changes, including
 - 20 A. Parameter changes: solubility parameters; solubility uncertainty ranges; probability of
21 microbial cellulosic, plastic, and rubber (CPR) degradation
 - 22 B. Error corrections
 - 23 C. Inventory updates
 - 24 D. Changes to CPR degradation implementation
 - 25 E. New Culebra transmissivity fields (T fields)
- 26 6. Incorporation of CRA-2009 changes, including
 - 27 A. The parameter representing the maximum flow duration for direct brine releases (DBRs)
 - 28 B. The sampling method applied to the humid and inundated CPR degradation rates
 - 29 C. Additional chemistry parameters
 - 30 D. Capillary pressure and relative permeability models
 - 31 E. Updated drilling rate

1 F. Parameter corrections – emplacement material parameters, halite/disturbed rock zone
2 (DRZ) porosity, and fraction of the repository occupied by waste

3 G. Input file corrections

4 7. Operational considerations

5 A summary of each change is presented in this section. References to appropriate sections of
6 this appendix are provided for those changes that impact modeling assumptions. In addition,
7 references are provided to other sections of the CRA-2009 where implementation of the changes
8 is discussed.

9 **MASS-2.1 FEPs Assessment**

10 In the WIPP PA methodology (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.3), FEPs are elements used
11 to develop the conceptual models and modeling assumptions represented in PA. The process
12 used to develop and screen FEPs is outlined in Appendix SCR-2009, Section SCR-2.0. The
13 results of the CRA-2004 FEPs screening are documented in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA,
14 Attachment SCR. For the CRA-2009, a reassessment of the CRA-2004 baseline FEPs was
15 conducted to determine whether changes in WIPP activities and conditions affected the original
16 FEPs descriptions, bases, or screening decisions. This assessment also determined whether
17 additional FEPs should be included in the CRA baseline. The reassessment results are
18 documented in Appendix SCR-2009, Section SCR-3.0 and Section 32 of this application, Scope
19 of Performance Assessment. Changes to the baseline FEPs include updating screening
20 arguments with new information that has become available and separating general FEPs into
21 more descriptive FEPs. No changes to PA implementation or modeling assumptions were made
22 as a result of the FEPs reassessment because no FEPs that were previously screened out of PA
23 calculations have been screened in and no FEPs that were screened in have been screened out.

24 **MASS-2.2 Monitoring**

25 Monitoring activities have continued since the certification of the WIPP. These activities are
26 used to validate assumptions and PA parameters, and to detect substantial and detrimental
27 deviation from expected repository performance. Monitoring, as discussed here, applies to the
28 assurance requirement of 40 CFR § 191.14(b) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) and
29 the monitoring criteria at 40 CFR § 194.42 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996).
30 Appendix MON-2009 details the monitoring program that meets these requirements. The
31 monitoring program was assessed to determine if the results indicate that changes should be
32 made to the monitoring program. The results did not indicate that changes were required
33 (Wagner 2008). The monitoring program did, however, lead to a change in one monitored
34 parameter used in PA: because of increased drilling in the Delaware Basin, the drilling rate
35 parameter value used in the CRA-2009 PA has increased (see Appendix DATA-2009, Section
36 DATA-2.0 for information on this parameter change).

37 In the CRA-2009 PA, the drilling rate has been changed to meet the requirements for 40 CFR
38 § 194.33 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996). The drilling rate for boreholes is

1 discussed in Section 33 of this application. No changes to modeling assumptions are necessary
2 to account for this parameter change.

3 **MASS-2.3 Experimental Activities**

4 The EPA requires the recertification documentation to include an update of “additional analyses
5 and results of laboratory experiments conducted by the Department or its contractors as part of
6 the WIPP program” (40 CFR § 194.15(a)(3); see also 40 CFR § 194.15, U.S. Environmental
7 Protection Agency 1996). The following sections discuss analyses and experiments conducted to
8 support compliance determinations. Only analyses with conclusions relevant to this
9 recertification are discussed here.

10 **MASS-2.3.1 Magnesium Oxide Investigations**

11 The EPA has approved a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) change request to reduce the
12 magnesium oxide (MgO) excess factor from 1.67 to 1.2 times the quantity of MgO required to
13 consume all of the carbon dioxide (CO₂) that would be produced if microbes consumed all the
14 CPR materials in the emplaced waste at the WIPP (Reyes 2008 and Appendix MgO-2009,
15 Section MgO-6.2.4.6). Since PA assumes there is always enough MgO to maintain a favorable
16 chemical environment for actinide (An) solubilities, a reduction in the excess factor does not
17 change the modeling assumptions used to represent MgO in PA.

18 Experiments have been performed to support the implementation of MgO as an engineered
19 barrier. These experiments have characterized MgO and investigated the hydration and
20 carbonization of MgO to confirm its ability to sequester CO₂, buffer brine pH, and subsequently
21 help establish low An solubilities in the repository. These activities are described in detail in
22 Appendix MgO-2009. The results of these MgO investigations have not impacted the modeling
23 assumptions associated with MgO in PA (Appendix MgO-2009 and Appendix PA-2009, Section
24 PA-2.1.4.4).

25 **MASS-2.3.2 Actinide Investigations**

26 The DOE has continued to investigate An speciation and solubilities since the certification of the
27 WIPP. The current An experimental activities are described in Appendix SOTERM-2009,
28 Section SOTERM-3.0. The CRA-2009 PA uses the same An assumptions as the CRA-2004
29 PABC.

30 **MASS-2.4 Performance Assessment Models and Systems**

31 Changes have been made to the systems used to perform PAs. The PA hardware, operating
32 systems (OSs), and parameter database have been updated since the CRA-2004 and CRA-2004
33 PABC. These changes were necessary to replace obsolete hardware and OSs and to increase PA
34 capabilities.

35 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) maintains the computational platforms used to execute the
36 WIPP PA modeling codes. A small number of modeling tasks that feed into compliance
37 calculations are performed on desktop PC workstations running the Microsoft[®] Windows[®] XP

1 OS, as well as PC-based workstations and clusters running the Red Hat[®] Linux[®] OS. The WIPP
2 PA parameter database is hosted on a PC-based server running Windows[®] 2000. However, the
3 vast majority of the WIPP PA modeling codes used directly in compliance calculations are run
4 on the WIPP PA Alpha Cluster composed of Hewlett Packard[®] (formerly Compaq[®])
5 AlphaServer[™] systems. AlphaServers[™] are built around the Alpha processor and run the
6 OpenVMS[™] OS.

7 The computer systems and OSs have been upgraded since the CRA-2004 because of increasing
8 obsolescence of the OS and hardware. The current hardware and software versions used in the
9 CRA-2009 PA calculations are shown in Table MASS-1 and Table MASS-2. Significant
10 changes include those made to the WIPP PA Alpha cluster, where older AlphaServers[™] were
11 replaced with newer machines and the OS for all servers was upgraded. The WIPP PA Alpha
12 cluster now consists of four ES47 AlphaServers[™] and four ES45 AlphaServers[™]. The OS on
13 these systems has been upgraded from OpenVMS[™] 7.3-1 to OpenVMS[™] 8.2. Regression
14 testing of all codes used in compliance calculations has been performed to verify that the codes
15 continue to perform correctly after the hardware and OS changes (Long 2006).

16 The PC-based Linux[®] clusters have also been upgraded since the CRA-2004, but the new
17 configurations have not been used in compliance calculations included in the CRA-2009.

18 All changes to these systems are performed under the quality assurance (QA) program per the
19 Carlsbad Field Office Quality Assurance Program Document, and include testing, validation, and
20 verification to ensure that there is no impact on PA implementation. A synopsis of the changes
21 and references to the QA documentation are found in Long (2006). It should be noted that the
22 codes identified in Table 2-1 of Long (2006) are those that have changed since the CRA-2004
23 PABC. Some code outputs from previous certification PAs continue to be used in this CRA-
24 2009 PA because these codes and their input parameters have not changed; therefore, the codes
25 do not need to be rerun. These outputs are identified in Long (2008) and include the outputs of
26 DRSPALL, MODFLOW, and SECOTP2D.

27 **MASS-2.5 PABC**

28 The EPA requested changes to the CRA-2004 PA during their review of the first recertification
29 (Cotsworth 2005). These changes were incorporated in the CRA-2004 PABC and Leigh et al.
30 (2005), and in the subsequent CRA-2009 PA. The changes were assessed by the EPA and
31 approved as the certified WIPP baseline in their recertification decision (U.S. Environmental
32 Protection Agency 2006). The CRA-2004 PABC changes are described in Table MASS-3.

33 **MASS-2.5.1 Conceptual Model Changes**

34 The CRA-2009 PA uses the same conceptual models used in the CRA-2004 PABC. No changes
35 were made to the conceptual models used in the CRA-2004 PABC. For the CRA-2004 PABC,
36 incorporation of the changes required by the EPA in Cotsworth (2005) led to several changes in
37 the conceptual models used in the CRA-2004 PABC. Specifically, the requirement to assume
38 that (1) microbial gas generation occurs for all vectors, and (2) the sequential consumption of
39 CPR via the nitrate-to-sulfate-to-methanogenesis reaction sequence is constrained to limit the
40

1

Table MASS-1. CRA-2009 PA Codes

Code	Version	Build Date
ALGEBRACDB	2.35	31-JAN-1996
BRAGFLO	6.0	12-FEB-2007
CCDFGF	5.02	13-DEC-2004
CUTTINGS_S	6.02	9-JUN-2005
DRSPALL	1.10	14-JAN-2004
EPAUNI	1.15A	3-JUL-2003
GENMESH	6.08	31-JAN-1996
GROPECDB	2.12	27-JUN-1996
ICSET	2.22	1-FEB-1996
LHS	2.42	18-JAN-2005
MATSET	9.10	29-NOV-2001
MODFLOW-2000	1.6	20-SEP-2002
NUTS	2.05C	24-MAY-2006
PANEL	4.03	25-APR-2005
POSTBRAG	4.00A	28-MAR-2007
POSTSECOTP2D	1.04	5-JUN-1997
POSTLHS	4.07A	25-APR-2005
PREBRAG	8.0	8-MAR-2007
PRECCDFGF	1.01	7-JUL-2005
PRELHS	2.30	27-NOV-2001
PRESECOTP2D	1.22	12-JUN-1997
RELATE	1.43	6-MAR-1996
SECOTP2D	1.41A	9-JUL-2003
STEPWISE	2.21	2-DEC-1996
SUMMARIZE	3.01	21-DEC-2005

2
3

Table MASS-2. CRA-2009 PA Hardware

Node	Hardware Type	CPU
CCR	HP AlphaServer™ ES45	Alpha EV68
TDN	HP AlphaServer™ ES45	Alpha EV68
BTO	HP AlphaServer™ ES45	Alpha EV68
CSN	HP AlphaServer™ ES45	Alpha EV68
GNR	HP AlphaServer™ ES47	Alpha EV7
MC5	HP AlphaServer™ ES47	Alpha EV7
TRS	HP AlphaServer™ ES47	Alpha EV7
TBB	HP AlphaServer™ ES47	Alpha EV7

4

1 consumption reaction to only nitrate and sulfate reduction, changed the chemical conditions and
 2 gas generation conceptual models for the CRA-2004 PABC. These changes are also
 3 incorporated in the CRA-2009 PA and are discussed further in the CRA-2004 PABC summary
 4 report sections listed in Table MASS-3.

5 **Table MASS-3. Changes Incorporated in the CRA-2004 PABC**

Changes Included in the Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation		
EPA-Mandated Change	Description of Change	Reference
Solubility Parameters	Organic ligand concentrations recalculated, brine composition changes, U(VI) solubility changes, and change to account for no nonmicrobial vectors	PABC Summary (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.5) PANEL Analysis Package (Garner and Leigh 2005)
Solubility Uncertainty Ranges	Updated uncertainty ranges used	PABC Summary (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.6)
Probability of Microbial Activity	Microbial activity in all vectors versus 50% previously	PABC Summary (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.2)
CPR Degradation	Parameters for humid and inundated rate-changed Removal of methanogenesis	PABC Summary (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.3) PABC Summary (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.4)
Inventory	Inclusion of waste emplacement CPR Correct inventory errors	PABC Summary (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.1) PABC Inventory Report (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005)
Error Corrections	Additional DRSPALL vectors sampled; LHS, CCDFGF, CUTTING_S, SUMMARIZE and PRECCDFGF code corrections	PABC Summary (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.8) PABC Summary (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.9)
Culebra T Fields	Mining modifications incorporated in new flow fields	PABC Summary (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.7) The CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment TFIELD

6

7 **MASS-2.5.2 Recalculation of Culebra T Fields**

8 The CRA-2009 PA uses the CRA-2004 PABC T fields. No changes were made to the T field
 9 modeling assumptions for the CRA-2009 PA. Water level rises in the Culebra Dolomite
 10 Member of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as Culebra) have continued over recent
 11 years, and the observed heads have exceeded the ranges of uncertainty established for the steady-
 12 state heads in many of the WIPP observation wells used in the calibration of the T fields
 13 described in the CCA (Sandia National Laboratories 2002). The DOE recalculated T fields for
 14 the CRA-2004 using new Culebra data and geologic information (see Appendix TFIELD-2009).
 15 Additionally, the treatment of potential potash mining was recalculated during the CRA-2004
 16 PABC. The areas affected by mining were modified, and new flow fields were generated in
 17 response to the EPA's request for a PABC (Cotsworth 2005). (See also Leigh et al 2005, Section

1 2.7, and the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment TFIELD.) The DOE is continuing its field
2 observation program to investigate other potential causes for the water-level rises (Sandia
3 National Laboratories 2003). This program is discussed in Appendix HYDRO-2009.

4 **MASS-2.5.3 Waste Inventory Update**

5 The waste inventory used in the CCA was based on information contained in the Transuranic
6 Waste Baseline Inventory Database (see the CCA, Appendix BIR). No waste had been emplaced
7 in the repository at that time. Since 1996, waste has been emplaced in the repository and better
8 estimates have been made of the existing and projected waste streams at the generator sites.
9 Waste information in the CRA-2004 PA was updated to include the emplaced, currently stored,
10 and projected waste streams. This information was collected in the Transuranic Waste Baseline
11 Inventory Database, Rev 2.1, with the WIPP-specific information detailed in the CRA-2004,
12 Appendix DATA, Attachment F.

13 During the CRA-2004 PABC, the inventory information used in PA was again updated. Leigh,
14 Trone, and Fox (2005) summarizes these changes to the inventory. Changes include a correction
15 to the waste volumes reported by the Hanford Office of Richland Operations, the inclusion of
16 pre-1970 waste at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) as possible WIPP waste and a correction to
17 the volume and concentration of waste from Los Alamos National Laboratory.

18 The waste information used in the CRA-2009 PA is the same as in the CRA-2004 PABC
19 calculations, with the addition of cellulosic and plastic materials used for waste emplacement to
20 the inventory. Waste information in the CRA-2009 PA is discussed further in Leigh, Trone, and
21 Fox (2005).

22 **MASS-2.6 CRA-2009 Changes**

23 The CRA-2009 PA was updated based on new information since the CRA-2004 PABC.
24 Information on the implementation of these changes is contained in Clayton (2008, Section 2.1)
25 and is summarized in Table MASS-4.

26 **MASS-2.7 Operational Considerations**

27 No operational changes that would impact modeling assumptions have been made at the WIPP
28 since the 2006 recertification decision. As a result, no changes were made to modeling
29 assumptions for the CRA-2009 PA.

30 Shortly after submission of the CRA-2004 to the EPA, the DOE began using a new MgO
31 supplier, Martin Marrietta Magnesia Specialties, for the engineered barrier because the existing
32 vendor, Premier Chemicals, was no longer able to meet the stipulated MgO specifications. The
33 MgO specification did not change, and no associated change was made to modeling assumptions
34 as a result of the new vendor. Additional discussion of this operational change is found in
35 Appendix MgO-2009, Section MgO-2.2.

1

Table MASS-4. Changes Incorporated in the CRA-2009

WIPP Project Change	Summary of Change and Cross-Reference
DBR Parameters	The maximum DBR duration was decreased from 11 days to 4.5 days (Kirkes 2007).
CPR Degradation Rates	A conditional relationship was introduced between the inundated and humid gas generation rate to ensure that the inundated rate is the maximum rate (Kirchner 2008).
BRAGFLO Chemistry Capillary Pressure and Relative Permeability Model	New capillary pressure and relative permeability model for open cavities was added. Cut-off saturation is used, below which no chemical reactions occur (H ₂ O-required reactions) (Nemer and Clayton 2008).
Drilling Rate	Rate changed from 52.5 to 58.5 boreholes per square kilometer (km ²) over 10,000 years (Clayton 2008).
Parameter Error Corrections	Emplaced CPR Error Correction Halite/DRZ Porosity Error Correction Fraction of Repository Occupied by Waste Correction NUTS and DBR Calculation Input Files (Nemer 2007, Dunagan 2007, Ismail 2007a, Ismail 2007b, Clayton 2007).

2

1 **MASS-3.0 General Assumptions in PA Models**

2 A number of assumptions are applied generally to the disposal system through the conceptual
3 and mathematical models implemented in the CRA-2009 PA.

4 Table MASS-5, which lists modeling assumptions used in the PA, is a guide to general modeling
5 assumptions and provides guidance for integrating the assumptions with (1) the CRA-2004
6 chapters or CRA-2009 appendices in which they are discussed, and (2) the code(s) that
7 implement these assumptions.

8 The FEPs discussed in Appendix SCR-2009 that are relevant to these assumptions are also
9 indicated. The final column in the table indicates whether the DOE considers each assumption to
10 be reasonable or conservative. As discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.5, the
11 DOE has not attempted to bias the overall results of PA toward a conservative outcome.
12 However, where data or models are impractical to obtain, or where effects on performance are
13 not expected to be significant enough to justify development of a more complicated model, the
14 DOE has chosen to use conservative assumptions. In all other cases, best unbiased conceptual
15 models and parameter values have been selected. The designator R (reasonable) in the final
16 column indicates that the DOE considers the assumption to be reasonable based on WIPP-
17 specific data or information, data or information considered analogous to the WIPP disposal
18 system, expert judgment, or other reasoning. The designator C (conservative) indicates the DOE
19 considers the assumption may overestimate a process or effect that may contribute to releases to
20 the accessible environment. The regulatory designator (Reg) indicates that the assumption is
21 based on regulations in 40 CFR Part 191, criteria in 40 CFR Part 194, or other regulatory
22 guidance.

23 **MASS-3.1 Darcy's Law Applied to Fluid Flow Calculated by BRAGFLO,** 24 **MODFLOW-2000, and DRSPALL**

25 A mathematical relationship expressing fluid flux as a function of hydraulic head gradients in a
26 porous medium, commonly known as Darcy's Law, is applied to geologic media for all fluid-
27 flow calculations. For details about the specific formulation of Darcy's Law used in these
28 calculations, refer to Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2 for the disposal system and Section
29 PA-4.8 for the Culebra. Darcy's Law is not applied for flow up a borehole being drilled (see
30 Section MASS-16.2; the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.1.1; and Appendix PA-2009,
31 Section PA-4.6 for more discussion of this topic).

32 Darcy's Law generally applies for flow models if certain conditions are satisfied: (1) the flow
33 occurs in a porous medium with interconnected porosity, (2) flow velocities are low enough that
34 viscous forces dominate inertial forces, and (3) a threshold hydraulic gradient is exceeded. In the
35 CCA, Appendix MASS, these conditions were shown to be valid for the WIPP PA.

36 Darcy's Law assumes laminar flow; that is, there is no motion of the fluid at the fluid/solid
37 interface and velocity increases with distance from the fluid/solid interface. For liquids, it is
38 reasonable to assume laminar flow under most conditions, including those found in and
39 surrounding the WIPP repository. For gases at low pressure, however, gas molecules near the
40 solid interface may not have intimate contact with the solid and may have finite velocity, not

1

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions

Chapter or Section	Assumption Number	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
MASS-3.0 Some General Assumptions in PA Models MASS-3.1 Darcy's Law Applied for Fluid Flow calculated by BRAGFLO, MODFLOW-2000, and SECOTP2D	1	BRAGFLO MODFLOW-2000	Flow is governed by mass conservation and Darcy's Law in porous media. Flow is laminar and fluids are Newtonian.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Unsaturated Groundwater Flow (N24) Brine Inflow (W40)	R
	2	BRAGFLO	Two-phase flow in the porous media is by simultaneous immiscible displacement.	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42)	R
	3	BRAGFLO	The Brooks-Corey or Van Genuchten/Parker equations represent interactions between brine and gas.	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42)	R
	4	BRAGFLO	The Klinkenberg effect is included for flow of gases at low pressures.	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42)	R
	5	BRAGFLO	Threshold displacement pressure for flow of gas into brine is constant.	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42)	R
	6	BRAGFLO MODFLOW-2000 SECOTP2D	Fluid composition and compressibility are constant.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42)	R
MASS-3.2 Hydrogen Gas as Surrogate for Waste-Generated Gas Physical Properties in BRAGFLO	7	BRAGFLO DRSPALL	The gas phase is assigned the density and viscosity properties of hydrogen.	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42)	R
MASS-3.3 Salado Brine as Surrogate for Liquid Phase Physical Properties in BRAGFLO	8	BRAGFLO	All liquid physical properties are assigned the properties of Salado brine.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

2 See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2 Model Geometries MASS-4.0 Model Geometries CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2.1 Disposal System Geometry MASS-4.1 Disposal System Geometry as Modeled in BRAGFLO	BRAGFLO	The disposal system is represented by a two-dimensional, north-south, vertical cross section.	Stratigraphy (N1) Physiography (N39)	R
	BRAGFLO	Flow in the disposal system is radially convergent or divergent centered on the repository, shaft, and borehole for disturbed performance.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Unsaturated Groundwater Flow (N24)	R
	BRAGFLO	Variable dip in the Salado is approximated by a 1 degree dip to the south.	Stratigraphy (N1)	R
	BRAGFLO	Stratigraphic layers are parallel.	Stratigraphy (N1)	R
	BRAGFLO	The stratigraphy consists of units above the Dewey Lake, the Forty-niner, the Magenta, the Tamarisk, the Culebra, the Los Medaños, and the Salado Formations (comprising impure halite, MB 138, anhydrites A and B [lumped together], and MB 139). The dimensions of these units are constant. A Castile brine reservoir is included in the BRAGFLO grid in all scenarios.	Stratigraphy (N1)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2.2 Culebra Geometry MASS-4.3 Historical Context of Culebra Geometries as Modeled in MODFLOW-2000 and SECOTP2D	MODFLOW-2000 SECOTP2D	The Culebra is represented by a two-dimensional, horizontal geometry for groundwater flow and radionuclide transport simulation.	Stratigraphy (N1)	R
	MODFLOW 2000 PEST	Transmissivity varies spatially. There is no vertical flow to or from the Culebra.	Groundwater Recharge (N54) Groundwater Discharge (N53)	R
	SECOTP2D	The regional flow field provides boundary conditions for local transport calculations (see CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.10.2).	Advection (W90)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3 The Repository MASS-5.0 BRAGFLO Geometry of the Repository	BRAGFLO	The repository comprises five regions separated by panel closures: the waste panel, a north Rest of Repository (RoR), a south RoR and the access drifts (separated by panel closures), the operations region, and the experimental region. A single shaft region is also modeled, and a borehole region is included for a borehole that intersects the separate waste panel. The dimensions of these regions are constant (see the CRA-2004, Appendix MASS, Figure MASS-4).	Disposal Geometry (W1)	R-C
	BRAGFLO	Long-term flow up plugged and abandoned boreholes modeled as if all intrusions occur into a downdip (southern) panel.	Disposal Geometry (W1)	C
	BRAGFLO	For each repository region, the model geometry preserves design volume.	Disposal Geometry (W1)	R
	BRAGFLO	Pillars, individual drifts, and rooms are not modeled for long-term performance, and containers provide no barrier to fluid flow.	Disposal Geometry (W1)	C
	BRAGFLO	Long-term flow is radial to and from the borehole that intersects the waste disposal panel during disturbed performance.	Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	R
	BRAGFLO	DRZ provides a pathway to MBs.	—	R
	BRAGFLO	Grid and material properties are consistent with the Option D panel closure design.	—	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.1 Creep Closure MASS-6.0 Creep Closure Appendix PORSURF	SANTOS	Creep closure is modeled using a two-dimensional model of a single room. Room interactions are insignificant.	Salt Creep (W20) Changes in the Stress Field (W21) Excavation-Induced Changes in Stress (W19)	R
	SANTOS	The amount of creep closure is a function of time, gas pressure, and waste-matrix strength.	Salt Creep (W20) Changes in the Stress Field (W21) Consolidation of Waste (W32) Pressurization (W26)	R
	BRAGFLO	Porosity of operations and experimental areas is fixed at a value representative of consolidated material.	Salt Creep (W20)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.2 Repository Fluid Flow MASS-7.0 Repository Fluid Flow	BRAGFLO	General assumptions 1 to 8.	—	See above
	BRAGFLO	The waste disposal region is assigned a constant permeability representative of average consolidated waste without backfill.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Unsaturated Groundwater Flow (N24)	R
MASS-7.1 Flow Interactions with the Creep Closure Model	BRAGFLO	The experimental and operations regions are assigned a constant permeability representative of unconsolidated material and a constant porosity representative of consolidated material.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Unsaturated Groundwater Flow (N24) Salt Creep (N20)	C
MASS-7.2 Flow Interactions with the Gas Generation Model	BRAGFLO	For gas generation calculations, the effects of wicking are accounted for by assuming that brine in the repository contacts waste to an extent greater than that calculated by the Darcy Flow model used.	Wicking (W41)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.3 Gas Generation MASS-8.0 Gas Generation CRA-2004 Appendix TRU WASTE	BRAGFLO	Gas generation occurs by anoxic corrosion of steel containers and Fe and Fe-base alloys in the waste, giving H ₂ , and by microbial consumption of cellulose and, possibly, plastics and rubbers, giving mainly CO ₂ and H ₂ S. Radiolysis, oxic reactions, and other gas generation mechanisms are insignificant. Gas generation is calculated using the average-stoichiometry model, and is dependent on brine availability.	Container Material Inventory (W5) Waste Inventory (W2) Degradation of Organic Material (W44) Gases from Metal Corrosion (W49)	R
	BRAGFLO	The anoxic corrosion rate is dependent on liquid saturation. Anoxic corrosion of steel continues until all the steel is consumed. Steel corrosion will not be passivated by microbially generated gases (CO ₂ or H ₂ S). The water in brine is consumed by the corrosion reaction.	Brine Inflow (W40) Gases from Metal Corrosion (W49) Degradation of Organic Material (W44)	R
	BRAGFLO	Laboratory-scale experimental measurements of gas generation rates at expected room temperatures are used to account for the effects of biofilms and chemical reactions.	Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation (W48) Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation (W45) Chemical Effects of Corrosion (W51)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	BRAGFLO	The rate of microbial gas production is dependent on the amount of liquid present. It is assumed that microbial activity neither produces nor consumes water. Significant microbial activity occurs in all the simulations. In 75% of the simulations, microbes may consume all of the cellulose but none of the plastics and rubbers. In the remaining 25% of the simulations, microbes may consume all of the cellulose and all of the plastics and rubbers. Microbial production will continue until all biodegradable CPR materials are consumed if brine is present. The MgO backfill will react with all of the CO ₂ and remove it from the gaseous phase.	Brine Inflow (W40) Degradation of Organic Material (W44) Waste Inventory (W2)	R
	BRAGFLO	Gas dissolution in brine is of negligible consequence.	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42)	R
	BRAGFLO	The gaseous phase is assigned the properties of hydrogen (General Assumption 7).	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42)	See above
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.4 Chemical Conditions in the Repository SOTERM-2.0 Conceptual Framework of Chemical Conditions	NUTS PANEL	Chemical conditions in the repository will be constant. Chemical equilibrium is assumed for all reactions that occur between brine in the repository, waste, and abundant minerals, with the exceptions of gas generation and redox reactions.	Speciation (W56) Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics (W66)	R
	NUTS PANEL	Brine and waste in the repository will contain a uniform mixture of dissolved and colloidal species. All actinides have instant access to all repository brine.	Heterogeneity of Waste Forms (W3) Speciation (W56)	C

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	NUTS PANEL	No microenvironments that influence the overall chemical environment will persist.	Speciation (W56)	R
	NUTS PANEL	For the undisturbed performance and E2 scenarios, brine in the waste panels has the composition of Salado brine. For E1 and E1E2 (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.3.2.2) scenarios, all brine in the waste panel intersected by the borehole has the composition of Castile brine.	Speciation (W56)	R
	NUTS PANEL	Chemical conditions in the waste panels will be reducing. However, a condition of redox disequilibrium will exist between the possible oxidation states of the An elements.	Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics (W66) Speciation (W56) Effects of Metal Corrosion (W64)	R
	NUTS PANEL	The pH and CO ₂ fugacity in the waste panels will be controlled by the equilibrium between Mg(OH) ₂ and Mg ₅ (CO ₃) ₄ (OH) ₂ ·4H ₂ O. (A result of this assumption is low CO ₂ fugacity and mildly basic conditions.)	Speciation (W56) Backfill Chemical Composition (W10)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.5 Dissolved Actinide Source Term SOTERM-3.3 The Fracture Matrix Transport Computer Code	NUTS PANEL	Radionuclide dissolution to solubility limits is instantaneous.	Dissolution of Waste (W58)	C
	NUTS PANEL	Of the 29 isotopes considered as inputs, 6 actinides (Th, U, Np, Pu, Am, and Cm) are used in PANEL for calculations of radionuclide transport of brine (up a borehole). Four actinides (Th, U, Pu, and Am) are explicitly considered in NUTS for calculations of radionuclide transport in brine (porous materials) (Leigh and Trone 2005a). Choice of radionuclides is discussed in Leigh and Trone (2005b), Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005), and Leigh et al. (2005).	Waste Inventory (W2)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	NUTS PANEL	The reducing conditions in the repository will eliminate significant concentrations of Np(VI), Pu(V), Pu(VI), and Am(V) species. Am and Cm will exist predominantly in the III oxidation state; while Th will exist in the IV oxidation state. It is assumed that the solubilities and $K_{d,s}$ of U, Np, and Pu will be dominated by one of the remaining oxidation states: U(IV) or U(VI), Np(IV) or Np(V), and Pu(III) or Pu(IV) (See Appendix SOTERM-2009, Table SOTERM-15).	Speciation (W56) Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics (W66)	R
	NUTS PANEL	For a given oxidation state, the different actinides have similar solubilities.	Speciation (W56)	R
	NUTS PANEL	For undisturbed performance and for all aspects of disturbed performance, except for cuttings and cavings releases, radionuclides in the waste are distributed evenly throughout the disposal panel.	Waste Inventory (W2) Heterogeneity of Waste Forms (W3)	R
	NUTS PANEL	Mobilization of actinides in the gas phase is negligible.	Dissolution of Waste (W58)	R
	NUTS PANEL	An concentrations in the repository will be inventory limited when the mass of an An becomes depleted such that the predicted concentrations cannot be achieved.	Dissolution of Waste (W58)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.6 Source Term for Colloidal Actinides	NUTS PANEL	Four types of colloids constitute the source term for colloidal actinides: microbes, humic substances, intrinsic colloids, and mineral fragments.	Colloid Formation and Stability (W79) Humic and Fulvic Acids (W70)	R
	NUTS PANEL	The only intrinsic colloids that will form are those of Pu.	Colloid Formation and Stability (W79)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	NUTS PANEL	Concentrations of intrinsic colloids and mineral-fragment colloids are modeled as constants based on experimental observations. Humic and microbial colloidal An concentrations are modeled as proportional to dissolved An concentrations.	Colloid Formation and Stability (W79)	R
	NUTS PANEL	The maximum concentration of each An associated with each colloid type is constant.	Actinide Sorption (W61)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.4 Shafts and Shaft Seals MASS-12.0 Shafts and Shaft Seals	BRAGFLO	General Assumptions 1 to 8.	—	See above
	BRAGFLO	The four shafts connecting the repository to the surface are represented by a single shaft with a cross-section and volume equal to the total volume of the four real shafts and separated from the waste by less than the distance of the nearest real shaft.	Disposal Geometry (W1)	R
	BRAGFLO	The shaft seal system is represented by an upper and lower shaft region representing a composite of the actual materials in those regions.	Shaft Seal Geometry (W6) Shaft Seal Physical Properties (W7)	R
	BRAGFLO	The shaft is surrounded by a DRZ which heals with time. The DRZ is represented through the composite permeabilities of the shaft system itself, rather than as a discrete zone. The effective permeability of shaft materials are adjusted at 200 years after closure to reflect consolidation and possible degradation. Permeabilities are constant for the shaft seal materials through the Rustler formation.	Salt Creep (W20) Consolidation of Shaft Seals (W36) DRZ (W18) Microbial Growth on Concrete (W76) Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals (W74) Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals (W37)	R
	BRAGFLO	Concrete shaft components of the lower shaft are modeled as if they degrade after emplacement.	Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals (W37)	C

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

1 See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	NUTS	Radionuclides are not retarded by the seals.	Actinide Sorption (W61) Speciation (W56)	C
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5 The Salado MASS-13.0 Salado	BRAGFLO	General Assumptions 1 to 8.	—	See above
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.1 Impure Halite MASS-13.1 High Threshold Pressure for Halite-Rich Salado Rock Units	BRAGFLO	Intact rock and hydrologic properties are constant.	Stratigraphy (N1)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.2 Salado Interbeds MASS-13.3 The Fracture Model	BRAGFLO	Interbeds have a fracture-initiation pressure above which local fracturing and changes in porosity and permeability occur in response to changes in pore pressure. A power function relates the permeability increase to the porosity increase. A pressure is specified above which porosity and permeability do not change.	Disruption Due to Gas Effects (W25)	R
	BRAGFLO	Interbeds have identical physical properties; they differ only in position, thickness, and some fracture parameters.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.3 Disturbed Rock Zone MASS-13.4 Flow in the Disturbed Rock Zone	BRAGFLO	The permeability of the DRZ is sampled with the low value similar to intact halite and the high value representing a fractured material. The DRZ porosity is equal to the porosity of Salado halite to plus 0.29%.	Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ) (W18) Roof Falls (W22) Gas Explosions (W27) Seismic Activity (N12) Underground Boreholes (W39)	C-R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.4 Actinide Transport in the Salado MASS-13.5 Actinide Transport in the Salado	NUTS	Dissolved actinides and colloidal actinides are transported by advection in the Salado. Diffusion and dispersion are assumed negligible.	Advection (W90) Diffusion (W91) Matrix Diffusion (W92)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	NUTS	Sorption of actinides in the anhydrite interbeds, colloid retardation, colloid transport at higher than average velocities, coprecipitation of minerals containing actinides, channeled flow, and viscous fingering are not modeled.	Actinide Sorption (W61) Colloid Transport (W78) Colloid Filtration (W80) Colloid Sorption (W81) Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42) Fracture Flow (N25)	R
	NUTS	Radionuclides having similar decay and transport properties have been grouped together for transport calculations as discussed in Leigh and Trone (2005a). See also assumptions for dissolved actinide source term.	Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth (W12)	R
	NUTS	Sorption of actinides in the borehole is not modeled.	Actinide Sorption (W61)	C
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6 Units Above the Salado MASS-14.0 Geologic Units above the Salado	SECOTP2D	Above the Salado, lateral An transport to the accessible environment can occur only through the Culebra.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Unsaturated Groundwater Flow (N24) Solute Transport (W77)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.1 Los Medaños	MODFLOW-2000 BRAGFLO	The Los Medaños member of the Rustler Formation, Tamarisk, and Forty-niner are assumed to be impermeable.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)	C
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2 The Culebra MASS-15.0 Culebra Appendix TFIELD	MODFLOW-2000 SECOTP2D	General Assumptions 1, 6, and 8.	—	See above
	MODFLOW-2000	For fluid flow, the Culebra is modeled as a uniform (single-porosity) porous medium.	Saturated Groundwater flow (N23)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	MODFLOW-2000	The Culebra flow field is determined from the observed hydraulic conditions and estimates of the effects of climate change and potash mining outside the controlled area, and does not change with time unless mining is predicted to occur in the disposal system in the future.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Climate Change (N61) Precipitation (e.g., Rainfall) (N59) Temperature (N60) Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining (H37)	R
	BRAGFLO	The Culebra is assigned a single permeability to calculate brine flow into the unit from an intrusion borehole.	Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31) Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	R
	MODFLOW-2000	Gas flow in the Culebra is not modeled. Gas from the repository does not affect fluid flow in the Culebra.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production (W42)	R
	BRAGFLO MODFLOW-2000 SECOTP2D	Different thicknesses of the Culebra are assumed for BRAGFLO, MODFLOW-2000, and SECOTP2D calculations, although the Ts are consistent.	Effects of Preferential Pathways (N27)	R
	PEST	Uncertainty in the spatial variability of the Culebra transmissivity is accounted for by statistically generating 100 T fields for PA.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Fracture Flow (N25) Shallow Dissolution (N16)	R
	MODFLOW-2000 BRAGFLO	Potentiometric heads are set on the edges of the regional grid to represent flow in a portion of a much larger hydrologic system.	Groundwater Recharge (N54) Groundwater Discharge (N53) Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge (N56) Infiltration (N55)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.1 Transport of Dissolved Actinides in the Culebra MASS-15.2 Dissolved Actinide Transport and Retardation in the Culebra	SECOTP2D	Dissolved actinides are transported by advection in high-permeability features and by diffusion in low-permeability features.	Solute Transport (W77) Advection (W90) Diffusion (W91) Matrix Diffusion (W92)	R
	SECOTP2D	Sorption occurs on dolomite in the matrix. Sorption on clays present in the Culebra is not modeled.	Actinide Sorption (W61) Changes in Sorptive Surfaces (W63)	C
	SECOTP2D	Sorption is represented using a linear isotherm model.	Actinide Sorption (W61) Kinetics of Sorption (W62)	R
	SECOTP2D	The possible effects on sorption of the injection of brines from the Castile and Salado into the Culebra are accounted for in the distribution of An K_d s.	Actinide Sorption (W61) Groundwater Geochemistry (N33) Changes in Groundwater Eh (N36) Changes in Groundwater pH (N37) Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31)	R
	SECOTP2D	Hydraulically significant fractures are assumed to be present everywhere in the Culebra.	Advection (W90)	C
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.2 Transport of Colloidal Actinides in the Culebra MASS-15.3 Colloidal Actinide Transport and Retardation in the Culebra	SECOTP2D	An humic colloids are chemically retarded identically to dissolved actinides and are treated as dissolved actinides.	Advection (W90) Diffusion (W91) Colloid Transport (W78) Microbial Transport (W87)	R
	SECOTP2D	The concentration of intrinsic colloids is sufficiently low to justify elimination from PA transport calculations in the Culebra.	—	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	SECOTP2D	Microbial colloids and mineral fragments are too large to undergo matrix diffusion. Filtration of these colloids, which is modeled using an exponential decay approach, occurs in high-permeability features. Attenuation is so effective that associated actinides are assumed to be retained within the disposal system and are not transported in SECOTP2D.	Microbial Transport (W87) Colloid Sorption (W81)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.3 Subsidence Due to Potash Mining MASS-15.4 Subsidence Caused by Potash Mining in the Culebra	MODFLOW-2000	The effect of potash mining is to increase the hydraulic conductivity in the Culebra by a factor between 1 and 1,000.	Conventional Underground Potash Mining (H13) Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining (H37)	Reg.
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.3 The Tamarisk	MODFLOW-2000 BRAGFLO	The Tamarisk is assumed to be impermeable.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.4 The Magenta	BRAGFLO	General Assumptions 1 to 8.	—	See above
	BRAGFLO	The Magenta permeability is set to the lowest value measured near the center of the WIPP site. This increases the flow into the Culebra.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)	R
	NUTS	No radionuclides entering the Magenta will reach the accessible environment. However, the volumes of brine and actinides entering and stored in the Magenta are modeled.	Solute Transport (W77)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.5 The Forty-niner	BRAGFLO	The Forty-niner is assumed to be impermeable.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.6 Dewey Lake	BRAGFLO	General Assumptions 1 to 8.	—	See above
	NUTS	The sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake is sufficiently large to prevent any release over 10,000 years.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Actinide Sorption (W61)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.7 Supra-Dewey Lake Units	BRAGFLO	General Assumptions 1 to 8.	—	See above
	BRAGFLO	The units above the Dewey Lake are a single hydrostratigraphic unit.	Stratigraphy (N1)	R
	BRAGFLO	The units are thin and predominantly unsaturated.	Unsaturated Groundwater Flow (N24) Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7 The Intrusion Borehole MASS-16.0 Intrusion Borehole CRA-2004 Section 6.4.7.1 Releases during Drilling	CUTTINGS_S BRAGFLO DRSPALL	Any actinides that enter the borehole during drilling are assumed to reach the surface.	—	C
MASS-16.1 Cuttings, Cavings, and Spall Releases during Drilling	BRAGFLO PANEL CUTTINGS_S DRSPALL	Future drilling practices will be the same as they are at present.	Oil and Gas Exploration (H1) Potash Exploration (H2) Oil and Gas Exploitation (H4) Other Resources (H8) Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery (H9)	Reg.
	CUTTINGS_S DRSPALL	Releases of particulate waste material are modeled (cuttings, cavings, and spillings). Releases are corrected for radioactive decay until the time of intrusion.	Drilling Fluid Flow (H21) Suspension of Particles (W82) Cuttings (W84) Cavings (W85) Spallings (W86)	R
	CUTTINGS_S	Degraded waste properties are based on marine clays and surrogate materials.	Cavings (W85)	C

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

1 See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	DRSPALL	A hemispherical geometry with one-dimensional spherical symmetry defines the flow field and cavity in the waste.	Spallings (W86)	C
	DRSPALL	Tensile strength, based on completely degraded waste surrogates, is felt to represent extreme, low-end tensile strengths because it does not account for several strengthening mechanisms.	Spallings (W86)	C
	DRSPALL	Shape factor is 0.1, corresponding to particles that are easier to fluidize and entrain in the flow.	Spallings (W86)	C
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.1.1 Direct Brine Release During Drilling MASS-16.2 Direct Brine Releases during Drilling	BRAGFLO PANEL	Brine containing actinides may flow to the surface during drilling. DBR will have negligible effect on the long-term pressure and saturation in the waste panel.	Blowouts (H23)	R
	BRAGFLO	A two-dimensional grid (one degree dip) on the scale of the waste disposal region is used for DBR calculations.	Blowouts (H23)	R
	BRAGFLO CCDFGF	Calculation of DBR from several different locations provides reference results for the variation in release associated with location.	Blowouts (H23)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2 Long-Term Releases Following Drilling MASS-16.3 Long-Term Properties of the Abandoned Intrusion Borehole	BRAGFLO CCDFGF	Plugging and abandonment of future boreholes are assumed to be consistent with practices in the Delaware Basin.	Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31) Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	Reg.
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2.1 Continuous Concrete Plug through the Salado and Castile	BRAGFLO CCDFGF	A continuous concrete plug is assumed to exist throughout the Salado and Castile. Long-term releases through a continuous plug are analogous to releases through a sealed shaft.	Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31) Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	Reg.-R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2.2 The Two-Plug Configuration	BRAGFLO	A lower plug is located between the Castile brine reservoir and underlying formations. A second plug is located immediately above the Salado. The brine reservoir and waste panel are in direct communication through an open cased hole.	Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31) Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	Reg.-R
	BRAGFLO	The casing and upper concrete plug are assumed to fail after 200 years, and the borehole is assumed to be filled with silty-sand-like material. At 1,200 years after abandonment, the permeability of the borehole below the waste panel is decreased by one order of magnitude as a result of salt creep.	Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31) Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2.3 The Three-Plug Configuration	BRAGFLO	In addition to the two-plug configuration, a third plug is placed within the Castile above the brine reservoir. The third plug is assumed not to fail over the regulatory time period.	Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31) Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	Reg.-R
CRA-2004 Section 6.4.8 Castile Brine Reservoir MASS-18.0 Castile Brine Reservoir	BRAGFLO	The Castile region is assigned a low permeability, which inhibits fluid flow. Brine occurrences in the Castile are bounded systems. Brine reservoirs under the waste panels are assumed to have limited extent and interconnectivity, with effective radii on the order of several hundred meters.	Brine Reservoirs (N2)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.9 Climate Change MASS-17.0 Climate Change	SECOTP2D	Climate-related factors are treated through recharge. A parameter called the Climate Index is used to scale the Culebra flux field.	Climate Change (N61) Temperature (N60) Precipitation (e.g., Rainfall) (N59)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

1 See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.10 Initial and Boundary Conditions for Disposal System Modeling CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.10.1 Disposal System Flow and Transport Modeling (BRAGFLO and NUTS)	BRAGFLO	There are no gradients for flow in the far-field of the Salado, and pressures are above hydrostatic but below lithostatic. Excavation and waste emplacement result in partial drainage of the DRZ.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Brine Inflow (W40)	R
	BRAGFLO	An initial water-table surface is set in the Dewey Lake at an elevation of 980 meters (m) (3,215 feet [ft]) above mean sea level. The initial pressures in the Salado are extrapolated from a sampled pressure in MB139 at the shaft and are in hydrostatic equilibrium. The excavated region is assigned an initial pressure of one atmosphere. The liquid saturation of the waste-disposal region is consistent with the liquid saturation of emplaced waste. Other excavated regions are assigned zero liquid saturation, except the shaft, which is fully saturated.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)	R
	NUTS	Molecular transport boundary conditions are no diffusion or dispersion in the normal direction across far-field boundaries. Initial An concentrations are zero everywhere, except in the waste.	Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth (W12) Solute Transport (W77)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.10.2 Culebra Flow and Transport Modeling (MODFLOW-2000, SECOTP2D)	MODFLOW-2000	Constant head and no-flow boundary conditions are set on the far-field boundaries of the flow model.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23)	R
	MODFLOW-2000	Initial An concentrations in the Culebra are zero.	Solute Transport (W77)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.10.3 Initial and Boundary Conditions for Other Computational Models	NUTS PANEL BRAGFLO (DBR) CUTTINGS_S	Initial and boundary conditions interpolated from previously executed BRAGFLO calculation.	—	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12 Sequences of Future Events	CCDFGF	Each 10,000-year future (random sequence of future events) is generated by randomly and repeatedly sampling (1) the time between drilling events, (2) the location of drilling events, (3) the activity level of the waste penetrated by each drilling intrusion, (4) the plug configuration of the borehole, and (5) the penetration of a Castile brine reservoir, and by randomly sampling the occurrence of mining in the disposal system.	Oil and Gas Exploration (H1) Potash Exploration (H2) Oil and Gas Exploitation (H4) Other Resources (H8) Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery (H9) Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (N31) Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	Reg.-R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.1 Active and Passive Institutional Controls in Performance Assessment Chapter 7.0	CCDFGF	Active institutional controls are effective for 100 years and completely eliminate the possibility of disruptive human activities (e.g., drilling and mining). No credit is taken for passive institutional controls.	—	Reg.-R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.2 Number and Time of Drilling Intrusions	CCDFGF	Drilling may occur after 100 years according to a Poisson process.	Loss of Records (H57) Oil and Gas Exploration (H1) Potash Exploration (H2) Oil and Gas Exploitation (H4) Other Resources (H8)	Reg.-R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.3 Location of Intrusion Boreholes	CCDFGF	The waste disposal region is discretized into 144 regions, each with an equal probability of being intersected. A borehole can penetrate only one region.	Disposal Geometry (W1)	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.4 Activity of the Intersected Waste Appendix TRU WASTE	CCDFGF	Six-hundred ninety waste streams are identified as contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU). All 77 remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-TRU) waste streams were grouped (binned) together into one equivalent or average (WIPP-scale) RH-TRU waste stream.	Heterogeneity of Waste Forms (W3)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.5 Diameter of the Intrusion Borehole CCA Appendix DEL	CUTTINGS_S	The diameter of the intrusion borehole is constant at 12.25 inches (in.) (31.12 centimeters [cm]).	—	Reg.-R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.6 Probability of Intersecting a Brine Reservoir	CCDFGF	One brine reservoir is assumed to exist below the waste panels. The probability that a deep borehole intersects a brine reservoir below the waste panels is sampled uniformly from 0.01 to 0.60.	Brine Reservoirs (N2)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.7 Plug Configuration in the Abandoned Intrusion Borehole	CCDFGF	The two-plug configuration has a probability of 0.696. The three-plug configuration has a probability of 0.289. The continuous concrete plug has a probability of 0.015.	—	Reg.-R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.8 Probability of Mining Occurring in the Land Withdrawal Area	CCDFGF	Mining in the disposal system occurs a maximum of once in 10,000 years (a 10 ⁻⁴ probability per year).	—	Reg.-R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13 Construction of a Single Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF)	CCDFGF	Deterministic calculations are executed with BRAGFLO, NUTS, MODFLOW-2000, SECOTP2D, CUTTINGS_S, and PANEL to generate reference conditions. These reference conditions are used to estimate the consequences associated with random sequences of future events. These are, in turn, used to develop CCDFs.	—	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	CCDFGF	Ten thousand random sequences of future events are generated for each CCDF plotted.	—	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13.1 Constructing Consequences of the Undisturbed Performance Scenario	CCDFGF	A BRAGFLO and NUTS calculation with undisturbed conditions is sufficient for estimating the consequences of the undisturbed performance scenario.	—	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13.2 Scaling Methodology for Disturbed Performance Scenarios	CCDFGF	Consequences for random sequences of future events are constructed by scaling the consequences associated with deterministic calculations (reference conditions) to other times, generally by interpolation, but sometimes by assuming either similarity or no consequence.	—	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13.3 Estimating Long-Term Releases from the E1 Scenario	CCDFGF NUTS	Reference conditions are calculated or estimated for intrusions at 100, 350, 1,000, 3,000, 5,000, 7,000, and 9,000 years.	Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13.4 Estimating Long-Term Releases from the E2 Scenario	CCDFGF NUTS SECOT2D	The methodology is similar to the methodology for the E1 scenario. For multiple E1 intrusions into the same panel, the additional source term to the Culebra for the second and subsequent intrusions is assumed to be negligible.	Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32) Waste Inventory (W2)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13.5 Estimating Long-Term Releases from the E1E2 Scenario	CCDFGF PANEL	The concentration of actinides in liquid moving up the borehole assumes homogeneous mixing within the panel.	Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	C
	PANEL	Any actinides that enter the borehole for long-term flow calculations reach the Culebra.	Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32)	C

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

Table MASS-5. General Modeling Assumptions (Continued)

Chapter or Section	Code	Modeling Assumption	Related FEP in Appendix SCR-2009	Assumption Considered ^a
	CCDFGF PANEL	Reference conditions are calculated or estimated for intrusion at 100, 300, 1,000, 2,000, 4,000, 6,000 and 9,000 years.	Oil and Gas Exploration (H1)	—
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13.6 Multiple Scenario Occurrences	CCDFGF PANEL	The panels are assumed not to be interconnected for long-term brine flow.	Saturated Groundwater Flow (N23) Unsaturated Groundwater Flow (N24)	R
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13.7 Estimating Releases During Drilling for All Scenarios	CCDFGF PANEL NUTS	Repository conditions will be dominated by Castile brine if any borehole connects to a brine reservoir.	Brine Reservoirs (N2) Natural Borehole Fluid Flow (H31)	R
	CUTTINGS_S PANEL CCDFGF	Depletion of actinides in parts of the repository penetrated by boreholes is not accounted for in calculating the releases from subsequent intrusions at such locations.	Waste-Induced Borehole Flow (H32) Waste Inventory (W2)	C
CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.13.8 Estimating Releases in the Culebra and the Impact of the Mining Scenario	CCDFGF	Releases from intrusions at random times in the future are scaled from releases calculated at 100 years with a unit source of radionuclides in the Culebra.	—	R
	CCDFGF	Actinides in transit in the Culebra when mining occurs are transported in the flow field used for the undisturbed case. Actinides introduced subsequent to mining are transported in the flow field used for the disturbed case (i.e., the mined case).	—	R

^a R = Reasonable

C = Conservative

Reg. - Based on regulatory guidance

See above - Refers to assumptions 1 through 8 listed at the beginning of this table.

- 1
- 2 necessarily zero. This effect, which results in additional flux of gas above that predicted by
- 3 application of Darcy's Law, is known as the slip phenomenon, or Klinkenberg effect (Bear 1972,
- 4 p. 128). A correction to Darcy's Law for the Klinkenberg effect is incorporated into the
- 5 BRAGFLO model (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2).
- 6 Darcy flow for one and two phases implies that values for principal fluid and rock parameters
- 7 must be specified. Fluid properties in the Darcy flow model used for the WIPP PA are density,
- 8 viscosity, and compressibility, while rock properties are porosity, permeability, and

1 compressibility (pore or bulk). In BRAGFLO, other parameters are required to describe the
2 interactions or interference between the gas and brine phases present in the model because those
3 phases can occupy the same pore space. In the WIPP application of Darcy flow models,
4 compressibility of both the liquid and rock are related to porosity through a dependence on
5 pressure. Fluid density, viscosity, and compressibility are functions of fluid composition,
6 pressure, and temperature. It is assumed in BRAGFLO that fluid viscosity is a function of
7 pressure, but its density and compressibility are held constant. Fluid composition for the
8 purposes of modeling flow and transport is assumed to be constant.

9 **MASS-3.2 Hydrogen Gas as Surrogate for Waste-Generated Gas Physical** 10 **Properties in BRAGFLO and DRSPALL**

11 Hydrogen gas is produced as a result of the corrosion of steel in the repository by water or brine.
12 As in the CCA, the gas phase in the BRAGFLO model is assigned the properties of hydrogen
13 because hydrogen will, under most conditions reasonable for the WIPP, be the dominant
14 component of the gas phase. The model for spillings, DRSPALL, also assigns the physical
15 properties of hydrogen to the gas phase. As discussed in the following text, the effect of
16 assuming flow of pure H₂ instead of a mixture of gases (including H₂, CO₂, H₂S, and CH₄), was
17 shown to be minor relative to the permeability variations in the surrounding formations.

18 Other gases may be produced by processes occurring in the repository. If microbial degradation
19 occurs, a significant amount of CO₂ and possibly methane (CH₄) will be generated by microbial
20 degradation of cellulose and, possibly, plastics and rubbers in the waste. The CO₂ produced,
21 however, will react with the magnesium-oxide (MgO) engineered barrier and cementitious
22 materials to form brucite (Mg(OH)₂), hydromagnesite (Mg₅(CO₃)₄(OH)₂·4H₂O), and calcite
23 (CaCO₃) thus resulting in very low CO₂ fugacity in the repository. Although other gases exist in
24 the disposal system, BRAGFLO calculations assume these gases are insignificant and they are
25 not included in the model.

26 With the average stoichiometry gas generation model, the total number of moles of gas generated
27 will be the same whether the gas is considered to be pure H₂ or a mixture of several gases,
28 because the generation of other gases is accounted for by specifying the stoichiometric factor γ
29 (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.5). Therefore, considering only the moles of gas
30 generated, the pressure buildup in the repository will be approximately the same because the
31 expected gases behave similarly to an ideal gas, even up to lithostatic pressures.

32 The effect of assuming pure H₂ instead of a mixture of gases (including H₂, CO₂, H₂S and CH₄)
33 on flow behavior, and its resulting impact on the WIPP repository pressure, is as follows:

34 Radial flow in a fully saturated rock with nonideal gas is described by Darcy's Law, which, for
35 the given problem, has a solution of the form (Amyx, Bass, and Whiting 1960, p. 78, Equation
36 2-33)

1
$$q_b = 1.988 \times 10^{-5} \left[\frac{T_b Z_b}{P_b} \frac{kh (P_e^2 - P_w^2)}{\mu_{avg} Z_{avg} \ln \left(\frac{r_e}{r_w} \right)} \right] \quad (\text{MASS.1})$$

2 which can be rewritten as

3
$$P_e^2 - P_w^2 = \frac{q_b P_b}{1.988 \times 10^{-5} T_b Z_b} \times \frac{\mu_{avg} Z_{avg}}{kh} \ln \left(\frac{r_e}{r_w} \right) \quad (\text{MASS.2})$$

4 where

- 5 q = gas flow rate (cubic feet per day at base (reference) conditions)
- 6 T = temperature (K)
- 7 P = pressure (pounds per square inch absolute)
- 8 k = permeability (millidarcys)
- 9 h = height (feet)
- 10 μ = viscosity (centipoises)
- 11 Z = gas compressibility factor (defined as the ratio of the actual molar volume of a gas to the
- 12 corresponding ideal gas volume RT/P at the same temperature and pressure)
- 13 r = radius (consistent units)
- 14 R = ideal gas constant
- 15 e = denotes external boundary (repository)
- 16 w = denotes internal boundary (wellbore)
- 17 b = denotes base or reference conditions for gas (temperature, pressure, compressibility
- 18 factor)
- 19 avg = denotes average properties between external and internal boundaries because u and z are
- 20 functions of pressure which change with time

21 This expression is useful for examining the effects of gas properties, specifically the viscosity (μ)

22 and the compressibility (Z) and rock properties (namely k), on the flow rate (q) and the pressure

23 (P).

24 To evaluate the effect of gas composition on q and P, SUPERTRAPP, a computer program

25 developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), was used (National

26 Institute of Standards and Technology 1992). SUPERTRAPP calculates gas properties for 116

27 pure fluids and mixtures of up to 20 components for temperatures to 1,000 K (726 °C, 1340 °F)

28 and pressures to 300 megapascals (MPa). Because such small quantities of H₂S are anticipated

29 at the WIPP, its impact is negligible.


30 Figure MASS-1 shows the relationship between gas viscosity and composition of H₂-CO₂

31 mixtures for various mole fractions of H₂ at pressures of 7 MPa and 15 MPa, as determined from

32 SUPERTRAPP. The viscosity at 50% mole fraction H₂ is about 2.3 times greater than for 100%

33 mole fraction H₂. As shown in Equation (MASS.1), viscosity has an inverse relationship to flow

34 rate and, as shown in Equation (MASS.2), a direct relationship to the square of the repository




1
2 **Figure MASS-1. Gas Viscosity as a Function of Mole Fraction H₂ at 7 MPa and 15 MPa**
3 **Pressure**

4 pressure. Hence, viscosity differences that would result if gas properties other than those of
5 hydrogen were incorporated would result in a decrease in flow rate and potentially higher
6 pressures.

7 As shown in Figure MASS-2, the gas compressibility at 50% mole fraction H₂ is about 0.9 times
8 that of pure H₂. Like viscosity, the gas compressibility (actual volume/ideal volume) is inversely
9 related to flow rate and directly related to the square of the repository pressure. Therefore, the
10 impact of variation in gas compressibility caused by composition is considered minor and is not
11 considered.

12 The viscosity and compressibility calculations described above for H₂-CO₂ mixtures were
13 repeated for H₂-CH₄ mixtures for various mole fractions of H₂ at pressures of 7 MPa and 15 MPa
14 (Kanney 2003). The variability of viscosity with the composition for the H₂-CH₄ mixtures is
15 smaller than that observed for the H₂-CO₂ mixtures. For example, at 15 Mpa, the gas viscosity
16 of H₂-CH₄ at 50% mole fraction is only 1.6 times greater than the viscosity at 100% mole
17 fraction. The H₂-CH₄ mixtures are only slightly less compressible than the H₂-CO₂ mixtures.
18 For example, at 15 MPa, the gas compressibility of the H₂-CH₄ at 50% mole fraction is
19 approximately 0.94 times the compressibility at 100% mole fraction. Changing composition
20 from 100% to 50% H₂ would result in a slight increase in flow rate and a decrease in pressure.

21 The permeability of each component of the formation plays a significant role in determining both
22 flow rate and pressure. Because marker bed (MB) permeabilities and Salado impure halite
23 permeabilities vary over three to four orders of magnitude (see Fox 2008, Table 30 and Table
24 31), the permeabilities of these flow pathways will have a greater influence on pressure and flow
25 rate determinations than either uncertainty in viscosity or gas compressibility effects.



1
2 **Figure MASS-2. Gas Compressibility as a Function of Mole Fraction H₂**

3 Note that the BRAGFLO code includes a pressure-induced fracture model that will limit pressure
4 increases in the repository (Schreiber 1997). For example, at high repository pressures, the
5 factor of 1.5 pressure increase calculated here using the simplified Darcy’s Law model is
6 unlikely to be seen in the BRAGFLO results, since fracturing will lead to increased permeability,
7 effectively limiting pressure increases.

8 **MASS-3.3 Salado Brine as Surrogate for Liquid-Phase Physical Properties in**
9 **BRAGFLO**

10 BRAGFLO uses Salado Formation brine properties as the physical properties for all liquids.
11 However, liquid in the modeled region may consist of (1) brine originally in the Salado, (2)
12 liquid introduced in the excavation during construction, maintenance, and ventilation during the
13 operational phase, (3) a very small amount of liquid introduced as a component of the waste,
14 (4) liquid from overlying units, and (5) liquid from the Castile brine reservoir. However, for
15 BRAGFLO modeling, it is assumed that the properties of all of these liquids are similar enough
16 to Salado brine properties that the effect of any variation in properties resulting from liquids
17 mixing is negligible. The variations in chemical properties of brine are accounted for as
18 discussed in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-2.0, Section SOTERM-2.3, and
19 Section SOTERM-5.0.

1 **MASS-4.0 Model Geometries**

2 This section presents supplementary information on the disposal system geometry.

3 **MASS-4.1 Disposal System Geometry as Modeled in BRAGFLO**

4 Overall, the conceptual model of the disposal system geometry represents the spatial effects of
5 process interactions in two dimensions. The geometry used to represent long-term fluid flow
6 processes in the Salado, flow between a borehole and overlying units and flow within the
7 repository (where processes coupled to fluid flow such as creep closure and gas generation
8 occur), is a vertical cross-section through the repository on a north-south axis shown in Figure
9 MASS-3 (see also Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.1). The dimension of this geometry in
10 the direction perpendicular to the plane of the cross-section varies so that spatial effects of
11 certain processes can be better represented.

12 For fluid flow and transport modeling in the Culebra, the geometry is a horizontal, two-
13 dimensional plane (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.8, Figure PA-32). For modeling brine
14 flow from the intruded panel to the borehole during drilling (DBR), the geometry is a two-
15 dimensional, horizontal representation of a waste panel as described in Section MASS-16.2 (see
16 also the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.1).

17 Using a two-dimensional geometry to represent the three-dimensional Salado flow is based on
18 the assumption that brine and gas flow will converge upon and diverge from the repository
19 horizon. Grid flaring is used when flows can be represented as divergent and convergent from
20 the center of the flaring (see Section MASS-4.2.5). The impact of this conceptual model and its
21 implementation in a two-dimensional grid has been compared to a model that does not make the
22 assumption of convergent and divergent flow (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment
23 MASS, Attachment 4-1 for additional information). The conceptual model for the Salado also
24 includes the slight and variable dip of beds in the vicinity of the repository, which might affect
25 fluid flow.

26 Above and below the repository, it is assumed that any flow between the borehole or shaft (see
27 the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3) and surrounding materials will converge or diverge.
28 With respect to flow in units overlying the Salado, the only purpose of this conceptual model is
29 to determine the quantity (flux) of fluid leaving or entering the borehole or shaft. Fluid
30 movement through the units above the Salado is treated in a different conceptual model (see the
31 CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6). Below the repository, the possible presence of a brine
32 reservoir is considered to be important, so a hydrostratigraphic layer representing the Castile and
33 a possible brine reservoir in it is included (see the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS-4.2
34 for the disposal system geometry historical context prior to the CCA).

35 **MASS-4.2 Change to Disposal System Geometry since the CCA**

36 Changes have been made to the disposal system geometry since the first WIPP certification. The
37 disposal system geometry is specifically represented in BRAGFLO. This section describes the
38 methodology used to create the two-dimensional BRAGFLO computational grid used for the




Figure MASS-3. Logical Grid Used for the CRA-2004 and 2009 PA BRAGFLO Calculations

1 CRA-2004 PA calculations. The CRA-2004 grid is similar to the CCA and the CCA
2 Performance Assessment Verification Test (PAVT) grids, except for the differences described
3 below. Since no changes have been made to the geometry since the CRA-2004 PABC, this grid
4 was used in the CRA-2009 PA.

5 The most important changes affecting the CRA-2004 BRAGFLO grid were the implementation
6 of the Option D panel closures and a simplified shaft seal model. Additional grid refinements
7 were also made to increase numerical accuracy and computational efficiency and to reduce
8 numerical dispersion. These changes modify the conceptual models. All conceptual model
9 changes were approved by the Salado Flow Peer Review Panel in February 2003 (Caporuscio,
10 Gibbons, and Oswald 2003). For completeness, all changes from the CCA PA/CCA PAVT grid
11 are described here. These changes were made and approved by the EPA in the 2004
12 recertification decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006) and are repeated here for
13 completeness and to show the historical progression of the grid from the CCA to the CRA-2009
14 PA.

15 **MASS-4.2.1 CCA to CRA-2004 Baseline Grid Changes**

16 The baseline grid used in the CCA PA and the CCA PAVT had 33 cells in the x direction and 31
17 cells in the y direction, while the grid used for the CRA-2004 PA and later calculations has
18 dimensions 68 by 33 cells. The specific changes implemented in the CRA-2004 grid are listed
19 below and discussed in more detail in the following sections. Logical grids for the CCA PA, the
20 CCA PAVT, and the CRA-2004 and CRA-2009 PAs are shown in Figure MASS-3 and Figure
21 MASS-4.

22 The following changes have been implemented in the CRA-2004 grid:

- 23 1. A simplified shaft seal model is implemented.
- 24 2. Option D-type panel closures are implemented.
- 25 3. Segmentation of the waste regions is increased.
- 26 4. A grid-flaring method is redefined and simplified.
- 27 5. X spacing of the grid beyond the repository to the north and south is refined.
- 28 6. Layers above and below MB 139 have been made relatively thin (~1 m thick), and Y spacing
29 in the Salado has been changed.

30 **MASS-4.2.2 CRA-2004 Simplified Shaft Seal Model**

31 A shaft seal model is included in the CRA-2004 grid, but it is implemented in a simpler fashion
32 than that used for the CCA PA and the CCA PAVT. A detailed description of the parameters
33 used to define the simplified model is discussed in AP-094 (James and Stein 2002) and the
34 resulting analysis report (James and Stein 2003). The model used in the CRA-2004 PA is
35 described by Stein and Zelinski (2003a and 2003b), and was approved by the Salado Flow Peer
36 Review Panel (Caporuscio, Gibbons, and Oswald 2003).

CCA/PAVT Grid





Figure MASS-4. Logical Grid Used for the CCA PA BRAGFLO Calculations

The new model does not alter the conceptual model of the shaft seal components as described in the CCA. Rather, it simplifies the representation of seal components in the repository system model. The CRA and CCA shaft models are graphically compared in Figure MASS-5. The simplified shaft model was tested in the AP-106 calculations (Stein and Zelinski 2003a and 2003b), which supported the Salado Flow Peer Review (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 9.0, Section 9.1.3.4). The results of this analysis demonstrated that brine flow through the simplified shaft model was comparable to brine flows through the detailed shaft model in the CCA PAVT calculations. The conclusion remains that the shaft seals are very effective barriers to flow throughout the 10,000-year regulatory period. The CRA-2004 PA shaft representation is used in the CRA-2009 PA.

MASS-4.2.3 CRA-2004 Implementation of Option D-Type Panel Closure

In the CCA, the DOE presented four options for panel closure designs (A through D). Upon reviewing the CCA, the EPA mandated the implementation of the Option D design. For the



1
 2 **Figure MASS-5. Comparison of the Simplified Shaft (CRA-2004 and CRA-2009) and the**
 3 **Detailed Shaft (CCA) Models**

4 CRA-2004, the true cross-sectional area of the Option D panel closures was represented in the
 5 flow model. In addition, to appropriately represent the effect of Option D geometry on
 6 repository fluid flow, the segmentation of the waste regions was increased in the grid. This
 7 change is described fully in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-
 8 4.2.4. The CRA-2009 PA continues to use the same panel closure representation as the CRA-
 9 2004 PA.

10 For CRA-2004, three sets of panel closures are included in the model domain. The southernmost
 11 set of closures represents a pair of closures separating a single waste panel from the other waste
 12 areas. The middle set of closures represents four panel closures that will be emplaced between
 13 the southern and northern extended panels. The northernmost set of panel closures represents
 14 two sets of four panel closures that will be emplaced between the waste regions and the shaft
 15 seals.

16 Each set of panel closures is represented in the CRA-2004 grid with four materials. Refer to
 17 Figure MASS-6.

- 18 1. CONC_PCS: This material represents the concrete monolith, which has properties of Salado
 19 Mass Concrete (SMC).
- 20 2. DRZ_PCS: This material represents the DRZ immediately above the concrete monolith that
 21 is expected to heal after the emplacement of the monolith.




Figure MASS-6. Logical Grid Representation of the Option D Panel Closures for the CRA


3. DRF_PCS: This material represents the empty drift and explosion wall portion of the panel closure. This material has the same properties as WAS_AREA (including creep closure).
4. MB materials S_ANH_AB and S_MB 139: These materials are the same as those used to represent the anhydrite MBs in other parts of the grid. MB materials were used because they have permeability ranges very close to the material CONC_PCS and in the case when pressures near the panel closures exceed the fracture initiation pressure of the MBs, fractures could extend around the concrete monolith out of the 2-D plane represented by the numerical grid. By using MB materials to represent the parts of the panel closures that intersect MBs, both the permeability of the closure and the potential fracture behavior of MB material near the closures are represented.

Figure MASS-7 is a schematic diagram comparing the panel closure implementation in the CCA and CRA-2004 grids. Permeability ranges are indicated for all materials. Figure MASS-6 shows the 13 grid cells used to represent each set of Option D panel closures in the CRA-2004 BRAGFLO grid.

MASS-4.2.4 Increased Segmentation of Waste Regions in Grid

The CCA PA/CCA PAVT grid divided the waste region into two regions: a single panel in the southern end of the repository referred to as the Waste Panel, and a larger region containing the other nine panels referred to as the RoR. The Waste Panel is intersected by an intrusion borehole and is used to represent conditions in any panel intersected by a borehole.

It is assumed that the Option D panel closures are effective at impeding flow between panels. Therefore, it was considered necessary to divide the rest of repository (RoR) into northern and southern blocks separated by a set of panel closures. The south RoR block represents conditions in a panel directly adjacent to an intruded panel. The north RoR block represents conditions in a nonadjacent panel far from the intruded panel (i.e., it has at least two panel closures between it and the intruded panel). This representation assumes that the effects of drilling intrusions will be damped in nonintruded panels, and the degree of damping will depend on the proximity of the drilling intrusion and the number of panel closures separating the intruded panel from other regions of the repository. The CRA-2009 PA uses the same segmentation of the waste regions as in the CRA-2004 PA. (See the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-4.2.4 for a description of waste-region segmentation.)



[* = allowed to fracture, permeability is pressure dependant above ~12.5 MPa]

Figure MASS-7. Schematic Comparison of the Representation of Panel Closures in the CCA PAVT and CRA-2004

MASS-4.2.5 CRA-2004 Redefined and Simplified Grid Flaring Method

Grid flaring is a method to represent three-dimensional volumes in a two-dimensional grid. Flaring is used when flows can be represented as divergent and convergent from the center of flaring. The CCA PA/CCA PAVT grid used flaring at two different scales: locally around the borehole and shaft, and regionally to the north and south of the excavated regions (around a point in the northern end of the RoR). For the CRA-2004 PA, the local flaring around the borehole is the same as in the CCA PA/CCA PAVT grid. The local flaring around the shaft was eliminated because it had been demonstrated not to be a release pathway. Likewise, the manner in which the regional flaring was calculated has been simplified. The CRA-2009 PA uses the same grid flaring as in the CRA-2004 PA. (See the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-4.2.5 for a description of grid flaring).

MASS-4.2.6 CRA-2004 Refinement of the X-Spacing Outside the Repository

The grid blocks to the north and south of the excavated region were refined in the x-direction from the baseline grid. The x dimension of the grid cells immediately to the north and south of the repository starts at 2 m and increases by a factor of 1.45.

1 Exceptions to this are made to ensure that the location of the Land Withdrawal Boundary and the
2 total extent of the grid matches that in the baseline grid. This CRA-2004 PA refinement factor
3 was chosen to reduce numerical dispersion caused by rapid increases in cell dimensions
4 (Anderson and Woessner 1992 and Wang and Anderson 1982). The CRA-2009 PA continues to
5 use this refinement.

6 **MASS-4.2.7 CRA-2004 Refinement of the Y-Spacing**

7 During the CRA-2004 PA, the y direction grid spacing within the layers representing the Salado
8 was changed from the CCA PA/CCA PAVT grid spacing. The Salado grid spacing used in the
9 CCA PA was dictated by the thickness of different shaft seal materials. Since the shaft is no
10 longer represented in the model domain, the y spacing in the Salado is now uniform. In addition,
11 two layers were added immediately above and below MB 139 to refine the grid spacing and
12 reduce numerical dispersion. These changes resulted in a total of 33 y divisions for the grid, and
13 increased the numerical accuracy of flow and transport calculations.

14 The x and y direction refinements used in the CRA-2004 PA grid are included in the CRA-2009
15 PA.

1 **MASS-5.0 BRAGFLO Geometry of the Repository**

2 The BRAGFLO code uses a grid to represent the conceptual model of the repository geometry
3 (see Figure MASS-3). As with the geometry of the disposal system discussed in the CRA-2004,
4 Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2.1 and earlier in this appendix, the principal process considered in
5 setting up the repository geometry is fluid flow. Several features considered to be important in
6 fluid flow are included in the conceptual model. The first is the overall dimension of the
7 repository along the north-south trend of the cross section, as well as the major divisions within
8 the repository (i.e., waste disposal region, operations region, and experimental region). The
9 second is the volume of a single panel, because fluid flow to a borehole penetrating the
10 repository may have direct access only to the volume in a waste panel. Access to other regions
11 of the repository may require flow through or around a panel closure. The third feature is the
12 physical dimensions of panel closures separating the single panel and the other major divisions
13 of the repository.

14 Notably absent from the conceptual model for the long-term performance of the repository are
15 pillars and individual drifts and rooms. These are excluded from the model for simplicity, and it
16 is assumed that they have either negligible impact on fluid-flow processes or, alternatively, that
17 including them in the conceptual model would be beneficial to long-term performance because
18 their presence could make flow paths more tortuous and decrease fluxes. This assumption
19 includes lumping four and five of the 10 panels into the south RoR and north RoR regions
20 respectively (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-4.2.4).

21 The BRAGFLO model of the WIPP disposal system is a two-dimensional array of three-
22 dimensional grid blocks. Each grid block has a finite length, width, height, volume, and surface
23 area for its boundaries with neighboring grid blocks. The BRAGFLO two-dimensional grid is
24 similar to any other two-dimensional grid used to treat flows, except that the grid-block
25 dimension in the z direction (perpendicular to the plane of the grid) varies from block to block as
26 a function of the x direction (the lateral direction) (see the CRA-2004, Appendix MASS, Section
27 MASS-4.2.5). This allows the BRAGFLO grid to treat important geometric aspects of the WIPP
28 disposal system, such as the very small intrusion borehole, the moderate-sized shaft, and the
29 larger controlled areas. The grid configurations used in the CCA PA and the CCA PAVT are
30 shown in Figure MASS-4, while the grid used for the CRA-2004 PA and the CRA-2009 PA is
31 shown in Figure MASS-3.

32 **MASS-5.1 Historical Context of the Repository Model**

33 Several early models of repository fluid-flow behavior—including models of radionuclide
34 migration pathways, gas flow from the disposal area to the shaft, Salado brine flow through
35 panel to borehole, effects of anhydrite layers on Salado brine flow through a panel, and flow
36 from a brine reservoir through a disposal room—are summarized in Rechar et al. (1990, pp.
37 153–60). In the preliminary PA of 1992, all waste was lumped into a single region (WIPP
38 Performance Assessment 1993). Because human intrusion boreholes were treated in detail for
39 the CCA PA, it was necessary to model a single waste panel with a borehole surrounded by two-
40 dimensional radial-flaring gridblocks. This approach is continued for the CRA-2009 PA. The
41 CCA PA treated the remainder of the waste area as a single RoR. For the CRA-2004 PA and
42 subsequent analyses, the RoR is divided into two areas separated by a panel closure system. As

1 discussed earlier, this change was made to more adequately simulate the effects of the Option D
2 closure in impeding fluid flow between panels.

3 **MASS-5.2 CRA-2009 Repository Model**

4 The repository model for the CRA-2009 PA is the same model used in the CRA-2004 PABC.
5 That model used the same features described for the CRA-2004 PA, with no changes to the
6 representation of the repository geometry or BRAGFLO grid.

1 **MASS-6.0 Creep Closure**

2 The creep closure model used in the CRA-2009 is the same used in the CRA-2004 and the CRA-
3 2004 PABC. The model used for creep closure of the repository is discussed in Appendix
4 PORSURF-2009. Historical information on creep closure modeling is also contained in
5 Appendix PORSURF-2009.

1 **MASS-7.0 Repository Fluid Flow**

2 Most repository fluid flow assumptions have not changed from those used in the CRA-2004
3 PABC. Those that did not change are discussed in Section MASS-7.1 and Section MASS-7.2
4 while those that did change are discussed in Section MASS-7.3. This model represents the long-
5 term flow behavior of liquid and gas in the repository and its interaction with other regions in
6 which fluid flow may occur, such as the Salado, shafts, or an intrusion borehole. This model is
7 not used to represent the interaction of fluids in the repository with a borehole during drilling.
8 Historical information on alternative conceptual models for brine inflow to the repository is
9 contained in the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS-7.0).

10 The first principle in the conceptual model for fluid flow in the repository is that gas and brine
11 can both be present and mobile (two-phase flow), governed by conservation of energy and mass
12 and by Darcy's Law for their fluxes (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2). Consistent with
13 typical concepts of two-phase flow, the phases can affect each other by impeding flow caused by
14 partial saturation (relative permeability effects) and by affecting pressure caused by capillary
15 forces (capillary pressure effects).

16 The flow of brine and gas in the repository is assumed to behave as two-phase, immiscible,
17 Darcy flow (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2). BRAGFLO is used to simulate brine and
18 gas flow in the repository and to incorporate the effects of disposal-room closure and gas
19 generation. Fluid flow in the repository is affected by the following factors:

- 20 • The geometric association of pillars, rooms, and drifts; panel closure caused by creep; and
21 possible borehole locations
- 22 • The varied properties of the waste areas resulting from creep closure and heterogeneous
23 contents
- 24 • Flow interactions with other parts of the disposal system
- 25 • Reactions that generate gas

26 The geometry of the panel around the intrusion borehole is consistent with the assumption that
27 the fluid flow there will occur directly toward or directly away from the borehole. The geometry
28 represents a semicircular volume north of the borehole and a semicircular volume south of the
29 borehole (representing radial flow in a subregion of a two-dimensional representation of the
30 repository).

31 Approximating convergent and divergent flow around the intrusion borehole creates a narrow
32 neck in the otherwise fairly uniform width grid in the region representing the repository. In the
33 undisturbed performance scenario, and under certain conditions in other scenarios, flow in the
34 repository may pass laterally through this neck. In reality, this neck does not exist. Its presence
35 in the model is expected to have a negligible or conservative impact on model predictions
36 compared to predictions that would result from a more realistic model geometry. The time scale
37 involved and the permeability contrast between the repository and surrounding rock are
38 sufficient so that the lateral flow that may occur in the repository is restricted by the rate at which

1 liquid gets into or out of the repository, rather than by the rate at which it flows through the
2 repository.

3 Gas generation is affected by the quantity of liquid in contact with metal. However, the
4 distribution of fluid in the repository can only be approximated. For example, capillary action
5 can create wicking that would increase the overall region in which gas generation occurs, but
6 modeling this at the necessary resolution to simulate these processes would greatly increase the
7 time required to carry out the modeling (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.6 and CRA-2004,
8 Section 6.4.3.3). Therefore, as a bounding measure for gas generation purposes, brine in the
9 repository is distributed to an extent greater than estimated by the Darcy flow models or by the
10 values of parameters chosen.

11 Option D panel closures and the surrounding rocks are represented by a group of materials,
12 including

- 13 1. SMC
- 14 2. A material representing the empty drift and explosion wall
- 15 3. A material representing healed DRZ
- 16 4. MBs

17 SMC and healed DRZ materials are assigned permeability values sampled independently from a
18 distribution ranging from 2×10^{-21} to 1×10^{-17} m². This value range is considered reasonable
19 because the shape of the Option D closure assumes a compressive state that maintains a concrete
20 permeability range similar to the CCA PAVT permeability. This range captures the uncertainty
21 in the long-term performance of the Option D panel closure design.

22 Modeling of flow within the repository is based on homogenizing the room contents into
23 relatively large computational volumes. The approach ignores heterogeneities in disposal room
24 contents that may influence gas and brine behavior by causing fluid flow among channels or
25 creating preferential paths in the waste, bypassing entire regions. Isolated regions could exist for
26 several reasons:

- 27 • They may be isolated by low-permeability regions of waste that serve as barriers.
- 28 • Connectivity with the interbeds may occur only at particular locations within the repository.
- 29 • The repository dip may promote preferential gas flow in the upper regions of the waste.

30 For the CCA, the adequacy of the repository homogeneity assumption was examined in
31 screening analyses DR-1 (Webb 1995) and DR-6 (Vaughn, Lord, and MacKinnon 1995a). These
32 analyses used an additional parameter in BRAGFLO to specify the minimum active (mobile)
33 brine flow saturation (pseudoresidual brine saturation). Above this saturation, the normal
34 descriptions of two-phase flow apply (i.e., either the Brooks and Corey or van Genuchten and
35 Parker relative permeability models). Below this minimum, brine is immobile, although it is
36 available for reaction and may still be consumed during gas-generation reactions. The

1 assumption of a minimum saturation limit was justified based on the presumed heterogeneity of
2 the waste and the slight dip in the repository. The minimum active brine saturation was treated
3 as an uncertain parameter and sampled uniformly between the values 0.1 and 0.8 during the
4 analysis. This saturation limit was applied uniformly throughout the disposal room to bound the
5 impact of heterogeneities on flow (Webb 1995 and Vaughn, Lord, and MacKinnon 1995a).
6 Results of this analysis showed that releases to the accessible environment in the baseline case
7 (homogenization) are consistently higher.

8 The experimental and operations regions were represented in the CCA PA by a fixed porosity of
9 18.0% and a permeability of 10^{-11} m². The combination of low porosity and high permeability
10 conservatively overestimated fluid flow through these regions and limited the capacity of these
11 regions to store fluids, potentially overestimating releases to the environment. This conclusion
12 was based on a screening analysis (Vaughn, Lord, and MacKinnon 1995b) that examined the
13 importance of permeability varying with porosity in closure regions (waste disposal region,
14 experimental region, and operations region). To perform this analysis, a model for estimating
15 the change in permeability with porosity in the closure regions was implemented in BRAGFLO.
16 A series of BRAGFLO simulations was performed to determine whether permeability varying
17 with porosity in the closure regions could enhance contaminant migration to the accessible
18 environment. Two basic scenarios were considered in the screening analysis: undisturbed
19 performance and disturbed performance. To assess the sensitivity of system performance on
20 dynamic permeability in the closure regions, CCDFs of normalized contaminated brine releases
21 were constructed and compared with the corresponding baseline conditional CCDFs. The
22 baseline model treated permeabilities in the closure regions as fixed values. Results of this
23 analysis showed that the inclusion of dynamic closure of the waste disposal region, experimental
24 region, and operations region in BRAGFLO resulted in computed releases to the accessible
25 environment that are essentially equivalent to the baseline case.

26 A separate analysis (Park and Hansen 2003) examined the possible effects of heterogeneity in
27 waste container and waste material strength on room closure. The analysis of room closure
28 found that the room porosity may vary widely depending on the type of waste container and the
29 emplacement of waste in the repository. However, analysis of a separate PA (Hansen et al.
30 2003) found that PA results are relatively insensitive to the uncertainty in room closure and room
31 porosity. The conclusions of the separate PA are summarized in Section MASS-21.0 of this
32 appendix.

33 **MASS-7.1 Flow Interactions with the Creep Closure Model**

34 The dynamic effect of halite creep and room consolidation on room porosity is modeled only in
35 the waste disposal region. Other parts of the repository, such as the experimental region and the
36 operations region, are modeled assuming fixed (invariant with time) properties. In these regions,
37 the permeability is held at a fixed high value representative of unconsolidated material, while the
38 porosity is maintained at relatively low values associated with highly consolidated material. This
39 combination of low porosity and high permeability is assumed to conservatively overestimate
40 flow through these regions and minimize the capacity of this material to store fluids, thus
41 maximizing the release to the environment. To examine the acceptability of this assumption, a
42 screening analysis (Vaughn, Lord, and MacKinnon 1995c) evaluated the effect of including
43 closure of the experimental region and operations region. In this analysis, consolidation of the

1 experimental region and operations region was implemented in BRAGFLO by relating pressure
2 and time to porosity using a porosity-surface method. The porosity surface for the experimental
3 region and operations region differs from the surface used for consolidation of the disposal room
4 and is based on an empty excavation (see Appendix PORSURF-2009). The screening analysis
5 showed that disregarding dynamic closure of the experimental region is acceptable because it is
6 conservative: lower releases occur when closure of the experimental region and operations
7 region is computed compared to simulations with time-invariant high permeability and low
8 porosity.

9 **MASS-7.2 Flow Interactions with the Gas Generation Model**

10 Gas generation affects repository pressure, which in turn is an important parameter in other
11 processes such as two-phase flow, creep closure, and fracturing of the interbeds and DRZ. Gas-
12 generation processes considered in PA calculations include anoxic corrosion and microbial
13 degradation. Radiolysis is excluded from PA calculations on the basis of laboratory experiments
14 and a screening analysis (Vaughn et al. 1995) that concluded that radiolysis does not
15 significantly affect repository performance.

16 In modeling gas generation, the effective liquid in a computational cell is the computed liquid in
17 that cell plus an adjustment for the uncertainty associated with wicking by the waste (see
18 Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.6). Capillary action (wicking) is the ability of a material to
19 carry a fluid by capillary forces above the level it would normally seek in response to gravity.
20 Because the current gas-generation model computes substantially different gas-generation rates
21 depending on whether the waste is wet or merely surrounded by water vapor, the physical extent
22 of wetting could be important. A screening analysis (Vaughn, Lord, and MacKinnon 1995d)
23 examined wicking and concluded that it should be included in PA calculations.

24 The baseline gas-generation model in BRAGFLO accounts for corrosion of iron and microbial
25 degradation of cellulose and possibly plastics and rubber. The net reaction rate of these
26 processes depends directly on brine saturation: an increase in brine saturation will increase the
27 net reaction rate by weighting the inundated portion more heavily and the slower humid portion
28 less heavily. To simulate the effect of wicking on the net reaction rate, an effective brine
29 saturation, which includes a wicking saturation contribution, is used to calculate reaction rates
30 rather than the actual brine saturation. To account for uncertainty in the wicking saturation
31 contribution, this contribution was sampled from a uniform distribution from 0.0 to 1.0 for each
32 BRAGFLO simulation in the analysis.

33 **MASS-7.3 CRA-2009 Flow Interactions with the Gas-Generation Model** 34 **Changes**

35 The assumptions for brine availability were changed in BRAGFLO Version 6.0 to account for
36 brine-consuming reactions. Brine-consuming reactions such as anoxic corrosion tend to dry out
37 the waste-filled regions of the repository. The former BRAGFLO code and underlying models
38 could not simulate completely dry cells in the grid. To accommodate brine-consuming reactions
39 and allow the code to run, BRAGFLO Version 6.0 includes a lower cut off in brine saturation for
40 waste-filled regions in the repository, representing a numerically dry condition. At this cut-off
41 saturation, biodegradation and iron corrosion ceases. This modification is explained fully in

- 1 Section 5.2.2 of Nemer and Clayton (2008). BRAGFLO version 6.0 was used in the CRA-2009
- 2 PA; older versions of the code were used in previous PAs.

1 **MASS-8.0 Gas Generation**

2 The gas generation model represents the possible generation of gas in the repository by corrosion
3 of steel and microbial degradation of CPR materials. The CRA-2009 uses the CRA-2004 PABC
4 gas generation modeling assumptions. Although the amount of the excess MgO engineered
5 barrier emplaced in the repository has been reduced from 1.67 to 1.2, the PA methodology does
6 not account for any excess material in the modeling assumption and therefore no changes to
7 these assumptions are necessary. Additional discussion of this topic may be found in Appendix
8 PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.5 and Appendix SCR-2009 (FEPs W44 through W48, W53, and N71)
9 and the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.3.

10 **MASS-8.1 Historical Context of Gas Generation Modeling**

11 See the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS-8.1 for historical information on the
12 development of the CCA gas-generation conceptual model.

1 **MASS-9.0 Chemical Conditions**

- 2 The chemical conditions modeling assumptions have not changed from those in the CRA-2004
3 PABC. The models used for chemical conditions in the repository are discussed in Appendix
4 MgO-2009 and Appendix SOTERM-2009.

1 **MASS-10.0 Dissolved Actinide Source Term**

2 The dissolved An source term modeling assumptions have not changed from those in the CRA-
3 2004 PABC. The models used for the dissolved An source term in the repository are discussed
4 in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-4.0 and Section SOTERM-5.0.

1 **MASS-11.0 Colloidal Actinide Source Term**

- 2 The colloidal An source term modeling assumptions have not changed from those in the CRA-
3 2004 PABC. The models used for the colloidal An source term are discussed in Appendix
4 SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-3.8.

1 **MASS-12.0 Shafts and Shaft Seals**

- 2 The shafts and shaft seals modeling assumptions have not changed from those in the CRA-2004
3 PABC. The models used for shafts and shaft seals are discussed in the CRA-2004, Appendix
4 PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-12.0.

1 **MASS-13.0 Salado**

2 The far-field Salado modeling assumptions used in the CRA-2009 are the same as those used in
3 the CRA-2004 PABC. No changes have been made to these modeling assumptions for the CRA-
4 2009 PA. The purpose of this model is to reasonably represent the effects of fluid flow in the
5 Salado on long-term performance of the disposal system. The conceptual model is also
6 discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5. The Salado fluid flow model represented
7 in the CRA-2004 PABC is also used in the CRA-2009 PA (Nemer and Clayton 2008).

8 Fluid flow in the Salado is considered in the conceptual model of long-term disposal system
9 performance for several reasons. First, some liquid could move from the Salado to the repository
10 because of the considerable gradients that can form for liquid flow inward to the repository. This
11 possibility is important because such fluid can affect creep closure, gas generation, An solubility,
12 and other processes occurring in the repository. Second, gas generated in the repository is
13 thought to be capable of fracturing the Salado interbeds under certain conditions, creating
14 increased permeability channels that could be pathways for lateral transport. The lateral
15 transport pathway in intact Salado is also modeled, but it is considered unlikely to result in any
16 significant radionuclide transport to the accessible environment boundary.

17 The fundamental principle in the conceptual model for fluid flow in the Salado is that it is a
18 porous medium within which gas and brine can both be present and mobile (two-phase flow),
19 governed by conservation of energy and mass and by Darcy's Law for their fluxes (see Appendix
20 PA-2009, Sections PA-4.2). Consistent with typical concepts of two-phase flow, each phase can
21 affect the other by impeding flow because of partial saturation (relative permeability effects) and
22 by affecting pressure by capillary forces (capillary pressure effects). It was originally assumed
23 that no waste-generated gas is present before repository closure. However, during the EPA
24 completeness review of the CRA-2004, the representation of the gas-generation rate was
25 changed for the CRA-2004 PABC (Cotsworth 2005). The repository was precharged after
26 closure to represent the short-term, but initially faster, microbial gas-generation rate (see Section
27 MASS-8.0 and Leigh et al. 2005, Section 2.3). Future states are modeled as producing gas by
28 corrosion and microbial activities. Should high pressure develop over the regulatory period, it is
29 allowed to access MBs in the Salado.

30 Some variability in composition exists between different horizons of the Salado. The largest
31 differences occur between the anhydrite-rich layers called interbeds and those dominated by
32 halite. Within horizons dominated by halite, composition varies from nearly pure halite to halite
33 plus several percent other minerals, in some instances including clay (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0,
34 Section 2.1.3.4). The Salado is modeled as impure halite except for those interbeds that intersect
35 the DRZ near the repository. This conceptual model and an alternative model that explicitly
36 represented all stratigraphically distinct layers of the Salado near the repository (Christian-Frear
37 and Webb 1996) produced similar results.

38 From other modeling and theoretical considerations, flow between the Salado and the repository
39 is expected to occur primarily through interbeds that intersect the DRZ. Because of the large
40 surface areas between the interbeds and surrounding halite, the interbeds serve as conduits for
41 the flow of brine in two directions: from halite to interbeds to the repository, or, for brine
42 flowing out of the repository, from the repository into interbeds and then into halite. Because the

1 repository is modeled as a relatively porous and permeable region, brine is considered most
2 likely (but not constrained) to leave the repository through MB 139 below the repository because
3 of the effect of gravity. If repository pressures become sufficiently high, gas is modeled to exit
4 the repository via the MBs.

5 The effect of gravity may also be important in the Salado because of the slight and variable
6 natural stratigraphic dip. For long-term performance modeling, the dip in the Salado within the
7 domain is taken to be constant and 1 degree from north to south.

8 Fluid flow in the Salado is conceptualized as occurring either convergently into the repository or
9 divergently from it, as discussed in detail in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2.1.
10 Because the repository is not conceptualized as homogeneous, implementing a geometry for the
11 conceptual model of convergent or divergent flow in the Salado is somewhat complicated and is
12 discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2.1.

13 The conceptual model for Salado fluid flow has primary interactions with three other conceptual
14 models. The interbed fracture conceptual model allows porosity and permeability of the
15 interbeds to increase as a function of pressure. The repository fluid flow model is directly
16 coupled to the Salado fluid flow model by the governing equations of flow in BRAGFLO (in the
17 governing equations of the mathematical model, they cannot be distinguished), and it differs only
18 in the region modeled and the parameters assigned to materials. The Salado model for An
19 transport is directly coupled to the conceptual model for flow in the Salado through the process
20 of advection. Additional information on the treatment of the Salado in PA is found in Appendix
21 PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.

22 **MASS-13.1 High Threshold Pressure for Halite-Rich Salado Rock Units**

23 An important parameter used to describe the effects of two-phase flow is threshold pressure,
24 which helps to determine the ease with which gas can enter a liquid-saturated rock unit. For a
25 brine-saturated rock, the threshold pressure is defined as “equal to the capillary pressure at which
26 the relative permeability to the gas phase begins to rise from its zero value, corresponding to the
27 incipient development of interconnected gas flow paths through the pore network” (Davies 1991,
28 p. 9).

29 The threshold pressure, as well as other parameters used to describe two-phase characteristics,
30 has not been measured for halite-rich rocks of the Salado. The Salado, however, is thought to be
31 similar in pore structure to rocks for which threshold pressures have been measured (Davies
32 1991). Based on this observation, Davies (1991) postulated that the threshold pressure of the
33 halite-rich rocks in the Salado could be estimated if an empirical correlation exists between rocks
34 postulated to have similar pore structure.

35 Davies developed a correlation between threshold pressure and intrinsic permeability applicable
36 to the Salado halites. A similar correlation was developed for Salado anhydrites; subsequent
37 testing confirmed that the correlation predicted threshold pressures accurately. The correlation
38 developed by Davies predicts threshold pressures in intact Salado halites on the order of 20 MPa
39 or greater (Davies 1991). This threshold pressure predicted by correlation is much higher than

1 that expected to persist in the repository, so that for all practical and predictive purposes, no gas
2 will flow into intact Salado halites (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.1).

3 Because threshold pressure helps control the flow of gas, and because the greatest volume of
4 rock in the Salado is rich in halite, a high threshold pressure effectively limits the volume of gas
5 that can be accommodated in the pore spaces of the intact host formation. Thus, high threshold
6 pressure is considered conservative, because if gas could flow into the pore spaces of intact
7 Salado halite, repository pressures could be reduced dramatically.

8 **MASS-13.2 Historical Context of the Salado Conceptual Model**

9 See the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS-13.2 for the historical information relating to the
10 CCA Salado conceptual model. The Salado conceptual model is unchanged for the CRA-2009
11 PA.

12 **MASS-13.3 The Fracture Model**

13 The fracture model assumptions have not changed from those in the CRA-2004 PABC. The
14 purpose of this model is to alter the porosity and permeability of the anhydrite interbeds and the
15 DRZ if their pressure approaches lithostatic, simulating some of the hydraulic effects of fractures
16 with the intent that unrealistically high pressures (in excess of lithostatic) do not occur in the
17 repository or disposal system. The conceptual model is also discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter
18 6.0, Section 6.4.5.2. The fracture model assumptions have not changed from those in the CRA-
19 2004 PABC.

20 In the 1992 preliminary PA, repository pressures were shown to greatly exceed lithostatic
21 pressure if a large quantity of gas was generated. Pressures within the waste repository and
22 surrounding regions were predicted to be roughly 20 to 25 MPa. It was expected that fracturing
23 within the anhydrite MBs would occur at pressures slightly above lithostatic pressure. An expert
24 panel on fractures was convened to develop the conceptual bases for the fracturing within the
25 anhydrite MBs.

26 Two parametric behaviors must be quantified in the conceptual model. First, the change of
27 porosity with pressure in the anhydrite MBs must be specified. This is done with a relatively
28 simple equation, described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.4, that relates porosity change
29 to pressure change using an assumption that the fracturing can be thought of as increasing the
30 compressibility of interbeds. Parameters in the model are treated as fitting parameters and have
31 little relation to physical behavior except that they affect the porosity change. The second
32 parametric behavior is the change of permeability with pressure, which is incorporated by a
33 functional dependence on the porosity change. It is assumed that a power function is appropriate
34 for relating the magnitude of permeability increase to the magnitude of porosity increase. The
35 parameter in this power function, an exponent, is also treated as a fitting parameter and can be
36 set so that the behavior of permeability increase with porosity increase fits the desired behavior.

37 The fracture enhancement model assumes fracture propagation is uniform in the lateral direction
38 to flow within the MBs in the absence of dip. The 1-degree dip modeled in BRAGFLO may
39 affect fracture propagation direction; however, within the accuracy of the finite difference grid, a

1 fracture will develop radially outward. This would not account for fracture fingering or a
2 preferential fracturing direction; however, no existing evidence supports heterogeneous anhydrite
3 properties that would contribute to preferential fracture propagation. This evidence is discussed
4 in the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment 13-2.

5 The maximum enhanced fracture porosity controls the storativity within the fracture. The extent
6 of the migration of the gas front into the MB is sensitive to this storativity. The additional
7 storativity caused by porosity enhancement will mitigate gas migration within the MB. The
8 enhancement of permeability by MB fracturing will make the gas more mobile and will
9 contribute to longer gas-migration distances. Thus the effects of porosity enhancement at least
10 partially counteract the effects of permeability enhancement in affecting the gas-migration
11 distances.

12 Because intact anhydrite is partially fractured, the pressure at which porosity or permeability
13 changes are initiated is close to the initial pressure within the anhydrite. The fracture treatment
14 within the MBs will not contribute to early brine drainage from the MB because the pressures at
15 these times are below the fracture initiation pressure.

16 The input data to the interbed fracture model (see Fox 2008, Table 30, Table 31, and Table 32)
17 were chosen deterministically to produce the appropriate pressure and porosity response as
18 predicted by a linear elastic fracture mechanics model, as discussed in Mendenhall and Gerstle
19 (1993).

20 **MASS-13.4 Flow in the DRZ**

21 Modeling assumptions relating to flow in the DRZ have not changed from those in the CRA-
22 2004 PABC. The conceptual model for the DRZ around the waste disposal, operations, and
23 experimental regions has been chosen to provide a reasonably conservative estimate of fluid flow
24 between the repository and the intact halite and anhydrite MBs. The conceptual model is also
25 discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.3.

26 The conceptual model implemented in the CCA PA used values for the permeability and porosity
27 of the DRZ that did not vary with time. A screening analysis examined an alternative conceptual
28 model for the DRZ in which permeability and porosity changed dynamically in response to
29 changes in pressure (Vaughn, Lord, and MacKinnon 1995e). This analysis implemented a
30 fracturing model in BRAGFLO for the DRZ. This fracturing model is used in the existing
31 anhydrite interbed model. In this model, formation permeability and porosity depend on brine
32 pressure, as described by Freeze, Larsen, and Davies (1995, pp. 2-16 through 2-19) and
33 Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.4. This model permits the representation of two important
34 formation-alteration effects. First, pressure buildup caused by gas generation and creep closure
35 within the waste will slightly increase porosity within the DRZ and offer additional fluid storage
36 with lower pressures. Second, the accompanying increase in formation permeability will enhance
37 fluid flow away from the DRZ. Because an increase in porosity tends to reduce outflow into the
38 far field, parameter values for this analysis were selected so that the DRZ alteration model
39 greatly increases permeability while only modestly increasing porosity.

1 Two basic scenarios were considered in the screening analysis by Vaughn, Lord, and
2 MacKinnon (1995e): undisturbed repository performance and disturbed repository performance.
3 Both scenarios included a 1-degree formation dip downward to the south. Intrusion event E1 is
4 considered in the disturbed scenario and consists of a borehole that penetrates the repository and
5 pressurized brine in the underlying Castile. Two variations of intrusion event E1 were
6 examined: E1 updip and E1 downdip. In the E1 updip event, the intruded panel region was
7 located on the north end of the waste disposal region, whereas in the E1 downdip event, the
8 intruded panel region was located on the south end of the disposal region. These two different
9 geometries permitted evaluation of the possibility of increased brine flow into the panel region
10 and the potential for subsequent impacts on contaminant migration. To incorporate the effects of
11 uncertainty in each case (E1 updip, E1 downdip, and undisturbed), a Latin hypercube sample
12 (LHS) size of 20 was used, for a total of 60 simulations. To assess the sensitivity of system
13 performance on formation alteration of the DRZ, conditional CCDFs of normalized
14 contaminated brine releases were constructed and compared with the corresponding baseline
15 model conditional CCDFs that were computed with constant DRZ permeability and porosity
16 values. Based on comparisons between conditional CCDFs, computed releases to the accessible
17 environment were determined to be essentially equivalent between the two treatments. Since the
18 two configurations were determined to have essentially equivalent impacts on releases, the
19 intrusion borehole was assumed to intrude in the down-dip or south side of the repository where
20 it is assumed brine would more readily accumulate (see Figure MASS-3).

21 Preliminary PAs considered alternative conceptual models that allowed for some lateral extent of
22 the DRZ into the halite surrounding the waste disposal region and for the development of a
23 transition zone between anhydrites A and B and MB 138 (WIPP Performance Assessment 1993,
24 Volume 4, Figure 4.1-2 and Figure 5.1-2; and Davies, Webb, and Gorham 1992; and Gorham et
25 al. 1992). The transition zone was envisioned as a region that had experienced some hydraulic
26 depressurization and perhaps some elastic stress relief because of the excavation, but probably no
27 irreversible rock damage and no large permeability changes. Modeling results indicated that
28 including the lateral extent of the DRZ had no significant effect on fluid flow. Communication
29 vertically to MB 138 was thought to be a potentially important process, however, and the model
30 adopted for PA assumes that the DRZ extends upward to MB 138 and permeability is sampled
31 over the same range used in the CRA PAVT. This representation continues to be used in the
32 CRA-2009 PA.

33 **MASS-13.5 Actinide Transport in the Salado**

34 The An transport modeling assumptions have not changed from those in the CRA-2004 PABC.
35 The purpose of this model, implemented in the code NUTS, is to represent the transport of
36 actinides in the Salado. This model is also discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section
37 6.4.5.4 and Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.3.4.

38 Actinide transport in the Salado is conceptualized as occurring only by advection, or movement
39 of material through the bulk flow of a fluid, through the porous medium described in the Salado
40 hydrology conceptual model. Advection is a direct function of fluid flow, which is discussed in
41 the conceptual model for Salado fluid flow. Other processes that might disperse actinides, such
42 as diffusion, hydrodynamic dispersion, and channeling in discrete fractures, are not included in

1 the conceptual model. Since these processes will reduce An transport, it is conservative to
2 ignore these processes.

3 To model radionuclide transport in the Salado, NUTS takes as input BRAGFLO's velocity field,
4 pressures, porosities, saturations, and other model parameters (including geometrical grid,
5 residual saturation, material map, brine compressibility, and time step) averaged over a given
6 number of time steps (20 for the CRA-2009 PA calculations). NUTS then models the transport
7 of radionuclides within all the regions for which BRAGFLO computes brine and gas flow. The
8 brine must pass through some part of the repository at some point during the 10,000-year
9 regulatory period if it is to become contaminated. Radioactive constituents of the waste in the
10 repository are assumed to dissolve into the brine while the brine is in the repository; the
11 radionuclides are then transported by advection to other regions outside the repository.
12 Consequently, the results of NUTS are subject to all the uncertainties associated with
13 BRAGFLO's conceptual model and parameterization, and are presented in Appendix PA-2009.
14 Details of the source term, which specifies the types and amounts of radionuclides that are
15 assumed to come into contact with the waste, are discussed in Appendix SOTERM-2009,
16 Section SOTERM-3.1 and Table SOTERM-6.

17 NUTS neglects molecular dispersion. For materials of interest in the WIPP repository system,
18 molecular diffusion coefficients are, at most, on the order of $4 \times 10^{-10} \text{ m}^2$ per second. Thus, the
19 simplest scaling argument using a time scale of 10,000 years leads to a molecular diffusion (that
20 is, mixing) length scale of approximately 33 ft (10 m), which is negligible compared to the
21 lateral advection length scale of roughly 7,874 ft (2,400 m) (the lateral distance from the
22 repository to the accessible environment).

23 NUTS also neglects mechanical dispersion (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.4.2).
24 Dispersion is quantified by dispersivities, which are empirical tensor factors proportional to flow
25 velocity (to within geometrical factors related to flow direction). They account for both the
26 downstream and cross-stream spreading of local extreme values in concentration of dissolved
27 constituents. Physically, the spreading is caused by the fact that both the particle paths and
28 velocity histories of once-neighboring particles can be vastly different because of material
29 heterogeneities characterized by permeability variations. These variations arise from the
30 irregular cross-sectional areas and tortuous inhomogeneous, anisotropic connectivity between
31 pores. Because of its velocity dependence, the transverse component of mechanical dispersivity
32 tends to transport dissolved constituents from regions of relatively rapid flow (where mechanical
33 dispersion has a larger effect) to regions of slower flow (where mechanical dispersion has a
34 smaller effect). In the downstream direction, dispersivity merely spreads constituents in the flow
35 direction. Conceptually, ignoring lateral spreading assures that dissolved constituents will
36 remain in the rapid part of the flow field, which assures their transport toward the boundary.
37 Similarly, ignoring longitudinal dispersivity ignores the elongation of a feature in the flow
38 direction, which would delay the arrival of radionuclide constituents at the accessible
39 environment. However, because the EPA release limits are time-integrated measures, the exact
40 time of arrival is unimportant for constituents that arrive at the accessible environment, so long
41 as arrival occurs within the assessment period (10,000 years).

42 NUTS conservatively disregards sorptive and other retarding effects throughout the entire flow
43 region even though retardation must occur at some level within the repository, the MBs, and the

1 anhydrite interbeds, and especially in zones with clay layers or clay as accessory minerals.
2 Advection is, therefore, the only transport mechanism considered in NUTS. Because the Darcy
3 flows are given by BRAGFLO to NUTS as input, the maximum solubility limits for combined
4 dissolved and colloidal components are the most important NUTS parameters. These
5 components are described in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-5.0.

1 **MASS-14.0 Geologic Units above the Salado**

2 The modeling assumptions of the geologic units above the Salado have not changed from those
3 in the CRA-2004 PABC. The model for geologic units above the Salado was developed to
4 provide a reasonable and realistic basis for simulations of fluid flow within the disposal system
5 and detailed simulations of groundwater flow and radionuclide transport in the Culebra. The
6 conceptual model for these units is also discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.

7 The conceptual model used in PA for the geologic units above the Salado is based on the overall
8 concept of a groundwater basin, as introduced in the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.1 and
9 in the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS-14.2. The computer code SECOFL3D was
10 originally used to evaluate the effect on regional-scale fluid flow by recharge and rock properties
11 in the groundwater basin above the Salado (see the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment 17-2).
12 However, simpler models for this region are implemented in codes used in PA. For example, in
13 the BRAGFLO model, layer thicknesses, important material properties including porosity and
14 permeability, and hydrologic properties such as pressure and initial fluid saturation are specified,
15 but the model geometry and boundary conditions are not suited to groundwater basin modeling
16 (nor is the BRAGFLO model used to make inferences about groundwater flow in the units above
17 the Salado). In PA, the Culebra is the only subsurface pathway modeled for radionuclide
18 transport above the Salado, although the groundwater basin conceptual model includes other
19 flow interactions. The Culebra model implemented in PA includes spatial variability in
20 hydraulic conductivity and uncertainty and variability in physical and chemical transport
21 processes. Thus, the geometries and properties of units in the different models applied to the
22 units above the Salado by the DOE are chosen to be consistent with the purpose of the model.

23 The MODFLOW-2000 and SECOTP2D codes are used directly in PA to model fluid flow and
24 transport in the Culebra. The assumptions made in these codes are discussed in the CRA-2004,
25 Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2 and the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section
26 MASS-15.0.

27 With respect to the units above the Salado, the BRAGFLO model is used only for determination
28 of fluid fluxes between the shaft or intrusion borehole and hydrostratigraphic units. For this
29 purpose, it does not need to resolve regional or local flow characteristics.

30 The basic stratigraphy and hydrology of the units above the Salado are described in the CRA-
31 2004, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.3.5, Section 2.1.3.6, Section 2.1.3.7, Section 2.1.3.8, Section
32 2.1.3.9, and Section 2.1.3.10 and Section 2.2.1.4. Additional supporting information is contained
33 in the CCA, Appendices GCR, HYDRO, and SUM. Details of the conceptual model for each
34 unit are described in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.1, Section 6.4.6.2, Section
35 6.4.6.3, Section 6.4.6.4, Section 6.4.6.5, Section 6.4.6.6, and Section 6.4.6.7 and additional
36 information on units above the Salado is found in Appendix HYDRO-2009.

37 The representation of units above the Salado used in the CRA-2009 PA has not changed from
38 that used in the CRA-2004 PA.

1 **MASS-14.1 Historical Context of the Units above the Salado Model**

2 See the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS-14.1 for historical information relating to the
3 conceptual models for units above the Salado for the CCA. The conceptual models for the units
4 above the Salado are unchanged for CRA-2009 PA.

5 **MASS-14.2 Groundwater-Basin Conceptual Model**

6 The groundwater-basin conceptual model and associated modeling assumptions have not
7 changed from those of the CRA-2004 PABC. For a discussion on the groundwater-basin
8 conceptual model, see the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS-14.2.

1 **MASS-15.0 Flow Through the Culebra**

2 The Culebra flow modeling assumptions have not changed from those in the CRA-2004 PABC.
3 The conceptual model for groundwater flow in the Culebra (1) provides a reasonable and
4 realistic basis for simulating radionuclide transport in the Culebra and (2) allows evaluation of
5 the extent to which uncertainty about groundwater flow in the Culebra may contribute to
6 uncertainty in the estimate of cumulative radionuclide releases from the disposal system. See the
7 CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2 for additional references to other relevant discussions on
8 this conceptual model.

9 The conceptual model used in PA for groundwater flow in the Culebra treats the Culebra as a
10 confined two-dimensional aquifer with constant thickness and spatially varying transmissivity
11 (see the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment 15-7). Flow is modeled as single-phase (liquid)
12 Darcy flow in a porous medium.

13 Basic stratigraphy and hydrology of the units above the Salado are described in the CRA-2004,
14 Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1 and Section 2.2. Additional supporting information is contained in the
15 CCA, Appendices GCR, HYDRO, and SUM.

16 The conceptual model for flow in the Culebra is discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0,
17 Section 6.4.6.2. Details of the calibration of the T fields, based on available field data, are given
18 in Appendix TFIELD-2009, Section TFIELD-4.0. Initial and boundary conditions used in the
19 model are given in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.10.2. A discussion of the adequacy
20 of the two-dimensional assumption for PA calculations is included in the CCA, Appendix
21 MASS, Attachment 15-7.

22 The principal parameter used in PA to characterize flow in the Culebra is an index parameter (the
23 transmissivity index) used to select a single T field for each LHS element from a set of calibrated
24 fields (see Fox 2008, Table 1), each of which is consistent with available data.

25 **MASS-15.1 Historical Context of the Culebra Model**

26 See the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-15.1 for historical
27 information relating to the Culebra conceptual model. The conceptual model for this unit is
28 unchanged for CRA-2009.

29 **MASS-15.2 Dissolved Actinide Transport and Retardation in the Culebra**

30 The purpose of this model is to represent the effects of advective transport and physical and
31 chemical retardation on the movement of actinides in the Culebra. This conceptual model is also
32 discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.1. The same model is used in the CRA-
33 2004 PABC and the CRA-2009 PA. For a historical presentation of this model, see the CRA-
34 2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-15.2.

1 **MASS-15.3 Colloidal Actinide Transport and Retardation in the Culebra**

2 The purpose of this model is to represent the effects of colloidal An transport in the Culebra.
3 This model is also discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.2 and the CRA-2004,
4 Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Attachments 15-2, 15-8, and 15-9. No changes have been
5 made to this model since the CRA-2004. Additional information and historical information on
6 colloidal An transport and retardation in the Culebra can be found in the CRA-2004, Appendix
7 PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-15.3.

8 **MASS-15.4 Subsidence Caused by Potash Mining in the Culebra**

9 The mining-related modeling assumptions have not changed from those in the CRA-2004 PABC.
10 This model incorporates the effects of potash mining in the McNutt Potash Zone on disposal
11 system performance (see Appendix SCR-2009, FEP H13, FEP H37, and FEP H38). Provisions
12 in Part 194 provide a conceptual model and elements of a mathematical model for these effects.
13 The DOE has implemented the EPA conceptual model (40 CFR § 194.32(b), U.S. Environmental
14 Protection Agency 1996) to be consistent with EPA criteria and guidance; this model is
15 described in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.3. Additional information on the
16 implementation of the mining subsidence model is available in Appendix TFIELD-2009, Section
17 TFIELD-9.0; the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachments 15-4 and 15-7; and Wallace (1996).

18 The principal parameter in this model is the range assigned to a factor by which hydraulic
19 conductivity in the Culebra is increased (see the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment 15-4). As
20 allowed in supplementary information to Part 194, it is the only parameter changed to account
21 for the effects of mining.

22 Mining in the McNutt has been considered in the performance of the WIPP since the original
23 siting activities. Siting criteria for both the site abandoned in 1975 and the current site included
24 setbacks from active mines. (See, for example, the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS-2.0.)
25 The 1980 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the WIPP (U.S. Department of
26 Energy 1980, pp. 9-145 through 9-148) considered the possibility of an indirect dose arising
27 from the effects of solution mining for potash or halite.

28 Mining has been included in scenario development for the WIPP since the earliest work on this
29 topic (see U.S. Department of Energy 1980 [pp. 9-145 through 9-148], Hunter 1989, Marietta et
30 al. 1989, Guzowski 1990, Tierney 1991, and WIPP Performance Assessment 1991). These early
31 scenario developments considered both solution and room-and-pillar mining. The focus was
32 generally on effects of mining outside the disposal system. In the CCA FEPs screening, solution
33 mining was screened out during scenario development (see Appendix SCR-2009, FEP H58 and
34 FEP H59). The two primary effects of mining considered were (1) changes in the hydraulic
35 conductivity of the Culebra or other units, and (2) changes in recharge as a result of surface
36 subsidence. These mining effects were not formally incorporated into quantitative assessment of
37 repository performance in preliminary PAs.

38 The inclusion of mining in PA satisfies the requirements of section 194.32(b) to consider the
39 effects of this activity on the disposal system.

1 **MASS-16.0 Intrusion Borehole**

2 The intrusion borehole modeling assumptions have not been changed from those in the CRA-
3 2004 PABC. The inclusion of intrusion boreholes in PA adds to the number of release pathways
4 for radionuclides from the disposal system. Direct releases to the surface may occur during
5 drilling as particulate material from cuttings, cavings, and spallings are carried to the surface.
6 Also, dissolved actinides may be carried to the surface in brine during drilling. Once abandoned,
7 the borehole presents a possible long-term pathway for fluid flow, such as might occur between a
8 hypothetical Castile brine reservoir, the repository, and overlying units. This topic is also
9 addressed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7 and Appendix SCR-2009 (FEP H1 and
10 FEP H21).

11 **MASS-16.1 Cuttings, Cavings, and Spallings Releases during Drilling**

12 The cuttings, cavings, and spallings models estimate the quantity of actinides released as solids
13 directly to the surface during drilling through the repository. The releases are caused by three
14 mechanisms: the drill bit boring through the waste (cuttings); the drilling fluid eroding the walls
15 of the borehole (cavings); and high repository gas pressure causing solid material failure and
16 entrainment into the drilling fluid in the wellbore (spallings). See the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0,
17 Section 6.4.7.1 and references to other appendices cited in that section for additional
18 information. Stochastic uncertainty in parameters relevant to these release mechanisms is
19 addressed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12. The conceptual model for cuttings,
20 cavings, and spallings is discussed in three parts because of the different processes that produce
21 the three types of material.

22 Cuttings are materials removed to the surface through drilling mud by the direct mechanical
23 action of the drill bit. The volume of waste removed to the surface is a function of the repository
24 height and the drill bit area. The principal parameter in the cuttings model is the diameter of the
25 drill bit (see Appendix DATA-2009, Attachment A).

26 Cavings are materials introduced into the drilling mud by the erosive action of circulating
27 drilling fluid on the waste in the walls of the borehole annulus. Erosion is driven solely by the
28 shearing action of the drilling fluid (or mud) as it moves up the borehole annulus. Shearing may
29 be caused by either laminar or turbulent flow. Repository-pressure effects on cavings, which are
30 negligible, are covered by the spall process. The principal parameters in the cavings model are
31 the properties of the drilling mud, drilling rates, the drill string angular velocity, and the shear
32 resistance of the waste. (See Fox 2008, Table 13 and Table 18, for details on the sampled
33 parameters used in the cavings model, the drill string angular velocity, and the effective shear
34 resistance to erosion.)

35 Spallings are solids introduced into the wellbore by the fluid pressure difference between the
36 repository and the bottom of the wellbore. If the repository pressure is sufficiently high (more
37 than about 12 MPa) relative to the well bottom hole pressure (about 8 MPa), the stress state in
38 the repository may cause repository solids to fail in the vicinity of the wellbore. In turn, these
39 solids may become entrained in the gas flowing toward the well, ultimately to be carried up to
40 the land surface and constituting a release. The principal parameters in the spallings model are
41 the gas pressure in the repository when it is penetrated and properties of the waste such as

1 permeability, tensile strength, and particle diameter. Because the release associated with spalling
2 is sensitive to gas pressure in the repository, it is strongly coupled to the BRAGFLO-calculated
3 conditions in the repository at the time of penetration.

4 **MASS-16.1.1 Historical Context of Cuttings, Cavings, and Spallings Models**

5 Cuttings and cavings releases are straightforward. The analytical equations governing erosion
6 (cavings) based on laminar and turbulent flow (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.5) have been
7 implemented in the code CUTTINGS_S. Using selected input based on assumed physical
8 properties of the waste and other drilling parameters, this code calculates the final caved
9 diameter of the borehole that intersects the waste.

10 The various approaches used for spallings up to the CCA PA are documented in the CCA,
11 Appendix MASS, Section MASS-16.1.1. Since the CCA PA, the spallings model has been
12 extensively revised and has changed fundamentally from an end-state erosional model to a
13 mechanically based, coupled material failure and transport model (WIPP Performance
14 Assessment 2003a). This model is implemented in the code DRSPALL. A discussion tracing
15 the historical steps from the CCA erosional model to the current DRSPALL model can be found
16 in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-16.1.1.

17 **MASS-16.1.2 Waste Mechanistic Properties**

18 Waste mechanical properties used in the CRA-2009 PA are the same as those in the CRA-2004
19 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC. Changes to the waste mechanistic properties for CRA-2004 were
20 previously documented in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-
21 16.1.2. Those changes involved the development of surrogate waste materials for the WIPP
22 spallings model. Surrogate waste recipes for 50% and 100% corrosion of the Fe-based inventory
23 were fabricated from the projected inventory of waste materials. The development of each
24 surrogate product assumed extensive degradation of the modeled constituent (Hansen et al.
25 1997). Subsurface processes contributing to massive degradation of the waste taken into
26 consideration include ample brine availability; extensive microbial activity and corrosion of
27 metals; and an absence of cementation, mineral precipitation, and salt encapsulation.

28 The WIPP PA uses the parameter BOREHOLE:TAUFAIL to represent the hydrodynamic shear
29 strength of the waste in the numerical code CUTTINGS_S (see Appendix PA-2009, Section
30 PA-4.5). It is officially called the “effective shear strength for erosion,” but it is more commonly
31 known as the “waste shear strength.” The parameter is treated as a sampled value in WIPP PA
32 with a log-uniform distribution and a range of 0.05 to 77 Pa. This range of values was derived
33 by DOE from literature reviews of incipient motion of seafloor or channel bed sediments—0.05
34 Pa corresponds to a San Francisco Bay mud—and consideration of the mean particle size of the
35 WIPP waste as determined by an expert elicitation (Berglund 1996, Carlsbad Area Office
36 Technical Assistance Contractor [CTAC] 1997). The lower limit of this range of values
37 represents what is hypothesized as an extreme case of degradation of the waste and waste
38 containers.

1 **MASS-16.1.3 Mechanistic Model for Spall**

2 The CRA-2009 PA uses the same spillings model that was used in the CRA-2004 PA and the
3 CRA-2004 PABC. No changes were made to the model or implementation of the results in PA.

4 In the CRA-2004 PA, a new approach to modeling the WIPP spillings process was developed to
5 address peer review concerns during the original certification process (see the CCA, Chapter 9.0,
6 Section 9.3.1.2 and the CRA-2004, Appendix PEER-2004, Section PEER-2004 3.0). Instead of
7 focusing on the end state after penetration, as was done in the original CCA erosional model, the
8 new model sought to capture the system behavior from just before penetration through to the end
9 state. In doing so, many more phenomena were included in the model. Considered in this new
10 conceptual model was unsteady, convergent gas flow from the repository toward the wellbore
11 that caused mechanical stress and potential failure of solids near the face of the wellbore.
12 Pressure in the cavity at the point of penetration was balanced by the mud column in the
13 wellbore and the repository pressure.

14 The new spall model, DRSPALL (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003a), is based on a
15 predecessor code called GASOUT (Hansen et al. 1997, Appendix C). DRSPALL builds upon
16 GASOUT by:

- 17 1. Adding a wellbore flow model that transports mud, repository gas, and waste solids from
18 repository level to the land surface
- 19 2. Adding a fluidized bed model that evaluates the potential for failed particulate waste to
20 fluidize and become entrained in the wellbore flow

21 The wellbore flow model in DRSPALL utilizes one-dimensional geometry with a compressible,
22 viscous, isothermal, homogeneous mixture of mud, gas, and solids. Standard mass and
23 momentum balance, friction loss, and slurry viscosity equations are used. Wellbore flow model
24 results were successfully verified against those from an independent commercial code for several
25 test problems (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003b).

26 DRSPALL applies the fluidized bed theory to determine the mobilization of failed material to the
27 flow stream in the wellbore. If the escaping gas velocity exceeds the minimum fluidization
28 velocity, failed material is fluidized and entrained for transport at the land surface. If gas
29 velocity is too low to fluidize the bedded material, the cavity size is allowed to stabilize. The
30 spall volumes predicted by DRSPALL are based on the following conservative assumptions for
31 material properties and for the flow geometry within the repository:

- 32 • The particle size distribution for spillings is based on a detailed analysis (Wang 1997) of
33 data from an expert elicitation (Carlsbad Area Office Technical Assistance Contractor
34 [CTAC] 1997). This analysis considered several limiting cases in developing a conservative
35 distribution for mean particle size ranging from 1 millimeter to 10 cm (Hansen, Pfeifle, and
36 Lord 2003).
- 37 • The shape factor for fluidization of particles has a potential range from 0 to 1.0. Smaller
38 values of the shape factor denote particles that are less spherical, and, therefore, more easily

1 fluidized and transported in the flow. The shape factor is conservatively set to a value of 0.1
2 (Lord 2003).

- 3 • The tensile strength of the waste assigned for the spalling process is uncertain, ranging from
4 0.12 MPa to 0.17 MPa (Hansen, Pfeifle, and Lord 2003). Tensile strength data was measured
5 in laboratory experiments on surrogate materials chosen to conservatively represent highly
6 degraded residuals from typical wastes. The given range is felt to represent extreme, low-end
7 tensile strengths because it does not account for several strengthening mechanisms, such as
8 MgO hydration and halite precipitation/cementation (Hansen et al. 1997).
- 9 • DRSPALL uses a hemispherical geometry (one-dimensional spherical symmetry) for the
10 flow field and cavity in the waste. This conceptual model is appropriate when the drill bit
11 first penetrates the repository. But as the drill bit passes completely through the compacted
12 waste, the flow field transitions toward a cylindrically symmetric geometry. This transition
13 is important because the largest spall release volumes are predicted to occur at late times,
14 well after the drill bit has penetrated through the waste, and because the spall volumes
15 predicted for a cylindrical geometry are less than for the hemispherical geometry (Lord,
16 Rudeen, and Hansen 2003).

17 In summary, the conservative assumptions for waste properties, the waste flow geometry, and the
18 driller's actions provide very conservative spalling release volumes (see also Appendix PA-2009,
19 Section PA-4.6 for a description of the spallings model, and the CRA-2004, Appendix PEER-
20 2004, Section PEER-2004 3.0 for the results of the spallings model peer review). As stated
21 previously, the DRSPALL calculations from the CRA-2004 PABC were also used in the CRA-
22 2009 PA (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-6.7.4 and Section PA-8.5.2.1).

23 **MASS-16.1.4 Calculation of Cuttings, Cavings, and Spall Releases**

24 The modeling assumptions relating to the calculations of cuttings, cavings and spallings releases
25 have not changed since the CRA-2004. As detailed in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-6.7.5,
26 cuttings and cavings releases for intrusions into CH-TRU waste are computed by multiplying the
27 volume released (calculated by the code CUTTINGS_S) by the radioactivity in three
28 independently selected waste streams, consistent with the conceptual assumption that waste
29 streams are randomly emplaced in waste stacks that are three drums high. The effect of this
30 assumption on PA results was examined in a separate PA (Hansen et al. 2003) in which cuttings
31 and cavings releases were computed by assuming that each intrusion encounters only a single
32 waste stream. The differences in repository performance (determined by comparing the mean
33 CCDFs for releases) were determined to be minor. For more details on the analysis, see the
34 CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-21.0.

35 Because spallings may release a relatively large volume of material (exceeding 4 m³), spalling
36 releases for intrusions into CH-TRU waste are computed by multiplying the volume of spalled
37 material with the average concentration of radioactivity in the waste at the time of the intrusion.
38 A separate PA (Hansen et al. 2003) compared spalling releases computed using the average
39 concentration of radioactivity in the waste to spalling releases computed using the radioactivity
40 of a single, randomly selected waste stream. The analysis determined that the assumption had
41 only a minor effect on the mean CCDF for releases. For more details on the analysis, see the

1 CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-21.0. During their completeness
2 review of the CRA-2004, the EPA requested additional DRSPALL vectors be used in the CRA-
3 2004 PABC. Minor changes were made to the implementation of spillings results that did not
4 change the overall modeling assumptions. These implementation changes are outlined in Leigh
5 et al. (2005, Section 7.8).


6 **MASS-16.2 Direct Brine Releases during Drilling**

7 The DBR modeling assumptions for the CRA-2004 PABC are used in the CRA-2009 PA. This
8 model provides a series of calculations to estimate the quantity of brine released directly to the
9 surface during drilling. DBRs may occur when a driller penetrates the WIPP and unknowingly
10 brings contaminated brine to the surface during drilling (these releases are not accounted for in
11 the cuttings, cavings, and spillings calculations, which model only the solids removed during
12 drilling). Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.7 describes the DBR model used for the CRA-2009
13 PA. The CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment 16-2 describes the DBR model used for the CCA
14 PA. The conceptual model for DBRs is discussed in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.7 and the
15 CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.1.1.

16 Uncertainty in the BRAGFLO DBR calculations is captured in the 10,000-year BRAGFLO
17 calculations from which the initial and boundary conditions are derived. The model parameters
18 that have the most influence on DBRs are repository pressure and brine saturation at the time of
19 intrusion. Brine saturation is influenced by many factors, including Salado and MB permeability
20 and gas-generation rates (for undisturbed scenario calculations). For E1 and E2 intrusion
21 scenarios, Castile brine-reservoir pressure and volume, and abandoned borehole permeabilities
22 influence conditions for the second and subsequent intrusions. The dip in the repository (hence
23 the location of intrusions), two-phase flow parameters (residual brine and gas saturation), time of
24 intrusion, and duration of flow have lesser impacts on brine releases.

25 To account for changes in the BRAGFLO model (see Section MASS-2.0), the implementation of
26 the DBR model was adjusted for the CRA 2004-PA. These adjustments are also used in the
27 CRA-2009 PA. Figure MASS-8 shows the DBR grid used in the CRA-2004 PA and the CRA-
28 2009 PA.

29 The grid dimensions and resolution are the same as in the CCA PA, but the material parameters
30 assigned to the panel closures were changed during the CRA-2004 to be more consistent with the
31 conceptual model for the Option D panel closures. In addition, the material parameters assigned
32 to the DRZ were changed to represent the DRZ more consistently. In the CCA PA, the pillars
33 between rooms and the halite separating panels were assigned properties consistent with the
34 DRZ material in the BRAGFLO grid. The DRZ permeability used in the CCA PA (10^{-15} m^2)
35 was low enough that brine did not flow between panels during the 11-day DBR calculations.
36 When the permeability of the DRZ was changed in the CCA PAVT (from a constant value of
37 10^{-15} m^2 to a sampled value between $10^{-19.4} \text{ m}^2$ and $10^{-12.5} \text{ m}^2$), realizations with high DRZ
38 permeability allowed brine flow between panels during the 11-day period for DBR calculations.
39 It is not reasonable to model the halite between panels as DRZ, since the DRZ would extend only
40 a few meters into the 60 m-thick pillars. Consequently, the material parameters assigned to cells
41 separating panels were changed to be representative of undisturbed halite rather than DRZ. Stein
42



Note: Model cells are not to scale. The actual dimensions of the grid blocks are indicated along the edge of the diagram.

1

2 **Figure MASS-8. Repository-Scale Horizontal BRAGFLO Mesh Used for DBR**
 3 **Calculations**

4 (2003a) provides details on the material parameters used in the DBR calculation and the rationale
 5 for the parameter values. Note that the CRA-2009 PA uses a different DBR maximum duration
 6 of 4.5 days, based on current drilling practices (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.7.8). This
 7 parameter change does not impact the modeling assumptions discussed above.

8 **MASS-16.3 Long-Term Properties of the Abandoned Intrusion Borehole**

9 The long-term treatment and assumptions used to represent boreholes in the CRA-2009 PA have
 10 not changed from the treatment and assumptions used in the CRA-2004 PA. See the CRA-2004,
 11 Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-16.3 for the borehole modeling assumptions
 12 used in the CRA-2009 PA.

1 **MASS-17.0 Climate Change**

2 The purpose of this model is to allow quantitative consideration of the extent to which
3 uncertainty about future climate may contribute to uncertainty in estimates of cumulative
4 radionuclide releases from the disposal system. This model has not changed since the CCA and
5 is used in the CRA-2009 PA. Consideration is limited to conditions that could result from
6 reasonably possible natural climatic changes. The model is not intended to provide a
7 quantitative prediction of future climate, nor is it intended to address uncertainty in system
8 properties other than estimated cumulative radionuclide releases that may be affected by climate
9 change. See the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-17.0 and Section
10 MASS-17.1 for current and historical information on the climate change model. The
11 implementation of this model in PA is also discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section
12 6.4.9 and Appendix PA, Section PA-2.1.4.6. See also the CCA, Appendix CLI for information
13 on expected climate variability over the 10,000-year regulatory time period.

1 **MASS-18.0 Castile Brine Reservoir**

2 The conceptual model for the hypothetical brine reservoir is included in PA to estimate the
3 extent to which uncertainty about the existence of a brine reservoir under the waste disposal
4 region may contribute to uncertainty in the estimate of cumulative radionuclide releases from the
5 disposal system. The conceptual model is not intended to provide a realistic approximation of an
6 actual brine reservoir under the waste disposal region. Data are insufficient to determine
7 whether such a brine reservoir exists.

8 The representation of the Castile brine reservoir in the CRA-2009 PA has not changed from the
9 CRA-2004 PA. However, this model is not the same as the one used in the original CCA PA.
10 The following describes the changes to the model since the 1996 CCA PA.

11 The Castile Formation is treated as an impermeable unit in PA and plays no role in the analysis
12 except to separate the Salado from the modeled brine reservoir in the BRAGFLO grid. In
13 human-intrusion scenarios, the hypothetical brine reservoir can be penetrated by an intrusion
14 borehole connecting it to the repository. The amount of brine that can enter the repository from
15 the brine reservoir is important to PA because brine is required for gas generation reactions and
16 can transport radionuclides in solution, contributing to potential releases.

17 The properties of the hypothetical brine reservoir defined for PA include: permeability, porosity,
18 pore volume, initial pressure, and various two-phase flow parameters. Values assigned for these
19 properties were chosen to either be consistent with the available data from and analyses of
20 borehole penetrations of brine reservoirs in the region, or provide a reasonable response in the
21 BRAGFLO model.

22 The treatment of the brine reservoir for the CRA-2004 PA is different than that used in the CCA
23 PA. The major changes to the brine reservoir representation were made by the EPA in the CCA
24 PAVT (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b). For the CCA PAVT, the EPA defined
25 new parameter ranges for bulk compressibility and total pore volume. The range of bulk
26 compressibility was based on a reevaluation of field test data from the WIPP-12 borehole
27 following the CCA (Beauheim 1997). Since the total volume of the grid cells used to represent
28 the brine reservoir in BRAGFLO is fixed, the range of total pore volume was set by defining a
29 range of “effective” porosity (pore volume = grid volume × effective porosity). This range of
30 porosity values is not representative of the actual host rock. It was chosen to produce a
31 reasonable response in the BRAGFLO model by providing a predefined range of total pore
32 volumes based on the field tests at WIPP-12.

33 For the CRA-2004 PA, the DOE implemented this approach by assuming that the productivity
34 ratio (PR) remains constant ($2.0051 \times 10^{-3} \text{ m}^3/\text{Pa}$). The PR is defined as:

$$PR = V \frac{C_r}{\phi},$$

35
36 where V is the grid volume of the brine reservoir ($18,462,514 \text{ m}^3$), C_r is the bulk compressibility
37 (2×10^{-11} to $1 \times 10^{-10} \text{ Pa}^{-1}$), and ϕ is the effective porosity (0.1842 to 0.9208). To maintain a
38 constant pore volume in the brine reservoir, the porosity range used in the CRA-2004 PA is

1 slightly modified from that used in the CCA PAVT because the fixed-grid volume increased
2 slightly in the CRA-2004 BRAGFLO grid from the volume assumed in the CCA BRAGFLO
3 grid. In this approach, bulk compressibility and effective porosity are directly proportional
4 (Stein 2003b). See Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.10 for the details on the implementation
5 in PA.

6 Basic geologic information about the Castile is given in the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0, Section
7 2.1.3.3. The hydrology of the known brine reservoirs is discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0,
8 Section 2.2.1.2.2. The treatment of the hypothetical brine reservoir in PA is discussed in the
9 CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.8.

10 **MASS-18.1 Historical Context of the Castile Brine Reservoir Model**

11 See the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment 18.1 for historical information on the Castile brine
12 reservoir model.

1 **MASS-19.0 Option D Panel Closure**

2 The option D panel closure assumptions have not changed from those used in the CRA-2004
3 PABC. The certification decision by the EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a)
4 included several conditions that the DOE was required to meet. In the first of these conditions,
5 the EPA required the DOE to implement a specific design for the panel closure system referred
6 to as Option D and required the concrete monolith to be constructed using SMC. The DOE had
7 included four Options (A-D) for the panel closure design using standard concrete or SMC in the
8 CCA. The Option D design consisted of two components: a large monolith constructed of SMC
9 and keyed into the surrounding DRZ, and an explosion wall constructed of concrete blocks,
10 which is not keyed into the DRZ.

11 The PA calculations that supported the CCA and the subsequent CCA PAVT calculations
12 included generic panel closures in the BRAGFLO grid. These generic closures were not
13 representative of the Option D design. The generic panel closures included in the CCA PA and
14 the CCA PAVT calculations were relatively permeable and allowed gas to flow freely between
15 panels. In the CCA PA and the CCA PAVT calculations, a drilling intrusion into a single panel
16 generally caused pressures in the entire repository to decrease.

17 Following the original certification of the repository, the DOE updated the modeling of the panel
18 closures in PA so that the mandated Option D design was adequately represented. A new panel
19 closure representation was developed and presented to the Salado Flow Peer Review Panel in
20 May 2002, and again in February 2003. The peer review panel approved the new conceptual
21 models, which included the implementation of the Option D panel closures in the grid
22 (Caporuscio, Gibbons, and Oswald 2003).

23 In the CCA PA/CCA PAVT BRAGFLO grid, only two panel closures were represented. For the
24 CRA-2004 PA and the CRA-2009, however, the DOE included an additional set of panel
25 closures. Preliminary tests of the Option D panel closure representation (Hansen et al. 2002)
26 concluded that Option D panel closures were effective at impeding fluid flow between panels on
27 the order of thousands of years, but that, given enough time, pressures slowly equilibrated.
28 These results suggest that the effect of a single intrusion event on pressures in other panels
29 depends on the number of panel closures that lie between the intruded panel and the other panels.
30 Therefore, the DOE decided to divide the RoR region into two regions separated by a panel
31 closure. This panel closure represents a set of four panel closures to be located between the
32 northern and southern internal extended panels. The south RoR represents panels directly
33 adjacent to an intruded panel and the north RoR represents panels that are farther away from the
34 intruded panel (two sets of panel closures lie in between).

35 The DOE assumes that the effect of the Option D panel closures will be to impede fluid flow
36 through and around the closures. Only the concrete monolith portion of the closure system is
37 assumed to remain effective over the 10,000-year regulatory period. The explosion wall is
38 assumed to be effective for only a brief period during the operational period. The explosion wall
39 and the open drift adjacent to the monolith are represented in the BRAGFLO grid by a column of
40 grid cells with the properties of the waste area (e.g., high permeability) and include creep closure
41 effects. The monolith is represented in the BRAGFLO grid by an adjacent column of grid cells
42 with a length equal to the length of the monolith (7.9 m) multiplied by the number of panel

1 closures in series and a width equal to the width of the monolith (10 m) multiplied by the number
2 of panel closures in parallel. For instance, in Figure MASS-3, the southern panel closure in the
3 BRAGFLO grid represents a single set of two panel closures (in parallel) that separate a single
4 external panel from one of the two internal extended panels (9 and 10). The middle panel
5 closure in the BRAGFLO grid represents a single set of four panel closures (in parallel) that
6 separate the internal extended panels (9 and 10) from one another. The northern panel closure in
7 the BRAGFLO grid represents two sets (in series) of four panel closures (in parallel) that lie
8 between the northern edge of the waste region and the shafts.

9 It is assumed in the modeling that the DRZ above the concrete monolith will heal and quickly
10 attain a state of relatively low permeability. However, it is also assumed that if pressures exceed
11 the fracture initiation pressure (~0.2 MPa above lithostatic), the DRZ and anhydrite MB
12 materials that intersect the waste room can fracture and allow gas or brine to circumvent the
13 panel closures by flowing around the concrete monolith. This possibility is included in the
14 implementation of the panel closures in the BRAGFLO by replacing the concrete monolith
15 material with MB material everywhere the monolith intersects and cuts through the MBs. This
16 implementation is appropriate even at low pressures because the permeability range of the
17 concrete and the MBs is nearly equivalent. In addition, fracturing is considered in these grid
18 elements at high pressures, allowing fluids to flow and simulating the consequence of fractures
19 extending around the monolith.

20 The representation of panel closures used in the CRA-2004 PABC has not changed and this
21 representation continues to be used in the CRA-2009 PA (see Figure MASS-6 and Appendix PA-
22 2009, Section PA-4.2.8). Additional information on panel closure effects on repository
23 performances can be seen in the CRA-2004 BRAGFLO Analysis Package (Stein and Zelinski
24 2003a and 2003b).

1 **MASS-20.0 Summary of Clay Seam G Modeling Assumptions**

2 One of the changes to the repository design since the CCA is the raising of the repository horizon
3 in the southern half of the waste panels. Specifically, Panels 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 will be excavated at
4 an elevation approximately 2.4 m above the level of Panels 1, 2, 7, 8, and 10 and the operations
5 and experimental areas. This change in horizon will bring the roof of the raised rooms to the
6 level of the Clay Seam G. The change is expected to improve roof conditions and enhance
7 operations and mine safety. The DOE submitted a planned change request to the EPA describing
8 the change and arguing that it would have minimal impact on long-term repository performance
9 (Triay 2000). The EPA responded to the change request in a letter (Marcinowski 2000) in which
10 they agreed with the DOE that the effects on long-term performance would be minimal. The
11 modeling assumptions used to represent this change are described in the CRA-2004, Appendix
12 PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-20.0. No changes were made to these assumptions since
13 the CRA-2004 PA. These assumptions have also been used in the CRA-2009 PA.

1 **MASS-21.0 Evaluation of Waste Structural Impacts, Emplacement** 2 **and Homogeneity**

3 Waste-related modeling assumptions have not changed from those used in the CRA-2004 PABC.
4 During the development of the CCA PA, the DOE choose to assume random placement of TRU
5 waste in the WIPP, and developed conceptual and numerical models accordingly. The EPA
6 reviewed these models and their results and determined that the DOE had adequately modeled
7 random placement of waste in the disposal system. Since the CCA, additional information about
8 the waste and its emplacement has emerged, requiring the assumption of random placement to be
9 reevaluated. The waste inventory estimates were updated since the CCA PA (see the CRA-2004,
10 Appendix TRU WASTE and Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005 for the CRA-2004 PABC waste
11 updates), resulting in different estimates of important waste components, such as CPR materials.
12 Additionally, the CCA PA assumed that all waste could be modeled as if the waste was
13 emplaced in 55-gallon (gal) drums. However, the DOE is emplacing waste using several
14 different types of waste containers, including standard waste boxes and pipe overpacks. Waste
15 has been shipped to WIPP in campaigns from the generator sites, resulting in waste emplacement
16 that appears inconsistent with the representation of the waste as a homogeneous material.
17 Finally, the DOE is emplacing waste types, such as supercompacted waste, that were not
18 considered in the CCA inventory (U.S. Department of Energy 2002).

19 Many important waste characteristics, such as the radionuclide content and the mass of CPR
20 materials, are directly incorporated in PA by means of waste material parameters. These
21 parameters have been updated with the inventory updates (see Leigh and Trone 2005b, and
22 Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) and thus were represented in the CRA-2004 PABC and the CRA-
23 2009 PA. However, the PAs for compliance applications have not specifically accounted for
24 heterogeneity in waste materials or in waste containers. At the INL, for instance, debris waste is
25 volume-reduced by supercompaction, resulting in a very dense waste form containing a high
26 concentration of CPR material. In addition, the Pu residues from the Rocky Flats Environmental
27 Technology Site were packaged in pipe overpacks, which are more rigid than the typical 55-gal
28 drum assumed in the CCA. Additionally, in accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR
29 § 194.24(d) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2004), all PAs have assumed that waste is
30 emplaced in a random or homogeneous manner. Actual waste emplacement is determined by the
31 availability of waste at generator sites and the shipping schedules. Pipe overpacks occupy about
32 43% of the containers emplaced in Panel 1, suggesting that actual emplacement will not be
33 statistically random.

34 As a result of this new information and these changes, the DOE performed analyses (Hansen
35 et al. 2003) to determine if the modeling assumptions used in PA continue to adequately
36 represent the waste. The analysis reported in Hansen et al. (2003) focused on potential effects of
37 supercompacted waste and waste in pipe overpacks on repository performance. Both waste types
38 are structurally stiffer than the generic waste model used in the CCA PA, and the
39 supercompacted waste in particular has high concentrations of CPR materials. The analysis
40 began with a systematic reevaluation of the baseline FEPs to identify specific components of PA
41 that could be affected by supercompacted waste. The reassessment concluded that the FEPs
42 “screened in” were adequate to represent the variety of waste types and containers, and that none
43 of the “screened out” FEPs should be reconsidered for implementation. The FEPs assessment

1 concluded that creep closure of the repository, chemical conditions of the waste, gas generation
2 models, and waste mechanical properties could be affected by heterogeneities in the waste
3 materials and waste containers. In addition, the DOE determined that the assumption of random
4 waste emplacement should be reevaluated.

5 Analysis of creep closure of waste-filled rooms, accounting for several types of waste materials
6 and packaging, indicated that a wider range of long-term porosities could occur than that
7 established in the CCA, given the uncertainties about the structural integrity of waste packages
8 and their spatial arrangement in the repository (Park and Hansen 2003). For this reason, the
9 analysis in Hansen et al. (2003) treated creep closure as an uncertain variable. Sensitivity
10 analysis showed that this additional uncertainty did not significantly affect the results of PA.

11 Chemical conditions were also reexamined under a range of possible waste arrangements. The
12 assessment found that, regardless of actual waste emplacement, the MgO would still be sufficient
13 to maintain desired chemical conditions. Moreover, the constituents of supercompacted waste
14 would not alter the reactions that determine chemical equilibrium and, consequently, no changes
15 to An solubilities or to the gas-generation models were warranted to account for waste
16 heterogeneity. This topic was addressed during the second recertification in response to
17 comment G-12, in which the EPA requested that the DOE address potential effects of
18 heterogeneous waste loading based on the assumption of homogeneous chemical conditions.
19 The DOE's response indicated that the chemical conditions assumptions adequately addressed
20 nonrandom waste loading (Piper 2004). This was again addressed during the evaluation of the
21 MgO excess factor change from 1.67 to 1.20 (Reyes 2008). No changes were made to the
22 chemical conditions model as a result of these investigations.

23 Supercompacted waste contains elevated amounts of CPR materials relative to other waste
24 streams, and the future arrangement of this waste in the WIPP repository is uncertain. Thus, the
25 analysis treated the spatial distribution of CPR materials as uncertain. However, sensitivity
26 analysis demonstrated that uncertainty in the spatial distribution and quantity of CPR materials
27 had little effect on PA results. This was also shown in an analysis performed during the 2004
28 recertification while responding to an EPA request for additional information (Response to
29 Comment G-12, Dunagan, Hansen, and Zelinski 2004).

30 The representation of the waste properties was also considered; however, it was determined that
31 no changes to permeability, shear strength, or tensile strength were warranted. Based on this
32 evaluation, no changes to the models for DBRs were necessary.

33 DBRs as a consequence of a drilling intrusion are calculated with the assumption of random
34 waste emplacement in the repository. In addition, releases by spallings, DBR, and long-term
35 radionuclide transport assume that radionuclides are homogeneously distributed throughout the
36 waste. A sensitivity analysis determined that PA results are not greatly affected by the
37 assumption of random waste emplacement or by the assumption that radionuclides are
38 homogeneously distributed.

39 Based on the analysis reported in Hansen et al. (2003), the DOE concluded that:

- 1 1. Explicit representation of the specific features of supercompacted waste and of waste in pipe
2 overpacks, such as structural rigidity, was not warranted in modeling, since PA results were
3 relatively insensitive to the effects of such features.
 - 4 2. PA results were not affected significantly by the assumption of nonrandom waste
5 emplacement and the representation of these waste types as a homogeneous material.
- 6 Homogeneity issues were also addressed in response to another EPA comment during the CRA-
7 2004 completeness review. The EPA questioned in comment C-23-10 whether negating
8 container-scale variability was a valid assumption for spallings calculations (Cotsworth 2004).
9 In the CRA-2004 PA, spallings releases were calculated using the average radioactivity in all
10 CH-TRU waste streams. An analysis in Vugrin (2004) compared spallings results using three
11 randomly sampled waste streams against results using the average radioactivity over all CH-TRU
12 waste streams. The analysis concluded that the calculation of spallings releases is not
13 significantly affected by waste-scale variability.
- 14 The DOE continues to assume in PA that waste is randomly emplaced in the WIPP repository.
15 The CRA-2009 PA continues to use the same waste-related modeling approaches as the CRA-
16 2004 PABC.

1 **MASS-22.0 References**

- 2 Amyx, J.W., D.M. Bass, Jr., and R.L. Whiting. 1960. *Petroleum Reservoir Engineering,*
3 *Physical Properties.* New York: McGraw.
- 4 Anderson, M.P., and W.W. Woessner. 1992. *Applied Groundwater Modeling: Simulation of*
5 *Flow and Advective Transport.* New York: Academic Press.
- 6 Bear, J. 1972. *Dynamics of Fluid in Porous Media.* New York: Elsevier.
- 7 Beauheim, R.L. 1997. Memorandum to Palmer Vaughn (Subject: Revisions to Castile Brine
8 Reservoir Parameter Packages). 16 January 1997. ERMS 244699. Sandia National
9 Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 10 Berglund, J.W. 1992. *Mechanisms Governing the Direct Removal of Wastes from the Waste*
11 *Isolation Pilot Plant Repository Caused by Exploratory Drilling.* SAND92-7295. ERMS
12 223946. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 13 Berglund, J.W. 1996. Memorandum to B.M. Butcher (Subject: Effective Shear Resistance to
14 Erosion TAUFAIL). 28 October 1996. ERMS 247189. Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad,
15 NM.
- 16 Caporuscio, F., J. Gibbons, C. Li, and E. Oswald. 2003. *Salado Flow Conceptual Models Final*
17 *Peer Review Report* (March). ERMS 526879. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 18 Carlsbad Area Office Technical Assistance Contractor (CTAC). 1997. *Expert Elicitation on*
19 *WIPP Waste Particle Diameter Size Distribution(s) During the 10,000-Year Regulatory Post-*
20 *Closure Period* (Final Report, June 3). ERMS 541365. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of
21 Energy.
- 22 Christian-Frear, T.L., and S.W. Webb. 1996. *The Effect of Explicit Representation of the*
23 *Stratigraphy on Brine and Gas Flow at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.* SAND94-3173. WPO
24 37240. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Clayton, D.J. 2007. Memorandum to E. Vugrin, M. Lee, and D. Kessel (Subject: Corrections to
26 Input Files for DBR PABC Calculations). 6 June 2007. ERMS 546311. U.S. Department of
27 Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 28 Clayton, D.J. 2008. *Analysis Plan for the Performance Assessment for the 2009 Compliance*
29 *Recertification Application* (Revision 1). AP-137. ERMS 547905. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
30 National Laboratories.
- 31 Cotsworth, E. 2004. Letter to R.P. Detwiler (1 Enclosure). 20 May 2004. ERMS 535554. U.S.
32 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation Washington, DC.
- 33 Cotsworth, E. 2005. Letter to I. Triay (1 Enclosure). 4 March 2005. ERMS 538858. U.S.
34 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

- 1 Davies, P.B. 1991. *Evaluation of the Role of Threshold Pressure in Controlling Flow of Waste-*
2 *Generated Gas into Bedded Salt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.* SAND90-3246. WPO
3 26169. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Davies, P.B., S.W. Webb, and E.D. Gorham. 1992. Memorandum to B.M. Butcher, J.
5 Schreiber, and P. Vaughn (Subject: Feedback on “PA Modeling Using BRAGFLO—1992”; 4
6 Attachments). 14 July 1992. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 7 Dunagan, S. 2007. *Parameter Problem Report (PPR, 2007-001* (1 Attachment). Form NP 9-2-
8 2. ERMS 545481. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Dunagan, S., C. Hansen, and W. Zelinski. 2004. *Effects of Increasing Cellulosics, Plastics and*
10 *Rubbers on WIPP Performance Assessment.* ERMS 535941. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
11 Laboratories.
- 12 Fox, B. 2008. *Parameter Summary Report for CRA-2009* (Revision 0). ERMS 549747.
13 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Freeze, G.A., K.W. Larson, and P.B. Davies. 1995. *Coupled Multiphase Flow and Closure*
15 *Analysis of Repository Response to Waste-Generated Gas at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*
16 *(WIPP).* SAND93-1986. ERMS 229557. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 17 Garner, J., and C. Leigh. 2005. *Analysis Package for PANEL, CRA-2004 Performance*
18 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 540572. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
19 Laboratories.
- 20 Gorham, E., R. Beauheim, P. Davies, S. Howarth, and S. Webb. 1992. “Recommendations to
21 PA on Salado Formation Intrinsic Permeability and Pore Pressure for 40 CFR 191 Subpart B
22 Calculations, June 15, 1992.” *Preliminary Performance Assessment for the Waste Isolation Pilot*
23 *Plant, December 1993* (pp. A-49 through A-65). Volume 3, Model Parameters. SAND92-
24 0700/3. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Guzowski, R.V. 1990. *Preliminary Identification of Scenarios for the Waste Isolation Pilot*
26 *Plant, Southeastern New Mexico.* SAND90-7090. WPO 25771. Albuquerque: Sandia National
27 Laboratories.
- 28 Hansen, F.D., M.K. Knowles, T.W. Thompson, M. Gross, J.D. McLennan and J.F. Schatz. 1997.
29 *Description and Evaluation of a Mechanically Based Conceptual Model for Spall.* SAND97-
30 1369. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 Hansen, C.W., C. Leigh, D. Lord, and J. Stein. 2002. *BRAGFLO Results for the Technical*
32 *Baseline Migration.* ERMS 523209. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 33 Hansen, C.W., L.H. Brush, M.B. Gross, F.D. Hansen, B. Park, J.S. Stein, and T.W. Thompson.
34 2003. *Effects of Supercompacted Waste and Heterogeneous Waste Emplacement on Repository*
35 *Performance* (Revision 1). ERMS 532475. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Hansen, F.D., T.W. Pfeifle, and D.L. Lord. 2003. *Parameter Justification Report for DRSPALL*
2 (Revision 0). SAND2003-2930. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 3 Herrick, C.G., M. Riggins, B.Y Park, and E.D. Vugrin. 2007. *Recommendation for the Lower*
4 *Limit of the Waste Shear Strength (Parameter BOREHOLE:TAUFAIL)* (Rev. 1). ERMS 546343.
5 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 6 Hunter, R.L. 1989. *Events and Processes for Constructing Scenarios for the Release of*
7 *Transuranic Waste from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND89-
8 2546. WPO 27731. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Ismail, A.E. 2007a. Memorandum to File (Subject: Revised Porosity Estimates for the DRZ).
10 10 April 2007. ERMS 545755. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories,
11 Carlsbad, NM.
- 12 Ismail, A.E. 2007b. Memorandum to E.D. Vugrin, M.Y. Lee, and D.S. Kessel (Subject: Errors
13 in Input Files for NUTS for CRA-2004 PABC Calculations; 1 Attachment). 11 June 2007.
14 ERMS 546200. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 15 James, S.J., and J. Stein. 2002. *Analysis Plan for the Development of a Simplified Shaft Seal*
16 *Model for the WIPP Performance Assessment*. AP-094. ERMS 524958. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
17 National Laboratories.
- 18 James, S., and J. Stein. 2003. *Analysis Report for Development of a Simplified Shaft Seal Model*
19 *for the WIPP Performance Assessment* (Rev. 1). ERMS 525203. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
20 National Laboratories.
- 21 Julien, P.Y. 1998. *Erosion and Sedimentation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 22 Kanney, J.F. 2003. *Hydrogen Gas as a Surrogate for Waste-Generated Gas Physical Properties*
23 *in BRAGFLO*. Technical Memorandum. ERMS 532900. Sandia National Laboratories,
24 Carlsbad, NM.
- 25 Kirchner, T. 2008. *Generation of the LHS Samples for the AP-137 Revision 0 (CRA-09) PA*
26 *Calculations*. ERMS 547971. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 Kirkes, R. 2007. *Evaluation of the Duration of Direct Brine Release in WIPP Performance*
28 *Assessment* (Revision 0). ERMS 545988. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 29 Leigh, C., J. Kanney, L. Brush, J. Garner, G. Kirkes, T. Lowery, M. Nemer, J. Stein, E. Vugrin,
30 S. Wagner, and T. Kirchner 2005. *2004 Compliance Recertification Application Baseline*
31 *Performance Assessment Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 541521. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
32 National Laboratories.
- 33 Leigh, C.D., and J.R. Trone. 2005a. *Calculation of Radionuclide Inventories for Use in NUTS*
34 *in the Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 539644. Carlsbad,
35 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Leigh, C., and J. Trone. 2005b. *Calculation of the Waste Unit Factor for the Performance*
2 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 539613. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
3 Laboratories.
- 4 Leigh, C., J. Trone, and B. Fox. (2005). *TRU Waste Inventory for the 2004 Compliance*
5 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS
6 541118. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Long, J. 2006. *Installation of Open VMS 8.2-1 on the WIPP Alpha Cluster and Regression*
8 *Testing* (March 16). ERMS 542680. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Lord, D.L. 2003. *Justification for Particle Diameter and Shape Factor used in DRSPALL*.
10 ERMS 531477. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 11 Lord, D., D. Rudeen, and C. Hansen. 2003. *Analysis Package for DRSPALL: Compliance*
12 *Recertification Application*. Part I—Calculation of Spall Volumes. ERMS 532766. Carlsbad,
13 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Marcinowski, F. 2000. Letter to Dr. I. Triay, Manager. 11 August 2000. U.S. Environmental
15 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 16 Marietta, M.G., S.G. Bertram-Howery, D.R. Anderson, K.F. Brinster, R.V. Guzowski, H.
17 Iuzzolino, and R.P. Rechard. 1989. *Performance Assessment Methodology Demonstration:*
18 *Methodology Development for Evaluating Compliance with EPA 40 CFR 191, Subpart B, for the*
19 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. SAND89-2027. WPO 25952. Albuquerque: Sandia National
20 Laboratories.
- 21 Mendenhall, F.T., and W. Gerstle. 1993. Memorandum to Distribution (Subject: WIPP
22 Anhydrite Fracture Modeling). 6 December 1993. SWCF-A: W.B.S. 1.1.7.1. WPO 39830.
23 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 24 Monod, J. 1949. “The Growth of Bacterial Cultures.” *Annual Review of Microbiology*, vol. 3
25 (October): 371–94.
- 26 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 1992. *NIST Thermophysical Properties*
27 *of Hydrogen Mixtures Database (SUPERTRAPP) User’s Guide* (Version 1.0). Gaithersburg,
28 MD: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Standard
29 Reference Data Program.
- 30 Nemer, M.B. 2007. Memorandum to WIPP SNL Records Center (Subject: Effects of not
31 Including Emplacement Materials in CPR Inventory on Recent PA Results). 8 February 2007.
32 ERMS 545689. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 33 Nemer, M., and D. Clayton. 2008. *Analysis Package for Salado Flow Modeling, 2009*
34 *Compliance Recertification Application Calculation*. ERMS 548607. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
35 National Laboratories.

- 1 Parchure, T.M., and A.J. Mehta. 1985. "Erosion of Soft Sediment Deposits." *Journal of*
2 *Hydraulic Engineering*, vol. 111: 1308–26.
- 3 Park, B., and F.D. Hansen. 2003. *Analysis Report for Determination of the Porosity Surfaces of*
4 *the Disposal Room Containing Various Waste Inventories for WIPP PA (Revision 0)*. ERMS
5 533216. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 6 Partheniades, E. 1965. Erosion and Deposition of Cohesive Soils. *Journal of the Hydraulics*
7 *Division, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers*, vol. 91. no. HY1: 105–39.
- 8 Piper, L.L. 2004. Letter to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Subject: Partial Response
9 to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) September 2, 2004, Letter on Compliance
10 Recertification Application, 6th Response Package, Comment G-12). 23 December 2004.
11 Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 12 Rechard, R.P., W. Beyeler, R.D. McCurley, D.K. Rudeen, J.E. Bean, and J.D. Schreiber. 1990.
13 *Parameter Sensitivity Studies of Selected Components of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*
14 *Repository/Shaft System*. SAND89-2030. WPO 25946. Albuquerque: Sandia National
15 Laboratories.
- 16 Reeves, M., D.S. Ward, N.D. Johns, and R.M. Cranwell. 1986. *Theory and Implementation for*
17 *SWIFT II, The Sandia Waste-Isolation Flow and Transport Model for Fractured Media, Release*
18 *484*. SAND83-1159. NUREG/CR-3328. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Reyes, J. 2008. Letter to D.C. Moody 5 Attachments). 11 February 2008. U.S. Environmental
20 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 21 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2002. *Technical Baseline Reports: WBS 1.3.5.3,*
22 *Compliance Monitoring; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations; Milestone RII30 (July 31)*.
23 ERMS 523189. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 24 Schreiber, J.D. 1997. *WIPP PA User's Manual for BRAGFLO (Version 4.10, May)*. ERMS
25 245238. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Stein, J.S. 2003a. *Analysis Plan for Calculations of Direct Brine Releases : Compliance*
27 *Recertification Application*. AP-104. ERMS 528743. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
28 Laboratories.
- 29 Stein, J.S. 2003b. Memorandum to D. Kessel (Subject: Correlation Between Bulk
30 Compressibility and Porosity in the Castile Brine Pocket as Modeled in BRAGFLO). April 2003.
31 ERMS 527293. Sandia National Laboratories: Carlsbad, NM.
- 32 Stein, J., and W. Zelinski. 2003a. *Analysis Plan for the Testing of a Proposed BRAGFLO Grid*
33 *to be Used for the Compliance Recertification Application Performance Assessment*
34 *Calculations*. AP-106. ERMS 525236. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Stein, J.S., and W. Zelinski. 2003b. *Analysis Report for: Testing of a Proposed BRAGFLO Grid*
2 *to be used for the Compliance Recertification Application Performance Assessment*
3 *Calculations*. ERMS 526868. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Telander, M.R., and R.E. Westerman. 1997. *Hydrogen Generation by Metal Corrosion in*
5 *Simulated Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environments*. SAND96-2538. Albuquerque: Sandia
6 National Laboratories.
- 7 Tierney, M.S. 1991. *Combining Scenarios in a Calculation of the Overall Probability*
8 *Distribution of Cumulative Releases of Radioactivity From the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,*
9 *Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND90-0838. WPO 26030. Albuquerque: Sandia National
10 Laboratories.
- 11 Triay, I. 2000. Letter to Mr. F. Marcinowski, Director. June 26, 2000. U.S. Department of
12 Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 13 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1980. *Final Environmental Impact Statement, Waste*
14 *Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 2 vols. DOE/EIS-0026. ERMS 238835 (vol. 1) and ERMS
15 238838 (vol. 2). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 16 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
17 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
18 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2002. *Assessment Of Impacts On Long-Term Performance*
20 *From Supercompacted Wastes Produced By The Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project*
21 (December 6). Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 22 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
23 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
24 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 25 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
26 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
27 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
28 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
30 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
31 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
32 5223–45.
- 33 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
34 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
35 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol.
36 63 (May 18, 1998): 27353–406.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. *Technical Support Document for 194.23:*
2 *Parameter Justification Report* (May). Washington DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
4 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
5 Disposal Regulations; Alternative Provisions” (Final Rule). *Federal Register*, vol. 69 (July 16,
6 2004): 42571–83.
- 7 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
8 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
9 Disposal Regulations: Recertification Decision” (Final Notice). *Federal Register*, vol. 71 (April
10 10, 2006): 18010–021.
- 11 Vaughn, P., M. Lord, and R. MacKinnon. 1995a. Memorandum to D.R. Anderson (Subject:
12 DR-6: Brine Puddling in the Repository due to Heterogeneities). 21 December 1995. SWCF-
13 A:1.1.6.3. WPO 30795. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 14 Vaughn, P., M. Lord, and R. MacKinnon. 1995b. Memorandum to D.R. Anderson (Subject:
15 DR-7: Permeability Varying with Porosity in Closure Regions). 21 December 1995. SWCF-
16 A:1.1.6.3. WPO 30796. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 17 Vaughn, P., M. Lord, and R. MacKinnon. 1995c. Memorandum to D. R. Anderson (Subject:
18 DR3: Dynamic Closure of the North End and Hallways). 28 September 1995. SWCF-
19 A:1.1.6.3. WPO 30798. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 20 Vaughn, P., M. Lord, and R. MacKinnon. 1995d. Memorandum to D.R. Anderson (Subject:
21 DR-2: Capillary Action [Wicking] within the Waste Materials). 21 December 1995. SWCF-
22 A:1.1.6.3. WPO 30793. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 23 Vaughn, P., M. Lord, and R. MacKinnon. 1995e. Memorandum to D.R. Anderson (Subject:
24 S-6: Dynamic Alteration of the DRZ/Transition Zone). 28 September 1995. WPO 30798.
25 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 26 Vaughn, P., M. Lord, J. Garner, and R. MacKinnon. 1995. Memorandum to D.R. Anderson
27 (Subject: FEP Screening Issue GG-1). 10 October 1995. ERMS 230791. Sandia National
28 Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 29 Vugrin, E.D. 2004. Memorandum to David Kessel (Subject: Container-Scale Variability and
30 DRSPALL in response to C-23-10, Rev 1). 15 November 2004. ERMS 537870. Sandia
31 National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 32 Wagner, S.W. 2008. *Reassessment of MONPAR Analysis for Use in the 2009 Compliance*
33 *Recertification Application*. ERMS 548948. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 34 Wallace, M. 1996. “Summary Memo of Record for NS-11: Subsidence Associated with
35 Mining Inside or Outside the Controlled Area.” *Records Package for Screening Effort NS-11:*
36 *Subsidence Associated with Mining Inside or Outside the Controlled Area* (November 21) (pp.
37 1–28). ERMS 412918. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Wang, H.F, and M.P. Anderson. 1982. *Introduction to Groundwater Modeling: Finite*
2 *Difference and Finite Element Methods*. New York: Academic Press.
- 3 Wang, Y. 1997. Memorandum to Margaret Chu (Subject: Estimate WIPP Waste Particle Sizes
4 on Expert Elicitation Results: Revision 1). 5 August 1997. ERMS 246936. Albuquerque:
5 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 6 Webb, S. 1995. Memorandum to D.R. Anderson (Subject: DR-1:3D Room Flow Model with
7 Dip). 30 May 1995. SWCF-A:1.1.6.3. WPO 22494. Albuquerque: Sandia National
8 Laboratories.
- 9 WIPP Performance Assessment. 1991. *Preliminary Comparison with 40 CFR Part 191,*
10 *Subpart B, for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, December 1991*. 4 vol. SAND91-0893/1-4.
11 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 WIPP Performance Assessment. 1993. *Preliminary Performance Assessment for the Waste*
13 *Isolation Pilot Plant, December 1992*. Volume 4: Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses for 40
14 CFR 191, Subpart B. SAND92-0700/4. ERMS 223528. Albuquerque: Sandia National
15 Laboratories.
- 16 WIPP Performance Assessment. 2003a. *Design Document for DRSPALL Version 1.00* (Version
17 1.10, September). ERMS 529878. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 WIPP Performance Assessment. 2003b. *Verification and Validation Plan and Validation*
19 *Document for DRSPALL Version 1.00* (Version 1.00, September). ERMS 524782. Carlsbad,
20 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Appendix MgO-2009
Magnesium Oxide as an Engineered Barrier**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix MgO-2009
Magnesium Oxide as an Engineered Barrier

Table of Contents

MgO-1.0 IntroductionMgO-1

MgO-2.0 Description of the Engineered Barrier System.....MgO-3

 MgO-2.1 7 Emplacement of MgOMgO-3

 MgO-2.1.1 SupersacksMgO-3

 MgO-2.1.2 Minisacks.....MgO-4

 MgO-2.1.3 Changes Since the CRA-2004 in Emplacement of MgOMgO-6

 MgO-2.2 Vendors That Provided or Are Providing MgO.....MgO-6

 MgO-2.2.1 Changes since the CRA-2004 in Vendors Proving MgO.....MgO-7

MgO-3.0 Characteristics of MgOMgO-9

 MgO-3.1 Production of National Magnesia MgOMgO-9

 MgO-3.2 Premier MgO.....MgO-9

 MgO-3.2.1 ProductionMgO-10

 MgO-3.2.2 Characterization.....MgO-10

 MgO-3.2.3 Results since the CRA-2004 in Characteristics of MgOMgO-11

 MgO-3.3 Martin Marietta MgO.....MgO-12

 MgO-3.3.1 ProductionMgO-12

 MgO-3.3.2 Characterization.....MgO-14

MgO-4.0 Hydration and Carbonation of MgOMgO-18

 MgO-4.1 Hydration of MgO.....MgO-18

 MgO-4.1.1 Hydration of Premier MgOMgO-18

 MgO-4.1.2 Results since the CRA-2004 Regarding Hydration of MgOMgO-20

 MgO-4.2 1 Carbonation of MgOMgO-21

 MgO-4.2.1 Carbonation of Premier Chemicals MgO.....MgO-21

 MgO-4.2.2 Formation of Magnesite in the WIPP.....MgO-22

 MgO-4.2.3 Possible Passivation of MgO in the WIPPMgO-26

MgO-5.0 Effects of MgO on the WIPP Disposal SystemMgO-30

 MgO-5.1 Effects of MgO on Brine Composition, f_{CO_2} , pH, and Actinide SolubilitiesMgO-30

 MgO-5.1.1 Changes Since the CRA-2004 in Effects of MgO on Brine Composition, f_{CO_2} , pH, and Actinide Solubilities.....MgO-34

 MgO-5.2 Effects of MgO on Colloidal Actinide (An) ConcentrationsMgO-36

 MgO-5.2.1 Results since the CRA-2004.....MgO-36

 MgO-5.3 Effects of MgO on Other Near-Field Processes and ConditionsMgO-36

 MgO-5.3.1 Effects of MgO on Repository H₂O Content.....MgO-37

 MgO-5.3.2 Effects of MgO on Gas Generation.....MgO-37

 MgO-5.3.3 Effects of MgO on Room Closure.....MgO-39

 MgO-5.4 Effects of MgO on Far-Field An TransportMgO-39

MgO-6.0 The MgO Excess Factor.....MgO-41

 MgO-6.1 Effects of Microbial Respiratory Pathways on the MgO Excess FactorMgO-41

MgO-6.2 History of the MgO Excess Factor.....MgO-43
 MgO-6.2.1 Establishment of the MgO Excess FactorMgO-43
 MgO-6.2.2 Reduction of the MgO Excess Factor from 1.95 to 1.67.....MgO-44
 MgO-6.2.3 Additional Developments Relevant to the MgO Excess Factor Prior to
 the CRA-2004.....MgO-46
 MgO-6.2.4 Changes since the CRA-2004 in the MgO Excess Factor.....MgO-54
 MgO-7.0 References.....MgO-81

List of Figures

Figure MgO-1. Supersacks of MgO Emplaced on Top of the Waste StackMgO-4
 Figure MgO-2. Racks Used to Emplace Additional MgO.....MgO-7
 Figure MgO-3. SEM Image of Premier Chemicals MgO after Hydration in GWB
 at 90 °C (194 °F) for 21 Days (SNL Experiment
 CC-GW-90-30-5).....MgO-19
 Figure MgO-4. SEM Image of Premier Chemicals MgO after Hydration in
 ERDA-6 Brine at 70 °C (158 °F) after 21 days (SNL Experiment
 CC-ER-70-30-5)MgO-20

List of Tables

Table MgO-1. Particle-Size Distribution of Two Batches of Premier MgO
 (Bryan and Snider [2001a])MgO-11
 Table MgO-2. Effects of LOI Analysis Temperature on the Extent of Hydration
 under Accelerated Conditions on Fisher and Premier Chemicals
 MgO.....MgO-12
 Table MgO-3. Effects of Temperature Used for LOI Analyses of MgO
 Hydration Products on the Brucite + Portlandite Concentrations
 of the Hydrated Samples.....MgO-15
 Table MgO-4. Particle-Size Distribution of 10 Samples from One Lot of Martin
 Marietta MgO.....MgO-16
 Table MgO-5. Results of LOI Analysis and TGA on WTS-60.....MgO-17
 Table MgO-6. Compositions of GWB and ERDA-6 Brine Predicted by FMT for
 the An-Solubility Calculations for the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush
 and Xiong 2005a; 2005b; Brush 2005) (M, unless Otherwise
 Noted) before and after Equilibration with Brucite,
 Hydromagnesite, Halite, Anhydrite, and Other SolidsMgO-31
 Table MgO-7. Effect of the Mg-Carbonate Solid on the f_{CO_2} (atm), TIC
 Concentration (M), pH (Standard Units), and An Solubilities (M)
 in GWB after Equilibration with Brucite, Halite, Anhydrite, and
 Other SolidsMgO-32
 Table MgO-8. Effect of the Mg-Carbonate Solid on the f_{CO_2} (atm), TIC
 Concentration (M), pH (Standard Units), and An Solubilities (M)
 in ERDA-6 Brine after Equilibration with Brucite, Halite,
 Anhydrite, and Other SolidsMgO-32

Table MgO-9.	Effects of Panel Loading and the Source of SO_4^{2-} on Microbial Respiratory Pathways and the MgO Excess Factor—Base Case.....	MgO-49
Table MgO-10.	Effects of Panel Loading and the Source of SO_4^{2-} on Microbial Methanogenesis and the MgO Excess Factor—Effects of Having no Castile Brine Intrude Panel X	MgO-50
Table MgO-11.	Effects of Panel Loading and the Source of SO_4^{2-} on Microbial Respiratory Pathways and the MgO Excess Factor—Effects of Doubling the Time Required for Consumption of All CPR Materials	MgO-51
Table MgO-12.	Effects of Panel Loading and the Source of SO_4^{2-} on Microbial Respiratory Pathways and the MgO Excess Factor—Effects of Doubling the Effective Diffusion Coefficient for SO_4^{2-}	MgO-52

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

%	percent
µm	micrometer
AISinR	a synthetic brine representative of fluids sampled from the Culebra Member of the Rustler Formation in the WIPP air intake shaft
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
am	amorphous
AMWTP	Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Program
An(III)	actinide element(s) in the III oxidation state
An(IV)	actinide(s) in the IV oxidation state
An(V)	actinide(s) in the V oxidation state
aq	aqueous
ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
atm	atmosphere(s)
BNL	Brookhaven National Laboratory
BRAGFLO	Brine and Gas Flow
Brine A	a synthetic brine representative of intergranular Salado brines
C	Celsius
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CCDF	complementary cumulative distribution function
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
CPR	cellulosic, plastic, and rubber
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DI	deionized
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DRZ	disturbed rock zone
<i>E. coli</i>	<i>Escherichia coli</i>
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EQ3/6	a geochemical software package for speciation and solubility calculations (EQ3NR) and reaction-path calculations (EQ6)
ERDA-6	Energy Research and Development Administration (WIPP Well) 6
FMT	Fracture-Matrix Transport
ft	foot

g	gaseous or gram
gal	gallon
g/mol	grams per mole
GWB	Generic Weep Brine
HDPE	high-density polyethylene
ICP-AES	inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission spectroscopy
INEEL	Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
K_d	matrix distribution coefficient
kg	kilogram
kg/g	kilograms per gram
kg/lb	kilograms per pound
L	liter
lb	pound
LOI	loss-on-ignition
m	meter or molal
M	molar
m/s	meters per second
m^2/s	meters squared per second
m^3	cubic meters
mL	milliliter
mm	millimeter
mM	millimolar
mol	mole
mol %	mole percent
ND	not determined
nm	nanometer
NRC	National Research Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculations
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
PCR	Planned Change Request
pH	the negative, common logarithm of the activity of H^+

RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RH	relative humidity
RSI	Institute for Regulatory Science
RTR	real-time radiography
s	second(s) or solid
SCA	S. Cohen and Associates
SEM	scanning electron microscopy
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SPC	Salado Primary Constituents, a synthetic brine similar to Brine A
STTP	Source Term Test Program
SWB	standard waste box
TDOP	ten-drum overpack
TEA	Trinity Engineering Associates
TGA	thermal gravimetric analysis
TIC	total inorganic carbon
TRU	transuranic
VE	visual examination
vol %	volume percent
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
wt %	weight percent
WTS	Washington TRU Solutions, LLC
XRD	X-ray diffraction

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Al ₂ O ₃	aluminum oxide or alumina
Am	americium
An	actinide
Br	bromine
C	carbon
Ca	calcium
CaCl ₂	calcium chloride
Ca ²⁺	calcium ion

CaCO ₃	calcite
CaMg(CO ₃) ₂	dolomite
CaMg ₃ (CO ₃) ₄	huntite
CaMgSiO ₄	monticellite
CaO	calcium oxide or lime
CaO·MgO	dolime
CaSO ₄	anhydrite
CH ₄	methane
Cl ⁻	chloride ion
Cl	chlorine
CO ₂	carbon dioxide
CO ₃ ²⁻	carbonate ion
f _{co₂}	fugacity of CO ₂
Fe	iron
Fe ₂ O ₃	Fe(III) oxide, ferric oxide, or hematite
FeAl ₂ O ₄	hercynite
FeCr ₂ O ₄	chromite
H ⁺	hydrogen ion
H ₂ O	water (aq or g)
H ₂ S	hydrogen sulfide
K ⁺	potassium ion
Mg	magnesium
Mg(OH) ₂	brucite
Mg ²⁺	magnesium ion
Mg ₂ SiO ₄	forsterite
Mg ₄ (CO ₃) ₃ (OH) ₂ ·3H ₂ O	hydromagnesite (4323)
Mg ₅ (CO ₃) ₄ (OH) ₂ ·4H ₂ O	hydromagnesite (5424)
MgAl ₂ O ₄	spinel
MgCO ₃	magnesite
MgCO ₃ ·3H ₂ O	nesquehonite
MgCr ₂ O ₄	magnesiochromite
MgO	magnesium oxide

Mn	manganese
N ₂	nitrogen
Na	sodium
Na ⁺	sodium ion
Na ₂ Ca(SO ₄) ₂	glauberite
NaCl	sodium chloride or halite
NO ₃ ⁻	nitrate ion
Np	neptunium
O ₂	oxygen
O ₂ ⁻	anionic dioxygenyl radical
OH ⁻	hydroxide ion
OH [•]	hydroxyl radical(s)
Pb	lead
periclase	pure, crystalline MgO, the primary constituent of the WIPP engineered barrier
Pu	plutonium
SiO ₂	silicon dioxide or silica
SO ₄	sulfate
SO ₄ ²⁻	sulfate ion
Ti(Fe,Mg) ₂ O ₄	ulvöspinel
Th	thorium
U	uranium

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **MgO-1.0 Introduction**

2 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is emplacing magnesium oxide (MgO) in the Waste
3 Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository to provide an engineered barrier that decreases the
4 solubilities of the actinide (An) elements in transuranic (TRU) waste in any brine present in the
5 postclosure repository (U.S. Department of Energy 1996a, Appendix BACK; Appendix
6 SOTERM; U.S. Department of Energy 2004, Appendix BARRIERS; Appendix PA, Attachment
7 SOTERM). Because it will decrease An solubilities, MgO helps meet the U.S. Environmental
8 Protection Agency's (EPA's) requirement for multiple natural and engineered barriers, one of the
9 assurance requirements in its regulations for radioactive waste repositories at 40 CFR §
10 191.14(d) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993).

11 In 40 CFR § 191.12 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993), the EPA defined barriers as
12 "any material or structure that prevents or substantially delays movement of water or
13 radionuclides toward the accessible environment. For example, a barrier may be a geologic
14 structure, a canister, a waste form...or a material placed over and around waste provided that the
15 material or structure substantially delays movement of water or radionuclides."

16 The DOE proposed four engineered barriers in its Compliance Certification Application (CCA)
17 for the WIPP, submitted to the EPA in October 1996 (U.S. Department of Energy 1996a). The
18 four engineered barriers proposed by the DOE were MgO, panel closures, shaft seals, and
19 borehole plugs. The EPA, however, specified MgO as the only engineered barrier in the WIPP
20 disposal system that meets the assurance requirement in its May 1998 certification rulemaking
21 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a; 1998b). The EPA specified MgO as the only
22 engineered barrier because it considered panel closures, shaft seals, and borehole plugs to be part
23 of the disposal-system design.

24 MgO as used in the WIPP will decrease An solubilities by consuming essentially all of the
25 carbon dioxide (CO₂) that would be produced should microbial activity consume all of the
26 cellulosic, plastic, and rubber (CPR) materials in the TRU waste, waste containers, and waste-
27 emplacement materials in the repository. Although MgO will consume essentially all the CO₂,
28 minute quantities (relative to the quantity that would be produced by microbial consumption of
29 all of the CPR materials) will persist in the aqueous and gaseous phases. The residual quantities
30 would be so small relative to the initial quantity that the adverb "essentially" is hereafter omitted
31 in this appendix.

32 Consumption of CO₂ will decrease An solubilities by (1) buffering the fugacity of CO₂ (f_{CO_2}) at a
33 value or within a range of values favorable from the standpoint of the speciation and solubilities
34 of the An elements (the fugacity of a gaseous species, f_i , is similar to the partial pressure of that
35 species, p_i); (2) controlling the pH at a value favorable from the standpoint of An solubilities;
36 and (3) preventing the production of carbonate ion (CO₃²⁻) in significant quantities. The effect of
37 this residual CO₃²⁻ on the solubilities of An elements is described in Appendix SOTERM-2009,
38 Section SOTERM-3.2.1 and Section SOTERM-3.3.1.3.

39 The effects of MgO carbonation (consumption of CO₂) have been included in WIPP performance
40 assessment (PA) calculations by assuming that there will be no CO₂ in the repository. This
41 assumption has been implemented in PA by (1) removing CO₂ from the gaseous phase in the

1 Brine and Gas Flow (BRAGFLO) calculations, thereby somewhat reducing the predicted
2 pressurization of the repository; and (2) using the values of f_{CO_2} and pH predicted for reactions
3 among MgO, brine, and aqueous or gaseous CO_2 to calculate An solubilities. The assumption
4 that there will be no CO_2 has been implemented in all compliance-related WIPP PA calculations.
5 These include (1) the CCA PA calculations (Novak et al. 1996; the CCA, Appendix SOTERM),
6 (2) the CCA Performance Assessment Verification Test (PAVT) (Novak 1997; U.S.
7 Environmental Protection Agency 1998c, 1998d, and 1998e), (3) the PA calculations for the
8 2004 WIPP Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy
9 2004; the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM), (4) the CRA-2004 Performance
10 Assessment Baseline Calculations (PABC) (Brush and Xiong 2005a and 2005b, Brush 2005,
11 Leigh et al. 2005), and (5) the CRA-2009 PA.

12 In this appendix, “MgO” refers to the bulk, granular material being emplaced in the WIPP to
13 serve as the engineered barrier. MgO comprises periclase (pure, crystalline MgO—the main,
14 reactive constituent of the WIPP engineered barrier) and various impurities described in Section
15 MgO-3.0. Pure, crystalline MgO is always referred to as “periclase” in this Appendix. The term
16 “periclase” and other mineral names used herein are, strictly speaking, restricted to naturally
17 occurring forms of the materials that meet all the other requirements of the definition of a
18 mineral (see, for example, Bates and Jackson 1984). However, mineral names are used in this
19 report for convenience.

1 **MgO-2.0 Description of the Engineered Barrier System**

2 This section describes the emplacement of MgO in WIPP disposal rooms (Section MgO-2.2) and
3 the vendors that provided or are providing MgO to the WIPP (Section MgO-2.2).

4 Washington TRU Solutions, LLC (WTS) (2005) provides the current specifications for the
5 prepackaged MgO emplaced in the WIPP.

6 **MgO-2.1 Emplacement of MgO**

7 The DOE emplaced MgO in both supersacks and minisacks from the opening of the WIPP in
8 March 1999 until January 2001. During this period, the MgO emplaced in supersacks and that
9 emplaced in minisacks constituted about 85% and 15%, respectively, of the total quantity of
10 MgO emplaced in the repository.

11 In 2000, however, the DOE requested EPA approval to eliminate the minisacks (Triay 2000,
12 U.S. Department of Energy 2000); the EPA approved this request in 2001 (Marcinowski 2001,
13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2001). Section MgO-2.1.1 describes the supersacks;
14 Section MgO-2.0 describes the minisacks and the reasons for their elimination; and Section
15 MgO-2.1.2 describes changes since the CRA-2004.

16 **MgO-2.1.1 Supersacks**

17 The DOE is emplacing MgO in polypropylene supersacks atop each stack of 3 7-packs of 55-
18 gallon (gal) (208-liter [L]) drums, 3 standard waste boxes (SWBs), or various combinations of
19 these and other waste containers. Other such containers include ten-drum overpacks (TDOPs),
20 4-packs of 85-gal (321-L) drums, and 3-packs of 100-gal (379-L) drums. According to WTS
21 specifications, each supersack must contain 4200 ± 50 pounds (lb) (1905 ± 23 kilograms [kg]) of
22 MgO (WTS 2005). Forklifts are used to place the supersacks on top of the waste stacks. Figure
23 MgO-1 shows supersacks of MgO emplaced on top of the waste stack.

24 Emplacement of MgO in supersacks (1) facilitates handling and emplacement of MgO, (2)
25 minimizes potential worker exposure to dust, and (3) minimizes the exposure of periclase (the
26 main reactive constituent of MgO) to atmospheric CO₂ and H₂O during handling and
27 emplacement, and prior to panel closure. Washington TRU Solutions (2005) provides detailed
28 specifications for the supersacks. In particular, Washington TRU Solutions (2005) specifies that
29 the supersacks “shall provide a barrier to atmospheric moisture and carbon dioxide (CO₂) ...
30 equivalent to or better than that provided by a standard commercial cement bag” and “must be
31 able to retain [their] contents for a period of two years after emplacement without rupturing from
32 [their] own weight.” The specifications also require a certificate of compliance with all
33 requirements of Washington TRU Solutions (2005) for every shipment of MgO (see below), and
34 a certified chemical analysis for each new lot of MgO. The supersacks are subject to random
35 receipt inspection at the WIPP to ensure compliance with the dimensions and labeling specified
36 by Washington TRU Solutions (2005), and to identify any damage incurred during shipping.



1

2

Figure MgO-1. Supersacks of MgO Emplaced on Top of the Waste Stack

3 The supersacks contain dry, granular MgO, of which less than 0.5% can exceed 3/8 inches
4 (9.5 millimeters [mm]) in diameter (Washington TRU Solutions 2005). Emplacement of
5 granular MgO instead of powder (1) results in a bulk density high enough that sufficient MgO
6 can be emplaced without causing major operational difficulties, (2) reduces the likelihood of dust
7 formation and release in the event of premature supersack rupture, and (3) ensures that the
8 permeability of the material is high enough to promote complete reaction with aqueous or
9 gaseous CO₂.

10 Creep closure of WIPP disposal rooms will rupture the supersacks and disperse the MgO among
11 and within the ruptured waste containers. This will, in turn, expose the MgO to the room's
12 atmosphere, to any CO₂ produced by the microbial consumption of CPR materials, and to H₂O
13 vapor and any brine present.

14 **MgO-2.1.2 Minisacks**

15 Initially, the DOE emplaced MgO in both supersacks and 25-lb (11-kg) minisacks. The
16 minisacks were emplaced among the waste containers and between the waste containers and the
17 ribs (sides) of the disposal rooms.

18 In its request for EPA approval to eliminate the minisacks (Triay 2000 and U.S. Department of
19 Energy 2000), the DOE emphasized the need to reduce the industrial and radiological hazards
20 associated with the manual emplacement of the minisacks. The DOE (U.S. Department of
21 Energy 2000, p. 2) stated

22 Elimination of the mini-sacks will reduce the industrial hazards associated with the lifting and
23 handling of the mini-sacks. While the bulk of the MgO backfill (85%) is contained in the

1 supersacks which are emplaced using a forklift, each mini-sack of MgO must be emplaced
2 manually. This requires that personnel emplace eighteen twenty-five pound mini-sacks around the
3 drums for each waste stack, and 11 mini-sacks against the rib at the end of each row, a process
4 which will be repeated for the more than 108,000 estimated waste stacks (about 2,142,000 mini-
5 sacks) to be emplaced during the life of the facility. Handling and emplacing the mini-sacks
6 requires excessive bending and lifting, as well as climbing ladders on an uneven surface to
7 emplace mini-sacks in the upper tiers. Each of these actions [has] a risk of physical injury.

8 Also, elimination of the mini-sacks will reduce the potential radiation exposure to workers. This
9 exposure has been evaluated by timing the steps associated with emplacement and estimating the
10 radiological exposure over this time period (WID [Westinghouse Waste Isolation Division] 1997).
11 Although the total potential dose is not excessive, particularly when spread over the life of the
12 facility, any potential reduction of dose supports the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably
13 Achievable) concept, which defines [the] DOE's basic operating philosophy regarding radiation
14 exposure. It is the installation of the mini-sacks that is responsible for most of the radiological
15 dose associated with backfill emplacement. Elimination of the mini-sacks from the backfill
16 system will result in the elimination of associated radiological exposure.

17 The DOE also demonstrated that eliminating the minisacks would (1) not affect the ability of
18 MgO to function as an effective engineered barrier, thus meeting the EPA's assurance
19 requirement for multiple natural and engineered barriers; and (2) "[r]etain an acceptable safety
20 factor ..." (U.S. Department of Energy 2000, p. 3). Section MgO-6.0 defines the MgO excess
21 factor; Section MgO-6.2.2 describes the effect of eliminating the minisacks on the MgO excess
22 factor.

23 Wang (2000a and 2000b) supported the DOE's request to eliminate the minisacks by justifying
24 the DOE assertion that doing so would not affect the ability of MgO to function as an effective
25 engineered barrier and would not reduce the MgO excess factor to an unacceptable extent. Wang
26 (2000a) (1) described new evidence from laboratory studies of microbial gas generation, which
27 demonstrated that microbial methanogenesis could be an important process in the WIPP; and
28 (2) showed that, if methanogenesis were the dominant microbial respiratory pathway, a smaller
29 amount of CO₂ would be generated and the MgO excess factor would increase from values of
30 1.95 prior to and 1.67 after the proposed elimination of the minisacks to values of 3.73 prior to
31 and 3.23 after minisack elimination. Section MgO-6.1 describes the effects of microbial
32 respiratory pathways on the MgO excess factor; Section MgO-6.2.2 discusses the effects of
33 eliminating the minisacks on the MgO excess factor and the laboratory results demonstrating that
34 methanogenesis could be an important respiratory pathway.

35 In addition, Wang (2000b) used a bounding calculation to demonstrate that, even in the absence
36 of the minisacks, molecular diffusion in WIPP brines would be fast enough for MgO to control
37 chemical conditions in the repository.

38 In its 2001 approval of the DOE's request to eliminate the minisacks, the EPA stated, "... this
39 change, ... proposed to improve operational safety, will not significantly impact the WIPP's
40 long-term performance" (Marcinowski 2001). After inspecting the waste emplaced in Panel 1,
41 the EPA also "found that DOE accurately represented the steps required to attach minisacks to
42 the waste containers and the worker safety considerations involved in this activity" (U.S.
43 Environmental Protection Agency 2001). Furthermore, the EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection
44 Agency 2001) noted that "DOE's conceptualization of MgO performance in the repository was
45 very conservative," and cited the following as examples:

- 1 • The DOE did not take credit for the beneficial effects of MgO hydration on the long-term
2 performance of the repository.
- 3 • The “DOE proposes to reduce only excess MgO, which was not used in the [PA]
4 calculations” and “there would still be a large excess of MgO relative to any potential
5 evolved carbon [C].”
- 6 • “Attachment 4 [Wang (2000b)] concludes that molecular diffusion alone can effectively
7 mix brine with MgO from degraded super-sacks in a repository that has experience[d]
8 salt creep closure.... We reviewed DOE’s calculations and agree these processes will
9 function as expected and sufficient MgO will be available to react.”

10 **MgO-2.1.3 Changes Since the CRA-2004 in Emplacement of MgO**

11 In March 2004, the EPA approved the emplacement in the WIPP of compressed
12 (supercompacted) waste from the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) at the
13 Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Marcinowski 2004, Trinity
14 Engineering Associates 2004, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2004). However, the
15 EPA required that the DOE maintain an MgO excess factor (Section MgO-6.0) of 1.67 on a
16 room-by-room basis. Some of the AMWTP waste contains concentrations of CPR materials that
17 are high relative to the average concentration of CPR materials in TRU waste, thereby
18 necessitating the emplacement of additional MgO in the repository. To account for this, the
19 DOE has emplaced additional MgO supersacks on racks among the waste containers. Each rack
20 contains 5 supersacks identical to those placed on top of the waste containers, and spans the
21 same vertical distance normally occupied by the waste stack (3 7-packs of 55-gal [208-L] drums,
22 3 SWBs, or various combinations of these and other waste containers) and the supersack
23 emplaced atop the waste stack. Thus, emplacing additional MgO in the repository uses space
24 normally occupied by contact-handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU) waste. Figure MgO-2
25 shows a rack used to emplace additional MgO in the WIPP.

26 As of June 12, 2008, a total of 80 racks had been emplaced in the WIPP, comprising 30 racks in
27 Panel 2, Room 1; 21 racks in Panel 3, Room 5; 3 racks in Panel 3, Room 4; 3 racks in Panel 4,
28 Room 6; and 23 racks in Panel 4, Room 4.

29 **MgO-2.2 Vendors That Provided or Are Providing MgO**

30 National Magnesia Chemicals in Moss Landing, CA, was the first vendor to provide MgO for the
31 WIPP. National Magnesia supplied MgO from the opening of the WIPP in March 1999 through
32 mid-April 2000; during this period, waste was emplaced only in Panel 1, Room 7. This vendor
33 was sometimes referred to as National Refractory Materials (e.g., Papenguth 1999). Note that in
34 every seven-room WIPP panel, waste is emplaced in Room 7, at the back of the panel first and in
35 Room 1 last.

36 After National Magnesia stopped producing MgO, WTS considered Martin Marietta Magnesia
37 Specialties LLC, currently headquartered in Baltimore, MD, and Premier Chemicals of Gabbs,
38 NV, as potential vendors. At the request of the DOE’s Carlsbad Area Office, Papenguth (1999)



1
2

Figure MgO-2. Racks Used to Emplace Additional MgO

3 carried out a technical evaluation of MgO from both Martin Marietta and Premier to support
4 WTS's selection of a new vendor. The criteria used for this evaluation included density; particle
5 size; purity; and reactivity, quantified using a test developed by Krumhansl et al. (1997).
6 Based on cost and the results of the technical evaluation, WTS selected Premier Chemicals.
7 This vendor supplied MgO from mid-April 2000 (Panel 1, Room 7) through January 2005 (Panel
8 2, Room 2).

9 Section MgO-3.2 presents the results of the Premier MgO characterization.

10 **MgO-2.2.1 Changes since the CRA-2004 in Vendors Proving MgO**

11 Premier Chemicals informed WTS in 2004 that it would soon be unable to provide MgO that met
12 the requirement for the minimum concentration of MgO specified by Washington TRU Solutions
13 (2003): "The sum of MgO plus calcium oxide (CaO) shall be a minimum of 95%, with MgO
14 being no less than 90%."

15 Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties, LLC, was selected and has supplied the MgO emplaced
16 since January 2005 (Panel 2, Room 2). Martin Marietta MgO was selected based on cost and a

1 technical evaluation of its suitability by Wall (2005). The results of this study and additional
2 characterization of Martin Marietta MgO are described in more detail in Section MgO-3.3.2.

3 Because Martin Marietta did not begin supplying MgO until January 2005, all results reported
4 for Martin Marietta MgO have been obtained since the CRA-2004 (Section MgO-3.3 and Section
5 MgO-4.1.2).

1 **MgO-3.0 Characteristics of MgO**


2 This section describes the characteristics of the MgO provided to the WIPP by National
3 Magnesia Chemicals (Section MgO-3.1), Premier Chemicals (Section MgO-3.2), and Martin
4 Marietta Magnesia Specialties, LLC (Section MgO-3.3).

5 **MgO-3.1 Production of National Magnesia MgO**

6 This section is based on a brief description provided by Papenguth (1999).

7 National Magnesia produced MgO for the WIPP by mixing seawater (the source of Mg(OH)₂)
8 with calcined limestone at their plant in Moss Landing, CA. Limestone is a rock that mainly
9 comprises the mineral calcite (CaCO₃) or other polymorphs of CaCO₃. In some cases, this rock
10 can comprise nearly pure calcite. Clay minerals and quartz commonly occur as impurities in
11 limestone.


12 The calcination reaction for limestone is



14 The formula for limestone on the left-hand side of Reaction (MgO.1) does not include impurities
15 such as clay minerals and quartz, which presumably occur in small quantities in the material
16 quarried to produce National Magnesia MgO.

17 National Magnesia then mixed seawater with the lime (CaO) obtained from Reaction (MgO.1).
18 Although Papenguth (1999) did not describe the reaction(s) that occurred upon mixing, brucite
19 (Mg(OH)₂) presumably precipitated via a reaction similar to that discussed in Section MgO-
20 3.3.1, except that National Magnesia used seawater instead of brine, and lime instead of dolime
21 (CaO·MgO(solid[s])). Seawater solutes, such as sodium (Na⁺), calcium (Ca²⁺), chlorine (Cl⁻),
22 and SO₄²⁻, presumably remained mainly in solution.

23 After filtering and washing the precipitate to remove all the seawater, National Magnesia hard-
24 burned (calcined at 1000-1500 °C [1832-2732 °F]) the brucite to convert it to periclase via the
25 reaction



27 Hard burning produces MgO that is more reactive than dead-burned MgO (calcined at 1500-
28 2000 °C [2732-3632 °F]), but less reactive than light-burned MgO (calcined at 700-1000 °C
29 [1292-1832 °F]).


30 **MgO-3.2 Premier MgO**

31 This section describes the process that Premier Chemicals used to manufacture MgO for the
32 WIPP (Section MgO-3.2.1), the DOE's characterization of this product (Section MgO-3.2.2),
33 and changes in the WIPP project's understanding of its characteristics since the CRA-2004
34 (Section MgO-3.2.3).

1 **MgO-3.2.1 Production**

2 This section is based on a brief description provided by the DOE (the CRA-2004, Appendix
3 BARRIERS, Section BARRIERS-2.3.1).

4 Premier Chemicals produced MgO for the WIPP by mining ore from a sedimentary magnesite
5 (MgCO₃) deposit and calcining it to expel all CO₂, thereby producing periclase directly instead
6 of from calcined brucite:



8 Calcination of accessory CaCO₃ produced small quantities of lime. Calcination of other
9 accessory minerals in the ore, such as clay minerals and quartz, created minor quantities of oxide
10 and silicate minerals, such as spinel (MgAl₂O₄), ulvöspinel (Ti(Fe,Mg)₂O₄), forsterite
11 (Mg₂SiO₄), and monticellite (CaMgSiO₄). Calcination also drove off any H₂O in the ore.

12 **MgO-3.2.2 Characterization**

13 This section is based on the summary of the DOE's characterization of Premier Chemicals MgO
14 provided in the CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS, Section BARRIERS-2.3.1 and Section
15 BARRIERS-2.3.2.1.

16 This section emphasizes the DOE's identification and quantification of the reactive constituents
17 periclase and lime, and the nonreactive constituents of Premier Chemicals MgO. In this
18 appendix, *reactive constituents* refers to those solids that hydrate and carbonate to a significant
19 extent on the time scales of the accelerated or WIPP-relevant laboratory experiments described
20 below (Section MgO-4.1 and Section MgO-4.2). It is possible that the nonreactive constituents
21 of Premier MgO (or the MgO provided by other vendors) could significantly hydrate and
22 carbonate during the 10,000-year WIPP regulatory period. However, these experiments were
23 designed to investigate the hydration and carbonation of the reactive constituents of MgO, not
24 the relatively minor nonreactive constituents. Therefore, credit is not taken for possible CO₂
25 uptake by the nonreactive constituents.

26 Bryan and Snider (2001a) reported that a typical chemical analysis of Premier Chemicals MgO
27 yielded about 91 weight percent (wt %) MgO, 1 wt % alumina (Al₂O₃), 3 wt % silica (SiO₂),
28 4 wt % CaO, and 1 wt % iron(III) (Fe(III)) oxide (Fe₂O₃). These chemical analyses did not
29 differentiate between the MgO contained in the reactive constituent periclase and that contained
30 in the nonreactive constituents spinel, ulvöspinel, forsterite, and monticellite; or between the
31 CaO contained in the reactive constituent lime and that contained in the nonreactive constituent
32 monticellite. However, most of the MgO and CaO occurred as periclase and lime, respectively,
33 in Premier Chemicals MgO. On the other hand, some of the MgO and CaO, and most, if not all,
34 of the Al₂O₃, SiO₂, and Fe₂O₃ were present in the accessory oxide and silicate minerals described
35 above.

36 Snider (2002, Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 6, and Figure 7) observed that the hydration of Premier
37 Chemicals MgO reached completion after formation of about 85 mole % (mol %) brucite in
38 accelerated experiments. Snider (2003a) calculated that the average brucite concentration in this
39 lot of Premier Chemicals MgO was 84.6 mol % after complete hydration, based on the last 8 data

1 points of the inundated hydration experiment with deionized (DI) H₂O at 90 °C (194 °F) (Snider
2 2002, Figure 1 and Figure 2) and the last 16 data points of the humid hydration run at 95%
3 relative humidity (RH) and 80 °C (176 °F) (Snider 2002, Figure 6 and Figure 7). Therefore, it
4 was assumed in the CRA-2004 that this lot of Premier Chemicals MgO contained 84.6 mol %
5 periclase prior to hydration.

6 It is important to note that Snider (2002) determined the brucite concentration of the MgO
7 hydration products by loss-on-ignition (LOI) analysis, which quantified the mass of H₂O
8 released by brucite upon heating to 500 °C (932 °F). However, based on the results of Deng et al.
9 (2006) and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007) (Section MgO-3.3.2), it is now clear that LOI or
10 thermal gravimetric analysis (TGA) cannot readily differentiate between the H₂O lost by brucite
11 and portlandite. Therefore, Deng et al. (2006) and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007) reported
12 their results as mole percent brucite and portlandite or weight percent brucite and portlandite.
13 Thus, the results of Snider (2002) are described as mole percent brucite and portlandite in this
14 appendix, which correspond to the concentration in mole percent of periclase and lime prior to
15 hydration.

16 Snider (2003b) used inductively coupled plasma-optical atomic spectroscopy (ICP-AES) and
17 gravimetric analysis to quantify the mineralogical composition of one of the lots of Premier
18 Chemicals MgO used for the hydration and carbonation experiments (Section MgO-6.0). Based
19 on the assumption that the silicate in this MgO was forsterite, this lot of MgO contained
20 86.9 wt % periclase, 2.39 wt % lime, 2.07 wt % spinel, and 5.02 wt % forsterite. If the silicate
21 was monticellite, this lot contained 88.7 wt % periclase, 1.27 wt % lime, 2.07 wt % spinel, and
22 5.76 wt % monticellite. Given the uncertainties inherent in quantifying the mineralogical
23 composition of materials such as Premier Chemicals MgO, it is reasonable to conclude that this
24 material contained about 90 wt % reactive constituents (periclase and lime) and 10 wt %
25 nonreactive constituents (oxides and silicates).

26 Bryan and Snider (2001a) carried out particle-size analyses of two batches of MgO used for their
27 experiments. Table MgO-1 provides the results of these analyses.

28 **MgO-3.2.3 Results since the CRA-2004 in Characteristics of MgO**

29 Snider and Xiong (2004) reported the results of experiments on the inundated hydration and the
30 inundated carbonation of Premier Chemicals MgO. The objectives of this study were to
31 determine why Snider (2002, 2003a) had observed that the hydration of Premier Chemicals MgO
32 reached completion after formation of about 85 mol % brucite in three sets of experiments
33 (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and why the extent of Premier Chemicals MgO hydration in
34 accelerated tests was less than expected (Snider 2002, 2003a, 2003b).

35 Snider and Xiong (2004, Section 3.1.2.1 and Section 3.3.2.1) conducted Experiment 1 to
36 examine the effects of particle size on the extent of hydration and it yielded no useful data. The
37 cause of the unexpectedly low extent of hydration was identified by Experiments 2 and 3
38 (below).

Table MgO-1. Particle-Size Distribution of Two Batches of Premier MgO (from Bryan and Snider [2001a])

Size Range (mm)	Batch 1	Batch 2
< 0.15	31.0%	9.89%
0.15 to 0.30	8.36%	29.4%
0.30 to 0.50	4.59%	29.7%
0.50 to 0.71	3.50%	15.0%
0.71 to 2.00	14.2%	14.5%
> 2.00	37.4%	1.53%

Snider and Xiong (2004, Section 3.1.2.2 and Section 3.3.2.2) conducted Experiment 2 to test the validity of LOI analysis at 500 °C (932 °F). For this experiment, 22 separate runs were conducted with 5 grams (g) of reagent grade Fisher MgO and 100 milliliters (mL) of DI water in 125-mL polypropylene bottles at 90 °C (194 °F) for 1 to 15 days, followed by LOI analysis at 500 °C (932 °F). These runs yielded results from 87 to 99 mol % brucite, with no apparent increase in the extent of hydration from 1 to 15 days (Snider and Xiong 2004, Figure 8). Snider and Xiong (2004, p. 16) concluded, “The most likely reason for why hydration of Fisher MgO did not produce 100 mol % brucite in this experiment is that LOI analysis at 500 °C (932 °F) did not drive off all bound H₂O (see Experiment 3 below).”

Snider and Xiong (2004, Section 3.1.2.3 and Section 3.3.2.3) performed Experiment 3 to further test the validity of LOI at 500 °C (932 °F) by conducting 8 runs with either 5 g of Fisher or Premier Chemicals MgO and 100 mL of DI water in 125 mL polypropylene bottles at 90 °C (194 °F) for 29 days, followed by LOI analysis at 500 or 750 °C (932 or 1382 °F). Table MgO-2 provides the results of Experiment 3. These results imply that (1) not all of the bound H₂O is released during LOI analysis at 500 °C (932 °F), and (2) the concentration of brucite and portlandite in their hydration products and the concentration of periclase and lime for Premier Chemicals MgO prior to reaction were about 89 mol % and 92 wt % for the LOI analysis at 750 °C (1382 °F), thus confirming the impact of higher temperature on the LOI analysis.

MgO-3.3 Martin Marietta MgO

This section discusses the process that Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties LLC uses to produce MgO for the WIPP (Section MgO-3.3.1) and the DOE’s characterization of this product (Section MgO-3.3.2). Because Premier Chemicals was replaced by Martin Marietta in January 2005 (Section MgO-2.2.1), all the information described in this section has been obtained since the CRA-2004.

MgO-3.3.1 Production

This section summarizes the process Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties, LLC, uses to produce its MgO. This summary is based on information provided by Martin Marietta (Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties 2006) and the text in Brush and Roselle (2006, Section 2.3.1).

1 **Table MgO-2. Effects of LOI Analysis Temperature on the Extent of Hydration under**
 2 **Accelerated Conditions on Fisher and Premier Chemicals MgO**


Type of MgO	Brucite, 500 °C (932 °F) (mol %)	Brucite, 500 °C (932 °F) (wt %)	Brucite, 750 °C (1382 °F) (mol %)	Brucite, 750 °C (1382 °F) (wt %)
Fisher	90.5	93.2	NA ^a	NA
Fisher	90.2	93.0	NA	NA
Fisher	NA	NA	97.3	98.2
Fisher	NA	NA	98.5	99.0
Premier	84.2	88.5	NA	NA
Premier	83.0	87.6	NA	NA
Premier	NA	NA	88.7	91.9
Premier	NA	NA	89.4	92.4

^a NA = not analyzed.

3
 4 Martin Marietta pumps brine from a depth of about 762 m (2,500 feet (ft)) in the Michigan
 5 Basin. According to their website, this brine consists of CaCl₂ + MgCl₂ + H₂O. This simplified
 6 composition of the brine does not include solutes such as Na⁺, K⁺, and SO₄²⁻, which are
 7 important constituents of WIPP brines and which presumably are present at least to some extent
 8 in brines from the Michigan Basin.


9 Martin Marietta produces dolime by calcining dolomite (CaMg(CO₃)₂) quarried in Ohio.
 10 Dolomite, which is also commonly referred to as “dolomitic limestone,” is a rock that mainly
 11 comprises the mineral dolomite. In some cases, this rock can comprise nearly pure dolomite.

12 The calcination reaction for dolomite is



14 The formula for dolomite on the left-hand side of Reaction (MgO.4) does not include impurities
 15 such as clay minerals and quartz, which presumably occur in small quantities in the rock quarried
 16 to produce Martin Marietta MgO.

17 Martin Marietta then mixes the brine, dolime, and water to produce a slurry containing dissolved
 18 CaCl₂ and particulate Mg(OH)₂ produced via the following reaction:



21 Note that CaCl₂ and MgCl₂ are written as neutral complex species instead of ionic species in
 22 Reaction (MgO.5), and that H₂O is included on both sides of Reaction (MgO.5) to be consistent
 23 with the information on the Martin Marietta website.

24 Next, Martin Marietta allows the brucite to settle. They filter and wash it to remove all of the
 25 brine and the CaCl₂ dissolved in this brine.

1 Finally, Martin Marietta hard-burns (calcines at 1000-1500 °C [1832-2732 °F]) the brucite to
2 convert it to periclase via Reaction (MgO.2) (Section MgO-3.1).

3 **MgO-3.3.2 Characterization**

4 This subsection reviews the DOE's characterization of Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties
5 MgO, hereafter called Martin Marietta MgO. It is based on the text in Brush and Roselle (2006,
6 Section 2.3).

7 This section emphasizes the DOE's identification and quantification of the reactive and
8 nonreactive constituents of Martin Marietta MgO. The meanings of *reactive* and *nonreactive*
9 *constituents* are explained in Section MgO-3.2.

10 Wall (2005) carried out a technical evaluation on the suitability of Martin Marietta MgO. This
11 evaluation, which supported the 2004 selection of Martin Marietta as the vendor of MgO for the
12 WIPP (Section MgO-2.2.1), emphasized quantifying the concentration of the reactive phases
13 periclase and lime, but also considered the rate at which these phases hydrate in accelerated tests.

14 Wall (2005) conducted accelerated hydration experiments (hydration of MgO in DI water at
15 90 °C [194 °F]) to (1) measure the concentrations of periclase and lime in these materials and
16 compare them to those of Premier Chemicals MgO (Snider and Xiong 2004); (2) measure the
17 accelerated hydration rates of the Martin Marietta products and compare them to those of
18 Premier Chemicals MgO; (3) improve, if possible, the LOI technique used to measure the brucite
19 and portlandite contents of MgO hydration products. Wall (2005) evaluated three materials from
20 Martin Marietta: MagChem 10 WTS-20, MagChem 10 WTS-30, and MagChem 10 WTS-60.
21 ("MagChem 10" is omitted hereafter.) All of these products are hard-burned MgO (calcined at
22 1000-1500 °C [1832-2732 °F]) with a specified MgO content of 95 wt % and a bulk density of
23 87 lb/cubic foot (ft³) (1,400 kg/cubic meter (m³)). Assay results are typically 97 wt % MgO.
24 However, these results include MgO in phases other than periclase, such as other oxides or
25 silicates (Section MgO-3.2.2).

26 Table MgO-3 compares Wall's (2005) results for sample products WTS-20, WTS-30, and
27 WTS-60 with those obtained by Snider and Xiong (2004) for Premier Chemicals MgO. Snider
28 and Xiong (2004) and Wall (2005) reported the results of their MgO hydration product LOI
29 analysis as mole percent brucite or weight percent brucite. However, based on the results of
30 Deng et al. (2006) and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007) (see below), it is now clear that LOI or
31 TGA cannot readily differentiate between the H₂O lost by brucite and portlandite. Therefore,
32 Deng et al. (2006) and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007) reported their results as mole percent
33 brucite and portlandite or weight percent brucite and portlandite. Thus, the results of Snider and
34 Xiong (2004) and Wall (2005) are described as mole percent brucite and portlandite or weight
35 percent brucite and portlandite in this appendix, which corresponds to the mole percent or weight
36 percent concentration of periclase and lime prior to hydration.

37 Table MgO-3 illustrates the effects of the materials used for the accelerated hydration
38 experiments and the temperature used for LOI on the brucite and portlandite contents of the
39 hydration products and—by assumption—the periclase and lime contents of these materials.
40 Two important conclusions can be drawn from these results:

1 **Table MgO-3. Effects of Temperature Used for LOI Analyses of MgO Hydration Products**
 2 **on the Brucite + Portlandite Concentrations of the Hydrated Samples.**
 3 **From Wall (2005, Table 1), Unless Otherwise Noted.**

Material	Temperature Used for LOI			
	500 °C ^a		750 °C ^a	
	Mol %	Wt %	Mol %	Wt %
WTS-20	87 ± 5 ^b	91 ± 4 ^b	ND ^c	ND ^c
WTS-30	87 ± 5 ^b	91 ± 4 ^b	96 ± 5 ^b	97 ± 3 ^b
WTS-60	90 ± 3 ^b	93 ± 2 ^b	ND ^c	ND ^c
Premier	85 ^d	89 ^d	89 ^d	92 ^d

^a Snider and Xiong (2004) and Wall (2005) reported their results of LOI analysis of MgO hydration products as mole percent brucite or weight percent brucite. However, Deng et al. (2006a) and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007) report their results as mole percent brucite + portlandite or weight percent brucite + portlandite (see text). In this appendix, all of these results are reported as mole percent brucite + portlandite or weight percent brucite + portlandite.

^b Reported uncertainties represent two standard deviations (2σ).

^c ND = not determined.

^d Snider and Xiong (2004).

- 4
- 5 1. All three materials from Martin Marietta have the same or higher contents of reactive
 6 constituents (periclase and lime) than Premier Chemicals MgO.
- 7 2. LOI at 750 °C (1382 °F) yields higher brucite and portlandite contents (and, by assumption,
 8 higher initial periclase and lime contents) than LOI at 500 °C (932 °F). The results obtained
 9 for Premier MgO since the CRA-2004 (Section MgO-3.2.3) imply that the 750 °C (1382 °F)
 10 results are more accurate than the 500 °C (932 °F) results.

11 Wall (2005) reported that LOI at 750 °C (1382 °F) was unsuccessful for WTS-20 and WTS-60
 12 due to decrepitation of these samples at this temperature. Wall (2005) was unable to develop a
 13 procedure for LOI at 750 °C (1382 °F) that prevented decrepitation of these samples. However,
 14 the fact that LOI for WTS-60 at 500 °C (932 °F) yielded a higher brucite and portlandite content
 15 than LOI with WTS-30 at this temperature strongly suggested that the sample of WTS-60 tested
 16 by Wall (2005) had a periclase and lime content greater than or equal to that of WTS-30, and that
 17 the brucite and portlandite content of WTS-60 from LOI at 750 °C (1382 °F) would equal or
 18 exceed 96 ± 5 mol %, or 97 ± 3 wt % (see Table MgO-3). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
 19 based on these results that WTS-60, the MgO currently being emplaced in the WIPP, contains 96
 20 ± 5 mol % (97 ± 3 wt %) periclase and lime.

21 Another important result of Wall's (2005) work is that Martin Marietta MgO hydrated
 22 significantly faster in accelerated hydration experiments than Premier Chemicals MgO at the
 23 same temperature (90 °C [194 °F]). Although the DOE does not have any 25 °C (77 °F)
 24 hydration data for Martin Marietta MgO, comparison of the 90 °C (194 °F) data suggests that
 25 Martin Marietta MgO will hydrate faster—and carbonate faster—than Premier MgO at 28 °C
 26 (82 °F), the temperature in the undisturbed Salado Formation at the repository horizon and hence
 27 the temperature expected in the repository after it is filled and sealed (Munson et al. 1987).

1 Deng et al. (2006) and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007) carried out additional characterization of
 2 Martin Marietta WTS-60 MgO, the MgO currently being emplaced in the WIPP. Their
 3 characterization included the following analyses, all of which were conducted on Lot SL2980076
 4 of this material:

- 5 1. Particle-size analysis
- 6 2. Analysis of the chemical composition
- 7 3. Preliminary identification of the nonreactive constituents
- 8 4. LOI analysis and TGA of the reactive constituents in Martin Marietta WTS-60

9 This work was part of an ongoing laboratory study on the efficacy of Martin Marietta MgO
 10 (Deng, Nemer, and Xiong [2006] and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer [2007]).

11 Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007, Section 3.1) carried out particle-size analysis of Martin Marietta
 12 WTS-60 MgO by sieving. Table MgO-4 provides the results of their analysis.

13 **Table MgO-4. Particle-Size Distribution of 10 Samples from One Lot of Martin Marietta**
 14 **MgO. Adapted from Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007, Table 3).**

Size Range (mm)	Average (wt %)	Standard Deviation (wt %)
> 2.0 mm	7.02	0.91
1.0 to 2.0 mm	32.5	1.76
600 micrometer (µm) to 1.0 mm	20.2	1.28
300 µm to 600 µm	12.7	2.19
150 µm to 300 µm	5.4	0.70
75 µm to 150 µm	3.4	0.35
< 75 µm	17.9	1.88

15
 16 Deng et al. (2006, Section 3.1 and Appendix B, Section B.1) and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer
 17 (2007, Section 3.2 and Appendix B, Section B.1) determined the overall chemical composition
 18 of Martin Marietta WTS-60 MgO by dissolving it in nitric acid, analyzing the liquid by ICP-
 19 AES, and weighing the remaining solids. They reported the following concentrations of oxides
 20 (average concentrations and standard deviations) based on 12 analyses of Lot SL2980076:

- 21 1. MgO: 98.5 ± 2.5 wt %
- 22 2. Al₂O₃: 0.13 ± 0.02 wt %
- 23 3. SiO₂: 0.31 ± 0.01 wt %
- 24 4. CaO: 0.87 ± 0.03 wt %
- 25 5. Fe₂O₃: 0.12 ± 0.01 wt %

1 6. Total: 99.9 ± 2.5 wt %

2 These chemical analyses did not differentiate between the MgO and CaO contained in
 3 the reactive constituents periclase and lime and those contained in the nonreactive constituents.
 4 Preliminary characterization of the nonreactive constituents in WTS-60 suggests that they
 5 comprise (1) a spinel-group mineral that appears to be a solid solution of the four end members
 6 chromite (FeCr_2O_4), hercynite (FeAl_2O_4), magnesiochromite (MgCr_2O_4), and spinel; (2) hematite
 7 (Fe_2O_3); and (3) SiO_2 (polymorph was not determined). The relative proportions of these phases
 8 also have not been determined. It is possible that one or more of these nonreactive constituents
 9 could also consume significant quantities of CO_2 and H_2O in the WIPP, albeit at lower rates than
 10 periclase and lime.

11 Deng et al. (2006, Section 3.2; Section 4; and Appendix B, Section B.2) and Deng, Xiong, and
 12 Nemer (2007, Section 3.3; Section 4; and Appendix B, Subsection B.2) established the
 13 concentration of reactive constituents in Martin Marietta WTS-60 MgO by (1) hydrating samples
 14 of this material in DI H_2O at 90°C (194°F) for at least 3 days; (2) using LOI analysis and TGA
 15 to determine the quantity of H_2O released by hydrated MgO from $150\text{-}800^\circ\text{C}$ ($302\text{-}1472^\circ\text{F}$); and
 16 (3) assuming that nonreactive components did not hydrate to a significant extent, and that any
 17 unbound water was lost at temperatures below 150°C (302°F). In addition, they conducted a
 18 total carbon (C) analysis on samples of WTS-60 by C coulometry before and after hydration to
 19 ensure that precipitation of CaCO_3 , which might have occurred during hydration, did not affect
 20 the results of the LOI analyses and TGA. Based on eight LOI analyses and TGA, they reported
 21 that WTS-60 contains 96.0 ± 1.9 mol % (95.6 ± 1.7 wt %) periclase and lime (see Table MgO-5).

22 **Table MgO-5. Results of LOI Analysis and TGA on WTS-60. From Deng et al. (2006),**
 23 **Table 7 and Table 8, and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007), Table 8 and**
 24 **Table 9.**

Reactive Constituent	Average (mol %)	Standard Deviation (mol %)	Average (wt %)	Standard Deviation (mol %)
Periclase	95.2 ^a	1.82 ^a	94.8 ^b	1.72 ^b
Lime	0.6 ^a	0.04 ^a	0.9 ^b	0.02 ^b
Periclase + lime	95.8 ^a	1.86 ^a	95.7 ^c	1.74 ^b

^a From Deng et al. (2006a, Table 7).

^b From Deng et al. (2006a, Table 8).

^c Value corrected from the value of 95.6 provided by Deng et al. (2006a, Table 8).

25

1 **MgO-4.0 Hydration and Carbonation of MgO**

2 This section reviews the results of the DOE's studies on the hydration and carbonation of MgO
3 (Section MgO-4.1 and Section MgO-4.2, respectively).

4 **MgO-4.1 Hydration of MgO**


5 The DOE carried out extensive studies on the hydration of Premier Chemicals MgO under four
6 versions of Test Plan 00-07 (Wang and Bryan 2000; Wang, Bryan, and Wall 2001; Snider and
7 Xiong 2002b; Snider, Xiong, and Wall 2004); Section MgO-4.1.1 describes the results of these
8 studies obtained prior to the CRA-2004. Since then, the DOE completed its studies on the
9 hydration of Premier Chemicals MgO and initiated new studies with MgO from Martin Marietta
10 Magnesia Specialties LLC (Deng, Nemer, and Xiong 2006; Deng, Nemer, and Xiong 2007);
11 Section MgO-4.1.2 discusses the results of these studies.

12 **MgO-4.1.1 Hydration of Premier MgO**

13 This section, which reviews the results of studies on the hydration of Premier Chemicals MgO
14 completed prior to the CRA-2004, is based on the text in the CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS,
15 Section BARRIERS-2.3.2.1.


16 Bryan and Snider (2001a and 2001b), Snider (2002 and 2003b), and Xiong and Lord (2008)
17 studied the hydration of Premier Chemicals MgO under humid and inundated conditions. They
18 carried out humid experiments with 3 g of uncrushed Premier Chemicals MgO at an RH of 35,
19 50, 75, or 95% and temperatures of 25, 40, 60, or 80 °C (77, 104, 140, or 176 °F) for up to 460
20 days (Snider 2003b). Inundated experiments were conducted with 5 g of uncrushed Premier
21 Chemicals MgO in 100 mL of DI H₂O, 4.00 molar (M) sodium chloride (NaCl), Energy
22 Research and Development Administration (ERDA)-6, or Generic Weep Brine (GWB) at
23 temperatures of 25, 50, 70, and 90 °C (77, 122, 158, and 194 °F) for up to 360 days (Snider
24 2003b). ERDA-6 brine is a synthetic brine representative of fluids in brine reservoirs in the
25 Castile Formation (Popielak et al., 1983). Snider (2003c) verified that GWB is the average
26 composition of intergranular fluids collected from the Salado at the original stratigraphic horizon
27 of the repository and analyzed by Krumhansl, Kimball, and Stein (1991).

28 Based on these experiments with Premier Chemicals MgO, the most important hydration
29 reaction expected in the WIPP is



31 Reaction (MgO.6) was the only hydration reaction observed in the humid experiments.
32 Reaction (MgO.6) was also the only hydration reaction observed in the inundated runs with
33 ERDA-6 brine (Snider 2003b). In inundated experiments with GWB, hydration produced both
34 brucite and an amorphous or crystalline Mg-OH-Cl-H₂O phase (Snider 2003b). In most of the
35 runs with GWB, the Mg-OH-Cl-H₂O phase was amorphous and its exact composition was not
36 determined. In a few experiments at 25 °C (77 °F), however, a crystalline phase with the
37 composition Mg₃(OH)₅Cl·4H₂O was identified by X-ray diffraction (XRD) analysis (Snider
38 2003b). The thermodynamic speciation and solubility code Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT)

1 (Babb and Novak 1997 and addenda; Wang 1998) also predicts that both brucite and a similar
 2 Mg-OH-Cl-H₂O phase, Mg₂(OH)₃Cl·4H₂O, would be present in GWB and Salado Primary
 3 Constituents (SPC) brine after these brines equilibrate with the solids in WIPP disposal rooms
 4 (Section MgO-5.1). SPC brine (Novak 1997) is similar to Brine A, another synthetic fluid that
 5 was used to represent intergranular Salado brines (see Section MgO-5.1.1.2 and Molecke 1983).
 6 The FMT thermodynamic database contains the phase Mg₂(OH)₃Cl·4H₂O, but not
 7 Mg₃(OH)₅Cl·4H₂O; if Mg₃(OH)₅Cl·4H₂O were in the database, FMT might predict that
 8 Mg₃(OH)₅Cl·4H₂O would be present in GWB instead of or along with Mg₂(OH)₃Cl·4H₂O.
 9 However, long-term experiments with GWB suggested that brucite might be replacing the
 10 amorphous Mg-OH-Cl-H₂O phase, possibly because the Mg(II)(aq) concentration of this brine
 11 was decreasing with time. Figure MgO-3 is a scanning electron microscope (SEM) image of
 12 Premier Chemicals MgO after hydration in GWB; Figure MgO-4 shows Premier Chemicals
 13 MgO after hydration in ERDA-6 brine. Figure MgO-3 and Figure MgO-4 provide visual
 14 evidence that the passivation of MgO will not occur in the repository.



15
 16 **Figure MgO-3. SEM Image of Premier Chemicals MgO after Hydration in GWB at 90 °C**
 17 **(194 °F) for 21 Days (SNL Experiment CC-GW-90-30-5). The Light-Gray**
 18 **Phase Inside the Large Grain at the Center of This Image is Unhydrated**
 19 **Periclase. The Bright Inclusions in this Periclase are Oxides and Silicates**
 20 **Such as Spinel, Ulvöspinel, Forsterite, and Monticellite (Section MgO-3.2.1**
 21 **and Section MgO-3.2.2). The Dark-Gray Material Surrounding and**
 22 **Penetrating the Fractures in the Periclase is a Mg-OH-Cl-H₂O Phase,**
 23 **Probably Amorphous or Crystalline Mg₃(OH)₅Cl·4H₂O (Section MgO-**
 24 **4.1.1). Abundant Fractures are Seen Penetrating the Mg-OH-Cl-H₂O**
 25 **Phase. The Dark-Gray Material Surrounding the Mg-OH-Cl-H₂O Phase is**
 26 **Brucite. This Layer of Brucite Appears to be Loosely Attached to the Mg-**
 27 **OH-Cl-H₂O Phase, Thus Facilitating the Continued Access of Brine to the**
 28 **Mg-OH-Cl-H₂O Phase and Unhydrated Periclase.**



1
2 **Figure MgO-4. SEM Image of Premier Chemicals MgO after Hydration in ERDA-6 Brine**
3 **at 70 °C (158 °F) after 21 days (SNL Experiment CC-ER-70-30-5). Two**
4 **Concentric Layers of Brucite Surround an Inner Core of Brucite. The**
5 **Outer Layers of Brucite Appear to be Loosely Attached to the Core.**

6 **MgO-4.1.2 Results since the CRA-2004 Regarding Hydration of MgO**

7 Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007, Section 5) carried out accelerated hydration experiments with
8 Martin Marietta MgO. The primary objective of the accelerated hydration experiments was to
9 determine which factors (see below) have a significant effect on MgO hydration and carbonation
10 kinetics. Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007, Section 5) also conducted experiments to assess the
11 advantages and disadvantages of different types of containers, and the utility of tracer dyes for
12 their ongoing study of the efficacy of Martin Marietta MgO (Deng, Nemer, and Xiong (2006)
13 and Deng, Nemer, and Xiong (2007)). Fernández et al. (1999) identified particle size, solid-to-
14 solution ratio, and stirring speed as important factors that affect the kinetics of carbonation of
15 MgO slurries.

16 Therefore, Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007, Section 5) conducted an accelerated, inundated
17 hydration study using a fractional factorial matrix to determine which of these three factors are
18 important enough to include in their long-term hydration and carbonation studies. For the study,
19 they used MgO with particle sizes less than 75 µm, which constituted about 18 wt % of their
20 as-received material (see Table MgO-4); or 1.0 to 2.0 mm, which accounted for about 32 wt % of
21 their material (Lot SL2980076 of Martin Marietta MagChem WTS-60 MgO, the material
22 currently being emplaced in the WIPP). These are the particle-size ranges with the most
23 particles in this lot of Martin Marietta WTS-60 MgO. Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007, Section
24 5) used MgO-to-brine ratios of 0.05, 0.4, or 1 g/mL; these values are within the range of 0.001 to
25 10 g/mL expected in the WIPP (Nemer 2006). Furthermore, the previous studies of the

1 inundated hydration and carbonation of Premier Chemicals MgO (Section MgO-4.1.1 and
2 Section MgO-4.2.1, respectively) were performed at an MgO-to-brine ratio of 0.05 g/mL;
3 inclusion of this ratio in the accelerated hydration experiments with Martin Marietta MgO thus
4 facilitated comparison with these results. Finally, the samples were placed in an oven or in a
5 water-bath shaker at a shaking speed of 150 revolutions per minute to determine the effect of
6 agitation. Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007, Section 5) carried out these experiments by placing
7 Martin Marietta WTS-60 MgO and DI water in 30-mL high-density polyethylene (HDPE)
8 centrifuge tubes or 125-mL HDPE serum bottles, depending on the MgO-to-brine ratio, and
9 placed these containers in a water-bath shaker or an oven at 70 °C (158 °F) for periods of up to
10 43 days.

11 Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007, Section 5.4, p. 33) concluded,

12 [T]he small-particle-size samples hydrated faster than the large particle size during the first few
13 days, which is probably due to the larger specific surface area ... of the small particles. However
14 for the remainder of the experiment, the large-particle-size samples hydrate faster than the small
15 particle size. There are no obvious differences between experiments that were continuously stirred
16 in a water-bath shaker and those that were kept in the oven. The MgO-water ratio did not
17 significantly influence the hydration rate either. These visual observations have been confirmed
18 by the Minitab [statistical] analysis...

19 Finally, Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007, Section 5.7) fitted the results of the accelerated,
20 inundated-hydration experiments described above to one kinetic model in which the hydration
21 rate is controlled by the surface area of the MgO particles, and to three models in which the rate
22 is controlled by the diffusion of H₂O through the layer of brucite that formed on the surfaces of
23 the MgO particles. They concluded that the results obtained with the Martin Marietta WTS-60
24 MgO with small particle sizes (< 75 μm) are consistent with control by diffusion, but that the
25 results obtained with the large (1.0 to 2.0 mm) particles are consistent with surface-area control.

26 **MgO-4.2 Carbonation of MgO**

27 The DOE also conducted extensive studies on the carbonation of Premier Chemicals MgO under
28 Test Plan 00-07 (Wang and Bryan 2000; Wang, Bryan, and Wall 2001; Snider and Xiong 2002b;
29 Snider, Xiong, and Nemer 2004); Section MgO-4.2.1 describes the results of these studies
30 obtained prior to the CRA-2004. Since then, the DOE completed its carbonation studies with
31 Premier Chemicals MgO (Section MgO-4.2.2) and started new work with Martin Marietta MgO
32 (Deng, Nemer, and Xiong 2006 and 2007).


33 **MgO-4.2.1 Carbonation of Premier Chemicals MgO**

34 This section, which reviews the results of studies on the carbonation of Premier Chemicals MgO
35 completed prior to the CRA-2004, is based on the text in the CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS,
36 Section BARRIERS-2.3.2.2.

37 Bryan and Snider (2001a and 2001b), Snider (2002), Snider and Xiong (2002a), Xiong and
38 Snider (2003), and Xiong and Lord (2008) studied the carbonation of Premier Chemicals MgO
39 and reagent-grade materials under inundated conditions. Experiments were carried out with 5 g
40 of uncrushed Premier Chemicals MgO in 100 mL of DI H₂O, 4.00 M NaCl, ERDA-6 brine, or
41 GWB under an atmosphere of compressed, ambient, laboratory air at room temperature for up to

1 327 days (Snider and Xiong 2002a). Inundated experiments were also conducted with uncrushed
2 Premier Chemicals MgO; crushed, prehydrated Premier Chemicals MgO; Fisher reagent-grade
3 periclase; or prehydrated Fisher periclase in 100 mL of ERDA-6 brine or GWB under an
4 atmosphere containing 5% CO₂ for periods up to 91 days (Snider and Xiong 2002a). Humid
5 experiments were performed with 2.5 g of prehydrated Fisher periclase in an atmosphere
6 consisting of compressed, ambient, laboratory air at an RH of 33, 58, 75, or 95% at room
7 temperature and 40 °C (104 °F).

8 Based on these experiments, the carbonation reaction expected in the WIPP in the short term (a
9 few hundred to a few thousand years) is



11 In experiments with ERDA-6 brine and atmospheric CO₂, Snider and Xiong (2002a) detected
12 hydromagnesite with the composition Mg₅(CO₃)₄(OH)₂·4H₂O by XRD analysis. This solid is
13 referred to as “hydromagnesite (5424)” in this appendix. No other magnesium (Mg) carbonates
14 were detected in runs with ERDA-6 brine and atmospheric CO₂. Snider and Xiong (2002a)
15 detected both hydromagnesite (5424) and nesquehonite (MgCO₃·3H₂O) by XRD analysis in the
16 experiments with ERDA-6 brine and 5% CO₂, but hydromagnesite (5424) was clearly replacing
17 nesquehonite as these experiments proceeded. In experiments with GWB, hydromagnesite
18 (5424) was the only Mg carbonate detected by XRD analysis (Snider and Xiong 2002a).
19 Therefore, there is strong evidence that hydromagnesite (5424) will be the dominant Mg
20 carbonate for at least part of the 10,000-year regulatory period (the first few hundred to few
21 thousand years).



22 There are at least two forms of hydromagnesite: hydromagnesite (5424) (see above) and
23 hydromagnesite with the composition Mg₄(CO₃)₃(OH)₂·3H₂O. The latter is referred to as
24 “hydromagnesite (4323)” in this appendix. Thermodynamic data for both of these forms of
25 hydromagnesite are available; geochemical modeling carried out for the WIPP project (see
26 Section MgO-5.1) has always predicted that hydromagnesite (5424) will form under expected
27 WIPP conditions instead of hydromagnesite (4323) if magnesite is suppressed (i.e., prevented
28 from forming by switching off magnesite in the EQ36 or FMT input file). Moreover,
29 hydromagnesite (5424) was the only form of hydromagnesite produced in laboratory
30 experiments on the carbonation of Premier Chemicals MgO (i.e., hydromagnesite (4323) was not
31 reported). However, predictions of the effects of MgO on the chemical conditions in WIPP
32 disposal rooms and the solubilities of An elements under these conditions suggest that the effects
33 of hydromagnesite (5424) and hydromagnesite (4323) would be similar (compare Table MgO-7
34 and Table MgO-8 in Section MgO-5.1).

35 Section MgO-4.2.2 describes the conversion of hydromagnesite (5424) to magnesite in the
36 WIPP.

37 **MgO-4.2.2 Formation of Magnesite in the WIPP**

38 The DOE stated in the CCA, Appendix BACK and Appendix SOTERM, that magnesite would
39 be the Mg carbonate present throughout the 10,000-year regulatory period. This conclusion was
40 based on calculations by Novak et al. (1996) with the geochemical speciation component of the

1 FMT code (Babb and Novak 1995), which demonstrated that magnesite is thermodynamically
 2 stable with respect to hydromagnesite and other Mg carbonates under expected WIPP conditions.
 3 Because magnesite is the stable Mg carbonate, the DOE maintained that the brucite-magnesite or
 4 the hydromagnesite (5424)-magnesite carbonation reaction



7 would buffer f_{CO_2} in the repository at a value of 1.26×10^{-7} atmospheres (atm), and used this
 8 value of f_{CO_2} (along with other parameters) to calculate An speciation and solubilities for the
 9 CCA PA (CCA, Appendix SOTERM, p. SOTERM-6).

10 Recent thermodynamic calculations carried out by Brush and Xiong (2003a), Brush (2005), and
 11 Brush et al. (2006) with FMT (Babb and Novak 1997 and addenda; Wang 1998) and the EQ3/6
 12 geochemical software package (Daveler and Wolery 1992; Wolery 1992a and 1992b; Wolery
 13 and Daveler 1992) have also predicted that magnesite is stable with respect to hydromagnesite
 14 (5424), hydromagnesite (4323), and other Mg carbonates under expected WIPP conditions.

15 Furthermore, magnesite is commonly observed in the Salado (Lang 1939; Adams 1944;
 16 Lowenstein 1983 and 1988; Stein 1985) and in other formations in the Delaware Basin (Garber,
 17 Harris, and Borer 1990). Lowenstein (1988, p. 598) describes the siliciclastic-carbonate
 18 mudstone, in which magnesite is most abundant, as a “non-evaporitic sediment,” and attributes
 19 its origin to subaqueous “settling of fine-grained, suspended material in the center of the Salado
 20 basin where the energy of inflow waters had largely dissipated.” Therefore, the magnesite
 21 observed in the Salado did not necessarily form in situ. However, Garber, Haris, and Borer
 22 (1990), who reported that magnesite “occurs pervasively” throughout an 82-meter (m) (270-ft)
 23 interval of core recovered from a stratigraphic test well located along the subsurface trend of the
 24 Capitan Reef 27 kilometers (km) (17 miles) northeast of Carlsbad, concluded, “the most likely
 25 origin for the magnesite in the core is the downward movement of dense fluids from the Ochoan
 26 Series, Salado into the underlying, and [at the time] shallowly buried Tansil and Yates
 27 formations.” Clearly, magnesite either formed or persisted for long periods in the Delaware
 28 Basin.

29 During its review of the CCA, the EPA questioned the DOE’s conclusion that magnesite will be
 30 present throughout the entire 10,000-year regulatory period. For the CCA, the DOE based this
 31 conclusion on the fact that magnesite is the thermodynamically stable Mg carbonate under
 32 expected WIPP conditions (the CCA, Appendix BACK and Appendix SOTERM). The EPA
 33 accepted the DOE’s conclusion that magnesite is stable, but questioned whether the kinetics of
 34 the hydromagnesite (5424)-magnesite reaction are fast enough to produce enough magnesite in
 35 10,000 years for the brucite-magnesite reaction to buffer f_{CO_2} at 1.26×10^{-7} atm.

36 A literature review on the formation of dolomite and magnesite in the natural environment and
 37 laboratory studies of the formation of magnesite was completed (Sandia National Laboratories
 38 1997, Section 5.2.1, pp. 32-37). Section MgO-4.2.3 describes other aspects of this study. The
 39 literature review report (Sandia National Laboratories 1997, Section 5.2.1, pp. 32-35) provides
 40 several examples of naturally occurring dolomite and magnesite that may have formed in the last

1 several hundred to few thousand years. Nevertheless, this report states that “the most
2 quantitative rates for precipitation kinetics of magnesite come from laboratory experiments.”
3 Therefore, the data on magnesite formation from Sayles and Fyfe (1973) and Usdowski (1989
4 and 1994) obtained in laboratory experiments conducted at temperatures of 60, 126, and 180 °C
5 was used to perform an Arrhenius extrapolation to 28 °C, the temperature expected in the WIPP
6 after it is filled and sealed (Munson et al. 1987). Based on this extrapolation, it was concluded
7 “Under WIPP conditions, magnesite should form in several hundred years” (Sandia National
8 Laboratories 1997, Figure 5-4).

9 Based on this evidence, the EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998f) concluded:

10 The available rate data indicate that some portion, perhaps all, of the hydromagnesite will be
11 converted to magnesite over the 10,000-year period for repository performance. The exact time
12 required for complete conversion has not been established for all chemical conditions. However,
13 the available laboratory and field data clearly indicate that magnesite formation takes from
14 few hundred to, perhaps, a few thousand years. Thus, the early repository conditions can be best
15 represented by the equilibrium between brucite and hydromagnesite. These conditions will
16 eventually evolve to equilibrium between brucite and magnesite.

17 The EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998f) went on to describe the sequence of
18 reactions that it expected to occur in WIPP disposal rooms:

19 [T]he sequence of events resulting from brine infiltration and reaction with the MgO backfill in
20 the repository may be conceptualized by the following reactions, in order:

- 21 1. Rapid reaction (hours to days) between the brine and MgO to produce brucite.
- 22 2. Rapid carbonation (hours to days) of the brucite to produce nesquehonite and possibly
23 hydromagnesite.
- 24 3. Rapid conversion (days to weeks) of the nesquehonite to hydromagnesite.
- 25 4. Slow conversion (hundreds to thousands of years) of the hydromagnesite to magnesite”

26 However, the EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998f) also stated in the same
27 document:

28 These estimates of conversion rate are confounded by the fact that deposits of hydromagnesite are
29 found in some evaporite basins dated as late Quaternary in age (<23.7 million years) (Stamatakis,
30 1995), indicating that the hydromagnesite has persisted in a metastable state for a long period with
31 only partial conversion to magnesite and other magnesium carbonates.

32 Based at least in part on its interpretation of the implications of the huntite ($\text{CaMg}_3(\text{CO}_3)_4$)-
33 hydromagnesite deposits described by Stamatakis (1995) for the kinetics of the hydromagnesite-
34 magnesite reaction, the EPA stipulated that the brucite-hydromagnesite (5424) reaction be used
35 to buffer f_{CO_2} for the An-solubility calculations in the CCA PAVT (Trovato 1997a; U.S.
36 Environmental Protection Agency 1998f). This reaction would buffer f_{CO_2} at a value of
37 3.14×10^{-6} atm, a value somewhat higher than the value of 1.26×10^{-7} atm maintained by the
38 brucite-magnesite reaction that was used for the CCA PA. The DOE has used a value of
39 3.14×10^{-6} atm for f_{CO_2} in WIPP PA since the CCA PAVT. Brush and Roselle (2006)

1 reconsidered the implications of Stamatakis (1995) for the kinetics of the hydromagnesite-
2 magnesite reaction; their conclusions are described later in this section.

3 Experiments carried out for the WIPP project in the late 1990s by Zhang et al. (1999) imply that
4 magnesite will replace hydromagnesite (5424) rapidly enough to be the dominant Mg carbonate
5 for most of the 10,000-year regulatory period. Zhang et al. (1999) studied the conversion of
6 hydromagnesite (5424) to magnesite in a saturated NaCl solution and GWB at high temperatures
7 and used the Arrhenius equation to extrapolate the results to 25 °C (77 °F), close to the expected
8 WIPP temperature of 28 °C (82.4 °F) (Munson et al. 1987). Zhang et al. (1999) reacted 0.3 g of
9 reagent-grade hydromagnesite (5424) with 1.5 g of saturated NaCl solution or GWB in
10 autoclaves (type unspecified) at 110, 150, or 200 °C (230, 302, or 392 °F). They then quantified
11 the extent of conversion attained in their experiments by comparing XRD patterns for their
12 samples with XRD calibration curves obtained by running premixed samples of their reagent-
13 grade hydromagnesite (5424) and reagent-grade magnesite.

14 Conversion from hydromagnesite (5424) to magnesite took place in days to weeks at 110 and
15 150 °C (230 and 302 °F) (Zhang et al. 1999). This was preceded by an induction period that
16 persisted for nearly half of the time required for essentially complete conversion of
17 hydromagnesite (5424) to magnesite, during which only a few percent of the hydromagnesite
18 (5424) reacted to form magnesite. At 200 °C (392 °F), conversion took place in a few hours. (At
19 room temperature, formation of magnesite has not been observed in experiments carried out for
20 the WIPP project, even in experiments that lasted for a few years.) Conversion of
21 hydromagnesite (5424) to magnesite appeared to be a first-order reaction. The induction period,
22 during which about 4-5% of the hydromagnesite (5424) formed magnesite, may have resulted
23 from slow nucleation of magnesite, after which magnesite formed rapidly.

24 Zhang et al. (1999) also observed that conversion was faster in saturated NaCl than in GWB.
25 (All experiments carried out subsequently with Premier Chemicals MgO have also shown that
26 the rates of hydration and carbonation of periclase and brucite occurred faster in simpler, less
27 concentrated solutions than in complex solutions with higher ionic strengths; i.e., the rates of
28 reaction decrease in the order DI H₂O > 4 M NaCl > ERDA-6 brine > GWB.)

29 Based on their extrapolations to 25 °C (77 °F), Zhang et al. (1999) concluded that after an
30 induction period of 18 or 200 years in saturated NaCl or GWB, respectively, the “half-life” of
31 hydromagnesite (5424) (the time required for half of the hydromagnesite (5424) to convert to
32 magnesite) would be 4.7 years (saturated NaCl) or 73 years (GWB). A period of about 1000
33 years, the approximate sum of the 200-year induction period and 730 years (10 half-lives), would
34 result in conversion of over 99.9% of any hydromagnesite (5424) present to magnesite.

35 The applicability of the extrapolated results from Zhang et al. (1999) to the WIPP is probably
36 more defensible than that of the extrapolated results in Sandia National Laboratories (1997)
37 because Zhang et al. (1999) used high-ionic-strength brines—including one WIPP brine
38 (GWB)—for their experiments, but SNL (Sandia National Laboratories 1997) used only low-
39 ionic-strength (~0.05 M) results obtained from the literature.

40 Recently, Brush and Roselle (2006) reconsidered the implications of Stamatakis (1995) for the
41 kinetics of the hydromagnesite (5424)-magnesite reaction and concluded the following:

1 1. It is unclear—based on the poorly constrained age(s) of the huntite-hydromagnesite (4323)
2 deposits in the Kozani Basin, Greece—that the hydromagnesite (4323) there has persisted
3 longer than expected based on the results of Zhang et al. (1999).

4 2. It is unclear that any conclusions regarding the kinetics of the hydromagnesite (5424)-
5 magnesite reaction based on the hydromagnesite (4323) present in the Kozani Basin are
6 applicable to the conversion of the hydromagnesite (5424) produced in WIPP-relevant
7 laboratory experiments.

8 Stamatakis (1995) reported various ages or ranges of ages for the huntite-hydromagnesite
9 deposits in the Kozani Basin. He referred to the sedimentary rocks that host these deposits as
10 “late Neogene” and, on two occasions, “uppermost Neogene.” He referred to the alkaline, saline,
11 spring-fed lakes, and ponds from which these evaporite deposits precipitated as “Tertiary to
12 Recent” and “Neogene.” He did not provide any absolute (radiometric) ages for these deposits.

13 According to the current geologic time scale established by the International Commission on
14 Stratigraphy, the Neogene Period has lasted from 23.03 million years ago to the present
15 (Gradstein et al. 2005). Therefore, the ages Neogene, late Neogene, uppermost Neogene, and
16 Tertiary to Recent do not place a lower limit on the possible range of ages of these deposits,
17 especially in the absence of absolute (radiometric or astronomical) ages. Furthermore, the
18 description of the deposits provided by Stamatakis (1995) is consistent with a postdepositional
19 origin for at least some of the deposits. Therefore, it is not clear that the hydromagnesite there
20 has persisted longer than expected based on the results of Zhang et al. (1999).

21 The hydromagnesite in the huntite-hydromagnesite deposits of the Kozani Basin is
22 hydromagnesite (4323). Zhang et al. (1999) used hydromagnesite (5424) in their study on the
23 conversion of hydromagnesite to magnesite. Therefore, any conclusions regarding the rate of the
24 hydromagnesite-to-magnesite reaction based on the hydromagnesite (4323) present in the Kozani
25 Basin do not apply to the conversion of the hydromagnesite (5424) used by Zhang et al. (1999)
26 and observed in the laboratory experiments with Premier Chemicals MgO.

27 **MgO-4.2.3 Possible Passivation of MgO in the WIPP**

28 Laboratory studies on the carbonation of MgO were carried out to determine if (1) MgO would
29 rapidly neutralize the mildly acidic brines that would form if microbial consumption of CPR
30 materials in WIPP disposal rooms produces significant quantities of CO₂; and (2) reaction rims
31 would form on periclase and prevent this phase from effectively consuming all of the CO₂ that
32 could be produced by microbial consumption of CPR materials (Sandia National Laboratories
33 1997). A literature review on the formation of dolomite and magnesite in the natural
34 environment, laboratory studies on the formation of magnesite to determine the timescale on
35 which hydromagnesite (5424) would convert to magnesite, and the results of this activity are
36 described above (Sandia National Laboratories 1997 and Section MgO-4.2.2). It was
37 demonstrated that MgO would rapidly neutralize mildly acidic solutions; therefore, the
38 remainder of this discussion focuses on whether reaction rims would form on periclase and
39 prevent this phase from consuming CO₂ (Sandia National Laboratories 1997, Section 3.2, p. 7
40 and Figure 3-1, p. 8).

1 Short-term “scoping” experiments were carried out by placing MgO pellets in beakers containing
2 Salado or Castile brine and bubbling CO₂ through them for “less than a week.” (See Sandia
3 National Laboratories 1997, Section 3.2, p. 7.) The report states:

4 To provide as much latitude as possible in final materials selection, a material that had undergone
5 calcination at the higher end of the [temperature] range was chosen for testing. Because reactivity
6 typically decreases with increasing calcination temperature, selection of a material at the upper
7 end of the range will provide a worst case.

8 XRD analysis indicated that nesquehonite and hydromagnesite (polymorph unspecified) rapidly
9 formed on the surfaces of the pellets, and “After a few days of treatment, these layers coalesced
10 to cement the pellets together.” SEM analysis “suggested the presence of other phases as well.”
11 (See Sandia National Laboratories 1997, Section 3.2, p. 7)

12 Longer-term “final” experiments were also carried out (Sandia National Laboratories 1997,
13 Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.3.2, pp. 7-13). The primary objective of these experiments was “to
14 demonstrate that the formation of [Mg] carbonate surface coatings, if any, do not impact the
15 efficacy of the MgO backfill enough to impede the backfill’s ability to function as
16 conceptualized within the CCA PA.” A secondary objective was “to demonstrate that after
17 coatings form the MgO remaining inside the pellet will still be reasonably accessible to the
18 outside brine” (Sandia National Laboratories 1997, Section 3.3.1, p. 7). In the first set of these
19 longer-term experiments, about 8 g of 1- to 2-mm-diameter MgO pellets were placed in beakers
20 containing 250 mL of Salado or Castile brine and pure CO₂ was bubbled through the beakers for
21 up to 28 days, during which individual pellets were analyzed for their C content with a C
22 coulometer. In a larger, follow-on set of experiments, 0.5- to 1-mm and 2- to 4-mm-diameter
23 pellets were placed in beakers containing 100 mL of Salado or Castile brine. Manifolds were
24 used to bubble pure CO₂ through brines for up to 28 days, during which “the entire charge” was
25 removed from the beakers and analyzed for its C content. In the follow-up experiments,
26 triplicate experiments were run for every reaction time at which the C content was analyzed, and
27 triplicate C analyses were carried out on the solids in every beaker.

28 In addition, “tea-bag” experiments were conducted, in which MgO pellets (size unspecified)
29 were placed in porous bags about the size of a tea bag, the bottom third of the bags were
30 immersed in Salado or Castile brine, and pure CO₂ bubbled through the brines for periods of 3-
31 85 days. During these experiments, brine wicking moistened all of the pellets in these bags
32 (Sandia National Laboratories 1997, Section 3.3.2, p. 14).

33 “Carbonation curves” (plots of the conversion of their solids to Mg carbonates versus time) that
34 were “S-shaped” were reported (Sandia National Laboratories 1997, Section 4, pp. 17-18). The
35 data showed (1) “an initial incubation period of slow [CO₂] uptake, which is probably preceded
36 by a short period [during which] MgO actually dissolves to saturate the solution” and during
37 which the surfaces of the pellets hydrate to form brucite; (2) “a period of accelerated [CO₂]
38 uptake during which the [CO₂] content of the samples increases by several percent ... in a few
39 days”; and (3) “a long period [during which] the [CO₂] uptake rate is much slower than earlier in
40 the test, though the process does not seem to completely stop.” The incubation period was
41 correlated to dissolution of the MgO pellets, formation of a thin layer of brucite on the pellets,
42 and formation of “an incipient [Mg] carbonate phase ... consisting of fine platy crystals,”
43 possibly “protohydromagnesite.” (See Sandia National Laboratories 1997, Section 4.2, pp. 20-

29.) The period of rapid CO₂ uptake was correlated with the formation of nesquehonite needles, both on the surfaces of the pellets exposed to the brines and in the pores among the pellets. Finally, the final period of slower CO₂ uptake was correlated with reduced access of the brines to the pores caused by intergrowth of the nesquehonite needles and concomitant cementation of the pellets. However, cementation did not stop the carbonation of the pellets, even in the pores. Furthermore, “exfoliation” of nesquehonite and formation of protohydromagnesite or magnesite platy crystals was observed, possibly at the expense of nesquehonite (see Section MgO-4.2.1). Both of these processes would promote continued, albeit reduced, access of brine to the pores.

It was pointed out that, although “isolating reaction rims at high extents of conversion (15-30 mol %) were not observed,” the lower values of f_{CO_2} expected in WIPP disposal rooms would result in a lower concentration gradient of dissolved CO₂-bearing species from the brine to the surfaces of the MgO pellets, which would in turn localize the precipitation of Mg carbonates in the brines instead of on the surfaces of the pellets (see Sandia National Laboratories 1997, Section 5.1, pp. 30-32, and especially Figure 5-1). The experiments bubbled pure CO₂ through their brines (Sandia National Laboratories 1997, Section 3.3.2, pp. 8-14). This, in turn, established values of f_{CO_2} in the brines that were orders of magnitude greater than those expected in the repository, currently from 3.14×10^{-6} atm (both GWB and ERDA-6) down to 1.20×10^{-7} atm (GWB) or 1.23×10^{-7} atm (ERDA-6), the values characteristic of the brucite-hydromagnesite (5425) and the brucite-magnesite carbonation reactions (see Section MgO-5.1).

In addition to the laboratory experiments described above, MgO was added to one of the liter-scale experiments (L-28) in the WIPP Source Term Test Program (STTP) with actual TRU waste (Villarreal, Bergquist, and Leonard 2001a and 2001b; Villarreal, King, and Leonard 2001; Villarreal et al. 2001). (The STTP comprised 39 L-scale and 15 drum-scale experiments.) Because the dissolved plutonium (Pu) concentration in L-28 increased after the addition of MgO, the New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group cited this experiment as an example of the inefficacy of MgO, possibly because of passivation (Oversby 2000). The experiment in L-28 was carried out at a CO₂ pressure of 60 bars, 7 orders of magnitude higher than that expected in the WIPP (from 3.14×10^{-6} atm down to 1.20×10^{-7} atm; see Section MgO-5.1). The partial pressure of CO₂ in the WIPP will not exceed 3.14×10^{-6} atm because the rate of CO₂ consumption by the periclase and brucite in MgO is much higher than the microbial CO₂ production rate. Therefore, the conditions in L-28 were not representative of those expected in the WIPP, and the results are irrelevant to the WIPP (Brush, Moore, and Wall 2001).

Bryan and Snider (2001b, p. 5-9) and Snider (2002, pp. 3.1 through 3.15) conducted a series of “cemented-cake” experiments to determine whether lithification of MgO will occur in the WIPP and, if so, whether it would affect the rate of MgO hydration. For the experiments, 15, 30, or 45 g of Premier Chemicals MgO were placed in 125-mL plastic containers with ERDA-6 brine or GWB. This resulted in a 5-, 10-, or 15-mm thick layer of Premier Chemicals MgO at the bottom of the containers. The containers were then placed in ovens at 25, 50, 70, or 90 °C (77, 122, 158, or 194 °F) for periods of up to about 6 months. They were not agitated. (Agitation apparently prevented any lithification of MgO in their other inundated experiments.) Snider (2002, Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14) reported results from cemented-cake experiments that lasted for periods of about four to six months. She observed lithification of some samples; however, others remained “very friable,” even after inundation at 70 and 90 °C (Snider 2002, p. 3.1 through 3.15). Snider (2002, p. 3.13) had “anticipated that the thicker layers would hydrate

1 at a slower rate,” especially if lithification occurred. However, “MgO thickness has not affected
2 the hydration rate under inundated conditions in ERDA-6 brine (Figure-12)” (Snider 2002, p. 3.1
3 through 3.13); and “in GWB at 50, 70, and 90 °C (Snider 2002, Figure 13) thickness does not
4 affect hydration” (Snider 2002, p. 3.1 through 3.15). Furthermore, the 5-mm-thick samples in
5 GWB at 25 °C (77 °F) hydrated at the slowest rate, the 15-mm-thick samples hydrated at an
6 intermediate rate, and the 10-mm-thick samples hydrated at the fastest rate (Snider 2002,
7 Figure 13). Therefore, these experiments showed that lithification might occur, but, if it does, it
8 will not decrease the MgO hydration rate.

9 The results obtained all imply that the periclase in MgO and the brucite that forms from the
10 hydration of this periclase will be available to react, and will continue to react, until all CO₂ in
11 the repository has been consumed (Sandia National Laboratories (1997), Bryan and Snider
12 (2001b), and Snider (2002)). Nevertheless, Brush and Roselle (2006, Section 5.1 and Section
13 5.2) carried out a literature search for anthropogenic or natural analogs or experimental studies
14 that provide insight into whether hydration of periclase to form brucite, and carbonation of
15 brucite to form hydromagnesite and magnesite, will proceed to completion if H₂O or CO₂,
16 respectively, are present in the repository. The literature they found included studies of several
17 different types of chemical and geochemical systems:

- 18 1. Hydration of periclase in Portland cement
- 19 2. Hydration of periclase in magnesia sinters
- 20 3. Hydration of periclase formed in contact-metamorphosed dolomite and Mg-bearing
21 limestone
- 22 4. Laboratory studies of periclase hydration in metamorphic rocks formed at high pressures and
23 temperatures (these conditions are far from those expected in the WIPP, but provide valuable
24 insight because of the challenges involved in preventing periclase hydration during and after
25 “quenching” these experiments to ambient laboratory conditions)
- 26 5. Field studies of brucite carbonation during serpentinization of ultramafic rocks and the
27 weathering of the resulting serpentinites
- 28 6. The use of brucite to scrub CO₂ from the smokestacks of power plants, or for deep-geologic
29 sequestration of CO₂
- 30 7. The weathering of an approximately 4,000-year-old statue carved from a rock known as
31 predazzite, a brucite- or periclase-bearing limestone marble

32 The results of these anthropogenic- and natural-analog studies all imply that the periclase in the
33 MgO engineered barrier and the brucite that forms from the hydration of this periclase will be
34 available to react—and will continue to react—until all the CO₂ in the repository has been
35 consumed.

1 **MgO-5.0 Effects of MgO on the WIPP Disposal System**

2 This section reviews the effects of MgO on (1) brine composition, f_{CO_2} , pH, and An solubilities,
3 including changes since the CRA-2004 (Section MgO-5.1); (2) colloidal An concentrations
4 (Section MgO-5.2); (3) other near-field processes and conditions, including repository H_2O
5 content, gas generation, and room closure (Section MgO-5.3); and (4) far-field An transport
6 (Section MgO-5.4).

7 **MgO-5.1 Effects of MgO on Brine Composition, f_{CO_2} , pH, and Actinide (An)** 8 **Solubilities**

9 The DOE is emplacing MgO in the WIPP to decrease the solubilities of the An elements in TRU
10 waste by consuming all the CO_2 that would be produced by microbial activity should all the CPR
11 materials in the repository be consumed. Consumption of CO_2 will decrease An solubilities by
12 (1) buffering f_{CO_2} at a low value or within a low range of values, (2) maintaining a mildly basic
13 pH, and (3) preventing the production of significant carbonate ion (CO_3^{2-}) quantities.

14 The effects of MgO carbonation have been included in WIPP PA by removing CO_2 from the
15 gaseous phase in BRAGFLO calculations, and using the values of f_{CO_2} and pH predicted for
16 reactions among MgO, brine, and aqueous or gaseous CO_2 to calculate An solubilities.

17 Table MgO-6 provides the initial compositions of GWB and ERDA-6 brine and their
18 compositions predicted by FMT for the An-solubility calculations for the CRA-2004 PABC
19 (Brush and Xiong 2005a; 2005b; Brush 2005) after equilibration with (1) the MgO hydration and
20 carbonation products brucite ($\text{Mg}(\text{OH})_2$) and hydromagnesite (5424), respectively; (2) halite
21 (NaCl) and anhydrite (CaSO_4), two of the most abundant minerals in the Salado; and (3) the An-
22 bearing solids $\text{Am}(\text{OH})_3$; hydrous, amorphous ThO_2 ; and KNpO_2CO_3 . In addition to these
23 solids, which are specified in the input files, FMT predicted that (1) the solids
24 $\text{Mg}_2(\text{OH})_3\text{Cl}\cdot 4\text{H}_2\text{O}$ and whewellite (Ca oxalate hydrate, or $\text{CaC}_2\text{O}_4\cdot\text{H}_2\text{O}$) would precipitate from
25 GWB; and (2) glauberite ($\text{Na}_2\text{Ca}(\text{SO}_4)_2$) and whewellite would precipitate from ERDA-6 brine if
26 these brines equilibrate with brucite, hydromagnesite (5424), halite, and anhydrite. Note that,
27 although FMT predicted that $\text{Mg}_2(\text{OH})_3\text{Cl}\cdot 4\text{H}_2\text{O}$ would precipitate from GWB,
28 $\text{Mg}_3(\text{OH})_5\text{Cl}\cdot 4\text{H}_2\text{O}$ has been observed in experiments with GWB (see Section MgO-4.1.1 and
29 Figure MgO-3X). Note also that because these calculations were performed for the CRA-2004
30 PABC, oxalate (and other organic ligands) were added to these brines, which resulted in the
31 prediction that whewellite would precipitate.

32 FMT predicts equilibration of these brines with the solids listed above will (1) establish a total
33 inorganic C (TIC) concentration of 0.350 millimolar (mM) in GWB, and decrease the TIC
34 concentration from 16 to 0.428 mM in ERDA-6 brine; (2) buffer f_{CO_2} at 3.14×10^{-6} atm in both
35 brines; and (3) establish a pH of 8.69 in GWB and increase the pH from 6.17 to 8.94 in ERDA-6
36 brine.

37 Equilibration of GWB and ERDA-6 brine with these solids will also change the concentrations
38 of the major and other minor elements in these brines. In particular, the concentration of Mg in

1 GWB will decrease from 1.02 to 0.578 M, but will increase from 0.019 to 0.157 M in ERDA-6
 2 brine (Table MgO-6).

3 **Table MgO-6. Compositions of GWB and ERDA-6 Brine Predicted by FMT for the An-**
 4 **Solubility Calculations for the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush and Xiong 2005a;**
 5 **2005b; Brush 2005) (M, Unless Otherwise Noted) before and after**
 6 **Equilibration with Brucite, Hydromagnesite, Halite, Anhydrite, and Other**
 7 **Solids**

Element or Property	GWB before Reaction with Solids ^a	GWB after Reaction with Solids ^b	ERDA-6 Brine before Reaction with Solids ^c	ERDA-6 Brine after Reaction with Solids ^d
B(III)(aq)	0.158	0.166	0.063	0.0624
Na(I)(aq)	3.53	4.35	4.87	5.24
Mg(II)(aq)	1.02	0.578	0.019	0.157
K(I)(aq)	0.467	0.490	0.097	0.0961
Ca(II)(aq)	0.014	0.00895	0.012	0.0107
S(VI)(aq)	0.177	0.228	0.170	0.179
Cl(-I)(aq)	5.86	5.38	4.8	5.24
Br(-I)(aq)	0.0266	0.0278	0.011	0.0109
TIC	—	0.350 mM	16 mM	0.428 mM
Ionic strength	—	7.66 m	—	6.80 m
f _{CO₂} (atm)	—	3.14 × 10 ⁻⁶	—	3.14 × 10 ⁻⁶
pH	—	8.69	6.17	8.94
RH	—	0.732	—	0.748
Specific gravity	1.2	1.23	1.216	1.22

^a From Krumhansl et al. (1991) and Snider (2003c).
^b FMT Run 7 (Brush and Xiong 2005a; 2005b; Brush 2005).
^c From Popielak et al. (1983).
^d FMT Run 11 (Brush and Xiong 2005a; 2005b; Brush 2005).

8

9 Table MgO-7 and Table MgO-8 show the effects of the Mg-carbonate solid produced by the
 10 carbonation of brucite on the TIC concentration, f_{CO₂}, pH, and the solubilities of An elements in
 11 the III, IV, and V oxidation states (An(III), An(IV), and An(V)) in GWB and ERDA-6 brine,
 12 respectively. Brush and Xiong (2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d) carried out this sensitivity study as
 13 part of the An speciation and solubility calculations for the CRA-2004 PA. These calculations
 14 were superseded by those conducted for the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush and Xiong 2005a; 2005b;
 15 Brush 2005), which are now part of the WIPP PA baseline. However, Brush and Xiong (2005a,
 16 2005b) and Brush (2005) did not redo this sensitivity study for the CRA-2004 PABC. Therefore,
 17 Table MgO-7 and Table MgO-8 provide the results from the CRA-2004 PA, along with the
 18 results of the CRA-2004 PABC Runs 7 and 11, respectively (fourth column of Table MgO-7 and
 19 Table MgO-8). Runs 7 and 11 were also used for the CRA-2009 PA. Comparison of the CRA-
 20 2004 PA results in the third column of Table MgO-7 and Table MgO-8 with the CRA-2004
 21

1 **Table MgO-7. Effect of the Mg-Carbonate Solid on the f_{CO_2} (atm), TIC Concentration (M),**
 2 **pH (Standard Units), and An Solubilities (M) in GWB after Equilibration**
 3 **with Brucite, Halite, Anhydrite, and Other Solids**

Element or Property	Magnesite ^a	Hydro-magnesite ₅₄₂₄ ^b	Hydro-magnesite ₅₄₂₄ ^c	Hydro-magnesite ₄₃₂₃ ^d	Nesquehonite ^e
f_{CO_2}	1.20×10^{-7}	3.14×10^{-6}	3.14×10^{-6}	4.08×10^{-6}	1.42×10^{-4}
TIC	1.36×10^{-5}	3.50×10^{-4}	3.50×10^{-4}	4.56×10^{-4}	1.59×10^{-2}
pH	8.69	8.69	8.69	8.69	8.69
An(III)	3.06×10^{-7}	3.07×10^{-7}	3.87×10^{-7}	3.07×10^{-7}	2.12×10^{-6}
An(IV)	1.17×10^{-9}	1.19×10^{-8}	5.64×10^{-8}	1.52×10^{-8}	5.68×10^{-7}
An(V)	2.37×10^{-5}	1.02×10^{-6}	3.55×10^{-7}	8.06×10^{-7}	2.28×10^{-7}

^a CRA-2004 PA Run 14 (Brush and Xiong 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d).

^b CRA-2004 PA Run 18 (Brush and Xiong 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d).

^c CRA-2004 PABC Run 7 (Brush and Xiong 2005a; 2005b; Brush 2005).

^d CRA-2004 PA Run 16 (Brush and Xiong 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d).

^e CRA-2004 PA Run 20 (Brush and Xiong 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d).

4

5 **Table MgO-8. Effect of the Mg-Carbonate Solid on the f_{CO_2} (atm), TIC Concentration (M),**
 6 **pH (Standard Units), and An Solubilities (M) in ERDA-6 Brine after**
 7 **Equilibration with Brucite, Halite, Anhydrite, and Other Solids**

Element or Property	Magnesite ^a	Hydro-magnesite ₅₄₂₄ ^b	Hydro-magnesite ₅₄₂₄ ^c	Hydro-magnesite ₄₃₂₃ ^d	Nesquehonite ^e
f_{CO_2}	1.23×10^{-7}	3.14×10^{-6}	3.14×10^{-6}	4.08×10^{-6}	1.36×10^{-4}
TIC	1.87×10^{-5}	4.68×10^{-4}	4.28×10^{-4}	6.08×10^{-4}	2.00×10^{-2}
pH	9.02	9.02	8.94	9.02	9.00
An(III)	1.68×10^{-7}	1.69×10^{-7}	2.88×10^{-7}	1.70×10^{-7}	5.45×10^{-7}
An(IV)	1.72×10^{-9}	2.47×10^{-8}	6.79×10^{-8}	3.19×10^{-8}	1.01×10^{-6}
An(V)	1.19×10^{-4}	5.08×10^{-6}	8.24×10^{-7}	4.00×10^{-6}	1.10×10^{-6}

^a CRA-2004 PA Run 24 (Brush and Xiong 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d).

^b CRA-2004 PA Run 28 (Brush and Xiong 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d).

^c CRA-2004 PABC Run 11 (Brush and Xiong 2005a; 2005b; Brush 2005).

^d CRA-2004 PA Run 26 (Brush and Xiong 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d).



^e CRA-2004 PA Run 30 (Brush and Xiong 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2003d).

8

9 PABC results in the fourth column shows that the TIC concentration, $\log f_{\text{CO}_2}$, and pH predicted
 10 for GWB by the CRA-2004 PA and PABC calculations are identical to three significant figures.
 11 The TIC content, $\log f_{\text{CO}_2}$, and pH predicted for ERDA-6 by the CRA-2004 PA and PABC
 12 calculations are not identical, but are similar. The An(III), An(IV), and An(V) solubilities
 13 predicted for the CRA-2004 PA and PABC calculations are different for both brines because of
 14 changes in the thermodynamic databases for the An(III), An(IV), and An(V) models between
 15 these calculations. Although the CRA-2004 PA results were not part of the WIPP PA baseline,

1 the results of this sensitivity study still provide a reasonably accurate assessment of the effects of
2 the Mg carbonate formed in the WIPP.

3 Table MgO-7 and Table MgO-8 show that both the TIC content and the f_{CO_2} predicted for each
4 Mg-carbonate solid increase by about three orders of magnitude from magnesite to
5 hydromagnesite (5424), to hydromagnesite (4323), to nesquehonite. This is because magnesite
6 is the thermodynamically stable Mg carbonate under expected WIPP conditions; hydromagnesite
7 (5424) is metastable with respect to magnesite, hydromagnesite (4323) is metastable with respect
8 to hydromagnesite (5424), and nesquehonite is metastable with respect to hydromagnesite
9 (4323). The brucite carbonation Reactions (MgO.8), (MgO.7), as well as



12 would buffer f_{CO_2} at values of 1.20×10^{-7} atm (Reaction [MgO.8]) to 1.42×10^{-4} atm (Reaction
13 [MgO.11]) in GWB (Table MgO-7), or 1.23×10^{-7} atm (Reaction [MgO.8]) to 1.36×10^{-4} atm
14 (Reaction [MgO.11]) in ERDA-6 brine (Table MgO-8), depending on which of these reactions is
15 dominant. The TIC concentrations corresponding to these fugacities would be 1.36×10^{-5} M
16 (Reaction [MgO.8]) to 1.59×10^{-2} M (Reaction [MgO.11]) in GWB (Table MgO-8), or $1.87 \times$
17 10^{-5} M (Reaction [MgO.8]) to 2.00×10^{-2} M (Reaction [MgO.11]) in ERDA-6 brine (Table
18 MgO-8).

19 Although nesquehonite was observed in some of the DOE's carbonation experiments with
20 Premier Chemicals MgO (Section MgO-4.2.1), hydromagnesite (5424) was clearly replacing
21 nesquehonite as these experiments proceeded (Section MgO-4.2.1). Therefore, carbonation of
22 brucite to form hydromagnesite (5424) (Reaction [MgO.7]) will be the dominant carbonation
23 reaction for at least part of the 10,000-year regulatory period (the first few hundred to few
24 thousand years). The DOE has not observed the formation of hydromagnesite (4323), and has
25 not observed magnesite, except in some accelerated experiments (e.g., Zhang et al. 1999; Zhang,
26 Hardesty, and Papenguth 2001). However, these accelerated experiments (and other
27 considerations) imply that carbonation of brucite to form magnesite (Reaction [MgO.8]) will be
28 the dominant carbonation reaction for much, if not most, of the 10,000-year regulatory period
29 (Section MgO-4.2.3). Therefore, f_{CO_2} would be 3.14×10^{-6} atm in the WIPP initially while
30 hydromagnesite (5424) is the dominant Mg carbonate, but would decrease to $(1.20-1.23) \times$
31 10^{-7} atm as magnesite replaces hydromagnesite (5424) and becomes dominant. Similarly, the
32 TIC concentration would be about $(3.50-4.28) \times 10^{-4}$ M initially, but would decrease to about
33 $(1.36-1.87) \times 10^{-5}$ M.

34 Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-2.3.2 describes how MgO will control the pH of
35 brines in WIPP disposal rooms.

36 **MgO-5.1.1 Changes Since the CRA-2004 in Effects of MgO on Brine Composition, f_{CO_2} ,** 37 **pH, and Actinide (An) Solubilities**

38 This section describes the two changes in the predicted effects of MgO on chemical conditions in
39 the WIPP since the CRA-2004: MgO-5.1.1.1 describes the elimination of chemical conditions


1 predicted for nonmicrobial PA vectors, and MgO-5.1.1.2 discusses the substitution of GWB for
2 Brine A.

3 The reduction of the MgO excess factor that was approved by the EPA since the CRA-2004 will
4 not affect chemical conditions in the WIPP. Therefore, it is described in Section MgO-6.2.4.

5 **MgO-5.1.1.1 Elimination of Chemical Conditions for Nonmicrobial Vectors**

6 There are large uncertainties as to whether significant microbial consumption of the CPR
7 materials emplaced in the WIPP will occur during the 10,000-year WIPP regulatory period.
8 Therefore, Brush (1995) assumed that “significant microbial consumption of CPR materials is
9 possible, but by no means certain.” To incorporate these uncertainties in the CCA PA and
10 PAVT, Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996b) developed a conceptual model for microbial activity
11 in the repository. According to this model, there is a probability of 0.50 for significant microbial
12 activity. In the event of significant microbial activity, microbes could consume 100% of the
13 cellulosic materials in the repository. Furthermore, there is a conditional probability of 0.50 that
14 microbes could consume all of the plastic and rubber materials after consumption of all of the
15 cellulosic materials. Thus, in the CCA PA and PAVT, there was no microbial activity in about
16 50% of the PA realizations (vectors); microbes could consume all of the cellulosic materials, but
17 no plastic or rubber materials, in about 25% of the vectors; and microbes could consume all of
18 the CPR materials in the remaining ~25% of the vectors. (Note that even if significant microbial
19 activity could occur in a vector, microbes did not necessarily consume 100% of the cellulosic
20 materials or 100% of the CPR materials because the quantities of these materials that the PA
21 code BRAGFLO predicted would be consumed depended on several sampled parameters.) This
22 conceptual model for microbial activity was also used in the CRA-2004 PA.

23 For the CCA PA and PAVT, it was assumed that the chemical conditions in WIPP disposal
24 rooms would be identical whether or not significant microbial activity and gas generation occur.
25 (See Brush and Xiong 2003c, Section 5, for a detailed review of how near-field chemical
26 conditions were predicted for the CCA PA and PAVT.) For the CRA-2004 PA, however, Brush
27 and Xiong (2003c, Section 5.3.2) concluded that, for the vectors without microbial activity, the
28 reaction that would buffer f_{CO_2} is



30 not the brucite-hydromagnesite (5424) carbonation reaction (Reaction [MgO.7]) (Section MgO-
31 4.2.1 and Section MgO-5.1).

32 Brush and Xiong (2003a) used FMT to establish chemical conditions for the nonmicrobial
33 vectors in the CRA-2004 PA that were slightly different than those calculated for the microbial
34 vectors. They calculated that the f_{CO_2} would be 3.31×10^{-6} and 7.08×10^{-7} atm in GWB and
35 ERDA-6 brine, respectively, for the nonmicrobial vectors; and 3.14×10^{-6} atm in both brines for
36 the microbial vectors. They also predicted that the pH would be 8.69 and 8.99 in GWB and
37 ERDA-6 brine, respectively, for the nonmicrobial vectors and 8.69 and 9.02 for the microbial
38 vectors. Despite these differences, Brush and Xiong (2003a, Table 7) calculated An solubilities
39 that were nearly identical for the nonmicrobial and microbial vectors in most cases. The only
40 exceptions were the solubilities of An(IV) in ERDA-6 brine (5.84×10^{-9} M for the nonmicrobial

1 and 2.47×10^{-8} M for the microbial vectors) and An(V) in ERDA-6 brine (2.13×10^{-5} M in the
2 nonmicrobial and 5.08×10^{-6} M in the microbial vectors).

3 During its completeness review of the CRA-2004 PA, however, the EPA (Cotsworth 2005,
4 Enclosure 1, p. 1) stated

5 In the CRA performance assessment [the CRA-2004 PA], DOE assumes that the probability that
6 microbial degradation will occur and thus produce significant gas is 50 percent [*sic*]. However,
7 based on our review to date, including DOE's response to EPA comments ..., EPA believes that
8 there are reasonable alternative interpretations to DOE's responses. It is EPA's position that
9 microbes will survive over the regulatory period and be able to produce some gas, albeit with the
10 possibility that sometimes the resulting gas generation rate may be low or near zero. The revised
11 performance assessment [the CRA-2004 PABC] must implement a change so that the modeled
12 probability of microbial degradation is 1. DOE may propose different ranges of gas production or
13 microbe effectiveness as long as it is supported by data...

14 To incorporate this change in the CRA-2004 PABC, there is now a probability of 1 that
15 significant microbial activity could occur and that microbes could consume 100% of the
16 cellulosic materials in the repository. Furthermore, there is a probability of 0.25 that microbes
17 could consume all of the CPR materials. Therefore, microbes could consume all of the cellulosic
18 materials, but no plastic or rubber materials, in about 75% of the vectors; and microbes could
19 consume all of the CPR materials in the remaining ~25% of the vectors. The microbial gas
20 generation model for the CRA-2004 PABC is the one used for CRA-2009.

21 The separate chemical conditions established for the nonmicrobial vectors were used only once
22 in WIPP PA, for the CRA-2004 PA (the CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS, Section
23 BARRIERS-2.3.2.4; the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM, Section SOTERM-
24 2.2.2 and Section SOTERM-3.5).

25 **MgO-5.1.1.2 Substitution of GWB for Brine A**

26 Brush and Xiong (2003c, Section 5.3.1) proposed to the EPA that GWB (Krumhansl et al. 1991;
27 Snider 2003c) be substituted for Brine A (Molecke 1983) in future An speciation and solubility
28 calculations for WIPP PA because "this brine resembles the average composition of intergranular
29 Salado brines at or near the stratigraphic horizon of the WIPP more closely than Brine A." The
30 synthetic solution Brine A was used extensively for laboratory and modeling studies of WIPP
31 chemistry (e.g., Brush 1990; Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996) prior to the establishment of
32 GWB as a more representative Salado brine (Krumhansl, Kimball, and Stein 1991; Snider
33 2003c).

34 For the CRA-2004, Brush and Xiong (2003a) calculated chemical conditions and An solubilities
35 in both Brine A and GWB, as well as in ERDA-6 brine (used to represent fluids from Castile
36 brine reservoirs). The conditions and solubilities predicted for Brine A and GWB were very
37 similar, as were those predicted for Brine A or GWB and ERDA-6 brine. The solubilities
38 calculated in GWB were used for the CRA-2004 PA (the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment
39 SOTERM, Section SOTERM-3.5).

40 The EPA approved the use of GWB for An-solubility calculations for WIPP PA (U.S.
41 Environmental Protection Agency 2006). Therefore, the conditions predicted for GWB in WIPP

1 disposal rooms are now considered the baseline conditions for Salado brine. The solubilities
2 calculated in GWB were used for the CRA-2004 PABC (Leigh et al. 2005) and the CRA-2009
3 PA.

4 **MgO-5.2 Effects of MgO on Colloidal Actinide (An) Concentrations**

5 This section is based on the text in the CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS, Section BARRIERS-
6 2.3.3.

7 Colloids could affect the long-term performance of the WIPP because of their potential ability to
8 bind cationic metals such as the An elements in TRU waste, and because of their potential
9 mobility under expected repository conditions (Choppin 1988). Colloids are typically defined as
10 phases intermediate in size between dissolved ionic or molecular species and suspended particles
11 large enough to settle by gravity. The size range of colloids is typically on the order of
12 1 nanometer to 1 μm .

13 Humic substances, microbes, and mineral fragments could bind An elements in the WIPP.
14 Under some conditions, An elements could also form intrinsic colloids without binding to
15 humics, microbes, or minerals. Even if one or more of these four types of colloids form(s) in the
16 WIPP, they would not transport An elements out of the repository unless they remain suspended
17 in brine. If coagulation occurs, any An elements bound to these colloids would be immobilized,
18 at least with respect to direct brine releases or injection of brine into the Culebra Dolomite
19 Member of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as Culebra).

20 Chemical conditions in the repository will affect the colloidal An source term. The small
21 variations in pH within the narrow range imposed by MgO will not affect the concentrations of
22 An-bearing colloids significantly. Studies carried out to quantify the colloidal source term
23 included experiments under the conditions that will be established by MgO (the CRA-2004,
24 Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM, Section SOTERM-6.0 and Appendix SOTERM-2009).

25 **MgO-5.2.1 Results since the CRA-2004**

26 The results of Wall and Matthews (2005) imply that colloids formed by the association of
27 actinides and humic substances are highly unstable in the presence of MgO, and that these
28 colloids dissociate rapidly (i.e., within hours).

29 **MgO-5.3 Effects of MgO on Other Near-Field Processes and Conditions**

30 Section MgO-5.3.1, Section MgO-5.3.2, and Section MgO-5.3.3 are based on the text in the
31 CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS, Section BARRIERS-2.3.4.1, Section BARRIERS-2.3.4.2,
32 and Section BARRIERS-2.3.4.3.

33 **MgO-5.3.1 Effects of MgO on Repository H₂O Content**

34 The hydration of periclase could consume significant quantities of H₂O in the WIPP (Reaction
35 [MgO.6]). The carbonation of brucite to form hydromagnesite (5424) (Reaction [MgO.7]) or,
36 less likely, hydromagnesite (4323), will not release this H₂O unless hydromagnesite (5424) or
37 (4323) goes on to form magnesite. Furthermore, even if large quantities of magnesite form

1 during the 10,000-year regulatory period (Reaction [MgO.8]), there will still be large quantities
2 of periclase available for hydration because the DOE is emplacing more MgO than necessary to
3 consume all the CO₂ that would be produced by microbial activity should all the CPR materials
4 in TRU waste and waste containers be consumed.

5 MgO hydration is not included in PA at this time.

6 **MgO-5.3.2 Effects of MgO on Gas Generation**

7 The two gas-producing processes included in WIPP PA are anoxic corrosion of steels and other
8 Fe-base alloys, which will produce H₂, and microbial consumption of CPR materials, which will
9 produce mainly CO₂, hydrogen sulfide (H₂S), and methane (CH₄).

10 **MgO-5.3.2.1 Gas Generation from Anoxic Corrosion**

11 Telander and Westerman (1993 and 1997) studied anoxic corrosion of various metals and
12 concomitant H₂ production under expected WIPP conditions. Wang and Brush (1996a and
13 1996c) used results from three types of experiments carried out by Telander and Westerman
14 (1993 and 1997) to establish ranges and probability distributions of H₂ production rates for the
15 CCA PA:

- 16 1. Experiments with low-C steels in or above Brine A under atmospheres consisting of initially
17 pure CO₂, nitrogen (N₂), or hydrogen sulfide (H₂S) in inert (noncorroding), metallic
18 containers at low-to-intermediate pressures (about 1 to 20 atm).
- 19 2. Experiments with low-C steels in Brine A under H₂, CO₂, or N₂ in autoclaves at high
20 pressures (35 to 127 atm).
- 21 3. Runs with low-C steels in ERDA-6 brine at pH values of 2.8 to 10.6 under N₂. All these
22 experiments were conducted at 30 ± 5 °C (86 ± 9 °F). Brine A and ERDA-6 brine are
23 described above (Section MgO-4.1.1)

24 Anoxic corrosion of low-C steels in Brine A under initially pure N₂ resulted in a pH of 8.3, 8.3,
25 and 8.4 after 6, 12, and 24 months, respectively (see Telander and Westerman 1993, Table 6-3,
26 Test Containers 10, 17, and 25). Wang and Brush (1996a; 1996c) used the 12-to-24-month data
27 from these experiments to establish a range and probability distribution of inundated, anoxic-
28 corrosion rates of steels and other Fe-base alloys of 0 to 0.5 μm/year for the CCA PA. This is
29 equivalent to a range of (0-1.59) × 10⁻¹⁴ meters per second (m/s). Data on the effects of pH on
30 corrosion rates (Telander and Westerman 1997, Table 6-5) have demonstrated that rates obtained
31 at a pH of 8.3 or 8.4 are somewhat higher than those at a pH of 8.69, 8.99, or 9.02, the values
32 expected for the brucite dissolution reaction (see Reaction [MgO.3], above). Therefore, the
33 anoxic-corrosion rates established by Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996c) for the CCA
34 incorporated the effects of MgO on pH.

35 For the CCA PAVT, the EPA specified that the upper limit of the inundated anoxic-corrosion
36 rate range be increased from 1.59 × 10⁻¹⁴ m/s to 3.17 × 10⁻¹⁴ m/s (Trovato 1997b, Enclosure 2;
37 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998e, Table ES-4, Section 5.15, and Table 6.3 and

1 Table 6.4; Hansen and Leigh 2003). A range of $(0-3.17) \times 10^{-14}$ m/s was also used for the CRA-
2 2004 PA (CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Section PA-5.2) and the CRA-2004 PABC (Leigh et al.
3 2005).

4 **MgO-5.3.2.2 Microbial Gas Generation**

5 Francis and Gillow (1994 and 2000), Francis, Gillow, and Giles (1997), and Gillow and Francis
6 (2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, and 2003) did not include MgO or the effects of pH in their study
7 of microbial gas generation under expected WIPP conditions. Instead, they included bentonite in
8 about half of their experiments because a backfill consisting of 70 wt % crushed salt and 30 wt %
9 bentonite had been proposed as an alternative to a backfill consisting entirely of crushed salt, the
10 design-basis backfill in January 1992 when these microbial gas-generation experiments were
11 started. No microbial experiments have been carried out with MgO since the use of this material
12 to consume CO₂ and control f_{CO_2} and pH in the WIPP was proposed in 1996.

13 Dissolution of brucite (Section MgO-5.1, Reaction [MgO.11]) will prevent the pH of any brine
14 present from decreasing below a value of about 9. This mildly basic value is somewhat higher
15 than the mildly acidic pH values produced by dissolution of microbial CO₂ in the experiments
16 described by Francis and Gillow (1994 and 2000), Francis et al. (1997), and Gillow and Francis
17 (2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, and 2003). However, emplacement of MgO in the WIPP and a
18 consequent, mildly basic pH of 9 will not in and of itself preclude significant microbial activity
19 in the repository. This conclusion is based on the common observation of viable alkalophilic
20 microbes in alkaline lakes with pH values of 9 to 10. Such alkaline lakes occur frequently in arid
21 and semiarid environments, such as southeastern New Mexico and adjacent areas of west Texas,
22 and could be one source of the halophilic microbes observed in the WIPP. However, several
23 investigators have reported that MgO and compounds derived from MgO possess inhibitory or
24 even biocidal properties (Asghari and Farrah 1993; Chapman et al. 1995; Koper et al. 2002;
25 Sawai 2003; Sawai et al. 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2000a, and 2000b; Stoimenov et al. 2002;
26 Yamamoto et al. 1998). Some of the results of these studies may be applicable to the WIPP.

27 First, the inhibitory or biocidal effects of MgO probably result from the presence of brucite, not
28 periclase (Sawai et al. 1995a), because most of the experiments cited above were conducted in
29 aqueous solutions or in growth media that contained H₂O, and most of these experiments were
30 long enough for significant nucleation and growth of brucite on periclase surfaces exposed to
31 these solutions or media.

32 Second, the inhibitory or biocidal effects of MgO do not seem to be caused by the mildly basic
33 pH that results from the presence of brucite in aqueous solutions or growth media. Sawai et al.
34 (2000b) reported that the survival of *Escherichia coli* (*E. coli*) was unaffected by a MgO-free,
35 alkaline growth medium at pH values of 10, 10.25, and 10.5, but that *E. coli* survival decreased
36 significantly in the same medium at pH values of 10.75 and 11. This result agrees with the
37 conclusion that a mildly basic pH of about 9 (Section MgO-5.1) will not by itself preclude
38 microbial activity in the WIPP.

39 Third, inhibition of microbial activity seems to require contact between MgO particles and
40 microbes (Sawai et al. 2000a). This conclusion is based on the observation that increased
41 shaking speed of an MgO-bearing slurry increased the mortality of *E. coli* in the slurry.

1 Fourth, the inhibitory effect is inversely proportional to the size of the MgO particles (Sawai
2 et al. 1996; Koper et al. 2002; Stoimenov et al. 2002) and the temperature at which the MgO was
3 prepared (Sawai et al., 1996).

4 Application of these results to microbial activity in the WIPP is difficult in the absence of long-
5 term experiments under expected repository conditions. Biocides are often used for sterilization
6 of solid materials, but become ineffective as the volume of the material(s) to be sterilized
7 increases. This is because it becomes progressively more difficult to ensure uniform distribution
8 of the biocide throughout these materials, and hence to ensure contact between the biocide and
9 the microbes, as the volume increases. Therefore, sterilization methods such as autoclaving and
10 radiation are used for materials with large volumes. In the case of MgO, Sawai et al. (2000a)
11 reported that inhibition of microbial activity seems to require contact between MgO particles and
12 microbes. Although room closure will rupture the supersacks and disperse the MgO into the
13 interstices among and within the ruptured waste containers, this will not ensure contact between
14 MgO particles and microbes. Furthermore, survival of microbes in samples subjected to
15 treatment with an inhibitory or biocidal agent such as MgO, especially those that have had some
16 contact with particulate MgO, would probably result in the development of increased resistance
17 to MgO.

18 The results described above suggest that MgO might reduce the rate of microbial gas generation
19 in the WIPP. However, in the absence of repository-specific experiments, the potential
20 inhibitory or biocidal effects of MgO on the microbial gas-production rates are not included in
21 PA.

22 **MgO-5.3.3 Effects of MgO on Room Closure**

23 In the CCA PA, the CCA PAVT, the CRA-2004 PA, and the CRA-2004 PABC calculations,
24 room closure initially proceeded as if the rooms were open. The free air space was eliminated
25 early in the calculations by unmitigated creep closure. Eventually, the salt contacted the waste
26 and deformed it according to the waste response model. At the same time, corrosion and gas
27 production pressurized the rooms. The coupled processes involved compression owing to the
28 superincumbent rock counterbalanced by gas production, which was obtained from sampled
29 parameters. Thus, room closure was caused by salt creep modified by the structural response of
30 the waste and by gas production. MgO was not explicitly included in the PA room closure
31 calculations, and is not expected to have a significant effect on room closure.

32 **MgO-5.4 Effects of MgO on Far-Field An Transport**

33 This section is based on the text in CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS, Section BARRIERS-2.4.

34 MgO could affect the matrix distribution coefficients (K_{ds}) used to predict transport of dissolved
35 thorium (Th), uranium (U), Pu, and americium (Am) through the Culebra (see Brush 1996 or
36 Brush and Storz 1996 for a definition of matrix K_{ds}). For the CCA PA, data from an empirical
37 sorption study, a mechanistic sorption study, and a column-transport study were used to establish
38 ranges and probability distributions of K_{ds} for Th, U, Pu, and Am.

1 Most of these K_{ds} were obtained from 6-week, empirical sorption experiments carried out with
2 1 g of dolomite-rich rock crushed to a size range of 75 to 500 μm ; 20 mL of Brine A, ERDA-6
3 brine, AISinR, or H-17 with dissolved Th(IV), U(VI), Np(V), Pu(V), or Am(III); and a
4 controlled atmosphere containing 0.24, 1.4, or 4.1% CO_2 to simulate the expected range of f_{CO_2}
5 in the Culebra, about 3.16×10^{-4} to 3.16×10^{-2} atm (see Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996).
6 Brine A and ERDA-6 brine are described above (Section MgO-4.1.1); AISinR is a synthetic
7 brine representative of fluids sampled from the Culebra in the WIPP air intake shaft; and H-17
8 simulates Culebra brine from the H-17 Hydropad.

9 Brush (1996) and Brush and Storz (1996) extended the empirical K_{ds} obtained with Brine A and
10 ERDA-6 brine to a pH of about 9 or 10 with data from a mechanistic sorption study that
11 quantified the effects of f_{CO_2} , pH, and ionic strength on the sorption of Th(IV), U(VI),
12 neptunium(V) (Np(V)), Pu(V), and Am(III) from synthetic NaCl solutions by well-characterized,
13 pure dolomite. Therefore, the K_{ds} for Brine A and ERDA-6 brine used for the CCA PA included
14 the effects of MgO on pH. The K_{ds} for the Culebra brines, however, did not include the effects
15 of MgO on pH because it was assumed that if mixing is sufficient to produce fluids with
16 compositions similar to those of Culebra brines, the pH of these mixtures will also be similar to
17 those of Culebra brines (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz, 1996).

18 For the CCA PAVT, the EPA specified that the probability distributions for the K_{ds} be changed
19 from uniform to loguniform (Trovato 1997a, Enclosure 2; U.S. Environmental Protection
20 Agency 1998a, Table ES-3 and Table ES-4, Section 5.34, Section 5.3.5, Section 5.36, Section
21 5.37, and Section 5.38 and Table 6.3 and Table 6.4; Hansen and Leigh 2003). However, the
22 EPA did not change any of the K_{ds} .

23 Brush and Storz (1996) corrected some of the ranges of K_{ds} established by Brush (1996) for the
24 CCA PA. These corrections were too late for the far-field transport calculations for the CCA
25 PA, and were not included in the far-field transport calculations for the CCA PAVT. Hansen and
26 Leigh (2003), however, incorporated them in the PA database, and the CRA-2004 PA and the
27 CRA-2004 PABC used the corrected K_{ds} along with the loguniform probability distributions
28 specified by the EPA (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Section PA-5.2). The K_{ds} for Brine A
29 and ERDA-6 brine used for the CRA-2004 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC included the effects of
30 MgO on pH, but the K_{ds} for the Culebra brines do not (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996).

1 **MgO-6.0 The MgO Excess Factor**

2 The MgO excess factor is defined as the ratio of the total amount of MgO to be emplaced in the
3 WIPP divided by the total amount required to consume all of the CO₂ produced by microbial
4 activity should all of the CPR materials in the repository be consumed, calculated as specified by
5 the EPA (Marcinowski 2004; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2004). The EPA's
6 specifications for calculating the excess factor are described below.

7 Previously, the DOE referred to the MgO excess factor as the "MgO safety factor," and the EPA
8 still uses "MgO safety factor." In this appendix, "MgO excess factor" is used exclusively. For
9 the purposes of the discussions below, these terms are synonymous.

10 **MgO-6.1 Effects of Microbial Respiratory Pathways on the MgO Excess** 11 **Factor**




12 The conceptual model of sequential use of electron acceptors is based on the common
13 observation that, at any given time, (1) microbes use the best available electron acceptor
14 (oxidant) (i.e., the one that yields the most free energy per mole of organic C consumed);
15 (2) after depletion of the best available electron acceptor, these microbes—or other microbes—
16 begin to consume the next-best available electron acceptor; and (3) this process continues with
17 successively less favorable electron acceptors until all of the substrates (CPR materials in the
18 case of the WIPP) are consumed, an essential nutrient is consumed, or some other limiting
19 condition is attained. Sequential use of electron acceptors has been observed in a diverse array
20 of natural and anthropogenic environments, such as lacustrine, riverine, estuarine, and oceanic
21 sediments; soils; and landfills. In these environments, the order of use observed is oxygen (O₂)
22 (referred to as aerobic respiration), NO₃⁻ (denitrification), Mn(IV) oxides and hydroxides (Mn
23 reduction), Fe(III) oxides and hydroxides (Fe reduction), SO₄²⁻ (SO₄²⁻ reduction), and CO₂
24 (fermentation and methanogenesis) (Froelich et al. 1979; Berner 1980; Criddle, Alvarez, and
25 McCarty 1991; Chapelle 1993; Wang and Van Cappellen 1996; Schlesinger 1997; Hunter,
26 Wang, and P. Van Cappellan 1998; Fenchel, King, and T.H. Blackburn 2000). (In the following
27 discussion, fermentation and methanogenesis are usually referred to as "methanogenesis" for
28 simplicity.) Sequential use of electron acceptors by microbes is included in the conceptual
29 model for gas generation in the WIPP, one of the four conceptual models for long-term chemical
30 evolution of WIPP disposal rooms implemented in WIPP PA (Sandia National Laboratories
31 1996; U.S. Department of Energy 1996a, Chapter 6, Section 6.4.3.3; CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0,
32 Section 6.4.3.3).

33 In the WIPP, the quantities of O₂, Mn(IV) oxides and hydroxides, and Fe(III) oxides and
34 hydroxides will be small relative to that of CPR materials (Brush 1990 and 1995; Wang and
35 Brush 1996a). Therefore, aerobic respiration, manganese (Mn) reduction, and Fe reduction can
36 be ignored from the standpoint of their potential effects on the long-term chemical behavior of
37 the repository.

38 However, several potentially useful electron acceptors will be present in and/or around WIPP
39 disposal rooms: (1) some NO₃⁻ and SO₄²⁻ will be present in the waste; (2) SO₄²⁻ is present in
40 SO₄²⁻-bearing minerals such as anhydrite, gypsum (CaSO₄·2H₂O), and polyhalite

1 (K₂MgCa₂(SO₄)₄·2H₂O) in the Salado surrounding the repository, and dissolved in Salado and
 2 Castile Formation brines; and (3) CO₂ could be produced by denitrification, SO₄²⁻ reduction, and
 3 even methanogenesis (Brush 1990 and 1995; Wang and Brush 1996a). Therefore,
 4 denitrification, SO₄²⁻ reduction, and methanogenesis are potentially important microbial
 5 respiratory pathways in the repository.

6 The overall reactions used to represent possible denitrification, SO₄²⁻ reduction, and
 7 methanogenesis in the WIPP (Wang and Brush 1996a) are, respectively,



13 For these reactions, the CO₂ yields are 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic C consumed from
 14 denitrification and SO₄²⁻ reduction, and 0.5 mol of CO₂ per mol of C from methanogenesis.
 15 Therefore, the MgO excess factor that would be calculated assuming that methanogenesis is the
 16 only or the dominant respiratory pathway would be double or approximately double that
 17 calculated assuming denitrification or SO₄²⁻ reduction is the only or the dominant respiratory
 18 pathway.

19 The total quantity of CPR materials in the WIPP TRU waste inventory—including the waste, the
 20 waste containers, and various waste emplacement materials—exceeds the quantity of NO₃⁻ and
 21 SO₄²⁻ in the waste. This was the case at the time of the CCA PA and the CCA PAVT (U.S.
 22 Department of Energy 1996b), the CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment F, and the CRA-
 23 2004 PABC (Crawford 2005a and 2005b). Therefore, it appeared that (1) the quantity of CPR
 24 materials consumed by methanogenesis could exceed that consumed by denitrification and SO₄²⁻
 25 reduction, should all of the CPR materials be consumed; and (2) the overall CO₂ yield calculated
 26 assuming that methanogenesis would be dominant could be close to 0.5 mol of CO₂ per mol of C
 27 consumed (the CCA, Appendix SOTERM; the CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS). (Note that
 28 the conservative assumption that all of the CPR materials in the inventory would be consumed
 29 provides a lower bound on the MgO excess factor because partial consumption of the CPR
 30 materials would produce less CO₂ and consume less MgO.)

31 Thus, Wang (2000a) used the masses of CPR materials, NO₃⁻, and SO₄²⁻ in the WIPP TRU waste
 32 inventory used for the CCA PA and the CCA PAVT (U.S. Department of Energy 1996b) to
 33 calculate that, should microbes consume all the CPR materials, denitrification would consume
 34 about 3 mol % of these materials, SO₄²⁻ reduction would consume 2 mol %, and methanogenesis
 35 would consume 95 mol %. The overall CO₂ yield would be 0.525 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic
 36 C consumed. Snider (2003d) used the CRA-2004 PA inventory (CRA-2004, Appendix DATA,
 37 Attachment F) to calculate that denitrification would consume 4.72 mol % of the CPR materials,
 38 SO₄²⁻ reduction would consume 0.82 mol %, methanogenesis would consume 94.46 mol %, and
 39 the overall CO₂ yield would be 0.528 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic C consumed. Based on the
 40 CRA-2004 PABC inventory (Crawford 2005a and 2005b), Brush et al. (2006) calculated that

1 denitrification, SO_4^{2-} reduction, and methanogenesis would consume 4.89, 0.84, and 94.27 mol
2 %, respectively, of the CPR materials in the repository; the overall CO_2 yield would be
3 0.529 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C.

4 However, it is possible that microbial SO_4^{2-} reduction could continue after microbes consume all
5 the SO_4^{2-} in the waste. Microbial SO_4^{2-} reduction could continue by using the SO_4^{2-} dissolved in
6 Salado or Castile brines, or by using SO_4^{2-} released by the dissolution of anhydrite, gypsum, and
7 polyhalite in the disturbed rock zone (DRZ) surrounding WIPP disposal rooms (Section MgO-
8 6.2.3.1, Section MgO-6.2.3.2, and Section MgO-6.2.3.3).

9 **MgO-6.2 History of the MgO Excess Factor**

10 This section reviews (1) the establishment of the MgO excess factor (Section MgO-6.2.1); (2) the
11 reduction of the MgO excess factor from 1.95 to 1.67 (Section MgO-6.2.2), which occurred
12 concomitantly with the EPA's approval of the DOE's request to eliminate the emplacement of
13 minisacks (Section MgO-2.1.2); (3) additional developments relevant to the MgO excess factor
14 prior to the CRA-2004 (Section MgO-6.2.3); and (4) changes since the CRA-2004 (Section
15 MgO-6.2.4), which included the EPA's approval of the DOE's request to reduce the MgO excess
16 factor from 1.67 to 1.2.

17 **MgO-6.2.1 Establishment of the MgO Excess Factor**

18 Just prior to the submittal of the CCA, Peterson (1996) calculated the quantity of MgO required
19 to consume all of the CO_2 produced should microbes consume all of the CPR materials in the
20 WIPP. Peterson (1996) assumed that (1) microbes would consume all of the CPR materials in
21 the WIPP TRU waste inventory (U.S. Department of Energy 1996b), and (2) the CO_2 yield
22 would be 1 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C in the CPR materials (i.e., there would be no
23 methanogenesis).

24 The DOE stated in the CCA that it would emplace 85,600 short tons (77,640 metric tons) of
25 MgO in the WIPP (U.S. Department of Energy 1996a, Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3). However, it did
26 not specify an MgO excess factor. Instead, it said that "Since the MgO backfill is being added in
27 large excess, any quantity of brine that may enter the repository will be saturated with respect to
28 the appropriate MgO reaction products" (the CCA, Appendix BACK, p. BACK-3).

29 The MgO excess factor was first established by an EPA request for additional information during
30 its review of the CCA, and by the DOE's response to that request. The portion of the EPA
31 request relevant to the establishment of the MgO excess factor was that the DOE "... provide
32 information which demonstrates that the excess volume proposed to be emplaced can actually be
33 accommodated and whether it covers the uncertainties in the actual geochemical process"
34 (Nichols 1996, Enclosure 2, p. 11). The pertinent portion of the DOE's response (Dials 1997)
35 was the following:

36 The quantity of MgO required to be emplaced to assure removal of CO_2 from the gas phase is
37 based on calculations that consider all processes that might contribute to CO_2 production. These
38 calculations are very conservative in that they utilize a maximum extent of CO_2 production, a
39 quantity that is unlikely to be attained. Based on the [Baseline Inventory Report, or BIR] and
40 memoranda in the Records Center, the total number of moles of MgO required to react with the

1 maximum possible amount of CO₂ generated is 9.85×10^8 mol. Using the appropriate conversion
2 factors (40.3 g/mol, 0.001 kg/g, 2.202 kg/lb, 0.0005 lb/ton) a total of 43,700 tons of MgO are
3 required to react with this maximum estimate of [CO₂] production. Section 3.3.3 of the CCA
4 documents that approximately 85,600 tons of backfill will be emplaced in the repository.
5 Therefore, by dividing the mass of backfill to be emplaced (85,600 tons) by the maximum mass of
6 MgO required to react with the maximum possible [CO₂] production (43,700 tons), a 1.95 factor
7 of safety results. In other words, 95% more MgO will be emplaced than is required to react with a
8 conservative estimate of the maximum quantity of CO₂ production.

9 The EPA included this calculation of the MgO excess factor in its review of the CCA (U.S.
10 Environmental Protection Agency 1998a, Section 44.A.5 and Section 44.A.6).

11 This excess factor of 1.95 is consistent with the conservative assumptions that (1) microbes
12 would consume all of the CPR materials in the inventory (U.S. Department of Energy 1996b),
13 and (2) the CO₂ yield would be 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic C in the CPR materials (i.e.,
14 there would be no methanogenesis even if all of the CPR materials in the repository were
15 consumed).

16 The DOE assumed that the CO₂ yield would be 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic C in the CPR
17 materials because at the time that Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996b) established the conceptual
18 model and parameters for microbial gas generation in the CCA PA, Francis and Gillow (1994)
19 and Francis, Gillow, and Giles (1997) had observed aerobic respiration and denitrification, but
20 not methanogenesis, in their microbial gas-generation experiments at Brookhaven National
21 Laboratory (BNL). By the time Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996b) established the model and
22 parameters for the CCA PA, BNL had carried out their experiments for up to 1,228 days (3.36
23 years). Therefore, there was no experimental evidence at the time of the CCA PA or the CCA
24 PAVT that methanogenesis would actually occur in the WIPP. There were at least four possible
25 reasons why methanogenesis had not been observed by the time of the CCA and the CCA
26 PAVT:

- 27 1. Halophilic methanogens capable of metabolizing complex, organic substrates such as
28 cellulosic materials under expected WIPP conditions do not exist.
- 29 2. Halophilic methanogens capable of metabolizing complex, organic substrates exist, but were
30 not present in the materials used to inoculate these experiments (laboratory dust; brine and
31 mud from the salt lakes in Nash Draw; and brine collected from G Seep in G Drift, a drift
32 located in the northern end of the WIPP underground workings).
- 33 3. Methanogens were present in the materials used to inoculate these experiments, but had not
34 survived collection, storage, and inoculation of the BNL experiments.
- 35 4. Methanogens had survived collection, storage, and inoculation of these experiments, but
36 there had not been enough time for other microbes to consume all of the NO₃⁻ and SO₄²⁻ and
37 allow the methanogens to become active.

38 **MgO-6.2.2 Reduction of the MgO Excess Factor from 1.95 to 1.67**

39 In 2001, the MgO excess factor decreased from 1.95 to 1.67 when the EPA approved the DOE's
40 2000 request to eliminate the emplacement of minisacks among the waste containers and

1 between the waste containers and the ribs (Triay 2000; U.S. Department of Energy 2000;
2 Marcinowski 2001; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2001). Section MgO-2.1.2 describes
3 the DOE's request to eliminate the minisacks and the EPA's approval of this request.

4 The DOE's 2000 request to eliminate the minisacks proposed a less-conservative assumption for
5 the calculation of the MgO excess factor: that methanogenesis would be the dominant microbial
6 respiratory pathway in the WIPP should all of the CPR materials in the repository be consumed,
7 and therefore, microbes would not convert all of the organic C in the CPR materials to CO₂.

8 The DOE proposed this less-conservative assumption because Francis and Gillow (2000, pp. 2,
9 3, and 10) observed CH₄ in the headspaces of their long-term, inundated microbial gas-
10 generation experiments carried out at BNL for 2,718 days (7.44 years) under most combinations
11 of conditions. However, Francis and Gillow (2000) did not observe CH₄ in the inundated
12 experiments to which excess NO₃⁻ had been added at the start of the experiments. The addition
13 of excess NO₃⁻ to some of the experiments appears to have prevented the onset of
14 methanogenesis. Wang (2000a) used the results of Francis and Gillow (2000) to support the
15 DOE's request to eliminate the minisacks (Section MgO-2.1.2).

16 Therefore, it was clear that the absence of experimental evidence for methanogenesis at the time
17 of the CCA was because microbial activity in the initially aerobic inundated experiments had not
18 progressed through aerobic respiration, denitrification, and SO₄²⁻ reduction to methanogenesis;
19 and that microbial activity in the initially anaerobic inundated experiments had not progressed
20 through denitrification and SO₄²⁻ reduction to methanogenesis. The requirement that these steps
21 be completed prior to the onset of methanogenesis is a consequence of the observation of the
22 sequential use of electron acceptors (Section MgO-6.1), according to which methanogenesis does
23 not start until any and all NO₃⁻ and SO₄²⁻ are depleted. Although methanogenesis had not been
24 observed by the time of the CCA in experiments carried out for up to 1,228 days (3.36 years),
25 Francis and Gillow observed CH₄ in inundated experiments after 2,718 days (7.44 years).

26 It was also clear from these results by the time of the DOE's 2000 request to eliminate the
27 minisacks that (1) there exist communities of halophilic methanogens capable of metabolizing
28 complex organic substrates, such as cellulosic materials, under expected WIPP conditions;
29 (2) these microbes are present and viable in one or more of the materials used to inoculate these
30 experiments; and (3) these microbes are capable of surviving exposure to O₂. Methanogens are
31 obligate anaerobes and, as such, are extremely sensitive to exposure to O₂. The fact that they
32 produced CH₄ after exposure to O₂ implies that they are capable of producing resistant forms that
33 can survive initially oxic conditions in these experiments.

34 Furthermore, results from the BNL microbial gas-generation study have confirmed that viable
35 halophilic methanogens capable of metabolizing cellulosic materials under expected near-field
36 conditions are present in the WIPP underground workings. Francis and Gillow (2000, pp. 2 and
37 10) detected CH₄ in initially oxic, unamended, and uninoculated experiments, and in initially
38 anoxic, unamended, and uninoculated experiments. The most likely explanation for microbial
39 gas production in these uninoculated experiments is that G Seep, the brine used for these
40 inundated experiments, was collected from the WIPP underground workings. This brine
41 contained a small but viable microflora, including methanogens, and was not sterilized prior to
42 use. The fact that these microbes produced CH₄ after exposure to O₂ in the air used to ventilate

1 G Drift and in initially oxic experiments implies that they are capable of producing resistant
2 forms that can withstand initially oxic conditions in the repository.

3 However, the presence of viable halophilic methanogens in the WIPP does not preclude the
4 possibility that similar communities of microbes are also present in the other materials used to
5 inoculate these experiments, especially brine and mud from the salt lakes in Nash Draw. It is
6 quite possible that methanogens in these lakes are also capable of producing resistant forms that
7 can survive the oxic conditions encountered during eolian transport from Nash Draw to the
8 WIPP air intake shaft, and initially oxic conditions in the repository. Therefore, the presence of
9 viable methanogens in the WIPP does not depend on the claim that microbes have survived in
10 the Salado since the Permian Period (Vreeland, Rosenzweig, and Powers 2000) a claim that is
11 controversial (see, for example, Hazen and Roedder 2001; Parkes 2000; Powers, Vreeland, and
12 Rosenzweig 2001; Satterfield et al. 2005).

13 Based on the results of Francis and Gillow (2000) and the analysis of Wang (2000a), the DOE's
14 2000 request to eliminate the minisacks proposed that, if methanogenesis were the dominant
15 respiratory pathway, it would increase the MgO excess factor from values of 1.95 prior to and
16 1.67 after the proposed elimination of the minisacks to values of 3.73 prior to and 3.23 after
17 minisack elimination (U.S. Department of Energy 2000, Table 1).

18 The EPA's approval of the DOE's request to eliminate the minisacks included the results of
19 several of the DOE's calculations regarding excess MgO, but did not acknowledge the proposed
20 excess factors of 3.73 prior to and 3.23 after minisack elimination (U.S. Environmental
21 Protection Agency 2001, Table 1).

22 **MgO-6.2.3 Additional Developments Relevant to the MgO Excess Factor Prior to the** 23 **CRA-2004**

24 In March 2004, the EPA approved emplacing supercompacted waste from the AMWTP at the
25 INEEL in the WIPP (Marcinowski 2004; Trinity Engineering Associates 2004; U.S.
26 Environmental Protection Agency 2004). However, the EPA specified that the DOE maintain an
27 MgO excess factor of 1.67. Because much of the AMWTP waste contains high concentrations
28 of CPR materials, the DOE anticipated the need to emplace additional MgO in the repository,
29 and began to explore various possible approaches to support a Planned Change Request (PCR)
30 for EPA approval of a reduction in the MgO excess factor.

31 **MgO-6.2.3.1 Additional Evidence for Microbial Methanogenesis under Expected WIPP** 32 **Conditions**

33 Gillow and Francis (2001b) reported additional CH₄ in the inundated, initially anaerobic
34 experiments in which Francis and Gillow (2000, pp. 2, 3, and 10) had first detected this gas.
35 Furthermore, Gillow and Francis (2001b, pp. 3-4 and 3-5) detected CH₄ in experiments to which
36 excess NO₃⁻ had been added at the start of these experiments. These results were from
37 experiments sampled after 3462 days (9.48 years). After 2,718 days (7.44 years), Francis and
38 Gillow (2000, pp. 2, 3, and 10) had not observed CH₄ in the experiments to which excess NO₃⁻
39 had been added. Therefore, this excess NO₃⁻ had delayed, but did not permanently prevent, the

1 onset of methanogenesis. This seemed to make the case stronger for methanogenesis as a
2 potential microbial respiratory pathway in the WIPP.

3 Consequently, the DOE emphasized the likely dominance of methanogenesis during microbial
4 consumption of the CPR materials in the WIPP (CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS, Section
5 BARRIERS-2.5.1). Based on the CRA-2004 PA inventory (CRA-2004, Appendix DATA,
6 Attachment F) and calculations by Snider (2003d), the DOE concluded that (1) 4.72 mol % of
7 the CPR materials would be consumed by denitrification, 0.82 mol % by SO_4^{2-} reduction, and
8 94.46 mol % by methanogenesis; (2) the overall CO_2 yield would be 0.528 mol of CO_2 per mol
9 of organic C consumed; and (3) the MgO excess factor would be 2.45.

10 However, during a DOE-EPA technical exchange in January 2004, the EPA expressed concern
11 that naturally occurring SO_4^{2-} could delay or even prevent methanogenesis in the WIPP after
12 microbes consume the SO_4^{2-} in the waste. Dissolved SO_4^{2-} is present in both Salado and Castile
13 brines (see Table MgO-6), so advective transport of SO_4^{2-} into WIPP disposal rooms via seepage
14 of intergranular Salado brines (i.e., GWB) from the DRZ, or inflow of brines from the Castile
15 (i.e., ERDA-6 brine) could delay or prevent methanogenesis. Furthermore, diffusive transport of
16 dissolved SO_4^{2-} from DRZ minerals such as anhydrite, gypsum, and polyhalite—all of which
17 contain SO_4^{2-} —to WIPP disposal rooms could become important as microbial consumption of
18 SO_4^{2-} in the waste creates a concentration gradient from the DRZ to the repository.

19 **MgO-6.2.3.2 The DOE's Analysis of Transport of Naturally Occurring SO_4^{2-} into WIPP** 20 **Disposal Rooms**

21 Kanney et al. (2004) analyzed the effects of CPR materials in a panel and transport of naturally
22 occurring SO_4^{2-} on the extent of microbial methanogenesis in the WIPP and the MgO excess
23 factor for different assumed loadings of AMWTP supercompacted waste in a panel.

24 Kanney et al. (2004) used the four loadings of AMWTP supercompacted waste in a hypothetical
25 "Panel X" developed by Leigh (2003, 2004a, and 2004b) for the DOE's analysis of the effects of
26 this waste on the long-term performance of the WIPP (Hansen et al. 2004). The four loadings
27 assumed for Panel X were (1) the "DOE homogeneous Panel X," based on the assumption that
28 the AMWTP supercompacted waste would be homogeneously emplaced throughout the entire
29 10-panel repository (Panel X would comprise ~11-12 volume % (vol %) AMWTP
30 supercompacted waste, the same as the other 9 panels); (2) the "DOE realistic Panel X," which
31 would comprise 14 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste; (3) the "DOE conservative Panel X,"
32 which would consist of 27 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste; and (4) the "EPA
33 conservative Panel X," which would contain 50 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste. In all
34 four cases, the remaining waste in the WIPP inventory was assumed to be distributed
35 homogeneously throughout the other nine panels.

36 Kanney et al. (2004, Section 3.2.1, pp. 20-22, and especially Figure 4 and Figure 5) used the
37 BRAGFLO results from the PA calculations of Hansen et al. (2004) to demonstrate that

38 In all but a few vectors, CPR biodegradation has ceased after about 2000 years. In most vectors,
39 this is because all of the CPR has been consumed. For a few vectors the consumption of CPR
40 [materials] has ceased even though there [are] CPR [materials] remaining. This is likely caused by
41 very low brine saturations. For those few vectors that still show some activity, the rate of ...

1 consumption is only a fraction of the inundated rate. Thus, a value [of] 2000 years for the
2 biodegradation time scale T_{bio} is appropriate for this analysis.

3 Kanney et al. (2004, Section 3.1.1, p. 19; and Section 3.2.2, p. 22) then used a dissolved SO_4^{2-}
4 concentration of 182 mM, the highest concentration predicted by Brush and Xiong (2003a) for
5 GWB or ERDA-6 brine before or after equilibration with the solids in WIPP disposal rooms (see
6 Section MgO-5.1), and a brine volume of $7.74 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$, the largest volume predicted after 2,000
7 years in all of the 100 vectors of Replicate 1 of Hansen et al. (2004), to calculate the quantity of
8 SO_4^{2-} that could enter the repository via advective transport.

9 To calculate the quantity that could enter via diffusive transport in 2,000 years, Kanney et al.
10 (2004, Section 2.2.2, pp. 5-7; Section 3.1.2, p. 18) used a concentration of 1.7 wt % each for
11 anhydrite, gypsum, and polyhalite (Stein 1985; Brush 1990) to calculate the concentration of
12 SO_4^{2-} in the Salado at or near the stratigraphic horizon of the WIPP. Kanney et al. (2004,
13 Section 2.3.3, pp. 13-16; Section 3.2.3, p. 23) then assumed that all the SO_4^{2-} in these minerals
14 within 1.06 m (3.5 ft) of the excavated surfaces of a panel would diffuse into the repository in
15 2000 years. They calculated this “effective diffusion length” using (1) a value of 9.84×10^{-10}
16 meters squared per second (m^2/s) for the free-solution tracer diffusion coefficient of SO_4^{2-} (Li
17 and Gregory 1974), (2) a value of 0.05 for the porosity of the Salado DRZ, (3) a value of 1.8 for
18 the cementation factor (Deal et al. 1989), (4) a tortuosity of 0.091, and (5) a value of $4.48 \times$
19 $10^{-12} \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$ for the effective diffusion coefficient of SO_4^{2-} .

20 For these parameter values, Kanney et al. (2004) predicted that a maximum quantity of $1.35 \times$
21 10^6 kg of SO_4^{2-} would be advected into Panel X in Castile brine and a total of $2.37 \times 10^6 \text{ kg}$ of
22 SO_4^{2-} would dissolve from anhydrite, gypsum, and polyhalite and diffuse into Panel X from the
23 DRZ surrounding Panel X. These quantities are much greater than those in this panel’s waste,
24 just $(1.40\text{-}4.40) \times 10^4 \text{ kg}$. Therefore, the total quantity of SO_4^{2-} available to SO_4^{2-} -reducing
25 microbes would be $\sim 3.74 \times 10^6 \text{ kg}$ ($1.35 \times 10^6 \text{ kg} + 2.37 \times 10^6 \text{ kg} + 1.4 \times 10^4 \text{ kg}$).

26 Finally, Kanney et al. (2004, Section 3.3, pp. 24-26) used the waste-material parameters from
27 Leigh (2004a, 2004b), the CRA-2004 PA inventory (the CRA-2004, Appendix DATA,
28 Attachment F), and the methods of Snider (2003d) to predict the quantities of CPR materials in
29 the DOE homogeneous Panel X, the DOE realistic Panel X, the DOE conservative Panel X, and
30 the EPA conservative Panel X that would be consumed by microbes in 2000 years via
31 denitrification, SO_4^{2-} reduction using SO_4^{2-} in the waste, SO_4^{2-} reduction using naturally
32 occurring SO_4^{2-} (Castile-brine SO_4^{2-} and SO_4^{2-} in DRZ minerals), and methanogenesis. They
33 also determined the MgO excess factors for these panels.

34 Table MgO-9 provides the results of these calculations. They show that, for a given panel
35 loading (i.e., for a given quantity of CPR materials), including naturally occurring SO_4^{2-}
36 decreased the MgO excess factor relative to that calculated using only the SO_4^{2-} in the waste
37 (e.g., the MgO safety factor for the DOE homogeneous Panel X decreased from 2.45 to 1.37).
38 Kanney et al. (2004, Section 3.3, pp. 25-26) also concluded,

1 **Table MgO-9. Effects of Panel Loading and the Source of SO₄²⁻ on Microbial Respiratory**
 2 **Pathways and the MgO Excess Factor—Base Case. Adapted from Kanney**
 3 **et al. (2004).**

Loading of Panel X and Source of SO ₄ ²⁻	Denitrification (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	SO ₄ ²⁻ Reduction (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	Methanogenesis (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	MgO Excess Factor
DOE Homogeneous:^a				
Waste SO ₄ ²⁻	4.75	0.82	94.46	2.45
Waste + Natural SO ₄ ²⁻	4.75	70.57	24.68	1.37
DOE Realistic:^b				
Waste SO ₄ ²⁻	4.48	0.66	94.87	2.44
Waste + Natural SO ₄ ²⁻	4.48	63.27	32.26	1.40
DOE Conservative:^c				
Waste SO ₄ ²⁻	3.00	0.16	96.84	1.71
Waste + Natural SO ₄ ²⁻	3.00	42.98	54.03	1.13
EPA Conservative:^d				
Waste SO ₄ ²⁻	1.03	0.23	98.75	1.21
Waste + Natural SO ₄ ²⁻	1.03	32.31	66.66	0.94

^a Panel X would comprise ~11-12 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^b Panel X would comprise 14 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^c Panel X would consist of 27 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^d Panel X would contain 50 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

4
 5 In spite of the decreases noted above, these results show that the MgO [excess]¹F factor is not
 6 very sensitive to the amount of [SO₄²⁻]. For the DOE homogeneous [P]anel X, the amount of
 7 [SO₄²⁻] increased by about 8500% while the ... [excess] factor decreased by about 44%. For the
 8 DOE realistic [P]anel X, the amount of [SO₄²⁻] increased by about 9500% and the [MgO excess]
 9 factor decreased by about 43%. For the DOE conservative case, the amount of [SO₄²⁻] increased
 10 by about 26,500% and the [excess] factor decreased by about 34%. For the EPA conservative
 11 scenario, the amount of [SO₄²⁻] increased by about 14000% and the ... [excess] factor decreased by
 12 about 22%.

13 The MgO [excess] factor is much more sensitive to the amount of CPR [materials]. Keeping in
 14 mind that there is roughly the same amount of [SO₄²⁻] available in each [panel], one can observe
 15 how the [excess] factor change[d] as more CPR [materials were] added by comparing [excess]
 16 factors for different [loadings]. In going from the DOE realistic [Panel X] to the EPA
 17 conservative [Panel X], the [mass of] CPR [materials] increase[d] by about 95% and the MgO
 18 safety factor decrease[d] by about 33%.

19 Note that the fraction of CPR [materials consumed] by [SO₄²⁻] reduction in the EPA conservative
 20 [P]anel X ... [was] actually less than for the DOE conservative [P]anel X, while the MgO [excess]
 21 factor [was] lower than that of [the] DOE conservative [P]anel X. This [was] caused by the larger
 22 amount of CPR [materials] in the EPA conservative [P]anel X....

23 Kanney et al. (2004, Section 4, pp. 27-34) also carried out an uncertainty analysis of the effects
 24 of the brine volume that enters a panel following a human intrusion, the time required for

¹ Explanatory text appears in brackets.

1 microbial consumption of all of the CPR materials, and the effective diffusion coefficient for
 2 SO_4^{2-} on these results.

3 Kanney et al. (2004, Section 4, Table 13) pointed out that the probability of a large volume of
 4 brine flowing into a panel from a reservoir in the Castile (the only way that large volumes of
 5 brine can enter the repository) is quite low; about 0.006. Therefore, Kanney et al. (2004, Section
 6 4.1, pp. 27-29) recalculated the effects of panel loading and the source of SO_4^{2-} on microbial
 7 methanogenesis in the absence of Castile brine. This change (1) decreased the maximum volume
 8 of brine that could enter Panel X by about 75%, from 7.74×10^4 to $1.91 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$; (2) decreased
 9 the maximum quantity of SO_4^{2-} advected into this panel by the same percentage, from 1.35×10^6
 10 to $3.34 \times 10^5 \text{ kg}$; and (3) decreased the total quantity of SO_4^{2-} available to microbes in the panel
 11 by 27%, from $(3.74\text{-}3.77) \times 10^6$ to $(2.72\text{-}2.75) \times 10^6 \text{ kg}$. The absence of Castile brine from
 12 Panel X increased the percentage of CPR materials consumed by methanogenesis by about 13%
 13 in the case of the EPA conservative Panel X to 77% for the DOE homogeneous Panel X, and
 14 increased the MgO excess factor for the same panels by about 6-11% (see Table MgO-10).

15 **Table MgO-10. Effects of Panel Loading and the Source of SO_4^{2-} on Microbial**
 16 **Methanogenesis and the MgO Excess Factor—Effects of Having no Castile**
 17 **Brine Intrude Panel X. Adapted from Kanney et al. (2004).**

Loading of Panel X and Source of SO_4^{2-}	Denitrification (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	SO_4^{2-} Reduction (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	Methanogenesis (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	MgO Excess Factor
DOE Homogeneous:^a				
Castile brine present	4.75	70.57	24.68	1.37
No Castile brine	4.75	51.47	43.77	1.52
DOE Realistic:^b				
Castile brine present	4.48	63.27	32.26	1.40
No Castile brine	4.48	46.13	49.40	1.55
DOE Conservative:^c				
Castile brine present	3.00	42.98	54.03	1.13
No Castile brine	3.00	31.26	65.75	1.22
EPA Conservative:^d				
Castile brine present	1.03	32.31	66.66	0.94
No Castile brine	1.03	23.53	75.44	1.00

^a Panel X would comprise ~11-12 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^b Panel X would comprise 14 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^c Panel X would consist of 27 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^d Panel X would contain 50 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

18

19 Kanney et al. (2004, Section 4.2, pp. 29-32) then predicted the effects of doubling the time
 20 required for microbial consumption of all CPR materials from 2,000 to 4,000 years. This change

- 1 1. Increased the maximum volume of Castile brine that could enter Panel X by about 32%, from
2 7.74×10^4 to 1.02×10^5 m³
 - 3 2. Increased the maximum quantity of SO₄²⁻ advected into this panel by the same percentage,
4 from 1.35×10^6 to 1.78×10^6 kg
 - 5 3. Increased the effective diffusion length by 42%, from 1.06 to 1.50
 - 6 4. Increased the quantity of SO₄²⁻ that diffused into the panel by 41%, from 2.37×10^6 to $3.35 \times$
7 10^6 kg
 - 8 5. Increased the total quantity of SO₄²⁻ available in this panel by 37%, from $(3.74-3.77) \times 10^6$ to
9 $(5.14-5.17) \times 10^6$ kg
- 10 Doubling the time required for microbial consumption of all of the CPR materials decreased the
11 percentage of CPR materials consumed by methanogenesis by about 18% in the case of the EPA
12 conservative Panel X to 100% for the DOE homogeneous Panel X, and decreased the MgO
13 excess factor for the same panels by about 9-12% (Table MgO-11).

14 **Table MgO-11. Effects of Panel Loading and the Source of SO₄²⁻ on Microbial Respiratory**
15 **Pathways and the MgO Excess Factor—Effects of Doubling the Time**
16 **Required for Consumption of All CPR Materials. Adapted from Kanney**
17 **et al. (2004).**

Loading of Panel X and Source of SO ₄ ²⁻	Denitrification (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	SO ₄ ²⁻ Reduction (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	Methanogenesis (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	MgO Excess Factor
DOE Homogeneous:^a				
2,000 years	4.75	70.57	24.68	1.37
4,000 years	4.75	95.25	0.00	1.21
DOE Realistic:^b				
2,000 years	4.48	63.27	32.26	1.40
4,000 years	4.48	86.98	8.54	1.25
DOE Conservative:^c				
2,000 years	3.00	42.98	54.03	1.13
4,000 years	3.00	59.20	37.81	1.02
EPA Conservative:^d				
2,000 years	1.03	32.31	66.66	0.94
4,000 years	1.03	44.47	54.51	0.86

^a Panel X would comprise ~11-12 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^b Panel X would comprise 14 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^c Panel X would consist of 27 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^d Panel X would contain 50 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

1 Finally, Kanney et al. (2004, Section 4.3, pp. 32-34) predicted the effects of approximately
 2 doubling the effective diffusion coefficient for SO_4^{2-} , from 4.48×10^{-12} to 1.00×10^{-11} m^2/s . This
 3 change (1) increased the effective diffusion length by 50%, from 1.06 to 1.59 m (3.5 to 5.2 ft);
 4 (2) increased the quantity of SO_4^{2-} that diffused into the panel by 49%, from 2.37×10^6 to $3.54 \times$
 5 10^6 kg; and (3) increased the total quantity of SO_4^{2-} available by 31%, from $(3.74\text{-}3.77) \times 10^6$ to
 6 $(4.91\text{-}4.94) \times 10^6$ kg. Doubling the effective diffusion coefficient for SO_4^{2-} decreased the
 7 percentage of CPR materials consumed by methanogenesis by about 15% in the case of the EPA
 8 conservative Panel X to 89% for the DOE homogeneous Panel X, and decreased the MgO excess
 9 factor for the same panels by about 6-10% (Table MgO-12).

10 **Table MgO-12. Effects of Panel Loading and the Source of SO_4^{2-} on Microbial Respiratory**
 11 **Pathways and the MgO Excess Factor—Effects of Doubling the Effective**
 12 **Diffusion Coefficient for SO_4^{2-} . Adapted from Kanney et al. (2004).**

Loading of Panel X and Source of SO_4^{2-}	Denitrification (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	SO_4^{2-} Reduction (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	Methanogenesis (% of CPR Materials Consumed)	MgO Excess Factor
DOE Homogeneous:^a				
Base Case	4.75	70.57	24.68	1.37
Doubling D_{eff}	4.75	92.48	2.76	1.23
DOE Realistic:^b				
Base Case	4.48	63.27	32.26	1.40
Doubling D_{eff}	4.48	82.94	12.58	1.27
DOE Conservative:^c				
Base Case	3.00	42.98	54.03	1.13
Doubling D_{eff}	3.00	56.44	40.57	1.04
EPA Conservative:^d				
Base Case	1.03	32.31	66.66	0.94
Doubling D_{eff}	1.03	42.40	56.58	0.88

^a Panel X would comprise ~11-12 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^b Panel X would comprise 14 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^c Panel X would consist of 27 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

^d Panel X would contain 50 vol % AMWTP supercompacted waste.

13

14 **MgO-6.2.3.3 The EPA’s Response to the DOE’s Analysis of Transport of Naturally**
 15 **Occurring SO_4^{2-} into the WIPP**

16 The EPA concluded that the analysis of Kanney et al. (2004) did not adequately bound the
 17 quantity of naturally occurring SO_4^{2-} that could enter WIPP disposal rooms. In its review of the
 18 issues associated with the emplacement of AMWTP supercompacted waste in the WIPP, Trinity
 19 Engineering Associates (TEA) (2004, pp. 31-33) concluded,

20 TEA agrees that advection, dissolution, and diffusion in brine are the major mechanisms for
 21 transporting natural $[\text{SO}_4^{2-}]$ into the repository. TEA also agrees that basing the quantity of
 22 available $[\text{SO}_4^{2-}]$ on the maximum available brine volume and ignoring mass transfer limitations in

1 dissolution and diffusion are conservative. However, TEA questions certain details of the
2 approach that should be resolved before [the DOE's] calculations can be accepted as adequately
3 bounding sulfate availability. These questions primarily concern the questionable basis for the
4 assumed rate of room closure and the associated degree of DRZ healing, a lack of consideration of
5 the anhydrite-rich beds immediately above the repository, and a lack of consideration of the effect
6 of increased [Fe] surface area or the conservatism of the microbial degradation rates in
7 determining an appropriate time scale for the sulfate reduction reaction.

8 The timing of room closure and the associated degree of DRZ healing cited by Kanney et al.
9 [2004] are related to the accuracy of SANTOS model predictions which are currently being
10 reviewed by the Agency... If the SANTOS model predictions are found to be inaccurate, the
11 conclusions cited by Kanney et al. [2004] may not be supported. In addition, the belief that the
12 vertical DRZ would essentially heal within fewer than 100 years may be inconsistent with the
13 approved conceptual model implemented in the CCA and PAVT [PAs], which incorporate a DRZ
14 that endures for 10,000 years with permeabilities that can be orders of magnitude higher than for
15 intact halite. Even if the vertical DRZ rapidly heals to the extent that additional vertical brine flow
16 is not of concern, [the DOE's] diffusion length of about 1 m is not consistent with the
17 approximately 3 m cited extent of the lateral DRZ. The lateral DRZ includes stress fracturing,
18 provides advective access to Anhydrite B, and will endure significantly longer than the vertical
19 DRZ (Kanney et al. 2004, p. 9).

20 TEA agrees that pressure-induced fractures are more likely to conduct brine away from the
21 repository rather than toward it, and that brine flow into the repository from the thinner anhydrite
22 layers immediately above the waste rooms is likely to be small compared with the volume of brine
23 inflow assumed in [the DOE's] calculations. However, TEA believes that structural disruptions
24 during room closure, such as a roof collapse that would bring [SO₄²⁻]-bearing minerals such as
25 anhydrite into direct contact with waste room brines, cannot be ruled out. Additional [SO₄²⁻]
26 could be derived in this manner from Anhydrite Interbeds A and B, and from the anhydrite-rich
27 halite between these interbeds (Stein 1985). As the [SO₄²⁻] in the brine is consumed by the
28 reduction reaction, the tendency of the system to maintain chemical equilibrium requires that
29 sulfates present in minerals accessible to repository brines dissolve. These sources of additional
30 natural [SO₄²⁻] were not considered in [the DOE's] analysis.

31 The assumption that all [SO₄²⁻] around the repository within an approximately 1 m diffusion
32 length would be available for reaction was considered by [the DOE] to account for [SO₄²⁻] that
33 may be dissolved from the Salado as well as [SO₄²⁻] that may diffuse from the Salado (Kanney
34 et al. 2004, p. 13). The approximately 1 m diffusion length was based in part on the assumption
35 that CPR degradation would be essentially complete within 2,000 years (Kanney et al. 2004,
36 Sections 2.3.1 and 3.2.1). The 2,000-year time scale is used by [the DOE] to establish limits for
37 the volume of brine inflow and diffusion length that need to be considered as sources of [SO₄²⁻].
38 However, the assumption that CPR degradation would be essentially complete within 2,000 years
39 does not hold for waste panels with the increased iron surface areas that would be present with
40 supercompacted AMWTF waste. Stein and Zelinski (2003, Figure 2) show that CPR
41 biodegradation endures for over 10,000 years for an increasing number of vectors because of
42 decreased brine saturation as the iron surface area increases. TEA has agreed that the effects of
43 increased iron surface areas can be ignored in [PA] for purposes of gas generation impacts because
44 the prolonged CPR degradation reaction conservatively results in less overall gas generation (see
45 Section 5.2.2 [of TEA, 2004]). However, ignoring a prolonged CPR degradation reaction for
46 purposes of limiting the [SO₄²⁻]-reduction reaction is not conservative and inappropriate. In
47 addition, the microbial degradation rates used in BRAGFLO are consistent with the higher initial
48 reaction rates observed in microbial degradation experiments. Use of these higher initial rates is
49 conservative from the standpoint of estimating gas generation rates, but use of the lower, long-
50 term rates would be more conservative for the purpose of determining the length of time available
51 for [SO₄²⁻] diffusion.

1 The MgO safety factors calculated by [the DOE] fall below the Agency-approved value of 1.67
 2 (EPA, 2001) for *every* [TEA's italics] waste loading scenario considered in [the DOE's] analysis
 3 when natural sulfates are included. [The DOE's] calculated safety factors range from 0.94 for the
 4 EPA loading scenario (50 percent supercompacted AMWTF waste and 50 percent standard waste)
 5 to 1.40 for the DOE realistic Panel X scenario described in Section 5.2.1.2 [of TEA, 2004]
 6 (Kanney et al. 2004, Table 12). TEA believes that uncertainties in the quantities of CPR
 7 [materials] present in a waste panel and in the extent to which [SO₄²⁻] reduction will occur are
 8 sufficiently great that the Agency-approved safety factor of 1.67 is the minimum that should
 9 be maintained...

10 TEA concludes that the aforementioned DOE study by Kanney et al. (2004) provides useful
 11 information but clearly demonstrates that reductions in the effect of methanogenesis due to the
 12 availability of natural [SO₄²⁻] can have a significant adverse effect on MgO safety factors. TEA
 13 also believes that not all potential sources for natural [SO₄²⁻] to enter the repository were
 14 considered in [the DOE's] analysis and that an acceptable bounding analysis has therefore not been
 15 performed...

16 Furthermore, U.S. EPA (2004, pp. 7-8) concluded that

17 [The] DOE's analysis may be correct but uncertainties remain in the quantities of CPR [materials]
 18 present in a waste panel and in the extent to which sulfate reduction will occur. More [SO₄²⁻] may
 19 be present in the waste or waste area environment than currently estimated. More waste with high
 20 CPR may be placed in a panel than currently anticipated. Because of these uncertainties, [the]
 21 DOE needs to ensure that these uncertainties are accounted for in the calculation of the MgO
 22 safety factor, even if it appears that there is enough MgO for [PA] calculations.

23 Methanogenesis may not occur because of the presence of excess [SO₄²⁻] in the system, so MgO
 24 safety factor calculations need to assume all [C] could be converted to [CO₂] until the Department
 25 provides adequate evidence that methanogenesis is the dominant process...

26 **MgO-6.2.4 Changes since the CRA-2004 in the MgO Excess Factor**

27 In March 2004, the EPA approved the DOE's request to dispose of supercompacted waste in the
 28 WIPP (Marcinowski 2004; Trinity Engineering Associates 2004; U.S. Environmental Protection
 29 Agency 2004). As part of its approval, the EPA specified that the DOE maintain an MgO excess
 30 factor of 1.67, calculated assuming that there would be no microbial methanogenesis in the
 31 repository. The elimination of methanogenesis from consideration in WIPP PA is discussed in
 32 Leigh et al. (2005, Section 2.4) and Cotsworth (2005). In some cases, maintaining an excess
 33 factor of 1.67 has, in turn, required that the DOE emplace additional MgO in place of TRU waste
 34 (Section MgO-2.1.1). Therefore, the DOE continued to explore various possible approaches to
 35 support a PCR for EPA approval of a reduction in the MgO excess factor.

36 **MgO-6.2.4.1 The RSI's Expert Review of the DOE's Use of MgO**

37 In 2005 and 2006, the Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI) of Alexandria, VA, reviewed the
 38 DOE's use of MgO in the WIPP, especially the need to emplace additional MgO in rooms with
 39 supercompacted waste.

40 The RSI carries out studies; assesses regulatory actions; conducts peer reviews of studies by
 41 other organizations; and provides training and other services to federal, state, and local
 42 governments in the biological, chemical, health, and physical sciences, and in all areas of
 43 engineering. The RSI was established in 1985 and received nonprofit status in 1986. From 1989

1 until mid-1995, the RSI operated through the University of Maryland at Baltimore and Temple
2 University in Philadelphia, PA. Since then, the RSI has operated as an independent organization.
3 The RSI has a small in-house staff and utilizes individuals in other organizations, especially for
4 peer reviews (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2008).

5 In 2005, the RSI assembled an expert panel chaired by Edward Abbott, Professor of Chemistry at
6 Montana State University in Bozeman, MT. The other members of this panel were Gudmundur
7 S. (“Bo”) Bodvarsson, Director of the Earth Sciences Division at Lawrence Berkeley National
8 Laboratory in Berkeley, CA; R. Ian Miller, President of the GoldSim Technology Group, LLC,
9 in Issaquah, WA; Dade W. Moeller, President of Dade Moeller and Associates, Inc., and
10 Professor Emeritus at Harvard University in Cambridge, MA; and Richard Wilson, Mallinckrodt
11 Research Professor of Physics at Harvard University. The GoldSim Technology Group, LLC,
12 develops, maintains, and applies the GoldSim software package for decision analysis and PA
13 calculations for radioactive waste repositories and other environmental studies. Dade Moeller
14 and Associates provides services in the environmental and occupational sciences. A. Alan
15 Moghissi, President of the RSI, oversaw the operation of the expert panel during its review.
16 Sorin R. Straja, Vice President for Science and Technology of the RSI, served as the technical
17 secretary for the expert panel.

18 The RSI expert panel met for two days in July 2005 in Carlsbad, NM. Several DOE and DOE-
19 contractor personnel made detailed presentations to the panel on

- 20 1. The methodology used for WIPP PA
- 21 2. The history of engineered barriers in the WIPP disposal system, especially MgO
- 22 3. Aspects of WIPP chemistry and geochemistry related to MgO
- 23 4. Calculation of the MgO excess factor
- 24 5. Preliminary PA calculations pertinent to possible reductions in the amount of excess MgO
25 emplaced in the repository
- 26 6. Possible approaches to support a PCR for EPA approval of a reduction in the MgO excess
27 factor

28 The members of the panel prepared a summary of their initial impressions and identified issues
29 to be addressed at the next meeting (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006).

30 The RSI expert panel met again for two days in September 2005 in Albuquerque, NM. DOE and
31 DOE contractor personnel responded to several issues raised during the first meeting of the
32 panel, including the following:

- 33 1. The history of implementing and using MgO in the WIPP disposal system and its description
34 in WIPP regulatory-compliance documents
- 35 2. MgO-related assumptions in WIPP PA

- 1 3. Issues that arose while scoping PA calculations for possible reductions in the amount of
2 excess MgO
- 3 4. Issues pertinent to the availability of naturally occurring SO_4^{2-} in and around the repository
- 4 5. Possible approaches to support a PCR for EPA approval of a reduction in the MgO excess
5 factor

6 The panel also met in a closed session to discuss a possible PCR (Institute for Regulatory
7 Science [RSI] 2006).

8 Subsequent to the September 2005 meeting, Abbott prepared a set of draft findings and
9 recommendations, which were modified and included in Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI)
10 2006. At the same time, R. Patterson, D. Mercer, T. W. Thompson, and M. B. Gross assembled
11 brief summaries of the WIPP disposal system and its use of MgO as the engineered barrier from
12 previous WIPP regulatory-compliance documents; these summaries also appeared in Institute for
13 Regulatory Science (RSI) 2006. The report of the expert panel also included excerpts from the
14 EPA's regulations related to natural and engineered barriers in the WIPP (Institute for
15 Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006).

16 The RSI expert panel reported nine findings. The first three findings dealt with possible
17 generation of CO_2 from microbial consumption of CPR materials in the WIPP.

18 The first question posed to the panel ("Criterion 1") was, "Is the assumption that *cellulosic*
19 materials [in TRU waste] could be consumed by microbes, under conditions prevailing at WIPP,
20 consistent with scientific and engineering principles, standards, and practices?" (Institute for
21 Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, p. 19).

22 In response to this question, the Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI) (2006, p. 19) found

23 The assumption that *cellulosic* materials [the RSI's italics] could be consumed by microbes under
24 conditions prevailing at WIPP is consistent with scientific and engineering principles, standards,
25 and practices. Because a small portion of the material will be incorporated into the microbial
26 biomass, biodegradation is unlikely to reach 100%. An extensive review by staff members ... led
27 to the conclusion that communities of halophilic, fermentative, and methanogenic are potentially
28 capable of metabolizing cellulosic materials, under expected WIPP conditions.

29 The biodegradation of cellulosic materials could progress under at least two scenarios:

- 30 1. During the initial phases of emplacement of waste at WIPP when $[\text{O}_2]$ is available; and
- 31 2. As a consequence of human intrusion that resulted in brine reaching and interacting with
32 the waste.

33 However, the RSI expert panel also agreed with two of the conclusions reached by the U.S.
34 National Academy of Sciences' Committee on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (National Research
35 Council [NRC] Committee on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 1996 and 2001), which RSI
36 (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, p. 19) stated as

37 Two committees of the National Research Council (NRC, 1996; 2001) came to the conclusion that

- 1 1. The biodegradation of cellulosic materials is expected to be minimal; but
- 2 2. For that portion that does undergo biodegradation, the rate is expected to be maximum
- 3 3 during the pre-closure period.

4 Finally, the RSI expert panel stated that they “made no attempt to independently quantify the
5 extent and rate of biodegradation of *cellulosic* materials” (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI]
6 2006, p. 10).

7 The second question posed to the panel (“Criterion 2”) was, “Is the assumption that *plastic*
8 materials ... in TRU waste could be consumed by microbes, under conditions prevailing at
9 WIPP, consistent with scientific and engineering principles, standards, and practices?” (Institute
10 for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, p. 10).

11 In response, the Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI) (2006, pp. 10–11) found

12 The assumption that *plastic* materials [the RSI’s italics] will be completely metabolized by
13 microbes under conditions prevailing at WIPP is not consistent with scientific and engineering
14 principles, standards, and practices. However, partial metabolization of such materials is possible,
15 but if it occurs at all, then its rate and extent of reaction is expected to be significantly lower than
16 that for cellulosic materials. Under WIPP conditions, neither thermo-oxidation nor photo-
17 oxidation can occur, and therefore the biodegradation of polymers, such as polyethylene, will be
18 highly unlikely. It is of particular interest to note that, in its regulations [U.S. EPA, 1992a,
19 p. 54,460; U.S. EPA, 1992b, p. 54,461], the EPA ... defined the following polymers as
20 nonbiodegradable:

- 21 • polyethylene,
- 22 • high density polyethylene (HDPE),
- 23 • polypropylene, polystyrene,
- 24 • polyurethane,
- 25 • polyacrylate,
- 26 • polynorborene,
- 27 • polyisobutylene,
- 28 • ground synthetic rubber,
- 29 • cross-linked allylstyrene,
- 30 • tertiary butyl copolymers.

31 The EPA regulations, cited above, which were developed as an outgrowth of experience with land
32 disposal facilities, as well as laboratory studies, involved significant public participation.

33 The rate of biodegradation of a polymer depends on the mechanism of degradation; its structure;
34 and the presence of the required microbial populations and environmental conditions that enhance
35 their growth. Although the understanding of polymer degradation is limited, there is sufficient
36 information indicating that critical parameters include oxygen, temperature, and water.

1 In recent years there has been an increasing recognition of a need to develop polymers that would
2 be biodegradable. Through modifications, such as changing the chemical structure of certain
3 plastic materials so as to initiate and accelerate the biodegradation process, this goal has been
4 achieved. In fact, many polymers on the market today, that heretofore were considered not to be
5 subject to biodegradation, are now degradable. However, the polymers likely to be disposed at
6 WIPP are not expected to belong to the new classes of biodegradable polymers. In addition, any
7 biodegradable polymers that may have been present in the initial TRU waste should have been
8 biodegraded by the time it was disposed at WIPP.

9 On the basis of the information that was provided, the [RSI expert panel] concluded that the
10 fraction of plastics that is expected to be biodegraded under the conditions existing within the
11 WIPP is small. This conclusion is consistent with the assessment of the NRC (2001) and the
12 regulatory decisions of the EPA. However, the [RSI expert panel] made no attempt to
13 independently quantify the extent and the rate of biodegradation of *plastic* materials [the RSI's
14 italics].

15 The third question ("Criterion 3") was, "Is the assumption that *rubber* materials will be
16 consumed by microbes, under the conditions prevailing at WIPP, consistent with scientific and
17 engineering principles, standards, and practices?" (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006,
18 p. 11).

19 The Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI) (2006, pp. 11–12) found

20 The assumption that commercial *rubber* materials [the RSI's italics] will be completely
21 metabolized by microbes, under conditions prevailing at WIPP, is not consistent with scientific
22 and engineering principles, standards, and practices. The extent of biodegradation of rubber
23 materials, if it occurs, is likely to be significantly lower than that for plastic materials, and very
24 much less than that for cellulosic materials.

25 Raw *natural* rubber [the RSI's italics] obtained from the latex of *Hevea brasiliensis* trees, contains
26 more than 90% poly(cis-1,4-isoprene). The remaining constituents include proteins, lipids,
27 carbohydrates, resins, and inorganic salts. Raw *synthetic* rubber [the RSI's italics] consists
28 essentially of poly(cis-1,4-isoprene) rubber with the addition of antioxidants to prevent ageing.
29 The monomer units of natural rubber contain unsaturated bonds that are susceptible to thermo-
30 oxidative degradation, attack by ozone, or degradation by [ultraviolet]-light. In contrast, the
31 synthetic alternatives to the natural rubber can withstand elevated temperatures for long times
32 even under relatively aggressive conditions. Commercial rubber (natural or synthetic) is usually
33 vulcanized (crosslinked) by heating in the presence of sulfur. The lack of biodegradability of
34 commercial rubber products is the consequence of inhibition of the oxidation process by
35 antioxidants.

36 On the basis of the information that was provided, the [RSI expert panel] concluded that the
37 fraction of rubber that is expected to be biodegraded under the conditions existing within the
38 WIPP is small. The conclusion is consistent with the assessment of the NRC (2001) and the
39 regulatory decisions of the EPA. However, the level and the rate of biodegradation of *rubber*
40 materials [the RSI's italics], as small as they may be, were not independently quantified by [the
41 RSI expert panel].

42 The fourth finding of the RSI expert panel dealt with the performance of MgO in the WIPP. The
43 fourth question ("Criterion 4") was, "Under conditions prevailing at WIPP, is the assumption
44 that all the MgO, as presently emplaced, will be available to react with CO₂ consistent with
45 scientific and engineering principles, standards, and practices?" (Institute for Regulatory Science
46 [RSI] 2006, p. 12).

1 The Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI) (2006, pp. 12-13) found

2 Under conditions prevailing at WIPP, [the RSI expert panel] has concluded that the assumption
3 that 100% of the MgO will be available to react with CO₂ is not consistent with scientific and
4 engineering principles, standards, and practices.

5 The processes that will occur in the emplacement rooms are very complex. They will involve the
6 interplay of multiple processes, including the mechanical creep of the salt formation; the
7 development of a gaseous phase consisting mostly of CO₂; and the gradual inflow of brine from
8 the surrounding saturated salt. These processes will likely result in a very heterogeneous
9 hydrological and chemical environment within the emplacement rooms. Although hydrological
10 and chemical gradients in the gas and liquid phases within the rooms will tend to equilibrate
11 thermodynamic and chemical conditions, local pockets of unreacted MgO are likely to be present
12 for long periods of time. For these reasons, the [RSI expert panel] believes that 100% reaction of
13 the MgO with CO₂ is not likely to occur. Nonetheless, the [RSI expert panel] has concluded that
14 most of the MgO will be active in chemical reactions.

15 The fifth and sixth findings of the RSI expert panel involved the performance of the WIPP in the
16 hypothetical absence of MgO. (The DOE has never requested that the EPA approve eliminating
17 MgO from the WIPP, only that the EPA approve reducing the amount of excess MgO that the
18 DOE must emplace.)

19 The fifth question (“Criterion 5”) was, “Assuming that only cellulosic materials are consumed by
20 microbes, is it consistent with scientific and engineering principles, standards, and practices to
21 conclude that, in the absence of MgO, the solubility of actinides will be such that releases to the
22 accessible environment will still be below the EPA limits?” (Institute for Regulatory Science
23 [RSI] 2006, p. 13).

24 The Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI) (2006, p. 13) found

25 “On the basis of the information received by the [RSI expert panel], it is likely that releases to the
26 accessible environment will be below the EPA regulatory limits. However, the evidence received
27 by the [RSI expert panel] is not sufficient to definitely support this conclusion.

28 The sixth question (“Criterion 6”) was, “Assuming that all cellulosic, plastic and rubber
29 materials are consumed by microbes, is it consistent with scientific and engineering principles,
30 standards, and practices to conclude that, in the absence of MgO, the solubility of the actinides
31 will be such that releases to the accessible environment will still be below the EPA limits?”
32 (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, p. 13).

33 The Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI) (2006, pp. 13–14) found

34 On the basis of the information received by the [RSI expert panel], it is likely that releases to the
35 accessible environment will be below the EPA regulatory limits. However, the evidence received
36 by the [RSI expert panel] is not sufficient to definitely support this conclusion.

37 The seventh criterion and finding dealt with the application of “acceptable knowledge” to the
38 characterization of the concentrations of CPR materials in TRU waste, and will not be discussed
39 herein.

1 The eighth question (“Criterion 8”) was, “Is the requirement to emplace a 67% MgO excess
2 consistent with as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) scientific and engineering principles,
3 standards, and practices? Is the associated increased and real risk to the affected workers and the
4 general public imposed by this requirement offset by the potentially reduced risk to future
5 generations?” (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, p. 15).

6 The Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI) (2006, p. 15) found

7 In reference to Finding 4, the [RSI expert panel] has concluded that most of the MgO will be
8 available for chemical reaction. In reference to Findings 1-3, the [RSI expert panel] has concluded
9 that only a small fraction of the CPR materials is likely to be biodegraded to produce CO₂. In
10 reference to Findings 5-6, the [RSI expert panel] believed that it is likely that the EPA release
11 standards would be met, even if the amount of MgO is less than the quantity required to consume
12 all the CO₂ produced. Therefore, the [RSI expert panel] concludes that 67% MgO excess (i.e.,
13 67% in excess of the stoichiometric quantity required assuming complete biodegradation of
14 CPR materials to CO₂) is not necessary.

15 The ninth criterion and finding dealt with whether it would be reasonable for the DOE to
16 convene another expert panel to “reach a consensus on the potential extent of consumption of
17 various components of CPR materials” and, if so, if other issues should be considered. The RSI
18 expert panel’s response to this criterion is included below in the discussion of its
19 recommendations.

20 The Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI) (2006, p. 16) made two recommendations:

- 21 1. The DOE should consider convening an Expert Elicitation Panel to provide a more
22 realistic and accurate estimate of the potential extent of biodegradation of various
23 components of CPR materials likely to be emplaced in the WIPP.
- 24 2. The DOE should consider performing a single-room realistic analysis of the complex
25 processes involved, including gas generation, chemical reactions, biodegradation, and
26 mechanical creep.

27 In its ninth finding, the RSI expert panel recommended that, in addition to providing “more
28 realistic and accurate estimate[s]” of the fractions of the CPR materials that would be consumed
29 by microbial activity in the WIPP, the expert elicitation panel should also estimate the “fraction
30 of the emplaced MgO [that] is likely to react with the CO₂” and “the performance consequences
31 of a partial or complete shortfall in MgO buffering capacity” (Institute for Regulatory Science
32 [RSI] 2006, p. 16).

33 The RSI expert panel did not provide any details on how the DOE should perform “a single-
34 room realistic analysis of the complex processes involved” in the WIPP.

35 **MgO-6.2.4.2 The DOE’s PCR for EPA Approval of Reducing the MgO Excess Factor** 36 **from 1.67 to 1.2**

37 In April 2006, the DOE submitted a PCR for EPA approval of reducing the MgO excess factor
38 from 1.67 to 1.2 (Moody 2006). To justify its request, the DOE used reasoned arguments
39 regarding health-related transportation risks to the public, the cost of emplacing MgO, and the

1 uncertainties inherent in predicting the extent of microbial consumption of CPR materials during
2 the 10,000-year WIPP regulatory period.

3 The EPA responded by requesting that the “DOE needs to address the uncertainties related to
4 MgO effectiveness, the size of the uncertainties, and the potential impact of the uncertainties on
5 long-term performance” (Gitlin 2006). In particular, the EPA instructed the DOE to identify all
6 of the uncertainties related to the calculation of the MgO excess factor, and quantify these
7 uncertainties, if possible.

8 **MgO-6.2.4.3 The EPA’s Review of the Consumption of CPR Materials in the WIPP and** 9 **Its Effects on the MgO Excess Factor**

10 As the DOE began to address the uncertainties related to the MgO excess factor, S. Cohen and
11 Associates (SCA) carried out a review of the possible consumption of CPR materials in the
12 WIPP for the EPA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006). The objectives of this report were the
13 following:

14 [T]o identify specific technical questions that must be answered and uncertainties that must be
15 addressed before EPA can consider changing the amounts of MgO backfill that must be placed in
16 the repository to maintain the effectiveness of the engineered barrier. Therefore, a preliminary
17 review of the available data relevant to a number of issues related to the MgO backfill was carried
18 out. This review included chemistry-related issues such as the potential CO₂-generating microbial
19 degradation reactions that could occur within the repository, the extent to which these reactions
20 could occur, and the reactivity of MgO in the repository environment. These issues were
21 addressed by consulting the available scientific literature, including data generated by the WIPP
22 program and a survey of other relevant information. The possibility of conducting experiments to
23 better define the reaction rates and possible extent of the microbial degradation reactions was also
24 considered. Regulatory requirements related to engineered barriers in the WIPP and ways in
25 which uncertainties must be addressed were evaluated as well, and are summarized in this report
26 [SCA, 2006, pp. 1-1 to 1-2].

27 In addition, the SCA report (S. Cohen and Associates 2006) responded to the findings and
28 recommendations of the RSI expert panel, and to its assessment of the EPA regulations relevant
29 to MgO.

30 In its first three findings, the RSI expert panel stated that “[t]he assumption that *cellulosic*
31 materials could be consumed by microbes under conditions prevailing at WIPP is consistent with
32 scientific and engineering principles, standards, and practices” (Institute for Regulatory Science
33 [RSI] 2006, p. 9), but that the fraction of plastic and rubber materials “that is expected to be
34 biodegraded under the conditions existing within the WIPP is small” (Institute for Regulatory
35 Science [RSI] 2006, pp. 11 and 12). With regard to the RSI expert panel’s first three findings,
36 SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006, p. 4-2) stated

37 The rates and extent of CPR degradation during the 10,000-year WIPP regulatory period are likely
38 to be influenced by the following:

- 39 • Composition of the CPR materials
- 40 • Microbial population

- 1 • Chemical and physical environment, including the quantity and salinity of the repository
- 2 brines, redox conditions, pH, and temperature
- 3 • Radiation dose to the CPR materials and associated brines
- 4 • Interactions of different processes.

5 SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006, pp. 4-2 through 4-8) reviewed some of the literature
 6 pertaining to these factors. SCA described its review as “preliminary.” It then reviewed results
 7 obtained by the WIPP project and results in the literature pertaining to the possible microbial
 8 consumption of CPR materials (S. Cohen and Associates 2006, pp. 4-8 through 4-18).

9 With regard to the possible extent of microbial consumption of cellulosic materials in the WIPP,
 10 SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006, pp. 4-11 through 4-12) stated

11 A number of factors contribute to the high likelihood that cellulose will be completely degraded
 12 in the WIPP repository. These factors include the variety of microorganisms that can degrade
 13 cellulosic materials, the general adaptability of microbes to their environment and available [C]
 14 sources, the abundant [SO₄²⁻] in the repository, and the long regulatory time period.

15 Although relatively little data appear to be available regarding the chemical effects of radiation on
 16 cellulose, it appears low-level radiation may decrease polymer chain length and alter physical and
 17 chemical properties of cellulose. It is expected that radiation-induced degradation of cellulose in
 18 the WIPP will occur through direct and indirect interaction with ionizing radiation from
 19 radionuclides in the waste. The direct interactions, which are interactions of the ionizing radiation
 20 with the solid cellulose, initiate scissions on the backbone of the molecules leading to degradation;
 21 however, a very small yield of branching also can occur. The presence of oxygen in the repository
 22 environment is not required for these scission reactions. Indirect interactions will occur through
 23 the radiolysis of water. As mentioned above in Section 4.1.4, the radiolysis of water produces
 24 hydroxyl radicals (•OH). Hydroxyl radicals can cause hydrolytic cleavage of glycoside linkages in
 25 cellulose, which would be expected to facilitate microbial degradation.

26 Although some radiation-induced effects could act to limit cellulose biodegradation, on balance,
 27 the overall effects of radiation on cellulose appear to increase the likelihood of microbial
 28 degradation of cellulose through cleavage of the polymer backbone and decreased molecular
 29 weight. The available literature appears to indicate that microbial and radiation-induced
 30 degradation of cellulose may proceed virtually to completion over 10,000 years if water is
 31 present in the WIPP repository.

32 With regard to the possible extent of microbial consumption of plastic materials, SCA (S. Cohen
 33 and Associates 2006, p. 4-15) stated

34 Literature data are available regarding both microbial degradation and radiation-induced
 35 degradation of plastics such as polyethylene and [polyvinylchloride]. Microbial degradation of
 36 plastics generally is less extensive in the short term than microbial degradation of cellulosic
 37 materials, based on the data identified in the literature. Radiolytic processes may degrade plastics
 38 directly, and also may indirectly contribute to the long-term biodegradability of plastics by
 39 altering their chemical and physical properties. The likelihood of significant radiolytic effects on
 40 plastics degradation would depend on the dose. The dose to WIPP waste can be calculated from
 41 the DOE’s inventory projections (Leigh and Trone 2005). The presence of oxygen in the
 42 repository before closure and for a period of time after closure could affect both radiolytic and
 43 microbial processes. This preliminary evaluation of the data indicates that plastic degradation may
 44 occur over 10,000 years in the WIPP repository.

1 SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006, pp. 3-4 through 3-6) also responded to the RSI expert
2 panel's statement in its second finding (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, pp. 10–11)
3 that the EPA had defined polymers such as polyethylene, HDPE, and polypropylene as
4 nonbiodegradable:

5 RSI (2006) cited EPA's RCRA [Resource Conservation and Recovery Act] regulations at 40 CFR
6 264.314 and 40 CFR 265.314 to support the contention that 'the fraction of plastics that is
7 expected to be biodegraded under conditions existing within the WIPP is small' (Finding 2). For
8 example, 40 CFR 264.314 lists a number of high molecular weight polymers, such as
9 polyethylene, polypropylene, and ground synthetic rubber, as non-biodegradable sorbents to
10 sequester free liquids prior to disposal in surface hazardous landfills. EPA has listed in its *Federal*
11 *Register* notice 'Final Rule Regarding Liquids in Hazardous Waste Landfills' [U.S. EPA, 1992a;
12 1992b] on November 18, 1992, of certain high-density polymers as non-biodegradable sorbents in
13 RCRA landfills. The *Federal Register* notice did not, however, provide any background
14 information supporting the contention that such high molecular weight polymers were non-
15 biodegradable. The Agency merely stated that such materials 'have proved to be highly resistant
16 to biodegradation.' In an earlier *Federal Register* notice of June 1987, when EPA first proposed
17 the use of high-molecular weight polymers as nonbiodegradable sorbents, the notice stated the
18 following [U.S. EPA, 1987, p. 23,696]:

19 *[T]he Agency now believes that a different criterion should be used to determine*
20 *if an organic polymer is biodegradable. The Agency proposes to determine this*
21 *alternative criterion by using tests which involve incubating the absorbent*
22 *materials with prepared stock cultures of various microorganisms under ideal*
23 *conditions for their growth. This incubation demonstrates the fungal resistance*
24 *of polymers and is used by the American Society for ... Testing [and] Materials*
25 *laboratory test ASTM Method G21-70... [SCA's italics].*

26 The relevance of the fact that certain plastics and rubbers are defined as non-biodegradable for use
27 as sorbents in RCRA surface landfills to the assumption that such materials are nonbiodegradable
28 in the context of the WIPP environment is questionable based on the following considerations:

- 29 • Under 40 CFR 264.117, post-closure monitoring is limited to 30 years unless extended by the
30 EPA Regional Administrator, while at the WIPP, regulatory compliance must be
31 demonstrated through PA for 10,000 years.
- 32 • Under 40 CFR 264.314, EPA offers three tests to demonstrate that materials not specifically
33 listed as non-biodegradable sorbents in §264.314(e)(1)(i) and (ii) can be used as non-
34 biodegradable sorbents. Two of the tests are American Society for Testing and Materials
35 (ASTM) procedures and one is an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
36 (OECD) procedure. In 1995, EPA decided to add the OECD test to §264.314(e)(2) as
37 described in its *Federal Register* notice [U.S. EPA, 1995]. In the *Federal Register* notice,
38 EPA noted that:

39 *[T]he OECD [T]est 301B is a test for biodegradability in an aerobic*
40 *environment, as are the two ASTM tests that were promulgated in the November*
41 *18, 1992 rule. The Agency also recognizes that the actual environment in which*
42 *the sorbents will be used, i.e., in a container in a landfill, will be anaerobic. The*
43 *Agency does not know, however, of any published widely accepted tests for the*
44 *biodegradability of materials in anaerobic conditions that would be practical*
45 *for purposes of this rule. The Agency believes, however, that OECD 301B is an*
46 *acceptable surrogate for determining if a sorbent will biodegrade in*
47 *containerized liquids in a hazardous waste landfill [SCA's italics].*

1 The environment in the WIPP will become anaerobic shortly after closure and will remain so
2 throughout the regulatory period. Therefore, the assumption that high molecular weight
3 polymers will not biodegrade may not be valid at WIPP.

- 4 • While materials may be judged functionally as non-biodegradable sorbents in RCRA surface
5 landfills, they can achieve that functionality even if limited biodegradation actually occurs. In
6 the WIPP, on the other hand, at least one mol of MgO backfill must be provided for each mol
7 of CO₂ generated from CPR decomposition. This places a greater burden on defining
8 quantitatively the extent to which biodegradation occurs at the WIPP.

9 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) definition of some plastic sorbents as
10 nonbiodegradable is based mainly on observations over relatively short time frames and testing
11 in aerobic environments. These conditions do not appear relevant to the long-term WIPP
12 environment or regulatory period of performance. Therefore, the RCRA definition of some
13 plastic sorbents as nonbiodegradable appears to have essentially no relevance to the
14 determination of whether plastic and rubber materials are likely to be substantially biodegraded
15 in the WIPP repository.

16 With respect to the possible extent of microbial consumption of rubber materials, SCA (S. Cohen
17 and Associates 2006, p. 4-18) stated

18 Available WIPP and literature data indicate that rubber materials likely to be present in the WIPP
19 repository will be partially degraded by microbes. Radiation appears to affect both the physical
20 and chemical properties of rubber, and in WIPP experiments appeared to enhance microbial
21 degradation. The presence of oxygen in the repository before closure and immediately after
22 closure could affect the physical and chemical properties of the rubber. This preliminary
23 evaluation of the data indicates that rubber degradation may occur over 10,000 years in the WIPP
24 repository.

25 The RSI expert panel's fourth finding was that, "100% reaction of the MgO with CO₂ is not
26 likely to occur. Nonetheless ... most of the MgO will be active in chemical reactions" (Institute
27 for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, p. 13). SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006, p. 5-1) agreed
28 with this finding:

29 Review of the available information related to MgO reactivity indicates that MgO is likely to react
30 in the repository to control CO₂ concentrations in the brine. However, it is possible that a small
31 fraction of the MgO could become unavailable for reaction because of physical segregation. This
32 relatively small source of uncertainty has been adequately accounted for by using an MgO safety
33 factor greater than one.

34 With regard to the RSI expert panel's fourth finding, SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006,
35 p. 6-1) also stated

36 [T]he MgO backfill is likely to perform as designed and control brine pH and CO₂ concentrations
37 in the repository. Incomplete reaction of the MgO with brine and CO₂ is unlikely to occur unless
38 the MgO is physically segregated from the brine or CO₂; if such physical segregation should
39 occur, the effective MgO safety factor would be decreased by a commensurate amount. The
40 recent changes in MgO placement methods, with a constant safety factor calculated for each
41 disposal room, limit the potential effects of inhomogeneous distribution of CPR in the waste, and
42 are likely to minimize the uncertainties associated with possible physical segregation of the MgO
43 from brine and CO₂. However, the small remaining uncertainty related to physical segregation
44 should be addressed by the MgO safety factor.

1 The RSI expert panel’s fifth and sixth findings, which responded to the question, “Assuming that
 2 only cellulosic materials [or all of the CPR materials] are consumed by microbes, is it consistent
 3 with scientific and engineering principles, standards, and practices to conclude that, in the
 4 absence of MgO, the solubility of actinides will be such that releases to the accessible
 5 environment will still be below the EPA limits?” (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006,
 6 p. 13), were that: “On the basis of the information received by the [RSI expert panel], it is likely
 7 that releases to the accessible environment will be below the EPA regulatory limits. However,
 8 the evidence received by the [RSI expert panel] is not sufficient to definitely support this
 9 conclusion” (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, pp. 13–14).

10 SCA did not specifically address whether, in the absence of MgO, the WIPP would continue to
 11 meet the EPA’s containment requirements, given microbial consumption of cellulosic materials,
 12 or microbial consumption of all of the CPR materials. However, SCA (S. Cohen and Associates
 13 2006, p. 3-4) stated

14 The use of at least one engineered barrier at WIPP is required by 40 CFR 194.44 to ‘prevent or
 15 substantially delay the movement of water or radionuclides toward the accessible environment.’
 16 For the CCA, DOE identified and EPA approved MgO backfill in the disposal rooms as the only
 17 WIPP engineered barrier (DOE 1996[b]). MgO backfill was designed to maintain alkaline pH and
 18 mitigate the effects of CO₂ generation in the disposal rooms, thereby controlling actinide
 19 solubilities in intruding brines ([U.S.] EPA 1997). The inclusion of MgO backfill as an
 20 engineered barrier remained unchanged for the CRA, although the required safety factor and
 21 backfill emplacement strategy have changed since the CCA....

22 Furthermore, in response to a recommendation by the NRC (2001) that “The committee
 23 recommends that the net benefit of MgO used as backfill be reevaluated. The option to
 24 discontinue emplacement of MgO should be considered,” SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006,
 25 p. 3-1) stated that

26 Removing the MgO backfill from the repository design will likely affect predictions of gas
 27 generation and actinide solubilities. Additional information would be necessary before EPA could
 28 consider elimination of, or significant modifications to, the MgO backfill. EPA regulations
 29 require assurance requirements (40 CFR 191.14), including an engineered barrier, to compensate
 30 for uncertainties in the prediction of future repository performance and provide increased
 31 confidence in the disposal system. The MgO backfill is the only engineered barrier in the WIPP
 32 repository and an engineered barrier is required by regulation....

33 The RSI expert panel’s seventh finding, which dealt with the application of “acceptable
 34 knowledge” to the characterization of the concentrations of CPR materials in TRU waste, and
 35 SCA’s response to this finding are not discussed herein.

36 In its eighth finding, the RSI expert panel stated that “[a] 67% MgO ... is not necessary”
 37 (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, p. 15). SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006,
 38 p. 5-1) responded by stating that

39 In the original certification review (EPA 1997), EPA accepted MgO as the only engineered barrier
 40 (40 CFR 194.44). This acceptance was predicated on the assumption that MgO was necessary to
 41 control chemical conditions in disposal rooms. [U.S.] EPA (1997) also stated that excess MgO,
 42 i.e., the MgO safety factor, was a conservative measure, an assurance requirement, necessary to
 43 overcome the uncertainty associated with predicting the expected future(s) of the WIPP disposal
 44 system. The engineered barrier is of critical importance because of a number of uncertainties

1 associated with repository performance over the long regulatory time period. Assuming that all
 2 CPR [C] could be converted to CO₂ was a conservative assumption associated with the engineered
 3 barrier's performance. If this conservative assumption is no longer included in the determination
 4 of the MgO safety factor, the potential significance of other uncertainties would increase, such as
 5 those related to CPR inventory, CPR degradation rates and extents, and the possible physical
 6 segregation of small amounts of MgO. The MgO safety factor must account for these
 7 uncertainties in the absence of conservative assumptions regarding the extent of CPR degradation
 8 to form CO₂. Because of the importance of the MgO backfill, an understanding of the potential
 9 effects of a shortfall would be necessary before the technical feasibility of significantly reducing
 10 the MgO safety factor could be assessed.

11 In its summary and conclusions, SCA listed “a number of potential technical issues ... related to
 12 whether the amount of MgO placed in the repository can be reduced without affecting repository
 13 safety” (S. Cohen and Associates 2006, p. 6-1). These included (1) the availability of MgO,
 14 which could be reduced by the possible physical segregation of small quantities of MgO from
 15 brine; (2) uncertainties in the quantities of CPR materials in the inventory; and (3) the extent of
 16 microbial consumption of CPR materials during the 10,000-year regulatory period.

17 SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006, pp. 6-1 to 6-2) also identified several issues that could
 18 affect the possible extent of microbial consumption of CPR materials. These included the
 19 following:

- 20 1. The adaptability of microbes to different substrates and environments
- 21 2. The short-term effects of microbial consumption of CPR materials by aerobic bacteria and
 22 fungi
- 23 3. The short-term effects of α radiolysis of CPR materials (i.e., radiolysis under oxic
 24 conditions) on the biodegradability of these materials
- 25 4. The length of time that molecular oxygen (O₂) will be present
- 26 5. The long-term effects of α radiolysis of CPR materials (i.e., radiolysis under anoxic
 27 conditions) on the biodegradability of these materials
- 28 6. The long-term, integrated radiation dose to CPR materials
- 29 7. Uncertainties associated with the predicted availability of brine in the repository

30 In its ninth finding and its first recommendation, the RSI expert panel stated that (1) “[t]he DOE
 31 should consider convening an Expert Elicitation Panel to provide a more realistic and accurate
 32 estimate of the potential extent of biodegradation of various components of CPR materials likely
 33 to be emplaced in the WIPP”; (2) the Expert Elicitation Panel should estimate the “fraction of
 34 the emplaced MgO [that] is likely to react with the CO₂”; and (3) that the Expert Elicitation
 35 Panel should estimate “the performance consequences of a partial or complete shortfall in MgO
 36 buffering capacity” (Institute for Regulatory Science [RSI] 2006, p. 16). SCA (S. Cohen and
 37 Associates 2006, p. 3-4), responded

1 Requirements related to the elicitation of expert judgment for use in compliance applications are
2 provided in 40 CFR 194.26. With regard to the circumstances under which expert judgment can
3 be used for compliance applications, the regulation states [40 CFR 194.26(a)]:

4 *Expert judgment, by an individual expert or panel of experts, may be used to*
5 *support any compliance application, provided that expert judgment does not*
6 *substitute for information that could reasonably be obtained through data*
7 *collection or experimentation [SCA's italics].*

8 In its summary and conclusions, SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2006, pp. 6-2 through 6-3) went
9 on to describe the “information that could reasonably be obtained through data collection or
10 experimentation” with regard to the possible extent of microbial consumption of CPR materials:

11 The results of the preliminary review described in this report indicate that cellulose may be
12 completely degraded in the repository environment over the 10,000-year regulatory period. The
13 preliminary review of information regarding the possible extent of plastics and rubber degradation
14 in the repository is less conclusive; therefore, additional literature review and experimental
15 investigations may be necessary to determine the likely extent of radiolytic and microbial
16 degradation of plastics and rubber during the 10,000-year regulatory period. Processes likely to
17 affect waste during use, storage, transport, and the early disposal period include degradation by
18 aerobic bacteria and fungi, and radiolysis in the presence of [O₂]. Estimation of the length of time
19 [O₂] will persist in the repository and the radiation doses to waste could be used to determine the
20 likely effects of these processes. Although these processes may not significantly affect short-term
21 rates and extents of degradation of CPR, their effects could influence mechanisms, rates, and
22 extents of CPR degradation over the long WIPP regulatory time period. The available literature
23 should be reviewed to determine whether these early degradation processes and long-term
24 radiolysis under anaerobic conditions are likely to make CPR more susceptible to microbial
25 degradation in the longer-term anaerobic WIPP environment.

26 Any assessment of the extents of degradation of CPR should include an estimation of associated
27 uncertainties, which should be incorporated in the MgO safety factor. These estimated
28 uncertainties should reflect all possible physical and chemical processes that might occur over
29 10,000 years including:

- 30 • The adaptability of microbes to different substrates and environments
- 31 • Potential physical segregation of small quantities of MgO from brine
- 32 • CPR inventory uncertainties
- 33 • Effects of short-term aerobic radiolysis and biodegradation reactions on long-term microbial
34 degradation of CPR
- 35 • Effects of long-term anaerobic radiolytic processes on CPR biodegradation
- 36 • Uncertainties associated with the predicted availability of brine in the repository

37 EPA regulations require that expert judgment should not be substituted for available experimental
38 data or data that could be obtained from a reasonable set of experiments (40 CFR 194.26). The
39 results of this review have indicated that literature describing experimental data is available that
40 might be used to reduce the uncertainties associated with the extent of CPR degradation in the
41 WIPP repository and improve understanding of WIPP's future performance. Consequently, use of
42 expert judgment to assess the likely extents of CPR degradation in the WIPP repository may not
43 be justified at this time and would require adequate justification by DOE. If the use of expert
44 judgment is justified, this judgment should include not only the likely extents of CPR degradation,
45 but also the associated uncertainties, taking into account the factors listed above.

1 A more extensive evaluation of the available WIPP and non-WIPP literature should be carried out
2 to determine whether the data are sufficient for estimating the likely extent of CPR degradation
3 during the 10,000-year regulatory period, or whether experiments might be designed to determine
4 the probable extents of degradation of the various materials over this long regulatory time period.
5 The goal of the literature review and experimental studies would be to adequately quantify or
6 capture system uncertainties, including both the uncertainties associated with the quantities of
7 CPR in the repository and the chemical uncertainties related to the CPR degradation reactions and
8 reactions of the MgO backfill. Sufficient excess MgO (an adequate safety factor) needs to be
9 emplaced in each disposal room to compensate for the range of uncertainties related to CPR
10 degradation and the effective performance of the MgO engineered barrier, thereby ensuring
11 WIPP's expected safe performance in the future.

12 Finally, SCA noted that the RSI expert panel recommended that “[t]he DOE should consider
13 performing a single-room realistic analysis of the complex processes involved, including gas
14 generation, chemical reactions, biodegradation, and mechanical creep” (Institute for Regulatory
15 Science [RSI] 2006, p. 16). However, SCA did not comment on this recommendation.

16 **MgO-6.2.4.4 The DOE's Assessment of the Uncertainties Related to the MgO Excess** 17 **Factor**

18 The DOE carried out an analysis (Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner 2006) and several supporting
19 analyses (Brush and Roselle 2006; Brush et al. 2006; Clayton and Nemer 2006; Deng et al. 2006;
20 Kanney and Vugrin 2006; Kirchner and Vugrin 2006) to respond to the EPA's request for
21 additional information on “the uncertainties related to MgO effectiveness, the size of the
22 uncertainties, and the potential impact of the uncertainties on long-term performance” (Gitlin
23 2006).

24 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, p. 2) defined the MgO effective excess factor as “a quantity
25 that incorporates uncertainties into the current definition of the MgO excess factor.” The results
26 of the supporting analyses cited above were used to quantify these uncertainties whenever
27 possible and incorporate them in the effective excess factor.

28 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, p. 8) recognized four categories of uncertainties that could
29 affect the MgO effective excess factor:

- 30 1. Uncertainties in the quantities of CPR materials that will be consumed during the 10,000-
31 year WIPP regulatory period
- 32 2. Uncertainties in the number of moles of CO₂ produced per mole of organic C in CPR
33 materials (i.e., the CO₂ yield)
- 34 3. Uncertainties in the quantity of MgO that will be available to consume CO₂
- 35 4. Uncertainties in the number of moles of CO₂ consumed per mole of available MgO

36 Although Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Appendix A) reviewed previous discussions of the
37 uncertainties inherent in predicting the extent of microbial consumption of CPR materials in
38 10,000 years (Brush 1995; Gillow and Francis 2003; Brush 2004; the CRA-2004, Appendix
39 BARRIERS), they did not attempt to incorporate them in the MgO effective excess factor.

1 Therefore, they used the conservative assumption that microbes will consume 100% of the CPR
2 materials to calculate the MgO effective excess factor.

3 **MgO-6.2.4.4.1 Uncertainties in the CO₂ Yield From Microbial Consumption of CPR** 4 **Materials**

5 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 4) included two sources of the uncertainties inherent
6 in predicting the CO₂ yield per mole of organic C in CPR materials: (1) uncertainty in the
7 quantities of CPR materials emplaced in WIPP disposal rooms, and (2) uncertainty as to the
8 microbial respiratory pathways involved in consumption of the CPR materials (see Section
9 MgO-6.1).

10 Kirchner and Vugrin (2006) quantified the uncertainties in the estimates of the quantities of CPR
11 materials emplaced in WIPP disposal rooms. Their analysis was based on the differences
12 between the masses of CPR materials measured by real-time radiography (RTR) and visual
13 examination (VE), paired by waste container. They assumed that the VE measurements were the
14 more accurate values and, because they observed no significant bias in the RTR measurements,
15 that the sum of the RTR measurements best estimate the true value of the CPR material quantity
16 in a room. Kirchner and Vugrin (2006) then used Monte Carlo methods “to simulate potential
17 errors in the RTR measurements and to construct a distribution representing the uncertainty in
18 the ... CPR [materials] in a room” and concluded “that the uncertainty [standard deviation] on
19 the total mass of CPR [materials] in a room would be less than 0.3%.” See Kirchner and Vugrin
20 (2006) for a detailed explanation of this analysis, and Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006) for an
21 explanation of how the results were incorporated in the MgO effective excess factor.

22 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006) reviewed previous discussions on the effects of microbial
23 respiratory pathways on the CO₂ yield per mole of organic C in CPR materials (Wang and Brush
24 1996a; Snider 2003d; and Section MgO-6.1). However, Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006) did
25 not include the effects of possible methanogenesis on the CO₂ yield, because the EPA concluded
26 that Kanney et al. (2004) did not adequately bound the quantity of naturally occurring SO₄²⁻ that
27 could enter WIPP disposal rooms (TEA 2004, pp. 31-33; U.S. EPA 2004, pp. 7-8) and specified
28 that methanogenesis not be included in PA. Therefore, Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006)
29 included only denitrification and SO₄²⁻ reduction in their analysis. They calculated that microbes
30 would consume 4.89 mol % of the organic C in the CPR materials in the CRA-2004 PABC
31 inventory via denitrification and 0.84 mol % via SO₄²⁻ reduction using SO₄²⁻ in the waste
32 (Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner 2006, p. 11). The remainder of the organic C, 94.27 mol %, would
33 be consumed via SO₄²⁻ reduction using naturally occurring SO₄²⁻.

34 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006) quantified the effects of the source of SO₄²⁻ on the MgO
35 effective excess factor. There are three potential sources of SO₄²⁻ for microbial consumption of
36 CPR materials via SO₄²⁻ reduction: (1) SO₄²⁻ in the waste; (2) SO₄²⁻ dissolved in Salado or
37 Castile brines; and (3) SO₄²⁻ contained in DRZ minerals such as anhydrite, gypsum, or
38 polyhalite. Microbes would consume 0.84 mol % of the organic C in the CPR materials in the
39 CRA-2004 PABC inventory via SO₄²⁻ reduction using SO₄²⁻ in the waste, and produce CO₂ with
40 a yield of 1 mol per mol of organic C consumed. The CO₂ yield from the SO₄²⁻ dissolved in
41 WIPP brines would be 1 mol per mol of organic C consumed (see below), but the amount of
42 organic C in the CPR materials that would be consumed via SO₄²⁻ reduction using SO₄²⁻ in brines

1 had never been calculated. Furthermore, neither the amount of organic C in the CPR materials
2 that would be consumed via SO_4^{2-} reduction using SO_4^{2-} in DRZ minerals nor the CO_2 yield from
3 this process had previously been calculated.

4 Therefore, Clayton and Nemer (2006) calculated the quantities of dissolved SO_4^{2-} that could
5 enter the repository in brine, and Brush et al. (2006) calculated the CO_2 yield from microbial
6 consumption of CPR materials via SO_4^{2-} reduction using DRZ minerals. The analysis of Clayton
7 and Nemer will be described first because Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006) assumed that
8 microbes would use SO_4^{2-} from the waste and brine before using the SO_4^{2-} from DRZ minerals.
9 This assumption was conservative because SO_4^{2-} reduction with SO_4^{2-} from the waste and brine
10 would have a higher CO_2 yield than SO_4^{2-} reduction using SO_4^{2-} from DRZ minerals (see below).

11 Clayton and Nemer (2006) determined at the outset of their analysis that it was conservative to
12 assume that Salado brine will not be a significant source of SO_4^{2-} for microbial consumption of
13 CPR materials. Microbial SO_4^{2-} reduction produces 2 mol of CO_2 per mol of SO_4^{2-} consumed
14 (see Equation MgO.14 in Section MgO-6.1). For every mol of SO_4^{2-} dissolved in GWB, there
15 are about 5.76 mol of dissolved Mg before equilibration with the solids in WIPP disposal rooms
16 (Section MgO-5.1) and 2.54 mol of dissolved Mg after equilibration with these solids (Table
17 MgO-6). Therefore, GWB will always contain enough dissolved Mg to consume all of the CO_2
18 that would be produced via SO_4^{2-} reduction using the SO_4^{2-} dissolved in this brine.

19 Clayton and Nemer (2006) then established a probability distribution for the quantities of SO_4^{2-}
20 dissolved in Castile brines that could enter a panel during the 10,000-year regulatory period.
21 They used a Monte Carlo simulation to generate 1,000 possible human-intrusion (drilling)
22 futures. Each of these futures consisted of possible intrusion sequences into all 10 panels of the
23 repository. For each future, they identified the “worst-case” panel: the panel with the most
24 boreholes that intersected a Castile brine reservoir and hence the largest volume of Castile brine
25 in that future. Clayton and Nemer (2006) then used the results from the BRAGFLO calculations
26 for the CRA-2004 PABC (Nemer and Stein 2005) to calculate a probability distribution of the
27 quantities of SO_4^{2-} that could enter a panel from a single intrusion that penetrated a Castile brine
28 reservoir. Finally, Clayton and Nemer (2006) combined the uncertainties in the drilling futures
29 with those in the quantities of Castile-brine SO_4^{2-} from a single intrusion to create a probability
30 distribution of the quantities of SO_4^{2-} that could enter the worst-case panel in 10,000 years.
31 Clayton and Nemer (2006, Figure 1) obtained a complementary cumulative distribution function
32 (CCDF) for the quantities of Castile SO_4^{2-} that could enter a panel in 10,000 years. The mean
33 value of this CCDF was consumption of 2.4 mol % of the organic C in CPR materials via SO_4^{2-}
34 reduction using Castile-brine SO_4^{2-} , with a standard deviation of 5.1 mol %. The mean value
35 was small because almost 30% of the drilling futures did not have intrusions that penetrated a
36 brine reservoir and thus did not have any Castile-brine SO_4^{2-} . Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner
37 (2006) incorporated these values into the MgO effective excess factor.

38 Brush et al. (2006) calculated the CO_2 yield from microbial consumption of CPR materials via
39 SO_4^{2-} reduction using DRZ minerals. If microbes consume all the SO_4^{2-} in the waste and in
40 brines that enter WIPP disposal rooms, the resulting concentration gradient from the
41 intergranular brines in the DRZ to the brine(s) in the repository would drive diffusive transport
42 of SO_4^{2-} from the DRZ through saturated voids to the waste. This would in turn decrease the
43 SO_4^{2-} concentration in the brines in the DRZ, which would lead to the dissolution of SO_4^{2-} -

1 bearing minerals such as anhydrite, gypsum, and polyhalite present in both the marker beds and
2 the nearly pure halites in the Salado (Stein 1985). Because all of these SO_4^{2-} -bearing minerals
3 also contain Ca, dissolution of these minerals would release Ca^{2+} to these intergranular brines
4 and (after transport) to the repository. This Ca^{2+} would remove CO_2 from both the aqueous and
5 gaseous phases by precipitating it as minerals such as calcite (CaCO_3); metastable polymorphs of
6 calcite like aragonite, vaterite, or ikaite; monohydrocalcite ($\text{CaCO}_3 \cdot \text{H}_2\text{O}$), amorphous CaCO_3
7 ($\text{CaCO}_3(\text{amorphous} [\text{am}])$), or pirssonite ($\text{Na}_2\text{Ca}(\text{CO}_3)_2 \cdot 2\text{H}_2\text{O}$). Consumption of CO_2 by
8 precipitation of CaCO_3 -bearing minerals would reduce the amount of MgO that must be
9 emplaced, thus impacting the calculation of the MgO effective excess factor.

10 Brush et al. (2006) used the reaction-path code EQ6 (Wolery and Daveler 1992), part of the
11 EQ3/6 geochemical software package (Daveler and Wolery 1992; Wolery 1992a and 1992b), to
12 simulate the precipitation of CaCO_3 -bearing minerals via the process described above. Brush
13 et al. (2006) quantified the sensitivity of the CO_2 yield to factors such as

- 14 1. The initial brine composition and the brine volume
- 15 2. Whether carbonation of brucite produces hydromagnesite (5424) or magnesite
- 16 3. The effects of organic ligands
- 17 4. The effects of precipitation of $\text{CaCO}_3(\text{am})$ instead of calcite

18 They assumed that microbes will consume all of the CPR materials in WIPP disposal rooms, and
19 calculated that microbes would consume 4.89 mol % of the organic C in the CPR materials in the
20 CRA-2004 PABC inventory via denitrification using NO_3^- in the waste and produce CO_2 with a
21 yield of 1 mol per mol of organic C consumed; 0.84 mol % of the organic C via SO_4^{2-} reduction
22 using SO_4^{2-} in the waste with a yield of 1 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C; and 94.27 mol % of
23 the organic C via SO_4^{2-} reduction using SO_4^{2-} from DRZ minerals. Brush et al. (2006) did not
24 include any SO_4^{2-} reduction using Castile-brine SO_4^{2-} because this was an uncertain parameter,
25 the effects of which were incorporated later by Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006).

26 Brush et al. (2006) calculated that the effective CO_2 yield from SO_4^{2-} reduction using SO_4^{2-} from
27 DRZ minerals would be 0.54-0.60 mol per mol of organic C in the CPR materials consumed.
28 The overall CO_2 yield, which included denitrification and SO_4^{2-} reduction using SO_4^{2-} from the
29 waste, but not Castile-brine SO_4^{2-} , would be 0.57-0.62 mol per mol of organic C.

30 A potential concern evaluated by Brush et al. (2006) is that certain elements or compounds in
31 WIPP disposal rooms could inhibit or even prevent calcite precipitation. Dissolved Mg, for
32 example, could inhibit or prevent the precipitation of calcite, depending on its concentration.
33 However, the literature reviewed for this analysis suggested that if an element or compound
34 inhibits or prevents the precipitation of one CaCO_3 -bearing mineral, another, less-stable CaCO_3 -
35 bearing mineral precipitates instead. Thus, if dissolved Mg inhibits or prevents the formation of
36 calcite, aragonite would precipitate (Fernández-Díaz et al. 1996), possibly with coprecipitation of
37 as much as 20% MgCO_3 in addition to CaCO_3 (Morse 1983). The most important point,
38 however, is that if precipitation of CaCO_3 -bearing minerals were prevented, microbial SO_4^{2-}
39 reduction would cease after the consumption of 4.89 mol % of the organic C in the CPR
40 materials in the CRA-2004 PABC inventory via denitrification, 0.84 mol % via SO_4^{2-} reduction

1 using SO_4^{2-} in the waste, and 2.4 mol % via SO_4^{2-} reduction using Castile-brine SO_4^{2-} . Any
2 additional consumption of CPR materials could only occur via methanogenesis, which has a CO_2
3 yield of 0.5 mol per mol of organic C consumed. This is because failure of CaCO_3 to precipitate
4 would prevent additional dissolution of SO_4^{2-} -bearing minerals and result in rapid microbial
5 depletion of SO_4^{2-} .

6 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006) accounted for the possibility of magnesian calcite formation
7 in the WIPP by conservatively assuming that any CO_2 not consumed by hydromagnesite (5424)
8 or magnesite in the simulations of Brush et al. (2006) would be incorporated in a solid solution
9 or two-phase mixture with the composition $\text{Mg}_{0.22}\text{Ca}_{0.78}\text{CO}_3$, rather than a polymorph of CaCO_3
10 or pirssonite as predicted by EQ6. Magnesian calcite with the composition $\text{Mg}_{0.22}\text{Ca}_{0.78}\text{CO}_3$
11 (Meldrum and Hyde 2001) was the most Mg-rich calcite that Brush et al. (2006) found, if
12 dissolved SO_4^{2-} were present, in their literature review of elements or compounds that could
13 inhibit CaCO_3 precipitation. Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006) implemented this assumption
14 by adjusting the effective CO_2 yield from SO_4^{2-} reduction using SO_4^{2-} from DRZ minerals from
15 0.54-0.60 mol per mol of organic C consumed (Brush et al. 2006) to 0.62-0.69 mol per mol of
16 organic C. They added additional conservatism by using only the upper end of this range, or
17 0.69 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C in their calculation of the MgO effective excess factor.

18 Finally, Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.2.3, pp. 51-52) combined the yields for
19 each step of the possible microbial consumption of CPR materials as follows:

- 20 1. Consumption of 4.89% of the organic C in the CPR materials via denitrification using NO_3^-
21 in the waste, with a yield of 1 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C
- 22 2. Consumption of 0.84% of the organic C via SO_4^- reduction using SO_4^{2-} in the waste, with a
23 yield of 1 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C
- 24 3. Consumption of 2.4 mol % of the organic C via SO_4^{2-} reduction using Castile-brine SO_4^{2-} ,
25 with a yield of 1 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C
- 26 4. Consumption of the remaining 91.87 mol % of the organic C via SO_4^{2-} reduction using SO_4^{2-}
27 from DRZ minerals, with a yield of 0.69 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C

28 The overall yield for this combination of microbial respiratory pathways and these sources of
29 electron acceptors is 0.715 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C, with a standard deviation of
30 0.016 mol of CO_2 per mol of organic C.

31 **MgO-6.2.4.4.2 Uncertainties in the Quantity of MgO that will be Available to Consume** 32 **CO_2**

33 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.0, p. 19) divided these uncertainties into two
34 categories: (1) uncertainties related to the characteristics and performance of MgO, and (2) those
35 related to the characteristics and performance of the WIPP.

36 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.1, p. 20) identified three uncertainties related to
37 MgO: (1) the concentration of reactive constituents in MgO, (2) the extent to which these

1 reactive constituents react with atmospheric CO₂ prior to emplacement in the repository, and
2 (3) the extent to which they react with CO₂ after emplacement.

3 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.1.1) incorporated the results of Deng et al. (2006a)
4 and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007b) in the MgO effective excess factor because these were the
5 first results obtained directly for Martin Marietta WTS-60, the MgO currently being emplaced in
6 the WIPP. Deng et al. (2006) and Deng, Xiong, and Nemer (2007b) reported that WTS-60
7 contains 96 ± 5 mol % periclase and lime (see Section MgO-3.3.2). Vugrin et al. (2006, Section
8 5.1.1) selected these results based on the review by Brush and Roselle (2006, Section 2) of the
9 characterization of the MgO that has been emplaced in the WIPP since it opened in March 1999
10 (see also Section MgO-3.0).

11 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.1.2, p. 21) assumed that “due to carbonation of
12 periclase prior to emplacement, 0.1% of the emplaced MgO will be unavailable to sequester CO₂
13 after closure of the repository.” This assumption is based on a DOE analysis carried out during
14 the EPA’s review of the CCA demonstrating that less than 0.1% of the MgO would be
15 carbonated in 30 years by CO₂ that penetrates the bag over 30 years, and the WTS specification
16 for MgO that states, “The super sack shall function as a barrier to atmospheric moisture and CO₂,
17 which is equivalent to or better than that provided by a standard commercial cement bag”
18 (Washington TRU Solutions 2005, Section 3.3.2 E.).

19 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.1.3, p. 22) also assumed “that all of the periclase
20 will be available to react and will continue to react until all of the CO₂ [in the repository] is
21 consumed.” This assumption is based on the conclusion by Brush and Roselle (2006, Section
22 3.2, p. 8):

23 Because all results to date imply that the periclase and lime present in MgO will be available to
24 react – and will continue to react – until all CO₂ in the repository has been consumed, the MgO
25 effective excess factor need not be reduced to account for incomplete reaction. This is consistent
26 with multiplication of the excess factor by 1.

27 However, Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.1.3, p. 22) also stated that they did not
28 include uncertainty in the MgO effective excess factor because they could not quantify it.

29 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.2, p. 22) identified five uncertainties in the
30 quantity of MgO that will be available to consume CO₂ related to the characteristics and
31 performance of the WIPP:

- 32 1. The probability that the supersacks will rupture and expose MgO to the repository
33 environment (i.e., aqueous and gaseous CO₂)
- 34 2. The loss of dissolved MgO from the repository via brine outflow
- 35 3. The mass of MgO in individual supersacks
- 36 4. The probability that CO₂ will be transported to MgO via brine-mixing processes
- 37 5. The probability of physical segregation of MgO from CO₂

1 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.2.1, p. 23) assumed “that all MgO supersacks
2 will rupture due to either microbial degradation or lithostatic loading, making the MgO available
3 for consumption of CO₂.”

4 Clayton and Nemer (2006) established a probability distribution for the fraction of MgO that
5 could be lost via brine outflow during the 10,000-year regulatory period. They used methods
6 similar to those for calculating the probability distribution for the quantities of SO₄²⁻ dissolved in
7 Castile brines that could enter a panel in 10,000 years. Clayton and Nemer (2006) used a Monte
8 Carlo simulation to generate 1,000 possible drilling futures, the brine-outflow results from the
9 BRAGFLO calculations for the CRA-2004 PABC (Nemer and Stein 2005), and an MgO excess
10 factor of 1.2 to calculate a CCDF for the quantities of MgO that could be lost in 10,000 years.
11 The mean of this CCDF was 0.8% of the quantity of MgO initially emplaced, with a standard
12 deviation of 1.9%. The mean value was small because almost 30% of the drilling futures did not
13 have intrusions that penetrated a brine reservoir, and thus did not have any Castile-brine SO₄²⁻.
14 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.2.2, p. 23) incorporated these results into the MgO
15 effective excess factor.

16 Kanney and Vugrin (2006) updated the analysis of Wang (2000b), which demonstrated that, in
17 the absence of minisacks, molecular diffusion in WIPP brines would be fast enough for MgO to
18 control chemical conditions in the repository (see Section MgO-2.1.2). Kanney and Vugrin
19 (2006) updated Wang’s (2000b) work by modifying it to be consistent with the CRA-2004
20 PABC, and applying it in a modified form to the results of analysis of the effects of
21 supercompacted waste on the long-term performance of the WIPP (Hansen et al. 2004). Neither
22 of these modifications changed the conclusion reached by Wang (2000b), that diffusive transport
23 alone is sufficient to mix CO₂ in the aqueous phase over length scales corresponding to the
24 postclosure height of WIPP disposal rooms and time scales appropriate to that of maximum
25 average brine flows. Both analyses (Wang 2000b; Kanney and Vugrin 2006) conservatively
26 omitted advective and dispersive mixing in the aqueous phase, which would be more effective
27 than diffusion; and diffusive transport of CO₂ in the gaseous phase, which would be very fast
28 relative to that in brine. Therefore, Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.2.3, p. 25)
29 “assume[d] that the mixing processes expected in the repository will be sufficient to maintain a
30 well-mixed brine.”

31 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.2.4, p. 25) assumed that none of the MgO
32 emplaced in WIPP disposal rooms would become physically segregated from the repository
33 environment. The report stated

34 Physical segregation of a quantity of MgO from brine or CO₂ due to roof collapse could
35 potentially impact the quantity of MgO available to sequester CO₂; however, the probability of
36 this segregation and the potential impact is negligible. It is probable that any roof failure will
37 occur by lowering of a roof beam onto the waste/MgO stack so that the failed material will not
38 intrude into the stack. Secondly, any failed roof which might occur in smaller blocks will be
39 fractured and will maintain a fairly high permeability to brine and gas for a significant amount of
40 time. Finally, any small scale spalling of the roof into the interstices of the stacks will also
41 probably maintain a high permeability either because grains will not re-cement easily, or if they
42 do, they will form a coherent mass with brine, MgO, and gas outside of them.

43 Furthermore, the current method that DOE uses to emplace the MgO and calculation of the MgO
44 excess factor on a room basis likely minimizes the possible physical segregation of MgO from

1 brine and CO₂. Operational controls guarantee one MgO supersack is emplaced on each stack of
 2 waste. If this quantity is not sufficient to meet the required MgO [excess factor] for a room,
 3 additional MgO is emplaced. These EPA audited operations are detailed in WIPP technical
 4 procedures (WTS, 2006).

5 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.2.4, p. 25) also stated that “The uncertainty with
 6 this assumption cannot presently be quantified, so the uncertainty will not be included in [the]
 7 calculations of the MgO effective excess factor.”

8 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.2.5, pp. 25-26) carried out a statistical analysis of
 9 the uncertainty in the mass of MgO in the supersacks and concluded that they could use a mean
 10 value of 4200 lbs, the value specified by WTS (Washington TRU Solutions 2005, Section 3.4.1,
 11 p. 3) for the mass of MgO in a supersack, and a standard deviation of 0.037%.

12 **MgO-6.2.4.4.3 Uncertainties in the Number of Moles of CO₂ Consumed per Mole of**
 13 **Available MgO**

14 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006) recognized four uncertainties that could affect the number of
 15 moles of CO₂ that would be consumed per mole of available MgO:

- 16 1. The extent to which consumption of CO₂ by brucite produces hydromagnesite (5424) or
 17 magnesite in WIPP disposal rooms
- 18 2. Possible consumption of CO₂ by materials other than MgO
- 19 3. Dissolution of CO₂ in WIPP brines
- 20 4. Incorporation of CO₂ in biomass

21 The extent to which carbonation of brucite produces hydromagnesite (5424) or magnesite will
 22 affect the MgO effective excess factor (Brush and Roselle 2006, Section 4; Vugrin, Nemer, and
 23 Wagner 2006, Section 6.1). The brucite-hydromagnesite (5424) carbonation reaction consumes
 24 0.8 mol of CO₂ per mol of MgO consumed; the brucite-magnesite reaction consumes 1 mol of
 25 CO₂ per mol of MgO (compare Reactions [MgO.7] and [MgO.8] in Section MgO-5.1). Brush
 26 and Roselle (2006, Section 4.1, Section 5.2, and Section 5.3) reviewed the results of laboratory
 27 and natural-analog studies of brucite carbonation. Based on their review, Brush and Roselle
 28 (2006, Section 4.1, p. 12) concluded

29 Any hydromagnesite formed prior to 9,000 years after the WIPP is filled and sealed would convert
 30 completely to magnesite, which – along with the initially formed hydromagnesite – would
 31 consume 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of periclase. Furthermore, much of the hydromagnesite formed
 32 after 9,000 years would react to form magnesite.

33 Brush and Roselle (2006, Section 4.2, pp. 12-13) also concluded

34 Incorporation of the ratio of the number of moles of CO₂ consumed per mol of periclase in MgO
 35 into the effective excess factor necessitates multiplication of this factor by a value close to 1. The
 36 number of moles of CO₂ consumed per mol of periclase will be close to 1 because: (1) magnesite
 37 will be the dominant Mg carbonate throughout most of the 10,000-year regulatory period; and (2)
 38 formation of magnesite from brucite (or periclase), and formation of hydromagnesite followed by

1 conversion of hydromagnesite to magnesite would both consume 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of
2 periclase. The exact ratio of CO₂ consumed per mol of periclase will depend on how much CO₂ is
3 produced by microbial activity prior to 9,000 years. Therefore, this ratio might have to be
4 computed on a vector-by-vector basis.

5 The laboratory and some of the natural-analog studies on which these conclusions are based are
6 also reviewed in Section MgO-4.2.2 (see above).

7 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 6.1, p. 29) carried out an analysis that demonstrated
8 that “as long as the half life for the conversion of hydromagnesite [5424] to magnesite is less
9 than 3,000 years, uncarbonated Mg[O] will remain.” Their analysis was based on the results of
10 Zhang et al. (1999), but introduced additional conservatisms that are not required to apply these
11 results to the formation of magnesite in the WIPP (see Section MgO-4.2.2). Vugrin, Nemer, and
12 Wagner (2006, Table 5, p. 35) also assumed that carbonation of brucite will consume 1 mol of
13 CO₂ per mol of MgO, consistent with conversion of all of the hydromagnesite (5424) in WIPP
14 disposal rooms to magnesite (Reaction [MgO.9] in Section MgO-4.2.2).

15 Brush and Roselle (2006, Section 6) reviewed the results of studies relevant to the possible
16 consumption of CO₂ by materials other than MgO in the WIPP. Brush and Roselle (2006,
17 Section 6.6, p. 25) concluded

18 Inclusion of the effects of consumption of CO₂ by Fe-base metals and their corrosion products,
19 lead (Pb)-base metals and their corrosion products, and CaO and Ca(OH)₂ in Portland cement
20 would be difficult at present because of the uncertainties associated with these processes in the
21 WIPP ... However, these materials could consume 36.1, 1.36, and 0.177% of the CO₂ that would
22 be produced by complete microbial consumption of all CPR materials in the repository.

23 Therefore, Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 6.2, p. 31) decided

24 Because of these uncertainties, this analysis will use the conservative assumption that CO₂ will not
25 be consumed by Fe-base metals or their corrosion products, Pb-base metals or their corrosion
26 products, or lime and portlandite in portland cements. However, if it were possible to quantify the
27 expected quantities of CO₂ that would be consumed by these materials and the associated
28 uncertainty in calculation of the [MgO effective excess factor], it would increase the mean [MgO
29 effective excess factor] and possibly the ... uncertainty. The magnitude of these increases is not
30 known.

31 Brush and Roselle (2006, Section 6.4, p. 24) demonstrated

32 Dissolution of CO₂ in WIPP brines cannot consume significant quantities of CO₂ relative to the
33 quantity that would be produced by microbial consumption of all CPR materials in the repository.
34 This is because the solubility of CO₂ in brines is too low, and the volumes of brines that could
35 flow through the repository are too low to dissolve significant amounts of CO₂. The CO₂
36 solubility is too low because the brucite-magnesite or brucite-hydromagnesite carbonation
37 reactions will buffer f_{CO₂} at values of [1.26 × 10⁻⁷ or 3.16 × 10⁻⁶ atm], respectively.

38 For example, Brush and Roselle (2006, Section 6.4, p. 24) calculated that “the amounts of CO₂
39 dissolved in 10,011 m³ of GWB, 100,000 m³ of ERDA-6 brine, or 1,000,000 m³ of ERDA-6
40 brine are just 0.000318%, 0.00389%, and 0.0389%, respectively, of the total quantity of CO₂ that
41 would be produced by microbial consumption of all [of the] CPR materials in the repository.”
42 Therefore, Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 6.3, p. 32) “assume[d] that no CO₂ is
43 consumed by dissolution in brine.”

1 Brush et al. (2006, Section 6.5, p. 24) stated

2 Some of the organic C in CPR materials would be sequestered in biomass (cellular material)
3 instead of being oxidized to CO₂ if significant microbial consumption of these materials occurs in
4 the WIPP. However, it would be difficult to predict defensibly how much C would be sequestered
5 in biomass.

6 Therefore, Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 6.4, p. 32) concluded

7 Because the uncertainty in the quantity of organic [C] that might be sequestered in biomass cannot
8 presently be quantified, this analysis will conservatively assume that no organic [C] in CPR
9 materials will be incorporated into biomass. If it [were] possible to quantify this uncertainty and
10 the uncertainty was included in calculation of the [MgO effective excess factor], it would have the
11 impact of increasing the mean [MgO effective excess factor] and increasing the standard
12 deviation. The magnitudes of these changes are not known.

13 **MgO-6.2.4.4 Conclusions Regarding the Uncertainties Related to the MgO Excess** 14 **Factor**

15 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 7) used the mean values and standard deviations of
16 the uncertainties that could be quantified (see above) to calculate an MgO effective excess factor
17 for an MgO excess factor of 1.2. They summarized the values of these parameters for the
18 uncertainties in the number of moles of CO₂ produced per mole of organic C in CPR materials,
19 the uncertainties in the quantity of MgO that will be available to consume CO₂, and the
20 uncertainties in the number of moles of CO₂ consumed per mole of available MgO in their Table
21 3, Table 4, and Table 5. Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006) summarized their calculation of the
22 MgO effective excess factor in their Equation 7-1 and provided details on their calculations of
23 the means and uncertainties (standard deviations) for their random variables and the MgO
24 effective excess factor in Appendix C of their report.

25 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 7.1, pp. 35-36) calculated that, for an MgO excess
26 factor of 1.2, the MgO effective excess factor has a mean value of 1.60 and that the uncertainty
27 (standard deviation) is 0.0819. Based on the assumption that the distribution of the effective
28 excess factor is lognormal, Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 7.1, p. 36) calculated

29 [T]here is a 3×10^{-5} probability that the [MgO effective excess factor] will be less than 1.30
30 (Table 7), which is 30% higher than the minimum [MgO effective excess factor] required to
31 maintain chemical conditions assumed in PA. Furthermore, there is only a 10^{-19} probability that
32 the [MgO effective excess factor] will be less than 1.01.

33 As long as the MgO effective excess factor is greater than or equal to 1.00, there would be
34 enough MgO present in WIPP disposal rooms to consume all the CO₂ produced by complete
35 consumption of all of the CPR materials in the repository.

36 **MgO-6.2.4.5 Revision of the DOE's Assessment of the Uncertainties Related to the MgO** 37 **Excess Factor**

38 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2007) revised the uncertainties used by Vugrin, Nemer, and
39 Wagner (2006) because of EPA-mandated changes to the PA technical baseline for the CRA-
40 2004 PABC. Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2007) (1) changed the overall yield for microbial

1 consumption of all of the CPR materials in the repository from 0.715 mol of CO₂ per mol of
2 organic C, with a standard deviation of 0.0158 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic C, to a constant
3 value of 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic C; and (2) changed the assumption that carbonation of
4 brucite will consume 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of MgO, consistent with conversion of all of the
5 hydromagnesite (5424) in WIPP disposal rooms to magnesite, and introduced a random variable
6 with a uniform distribution between 0.8 and 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of MgO, consistent with an
7 equal likelihood of forming hydromagnesite (5424) or magnesite.

8 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Section 5.2.3, pp. 51-52) combined the yields for each step
9 of the possible microbial consumption of CPR materials in the repository and obtained an overall
10 yield of 0.715 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic C, with a standard deviation of 0.016 mol of CO₂
11 per mol of organic C (see the discussion above of the uncertainties in the number of moles of
12 CO₂ produced per mole of organic C in CPR materials). Vugrin et al. (2007, Section 4.2.3,
13 p. 13) changed the overall yield from 0.715 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic C, with a standard
14 deviation of 0.016 mol of CO₂ per mol of organic C, to a constant value of 1 because

15 [T]he current PA technical baseline (established by the CRA-2004 PABC) includes only
16 denitrification and [SO₄²⁻] reduction as microbial [respiratory] pathways for the consumption of
17 organic [C]. Methanogenesis was not included in the CRA-2004 PABC. The current baseline
18 also does not include consumption of CO₂ by [Mg] in Salado brines or by precipitation of CaCO₃-
19 bearing minerals. Consequently, the effective CO₂ yield corresponding to the baseline
20 assumptions is 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of consumed organic [C]. This value represents the
21 maximum yield that could occur.

22 Because of the complexity involved with quantifying the uncertainty in the effective CO₂ yield,
23 this analysis will model the yield in a conservative manner consistent with the CRA 2004 PABC.
24 That is, it will be assumed that:

- 25 (1) Denitrification and [SO₄²⁻] reduction [would be] the only microbial [respiratory]
26 pathways or the consumption of organic [C].
- 27 (2) Methanogenesis [would not] occur.
- 28 (3) No CO₂ [would be] consumed by precipitation of CaCO₃-bearing minerals.
- 29 (4) No CO₂ [would be] consumed by [Mg] in Salado brines.

30 Consequently, this analysis will assume that the effective CO₂ yield is 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of
31 consumed organic [C]. This value represents the maximum effective yield that could occur, so
32 modeling the yield in this manner is conservative. The variable y_{yield} represents the effective CO₂
33 yield in this analysis, and it will be assigned a constant value of 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of
34 consumed organic [C]. If it [were] possible to quantify this uncertainty and the uncertainty [were]
35 included in [the] calculation of the [MgO effective excess factor], it would have the impact of
36 increasing the mean [effective excess factor] and increasing the standard deviation.

37 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2006, Table 5, p. 35) also assumed that carbonation of brucite will
38 consume 1 mol of CO₂ per mol of MgO, consistent with conversion of all of the hydromagnesite
39 (5424) in WIPP disposal rooms to magnesite (Reaction MgO.9 in Section MgO-4.2.2). They
40 based this assumption on the review by Brush and Roselle (2006, Section 4.1, Section 5.2, and
41 Section 5.3) of laboratory studies carried out for the WIPP project, laboratory studies carried out
42 for other applications, and studies of anthropogenic and natural analogs. However, Vugrin,

1 Nemer, and Wagner (2007, Section 6.1, p. 22) abandoned this assumption and introduced a
2 random variable:

3 As noted above, there is some uncertainty in the length of time required for hydromagnesite to
4 convert to magnesite. Thus, this analysis includes an approach that does not require the rate of
5 magnesite formation to model the uncertainty in the moles of CO₂ consumed per mol of MgO.
6 Two bounding scenarios are considered for modeling purposes:

7 **Scenario 1.** No hydromagnesite converts to magnesite. In this scenario, each
8 mol of MgO can consume 0.8 mol of CO₂, and this value represents the lower
9 bound for the moles of CO₂ sequestered per mol of MgO.

10 **Scenario 2:** All hydromagnesite converts to magnesite. In this scenario, each
11 mol of MgO can consume 1 mol of CO₂, and this value represents the upper
12 bound for the moles of CO₂ sequestered per mol of MgO.

13 For the [MgO effective excess factor] calculation, the moles of CO₂ sequestered per mol of MgO
14 are modeled as a random variable with a uniform distribution on [0.8,1]. Representing the
15 quantity in this manner incorporates the lower and upper bounds associated with Scenarios 1 and 2
16 and maximizes the uncertainty since the distribution is not weighted towards any particular value
17 on [0.8,1].

18 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2007, Section 7) used the mean values and standard deviations of
19 the uncertainties that could be quantified to recalculate an MgO effective excess factor for an
20 MgO excess factor of 1.2. They summarized the values of these parameters for the uncertainties
21 in the number of moles of CO₂ produced per mole of organic C in CPR materials, the
22 uncertainties in the quantity of MgO that will be available to consume CO₂, and the uncertainties
23 in the number of moles of CO₂ consumed per mole of available MgO in their Table 2, Table 3,
24 and Table 4. Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2007) summarized their calculation of the MgO
25 effective excess factor in their Equation 7-1 and provided details on their calculations of the
26 means and uncertainties (standard deviations) for their random variables and the MgO effective
27 excess factor in their Appendix B.

28 Vugrin, Nemer, and Wagner (2007, Section 7.1, pp. 27-28) calculated that, for an MgO excess
29 factor of 1.2, the MgO effective excess factor has a mean value of 1.03 and the uncertainty
30 (standard deviation) is 0.072.

31 Because the MgO effective excess factor is greater than 1.00, there would be enough MgO
32 present in WIPP disposal rooms to consume all of the CO₂ produced by complete consumption
33 of all of the CPR materials in the repository.

34 **MgO-6.2.4.6 The EPA's Approval of the DOE's Planned Change Request to Reduce the** 35 **MgO Excess Factor from 1.67 to 1.2**

36 The EPA approved the reduction of the MgO excess factor to 1.2 in February 2008 (Reyes
37 2008). However, the EPA imposed two conditions in its approval letter (Reyes 2008, p. 1):

38 First, [the] DOE must continue to calculate and track both the [C] disposed and the required MgO
39 needed on a room-by-room basis. Second, [the] DOE must annually verify the reactivity of MgO
40 and ensure that it is maintained at 96 [mol] % as assumed in [the] DOE's supporting
41 documentation. These conditions ensure that the WIPP will continue to meet the assurance
42 requirements in our radioactive waste disposal regulations.

1 The EPA's approval (Reyes 2008, p. 1) went on to state

2 As a result of this evaluation, it is our opinion that further reductions in the MgO safety factor are
3 not warranted given the current state of knowledge. We believe that reducing the safety factor
4 below 1.2, based on our current understanding of the disposal system, would not be sufficient to
5 comply with the assurance requirement that MgO is intended to address.

6 The EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2008) summarized its review of the DOE's
7 PCR for a reduction in the MgO excess factor from 1.67 to 1.2. SCA (2008) carried out a
8 detailed review of the uncertainties related to the use of MgO as the engineered barrier in the
9 WIPP. Langmuir (2007) reviewed the results of the analysis published by SCA (2008), and SCA
10 (2007) responded to this review. Finally, PECOS Management Services, Inc. reviewed the use
11 of MgO as an engineered barrier, and concluded that reducing the MgO excess factor from 1.67
12 to 1.2 would be appropriate and that the excess factor could be reduced even more (PMS 2007).
13 Langmuir (2007), PMS (PECOS Management Services, Inc. 2007), SCA (S. Cohen and
14 Associates 2007), SCA (S. Cohen and Associates 2008), and U.S. Environmental Protection
15 Agency (2008) were all included in Reyes (2008) as attachments.

1 **MgO-7.0 References**

- 2 Adams, J.E. 1944. "Upper Permian Ochoa Series of Delaware Basin, West Texas and
3 Southeastern New Mexico." *American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin*, vol. 28:
4 1596-1625.
- 5 Asghari, A., and S.R. Farrah. 1993. "Inactivation of Bacteria by Solids Coated with Magnesium
6 Peroxide," *Journal of Environmental Science and Health*, vol. A28: 779-93.
- 7 Babb, S.C., and C.F. Novak. 1995. *User's Manual for FMT, Version 2.0*. ERMS 228119.
8 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Performance Assessment.
- 9 Babb, S.C., and C.F. Novak. 1997. *User's Manual for FMT Version 2.3: A Computer Code
10 Employing the Pitzer Activity Coefficient Formalism for Calculating Thermodynamic
11 Equilibrium in Geochemical Systems to High Electrolyte Concentrations*. ERMS 243037.
12 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Performance Assessment.
- 13 Bates, R.L., and J.A. Jackson, eds. 1984. *Dictionary of Geological Terms*. 3rd ed. New York:
14 Anchor-Doubleday.
- 15 Berner, R.A. 1980. *Early Diagenesis: A Theoretical Approach*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- 16 Brush, L.H. 1990. *Test Plan for Laboratory and Modeling Studies of Repository and
17 Radionuclide Chemistry for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. SAND90-0266. ERMS 226015.
18 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Brush, L.H. 1995. *Systems Prioritization Method—Iteration 2 Baseline Position Paper: Gas
20 Generation in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March 17). ERMS 228740. Albuquerque:
21 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 Brush, L.H. 1996. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Ranges and Probability
23 Distributions of K_d s for Dissolved Pu, Am, U, Th, and Np in the Culebra for the PA Calculations
24 to Support the CCA). 10 June 1996. ERMS 238801. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia
25 National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 26 Brush, L.H. 2004. *Implications of New (Post-CCA) Information for the Probability of
27 Significant Microbial Activity in the WIPP* (July 28). ERMS 536205. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
28 National Laboratories.
- 29 Brush, L.H. 2005. *Results of Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP
30 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculations* (May 18). ERMS 539800. Carlsbad, NM:
31 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 32 Brush, L.H., R.C. Moore, and N.A. Wall. 2001. *Response to EEG-77, Plutonium Chemistry
33 under Conditions Relevant for WIPP Performance Assessment: Review of Experimental Results
34 and Recommendations for Future Work, by V.M. Oversby* (March 15). ERMS 517373.
35 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Brush, L.H., and G.T. Roselle. 2006. Memorandum to E.D. Vugrin (Subject: Geochemical
2 Information for Calculation of the MgO Effective Excess Factor). 17 November 2006. ERMS
3 544840. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 4 Brush, L.H., and L.J. Storz. 1996. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Revised Ranges and
5 Probability Distributions of K_{ds} for Dissolved Pu, Am, U, Th, and Np in the Culebra for the PA
6 Calculations to Support the CCA). 24 July 1996. ERMS 238231. U.S. Department of Energy,
7 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 8 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003a. *Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
9 *Compliance Recertification Application* (May 8). ERMS 529131. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
10 National Laboratories.
- 11 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003b. *Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
12 *Compliance Recertification Application* (March 20). AP-098. ERMS 526862. Carlsbad, NM:
13 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003c. *Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
15 *Compliance Recertification Application* (Rev. 1). AP 098. ERMS 527714. Carlsbad, NM:
16 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 17 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003d. *Calculation of Organic Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP*
18 *Compliance Recertification Application*. ERMS 527567. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
19 Laboratories.
- 20 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong, 2005a. *Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
21 *Performance-Assessment Baseline Calculations* (Rev 0, April 4). AP-120. ERMS 539255.
22 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong, 2005b. *Calculation of Organic-Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP*
24 *Performance-Assessment Baseline Calculations* (May 4). ERMS 539635. Carlsbad, NM:
25 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Brush, L.H., Y. Xiong, J.W. Garner, A. Ismail, and G.T. Roselle. 2006. *Consumption of Carbon*
27 *Dioxide by Precipitation of Carbonate Minerals Resulting from Dissolution of Sulfate Minerals*
28 *in the Salado Formation in Response to Microbial Sulfate Reduction in the WIPP*. ERMS
29 544785. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Bryan, C.R., and A.C. Snider. 2001a. "MgO Hydration and Carbonation at SNL/Carlsbad."
31 *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline Reports; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository*
32 *Investigations; Milestone RI010; January 31, 2001* (pp. 66–83). ERMS 516749. Carlsbad, NM:
33 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 34 Bryan, C.R., and A.C. Snider. 2001b. "MgO Experimental Work Conducted at SNL/CB:
35 Continuing Investigations with Premier Chemicals MgO." *Sandia National Laboratories*
36 *Technical Baseline Reports; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations; Milestone RI020; July 31,*
37 *2001* (pp. 5-1 through 5-15). ERMS 518970. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Chapelle, F.H. 1993. *Ground-Water Microbiology and Geochemistry*. New York: Wiley.
- 2 Chapman, M.A.S., J. Abercrombie, D.M. Livermore, and N.S. Williams. 1995. “Antibacterial
3 Activity of Bowel-Cleansing Agents: Implications of Antibacteroides Activity of Senna.”
4 *British Journal of Surgery*, vol. 82: 1053.
- 5 Choppin, G.R. 1988. “Humic and Radionuclide Migration.” *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 44/45:
6 23–28.
- 7 Clayton, D.J., and M.B. Nemer. 2006. Memorandum to E.D. Vugrin (Subject: Normalized
8 Moles of Castile Sulfate Entering the Repository and Fraction of MgO Lost Due to Brine Flow
9 Out of the Repository). 9 October 2006. ERMS 544385. U.S. Department of Energy,
10 Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 11 Cotsworth, E. 2005. Letter to I. Triay (1 Enclosure). 4 March 2005. ERMS 538858. U.S.
12 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Washington, DC.
- 13 Crawford, B.A. 2005a. *Determination of Waste Stream Oxyanions using TWBID Revision 2.1,*
14 *Version 3.13, Data Version 4.15* (February 24). ERMS 538811. Carlsbad, NM: Los Alamos
15 National Laboratory.
- 16 Crawford, B.A. 2005b. *Waste Material Densities in TRU Waste Streams from TWBID Revision*
17 *2.1, Version 3.13, Data Version D.4.15* (April 13). ERMS 539323. Carlsbad, NM: Los Alamos
18 National Laboratory.
- 19 Criddle, C.S., L.A. Alvarez, and P.L. McCarty. 1991. “Microbial Processes in Porous Media.”
20 *Transport Processes in Porous Media* (pp. 639–91) eds. J. Bear and M.Y. Corapcioglu.
21 Amsterdam: Kluwer.
- 22 Daveler, S.A., and T.J. Wolery. 1992. *EQPT, A Data File Preprocessor for the EQ3/6 Software*
23 *Package: User’s Guide and Related Documentation* (Version 7.0). UCRL-MA-110662 PT II.
24 Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
- 25 Deal, D.E., R.J. Abitz, D.S. Belski, J.B. Case, M.E. Crawley, R.M. Deshler, P.E. Drez,
26 C.A. Givens, R.B. King, B.A. Lauctes, J. Myers, S. Niou, J.M. Pietz, W.M. Roggenthen, J.R.
27 Tyburski, and M.G. Wallace. 1989. *Brine Sampling and Evaluation Program 1988 Report*.
28 DOE-WIPP-89-015. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy, WIPP Project Office.
- 29 Deng, H., S.R. Johnsen, G.T. Roselle, and M.B. Nemer. 2006. *Analysis of Martin Marietta*
30 *MagChem 10 WTS-60 MgO* (November 14). ERMS 544712. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
31 Laboratories.
- 32 Deng, H., M.B. Nemer, and Y. Xiong. 2006. *Experimental Study of MgO Reaction Pathways*
33 *and Kinetics* (Rev. 0, June 6). TP 06-03. ERMS 543633. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
34 Laboratories.

- 1 Deng, H., M.B. Nemer, and Y. Xiong. 2007. *Experimental Study of MgO Reaction Pathways*
2 *and Kinetics* (Rev. 1, January 10). TP 06-03. ERMS 545182. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
3 Laboratories.
- 4 Deng, H., Y. Xiong, and M.B. Nemer. 2007. *Experimental Work Conducted on MgO*
5 *Characterization and Hydration, Milestone Report*. ERMS 546570. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
6 National Laboratories.
- 7 Dials, G. 1997. Letter to R. Trovato (Enclosure: Fifth Set of Responses to the Letter of Nichols
8 1996). 7 March 1997. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Area Office.
- 9 Fenchel, T., G.M. King, and T.H. Blackburn. 2000. *Bacterial Biogeochemistry: The*
10 *Ecophysiology of Mineral Cycling*. 2nd ed. San Diego: Academic.
- 11 Fernández, A.I., J.M. Chimenos, M. Segarra, M.A. Fernández, and F. Espiell. 1999. "Kinetic
12 Study of Carbonation of MgO Slurries." *Hydrometallurgy*, vol. 53: 155-67.
- 13 Fernández-Díaz, L., A. Putnis, M. Prieto, and C.V. Putnis. 1996. "The Role of Magnesium in
14 the Crystallization of Calcite and Aragonite in a Porous Medium." *Journal of Sedimentary*
15 *Research*, vol. 66, no. 3: 482-91.
- 16 Francis, A.J., and J.B. Gillow. 1994. *Effect of Microbial Processes on Gas Generation under*
17 *Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Repository Conditions: Progress Report through 1992*.
18 SAND93-7036. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Francis, A.J., and J.B. Gillow. 2000. Memorandum to Y. Wang (Subject: Progress Report:
20 Microbial Gas Generation Program). 6 January 2000. ERMS 509352. Brookhaven National
21 Laboratory, Upton, NY.
- 22 Francis, A.J., J.B. Gillow, and M.R. Giles. 1997. *Microbial Gas Generation under Expected*
23 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Repository Conditions*. SAND96-2582. Albuquerque: Sandia
24 National Laboratories.
- 25 Froelich, P.N., G.P. Klinkhammer, M.L. Bender, N.A. Luedtke, G.R. Heath, D. Cullen,
26 P. Dauphin, D. Hammond, B. Hartman, and V. Maynard. 1979. "Early Oxidation of Organic
27 Matter in Pelagic Sediments of the Eastern Equatorial Atlantic: Suboxic Diagenesis."
28 *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 43: 1075-90.
- 29 Garber, R.A., P.M. Harris, and J.M. Borer. 1990. "Occurrence and Significance of Magnesite in
30 Upper Permian (Guadalupian) Tansil and Yates Formations, Delaware Basin, New Mexico."
31 *American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin*, vol. 74, no. 2: 119-34.
- 32 Gillow, J.B., and A.J. Francis. 2001a. "Re-Evaluation of Microbial Gas Generation under
33 Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Conditions: Data Summary Report, January 24, 2001."
34 *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline Reports; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository*
35 *Investigations; Milestone RI010; January 31, 2001* (pp. 19-46). ERMS 516749. Carlsbad, NM:
36 Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Gillow, J.B., and A.J. Francis. 2001b. “Re-Evaluation of Microbial Gas Generation under
2 Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Conditions: Data Summary and Progress Report (February
3 1–July 13, 2001), July 16, 2001, Rev. 0.” *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline*
4 *Reports; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations; Milestone R1020; July 31, 2001* (pp. 3-
5 1 through 3-21). ERMS 518970. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 6 Gillow, J.B., and A.J. Francis. 2002a. “Re-Evaluation of Microbial Gas Generation under
7 Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Conditions: Data Summary and Progress Report (July 14,
8 2001–January 31, 2002), January 22, 2002.” *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline*
9 *Reports; WBS 1.3.5.3, Compliance Monitoring; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations;*
10 *Milestone R1110; January 31, 2002* (pp. 2.1-1 through 2.1-26). ERMS 520467. Carlsbad, NM:
11 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Gillow, J.B., and A.J. Francis. 2002b. “Re-Evaluation of Microbial Gas Generation under
13 Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Conditions: Data Summary and Progress Report (February
14 1–July 15, 2002), July 18, 2002.” *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline Reports;*
15 *WBS 1.3.5.3, Compliance Monitoring; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations; Milestone R1130;*
16 *July 31, 2002* (pp. 3.1-1 through 3.1-A10). ERMS 523189. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
17 Laboratories.
- 18 Gillow, J.B., and A.J. Francis. 2003. *Microbial Gas Generation under Expected Waste Isolation*
19 *Pilot Plant Repository Conditions* (Rev. 0, October 6) ERMS 532877. Upton, NY: Brookhaven
20 National Laboratory.
- 21 Gitlin, B.C. 2006. Letter to D.C. Moody. 28 April 2006. ERMS 543319. U.S. Environmental
22 Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Washington, DC.
- 23 Gradstein, F.M., J.G. Ogg, and A.G. Smith, eds. 2005. *A Geologic Timescale 2004*.
24 Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- 25 Hansen, C.W., L.H. Brush, M.B. Gross, F.D. Hansen, B., Y. Park, J.S. Stein, and
26 T.W. Thompson. 2004. *Effects of Supercompacted Waste and Heterogeneous Waste*
27 *Emplacement on Repository Performance, Rev. 2* (January 19). ERMS 533551. Carlsbad, NM:
28 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 29 Hansen, C.W., and C.D. Leigh. 2003. *A Reconciliation of the CCA and the PAVT Parameter*
30 *Baselines* (Rev. 3, April 30). ERMS 528582. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 Hansen, F.D. 2005. Memorandum to D.S. Kessel (Subject: Magnesium Oxide Super Sack
32 Rupture under WIPP Conditions). 11 May 2005. ERMS 539724. Sandia National Laboratories,
33 Carlsbad, NM.
- 34 Hazen, R.M., and E. Roedder. 2001. “How Old Are Bacteria from the Permian Age?” *Nature*,
35 vol. 411: 155.
- 36 Hunter, K.S., Y. Wang, and P. Van Cappellan. 1998. “Kinetic Modeling of Microbially Driven
37 Redox Chemistry of Subsurface Environments: Coupling, Transport, Microbial Metabolism, and
38 Geochemistry.” *Journal of Hydrology*, vol. 209: 53–80.

- 1 Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI). 2006. *Application of Magnesium Oxide as an*
2 *Engineered Barrier at [the] Waste Isolation Pilot Plant—Report of the Expert Panel* (February
3 21). RSI-06-01. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Regulatory Science.
- 4 Institute for Regulatory Science (RSI). 2008. “About Us—Functional Statement.”
5 <<http://www.nars.org/aboutfunc-frame.htm>> 19 April 2008.
- 6 Kanney, J.F., A.C. Snider, T.W. Thompson, and L.H. Brush. 2004. *Effect of Naturally*
7 *Occurring Sulfate on the MgO Safety Factor in the Presence of Supercompacted Waste and*
8 *Heterogeneous Waste Emplacement* (March 5). ERMS 534150. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
9 National Laboratories.
- 10 Kanney, J.F., and E.D. Vugrin. 2006. Memorandum to D.S. Kessel (Subject: Updated Analysis
11 of Characteristic Time and Length Scales for Mixing Processes in the WIPP Repository to
12 Reflect the CRA-2004 PABC Technical Baseline and the Impact of Supercompacted Mixed
13 Waste and Heterogeneous Waste Emplacement). 31 August 2006. ERMS 544248. U.S.
14 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 15 Kirchner, T.B., and E.D. Vugrin. 2006. Memorandum to D.S. Kessel (Subject: Uncertainty in
16 Cellulose, Plastic, and Rubber Measurements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Inventory). 12
17 June 2006. ERMS 543848. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories,
18 Carlsbad, NM.
- 19 Koper, O.B., J.S. Klabunde, G.L. Marchin, K.J. Klabunde, P. Stoimenov, and L. Bohra. 2002.
20 “Nanoscale Powders and Formulations with Biocidal Activity toward Species and Vegetative
21 Cells of *Bacillus* Species, Viruses, and Toxins.” *Current Microbiology*, vol. 44: 49-55.
- 22 Krumhansl, J.L., J.W. Kelly, H.W. Papenguth, and R.V. Bynum. 1997. Memorandum to E.J.
23 Nowak (Subject: MgO Acceptance Criteria). 10 December 1997. ERMS 248997. U.S.
24 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 25 Krumhansl, J.L., K.M. Kimball, and C.L. Stein. 1991. *Intergranular Fluid Compositions from*
26 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND90-0584.
27 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 28 Lang, W.B. 1939. “Salado Formation of the Permian Basin.” *American Association of*
29 *Petroleum Geologists Bulletin*, vol. 23: 1569–72.
- 30 Langmuir, D. 2007. Memorandum to S.L. Ostrow (Subject: Letter Report Review of the
31 SC&A Draft Report “Review of MgO-Related Uncertainties in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant”).
32 4 November 2007. Hydrochem Systems Corporation, Silverthorne, CO.
- 33 Leigh, C.D. 2003. *Estimate of Cellulosics, Plastics, and Rubbers in a Single Panel in the WIPP*
34 *Repository in Support of AP-107* (Supersedes ERMS 530959) (September 4). ERMS 531324.
35 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 36 Leigh, C.D. 2004a. Memorandum to Record (Subject: Waste Parameters for a Single Panel
37 Assuming a 50/50 Volume Split between INEEL Supercompacted Waste and Waste from Other

- 1 Sites, Rev. 1). 26 February 2004. ERMS 534016. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National
2 Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 3 Leigh, C.D. 2004b. Memorandum to Record (Subject: Waste Parameters for an Alternative
4 TDOP Loading Assumption in the AMW Analysis, Rev. 1). 26 February 2004. ERMS 534017.
5 U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 6 Leigh, C., J. Kanney, L. Brush, J. Garner, G. Kirkes, T. Lowry, M. Nemer, J. Stein, E. Vugrin, S.
7 Wagner, and T. Kirchner. 2005. *2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance*
8 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 541521. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
9 Laboratories.
- 10 Leigh, C.D., and J.R. Trone. 2005. *Calculation of the Waste Unit Factor for the Performance*
11 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Rev. 0, May 3). ERMS 539613. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
12 National Laboratories.
- 13 Li, Y.H., and S. Gregory. 1974. "Diffusion of Ions in Sea Water and in Deep Sea Sediments."
14 *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 33, no. 5: 703-14.
- 15 Lowenstein, T.K. 1983. "Deposition and Alteration of an Ancient Potash Evaporite: The
16 Permian Salado Formation of New Mexico and West Texas." Ph.D. Dissertation. Baltimore:
17 The Johns Hopkins University.
- 18 Lowenstein, T.K. 1988. "Origin of Depositional Cycles in a Permian 'Saline Giant': The
19 Salado (McNutt Zone) Evaporites of New Mexico and Texas." *Geological Society of America*
20 *Bulletin*, vol. 100: 592-608.
- 21 Marcinowski, F. 2001. Letter to I.R. Triay (1 Enclosure). 11 January 2001. ERMS 519362.
22 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Radiation Protection Division, Washington, DC.
- 23 Marcinowski, F. 2004. Letter to R.P. Detwiler (Subject: Approving the DOE's Request to
24 Dispose of Compressed (Supercompacted) Waste from the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment
25 Program in the WIPP). 26 March 2004. ERMS 534327. U.S. Environmental Protection
26 Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 27 Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties. 2006. "Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About
28 Magnesium Oxide." <<http://www.magspecialties.com/students.htm>> 14 November 2006.
29 ERMS 544711.
- 30 Meldrum, F.C., and S.T. Hyde. 2001. "Morphological Influence of Magnesium and Organic
31 Additives on the Precipitation of Calcite." *Journal of Crystal Growth*, vol. 231: 544-58.
- 32 Molecke, M.A. 1983. *A Comparison of Brines Relevant to Nuclear Waste Experimentation*.
33 SAND83-0516. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 34 Moody, D.C. 2006. Letter to E.A. Cotsworth (Subject: Transmittal of Planned Change
35 Request; 1 Enclosure). 10 April 2006. ERMS 543262. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad
36 Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.

- 1 Morse, J.W. 1983. "The Kinetics of Calcium Carbonate Dissolution and Precipitation."
2 *Carbonates: Mineralogy and Chemistry*. Ed. R.J. Reeder. Blacksburg, VA: Mineralogical
3 Society of America. *Reviews in Mineralogy*, vol. 11, 227-64.
- 4 Munson, D.E., R.L. Jones, D.L. Hoag, and J.R. Ball. 1987. *Heated Axisymmetric Pillar Test*
5 *(Room H): In Situ Data Report (February, 1985 - April, 1987), Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*
6 *(WIPP) Thermal/Structural Interactions Program*. SAND87-2488. Albuquerque: Sandia
7 National Laboratories.
- 8 National Research Council (NRC) Committee on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. 1996. *The*
9 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: A Potential Solution for the Disposal of Transuranic Waste*.
10 Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- 11 National Research Council (NRC) Committee on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. 2001.
12 *Improving Operations and Long-Term Safety of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Final Report*.
13 Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- 14 Nemer, M.B. 2006. Memorandum to the SNL/WIPP Records Center (Subject: Expected Brine
15 volumes, Cumulative Brine Inflow, and MgO-to-Brine Solid-to-Liquid Ratio from PABC
16 BRAGFLO Results). 3 March 2006. ERMS 542612. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
17 Laboratories.
- 18 Nemer, M.B. and J.S. Stein. 2005. *Analysis Package for BRAGFLO: 2004 Compliance*
19 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (June 28). ERMS
20 540527. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 21 Nichols, M. 1996. Letter to A. Alm (1 Enclosure). 19 December 1996. U.S. Environmental
22 Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Washington, DC.
- 23 Novak, C.F. 1997. Memorandum to R.V. Bynum (Subject: Calculation of Actinide Solubilities
24 in WIPP SPC and ERDA-6 Brines under MgO Backfill Scenarios Containing either
25 Nesquehonite or Hydromagnesite as the Mg-CO₃ Solubility-Limiting Phase). 21 April 1997.
26 ERMS 246124. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 Novak, C.F., R.C. Moore, and R.V. Bynum. 1996. *Prediction of Dissolved Actinide*
28 *Concentrations in Concentrated Electrolyte Solutions: A Conceptual Model and Model Results*
29 *for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)*. SAND96-2695C. ERMS 238628. Presentation at
30 the 1996 International Conference on Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste,
31 September 16–19, 1996, Winnipeg, Manitoba.
- 32 Oversby, V.M. 2000. *Plutonium Chemistry under Conditions Relevant for WIPP Performance*
33 *Assessment: Review of Experimental Results and Recommendations for Future Work*. EEG-77.
34 Albuquerque: Environmental Evaluation Group.
- 35 Papenguth, H.W. 1999. Memorandum to M.G. Marietta (Subject: Evaluation of Candidate
36 MgO Materials for Use as Backfill at WIPP). 12 November 1999. ERMS 520314. U.S.
37 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.

- 1 Parkes, R.J. 2000. "A Case of Bacterial Immortality?" *Nature*, vol. 407: 844–45.
- 2 Peterson, A.C. 1996. *Mass of MgO That Could Be Added as Backfill in the WIPP and the Mass*
3 *of MgO Required to Saturate the Brine and React with the CO₂ Generated by Microbial*
4 *Processes* (March 11). ERMS 236214. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 5 PECOS Management Services, Inc. (PMS). 2007. *Review of the DOE Request for Magnesium*
6 *Oxide Requirement Reduction*. Albuquerque, NM: PMS.
- 7 Popielak, R.S., R.L. Beauheim, S.R. Black, W.E. Coons, C.T. Ellingson, and R.L. Olsen. 1983.
8 *Brine Reservoirs in the Castile Formation, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Project, Southeastern*
9 *New Mexico*. TME 3153. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy, WIPP Project Office.
- 10 Powers, D.W., R.H. Vreeland, and W.D. Rosenzweig. 2001. "Reply to 'How Old Are Bacteria
- 11 from the Permian Age?'" *Nature*, vol. 411: 155.
- 12 Reyes, J. 2008. Letter to D.C. Moody (5 Enclosures). 11 February 2008. U.S. Environmental
- 13 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 14 S. Cohen and Associates (SCA). 2006. *Preliminary Review of the Degradation of Cellulosic,*
15 *Plastic, and Rubber Materials in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, and Possible Effects on*
16 *Magnesium Oxide Safety Factor Calculations* (September 11). Vienna, VA: SCA.
- 17 S. Cohen and Associates (SCA). 2007. *Response to Comments by Langmuir (2007)* (December
- 18 1). Vienna, VA: SCA.
- 19 S. Cohen and Associates (SCA). 2008. *Review of MgO-Related Uncertainties in the Waste*
20 *Isolation Pilot Plant* (January 24). Vienna, VA: SCA.
- 21 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 1996. *Conceptual Models Information for the Peer*
22 *Review Panel* (May 13). ERMS 542940. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 1997. *Chemical Conditions Model: Results of the MgO*
24 *Backfill Efficacy Investigation* (April 23). Unpublished report. ERMS 419794. Albuquerque:
25 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Satterfield, C.L., T.K. Lowenstein, R.H. Vreeland, W.D. Rosenzweig, and D.W. Powers. 2005.
27 "New Evidence for 250 Ma Age of Halotolerant Bacterium from a Permian Salt Crystal."
28 *Geology*, vol. 33, no. 4: 265–68.
- 29 Sawai, J. 2003. "Quantitative Evaluation of Antibacterial Activities of Metallic Oxide Powders
30 (ZnO, MgO, CaO) by Conductimetric Assay." *Journal of Microbiological Methods*, vol. 54:
31 177–82.
- 32 Sawai, J., H. Igarashi, A. Hashimoto, T. Kokugan, and M. Shimizu. 1995a. "Evaluation of
33 Growth Inhibitory Effect of Ceramics Powder Slurry on Bacteria by Conductance Method."
34 *Journal of Chemical Engineering of Japan*, vol. 28: 288–93.

- 1 Sawai, J., H. Kojima, I. Saito, F. Kanou, H. Igarashi, A. Hashimoto, T. Kokugan, and
2 M. Shimizu. 1995b. "Mutagenecity Test of Ceramic Powder[s] Which Have Growth Inhibitory
3 Effect on Bacteria." *Journal of Chemical Engineering of Japan*, vol. 28: 352–54.
- 4 Sawai, J., H. Igarashi, A. Hashimoto, T. Kokugan, and M. Shimizu. 1996. "Effect of Particle
5 Size and Heating Temperature of Ceramic Powders on Antibacterial Activity of Their Slurry."
6 *Journal of Chemical Engineering of Japan*, vol. 29: 288–93.
- 7 Sawai, J., H. Kojima, H. Igarashi, A. Hashimoto, S. Shoji, T. Sawaki, A. Hakoda, E. Kawada,
8 T. Kokugan, and M. Shimizu. 2000a. "Antibacterial Characteristics of Magnesium Oxide
9 Powder." *World Journal of Microbiology and Biotechnology*, vol. 16: 187–94.
- 10 Sawai, J., H. Kojima, H. Igarashi, A. Hashimoto, S. Shoji, A. Takehara, T. Sawaki, T. Kokugan,
11 and M. Shimizu. 2000b. "Escherichia coli Damage by Ceramic Powder Slurries." *Journal of*
12 *Chemical Engineering of Japan*, vol. 30: 1034–39.
- 13 Sayles, F.L., and W.S. Fyfe. 1973. "The Crystallization of Magnesite from Aqueous Solutions."
14 *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 37: 87-99.
- 15 Schlesinger, W.H. 1997. *Biogeochemistry: An Analysis of Global Change*. New York:
16 Academic.
- 17 Snider, A.C. 2002. "MgO Studies: Experimental Work Conducted at SNL/Carlsbad: Efficacy
18 of Premier Chemicals MgO as an Engineered Barrier." *Sandia National Laboratories Technical*
19 *Baseline Reports; WBS 1.3.5.3, Compliance Monitoring; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository*
20 *Investigations; Milestone RI110; January 31, 2002* (pp. 3.1–1 through 3.1–18). ERMS 520467.
21 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 Snider, A.C. 2003a. *Calculation of the Quantities of MgO Required for Consumption of CO₂ for*
23 *the WIPP Compliance Recertification Application* (July 3). ERMS 530220. Carlsbad, NM:
24 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Snider, A.C. 2003b. "Hydration of Magnesium Oxide in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant."
26 *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline Reports; WBS 1.3.5.3, Compliance*
27 *Monitoring; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations; Milestone RI 03-210; January 31, 2003*
28 (pp. 4.2-1 through 4.2-6). ERMS 523189. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 29 Snider, A.C. 2003c. *Verification of the Definition of Generic Weep Brine and the Development*
30 *of a Recipe for This Brine*. ERMS 527505. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 Snider, A.C. 2003d. *Calculation of MgO Safety Factors for the WIPP Compliance*
32 *Recertification Application and for Evaluating Assumptions of Homogeneity in WIPP PA*
33 (September 11). ERMS 531508. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 34 Snider, A.C., and Y. Xiong. 2002a. "Carbonation of Magnesium Oxide." *Sandia National*
35 *Laboratories Technical Baseline Reports; WBS 1.3.5.3, Compliance Monitoring; WBS 1.3.5.4,*
36 *Repository Investigations; Milestone RI130; July 31, 2002* (pp. 4.1-1 through 4.1-28). ERMS
37 523189. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Snider, A.C., and Y.-L. Xiong. 2002b. *Experimental Study of WIPP Engineered Barrier MgO*
2 *at Sandia National Laboratories Carlsbad Facility* (Rev. 2, October 2). TP 00-07. ERMS
3 523957. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Snider, A.C., and Y.-L. Xiong. 2004. *Continuing Investigations of the Hydration and*
5 *Carbonation of Premier Chemical MgO* (October 12). ERMS 537188. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
6 National Laboratories.
- 7 Snider, A.C., Y.-L. Xiong, and N.A. Wall. 2004. *Experimental Study of WIPP Engineered*
8 *Barrier MgO at Sandia National Laboratories Carlsbad Facility* (Rev. 3, August 26). TP 00-07.
9 ERMS 536591. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Stamatakis, M.G. 1995. "Occurrence and Genesis of Huntite-Hydromagnesite Assemblages,
11 Kozani, Greece: Important New White Fillers and Extenders." *Transaction of the Institution of*
12 *Mining and Metallurgy, Section B: Applied Earth Science*, vol. 104: B179–B186.
- 13 Stein, C.L. 1985. *Mineralogy in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Facility Stratigraphic*
14 *Horizon*. SAND85-0321. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 Stein, J.S., and W. Zelinski. 2003. *Analysis Package for BRAGFLO: Compliance*
16 *Recertification Application* (October 23). ERMS 530163. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
17 Laboratories.
- 18 Stoimenov, P.K., R.L. Klinger, G.L. Marchin, and K.J. Klabunde. 2002. "Metal Oxide
19 Nanoparticles as Bactericidal Agents." *Langmuir*, vol. 18: 6679–86.
- 20 Telander, M.R., and R.E. Westerman. 1993. *Hydrogen Generation by Metal Corrosion in*
21 *Simulated Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environments*. SAND92-7347. Albuquerque: Sandia
22 National Laboratories.
- 23 Telander, M.R., and R.E. Westerman. 1997. *Hydrogen Generation by Metal Corrosion in*
24 *Simulated Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environments*. SAND96-2538. ERMS 223456.
25 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Triay, I. 2000. Letter to F. Marcinowski (Subject: Requesting EPA Approval of the
27 Elimination of MgO Minisacks from the WIPP). 21 July 2001. ERMS 519362. U.S.
28 Department of Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 29 Trinity Engineering Associates (TEA). 2004. *Review of Effects of Supercompacted Waste and*
30 *Heterogeneous Waste Emplacement on WIPP Repository Performance* (March 17). Cincinnati:
31 Trinity Engineering Associates.
- 32 Trovato, E.R. 1997a. Letter to G. Dials (2 Enclosures). 25 April 1997. ERMS 247206. U.S.
33 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 34 Trovato, E.R. 1997b. Letter to G. Dials (Enclosures: Parameters that Are no Longer of Concern
35 and Parameters that DOE must Use for the PAVT). 17 April ERMS 247196. U.S.
36 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996a. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
2 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1994-2184.
3 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 4 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996b. *Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report*
5 (Revision 3). DOE/CAO-95-1121. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 6 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2000. *MgO Mini-Sack Elimination Proposal* (July 21).
7 ERMS 519362. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 8 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
9 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
10 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 11 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1987. “40 CFR Parts 264 and 265 (FRL-3222-5)
12 Hazardous Waste Management System; Containerized Hazardous Liquids Requirements.”
13 *Federal Register*, vol. 52: 23695–697.
- 14 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1992a. “40 CFR Part 264-Standards for Owners
15 and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.” *Federal*
16 *Register*, vol. 57: 54452–460.
- 17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1992b. “40 CFR Part 265-Interim Status
18 Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal
19 Facilities.” *Federal Register*, vol. 57: 54452–461.
- 20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191 Environmental
21 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
22 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58: 66398–416.
- 23 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1995. “40 CFR Parts 264, 265, and 271
24 (FRL 5226–9) Hazardous Waste Management: Liquids in Landfills.” *Federal Register*, vol. 60:
25 35703–706.
- 26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “CARD No. 44: Engineered Barriers.”
27 *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
28 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
29 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 44-1 through 44-36). Washington, DC:
30 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
32 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
33 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
34 1998): 27353–406.
- 35 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998c. “CARD No. 23: Models and Computer
36 Codes.” *Compliance Application Review Documents for the Criteria for the Certification and*
37 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*

- 1 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 23-1 through 23-93). EPA 402-R-97-013.
2 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998d. *Technical Support Document for*
4 *Section 194.23: Models and Computer Codes*. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
5 Indoor Air.
- 6 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998e. *Technical Support Document for*
7 *Section 194.23: Parameter Justification Report* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation
8 and Indoor Air.
- 9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998f. *Technical Support Document for*
10 *Section 194.24: EPA's Evaluation of DOE's Actinide Source Term*. Washington, DC: Office of
11 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2001. *Approval of Elimination of Minisacks*.
13 Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 14 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2004. *Discussion of Major Issues Associated*
15 *with EPA's Compressed Waste Review*. ERMS 534327. Washington, DC: Office of Air and
16 Radiation.
- 17 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006. *Evaluation of the Compliance*
18 *Recertification Actinide Source Term and Culebra Dolomite Distribution Coefficient Values*.
19 Technical Support Document for Section 194.24. CRA-2004. Docket No. A-98-49.
- 20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2008. *Overview Summary of Planned Change*
21 *Request Decision*. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 22 Usdowski, E. 1989. "Synthesis of Dolomite and Magnesite at 60 °C in the System Ca²⁺-Mg²⁺-
23 CO₃²⁻-Cl-H₂O." *Naturwissenschaften*, vol. 76, no. 8: 374–75.
- 24 Usdowski, E. 1994. "Synthesis of Dolomite and Geochemical Implications." *Dolomites: A*
25 *Volume in Honour of Dolomieu* (pp. 345–60) Eds. B. Purser, M. Tucker, and D. Zenger.
26 Oxford: Blackwell. Special Publication No. 21 of the International Association of
27 Sedimentologists.
- 28 Villarreal, R., J.M. Bergquist, and S.L. Leonard. 2001a. *The Actinide Source-Term Waste Test*
29 *Program (STTP) Final Report, Volume I*. LA-UR-01-6822. Los Alamos: Los Alamos National
30 Laboratory.
- 31 Villarreal, R., J.M. Bergquist, and S.L. Leonard. 2001b. *The Actinide Source-Term Waste Test*
32 *Program (STTP) Final Report, Volume II*. LA-UR-01-6912. Los Alamos: Los Alamos
33 National Laboratory.
- 34 Villarreal, R., M. King, and S.L. Leonard. 2001. *The Actinide Source-Term Waste Test*
35 *Program (STTP) Final Report, Volume IV*. LA-UR-01-6914. Los Alamos: Los Alamos
36 National Laboratory.

- 1 Villarreal, R., A.C. Morzinski, J.M. Bergquist, and S.L. Leonard. 2001. *The Actinide*
2 *Source-Term Waste Test Program (STTP) Final Report, Volume III*. LA-UR-01-6913. Los
3 Alamos: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 4 Vreeland, R.H., W.D. Rosenzweig, and D.W. Powers. 2000. "Isolation of a 250-Million-Year-
5 Old Halotolerant Bacterium from a Primary Salt Crystal." *Nature*, vol. 407: 897–900.
- 6 Vugrin, E.D., M.B. Nemer, and S.W. Wagner. 2006. *Uncertainties Affecting MgO Effectiveness*
7 *and Calculation of the MgO Effective Excess Factor* (Rev. 0, November 17). ERMS 544781.
8 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Vugrin, E.D., M.B. Nemer, and S.W. Wagner. 2007. *Uncertainties Affecting MgO Effectiveness*
10 *and Calculation of the MgO Effective Excess Factor* (Rev. 1, June 26). ERMS 546377.
11 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Wall, N.A. 2005. *Preliminary Results for the Evaluation of Potential New MgO* (January 27).
13 ERMS 538514. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Wall, N.A., and S.A. Matthews. 2005. "Sustainability of Humic Acids in the Presence of
15 Magnesium Oxide." *Applied Geochemistry*, vol. 20: 1704–13.
- 16 Wang, Y. 1998. *WIPP PA Validation Document for FMT (Version 2.4), Document Version 2.4*.
17 ERMS 251587. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 Wang, Y. 2000a. Memorandum to B.A. Howard (Subject: Methanogenesis and Carbon
19 Dioxide Generation in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [WIPP]). 5 January 2000. ERMS 519362.
20 U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 21 Wang, Y. 2000b. Memorandum to B.A. Howard (Subject: Effectiveness of Mixing Processes
22 in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Repository). 21 June 2000. ERMS 512401. U.S. Department
23 of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 24 Wang, Y. and L.H. Brush. 1996a. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Estimates of Gas-
25 Generation Parameters for the Long-Term WIPP Performance Assessment). 26 January 1996.
26 ERMS 231943. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 27 Wang, Y. and L.H. Brush. 1996b. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Modify the
28 Stoichiometric Factor γ in the BRAGFLO to Include the Effect of MgO Added to WIPP
29 Repository as a Backfill). 23 February 1996. ERMS 232286. U.S. Department of Energy,
30 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 31 Wang, Y., and L.H. Brush. 1996c. Memorandum to P. Vaughn (Subject: An Adjustment for
32 Using Steel Corrosion Rates in BRAGFLO to Reflect Repository Chemical Condition Changes
33 Due to Adding MgO as Backfill). 29 February 1996. ERMS 235181. U.S. Department of
34 Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.

- 1 Wang, Y., and C.R. Bryan. 2000. *Experimental Study of WIPP MgO Backfill at Sandia*
2 *National Laboratories Carlsbad Facility* (Rev. 0, July 11). TP 00-07. ERMS 512216.
3 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Wang, Y., C.R. Bryan, and N.A. Wall. 2001. *Experimental Study of WIPP MgO Backfill at*
5 *Sandia National Laboratories Carlsbad Facility* (Rev. 1, June 22). TP 00-07. ERMS 518747.
6 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Wang, Y., and P Van Cappellan. 1996. “A Multicomponent Reactive-Transport Model of Early
8 Diagenesis: Application of Redox Cycling in Coastal Marine Sediments.” *Geochimica et*
9 *Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 60: 2993–3014.
- 10 Washington TRU Solutions (WTS). 2003. *Specification for Prepackaged MgO Backfill* (Rev.
11 5). D-0101. Carlsbad, NM: Washington TRU Solutions.
- 12 Washington TRU Solutions (WTS). 2005. *Specification for Prepackaged MgO Backfill* (Rev. 7,
13 May 12). Specification D-0101. Carlsbad, NM: Washington TRU Solutions.
- 14 Washington TRU Solutions (WTS). 2006. *CH Waste Processing* (Rev. 23, January). Technical
15 Procedure WP05-WH1011. Carlsbad, NM: Washington TRU Solutions.
- 16 Westinghouse Waste Isolation Division (WID). 1997. *Dose Assessment of Hand Emplacement*
17 *of MgO Sacks around CH Waste 7-Packs at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (April). WIPP
18 Radiological Control Position Paper 97-05. Carlsbad, NM: Westinghouse WID.
- 19 Wolery, T.J. 1992a. *EQ3/6, A Software Package for Geochemical Modeling of Aqueous*
20 *Systems: Package Overview and Installation Guide* (Version 7.0). UCRL-MA-110662 PT I.
21 Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
- 22 Wolery, T.J. 1992b. *EQ3NR, A Computer Program for Geochemical Aqueous*
23 *Speciation-Solubility Calculations: Theoretical Manual, User’s Guide, and Related*
24 *Documentation* (Version 7.0). UCRL-MA-110662 PT III. Livermore, CA: Lawrence
25 Livermore National Laboratory.
- 26 Wolery, T.J., and S.A. Daveler. 1992. *EQ6, A Computer Program for Reaction-Path Modeling*
27 *of Aqueous Geochemical Systems: Theoretical Manual, User’s Guide, and Related*
28 *Documentation* (Version 7.0). UCRL-MA-110662 PT IV. Livermore, CA: Lawrence
29 Livermore National Laboratory.
- 30 Xiong, Y., and A.S. Lord. 2008. “HHHExperimental Investigations of the Reaction Path in the
31 MgO-CO₂-H₂O System in Solutions with Various Ionic Strengths, and Their Applications to
32 Nuclear Waste IsolationHHH.” *Applied Geochemistry*, vol. 23: 1634–59.
- 33 Xiong, Y., and A.C. Snider. 2003. “Carbonation Rates of the Magnesium Oxide Hydration
34 Product Brucite in Various Solutions.” *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline*
35 *Reports; WBS 1.3.5.3, Compliance Monitoring; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations;*
36 *Milestone RI 03-210; January 31, 2003* (pp. 4.3-1 through 4.3-11). ERMS 526049. Carlsbad,
37 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Yamamoto, O., J. Sawai, M. Hotta, H. Kojima, and T. Sasamoto. 1998. "Growth Inhibition of
2 Bacteria by MgO-ZnO Solid-Solution Powders." *Journal of the Ceramic Society of Japan*,
3 vol. 106: 1252–54.
- 4 Zhang, P.-C., H.L. Anderson, J.W. Kelly, J.L. Krumhansl, and H.W. Papenguth. 1999. *Kinetics
5 and Mechanisms of Formation of Magnesite from Hydromagnesite in Brine*. SAND99-1946J.
6 ERMS 514868. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Zhang, P.-C., J. Hardesty, and H.W. Papenguth. 2001. "MgO Hydration Experiments
8 Conducted at SNL-ABQ," Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline Reports;
9 WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations; Milestone RI010; January 31, 2001 (pp. 55–65).
10 ERMS 516749. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Appendix MON-2009
WIPP Monitoring Programs**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix MON-2009
WIPP Monitoring Programs

Table of Contents

MON-1.0 Introduction MON-1
 MON-1.1 Compliance Monitoring Program..... MON-1
 MON-1.2 Preclosure and Postclosure Monitoring..... MON-2
 MON-1.3 Monitoring Assessment..... MON-2
 MON-1.4 Appendix Summary..... MON-2

MON-2.0 Compliance Monitoring Program Requirements MON-4
 MON-2.1 Compliance Certification/Recertification MON-4

MON-3.0 Preclosure Compliance Monitoring MON-9
 MON-3.1 Geotechnical Engineering Program Plan MON-9
 MON-3.1.1 Geomechanical Monitoring Activities MON-9
 MON-3.1.2 Geosciences Activities..... MON-10
 MON-3.1.3 Schedule MON-10
 MON-3.2 GMP MON-11
 MON-3.2.1 Scope MON-11
 MON-3.2.2 Schedule MON-12
 MON-3.2.3 Program Outputs..... MON-13
 MON-3.3 Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program MON-13
 MON-3.3.1 Schedule MON-14
 MON-3.3.2 Program Outputs..... MON-15
 MON-3.4 SMP MON-15
 MON-3.4.1 Schedule MON-16
 MON-3.4.2 Program Outputs..... MON-16
 MON-3.5 WIPP Waste Information System MON-16
 MON-3.5.1 Schedule MON-16
 MON-3.5.2 Program Outputs..... MON-16

MON-4.0 Postclosure (Long-Term) Monitoring MON-18

MON-5.0 Monitoring Programs Quality Assurance Requirements MON-19

MON-6.0 Reporting And Assessment MON-20
 MON-6.1 Monitoring Data Reporting MON-20
 MON-6.1.1 CMP Assessment Report..... MON-20
 MON-6.1.2 External Reporting..... MON-20

MON-7.0 References MON-22

List of Tables

Table MON-1. Monitoring Parameters..... MON-6
Table MON-2. WIPP GMP Sample Collection and Water Level Reporting Frequency .. MON-13
Table MON-3. DBDSP Data Collection Schedule MON-14

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARD	Compliance Application Review Document
CBFO	Carlsbad Field Office
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
cm	centimeter
CMP	Compliance Monitoring Program
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBDSP	Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DRZ	disturbed rock zone
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEP	feature, event, or process
ft	feet
GMP	Groundwater Monitoring Program
GWMPP	Groundwater Monitoring Program Plan
kg	kilogram
km	kilometer
m	meter
M&OC	Management and Operating Contractor
mi	mile
PA	performance assessment
QA	quality assurance
QAPD	Quality Assurance Program Document
SMP	Subsidence Monitoring Program
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WQSP	Water Quality Sampling Program
WWIS	WIPP Waste Information System

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Am	americium
Pu	plutonium
U	uranium

The page intentionally left blank.

1 **MON-1.0 Introduction**

2 This appendix to the 2009 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2009) describes a
3 specific monitoring program that was developed to meet commitments contained in the U.S.
4 Department of Energy's (DOE's) application to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
5 (EPA), which demonstrated compliance with radioactive waste disposal regulations 40 CFR Part
6 191 Subparts B and C and the certification criteria in 40 CFR Part 194. This appendix does not
7 address monitoring activities intended to demonstrate compliance with 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart
8 A.

9 The monitoring activities described are performed as assurance measures to detect substantial
10 and detrimental deviations from expected disposal system performance. This program consists
11 of a preclosure and postclosure monitoring program using monitoring techniques that do not
12 jeopardize the isolation of the waste. The program must be conducted until the DOE and EPA
13 agree there are no significant concerns to be addressed by further monitoring. The long-term
14 performance expectations for the disposal system are derived from conceptual models, scenarios,
15 and assumptions developed for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) performance assessment
16 (PA).

17 On January 3, 2002, the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) submitted a letter to the EPA (Triay
18 2002). This letter requested Appendix MON be rewritten to incorporate the portions of
19 Appendices EMP, GWMP, GTMP, SMP, and DMP required to demonstrate compliance with 40
20 CFR § 191.14(b) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) in accordance with the criteria
21 established by 40 CFR § 194.42 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996). The EPA
22 approved the request in a letter to CBFO on March 15, 2002 (Marcinowski 2002).

23 The activities performed for the overall monitoring programs at WIPP comprehensively address
24 the range of regulatory requirements at departmental, state, and federal levels. This appendix
25 addresses activities relevant to monitoring the disposal system. This document provides an
26 overview of the Compliance Monitoring Program (CMP) and specifically describes how

- 27 • The 10 compliance monitoring parameters are derived from the data.
- 28 • Information and data are extracted from the various WIPP monitoring and sampling
29 programs.
- 30 • The assessments are made against repository performance expectations.
- 31 • The results are reported to the EPA.

32 The descriptions provided in this appendix are specific to the CMP and, thus, the requirements of
33 section 191.14(b) and section 194.42.

34 **MON-1.1 Compliance Monitoring Program**

35 This appendix describes the CMP for the WIPP. Compliance monitoring concentrates on the
36 following areas:

- 1 • The Geotechnical Engineering Program
- 2 • The Groundwater Monitoring Program (GMP)
- 3 • The Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program (DBDSP)
- 4 • The Subsidence Monitoring Program (SMP)
- 5 • WIPP Waste Tracking and Control

6 The data and information collected since the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application
7 (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy 2004a) for the above-listed programs are recorded or
8 referenced in Appendix DATA-2009.

9 **MON-1.2 Preclosure and Postclosure Monitoring**

10 The requirements of 40 CFR § 191.14, section 194.42, the initial EPA certification (U.S.
11 Environmental Protection Agency 1998a), and the CRA-2004 serve as the regulatory basis for
12 preclosure and postclosure monitoring. These requirements specify that disposal systems must
13 be monitored to detect substantial and detrimental deviation from expected disposal system
14 performance.

15 **MON-1.3 Monitoring Assessment**

16 The DOE was required by 40 CFR § 194.42(a) to perform an analysis that would determine the
17 effects of various parameters on the performance of the disposal system, and to use the results in
18 preclosure and postclosure monitoring plans. The disposal system performance identified 10
19 monitoring parameters, listed in Section MON-2.1, to be monitored and assessed within the
20 CMP. The discussion of preclosure monitoring activities for these 10 parameters includes the
21 following:

- 22 • Identifying activities required to comply with the monitoring requirements of the EPA's
23 certification and recertification of compliance with Part 191 Subparts B and C during the
24 preclosure phase of the project
- 25 • Identifying organizations that generate the monitoring data, organizations that convert the
26 data to monitoring parameters and assess the results against expected results, and the
27 organization that reports the results of the assessments to the EPA
- 28 • Identifying the compliance monitoring schedule
- 29 • Providing an overview of quality assurance (QA) requirements applicable to the CMP

30 **MON-1.4 Appendix Summary**

31 Section MON-2.0 identifies the monitoring requirements of Part 191 Subparts B and C in
32 keeping with the criteria of Part 194. Section MON-3.0 describes the preclosure monitoring

1 program associated with each monitoring parameter, the monitoring schedules, and program
2 outputs. Section MON-4.0 describes the planned postclosure monitoring. Section MON-5.0
3 describes the QA requirements applicable to the CMP. Section MON-6.0 describes the process
4 of communicating and reporting CMP results and evaluations.

1 **MON-2.0 Compliance Monitoring Program Requirements**

2 The DOE's preclosure and postclosure CMP assesses the performance of specific aspects of the
3 disposal system. The relevant monitoring requirements are identified in

- 4 • Section 191.14(b)
- 5 • Section 194.42
- 6 • The May 18, 1998, 40 CFR Part 194 Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the
7 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the Disposal Regulations: Certification
8 Decision, Section VIII.D.4 Monitoring (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a)
- 9 • The CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2

10 **MON-2.1 Compliance Certification/Recertification**

11 The original approach used to develop the CMP was based on the results of the parameter
12 analysis documented in the CCA, Chapter 7.0, and Appendix MON, Attachment MONPAR.
13 The EPA documented its approval of the DOE monitoring approach in the compliance
14 certification decision (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a) and Compliance
15 Application Review Document (CARD) 42 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b). In
16 the CRA-2004, Appendix MON 2004 was rewritten to incorporate portions of Appendices EMP,
17 GWMP, GTMP, SMP, and DMP that were not revised from the CRA-2004. The DOE
18 reassessed the CCA, Appendix MON, Attachment MONPAR, for the CRA-2004 and determined
19 the original conclusions and monitoring parameters identified in MONPAR remain valid and
20 unchanged (Kirkes and Wagner 2003). For the CRA-2009, the DOE once again assessed the
21 original MONPAR analysis used to determine which monitoring parameters should be included
22 in the CMP. Based on the review of operational activities, conditions, monitoring data, PA, and
23 experimental programs that occurred since the CRA-2004, the reassessment states, "the
24 conclusions of the MONPAR analysis remain valid and its conclusions continue to be adequate
25 for inclusion in the CRA-2009" (Wagner 2008). The EPA-approved monitoring approach
26 recognizes that the DOE will monitor 10 parameters. These parameters are

- 27 1. Creep closure and stresses
- 28 2. Extent of brittle deformation
- 29 3. Initiation of brittle deformation
- 30 4. Displacement of deformation features
- 31 5. The Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as Culebra)
32 groundwater composition
- 33 6. Change in Culebra groundwater flow
- 34 7. Drilling rate

1 8. Probability of encountering a Castile brine reservoir

2 9. Subsidence

3 10. Waste activity

4 All of the above parameters are being monitored during the preclosure period.

5 The CRA-2004, Appendix MON 2004, Attachment A, describes DOE's plans for postclosure
6 monitoring. The DOE will revisit this plan for postclosure monitoring before the end of facility
7 operations.

8 The monitoring parameters that have related PA parameters include

9 • Drilling rate

10 • Probability of encountering Castile brine

11 • Change in Culebra groundwater flow

12 • Culebra groundwater composition

13 • Waste activity

14 The other monitoring parameters are related to screening decisions for repository features,
15 events, or processes (FEPs). Table MON-1 describes the related PA parameters and the major
16 FEPs screening decisions.

17 The data used to determine the 10 monitoring parameters of the CMP are generated by 5 separate
18 monitoring programs (described in Section MON-3.1, Section MON-3.2, Section MON-3.3,
19 Section MON-3.4, and Section MON-3.5). Each monitoring program focuses on the collection
20 of direct field measurements. The programs that generate or evaluate the data are described in
21 Section MON-6.0. Results from each monitoring program are documented individually in
22 annual reports (see Appendix DATA-2009), while the assessment results of the 10 parameters
23 are documented and reported in a compliance monitoring parameter assessment report (Sandia
24 National Laboratories 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, and 2008).

25 As stated earlier, if any of the data, parameters, or observations are not consistent with
26 expectations as defined in Section MON-6.1.1, the CMP process requires addressing concerns
27 and developing recommendations identified by unexpected results. Results from monitoring
28 programs will be generated on an ongoing basis throughout the operational period of the
29 repository. Compliance monitoring data are provided to the cognizant individuals and
30 organizations within the project and evaluated for their significance, and the evaluation results
31 and data summaries are reported to the EPA. Section MON-6.0 describes the process of
32 communicating and reporting CMP results and evaluations.

Table MON-1. Monitoring Parameters

Monitoring Parameter	Monitoring Program	Frequency of Data Collection and Reporting	Related PA Parameter	Related FEPs Evaluation Cycle	Evaluation of Data
Creep Closure and Stresses	Geotechnical Monitoring Program	Various data calls from weekly to monthly based on repository conditions, instrumentation, and data collection system. Data are reported annually.	Not directly related to a PA parameter. May provide a short-term (operational) observation of the geomechanical response of repository excavation. Can provide confidence in the creep closure model.	Salt creep, excavation-induced stress changes, changes in stress field, pressurization. Consolidation of waste/backfill.	Data from this monitoring program are evaluated annually and during recertification.
Extent of Brittle Deformation	Geotechnical Monitoring Program	Various data calls from weekly to monthly based on repository conditions, instrumentation, and data collection system. Data are reported annually.	Not directly related to a PA parameter. Can provide confidence in the long-term behavior of the disturbed rock zone (DRZ), as modeled. Intrinsic shaft DRZ permeability and effective shaft seal permeability is calculated from this parameter.	DRZ, roof falls, consolidation of seals.	Data are evaluated annually and during recertification.
Initiation of Brittle Deformation	Geotechnical Monitoring Program	Various data calls from weekly to monthly based on repository conditions, instrumentation, and data collection system. Data are reported annually.	Not directly related to a PA parameter. Can provide confidence in the anhydrite fracture model implemented in the BRAGFLO code. May provide related repository observation data on initiation or displacement of major brittle deformation features in the roof or surrounding rock.	Disruption due to gas effects.	Data are evaluated annually and during recertification.
Displacement of Deformation Features	Geotechnical Monitoring Program	Various data calls from weekly to monthly based on repository conditions, instrumentation, and data collection system. Data are reported annually.	Not directly related to a PA parameter. Provides related repository operational data on initiation or displacement of major brittle deformation features in the roof or surrounding rock.	Stability of open panel.	Data are evaluated annually and during recertification.

Table MON-1. Monitoring Parameters (Continued)

Monitoring Parameter	Monitoring Program	Frequency of Data Collection and Reporting	Related PA Parameter	Related FEPs Evaluation Cycle	Evaluation of Data
Culebra Groundwater Composition	GMP	Data are collected semiannually and reported annually.	Average Culebra brines composition and matrix distribution coefficient for uranium (U) (IV, VI), plutonium (Pu) (III, IV), thorium (Th) (IV), americium (Am) (III). Matrix distribution coefficient is not a sensitive PA parameter.	Groundwater geochemistry, actinide sorption.	Data are evaluated annually and during recertification.
Change in Culebra Groundwater Flow	GMP	Data are collected monthly and reported annually.	Culebra transmissivity, fracture and matrix porosity, fracture spacing, dispersivity, and climate index. Changes in Culebra groundwater flow are moderately significant to performance and incorporated into the PA.	Groundwater flow and recharge/discharge. Infiltration. Precipitation.	Data are evaluated annually and during recertification.
Drilling Rate	DBDSP	As well records are received (weekly and monthly basis). Data are reported annually.	Drilling rate per unit area. The number of holes is used to calculate a frequency of potential future intrusions into the repository.	Drilling.	Data are evaluated annually and during recertification.
Probability of Encountering a Castile Brine Reservoir	DBDSP	As drilling records are received. Data are reported annually.	Probability of encountering a Castile brine reservoir, reservoir pressure, and volume. These parameters are significant to long-term repository performance.	Drilling fluid flow, drilling fluid loss, blowouts, brine reservoirs.	Data are evaluated annually and during recertification.
Subsidence	SMP	Data are reported annually or as determined necessary by the DOE.	Not directly related to a PA parameter. Can provide spatial information on surface subsidence (if any) over the influence area of the underground openings during operations.	Changes to groundwater flow due to mining effects; subsidence baseline.	Data are evaluated annually or as determined necessary by the DOE.

Table MON-1. Monitoring Parameters (Continued)

Monitoring Parameter	Monitoring Program	Frequency of Data Collection and Reporting	Related PA Parameter	Related FEPs Evaluation Cycle	Evaluation of Data
Waste Activity	WIPP Waste Tracking and Control	Continually updated as waste is approved for shipment to WIPP. Data are reported annually.	Radionuclide inventory. Material parameter weights. These parameters are important to PA.	Waste radiological characteristics.	Data are evaluated annually and during recertification.

1

2 The 10 parameters above are called *compliance monitoring parameters*. As discussed
 3 previously, the EPA determined during the WIPP certification and the 2004 recertification that
 4 these parameters met the regulatory monitoring requirements.

1 **MON-3.0 Preclosure Compliance Monitoring**

2 This section describes the preclosure CMP and the resulting data. The 10 parameters, associated
3 monitoring program for each, frequency of data collection and reporting, related PA parameters,
4 and related screening decisions used to support the PA are listed in Table MON-1.

5 **MON-3.1 Geotechnical Engineering Program Plan**

6 The WIPP Geotechnical Engineering Program Plan (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2006) defines
7 the field programs and investigations carried out by the Geotechnical Engineering group within
8 the Management and Operating Contractor (M&OC). The geotechnical engineering activities
9 provide geologic information related to geotechnical characteristics and assess the stability and
10 performance of the underground facility. The activities defined in the WIPP Geotechnical
11 Engineering Program Plan that collects data related to PA parameters and make up the
12 Geotechnical Monitoring Program described in Table MON-1 are the Geomechanical
13 Monitoring Activities and Geosciences Activities.

14 **MON-3.1.1 Geomechanical Monitoring Activities**

15 Geomechanical monitoring activities provide data to validate design, track short-term and long-
16 term geotechnical performance of underground openings, and support routine safety and stability
17 evaluations of the excavations. Geomechanical monitoring generates data related to the
18 following four parameters:

- 19 1. Creep closure and stresses
- 20 2. Extent of brittle deformation
- 21 3. Initiation of brittle deformation
- 22 4. Displacement of deformation features

23 **MON-3.1.1.1 Scope**

24 The geomechanical monitoring activities provide data on the WIPP design for evaluating the
25 safety and stability of excavations and the behavior of underground openings. From an
26 operational point of view, data related to identifying areas of potential instability allow corrective
27 action to be taken in a timely manner. For underground opening behavior, in situ data are used
28 to model long-term disposal system performance.

29 **MON-3.1.1.2 Instrumentation**

30 Geomechanical instruments installed in the shafts and along drifts within the WIPP facility
31 monitor the geotechnical parameters. Instrumentation in the shafts and the underground
32 repository presently include tape extensometer stations, convergence meters, borehole
33 extensometers, piezometers, embedment strain gauges, stress gauges, inclinometers, load cells,

1 and crack meters. Instruments in the underground repository are either monitored remotely by a
2 surface data logger or read manually.

3 **MON-3.1.1.3 Data Acquisition**

4 Geomechanical data are acquired either remotely by the geomechanical data logging system or
5 manually by geotechnical engineering technicians. Manually acquired data are collected on a
6 quarterly basis and remotely acquired data are collected on a monthly basis, at a minimum.

7 **MON-3.1.1.4 Data Analysis and Dissemination**

8 Data analysis is performed on an annual basis and published. The results of the analyses are
9 published annually in the Geotechnical Analysis Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2004b,
10 2005a, 2006a, 2007a, and 2008).

11 An assessment of convergence measurements and geotechnical observations is made after each
12 round of data collection. The results of each assessment are distributed to affected underground
13 repository operations, engineering, and safety managers.

14 **MON-3.1.2 Geosciences Activities**

15 Geosciences activities document existing geologic conditions and characteristics and monitor for
16 changes resulting from the excavations. These activities generate data related to the following
17 four parameters:

- 18 1. Creep closure and stresses
- 19 2. Extent of brittle deformation
- 20 3. Initiation of brittle deformation
- 21 4. Displacement of deformation features

22 **MON-3.1.2.1 Scope**

23 Changes resulting from excavations are monitored by routine inspections of selected borehole
24 arrays to detect and quantify the occurrences of discontinuities such as fractures and bed
25 separations. The data collected from these inspections further the understanding of fracture
26 development within the Salado Formation that occurs around the excavations. Geosciences
27 activities also provide geologic and fracture mapping, geologic sampling, and seismic
28 monitoring.

29 **MON-3.1.3 Schedule**

30 The following activities are performed on the indicated schedule:

- 31 • Geomechanical Monitoring. This program uses instrumentation located in the shafts and
32 drifts, including tape extensometer stations, convergence meters, borehole extensometers,

1 piezometers, embedment strain gauges, stress gauges, inclinometers, load cells, and crack
2 meters. Instruments are read as designated in Table MON-1.

3 • Seismic Monitoring. Regional seismic monitoring and evaluation are conducted by the New
4 Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology. The network is operated continuously and
5 monitoring results are reported quarterly.

6 • Geologic Mapping. Geologic mapping is conducted in newly excavated areas and in other
7 areas when deemed necessary by the cognizant engineer or Geotechnical Engineering
8 Manager.

9 • At a minimum, a complete analysis of geotechnical data is performed annually. The
10 geotechnical activities will continue throughout the operational period.

11 **MON-3.2 GMP**

12 The purpose of the GMP is to collect groundwater data from numerous wells located at and near
13 the facility. Groundwater monitoring at the WIPP is carried out under the WIPP Groundwater
14 Monitoring Program Plan (GWMPP) (Washington Regulatory Environmental Services 2007).

15 The Culebra remains the focus of the GMP. It has been extensively studied during past
16 hydrologic characterization programs, and was found to be the most likely hydrologic pathway to
17 the accessible environment or compliance point for any potential human-intrusion-caused release
18 scenario.

19 Data obtained through the GMP are used to generate the Culebra groundwater composition and
20 the Culebra groundwater flow parameters. Details on how the program is implemented are
21 provided in the GWMPP (Washington Regulatory Environmental Services 2007).

22 **MON-3.2.1 Scope**

23 The GWMPP addresses requirements for sample collection, groundwater surface elevation
24 monitoring, groundwater flow direction, data management, and reporting of groundwater
25 monitoring data. It also identifies analytical parameters selected to assess groundwater quality.

26 Seven wells were drilled as part of the WIPP GMP: six Water Quality Sampling Program
27 (WQSP) wells (WQSP-1 through WQSP-6), completed to the Culebra, and WQSP-6a,
28 completed to the Dewey Lake Formation. Water samples are collected from these wells and
29 analyzed for certain chemical and physical parameters. This activity generates data in support of
30 the Culebra Groundwater Composition parameter. This parameter calls for analyzing the
31 following ions:

32 Cations: Ca^{2+} , K^+ , Na^+ , Mg^{2+}

33 Anions: Cl^- , HCO_3^- , SO_4^{2-}

34 Water level data are collected to assess changes in Culebra groundwater flow. Water level
35 measurements are tracked over time using WQSP wells and other wells that are widely

1 distributed across the WIPP area to monitor the area's potentiometric surface and groundwater
2 flow directions. If changes in water level(s) occur, the cause is investigated, and any potential
3 impact on the long-term performance of the repository is assessed.

4 **MON-3.2.1.1 Sampling and Reporting for Water Quality**

5 Sampling for water quality is performed at seven groundwater monitoring wells. The Culebra is
6 monitored using wells WQSP-1 through WQSP-6, and the Dewey Lake is monitored using well
7 WQSP-6a. Two types of water samples are collected: serial samples and final samples.

8 Serial samples are taken at regular intervals and analyzed for various physical and chemical
9 parameters (called field indicator parameters) in a mobile field laboratory positioned at the
10 wellhead. The serial sample data are used to determine when a representative sample of the
11 formation water can be taken. The field indicator parameters are chloride, divalent cations,
12 alkalinity, total iron, pH, Eh, temperature, specific conductance, and specific gravity.
13 Interpretation of the serial sampling data determines when conditions representative of
14 undisturbed groundwater are attained in the pumped groundwater.

15 When the field indicator parameters have stabilized, indicating that the sample is representative
16 of formation groundwater, final samples are collected in the appropriate type of container for the
17 specific analysis to meet state and federal groundwater requirements. The final samples are
18 submitted to laboratories for chemical analysis. Section MON-3.2.1 lists the analytes needed to
19 support the PA parameter.

20 The sample tracking system at WIPP uses uniquely numbered Chain of Custody forms and
21 Request for Analysis forms. For storage or transportation, the primary consideration is that
22 samples must be analyzed within the prescribed holding times for the parameters of interest.

23 **MON-3.2.1.2 Sampling and Reporting for Water Level Fluctuations**

24 Water level measurements are taken in the six groundwater monitoring wells (WQSP-1 through
25 WQSP-6) and other available WIPP wells in the monitoring network (Appendix HYDRO-2009,
26 Figure HYDRO-1. Location of WIPP Wells). The water level monitoring will identify water
27 level fluctuations.

28 In addition to the water level measurements, density is determined in the wells. This density is
29 used to convert the water level measurements to equivalent freshwater heads for developing
30 potentiometric surface maps.

31 **MON-3.2.2 Schedule**

32 Background water quality in both the upgradient and downgradient monitoring wells has been
33 established for the WIPP. The seven WQSP monitoring wells constructed for the GMP are
34 sampled on a semiannual basis to compare to the baseline water quality.

35 The groundwater level is measured by monitoring the wells at least on a monthly basis.
36 Groundwater level measurements are monitored and collected for other WIPP wells, as well as
37 for the WQSP wells. The water levels are determined in at least one accessible, completed

1 interval at each available well pad, and quarterly in redundant wells at well pads where two or
 2 more wells are completed in the same interval. Groundwater level measurements primarily
 3 examine changes in groundwater flow rate and direction to identify any changes pertinent to
 4 compliance. These groundwater data supplement the area water level database.

5 The characteristics of the GMP, such as the frequency of sampling and the location of the
 6 sampled wells, will be reevaluated if significant changes are observed in the groundwater flow
 7 direction or gradient. Reporting frequencies are listed in Table MON-2.

8 **Table MON-2. WIPP GMP Sample Collection and Water Level Reporting Frequency**

Type of Well	Frequency
Water Quality Sampling	
WQSP wells (seven)	Semiannually
Water Level Monitoring	
WQSP wells (seven)	Monthly and before sampling events
Other available WIPP wells	Monthly/quarterly

9

10 **MON-3.2.3 Program Outputs**

11 The groundwater samples are analyzed to quantify Culebra Groundwater Composition
 12 parameters and water quality parameters listed in Section MON-3.2.1.

13 The GMP also generates Culebra water level data. The data and results of the GMP are
 14 summarized and published on an annual basis in the WIPP Annual Site Environmental Report
 15 (U.S. Department of Energy 2003a, 2004c, 2005b, 2006b, and 2007b).

16 **MON-3.3 Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program**

17 The DBDSP is described in the Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Plan (Waste Isolation Pilot
 18 Plant 2004). This plan provides for the surveillance of drilling activities within the Delaware
 19 Basin, with specific emphasis on the nine-township area surrounding the WIPP site. The
 20 DBDSP collects information related to the following two parameters:

- 21 1. Probability of encountering a Castile brine reservoir
- 22 2. Drilling rate

23 In addition to the parameters listed above, the DBDSP collects information on the following
 24 activities:

- 25 • Borehole plugging
- 26 • Enhanced recovery
- 27 • Natural gas storage

- 1 • Solution mining
- 2 • Potash mining
- 3 • Seismic events

4 The WIPP PA includes the impacts of drilling on the performance of the repository. The number
 5 of deep boreholes drilled per square kilometer is a parameter used in PA calculations for WIPP
 6 inadvertent intrusion scenarios. This parameter is based on actual drilling rates within the
 7 Delaware Basin over the last 100 years, as required by 40 CFR § 194.33 (U.S. Environmental
 8 Protection Agency 1996).

9 The results of the DBDSP continue to expand the existing database. This program updates these
 10 data to detect any substantial deviations from the assumptions used in the previous PA (see
 11 Section MON-3.3.1, Table MON-3). Collecting additional information about resource
 12 exploration and exploitation activities and practices in the Delaware Basin provides information
 13 to determine whether the drilling scenarios, assumptions, and probabilities used in the PA will
 14 continue to be valid for each five-year recertification of the WIPP.

15 Drilling information for the study area is obtained through commercially available electronic
 16 databases and the records of government agencies. The electronic database is updated and
 17 reviewed weekly to reflect drilling activities in the Delaware Basin. Records of government
 18 agencies are updated as they become available.

19 **MON-3.3.1 Schedule**

20 Table MON-3 shows the frequency of DBDSP data collection.

21

Table MON-3. DBDSP Data Collection Schedule

Information Collected	Frequency
Borehole plugging	Weekly
Enhanced recovery	Monthly
Gas storage	Annually
Solution mining	Annually
Potash mining	Annually
Seismic events	Quarterly
Drilling-related	Weekly
Probability of encountering a Castile brine reservoir	Weekly
Drilling rate calculations	Quarterly

22

1 **MON-3.3.2 Program Outputs**

2 The DBDSP updates and maintains a database of drilling activities and related practices in the
3 Delaware Basin. For the nine-township area surrounding the WIPP, the DBDSP updates and
4 maintains a database containing the following information:

- 5 • Plugging and abandonment activities, including descriptions of plugging configurations
- 6 • The fraction of plugged and abandoned boreholes that are sealed
- 7 • Well conversion activities (injection, disposal, water)
- 8 • Injection well operations (disposal and secondary recovery)
- 9 • Drilling activities, including borehole depths, diameters, and type and amount of drilling
10 fluid
- 11 • Ownership of all state and federal minerals and hydrocarbon leases within the area
- 12 • Occurrences of pressurized brine within the Castile

13 Data collected and recorded by the DBDSP are reported annually in the Delaware Basin
14 Monitoring Annual Program Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2003b, 2004d, 2005c, 2006c,
15 and 2007c).

16 **MON-3.4 SMP**

17 The SMP is described in detail in the WIPP Underground and Surface Surveying Program
18 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2009). Subsidence monitoring measures vertical movement of the
19 land surface relative to a reference location using state-of-the-art leveling equipment. The
20 technique used to monitor subsidence measures the vertical height difference between two or
21 more markers placed on a surface a known distance away from each other using a leveling
22 survey. A reference benchmark is used as the standard and the relative movement of the other
23 benchmark(s) is measured to detect vertical movement over time. Subsidence measurements are
24 relative because the reference is fixed only with respect to the subsidence marker(s).

25 The activities associated with the SMP are designed to

- 26 • Provide time-related spatial information on surface subsidence within 152.4 meters (m)
27 (500 feet (ft)) surrounding the waste shaft during the operational phase of the repository
- 28 • Provide time-related spatial information on surface subsidence over the influence area of
29 the underground openings for comparison with subsidence predictions
- 30 • Maintain a database of subsidence data

31 With current technology, vertical elevation can be measured at a precision of 0.0305 centimeters
32 (cm) (0.001 ft). Subsidence monitoring was chosen by the DOE as a long-term monitoring tool

1 because it effectively meets the requirements in section 191.14(b) for long-term monitoring.
2 Subsidence monitoring is conducted to detect substantial and detrimental deviations from
3 expected repository performance by comparing actual subsidence to predicted subsidence.
4 Subsidence data currently being compiled will be compared to subsidence predictions. In
5 addition, subsidence monitoring during the operational phase generates data to establish a
6 baseline against which long-term subsidence data and information may be evaluated.

7 **MON-3.4.1 Schedule**

8 Subsidence surveys are performed annually throughout the operations period. After closure of
9 the repository, subsidence surveys will be performed at 10-year intervals for at least 100 years or
10 until no further useful information may be obtained through continued monitoring.

11 **MON-3.4.2 Program Outputs**

12 The SMP generates annual surface subsidence data for 24.14 kilometers (km) (15 miles (mi)) of
13 leveling loops through approximately 50 monuments. Results are reported annually in the WIPP
14 Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey (U.S. Department of Energy 2003c, 2004e, 2005d,
15 2006d, and 2007d).

16 **MON-3.5 WIPP Waste Information System**

17 Information on the waste activity parameter is measured or estimated by generator sites through
18 waste characterization activities. Sites are required to report certain information in the WIPP
19 Waste Information System (WWIS). Reports are generated to tabulate key waste parameters.
20 The waste activity parameter includes tracking the total material parameter weights and curie
21 content of 10 radionuclides listed in Section MON-3.5.2.

22 **MON-3.5.1 Schedule**

23 Radionuclide inventory data and material parameter weights for every container of waste placed
24 in the WIPP underground repository are submitted to the WWIS database at the time waste is
25 certified for shipment to WIPP. A current collection of radionuclide inventory data and material
26 parameter weights for the WIPP is maintained within the WWIS.

27 **MON-3.5.2 Program Outputs**

28 The data collected for the waste activity parameter is tracked by the WWIS. The WWIS
29 annually generates a Waste Emplacement Summary Report that is submitted each November to
30 the EPA in the annual 40 CFR § 194.4(b)(4) report (Triay 2003 and U.S. Department of Energy
31 2004f, 2005e, 2006e, and 2007e). The waste activity parameters being tracked and reported
32 include radiological activity (in curies) that were emplaced during the 40 CFR § 194.4(b)(4)
33 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) reporting period and the cumulative activity since
34 waste was first emplaced in the repository. The radionuclides being tracked (in curies) include

- 35 • ²⁴¹Am

- 1 • ^{238}Pu
 - 2 • ^{239}Pu
 - 3 • ^{240}Pu
 - 4 • ^{242}Pu
 - 5 • ^{233}U
 - 6 • ^{234}U
 - 7 • ^{238}U
 - 8 • ^{90}Sr
 - 9 • ^{137}Cs
- 10 The WWIS tracks other waste-related components that are annually reported in the section
11 194.4(b)(4) report. These waste components include
- 12 • Emplaced magnesium oxide (kg per room and per panel)
 - 13 • Emplaced cellulose, plastic and rubber materials (kg per room and per panel)
 - 14 • Emplaced container volume (m^3)
 - 15 • Emplaced ferrous metals (kg)
 - 16 • Emplaced non ferrous metals (kg)

1 **MON-4.0 Postclosure (Long-Term) Monitoring**

2 The final Postclosure Monitoring Plan will be developed prior to final facility closure (sealing of
3 the shafts), but will not be implemented until after facility closure. This plan will include a
4 review of the CRA-2004, Appendix MON 2004, Attachment A. When the final Postclosure
5 Monitoring Plan is written, any proposed changes to the commitments made in Attachment A
6 must be approved by the appropriate regulatory authorities.

1 **MON-5.0 Monitoring Programs Quality Assurance Requirements**

2 The quality of the work performed under the DOE CMP is accomplished per the criteria of 40
3 CFR § 194.22(a)(2)(ii) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996) and controlled by the
4 application of the CBFO Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) (U.S. Department of
5 Energy 2007f). Waste information is controlled by implementing the QAPD at generator sites.

6 In addition to the management requirements, such as document and record control established in
7 the QAPD, requirements related to sampling and monitoring activities are specified. In
8 particular, the following two sections of the QAPD are directly related to the performance of
9 monitoring work and the control of samples:

- 10 • Section 2.4 – Inspection and Testing
 - 11 – Qualification of personnel
 - 12 – Inspection
 - 13 – Test requirements
 - 14 – Monitoring, measuring, testing, and data collection
 - 15 – Use and control of measuring and test equipment
 - 16 – Calibration
- 17 • Section 4.0 – Sample Control Requirements
 - 18 – Sample control
 - 19 – Sample identification
 - 20 – Handling, storing, and shipping samples
 - 21 – Disposition of nonconforming samples

22 WIPP monitoring programs are subject to EPA inspections in accordance with 40 CFR § 194.21
23 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996).

24 The CMP relies on the individual monitoring plan's QA program to ensure compliance with
25 DOE WIPP requirements for data quality assessments, objectives, and analyses. Each sampling
26 and monitoring program is implemented through individual implementation plans, which include
27 the QA descriptions, objectives, and references to the applicable governing QA documents.

1 **MON-6.0 Reporting And Assessment**

2 Information flow is controlled to ensure important monitoring results are communicated to the
3 appropriate individuals and groups.

4 **MON-6.1 Monitoring Data Reporting**

5 The monitoring programs that generate data used in the CMP are implemented by the M&OC.
6 Reporting the data for the 10 compliance monitoring parameters is coordinated through the
7 M&OC.

8 **MON-6.1.1 CMP Assessment Report**

9 The results of the CMP are reported in the compliance assessment report (Sandia National
10 Laboratories 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, and 2008).

11 The CMP results may indicate two general cases: normal or expected conditions, in which
12 results are generally consistent with existing data, parameter values, and conceptual models; and
13 anomalous conditions, in which results are inconsistent with existing data, parameter values, or
14 conceptual models. DOE determines whether these results are consistent with expected
15 conditions modeled in the PA or screening decisions used to support the compliance
16 determination. The report also recommends if the CMP should be modified based on results of
17 the monitoring programs.

18 This report is sent to the EPA as part of the annual reporting requirement of 40 CFR §
19 194.4(b)(4).

20 **MON-6.1.2 External Reporting**

21 The DOE reviews the recommendations of the M&OC and the scientific advisor to evaluate their
22 significance. Significance is determined based on consideration of the following criteria:

- 23 • Containment requirements established pursuant to 40 CFR § 191.13 (U.S. Environmental
24 Protection Agency 1993) are, or are expected to be, exceeded.
- 25 • Releases from previously emplaced waste that lead to committed effective doses that are, or
26 are expected to be, in excess of those established pursuant to 40 CFR § 191.15 (U.S.
27 Environmental Protection Agency 1993) (not including emissions from operations covered
28 pursuant to Part 191 Subpart A).
- 29 • Releases that have caused, or are expected to cause, concentrations of radionuclides (or
30 estimated doses due to radionuclides in underground sources of drinking water in the
31 accessible environment) to exceed the limits established pursuant to Part 191 Subpart C.

32 If monitoring results meet any of these criteria, the results are considered significant. Significant
33 monitoring results are promptly reported to the EPA. The report is accompanied by a
34 recommended course of action, including the appropriate external reporting. If the monitoring

1 results exceed or possibly exceed containment requirements or release limits as specified in 40
2 CFR § 194.4(b)(3)(ii), the CBFO will immediately cease emplacement of waste in the WIPP and
3 notify the EPA within 24 hours.

4 If the DOE discovers a condition or activity that differs significantly from what is indicated in
5 the most recent compliance application, but does not involve conditions or activities listed in
6 section 194.4(b)(3)(ii), then the difference shall be reported in writing to the EPA within 10
7 calendar days of discovery.

8 For normal conditions where monitoring results are within expectations, the CMP assessment
9 documents this condition (Sandia National Laboratories 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, and 2008).
10 As stated previously, this report is sent to the EPA as part of the annual reporting requirement of
11 section 194.4(b)(4).

1 **MON-7.0 References**

- 2 Kirkes, R., and S. Wagner. 2003. *MONPAR Reassessment*. ERMS 533098. Carlsbad, NM:
3 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Marcinowski, F. 2002. Letter to I.R. Triay. 15 March 2002. U.S. Environmental Protection
5 Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 6 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2004. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
7 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2003* (Revision 1, June). WBS 1.3.1. Carlsbad, NM.
- 8 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2005a. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
9 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2004* (February). WBS 1.3.1. Carlsbad, NM.
- 10 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2005b. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
11 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2005* (November). WBS 1.3.1. Carlsbad, NM.
- 12 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2006. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
13 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2006* (October). WBS 1.3.1. Carlsbad, NM.
- 14 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 2008. *Sandia National Laboratories Annual Compliance*
15 *Monitoring Parameter Assessment for 2007* (January). WBS 1.3.1. Carlsbad, NM.
- 16 Triay, I.R. 2002. Letter to F. Marcinowski (1 Enclosure). 3 January 2002. U.S. Department of
17 Energy, Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad, NM.
- 18 Triay, I.R. 2003. Letter to F. Marcinowski (Subject: 2003 Annual Change Report; 3
19 Enclosures). 13 November 2003. U.S. Department of Energy. Carlsbad Field Office, Carlsbad,
20 NM.
- 21 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003a. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental*
22 *Report: Calendar Year 2002* (Rev. 1, September). DOE/WIPP 03-2225. Carlsbad, NM:
23 Carlsbad Field Office.
- 24 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003b. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Program*
25 *Report* (Rev. 4, September). DOE/WIPP-99-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 26 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2003c. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey*
27 (October). DOE/WIPP-04-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004a. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
29 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
30 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004b. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2002-June*
32 *2003* (March). 2 vols. DOE/WIPP 04-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004c. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2003 Site Environmental*
2 *Report*. DOE/WIPP 04-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004d. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Program*
4 *Report* (Rev. 5, September). DOE/WIPP 99-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 5 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004e. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey*
6 (December). DOE/WIPP 05-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 7 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004f. *Annual Change Report 2003/2004* (November 10).
8 DOE/WIPP 04-3317. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 9 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005a. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2003-June*
10 *2004* (March). 2 vols. DOE/WIPP 05-3117. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 11 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005b. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental*
12 *Report Calendar Year 2004*. DOE/WIPP 05-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 13 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005c. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Program*
14 *Report* (Rev. 6, September). DOE/WIPP-99-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 15 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005d. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey*
16 (December). DOE/WIPP-06-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 17 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005e. *Annual Change Report 2004–2005* (November).
18 DOE/WIPP-05-3317. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006a. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2004-June*
20 *2005* (April). 2 vols. DOE/WIPP 06-3117. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 21 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006b. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site*
22 *Environmental Report for 2005* (September). DOE/WIPP 06-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad
23 Field Office.
- 24 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006c. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Program*
25 *Report* (September). DOE/WIPP-06-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 26 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006d. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey*
27 (December). DOE/WIPP-07-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006e. *Annual Change Report 2005–2006* (October).
29 DOE/WIPP-06-3317. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 30 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007a. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2005-June*
31 *2006* (March). 2 vols. DOE/WIPP 07-3117. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 32 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007b. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site Environmental*
33 *Report Calendar Year 2006*. DOE/WIPP 07-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007c. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report*
2 (September). DOE/WIPP 07-2308. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007d. *WIPP Subsidence Monument Leveling Survey 2006*
4 (December 2006). DOE/WIPP 07-2293. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 5 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007e. *Annual Change Report 2006/2007: From July 1,*
6 *2006, to June 30, 2007* (November 16). DOE/WIPP-07 3317. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field
7 Office.
- 8 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007f. *Quality Assurance Program Document* (Revision 9,
9 December). DOE/CBFO-94-1012. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2008. *Geotechnical Analysis Report for July 2006 to June*
11 *2007* (March). DOE/WIPP-08-3177. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 12 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
13 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
14 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
15 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
17 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
18 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule”. *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
19 5223–45.
- 20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
21 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
22 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
23 1998): 27353–406.
- 24 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. “CARD No. 42: Monitoring.”
25 *Compliance Application Review Document Number 42 for the Criteria for the Certification and*
26 *Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR 191 Disposal*
27 *Regulations: Final Certification Decision* (May) (pp. 42-1 through 42-24). Washington, DC:
28 Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 29 Wagner, S.W. 2008. *Reassessment of MONPAR Analysis for Use in the 2009 Compliance*
30 *Recertification Application*. ERMS 548948. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 Washington Regulatory Environmental Services (WRES). 2007. *WIPP Groundwater*
32 *Monitoring Program Plan* (Rev. 7, March 6). WP 02-1. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 33 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). 2004. *WIPP Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program*
34 (Rev. 1, July 1). WP 02-PC.02. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 35 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). 2006. *WIPP Geotechnical Engineering Program Plan*
36 (Rev. 5, December 8). WP 07-01. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). 2008. *WIPP Underground and Surface Surveying Program*
- 2 (Rev. 5). WP 09-ES.01. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Appendix PA-2009
Performance Assessment**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix PA-2009
Performance Assessment

Table of Contents

PA-1.0 Introduction PA-1

PA-2.0 Overview and Conceptual Structure of the PA PA-4

 PA-2.1 Overview of Performance Assessment..... PA-4

 PA-2.1.1 Changes in the CRA-2009 PA PA-5

 PA-2.1.2 Conceptual Basis for PA..... PA-6

 PA-2.1.3 Undisturbed Repository Performance..... PA-7

 PA-2.1.4 Disturbed Repository Performance..... PA-9

 PA-2.1.5 Compliance Demonstration Method..... PA-15

 PA-2.1.6 Results of the PA PA-16

 PA-2.2 Conceptual Structure of the PA..... PA-17

 PA-2.2.1 Regulatory Requirements PA-18

 PA-2.2.2 Probabilistic Characterization of Different Futures..... PA-20

 PA-2.2.3 Estimation of Releases..... PA-21

 PA-2.2.4 Probabilistic Characterization of Parameter Uncertainty PA-24

 PA-2.3 PA Methodology PA-27

 PA-2.3.1 Identification and Screening of FEPs PA-27

 PA-2.3.2 Scenario Development and Selection PA-28

 PA-2.3.3 Calculation of Scenario Consequences..... PA-37

PA-3.0 Probabilistic Characterization of Futures PA-39

 PA-3.1 Probability Space..... PA-40

 PA-3.2 AICs and PICs PA-40

 PA-3.3 Drilling Intrusion PA-40

 PA-3.4 Penetration of Excavated/Nonexcavated Area PA-41

 PA-3.5 Drilling Location PA-42

 PA-3.6 Penetration of Pressurized Brine PA-43

 PA-3.7 Plugging Pattern PA-43

 PA-3.8 Activity Level..... PA-43

 PA-3.9 Mining Time..... PA-44

 PA-3.10 Scenarios and Scenario Probabilities..... PA-45

 PA-3.11 CCDF Construction..... PA-47

PA-4.0 Estimation of Releases PA-48

 PA-4.1 Results for Specific Futures..... PA-48

 PA-4.2 Two-Phase Flow: BRAGFLO PA-50

 PA-4.2.1 Mathematical Description..... PA-50

 PA-4.2.2 Initial Conditions PA-65

 PA-4.2.3 Creep Closure of Repository PA-67

 PA-4.2.4 Fracturing of MBs and DRZ..... PA-67

 PA-4.2.5 Gas Generation PA-69

 PA-4.2.6 Capillary Action in the Waste..... PA-75

 PA-4.2.7 Shaft Treatment PA-76

 PA-4.2.8 Option D Panel Closures PA-77

 PA-4.2.9 Borehole Model PA-80

PA-4.2.10 Castile Brine Reservoir.....	PA-81
PA-4.2.11 Numerical Solution.....	PA-82
PA-4.2.12 Gas and Brine Flow across Specified Boundaries.....	PA-85
PA-4.2.13 Additional Information.....	PA-86
PA-4.3 Radionuclide Transport in the Salado: NUTS.....	PA-86
PA-4.3.1 Mathematical Description.....	PA-88
PA-4.3.2 Calculation of Maximum Concentration $S_T(Br, Ox, El)$	PA-91
PA-4.3.3 Radionuclides Transported.....	PA-93
PA-4.3.4 NUTS Tracer Calculations.....	PA-96
PA-4.3.5 NUTS Transport Calculations.....	PA-97
PA-4.3.6 Numerical Solution.....	PA-97
PA-4.3.7 Additional Information.....	PA-100
PA-4.4 Radionuclide Transport in the Salado: PANEL.....	PA-101
PA-4.4.1 Mathematical Description.....	PA-101
PA-4.4.2 Numerical Solution.....	PA-102
PA-4.4.3 Implementation in PA.....	PA-103
PA-4.4.4 Additional Information.....	PA-103
PA-4.5 Cuttings and Cavings to Surface: CUTTINGS_S.....	PA-103
PA-4.5.1 Cuttings.....	PA-104
PA-4.5.2 Cavings.....	PA-104
PA-4.5.3 Additional Information.....	PA-111
PA-4.6 Spallings to Surface: DRSPALL and CUTTINGS_S.....	PA-111
PA-4.6.1 Summary of Assumptions.....	PA-111
PA-4.6.2 Conceptual Model.....	PA-112
PA-4.6.3 Numerical Model.....	PA-124
PA-4.6.4 Implementation.....	PA-129
PA-4.6.5 Additional Information.....	PA-130
PA-4.7 DBR to Surface: BRAGFLO.....	PA-130
PA-4.7.1 Overview of Conceptual Model.....	PA-130
PA-4.7.2 Linkage to Two-Phase Flow Calculation.....	PA-132
PA-4.7.3 Conceptual Representation for Flow Rate $rDBR(t)$	PA-134
PA-4.7.4 Determination of Productivity Index J_p	PA-135
PA-4.7.5 Determination of Waste Panel Pressure $p_w(t)$ and DBR.....	PA-137
PA-4.7.6 Boundary Value Pressure p_{wf}	PA-138
PA-4.7.7 Boundary Value Pressure p_{wE1}	PA-145
PA-4.7.8 End of DBR.....	PA-150
PA-4.7.9 Numerical Solution.....	PA-151
PA-4.7.10 Additional Information.....	PA-153
PA-4.8 Groundwater Flow in the Culebra Dolomite.....	PA-153
PA-4.8.1 Mathematical Description.....	PA-154
PA-4.8.2 Implementation.....	PA-155
PA-4.8.3 Computational Grids and Boundary Value Conditions.....	PA-158
PA-4.8.4 Numerical Solution.....	PA-160
PA-4.8.5 Additional Information.....	PA-160
PA-4.9 Radionuclide Transport in the Culebra Dolomite.....	PA-160
PA-4.9.1 Mathematical Description.....	PA-162

PA-4.9.2 Numerical Solution	PA-170
PA-4.9.3 Additional Information	PA-174
PA-5.0 Probabilistic Characterization of Subjective Uncertainty	PA-176
PA-5.1 Probability Space	PA-176
PA-5.2 Variables Included for Subjective Uncertainty	PA-177
PA-5.3 Variable Distributions	PA-177
PA-5.4 Correlations and Dependencies	PA-178
PA-5.5 Separation of Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty	PA-180
PA-6.0 Computational Procedures.....	PA-181
PA-6.1 Sampling Procedures	PA-181
PA-6.2 Sample Size for Incorporation of Subjective Uncertainty.....	PA-182
PA-6.3 Statistical Confidence on Mean CCDF	PA-182
PA-6.4 Generation of Latin Hypercube Samples.....	PA-183
PA-6.5 Generation of Individual Futures.....	PA-185
PA-6.6 Construction of CCDFs	PA-186
PA-6.7 Mechanistic Calculations.....	PA-188
PA-6.7.1 BRAGFLO Calculations.....	PA-188
PA-6.7.2 NUTS Calculations	PA-189
PA-6.7.3 PANEL Calculations	PA-190
PA-6.7.4 DRSPALL Calculations.....	PA-191
PA-6.7.5 CUTTINGS_S Calculations	PA-191
PA-6.7.6 BRAGFLO Calculations for DBR Volumes	PA-192
PA-6.7.7 MODFLOW Calculations.....	PA-192
PA-6.7.8 SECOTP2D Calculations.....	PA-193
PA-6.8 Computation of Releases	PA-193
PA-6.8.1 Undisturbed Releases.....	PA-194
PA-6.8.2 Direct Releases	PA-194
PA-6.8.3 Radionuclide Transport Through the Culebra	PA-196
PA-6.8.4 Determining Initial Conditions for Direct and Transport Releases	PA-197
PA-6.8.5 CCDF Construction	PA-199
PA-6.9 Sensitivity Analysis	PA-200
PA-6.9.1 Scatterplots	PA-201
PA-6.9.2 Regression Analysis.....	PA-202
PA-6.9.3 Stepwise Regression Analysis	PA-203
PA-7.0 Results for the Undisturbed Repository	PA-204
PA-7.1 Salado Flow	PA-204
PA-7.1.1 Pressure in the Repository	PA-204
PA-7.1.2 Brine Saturation in the Waste	PA-205
PA-7.1.3 Brine Flow Out of the Repository	PA-208
PA-7.2 Radionuclide Transport	PA-209
PA-7.2.1 Radionuclide Transport to the Culebra.....	PA-210
PA-7.2.2 Radionuclide Transport to the Land Withdrawal Boundary.....	PA-210

PA-8.0 Results for a Disturbed Repository..... PA-212

 PA-8.1 Drilling Scenarios..... PA-212

 PA-8.2 Mining Scenarios..... PA-213

 PA-8.3 Salado Flow..... PA-213

 PA-8.3.1 Pressure in the Repository..... PA-213

 PA-8.3.2 Brine Saturation..... PA-215

 PA-8.3.3 Brine Flow out of the Repository..... PA-219

 PA-8.4 Radionuclide Transport..... PA-224

 PA-8.4.1 Radionuclide Source Term..... PA-224

 PA-8.4.2 Transport through MBs and Shaft..... PA-226

 PA-8.4.3 Transport to the Culebra..... PA-226

 PA-8.4.4 Transport Through the Culebra..... PA-229

 PA-8.5 Direct Releases..... PA-231

 PA-8.5.1 Cuttings and Cavings..... PA-231

 PA-8.5.2 Spallings..... PA-232

 PA-8.5.3 DBRs..... PA-235

PA-9.0 Normalized Releases..... PA-237

 PA-9.1 Cuttings and Cavings..... PA-237

 PA-9.2 Spallings..... PA-238

 PA-9.3 Direct Brine..... PA-238

 PA-9.4 Groundwater Transport..... PA-240

 PA-9.5 Total Normalized Releases..... PA-241

PA-10.0 References..... PA-247

List of Figures

Figure PA-1. Overall Mean CCDFs for Total Normalized Releases: CRA-2009 PA and CRA-2004 PABC..... PA-16

Figure PA-2. Computational Models Used in PA..... PA-23

Figure PA-3. Construction of the CCDF Specified in 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart B..... PA-23

Figure PA-4. Distribution of CCDFs Resulting from Possible Values for the Sampled Parameters..... PA-25

Figure PA-5. Example Mean Probability of Release and the Confidence Limits on the Mean from CRA-2009 PA..... PA-26

Figure PA-6. Example CCDF Distribution From CRA-2009 PA (Replicate 1)..... PA-26

Figure PA-7. Logic Diagram for Scenario Analysis..... PA-29

Figure PA-8. Conceptual Release Pathways for the UP Scenario..... PA-30

Figure PA-9. Conceptual Release Pathways for the Disturbed Repository M Scenario..... PA-32

Figure PA-10. Conceptual Release Pathways for the Disturbed Repository Deep Drilling E2 Scenario..... PA-34

Figure PA-11. Conceptual Release Pathways for the Disturbed Repository Deep Drilling E1 Scenario..... PA-35

Figure PA-12. Conceptual Release Pathways for the Disturbed Repository Deep Drilling E1E2 Scenario..... PA-36

Figure PA-13.	CDF for Time Between Drilling Intrusions	PA-41
Figure PA-14.	Discretized Locations for Drilling Intrusions.....	PA-42
Figure PA-15.	Computational Grid Used in BRAGFLO for PA	PA-54
Figure PA-16.	Definition of Element Depth in BRAGFLO Grid	PA-55
Figure PA-17.	Identification of Individual Cells in BRAGFLO Grid	PA-56
Figure PA-18.	Schematic View of the Simplified Shaft Model.....	PA-78
Figure PA-19.	Schematic Side View of Option D Panel Closure.....	PA-78
Figure PA-20.	Representation of Option D Panel Closures in the BRAGFLO Grid.....	PA-79
Figure PA-21.	Selecting Radionuclides for the Release Pathways Conceptualized by PA	PA-94
Figure PA-22.	Detail of Rotary Drill String Adjacent to Drill Bit.....	PA-106
Figure PA-23.	Schematic Diagram of the Flow Geometry Prior to Repository Penetration.....	PA-112
Figure PA-24.	Schematic Diagram of the Flow Geometry After Repository Penetration.....	PA-113
Figure PA-25.	Effective Wellbore Flow Geometry Before Bit Penetration	PA-113
Figure PA-26.	Effective Wellbore Flow Geometry After Bit Penetration.....	PA-114
Figure PA-27.	Finite-Difference Zoning for Wellbore	PA-125
Figure PA-28.	DBR Grid Used in PA	PA-131
Figure PA-29.	Assignment of Initial Conditions for DBR Calculation	PA-133
Figure PA-30.	Borehole Representation Used for Poettmann-Carpenter Correlation	PA-140
Figure PA-31.	Areas of Potash Mining in the McNutt Potash Zone.....	PA-157
Figure PA-32.	Modeling Domain for Groundwater Flow (MODFLOW) and Radionuclide Transport (SECOTP2D) in the Culebra	PA-158
Figure PA-33.	Boundary Conditions Used for Simulations of Brine Flow in the Culebra	PA-159
Figure PA-34.	Finite-Difference Grid Showing Cell Index Numbering Convention Used by MODFLOW	PA-161
Figure PA-35.	Parallel-Plate, Dual-Porosity Conceptualization.....	PA-162
Figure PA-36.	Schematic of Finite-Volume Staggered Mesh Showing Internal and Ghost Cells	PA-171
Figure PA-37.	Illustration of Stretched Grid Used for Matrix Domain Discretization.....	PA-173
Figure PA-38.	Correlation Between S_HALITE:PRMX_LOG and S_HALITE:COMP_RCK.....	PA-179
Figure PA-39.	Correlation between CASTILLER:PRMX_LOG and CASTILLER:COMP_RCK.....	PA-179
Figure PA-40.	Dependency between WAS_AREA:GRATMICI and WAS_AREA:GRATMICH.....	PA-180
Figure PA-41.	Logic Diagram for Determining the Intrusion Type	PA-199
Figure PA-42.	Processing of Input Data to Produce CCDFs	PA-201
Figure PA-43.	Pressure in the Waste Panel Region, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009 PA	PA-205
Figure PA-44.	Primary Correlations of Pressure in the Waste Panel Region with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009 PA.....	PA-206
Figure PA-45.	Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009 PA	PA-207

Figure PA-46.	Primary Correlations of Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009 PA.....	PA-207
Figure PA-47.	Brine Flow Away From the Repository, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009 PA	PA-208
Figure PA-48.	Brine Flow via All MBs Across the LWB, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009 PA	PA-209
Figure PA-49.	Primary Correlations of Total Cumulative Brine Flow Away from the Repository with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009 PA	PA-210
Figure PA-50.	Pressure in the Waste Panel Region for Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA	PA-214
Figure PA-51.	Pressure in the Waste Panel Region for Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA	PA-214
Figure PA-52.	Primary Correlations of Pressure in the Waste Panel Region with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA.....	PA-216
Figure PA-53.	Primary Correlations of Pressure in the Waste Panel Region with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA.....	PA-216
Figure PA-54.	Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region for Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA	PA-217
Figure PA-55.	Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region for Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA	PA-218
Figure PA-56.	Primary Correlations of Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA.....	PA-218
Figure PA-57.	Primary Correlations of Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA.....	PA-219
Figure PA-58.	Total Cumulative Brine Outflow in Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA	PA-220
Figure PA-59.	Brine Flow via All MBs Across the LWB in Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA	PA-221
Figure PA-60.	Total Cumulative Brine Outflow in Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA	PA-221
Figure PA-61.	Brine Flow via All MBs Across the LWB in Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA	PA-222
Figure PA-62.	Primary Correlations of Cumulative Brine Flow Away from the Repository with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA	PA-223
Figure PA-63.	Primary Correlations of Cumulative Brine Flow Away from the Repository with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA	PA-223
Figure PA-64.	Total Mobilized Concentrations in Salado Brine, Replicate R1, CRA-2009 PA	PA-225
Figure PA-65.	Total Mobilized Concentrations in Castile Brine, Replicate R1, CRA-2009 PA	PA-225
Figure PA-66.	Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA	PA-227

Figure PA-67.	Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Scenario S3, CRA-2009 PA	PA-227
Figure PA-68.	Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA	PA-228
Figure PA-69.	Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Scenario S5, CRA-2009 PA	PA-228
Figure PA-70.	Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Replicate R1, Scenario S6, CRA-2009 PA	PA-229
Figure PA-71.	Scatterplot of Waste Particle Diameter Versus Spallings Volume, CRA-2009 PA	PA-232
Figure PA-72.	Scatterplot of Waste Permeability Versus Spallings Volume, CRA-2009 PA	PA-233
Figure PA-73.	Sensitivity of DBR Volumes to Pressure and Mobile Brine Saturation, Replicate R1, Scenario S2, Lower Panel, CRA-2009 PA	PA-236
Figure PA-74.	Overall Mean CCDFs for Cuttings and Cavings Releases: CRA-2009 PA and CRA-2004 PABC	PA-238
Figure PA-75.	Overall Mean CCDFs for Spallings Releases: CRA-2009 PA and CRA 2004 PABC	PA-239
Figure PA-76.	Overall Mean CCDFs for DBRs: CRA-2009 PA and CRA-2004 PABC.....	PA-239
Figure PA-77.	Mean CCDFs for Releases from the Culebra for Replicate R2: CRA-2009 PA and CRA-2004 PABC.....	PA-241
Figure PA-78.	The Preponderance and Distribution of Zeros Can Control the Regression	PA-242
Figure PA-79.	Total Normalized Releases, Replicates R1, R2, and R3, CRA-2009 PA	PA-242
Figure PA-80.	Confidence Interval on Overall Mean CCDF for Total Normalized Releases, CRA-2009 PA	PA-243
Figure PA-81.	Mean CCDFs for Components of Total Normalized Releases, Replicate R1, CRA-2009 PA.....	PA-244
Figure PA-82.	Mean CCDFs for Components of Total Normalized Releases, Replicate R2, CRA-2009 PA.....	PA-244
Figure PA-83.	Mean CCDFs for Components of Total Normalized Releases, Replicate R3, CRA-2009 PA.....	PA-245
Figure PA-84.	Overall Mean CCDFs for Total Normalized Releases: CRA-2009 PA and CRA-2004 PABC	PA-245

List of Tables

Table PA-1.	WIPP Project Changes and Cross References.....	PA-5
Table PA-2.	Release Limits for the Containment Requirements.....	PA-19
Table PA-3.	Parameter Values Used in Representation of Two-Phase Flow	PA-57
Table PA-4.	Models for Relative Permeability and Capillary Pressure in Two-Phase Flow	PA-63
Table PA-5.	Initial Conditions in the Rustler	PA-66

Table PA-6.	Probabilities for Biodegradation of Different Organic Materials (WAS_AREA:PROBDEG) in the CRA-2009 PA and the CRA-2004 PA	PA-72
Table PA-7.	Permeabilities for Drilling Intrusions Through the Repository.....	PA-81
Table PA-8.	Boundary Value Conditions for P_g and P_b	PA-83
Table PA-9.	Auxiliary Dirichlet Conditions for S_g and P_b	PA-83
Table PA-10.	Calculated Values for Dissolved Solubility	PA-92
Table PA-11.	Scale Factor $SF_{Hum}(Br, Ox, El)$ Used in Definition of $S_{Hum}(Br, Ox, El)$	PA-93
Table PA-12.	Scale Factor $SF_{Mic}(Ox, El)$ and Upper Bound $UB_{Mic}(Ox, El)$ (mol/L) Used in Definition of $S_{Mic}(Br, Ox, El)$	PA-93
Table PA-13.	Combination of Radionuclides for Transport.....	PA-96
Table PA-14.	Initial and Boundary Conditions for $C_{bf}(x, y, t)$ and $C_{st}(x, y, t)$	PA-98
Table PA-15.	Uncertain Parameters in the DRSPALL Calculations.....	PA-129
Table PA-16.	Initial Porosity in the DBR Calculation	PA-135
Table PA-17.	Boundary Conditions for p_b and S_g in DBR Calculations.....	PA-139
Table PA-18.	Radionuclide Culebra Transport Diffusion Coefficients.....	PA-163
Table PA-19.	Variables Representing Epistemic Uncertainty in the CRA-2009 PA	PA-164
Table PA-20.	Sampled Parameters Added Since the CRA-2004 PA	PA-177
Table PA-21.	Sampled Parameters Removed Since the CRA-2004 PA	PA-177
Table PA-22.	Correlation Observed Between Variables S_HALITE:PRMX_LOG and S_HALITE:COMP_RCK in Replicate 1	PA-184
Table PA-23.	Correlation Observed Between Variables CASTILER:PRMX_LOG and CASTILER:COMP_RCK in Replicate 1	PA-184
Table PA-24.	Algorithm to Generate a Single Future	PA-185
Table PA-25.	BRAGFLO Scenarios in the CRA-2009 PA	PA-188
Table PA-26.	NUTS Release Calculations in the CRA-2009 PA	PA-190
Table PA-27.	CUTTINGS_S Release Calculations in the CRA-2009 PA	PA-191
Table PA-28.	MODFLOW Scenarios in the CRA-2009 PA	PA-193
Table PA-29.	SECOTP2D Scenarios in the CRA-2004 PA	PA-193
Table PA-30.	Number of Realizations with Radionuclide Transport to the LWB Under Partial-Mining Conditions.....	PA-230
Table PA-31.	Number of Realizations with Radionuclide Transport to the LWB Under Full-Mining Conditions.....	PA-231
Table PA-32.	CRA-2009 PA Cuttings and Cavings Area Statistics.....	PA-232
Table PA-33.	CRA-2009 PA Spallings Volume Statistics	PA-234
Table PA-34.	CRA-2009 PA DBR Volume Statistics.....	PA-235
Table PA-35.	CRA-2009 PA and CRA-2004 PABC Statistics on the Overall Mean for Total Normalized Releases in EPA Units at Probabilities of 0.1 and 0.001	PA-246

Acronyms and Abbreviations

%	percent
AIC	active institutional control
An	actinide
BRAGFLO	BRine And Gas FLOW computer code
C	Celsius
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CCDF	complementary cumulative distribution function
CDF	cumulative distribution function
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
Ci	curies
CL	Confidence Limit
CPR	cellulosic, plastic, and rubber
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBR	direct brine release
DDZ	drilling damaged zone
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DP	disturbed repository performance
DRZ	disturbed rock zone
E	deep drilling scenario
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERDA	U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration
FEP	feature, event, and process
FMT	Fracture-Matrix Transport
FVW	fraction of excavated repository volume occupied by waste
gal	gallon
GWB	Generic Weep Brine
in	inch
J	Joule
K	Kelvin
K_d	distribution coefficient

kg	kilogram
km	kilometer
km ²	square kilometers
L	liter
LHS	Latin hypercube sampling
LWB	land withdrawal boundary
M	mining scenario
m	meter
m ²	square meters
m ³	cubic meters
MB	marker bed
ME	mining and drilling scenario
mi	miles
mol	mole
MPa	megapascal
MTHM	metric tons of heavy metal
MWd	megawatt-days
N	Newton
Pa	Pascal
PA	performance assessment
PABC	performance assessment baseline calculation
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
PCC	partial correlation coefficient
PCS	panel closure system
PDE	partial differential equation
PDF	probability distribution function
PIC	passive institutional control
PRCC	partial rank correlation coefficient
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
RKS	Redlich-Kwong-Soave
RoR	Rest of Repository
s	second

s ²	seconds squared
SCF/d	standard cubic feet per day
SMC	Salado Mass Concrete
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SRC	standardized regression coefficient
T field	transmissivity field
TRU	transuranic
TVD	Total Variation Diminishing
UP	undisturbed repository performance
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
yr	year

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Al	aluminum
Am	americium
C	carbon
C ₆ H ₁₀ O ₅	generic formula for CPR
Ca	calcium
CH ₄	methane
Cm	curium
CO ₂	carbon dioxide
Cr	chromium
Cs	cesium
Fe	iron
H ₂	hydrogen gas
H ₂ O	water
H ₂ S	hydrogen sulfide
I	iodine
Mg	magnesium
Mg(OH) ₂	brucite
Mg ₅ (CO ₃) ₄ (OH) ₂ ·4H ₂ O	hydromagnesite (5424)

MgO	magnesium oxide, or periclase
Mn	manganese
Ni	nickel
NO ₃ ⁻	nitrate
Np	neptunium
Pb	lead
Pm	promethium
Pu	plutonium
Ra	radium
Sn	tin
SO ₄	sulfate
SO ₄ ²⁻	sulfate ion
Sr	strontium
Tc	technetium
Th	thorium
U	uranium
V	vanadium

1 PA-1.0 Introduction

2 This appendix presents the mathematical models used to evaluate performance of the Waste
3 Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) disposal system and the results of these models for the 2009
4 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2009) Performance Assessment (PA). The term
5 PA signifies an analysis that (1) identifies the processes and events that might affect the disposal
6 system; (2) examines the effects of these processes and events on the performance of the disposal
7 system; and (3) estimates the cumulative releases of radionuclides, considering the associated
8 uncertainties, caused by all significant processes and events (40 CFR § 191.12 [U.S.
9 Environmental Protection Agency 1993]). PA is designed to address three primary questions
10 about the WIPP:

11 Q1: What processes and events that might affect the disposal system could take place at the
12 WIPP site over the next 10,000 years?

13 Q2: How likely are the various processes and events that might affect the disposal system to
14 take place at the WIPP site over the next 10,000 years?

15 Q3: What are the consequences of the various processes and events that might affect the
16 disposal system that could take place at the WIPP site over the next 10,000 years?

17 In addition, accounting for uncertainty in the parameters of the PA models leads to a further
18 question:

19 Q4: How much confidence should be placed in answers to the first three questions?

20 These questions give rise to a methodology for quantifying the probability distribution of
21 possible radionuclide releases from the WIPP repository over the next 10,000 years and
22 characterizing the uncertainty in that distribution due to imperfect knowledge about the
23 parameters contained in the models used to predict releases. The containment requirements of 40
24 CFR § 191.13 require this probabilistic methodology.

25 This appendix is organized as follows: Section PA-2.0 gives an overview and describes the
26 overall conceptual structure of the CRA-2009 PA. The WIPP PA is designed to address the
27 requirements of section 191.13, and thus involves three basic entities: (1) a probabilistic
28 characterization of different futures that could occur at the WIPP site over the next 10,000 years,
29 (2) models for both the physical processes that take place at the WIPP site and the estimation of
30 potential radionuclide releases that may be associated with these processes, and (3) a
31 probabilistic characterization of the uncertainty in the models and parameters that underlies the
32 WIPP PA. Section PA-2.0 is supplemented by Appendix SCR-2009, which documents the
33 results of the screening process for features, events, and processes (FEPs) that are retained in the
34 conceptual models of repository performance.

35 Section PA-3.0 describes the probabilistic characterization of different futures. This
36 characterization plays an important role in the construction of the complementary cumulative
37 distribution function (CCDF) specified in section 191.13. Regulatory guidance and extensive
38 review of the WIPP site identified exploratory drilling for natural resources and the mining of

1 potash as the only significant disruptions at the WIPP site with the potential to affect
2 radionuclide releases to the accessible environment. Section PA-3.0 summarizes the stochastic
3 variables that represent future drilling and mining events in the PA. The results of the PA for
4 CRA-2009, as documented in Section PA-7.0, Section PA-8.0, and Section PA-9.0 of this
5 appendix, confirm that direct releases from drilling intrusions are the major contributors to
6 radionuclide releases to the accessible environment.

7 Section PA-4.0 presents the mathematical models for both the physical processes that take place
8 at the WIPP and the estimation of potential radionuclide releases. The mathematical models
9 implement the conceptual models as prescribed in 40 CFR § 194.23 (2004), and permit the
10 construction of the CCDF specified in section 191.13. Models presented in Section PA-4.0
11 include two-phase (i.e., gas and brine) flow in the vicinity of the repository; radionuclide
12 transport in the Salado Formation (hereafter referred to as the Salado); releases to the surface at
13 the time of a drilling intrusion due to cuttings, cavings, spallings, and direct brine releases
14 (DBRs); brine flow in the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation (hereafter
15 referred to as the Culebra); and radionuclide transport in the Culebra. Section PA-4.0 is
16 supplemented by Appendices MASS-2009, TFIELD-2009, and PORSURF-2009. Appendix
17 MASS-2009 discusses the modeling assumptions used in the WIPP PA. Appendix TFIELD-
18 2009 discusses the generation of the transmissivity fields (T fields) used to model groundwater
19 flow in the Culebra. Appendix PORSURF-2009 presents results from modeling the effects of
20 excavated region closure, waste consolidation, and gas generation in the repository.

21 Section PA-5.0 discusses the probabilistic characterization of parameter uncertainty, and
22 summarizes the uncertain variables incorporated into the CRA-2009 PA, the distributions
23 assigned to these variables, and the correlations between variables. Section PA-5.0 is
24 supplemented by Fox (2008) and Appendix SOTERM-2009. Fox (2008) catalogs the full set of
25 parameters used in the CRA-2009 PA, previously referred to as the CCA Appendix PAR and the
26 CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment PAR. Appendix SOTERM-2009 describes the actinide
27 (An) source term for the WIPP performance calculations, including the mobile concentrations of
28 actinides that may be released from the repository in brine.

29 Section PA-6.0 summarizes the computational procedures used in the CRA-2009 PA, including
30 sampling techniques (i.e., random and Latin hypercube sampling (LHS)); sample size, statistical
31 confidence for mean CCDF, generation of sample, generation of individual futures, construction
32 of CCDFs, calculations performed with the models discussed in Section PA-4.0, construction of
33 releases for each future, and the sensitivity analysis techniques in use.

34 Section PA-7.0 presents the results of the PA for an undisturbed repository. Releases from the
35 undisturbed repository are determined by radionuclide transport in brine flowing from the
36 repository to the land withdrawal boundary (LWB) through the marker beds (MBs) or shafts.
37 Releases in the undisturbed scenario are used to demonstrate compliance with the individual and
38 groundwater protection requirements in 40 CFR Part 191 (40 CFR § 194.51 and 40 CFR
39 § 194.52).

40 Section PA-8.0 presents PA results for a disturbed repository. As will be discussed in Section
41 PA-2.3.1, the only future events and processes in the analysis of disturbed repository
42 performance are those associated with mining and deep drilling. Release mechanisms include

1 direct releases at the time of the intrusion via cuttings, cavings, spillings, and DBR, and long-
2 term releases via radionuclide transport up abandoned boreholes to the Culebra and thence to the
3 LWB.

4 Section PA-9.0 presents the set of CCDFs resulting from the CRA-2009 PA. This material
5 supplements 40 CFR § 194.34, which demonstrates compliance with the containment
6 requirements of section 191.13. Section PA-9.0 presents the most significant output variables
7 from the PA models, accompanied by sensitivity analyses to determine which subjectively
8 uncertain parameters are most influential in the uncertainty of PA results.

9 The overall structure of the CRA-2009 PA does not differ from that presented in the first WIPP
10 Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), the CRA-2004
11 (U.S. Department of Energy 2004) or the CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline
12 Calculation (PABC) (Leigh et al. 2005). This recertification application appendix follows the
13 approach used by Helton et al. (1998) to document the mathematical models used in the CCA PA
14 and the results of that analysis. Much of the content of this appendix derives from Helton et al.
15 (1998); these authors' contributions are gratefully acknowledged.

1 **PA-2.0 Overview and Conceptual Structure of the PA**

2 Because of the amount and complexity of the material presented in Appendix PA-2009, an
3 introductory summary is provided below, followed by detailed discussions of the topics in the
4 remainder of this section, which is organized as follows:

5 Section PA-2.1 – Overview of PA and the results

6 Section PA-2.2 – The conceptual structure of the PA used to evaluate compliance with the
7 containment requirements

8 Section PA-2.3 – The overall methodology used to develop FEPs, the screening methodology
9 applied to the FEPs, the results of the screening process, and the development
10 of the scenarios considered in the system-level consequence analysis

11 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to use the same PA methodology as in the
12 CCA and CRA-2004 because changes that have been made since the U.S. Environmental
13 Protection Agency (EPA) certified WIPP do not impact PA methodology. A corresponding
14 detailed presentation for the CRA-2004 PA methodology is provided in the CRA-2004, Chapter
15 6.0, Section 6.1, and a detailed presentation for the CRA-2004 PABC implementation is
16 provided in Leigh et al. (2005). A corresponding detailed presentation for the CCA PA
17 methodology is provided in Helton et al. (1998, Section 2).

18 **PA-2.1 Overview of Performance Assessment**

19 A demonstration of future repository performance was required by the disposal standards in Part
20 191. The EPA required a PA to demonstrate that potential cumulative releases of radionuclides
21 to the accessible environment over a 10,000-year period after disposal are less than specified
22 limits based on the nature of the materials disposed (section 191.13). The PA is to determine the
23 effects of all significant processes and events that may affect the disposal system, consider the
24 associated uncertainties of the processes and events, and estimate the probable cumulative
25 releases of radionuclides.

26 A PA was included in the CCA. This was the first demonstration of compliance by the DOE
27 with the EPA's disposal standards. The EPA required a verification PA based on the CCA PA
28 that included revised parameters and distributions. This PA was termed the CCA Performance
29 Assessment Verification Test (PAVT) (Trovoto 1997). The EPA based the original certification
30 of the WIPP on the information in the CCA and the results of the CCA PAVT (U.S.
31 Environmental Protection Agency 1998a). The CCA PAVT is documented in Sandia National
32 Laboratories (SNL) 1997 and U.S. Department of Energy 1997.

33 The WIPP is required to be recertified every five years after first waste receipt (Public Law
34 02-579). A revised PA was included in the first recertification application in 2004. This PA is
35 termed the CRA-2004 PA, and is documented in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0. The EPA again
36 required a verification PA using revised modeling assumptions and parameters (Cotsworth
37 2005). This PA was termed the CRA-2004 PABC and was documented in Leigh et al. (2005).

1 As part of the five-year recertification cycle, a PA is included in the CRA-2009. The CRA-2009
 2 PA is a culmination of the previous PAs and is not significantly different from the CRA-2004
 3 PABC, as the methodologies, conceptual models, and assumptions have not changed. Updates to
 4 parameters and improvements to computer codes are incorporated in the CRA-2009.

5 **PA-2.1.1 Changes in the CRA-2009 PA**

6 A list of changes to PA since the CRA-2004 and citations for where they are discussed is shown
 7 in Table PA-1. In addition to the changes discussed in Table PA-1, the terminology used to
 8 describe uncertainty has been updated to reflect the usage now prevalent in the risk assessment
 9 literature. Previously, uncertainty in model parameters was referred to as “subjective
 10 uncertainty,” and that due to stochastic processes was referred to as “stochastic uncertainty.” In
 11 the years since these terms were first employed, these concepts have matured, and the term
 12 “epistemic uncertainty” is now used to describe uncertainty from lack of knowledge, while the
 13 term “aleatory uncertainty” now describes uncertainty due to natural variability, e.g. uncertainty
 14 arising from future events whose occurrence can be defined in terms of probabilities. In this text,
 15 the terms epistemic uncertainty and aleatory uncertainty are used in place of the terms subjective
 16 uncertainty and stochastic uncertainty, respectively.

17 **Table PA-1. WIPP Project Changes and Cross References**

WIPP Project Change	Cross Reference
CRA-2004 to CRA-2004 PABC Changes^a	
Inventory Information	Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005
An Solubility Values	Garner and Leigh 2005
An Solubility Uncertainty Ranges	Garner and Leigh 2005
Microbial Gas Generation Model	Nemer and Stein 2005
Culebra T Fields Mining Modification	Lowry and Kanney 2005
Anhydrite Material Parameters	Vugrin et al. 2005
SPALL Model Parameters	Vugrin 2005
CRA-2004 PABC to CRA-2009 Changes^b	
DBR Maximum Duration Parameter	Kirkes 2007
Conditional Relationship Between Humid and Inundated Cellulosic, Plastic, or Rubber (CPR) Degradation Rates	Kirchner 2008a
BRAGFLO Code Improvements	Nemer and Clayton 2008
Capillary Pressure and Relative Permeability Model	Nemer and Clayton 2008
Drilling Rate	Clayton 2008a
Parameter Error Corrections <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emplaced CPR • Halite/Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ) Parameter • Fraction of Repository Occupied by Waste • NUTS and DBR Calculation Input Files 	Nemer 2007a, Ismail 2007a, Dunagan 2007, Ismail 2007b, Clayton 2007

^a See Leigh et al. 2005 for additional discussion of these changes and their implementation in the CRA-2004 PABC.

^b See Clayton et al. 2008 for additional discussions of these changes and their implementation in the CRA-2009 PA.

1 From this assessment, the DOE has demonstrated that the WIPP continues to comply with the
2 containment requirements of section 191.13. The containment requirements are stringent and
3 state that the DOE must demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the probabilities of
4 cumulative radionuclide releases from the disposal system during the 10,000 years following
5 closure will fall below specified limits. The PA analyses supporting this determination must be
6 quantitative and consider uncertainties caused by all significant processes and events that may
7 affect the disposal system, including future inadvertent human intrusion into the repository. A
8 quantitative PA is conducted using a series of loosely coupled computer models in which
9 epistemic parameter uncertainties are addressed by a stratified Monte Carlo sampling procedure
10 on selected input parameters, and uncertainties related to future intrusion events are addressed
11 using simple random sampling.

12 As required by regulation, results of the PA are displayed as CCDFs showing the probability that
13 cumulative radionuclide releases from the disposal system will exceed the values calculated for
14 scenarios considered in the analysis. These CCDFs are calculated using reasonable and, in some
15 cases, conservative conceptual models based on the scientific understanding of the disposal
16 system's behavior. Parameters used in these models are derived from experimental data, field
17 observations, and relevant technical literature. Changes to the CCA and CRA-2004 parameters
18 and models since the original certification have been incorporated into the CRA-2009 PA
19 (Clayton 2008a). The overall mean CCDF continues to lie entirely below the specified limits,
20 and the WIPP therefore continues to be in compliance with the containment requirements of 40
21 CFR Part 191 Subpart B (see Section PA-2.1.6). Sensitivity analysis of results shows that the
22 location of the mean CCDF is dominated by radionuclide releases that could occur on the surface
23 during an inadvertent penetration of the repository by a future drilling operation (Section PA-
24 9.0). Releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment from transport in groundwater
25 through the shaft seal systems and the subsurface geology are negligible, with or without human
26 intrusion, and do not significantly contribute to the mean CCDF. No releases are predicted to
27 occur at the ground surface in the absence of human intrusion. The natural and engineered barrier
28 systems of the WIPP provide robust and effective containment of transuranic (TRU) waste, even
29 if the repository is penetrated by multiple boreholes.

30 **PA-2.1.2 Conceptual Basis for PA**

31 The foundations of PA are a thorough understanding of the disposal system and the possible
32 future interactions of the repository, waste, and surrounding geology. The DOE's confidence in
33 the results of PA is based in part on the strength of the original research done during site
34 characterization, experimental results used to develop and confirm parameters and models, and
35 robustness of the facility design.

36 The progression of compliance applications document these aspects of PA leading up to the
37 CRA-2009 PA (i.e., the CCA, the CCA PAVT [Sandia National Laboratories 1997 and U.S.
38 Department of Energy 1997], the CRA-2004 PA, and the CRA-2004 PABC [Leigh et al. 2005]).

39 The interactions of the repository and waste with the geologic system, and the response of the
40 disposal system to possible future inadvertent human intrusion, are described in Section PA-
41 2.1.4.

1 **PA-2.1.3 Undisturbed Repository Performance**

2 An evaluation of undisturbed repository performance, which is defined to exclude human
3 intrusion and unlikely disruptive natural events, is required by regulation (see 40 CFR § 191.15
4 and 40 CFR § 191.24). Evaluations of past and present natural geologic processes in the region
5 indicate that none has the potential to breach the repository within 10,000 years (see the CCA,
6 Appendix SCR, Section SCR.1). Disposal system behavior is dominated by the coupled
7 processes of rock deformation surrounding the excavation, fluid flow, and waste degradation.
8 Each of these processes can be described independently, but the extent to which they occur is
9 affected by the others.

10 Rock deformation immediately around the repository begins as soon as excavation creates a
11 disturbance in the stress field. Stress relief results in some degree of brittle fracturing and the
12 formation of a DRZ, which surrounds excavations in all deep mines including the WIPP
13 repository. For the WIPP, the DRZ is characterized by an increase in permeability and porosity,
14 and it may ultimately extend a few meters (m) from the excavated region. Salt will also deform
15 by creep processes resulting from deviatoric stress, causing the salt to move inward and fill
16 voids. Salt creep will continue until deviatoric stress is dissipated and the system is once again at
17 stress equilibrium (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.1).

18 The ability of salt to creep, thereby healing fractures and filling porosity, is one of its
19 fundamental advantages as a medium for geologic disposal of radioactive waste, and one reason
20 it was recommended by the National Academy of Sciences (see the CCA, Chapter 1.0, Section
21 1.3). Salt creep provides the mechanism for crushed salt compaction in the shaft seal system,
22 yielding properties approaching those of intact salt within 200 years (see the CCA, Appendix
23 SEAL, Appendix D, Section D5.2). Salt creep will also cause the DRZ surrounding the shaft to
24 heal rapidly around the concrete components of the seal system. In the absence of elevated gas
25 pressure in the repository, salt creep would also substantially compact the waste and heal the
26 DRZ around the disposal region. Fluid pressures can become large enough through the
27 combined effect of salt creep reducing pore volumes, and gas generation from waste degradation
28 processes, to maintain significant porosity (greater than 20%) within the disposal room
29 throughout the performance period (see also the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3).

30 Characterization of the Salado indicates that fluid flow from the far field does not occur on time
31 scales of interest in the absence of an artificially imposed hydraulic gradient (see the CRA-2004,
32 Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.3.4 for a description of Salado investigations). This lack of fluid flow is
33 the second fundamental reason for choosing salt as a medium for geologic disposal of radioactive
34 waste. Lack of fluid flow is a result of the extremely low permeability of evaporite rocks that
35 make up the Salado. Excavating the repository has disturbed the natural hydraulic gradient and
36 rock properties, resulting in fluid flow. Small quantities of interstitial brine present in the Salado
37 move toward regions of low hydraulic potential, and brine seeps are observed in the underground
38 repository. The slow flow of brine from halite into more permeable anhydrite MBs, and then
39 through the DRZ into the repository, is expected to continue as long as the hydraulic potential
40 within the repository is below that of the far field. The repository environment will also include
41 gas, so the fluid flow must be modeled as a two-phase process. Initially, the gaseous phase will
42 consist primarily of air trapped at the time of closure, although other gases may form from waste
43 degradation. In the PA, the gaseous phase pressure will rise due to creep closure, gas generation,

1 and brine inflow, creating the potential for flow from the excavated region (see also the
2 CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.2).

3 An understanding of waste degradation processes indicates that the gaseous phase in fluid flow
4 and the repository's pressure history will be far more important than if the initial air were the
5 only gas present. Waste degradation can generate significant additional gas by two processes
6 (see also the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.3 for historical perspective, and Leigh et al.
7 2005, Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 for changes):

- 8 1. The generation of hydrogen (H_2) gas by anoxic corrosion of steels, other iron (Fe)-based
9 alloys, and aluminum (Al) and Al-based alloys
- 10 2. The generation of carbon dioxide (CO_2), hydrogen sulfide (H_2S), and methane (CH_4) by
11 anaerobic microbial consumption of waste containing CPR materials

12 Coupling these gas-generation reactions to fluid-flow and salt-creep processes is complex. Gas
13 generation will increase fluid pressure in the repository, thereby decreasing the hydraulic
14 gradient and deviatoric stress between the far field and the excavated region and inhibiting the
15 processes of brine inflow and salt creep. Anoxic corrosion will also consume brine as it breaks
16 down water to oxidize steels and other Fe-based alloys and release H_2 . Thus, corrosion has the
17 potential to be a self-limiting process, in that as it consumes all water in contact with steels and
18 other Fe-based alloys, it will cease. Microbial reactions also require water, either in brine or the
19 gaseous phase. It is assumed that microbial reactions will result in neither the consumption nor
20 production of water.

21 The total volume of gas generated by corrosion and microbial consumption may be sufficient to
22 result in repository pressures that approach lithostatic. Sustained pressures above lithostatic are
23 not physically reasonable within the disposal system, because the more brittle anhydrite layers
24 are expected to fracture if sufficient gas is present. The conceptual model implemented in the
25 PA causes anhydrite MB permeability and porosity to increase rapidly as pore pressure
26 approaches and exceeds lithostatic. This conceptual model for pressure-dependent fracturing
27 approximates the hydraulic effect of pressure-induced fracturing and allows gas and brine to
28 move more freely within the MBs at higher pressures (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section
29 6.4.5.2).

30 Overall, the behavior of the undisturbed disposal system will result in extremely effective
31 isolation of the radioactive waste. Concrete, clay, and asphalt components of the shaft seal
32 system will provide an immediate and effective barrier to fluid flow through the shafts, isolating
33 the repository until salt creep has consolidated the compacted crushed salt components and
34 permanently sealed the shafts. Around the shafts, the DRZ in halite layers will heal rapidly
35 because the presence of the solid material within the shafts will provide rigid resistance to creep.
36 The DRZ around the shaft, therefore, will not provide a continuous pathway for fluid flow (see
37 the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.4). Similarly, the panel closure will rigidly resist creep,
38 leading to a build-up of compressive stress which in turn will cause a rapid elimination of the
39 DRZ locally. In PA, it is conservatively assumed that the DRZ does not heal around either the
40 disposal region or the operations and experimental regions, and pathways for fluid flow may
41 exist indefinitely to the overlying and underlying anhydrite layers (e.g., MB 139 and Anhydrites

1 A and B). Some quantity of brine will be present in the repository under most conditions and
 2 may contain actinides mobilized as both dissolved and colloidal species. Gas generation by
 3 corrosion and microbial degradation is expected to occur, and will result in elevated pressures
 4 within the repository. These pressures will not significantly exceed lithostatic because the more
 5 brittle anhydrite layers will fracture and provide a pathway for gas to leave the repository.
 6 Fracturing due to high gas pressures may enhance gas and brine migration from the repository,
 7 but gas transport will not contribute to the release of actinides from the disposal system. Brine
 8 flowing out of the waste disposal region through anhydrite layers may transport actinides as
 9 dissolved and colloidal species. However, the quantity of actinides that may reach the accessible
 10 environment boundary through the interbeds during undisturbed repository performance is
 11 insignificant and has no effect on the compliance determination. No migration of radionuclides
 12 is expected to occur vertically through the Salado (see Section PA-7.0, and Ismail and Garner
 13 2008).

14 **PA-2.1.4 Disturbed Repository Performance**

15 The WIPP PA is required by the performance standards to consider scenarios that include
 16 intrusions into the repository by inadvertent and intermittent drilling for resources. The
 17 probability of these intrusions is based on a future drilling rate. This rate was calculated using the
 18 method outlined in Section 33, which analyzes the past record of drilling events in the Delaware
 19 Basin. Active institutional controls (AICs) are assumed to prevent intrusion during the first 100
 20 years after closure (40 CFR § 194.41). Passive institutional controls (PICs) were assumed in the
 21 CCA to effectively reduce the drilling rate by two orders of magnitude for the 600-year period
 22 following 100 years of active control. However, in certifying the WIPP, the EPA denied credit
 23 for the effectiveness of passive controls for 600 years (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
 24 1998a). Although the CRA-2009 PA does not include a reduced drilling intrusion rate to account
 25 for PICs, future PAs may do so. Future drilling practices are assumed to be the same as current
 26 practice, also consistent with regulatory criteria. These practices include the type and rate of
 27 drilling, emplacement of casing in boreholes, and the procedures implemented when boreholes
 28 are plugged and abandoned (see 40 CFR § 194.33).

29 Human intrusion by drilling may cause releases from the disposal system through five
 30 mechanisms:

- 31 1. Cuttings, which include material intersected by the rotary drilling bit
- 32 2. Cavings, which include material eroded from the borehole wall during drilling
- 33 3. Spallings, which include solid material carried into the borehole during rapid
 34 depressurization of the waste disposal region
- 35 4. DBRs, which include contaminated brine that may flow to the surface during drilling
- 36 5. Long-term brine releases, which include the contaminated brine that may flow through a
 37 borehole after it is abandoned

1 The first four mechanisms immediately follow an intrusion event and are collectively referred to
2 as direct releases. The accessible environment boundary for these releases is the ground surface.
3 The fifth mechanism, An transport by long-term groundwater flow, begins when concrete plugs
4 are assumed to degrade in an abandoned borehole and may continue throughout the regulatory
5 period. The accessible environment boundary for these releases is the lateral subsurface limit of
6 the controlled area (CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.0.2.3).

7 Repository conditions prior to intrusion will be the same as those for undisturbed repository
8 performance, and all processes active in undisturbed repository performance will continue to
9 occur following intrusion. Because an intrusion provides a pathway for radionuclides to reach
10 the ground surface and enter the geological units above the Salado, additional processes will
11 occur that don't in the undisturbed repository performance. These processes include the
12 mobilization of radionuclides as dissolved and colloidal species in repository brine and
13 groundwater flow, and subsequent An transport in the overlying units. Flow and transport in the
14 Culebra are of particular interest because it is the most transmissive unit above the repository.
15 Thus, the Culebra is a potential pathway for lateral migration of contaminated brine in the event
16 of a drilling intrusion accompanied by significant flow up the intrusion borehole (see the
17 CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2).

18 **PA-2.1.4.1 Cuttings and Cavings**

19 In a rotary drilling operation, the volume of material brought to the surface as cuttings is
20 calculated as the cylinder defined by the thickness of the unit and the diameter of the drill bit.
21 The quantity of radionuclides released as cuttings is therefore a function of the activity of the
22 intersected waste and the diameter of the intruding drill bit. The DOE uses a constant value of
23 0.31115 m (12.25 inches [in]), consistent with bits currently used at the WIPP depth in the
24 Delaware Basin (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.5). The intersected waste
25 activity may vary depending on the type of waste intersected. The DOE considers random
26 penetrations into remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-TRU) waste and each of the 690
27 different waste streams (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005, Section 4.4) identified for contact-handled
28 (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU) waste (569 and 693 waste streams were used in the CCA and
29 the CRA-2004, respectively; see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.0.2.3.1).

30 The volume of particulate material eroded from the borehole wall by the drilling fluids and
31 brought to the surface as cavings may be affected by the drill bit diameter, effective shear
32 resistance of the intruded material, speed of the drill bit, viscosity of the drilling fluid and rate at
33 which it is circulated in the borehole, and other properties related to the drilling process. The
34 most important of these parameters, after drill bit diameter, is the effective shear resistance of the
35 intruded material (Leigh et al. 2005, Section 7.2). In the absence of data describing the
36 reasonable and realistic future properties of degraded waste and magnesium oxide (MgO)
37 backfill, the DOE used conservative parameter values based on the properties of fine-grained
38 sediment. Other properties are assigned fixed values consistent with current practice. The
39 quantity of radionuclides released as cavings depends on the volume of eroded material and its
40 activity, which is treated in the same manner as the activity of cuttings (see also Section PA-4.5
41 and Section PA-6.8.2.1).

1 **PA-2.1.4.2 Spallings**

2 Unlike releases from cuttings and cavings, which occur with every modeled borehole intrusion,
3 spalling releases will occur only if pressure in the waste-disposal region exceeds the hydrostatic
4 pressure in the borehole. At lower pressures, below about 8 megapascals (MPa), fluid in the
5 waste-disposal region will not flow toward the borehole. At higher pressures, gas flow toward
6 the borehole may be sufficiently rapid to cause additional solid material to enter the borehole. If
7 spalling occurs, the volume of spalled material will be affected by the physical properties of the
8 waste, such as its tensile strength and particle diameter. The DOE based the parameter values
9 used in the PA on reasonable and conservative assumptions. Since the CCA, a revised
10 conceptual model for the spallings phenomena has been developed (see the CRA-2004,
11 Appendix PA, Section PA-4.6 and Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-16.1.3).
12 Model development, execution, and sensitivity studies necessitated implementing parameter
13 values pertaining to waste characteristics, drilling practices, and physics of the process. The
14 parameter range for particle size was derived by expert elicitation (Carlsbad Area Office
15 Technical Assistance Contractor [CTAC] 1997).

16 The quantity of radionuclides released as spalled material depends on the volume of spalled
17 waste and its activity. Because spalling may occur at a greater distance from the borehole than
18 cuttings and cavings, spalled waste is assumed to have the volume-averaged activity of CH-TRU
19 waste, rather than the sampled activities of individual waste streams. The low permeability of
20 the region surrounding the RH-TRU waste means it is isolated from the spallings process and
21 does not contribute to the volume or activity of spalled material (see also Section PA-4.6 and
22 Section PA-6.8.2.2 for more description of the spallings model).

23 **PA-2.1.4.3 Direct Brine Flow**

24 Radionuclides may be released to the accessible environment if repository brine enters the
25 borehole during drilling and flows to the ground surface. The quantity of radionuclides released
26 by direct brine flow depends on the volume of brine reaching the ground surface and the
27 concentration of radionuclides contained in the brine. As with spallings, DBRs will not occur if
28 repository pressure is below the hydrostatic pressure in the borehole. At higher repository
29 pressures, mobile brine present in the repository will flow toward the borehole. If the volume of
30 brine flowing from the repository into the borehole is small, it will not affect the drilling
31 operation, and flow may continue until the driller reaches the base of the evaporite section and
32 installs casing in the borehole (see also Section PA-4.7 and Section PA-6.8.2.3).

33 **PA-2.1.4.4 Mobilization of Actinides in Repository Brine**

34 Actinides may be mobilized in repository brine in two principal ways:

- 35 1. As dissolved species
- 36 2. As colloidal species

37 The solubilities of actinides depend on their oxidation states, with the more reduced forms (for
38 example, III and IV oxidation states) being less soluble than the oxidized forms (V and VI).

1 Conditions within the repository will be strongly reducing because of large quantities of metallic
2 Fe in the steel containers and the waste, and—in the case of plutonium (Pu)—only the lower-
3 solubility oxidation states (Pu(III) and Pu(IV)) will persist. Microbial activity will also help
4 create reducing conditions. Solubilities also vary with pH. The DOE is therefore emplacing
5 MgO in the waste-disposal region to ensure conditions that reduce uncertainty and establish low
6 An solubilities. MgO consumes CO₂ and buffers pH, lowering An solubilities in WIPP brines
7 (see Appendix SOTERM-2009 and Appendix MgO-2009). Solubilities in the PA are based on
8 the chemistry of brines that might be present in the waste-disposal region, reactions of these
9 brines with the MgO engineered barrier, and strongly reducing conditions produced by anoxic
10 corrosion of steels and other Fe-based alloys.

11 The waste contains organic ligands that could increase An solubilities by forming complexes
12 with dissolved An species. However, these organic ligands also form complexes with other
13 dissolved metals, such as magnesium (Mg), calcium (Ca), Fe, lead (Pb), vanadium (V),
14 chromium (Cr), manganese (Mn), and nickel (Ni), that will be present in repository brines due to
15 corrosion of steels and other Fe-based alloys. The CRA-2009 PA speciation and solubility
16 calculations include the effect of organic ligands but not the beneficial effect of competition with
17 Fe, Pb, V, Cr, Mn, and Ni. (Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-2.3.6 and Section
18 SOTERM-4.6, and Brush and Xiong 2005).

19 Colloidal transport of actinides has been examined, and four types of colloids have been
20 determined to represent the possible behavior at the WIPP. These include microbial colloids,
21 humic substances, An intrinsic colloids, and mineral fragments. Concentrations of An mobilized
22 as these colloidal forms are included in the estimates of total An concentrations used in PA
23 (Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-3.8.1 and Section SOTERM-4.7, and Garner and
24 Leigh 2005).

25 **PA-2.1.4.5 Long-Term Brine Flow up an Intrusion Borehole**

26 Long-term releases to the ground surface or groundwater in the Rustler Formation (hereafter
27 referred to as the Rustler) or overlying units may occur after the borehole has been plugged and
28 abandoned. In keeping with regulatory criteria, borehole plugs are assumed to have properties
29 consistent with current practice in the basin. Thus, boreholes are assumed to have concrete plugs
30 emplaced at various locations. Initially, concrete plugs effectively limit fluid flow in the
31 borehole. However, under most circumstances, these plugs cannot be expected to remain fully
32 effective indefinitely. For the purposes of PA, discontinuous borehole plugs above the
33 repository are assumed to degrade 200 years after emplacement. From then on, the borehole is
34 assumed to fill with a silty-sand-like material containing degraded concrete, corrosion products
35 from degraded casing, and material that sloughs into the hole from the walls. Of six possible
36 plugged borehole configurations in the Delaware Basin, three are considered either likely or
37 adequately representative of other possible configurations; one configuration (a two-plug
38 configuration) is explicitly modeled in the flow and transport model (see Section PA-3.7 and
39 Appendix MASS-2009, Section MASS-16.3).

40 If sufficient brine is available in the repository, and if pressure in the repository is higher than in
41 the overlying units, brine may flow up the borehole following plug degradation. In principle,
42 this brine could flow into any permeable unit or to the ground surface if repository pressure were

1 high enough. For modeling purposes, brine is allowed to flow only into the higher-permeability
2 units and to the surface. Lower-permeability anhydrite and mudstone layers in the Rustler are
3 treated as if they were impermeable to simplify the analysis while maximizing the amount of
4 flow into units where it could potentially contribute to disposal system releases. Model results
5 indicate that essentially all flow occurs into the Culebra, which has been recognized since the
6 early stages of site characterization as the most transmissive unit above the repository and the
7 most likely pathway for subsurface transport (see also the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0, Section
8 2.2.1.4.1.2).

9 **PA-2.1.4.6 Groundwater Flow in the Culebra**

10 Site characterization activities in the units above the Salado have focused on the Culebra. These
11 activities have shown that the direction of groundwater flow in the Culebra varies somewhat
12 regionally, but in the area that overlies the repository, flow is southward. These characterization
13 and modeling activities conducted in the units above the Salado confirm that the Culebra is the
14 most transmissive unit above the Salado. The Culebra is the unit into which actinides are likely
15 to be introduced from long-term flow up an abandoned borehole. Regional variation in the
16 Culebra's groundwater flow direction is influenced by the transmissivity observed, as well as the
17 lateral (facies) changes in the lithology of the Culebra in the groundwater basin where the WIPP
18 is located. Site characterization activities have provided no evidence of karst groundwater
19 systems in the controlled area, although groundwater flow in the Culebra is affected by the
20 presence of fractures, fracture fillings, and vuggy pore features (see Appendix HYDRO-2009
21 and the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.3.5). Other laboratory and field activities have
22 focused on the behavior of dissolved and colloidal actinides in the Culebra.

23 Basin-scale regional modeling of three-dimensional groundwater flow in the units above the
24 Salado demonstrates that it is appropriate, for the purposes of estimating radionuclide transport,
25 to conceptualize the Culebra as a two-dimensional confined aquifer (see the CRA-2004, Chapter
26 2.0, Section 2.2.1.1). Uncertainty in the flow field is incorporated by using 100 different
27 geostatistically based T fields, each of which is consistent with available head and transmissivity
28 data (Appendix PA-2009, Appendix TFIELD-2009).

29 Groundwater flow in the Culebra is modeled as a steady-state process, but two mechanisms
30 considered in the PA could affect flow in the future. Potash mining in the McNutt Potash Zone
31 (hereafter referred to as the McNutt) of the Salado, which occurs now in the Delaware Basin
32 outside the controlled area and may continue in the future, could affect flow in the Culebra if
33 subsidence over mined areas causes fracturing or other changes in rock properties (see the
34 CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.2.3). Climatic changes during the next 10,000 years may
35 also affect groundwater flow by altering recharge to the Culebra (see the CRA-2004, Chapter
36 6.0, Section 6.4.9 and the CCA, Appendix CLI).

37 Consistent with regulatory criteria of 40 CFR § 194.32, mining outside the controlled area is
38 assumed to occur in the near future, and mining within the controlled area is assumed to occur
39 with a probability of 1 in 100 per century (adjusted for the effectiveness of AICs during the first
40 100 years after closure). Consistent with regulatory guidance, the effects of mine subsidence are
41 incorporated in PA by increasing the transmissivity of the Culebra over the areas identified as
42 mineable by a factor sampled from a uniform distribution between 1 and 1000 (U.S.

1 Environmental Protection Agency 1996a, p. 5229). T fields used in PA are therefore adjusted
2 and steady-state flow fields calculated accordingly; once for mining that occurs only outside the
3 controlled area, and once for mining that occurs both inside and outside the controlled area
4 (Appendix TFIELD-2009, Section 9.0). Mining outside the controlled area is considered in both
5 undisturbed and disturbed repository performance.

6 The extent to which the climate will change during the next 10,000 years and how such a change
7 will affect groundwater flow in the Culebra are uncertain. Regional three-dimensional modeling
8 of groundwater flow in the units above the Salado indicates that flow velocities in the Culebra
9 may increase by a factor of 1 to 2.25 for reasonably possible future climates (see the CCA,
10 Appendix CLI). This uncertainty is incorporated in PA by scaling the calculated steady-state
11 specific discharge within the Culebra by a sampled parameter within this range.

12 **PA-2.1.4.7 Actinide Transport in the Culebra**

13 Field tests have shown that the Culebra is best characterized as a double-porosity medium for
14 estimating contaminant transport in groundwater (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0, Section
15 2.2.1.4.1.2 and Appendix HYDRO-2009). Groundwater flow and advective transport of
16 dissolved or colloidal species and particles occurs primarily in a small fraction of the rock's total
17 porosity and corresponds to the porosity of open and interconnected fractures and vugs.
18 Diffusion and slower advective flow occur in the remainder of the porosity, which is associated
19 with the low-permeability dolomite matrix. Transported species, including actinides (if present),
20 will diffuse into this porosity.

21 Diffusion from the advective porosity into the dolomite matrix will retard An transport through
22 two mechanisms. Physical retardation occurs simply because actinides that diffuse into the
23 matrix are no longer transported with the flowing groundwater. Transport is interrupted until
24 they diffuse back into the advective porosity. In situ tracer tests have demonstrated this
25 phenomenon. Chemical retardation also occurs within the matrix as actinides are sorbed onto
26 dolomite grains. The relationship between sorbed and liquid concentrations is assumed to be
27 linear and reversible. The distribution coefficients (K_{ds}) that characterize the extent to which
28 actinides will sorb on dolomite were based on experimental data (see the CRA-2004, Chapter
29 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2).

30 **PA-2.1.4.8 Intrusion Scenarios**

31 Human intrusion scenarios evaluated in the PA include both single intrusion events and
32 combinations of multiple boreholes. Two different types of boreholes are considered: those that
33 penetrate a pressurized brine reservoir in the underlying Castile Formation (hereafter referred to
34 as the Castile), and those that do not.

35 The presence of a brine reservoir under the repository is speculative, but on the basis of current
36 information cannot be ruled out. A pressurized brine reservoir was encountered at the WIPP-12
37 borehole within the controlled area to the north of the disposal region, and other pressurized
38 brine reservoirs associated with regions of deformation in the Castile have been encountered
39 elsewhere in the Delaware Basin (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.2.2). Based on a
40 geostatistical analysis of the geophysical data of brine encounters in the region, the DOE

1 estimates that there is a 0.08 probability that a random borehole penetrating waste in the WIPP
2 will also penetrate an underlying brine reservoir (see the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment
3 18-6). Upon their review of the CCA, the EPA determined that the DOE should treat this
4 probability as uncertain, ranging from 0.01 to 0.60 in the CCA PAVT. The EPA also required
5 the DOE to modify the assumptions concerning Castile properties to increase the brine reservoir
6 volumes (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998b; *Technical Support Document for*
7 *194.23: Parameter Justification Report*, Section 5). The EPA determined that changing the rock
8 compressibility and porosity of the Castile effectively modified the sampled brine reservoir
9 volume to include the possibility of larger brine reservoir volumes like those encountered by the
10 WIPP-12 borehole.

11 The primary consequence of penetrating a pressurized reservoir is to provide an additional
12 source of brine beyond that which might flow into the repository from the Salado. Direct
13 releases at the ground surface resulting from the first repository intrusion would be unaffected by
14 additional Castile brine, even if it flowed to the surface, because brine moving straight up a
15 borehole will not significantly mix with waste. However, the presence of Castile brine could
16 significantly increase radionuclide releases in two ways. First, the volume of contaminated brine
17 that could flow to the surface may be greater for a second or subsequent intrusion into a
18 repository that has already been connected by a previous borehole to a Castile reservoir. Second,
19 the volume of contaminated brine that may flow up an abandoned borehole after plug
20 degradation may be greater for combinations of two or more boreholes that intrude the same
21 panel if one of the boreholes penetrates a pressurized reservoir. Both processes are modeled in
22 PA.

23 **PA-2.1.5 Compliance Demonstration Method**

24 The DOE's approach to demonstrating continued compliance is the PA, which is based on the
25 criteria indicated in section 194.34. The PA process comprehensively considers the FEPs
26 relevant to disposal system performance (see Appendix SCR-2009). Those FEPs shown by
27 screening analyses to potentially affect performance are included in quantitative calculations
28 using a system of loosely coupled computer models to describe the interaction of the repository
29 with the natural system, both with and without human intrusion. Uncertainty in parameter values
30 is incorporated in the analysis by a Monte Carlo approach, in which multiple simulations (or
31 realizations) are completed using sampled values for the imprecisely known input parameters
32 (see the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.1.5). Distribution functions characterize the state of
33 knowledge for these parameters, and each realization of the modeling system uses a different set
34 of sampled input values. A sample size of 300 results in 300 different values of each parameter.
35 Thus, there are 300 different sets (vectors) of input parameter values. These 300 vectors were
36 divided among 3 replicates. Quality assurance activities demonstrate that the parameters,
37 software, and analysis used in PA were the result of a rigorous process conducted under
38 controlled conditions (40 CFR § 194.22).


39 Of the FEPs considered, exploratory drilling for natural resources was identified as the only
40 disruption with sufficient likelihood and consequence of impacting releases from the repository.
41 For each vector of parameters values, 10,000 possible futures (realizations) are simulated, where
42 a single future is defined as a series of intrusion events that occur randomly in space and time
43 (Section PA-2.2). Each of these futures is assumed to have an equal probability of occurring;

1 hence a probability of 0.0001. Cumulative radionuclide releases from the disposal system are
 2 calculated for each future, and CCDFs are constructed by sorting the releases from smallest to
 3 largest and then summing the probabilities across the future. Mean CCDFs were then computed
 4 for the three replicates of sampled parameters (Section PA-2.2).

5 **PA-2.1.6 Results of the PA**

6 This section summarizes the results of the CRA-2009 PA and demonstrates that the WIPP
 7 continues to comply with the quantitative containment requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13(a). The
 8 CRA-2009 PA is different than the original certification PA in the CCA and the PA in the
 9 CRA-2004 PABC because it includes additional information, changes, and new data required by
 10 40 CFR § 194.15 recertification application requirements. Table PA-1 details the changes and
 11 new information included in this PA.

12 The results of the CRA-2009 PA demonstrate that the repository continues to comply with the
 13 disposal standards. The key metric for regulatory compliance is the mean CCDF. Figure PA-1,
 14 which compares the overall mean CCDF for the CRA-2009 PA to the overall mean CCDF for
 15 the CRA-2004 PABC, demonstrates two key points. First, the overall mean CCDF lies entirely
 16 below the limits specified in section 191.13(a). Thus, the WIPP is in compliance with the
 17 containment requirements of Part 191. Second, for any probability, the expected releases in the
 18 CRA-2009 PA are only slightly higher than those in the CRA-2004 PABC, primarily because of
 19 the increased drilling rate.



20
 21 **Figure PA-1. Overall Mean CCDFs for Total Normalized Releases: CRA-2009 PA and**
 22 **CRA-2004 PABC**

23 Detailed results of the CRA-2009 PA are contained in Section PA-9.0, which describes
 24 sensitivity analyses conducted as the final step in the Monte Carlo analysis. These sensitivity

1 analyses indicate the relative importance of each sampled parameter in terms of its contribution
2 to uncertainty in estimating disposal system performance. Analyses also examine the sensitivity
3 of intermediate performance measures to the sampled parameters. Examples of such
4 intermediate performance measures include the quantity of radionuclides released to the
5 accessible environment by any one mechanism (for example, cuttings or DBRs), and other model
6 results that describe conditions of interest, such as disposal region pressure.

7 Section PA-9.0 presents CCDF distributions for each replication of the analysis, mean CCDFs,
8 and an overall mean CCDF with the 95% confidence interval estimated from the 3 independent
9 mean distributions. All 300 individual CCDFs, as well as the overall mean CCDF determined
10 from the 3 replicates, lie entirely below and to the left of the limits specified in section 191.13(a)
11 (see Figure PA-79). Thus, the WIPP continues to comply with the containment requirements of
12 Part 191. Comparing the results of the 3 replicates indicates that the sample size of 100 in each
13 replicate is sufficient to generate a stable distribution of outcomes (see Figure PA-80). Within
14 the region of regulatory interest (that is, at probabilities greater than $10^{-3}/10^4$ year [yr]), the
15 mean CCDFs from each replicate are essentially indistinguishable from the overall mean.

16 As discussed in Section PA-9.1, Section PA-9.2, and Section PA-9.3, examining the normalized
17 releases from cuttings and cavings, spallings, and DBRs provides insight into the relative
18 importance of each release mode's contribution to the mean CCDF's location and the
19 compliance determination. Releases from cuttings and cavings dominate the mean CCDF at high
20 probabilities, while DBRs dominate the mean CCDF at low probabilities. Spallings are less
21 important and have very little effect on the location of the mean. Subsurface releases from
22 groundwater transport are less than 10^{-6} EPA units and make no contribution to the mean
23 CCDF's location.

24 Uncertainties characterized in the natural system and the interaction of waste with the disposal
25 system environment show little variation between the location of the mean CCDFs of the three
26 replicates, providing additional confidence in the compliance determination. The natural and
27 engineered barrier systems of the WIPP provide robust and effective containment of TRU waste
28 even if the repository is penetrated by multiple borehole intrusions.

29 **PA-2.2 Conceptual Structure of the PA**

30 This section outlines the conceptual structure of the WIPP PA. First, a discussion of the
31 regulatory requirements is given. The requirements of section 191.13 and section 194.34
32 (summarized in Section PA-2.2.1) lead to the identification of three main PA components:

- 33 1. A probabilistic characterization of the likelihood for different futures to occur at the WIPP
34 site over the next 10,000 years
- 35 2. A procedure for estimating the radionuclide releases to the accessible environment
36 associated with each possible future that could occur at the WIPP site over the next 10,000
37 years
- 38 3. A probabilistic characterization of the uncertainty in the parameters used to estimate
39 potential releases

1 The probabilistic methods employed in WIPP PA give rise to the CCDF specified in section
2 191.13(a) and the distributions specified by 40 CFR § 194.34(b).

3 **PA-2.2.1 Regulatory Requirements**

4 The methodology employed in PA derives from the EPA's standard for the geologic disposal of
5 radioactive waste, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and
6 Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes (Part 191)
7 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993), which is divided into three subparts. 40 CFR
8 Part 191 Subpart A applies to a disposal facility prior to decommissioning and establishes
9 standards for the annual radiation doses to members of the public from waste management and
10 storage operations. Part 191 Subpart B applies after decommissioning and sets probabilistic
11 limits on cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment for 10,000 years
12 (section 191.13) and assurance requirements to provide confidence that section 191.13 will be
13 met (40 CFR § 191.14). Part 191 Subpart B also sets limits on radiation doses to members of the
14 public in the accessible environment for 10,000 years of undisturbed repository performance
15 (section 191.15). 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart C limits radioactive contamination of groundwater
16 for 10,000 years after disposal (section 191.24). In this recertification application, the DOE must
17 demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the WIPP will continue to comply with the
18 requirements of Part 191 Subparts B and C.

19 The following is the central requirement in Part 191 Subpart B, and the primary determinant of
20 the PA methodology (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1985, p. 38086).

21 § 191.13 Containment Requirements:

22 (a) Disposal systems for spent nuclear fuel or high-level or transuranic radioactive wastes shall be
23 designed to provide a reasonable expectation, based upon performance assessments, that
24 cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment for 10,000 years after disposal
25 from all significant processes and events that may affect the disposal system shall:

26 (1) Have a likelihood of less than one chance in 10 of exceeding the quantities calculated
27 according to Table 1 (Appendix A); and

28 (2) Have a likelihood of less than one chance in 1,000 of exceeding ten times the quantities
29 calculated according to Table 1 (Appendix A).

30 (b) Performance assessments need not provide complete assurance that the requirements of
31 191.13(a) will be met. Because of the long time period involved and the nature of the events and
32 processes of interest, there will inevitably be substantial uncertainties in projecting disposal
33 system performance. Proof of the future performance of a disposal system is not to be had in the
34 ordinary sense of the word in situations that deal with much shorter time frames. Instead, what is
35 required is a reasonable expectation, on the basis of the record before the implementing agency,
36 that compliance with 191.13(a) will be achieved.

37 Section 191.13(a) refers to "quantities calculated according to Table 1 (Appendix A)," which
38 means a normalized radionuclide release to the accessible environment based on the type of
39 waste being disposed, the initial waste inventory, and the size of release that may occur (U.S.
40 Environmental Protection Agency 1985, Appendix A). Table 1 of Appendix A specifies
41 allowable releases (i.e., release limits) for individual radionuclides and is reproduced as Table

1 PA-2. The WIPP is a repository for TRU waste, which is defined as “waste containing more
 2 than 100 nanocuries of alpha-emitting TRU isotopes, with half-lives greater than twenty years,
 3 per gram of waste” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1985, p. 38084). The normalized
 4 release R for TRU waste is defined by

$$5 \quad R = \sum_i \left(\frac{Q_i}{L_i} \right) \left(\frac{1 \times 10^6 \text{ Ci}}{C} \right) \quad (\text{PA.1})$$

6 where Q_i is the cumulative release of radionuclide i to the accessible environment during the
 7 10,000-year period following closure of the repository (curies [Ci]), L_i is the release limit for
 8 radionuclide i given in Table PA-2 (Ci), and C is the amount of TRU waste emplaced in the
 9 repository (Ci). In the CRA-2009 PA, $C = 2.32 \times 10^6$ Ci (Leigh and Trone 2005, Section 3).
 10 Further, “accessible environment” means (1) the atmosphere, (2) land surfaces, (3) surface
 11 waters, (4) oceans, and (5) all of the lithosphere beyond the controlled area. “Controlled area”
 12 means (1) a surface location, to be identified by PICs, that encompasses no more than 100 square
 13 kilometers (km²) and extends horizontally no more than 5 kilometers (km) in any direction from
 14 the outer boundary of the original radioactive waste’s location in a disposal system, and (2) the
 15 subsurface underlying such a location (section 191.12).

16 PAs are the basis for addressing the containment requirements. To help clarify the intent of Part
 17 191, the EPA promulgated 40 CFR Part 194 (2004), Criteria for the Certification and

18 **Table PA-2. Release Limits for the Containment Requirements (U.S. Environmental**
 19 **Protection Agency 1985, Appendix A, Table 1)**

Radionuclide	Release Limit L_i per 1000 MTHM ^a or Other Unit of Waste ^b
Americium-241 or -243	100
Carbon-14	100
Cesium-135 or -137	1,000
Iodine-129	100
Neptunium-237	100
Pu-238, -239, -240, or -242	100
Radium-226	100
Strontium-90	1,000
Technetium-99	10,000
Thorium (Th) -230 or -232	10
Tin-126	1,000
Uranium (U) -233, -234, -235, -236, or -238	100
Any other alpha-emitting radionuclide with a half-life greater than 20 years	100
Any other radionuclide with a half-life greater than 20 years that does not emit alpha particles	1,000

a Metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) exposed to a burnup between 25,000 megawatt-days (MWd) per metric ton of heavy metal (MWd/MTHM) and 40,000 MWd/MTHM.

b An amount of TRU wastes containing one million Ci of alpha-emitting TRU radionuclides with half-lives greater than 20 years.

1 Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the Part 191 Disposal
2 Regulations. There, an elaboration on the intent of section 191.13 is prescribed.

3 § 194.34 Results of performance assessments.

4 (a) The results of performance assessments shall be assembled into “complementary, cumulative
5 distributions functions” (CCDFs) that represent the probability of exceeding various levels of
6 cumulative release caused by all significant processes and events.

7 (b) Probability distributions for uncertain disposal system parameter values used in performance
8 assessments shall be developed and documented in any compliance application.

9 (c) Computational techniques, which draw random samples from across the entire range of the
10 probability distributions developed pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, shall be used in
11 generating CCDFs and shall be documented in any compliance application.

12 (d) The number of CCDFs generated shall be large enough such that, at cumulative releases of 1
13 and 10, the maximum CCDF generated exceeds the 99th percentile of the population of CCDFs
14 with at least a 0.95 probability.

15 (e) Any compliance application shall display the full range of CCDFs generated.

16 (f) Any compliance application shall provide information which demonstrates that there is at least
17 a 95% level of statistical confidence that the mean of the population of CCDFs meets the
18 containment requirements of § 191.13 of this chapter.

19 The DOE’s methodology for PA uses information about the disposal system and waste to
20 evaluate performance over the 10,000-year regulatory time period. To accomplish this task, the
21 FEPs with potential to affect the future of the WIPP are first defined (Section PA-2.3.1). Next,
22 scenarios that describe potential future conditions in the WIPP are formed from logical
23 groupings of retained FEPs (Section PA-2.3.2). The scenario development process results in a
24 probabilistic characterization for the likelihood of different futures that could occur at the WIPP
25 (Section PA-2.2.2). Using the retained FEPs, models are developed to estimate the radionuclide
26 releases from the repository (Section PA-2.2.3). Finally, uncertainty in model parameters is
27 characterized probabilistically (Section PA-2.2.4).

28 **PA-2.2.2 Probabilistic Characterization of Different Futures**

29 As discussed in Section PA-2.3.1, the CCA PA scenario development process for the WIPP
30 identified exploratory drilling for natural resources as the only disruption with sufficient
31 likelihood and consequence of impacting releases from the repository (see the CCA, Appendix
32 SCR). In addition, Part 194 specifies that the occurrence of mining within the LWB must be
33 included in the PA. This has not changed for the CRA-2009 PA. As a result, the projection of
34 releases over the 10,000 years following closure of the WIPP is driven by the nature and timing
35 of intrusion events.

36 The collection of all possible futures \mathbf{x}_{st} forms the basis for the probability space $(\mathcal{S}_{st}, \mathbb{S}_{st}, p_{st})$
37 characterizing aleatory uncertainty, where $\mathcal{S}_{st} = \{\mathbf{x}_{st} : \mathbf{x}_{st} \text{ is a possible future of the WIPP}\}$, \mathbb{S}_{st} is
38 a suitably restricted collection of sets of futures, called “scenarios” (Section PA-3.10), and p_{st} is

1 a probability measure for the elements of \mathcal{S}_{st} . A possible future, $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$, is thus characterized by
 2 the collection of intrusion events that occur in that future:

$$3 \quad \mathbf{x}_{st,i} = \left[\underbrace{(t_1, e_1, l_1, b_1, p_1, \mathbf{a}_1)}_{1^{\text{st}} \text{ intrusion}}, \underbrace{(t_2, e_2, l_2, b_2, p_2, \mathbf{a}_2)}_{2^{\text{nd}} \text{ intrusion}}, \dots, \underbrace{(t_n, e_n, l_n, b_n, p_n, \mathbf{a}_n)}_{n^{\text{th}} \text{ intrusion}}, t_{\min} \right] \quad (\text{PA.2})$$

4 where

- 5 n is the number of drilling intrusions
- 6 t_j is the time (year) of the j^{th} intrusion
- 7 l_j designates the location of the j^{th} intrusion
- 8 e_j designates the penetration of an excavated or nonexcavated area by the j^{th} intrusion
- 9 b_j designates whether or not the j^{th} intrusion penetrates pressurized brine in the Castile
 10 Formation
- 11 p_j designates the plugging procedure used with the j^{th} intrusion (i.e., continuous plug, two
 12 discrete plugs, three discrete plugs)
- 13 \mathbf{a}_j designates the type of waste penetrated by the j^{th} intrusion (i.e., no waste, CH-TRU
 14 waste, RH-TRU waste, and, for CH-TRU waste, the waste streams encountered)
- 15 t_{\min} is the time at which potash mining occurs within the LWB

16 The subscript st indicates that aleatory (i.e., stochastic) uncertainty is being considered; the
 17 letters st are retained for historical context. The subscript i indicates that the future \mathbf{x}_{st} is one of
 18 many sample elements from \mathcal{S}_{st} .

19 The probabilistic characterization of n , t_j , l_j , and e_j is based on the assumption that drilling
 20 intrusions will occur randomly in time and space at a constant average rate (i.e., follow a Poisson
 21 process); the probabilistic characterization of b_j derives from assessed properties of brine
 22 pockets; the probabilistic characterization of \mathbf{a}_j derives from the volumes of waste emplaced in
 23 the WIPP in relation to the volume of the repository; and the probabilistic characterization of p_j
 24 derives from current drilling practices in the sedimentary basin (i.e., the Delaware Basin) in
 25 which the WIPP is located. A vector notation is used for \mathbf{a}_j because it is possible for a given
 26 drilling intrusion to miss the waste or to penetrate different waste types (CH-TRU and RH-TRU)
 27 as well as to encounter different waste streams in the CH-TRU waste. Further, the probabilistic
 28 characterization for t_{\min} follows from the criteria in Part 194 that the occurrence of potash
 29 mining within the LWB should be assumed to occur randomly in time (i.e., follow a Poisson
 30 process with a rate constant of $\lambda_m = 10^{-4} \text{ yr}^{-1}$), with all commercially viable potash reserves
 31 within the LWB extracted at time t_{\min} . In practice, the probability measure p_{st} is defined by
 32 specifying probability distributions for each component of \mathbf{x}_{st} , as discussed further in Section
 33 PA-3.0.

34 PA-2.2.3 Estimation of Releases

35 Based on the retained FEPs (Section PA-2.3.1), release mechanisms include direct transport of
 36 material to the surface at the time of a drilling intrusion (i.e., cuttings, spallings, and brine flow)
 37 and release subsequent to a drilling intrusion due to brine flow up a borehole with a degraded

1 plug (i.e., groundwater transport). The quantities of releases are determined by the state of the
 2 repository through time, which is determined by the type, timing, and sequence of prior intrusion
 3 events. For example, pressure in the repository is an important determinant of spillings, and the
 4 amount of pressure depends on whether the drilling events that have occurred penetrated brine
 5 pockets and how long prior to the current drilling event the repository was inundated.

6 Computational models for estimating releases were developed using the retained FEPs; these
 7 models are summarized in Figure PA-2. These computational models implement the conceptual
 8 models representing the repository system as described in section 194.23 and the mathematical
 9 models for physical processes presented in Section PA-4.0. Most of the computational models
 10 involve the numerical solution of partial differential equations (PDEs) used to represent
 11 processes such as material deformation, fluid flow, and radionuclide transport.

12 The collection of computation models can be represented abstractly as a function $f(\mathbf{x}_{st}|\mathbf{v}_{su})$,
 13 which quantifies the release that could result from the occurrence of a specific future \mathbf{x}_{st} and a
 14 specific set of values for model parameters \mathbf{v}_{su} . Because the future of the WIPP is unknown, the
 15 values of $f(\mathbf{x}_{st}|\mathbf{v}_{su})$ are uncertain. Thus, the probability space $(\mathcal{S}_{st}, \mathbb{S}_{st}, p_{st})$, together with the
 16 function $f(\mathbf{x}_{st}|\mathbf{v}_{su})$, give rise to the CCDF specified in section 191.13(a), as illustrated in Figure
 17 PA-3. The CCDF represents the probability that a release from the repository greater than R will
 18 be observed, where R is a point on the abscissa (x-axis) of the graph (Figure PA-3).

19 Formally, the CCDF depicted in Figure PA-3 results from an integration over the probability
 20 space $(\mathcal{S}_{st}, \mathbb{S}_{st}, p_{st})$:


$$21 \quad \text{prob}(rel > R | \mathbf{v}_{su}) = \int_{\mathcal{S}_{st}} \delta_R(f(\mathbf{x}_{st} | \mathbf{v}_{su})) d_{st}(\mathbf{x}_{st} | \mathbf{v}_{su}) dV_{st} \quad (PA.3)$$

22 where $\delta_R(f(\mathbf{x}_{st}|\mathbf{v}_{su})) = 1$ if $f(\mathbf{x}_{st}|\mathbf{v}_{su}) > R$, $\delta_R(f(\mathbf{x}_{st}|\mathbf{v}_{su})) = 0$ if $f(\mathbf{x}_{st}|\mathbf{v}_{su}) \leq R$, and $d_{st}(\mathbf{x}_{st}|\mathbf{v}_{su})$ is the
 23 probability density function associated with the probability space $(\mathcal{S}_{st}, \mathbb{S}_{st}, p_{st})$. In practice, the
 24 integral in Equation (PA.3) is evaluated by a Monte Carlo technique, where a random sample
 25 $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$, $i = 1, nR$, is generated from \mathcal{S}_{st} consistent with the probability distribution p_{st} . Using this
 26 random sample, Equation (PA.3) is numerically evaluated as

$$27 \quad \text{prob}(rel > R | \mathbf{v}_{su}) = \int_{\mathcal{S}_{st}} \delta_R(f(\mathbf{x}_{st} | \mathbf{v}_{su})) d_{st}(\mathbf{x}_{st} | \mathbf{v}_{su}) dV_{st} \quad (PA.4)$$


$$\cong \sum_{j=1}^{nR} \delta_R(f(\mathbf{x}_{st,j} | \mathbf{v}_{su})) / nR$$

28 The models in Figure PA-2 are too complex to permit a closed-form evaluation of the integral in
 29 Equation (PA.4) that defines the CCDF specified in Part 191. In WIPP PA, these probability
 30 distribution functions (PDFs) are constructed using Monte Carlo simulation to sample the entire
 31 possible set of release outcomes. As long as the sampling is conducted properly and a sufficient
 32 number of samples is collected, the PDF of the sample should successfully approximate the PDF
 33 of the sample “universe” of all possible releases.



1
2

Figure PA-2. Computational Models Used in PA



3
4

Figure PA-3. Construction of the CCDF Specified in 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart B

1 In PA, the number of samples nR used to construct a CCDF is 10,000. However, the models in
 2 Figure PA-2 are also too computationally intensive to permit their evaluation for each of these
 3 10,000 futures. Due to this constraint, the models in Figure PA-2 are evaluated for a relatively
 4 small number of specific scenarios, and the results of these evaluations are used to construct
 5 CCDFs. The representative scenarios are labeled E0, E1, E2, and E1E2, and are defined in
 6 Section PA-3.10; the procedure for constructing a CCDF from these scenarios is described in
 7 Section PA-6.0.

8 **PA-2.2.4 Probabilistic Characterization of Parameter Uncertainty**

9 If the parameters used in the process-level models of Figure PA-2 were precisely known and if
 10 the models could accurately predict the future behavior of the repository, the evaluation of
 11 repository performance alone would be sufficient to answer the first three questions related to
 12 repository performance. However, the models do not perfectly represent the dynamics of the
 13 system and their parameters are not precisely known. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the
 14 confidence one has in the CCDFs being constructed. The confidence in the CCDFs is established
 15 using Monte Carlo methods to evaluate how the uncertainty in the model parameters impacts the
 16 CCDFs or releases. The probabilistic characterization of the uncertainty in the model parameters
 17 is the outcome of the data development effort for the WIPP (summarized in Section 8.0 in Fox
 18 2008).


19 Formally, uncertainty in the parameters that underlie the WIPP PA can be characterized by a
 20 second probability space $(\mathcal{S}_{su}, \mathbb{S}_{su}, p_{su})$, where the sample space \mathcal{S}_{su} is defined by

$$21 \quad \mathcal{S}_{su} = \{\mathbf{v}_{su}: \mathbf{v}_{su} \text{ is a sampled vector of parameter values}\} \quad (\text{PA.5})$$

22 The subscript su indicates that epistemic (i.e., subjective) uncertainty is being considered; the
 23 letters su are retained for historical context. An element $\mathbf{v}_{su} \in \mathcal{S}_{su}$ is a vector $\mathbf{v}_{su} = v_{su,1}, v_{su,2},$
 24 $\dots, v_{su,N}$ of length N , where each element $v_{su,k}$ is an uncertain parameter used in the models to
 25 estimate releases. In practice, the probability measure p_{su} is defined by specifying probability
 26 distributions for each element of \mathbf{v}_{su} , discussed further in Section PA-5.0.

27 If the actual value for \mathbf{v}_{su} were known, the CCDF resulting from evaluation of Equation (PA.4)
 28 could be determined with certainty and compared with the criteria specified in Part 191.
 29 However, given the complexity of the WIPP site, the 10,000-year period under consideration,
 30 and the state of knowledge about the natural and engineered system, values for \mathbf{v}_{su} are not
 31 known with certainty. Rather, the uncertainty in \mathbf{v}_{su} is characterized probabilistically, as
 32 described above, leading to a distribution of CCDFs (Figure PA-4) with each CCDF resulting
 33 from one of many vectors of values of \mathbf{v}_{su} . The uncertainty associated with the parameters is
 34 termed epistemic uncertainty, and has been referred to in WIPP PA documentation as subjective
 35 uncertainty.

36 WIPP PA uses a Monte Carlo procedure for evaluating the effects of epistemic uncertainty on
 37 releases. The procedure involves sampling the distributions assigned to the uncertain parameters
 38 and generating a CCDF of releases based on the results of the process-level models generated
 39 using those parameters values. By repeating this process many times, a distribution of the




R = Release to Accessible Environment (EPA Units)

Figure PA-4. Distribution of CCDFs Resulting from Possible Values for the Sampled Parameters

CCDFs can be constructed. The requirements of section 191.13 are evaluated, in part, using the mean probability of release. The overall mean probability curve is created by averaging across the CCDFs for releases, i.e., averaging the CCDFs across vertical slices (Figure PA-4) (a formal definition is provided in Helton et al. 1998). In addition, confidence limits on the mean are computed using standard t-statistics (Figure PA-5). The proximity of these curves to the boundary line in Figure PA-3 indicates the confidence with which Part 191 will be met. Confidence is also established by examining the distribution of the CCDFs in relation to the release limits (Figure PA-6).


WIPP PA uses a stratified sampling design called LHS (McKay, Beckman, and Conover 1979) to generate a sample $\mathbf{v}_{su}, i = 1, \dots, nLHS$, from \mathcal{S}_{su} consistent with the probability distribution p_{su} . LHS is an efficient scheme for sampling the range of a distribution using a relatively small sample. Based on order statistics, the sample size of $nLHS = 300$ replicates would provide coverage of 99% of the CCDF distribution with a confidence of 95%.

In Part 194, the EPA decided that the statistical portion of the determination of compliance with Part 191 will be based on the sample mean. The LHS sample sizes should be demonstrated operationally to improve (reduce the size of) the confidence interval for the estimated mean. The underlying principle is to show convergence of the mean (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996b, p. 8-41).



1

2 **Figure PA-5. Example Mean Probability of Release and the Confidence Limits on the**
 3 **Mean from CRA-2009 PA**



4

5 **Figure PA-6. Example CCDF Distribution From CRA-2009 PA (Replicate 1)**

1 The DOE has chosen to demonstrate repeatability of the mean and to address the associated
2 criteria of Part 194 using an operational approach of multiple replication, as proposed by Iman
3 (1982). The complete set of PA calculations was repeated three times with all aspects of the
4 analysis identical except for the random seed used to initiate the LHS procedure. Thus, PA
5 results are available for 3 replicates, each based on an independent set of 100 LHS vectors drawn
6 from identical distributions for imprecisely known parameters and propagated through an
7 identical modeling system. This technique of multiple replication allows the adequacy of the
8 sample size chosen in the Monte Carlo analysis to be evaluated and provides a suitable measure
9 of confidence in the mean CCDF estimation used to demonstrate compliance with section
10 191.13(a).

11 **PA-2.3 PA Methodology**

12 This section addresses scenarios formed from FEPs that were retained for PA calculations, and
13 introduces the specification of scenarios for consequence analysis.

14 **PA-2.3.1 Identification and Screening of FEPs**

15 The EPA has provided criteria concerning the scope of PAs in 40 CFR § 194.32. In particular,
16 criteria relating to the identification of potential processes and events that may affect disposal
17 system performance are provided in 40 CFR § 194.32(e), which states

18 Any compliance application(s) shall include information which:

- 19 (1) Identifies all potential processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and
20 events that may occur during the regulatory time frame and may affect the disposal system;
- 21 (2) Identifies the processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events
22 included in performance assessments; and
- 23 (3) Documents why any processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and events
24 identified pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section were not included in performance
25 assessment results provided in any compliance application.

26 Section 32 of this application fulfills these criteria by documenting the DOE's identification,
27 screening, and screening results of all potential processes and events consistent with the criteria
28 specified in section 194.32(e).

29 The first two steps in scenario development involve identifying and screening FEPs that are
30 potentially relevant to the performance of the disposal system. The CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0,
31 Section 6.2 discusses the development of a comprehensive initial FEPs set used in the CCA, the
32 methodology and criteria used for screening, the method used to reassess the CCA FEPs for the
33 CRA-2004, and a summary of the FEPs retained for scenario development. Changes to FEPs
34 since the CRA-2004 are outlined in Section 32 and Appendix SCR-2009 of this application.

35 The original FEPs generation and screening were documented in the CCA, and the resulting
36 FEPs list became the FEPs compliance baseline. The baseline contained 237 FEPs and was
37 documented the CCA, Appendix SCR. The EPA compliance review of FEPs was documented in
38 EPA's Technical Support Document 194.32: Scope of PA (U.S. Environmental Protection

1 Agency 1998c). The EPA numbered each FEP with a different scheme than the DOE used for
2 the CCA. The DOE has since adopted the EPA's numbering scheme.

3 **PA-2.3.2 Scenario Development and Selection**

4 Logic diagrams illustrate the formation of scenarios for consequence analysis from combinations
5 of events that remain after FEP screening (Cranwell et al. 1990) (Figure PA-7). Each scenario
6 shown in Figure PA-7 is defined by a combination of occurrence and nonoccurrence for all
7 potentially disruptive events. Disruptive events are defined as those that create new pathways or
8 significantly alter existing pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, radionuclide transport within
9 the disposal system. Each of these scenarios also contains a set of features and nondisruptive
10 events and processes that remain after FEP screening. As shown in Figure PA-7, undisturbed
11 repository performance (UP) and disturbed repository performance (DP) scenarios are
12 considered in consequence modeling for the WIPP PA. The UP scenario is used for compliance
13 assessments (40 CFR § 194.54 and 40 CFR § 194.55). Important aspects of UP and DP
14 scenarios are summarized in this section.


15 **PA-2.3.2.1 Undisturbed Repository Performance**

16 The UP scenario is defined in 40 CFR § 191.12 to mean "the predicted behavior of a disposal
17 system, including consideration of the uncertainties in predicted behavior, if the disposal system
18 is not disrupted by human intrusion or the occurrence of unlikely natural events." For
19 compliance assessments with respect to the Individual and Groundwater Protection
20 Requirements (section 191.15; Appendix IGP-2009), it is only necessary to consider the UP
21 scenario. The UP scenario is also considered with DP scenario for PA with respect to the
22 containment requirements (section 191.13).

23 No potentially disruptive natural events and processes are likely to occur during the regulatory
24 time frame. Therefore, all naturally occurring events and processes retained for scenario
25 construction are nondisruptive and are considered part of the UP scenario. Mining outside the
26 LWB is assumed at the end of AIC for all scenarios. The M scenario involves future mining
27 within the controlled area. The disturbed repository E scenario involves at least one deep drilling
28 event that intersects the waste disposal region. The M scenario and the E scenario may both
29 occur in the future. The DOE calls a future in which both of these events occur the ME scenario.
30 More detailed descriptions are found in Section PA-2.3.2.2.

31 The only natural features and waste- and repository-induced FEPs retained after screening that
32 are excluded in the UP scenario, but included in the DP scenario, are those directly associated
33 with the potential effects of future deep drilling within the controlled area. Among the most
34 significant FEPs that will affect the UP scenario within the disposal system are excavation-
35 induced fracturing, gas generation, salt creep, and MgO in the disposal rooms.

- 36 • The repository excavation and consequent changes in the rock stress field surrounding the
37 excavated opening will create a DRZ immediately adjacent to excavated openings. The
38 DRZ will exhibit mechanical and hydrological properties different than those of the intact
39 rock.




1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Figure PA-7. Logic Diagram for Scenario Analysis

- Organic material in the waste may degrade because of microbial activity, and brine will corrode metals in the waste and waste containers, with concomitant generation of gases. Gas generation may result in pressures sufficient to both maintain or develop fractures and change the fluid flow pattern around the waste disposal region.
 - At the repository depth, salt creep will tend to heal fractures and reduce the permeability of the DRZ and the crushed salt component of the long-term shaft seals to near that of the host rock salt.
 - The MgO engineered barrier emplaced in the disposal rooms will react with CO₂ and maintain mildly alkaline conditions. Metal corrosion in the waste and waste containers will maintain reducing conditions. These effects will maintain low radionuclide solubility.
- Radionuclides can become mobile as a result of waste dissolution and colloid generation following brine flow into the disposal rooms. Colloids may be generated from the waste (humics, mineral fragments, and An intrinsic colloids) or from other sources (humics, mineral fragments, and microbes).

1 Conceptually, there are several pathways for radionuclide transport within the undisturbed
 2 disposal system that may result in releases to the accessible environment (Figure PA-8).
 3 Contaminated brine may migrate away from the waste-disposal panels if pressure within the
 4 panels is elevated by gas generated from corrosion or microbial consumption. Radionuclide
 5 transport may occur laterally, through the anhydrite interbeds toward the subsurface boundary of
 6 the accessible environment in the Salado, or through access drifts or anhydrite interbeds to the
 7 base of the shafts. In the latter case, if the pressure gradient between the panels and overlying
 8 strata is sufficient, contaminated brine may migrate up the shafts. As a result, radionuclides may
 9 be transported directly to the ground surface, or laterally away from the shafts through permeable
 10 strata such as the Culebra, toward the subsurface boundary of the accessible environment. These
 11 conceptual pathways are shown in Figure PA-8.

12 The modeling system described in Section PA-4.0 includes potential radionuclide transport along
 13 other pathways, such as migration through Salado halite. However, the natural properties of the
 14 undisturbed system make radionuclide transport to the accessible environment via these other
 15 pathways unlikely.



16
 17

Figure PA-8. Conceptual Release Pathways for the UP Scenario

CCA-009-2

1 **PA-2.3.2.2 Disturbed Repository Performance**

2 Assessments for compliance with section 191.13 need to consider the potential effects of future
3 disruptive natural and human-initiated events and processes on the performance of the disposal
4 system. No potentially disruptive natural events and processes are considered sufficiently likely
5 to require inclusion in analyses of either the UP or DP scenario. The only future human-initiated
6 events and processes retained after FEP screening are those associated with mining and deep
7 drilling (but not the subsequent use of a borehole) within the controlled area or LWB when
8 institutional controls cannot be assumed to eliminate the possibility of such activities (Section
9 PA-3.2 and the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.1). In total, 21 disturbed repository FEPs
10 associated with future mining and deep drilling have been identified. These FEPs were assigned
11 a screening designator of the DP scenario.

12 For evaluating the consequences of disturbed repository performance, the DOE has defined the
13 mining scenario (M), the deep drilling scenario (E), and a mining and drilling scenario (ME).
14 These scenarios are described in the following sections.

15 **PA-2.3.2.2.1 Disturbed Repository M Scenario**

16 The M scenario involves future mining within the controlled area. Consistent with the criteria
17 stated by the EPA in 40 CFR § 194.32(b) for PA calculations, the effects of potential future
18 mining within the controlled area are limited to changes in hydraulic conductivity of the Culebra
19 that result from subsidence (as described in Section PA-3.9).

20 Radionuclide transport may be affected in the M scenario if a head gradient between the waste-
21 disposal panels and the Culebra causes brine contaminated with radionuclides to move from the
22 waste-disposal panels to the base of the shafts and up to the Culebra. The changes in the Culebra
23 T field may affect the rate and direction of radionuclide transport within the Culebra. Features of
24 the M scenario are illustrated in Figure PA-9.


25 The three disturbed repository FEPs labeled M in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Table 6-9 are
26 related to the occurrence and effects of future mining. The modeling system used for the M
27 scenario is similar to that developed for the UP scenario, but with a modified Culebra T field in
28 the controlled area to account for the mining effects.

29 **PA-2.3.2.2.2 Disturbed Repository E Scenario**

30 The disturbed repository E scenario involves at least one deep drilling event that intersects the
31 waste disposal region. The EPA provides criteria for analyzing the consequences of future
32 drilling events in PA in 40 CFR § 194.33(c).

33 Performance assessments shall document that in analyzing the consequences of drilling events, the
34 Department assumed that:

35 (1) Future drilling practices and technology will remain consistent with practices in the Delaware
36 Basin at the time a compliance application is prepared. Such future drilling practices shall
37 include, but shall not be limited to: the types and amounts of drilling fluids; borehole depths,
38 diameters, and seals; and the fraction of such boreholes that are sealed by humans; and



CCA-119-2

Figure PA-9. Conceptual Release Pathways for the Disturbed Repository M Scenario

(2) Natural processes will degrade or otherwise affect the capability of boreholes to transmit fluids over the regulatory time frame.

Consistent with these criteria, there are several pathways for radionuclides to reach the accessible environment in the E scenario. Before any deep drilling intersects the waste, potential release pathways are identical to those in the undisturbed repository scenario.

If a borehole intersects the waste in the disposal rooms, releases to the accessible environment may occur as material entrained in the circulating drilling fluid is brought to the surface. Particulate waste brought to the surface may include cuttings, cavings, and spillings. Cuttings are the materials cut by the drill bit as it passes through waste. Cavings are the materials eroded by the drilling fluid in the annulus around the drill bit. Spallings are the materials forced into the circulating drilling fluid if there is sufficient pressure in the waste disposal panels. During drilling, contaminated brine may flow up the borehole and reach the surface, depending on fluid pressure within the waste disposal panels.

When abandoned, the borehole is assumed to be plugged in a manner consistent with current practices in the Delaware Basin as prescribed in 40 CFR § 194.33(c)(1). An abandoned intrusion

1 borehole with degraded casing and/or plugs may provide a pathway for fluid flow and
2 contaminant transport from the intersected waste panel to the ground surface if the fluid pressure
3 within the panel is sufficiently greater than hydrostatic. Additionally, if brine flows through the
4 borehole to overlying units, such as the Culebra, it may carry dissolved and colloidal actinides
5 that can be transported laterally to the accessible environment by natural groundwater flow in the
6 overlying units.


7 Alternatively, the units intersected by an intrusion borehole may provide sources for brine flow
8 to a waste panel during or after drilling. For example, in the northern Delaware Basin, the
9 Castile, which underlies the Salado, contains isolated volumes of brine at fluid pressures greater
10 than hydrostatic (as discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.2.2). The WIPP-12
11 penetration of one of these reservoirs provided data on one brine reservoir within the controlled
12 area. The location and properties of brine reservoirs cannot be reliably predicted; thus, the
13 possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both a waste panel and a brine reservoir is accounted
14 for in consequence analysis of the WIPP, as discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section
15 6.4.8. Such a borehole could provide a connection for brine flow from the Castile to the waste
16 panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the waste panel.

17 A borehole that is drilled through a disposal room pillar, but does not intersect waste, could also
18 penetrate the brine reservoir underlying the waste disposal region. Such an event would, to some
19 extent, depressurize the brine reservoir, and thus would affect the consequences of any
20 subsequent reservoir intersections. The PA does not take credit for possible brine reservoir
21 depressurization.

22 The DOE has distinguished two types of deep drilling events by whether or not the borehole
23 intersects a Castile brine reservoir. A borehole that intersects a waste disposal panel and
24 penetrates a Castile brine reservoir is designated an E1 event. A borehole that intersects a waste
25 panel but does not penetrate a Castile brine reservoir is designated an E2 event. The
26 consequences of deep drilling intrusions depend not only on the type of a drilling event, but on
27 whether the repository was penetrated by an earlier E2 event or flooded due to an earlier E1
28 event. The PA also does not take credit for depressurization of brine reservoirs from multiple
29 drilling intrusions. These scenarios are described in order of increasing complexity in the
30 following sections.

31 **PA-2.3.2.2.3 The E2 Scenario**

32 The E2 scenario is the simplest scenario for inadvertent human intrusion into a waste disposal
33 panel. In this scenario, a panel is penetrated by a drill bit; cuttings, cavings, spallings, and brine
34 flow releases may occur; and brine flow may occur in the borehole after it is plugged and
35 abandoned. Sources for brine that may contribute to long-term flow up the abandoned borehole
36 are the Salado or, under certain conditions, the units above the Salado. An E2 scenario may
37 involve more than one E2 drilling event, although the flow and transport model configuration
38 developed for the E2 scenario evaluates the consequences of futures that have only one E2 event.
39 Features of the E2 scenario are illustrated in Figure PA-10.



Note: Borehole penetrates waste and does not penetrate pressurized brine in the underlying Castile. Arrows indicate hypothetical direction of groundwater flow and radionuclide transport.

- Anhydrite layers A and B
- Culebra
- Groundwater flow and radionuclide transport
- DRZ
- Repository and shafts
- Increase in Culebra hydraulic conductivity due to mining


CCA-011-2

1
2 **Figure PA-10. Conceptual Release Pathways for the Disturbed Repository Deep Drilling**
3 **E2 Scenario**

4 **PA-2.3.2.2.4 The E1 Scenario**

5 Any scenario with exactly one inadvertent penetration of a waste panel that also penetrates a
6 Castile brine reservoir is called E1. Features of this scenario are illustrated in Figure PA-11.

7 Sources of brine in the E1 scenario are the brine reservoir, the Salado, and, under certain
8 conditions, the units above the Salado. However, the brine reservoir is conceptually the
9 dominant source of brine in this scenario. The flow and transport model configuration developed
10 for the E1 scenario evaluates the consequences of futures that have only one E1 event.



Note: Borehole penetrates waste and pressurized brine in the underlying Castile Formation. Arrows indicate hypothetical direction of groundwater flow and radionuclide transport.


- Anhydrite layers A and B
- Groundwater flow and radionuclide transport
- Repository and shafts
- Culebra
- DRZ
- Increase in Culebra hydraulic conductivity due to mining

CCA-010-2

1
2 **Figure PA-11. Conceptual Release Pathways for the Disturbed Repository Deep Drilling**
3 **E1 Scenario**

4 **PA-2.3.2.2.5 The E1E2 Scenario**

5 The E1E2 scenario is defined as all futures with multiple penetrations of a waste panel of which
6 at least one intrusion is an E1. One example of this scenario, with a single E1 event and a single
7 E2 event penetrating the same panel, is illustrated in Figure PA-12. However, the E1E2 scenario
8 can include many possible combinations of intrusion times, locations, and types of event (E1 or
9 E2). The sources of brine in this scenario are those listed for the E1 scenario, and multiple E1
10 sources may be present. The E1E2 scenario has a potential flow path not present in the E1 or E2
11 scenarios: flow from an E1 borehole through the waste to another borehole. This flow path has
12 the potential to (1) bring large quantities of brine in direct contact with waste and (2) provide a



Note: Example shown includes only two boreholes, both of which penetrate waste and one of which penetrates pressurized brine in the underlying Castile. Pathways are similar for examples containing multiple boreholes. Arrows indicate hypothetical direction of groundwater flow and radionuclide transport.

- | | | |
|--------------------------|---|--|
| Anhydrite layers A and B | Groundwater flow and radionuclide transport | Repository and shafts |
| Culebra | DRZ | Increase in Culebra hydraulic conductivity due to mining |

CCA-012-2

Figure PA-12. Conceptual Release Pathways for the Disturbed Repository Deep Drilling E1E2 Scenario

1
 2
 3
 4 less restrictive path for this brine to flow to the units above the Salado (via multiple boreholes)
 5 compared to either the individual E1 or E2 scenarios. It is both the presence of brine reservoirs
 6 and the potential for flow through the waste to other boreholes that make this scenario different
 7 from combinations of E2 boreholes in terms of potential consequences. Estimates from flow and
 8 transport modeling are used to determine the extent of flow between boreholes and whether
 9 modeled combinations of E1 and E2 boreholes at specific locations in the repository should be
 10 treated as E1E2 scenarios or as independent E1 and E2 scenarios in the consequence analysis.

1 **PA-2.3.2.3 Disturbed Repository ME Scenario**

2 The M scenario and the E scenario may both occur in the future. The DOE calls a future in
3 which both of these events occur the ME scenario. The occurrence of both mining and deep
4 drilling do not create processes beyond those already described separately for the M and E
5 scenarios. For example, the occurrence of mining does not influence any of the interactions
6 between deep boreholes and the repository or brine reservoirs, nor does the occurrence of drilling
7 impact the effects of mining on Culebra hydrogeology.

8 **PA-2.3.2.4 Scenarios Retained for Consequence Analysis**

9 The scenarios described in Section PA-2.3.2.1, Section PA-2.3.2.2, and Section PA-2.3.2.3 have
10 been retained for consequence analysis to determine compliance with the containment
11 requirements in section 191.13. The modeling systems used to evaluate the consequences of
12 these undisturbed and disturbed scenarios are discussed in Section PA-2.3.3.

13 **PA-2.3.3 Calculation of Scenario Consequences**

14 Calculating scenario consequences requires quantitative modeling. This section discusses the
15 conceptual and computational models and some parameter values used to estimate the
16 consequence of the scenarios described in Section PA-2.3.2. Additional discussion of conceptual
17 models and modeling assumptions is provided in Section PA-4.0. Additional descriptions of
18 sampled parameter values are included in Fox (2008).

19 A single modeling system was used to represent the disposal system and calculate the CCDFs.
20 The modeling system, however, can be conveniently described in terms of various submodels,
21 with each describing a part of the overall system. The models used in the WIPP PA, as in other
22 complex analyses, exist at four different levels.

23 1. **Conceptual models** are a set of qualitative assumptions that describe a system or subsystem
24 for a given purpose. At a minimum, these assumptions concern the geometry and
25 dimensionality of the system, initial and boundary conditions, time dependence, and the
26 nature of the relevant physical and chemical processes. The assumptions should be
27 consistent with one another and with existing information within the context of the given
28 purpose.

29 2. **Mathematical models** represent the processes at the site. The conceptual models provide
30 the context within which these mathematical models must operate, and define the processes
31 they must characterize. The mathematical models are predictive in the sense that, once
32 provided with the known or assumed properties of the system and possible perturbations to
33 the system, they predict the response of the system. The processes represented by these
34 mathematical models include fluid flow, mechanical deformation, radionuclide transport in
35 groundwater, and removal of waste through intruding boreholes.

36 3. **Numerical models** are developed to approximate mathematical model solutions because
37 most mathematical models do not have closed-form solutions.

1 4. The complexity of the system requires computer codes to solve the numerical models. The
2 implementation of the numerical model in the computer code with specific initial and
3 boundary conditions and parameter values is generally referred to as the *computational*
4 *model*.

5 Data are descriptors of the physical system being considered, normally obtained by experiment
6 or observation. Parameters are values necessary in mathematical, numerical, or computational
7 models. The distinction between data and parameters can be subtle. Parameters are distinct from
8 data, however, for three reasons: (1) Data may be evaluated, statistically or otherwise, to
9 generate model parameters to account for uncertainty in data. (2) Some parameters have no
10 relation to the physical system, such as the parameters in a numerical model to determine when
11 an iterative solution scheme has converged. (3) Many model parameters are applied at a
12 different scale than one directly observed or measured in the physical system. The distinction
13 between data and parameter values is described further in Fox (2008) and Tierney (1990), where
14 distribution derivations for specific parameters are given. The interpretation and scaling of
15 experimental and field data are discussed in Fox (2008) for individual and sampled parameters,
16 as appropriate.

1 **PA-3.0 Probabilistic Characterization of Futures**

2 The PA for the WIPP identifies uncertainty in parameters and uncertainty in future events as
3 distinctly different entities and requires sampling to be conducted in two dimensions. One
4 dimension focuses on characterizing the uncertainty in terms of the probability that various
5 possible futures will occur at the WIPP site over the next 10,000 years. The other dimension
6 characterizes the uncertainty due to lack of knowledge about the precise values of model
7 parameters appropriate for the WIPP repository. Each dimension of the analysis is characterized
8 by a probability space. Monte Carlo methods are used with the WIPP PA modeling system to
9 sample each of the two probability spaces.

10 Characterizing the probability distribution for the first dimension of the PA depends on
11 identifying the kinds of events that could impact releases from the repository over the next
12 10,000 years. Screening analyses of possible future events concluded that the only significant
13 events with the potential to affect radionuclide releases to the accessible environment are drilling
14 and mining within the LWB (Appendix SCR-2009, Section SCR-5.0). Consequently, modeling
15 the future states of the repository focuses on representing the occurrences and effects of these
16 two events. CCDFGF uses stochastic processes to simulate intrusion events by drilling and the
17 occurrence of mining for natural resources. CCDFGF assembles the results from the
18 deterministic models and selects the most appropriate scenario data provided by these models to
19 use as the simulation of a 10,000-year future progresses. Ten thousand potential futures are
20 simulated and used to create distributions of potential releases, and then compiled into a single
21 CCDF of potential releases.

22 WIPP PA is required not only to estimate the likelihood of future releases, but to establish
23 confidence in those estimates. Confidence is established using the second dimension of the
24 analysis, which is based on the evaluation of uncertainty in the values of some of the parameters
25 of the deterministic models. This uncertainty is assumed to represent a lack of knowledge about
26 the true values of the parameters, and is labeled epistemic uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty can
27 be viewed as the representation of potential systematic errors in the results. The impact of
28 epistemic uncertainty on the results is determined by generating 300 sets of parameter values
29 using a stratified random sampling design, LHS, and then running the deterministic models and
30 CCDFGF with each set of sampled parameters. Thus, 300 CCDFs are generated by CCDFGF.
31 One set of parameters is often referred to as a vector. The 300 simulations are organized as 3
32 replicates of 100 vectors each. Because the uncertainty assigned to the parameters represents a
33 lack of knowledge, this epistemic uncertainty could theoretically be reduced by collecting data to
34 improve knowledge about the parameters. Epistemic uncertainty is represented in the
35 projections of potential releases from the repository by the variability among the 300 CCDFs.

36 The WIPP PA modeling system consists of a set of loosely coupled deterministic models
37 (BRAGFLO, PANEL, NUTS, SECOTP2D, and CUTTINGS_S) that provide scenario-specific
38 results to the code CCDFGF (Figure PA-2). CCDFGF is, in contrast, a stochastic simulation
39 model used to simulate potential futures of repository performance where drilling and mining
40 intrusions can impact the state of the repository and produce release events. CCDFGF
41 implements intrusions as stochastic events, thus incorporating the aleatory uncertainty associated
42 with projections of future events. This section describes how aleatory uncertainty is
43 implemented in PA. Epistemic uncertainty is discussed in Section PA-6.0.

1 **PA-3.1 Probability Space**

2 As discussed in Section PA-2.2.2, aleatory uncertainty is defined by the possible futures $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$
3 conditional on the set i of parameters used in Equation (PA.2). Section PA-3.2, Section PA-3.3,
4 Section PA-3.4, Section PA-3.5, Section PA-3.6, Section PA-3.7, Section PA-3.8, and Section
5 PA-3.9 describe the individual components t_j , e_j , l_j , b_j , p_j , \mathbf{a}_j , and t_{min} of $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ and their associated
6 probability distributions. The concept of a scenario as a subset of the sample space of $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ is
7 discussed in Section PA-3.10. The procedure used to sample the individual elements $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ is
8 described in Section PA-6.5.

9 **PA-3.2 AICs and PICs**

10 AICs and PICs will be implemented at the WIPP site to deter human activity detrimental to
11 repository performance. AICs and PICs are described in detail in the CRA-2004, Chapter 7.0
12 and in appendices referenced in Chapter 7.0. In this section, the impact of AICs and PICs on PA
13 is described.

14 AICs will be implemented at the WIPP after final facility closure to control site access and
15 ensure that activities detrimental to disposal system performance do not occur within the
16 controlled area. The AICs will preclude human intrusion in the disposal system. A 100-year
17 limit on the effectiveness of AICs in PA is established in 40 CFR § 191.14(a). Because of the
18 regulatory restrictions and the nature of the AICs that will be implemented, PA assumes there are
19 no inadvertent human intrusions or mining in the controlled area for 100 years following
20 repository closure.

21 PICs are designed to deter inadvertent human intrusion into the disposal system. Only minimal
22 assumptions were made about the nature of future society when designing the PICs to comply
23 with the assurance requirements. The preamble to Part 194 limits any credit for PICs in
24 deterring human intrusion to 700 years after disposal (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
25 1996a p. 5231). Although the DOE originally took credit for PICs in the CCA PA, but has not
26 taken credit since. Not including PICs is a conservative implementation, as no credit is taken for
27 a beneficial process.


28 **PA-3.3 Drilling Intrusion**

29 As described in Section PA-2.3.2.2, drilling intrusions in PA are assumed to occur randomly in
30 time and space following a Poisson process. Specifically, the drilling rate considered within the
31 area marked by a berm as part of the system for PICs (Fox 2008, Table 46) is 5.85×10^{-3}
32 intrusions per square kilometer per year (km^2/yr). AICs are assumed to prevent any drilling
33 intrusions for the first 100 years after the decommissioning of the WIPP (Section PA-3.2). In the
34 computational implementation of PA, it is convenient to represent the Poisson process for
35 drilling intrusions by its corresponding rate term $\lambda_d(t)$ for intrusions into the area marked by the
36 berm. Specifically,

$$\lambda_d(t) = \begin{cases} 0 & 0 \leq t < 100 \text{ yr} \\ (0.6285 \text{ km}^2)(5.85 \times 10^{-3} \text{ km}^{-2} \text{ yr}^{-1}) = 3.68 \times 10^{-3} \text{ yr}^{-1} & 100 \leq t \leq 10,000 \text{ yr} \end{cases} \quad (\text{PA.6})$$

2 where 0.6285 km² is the area enclosed by the berm (Fox 2008, Table 45) and *t* is elapsed time
3 since decommissioning the WIPP.

4 The function $\lambda_d(t)$ defines the parameter of the exponential distribution that gives rise to the
5 times of intrusions, t_j of Equation (PA.2). In the computational implementation of the analysis,
6 the exponential distribution is sampled to define the times between successive drilling intrusions
7 (Figure PA-13, Section PA-6.5). A key assumption of the exponential distribution is that events
8 are independent of each other, so the occurrence of one has no effect on the occurrence of the
9 next event. The process giving rise to such events is sometimes called a Poisson process because
10 the distribution of such events over a fixed interval of time is a Poisson distribution. Due to the
11 10,000-year regulatory period specified in section 191.13, t_j is assumed to be bounded above by
12 10,000 years in the definition of $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$. Further, t_j is bounded below by 100 years as defined in
13 Equation (PA.6).



14
15 **Figure PA-13. CDF for Time Between Drilling Intrusions**

16 **PA-3.4 Penetration of Excavated/Nonexcavated Area**

17 The variable e_j is a designator for whether or not the j^{th} drilling intrusion penetrates an
18 excavated, waste-filled area of the repository: $e_j = 0$ or 1 implies penetration of nonexcavated or

1 excavated area, respectively. The corresponding probabilities $P[e_j = 0]$ and $P[e_j = 1]$ for $e_j = 0$
 2 and $e_j = 1$ are

3
$$pEx_1 = P[e_j = 1] = 0.1273 \text{ km}^2 / 0.6285 \text{ km}^2 = 0.203 \tag{PA.7}$$


4
$$pEx_0 = P[e_j = 0] = 1 - pEx_1 = 0.797 \tag{PA.8}$$

5 where 0.1273 km^2 and 0.6285 km^2 are the excavated area of the repository and the area of the
 6 berm, respectively (Fox 2008, Table 45).

7 **PA-3.5 Drilling Location**

8 Locations of drilling intrusions through the excavated, waste-filled area of the repository are
 9 discretized to the 144 locations in Figure PA-14. Assuming that a drilling intrusion occurs
 10 within the excavated area, it is assumed to be equally likely to occur at each of these 144
 11 locations. Thus, the probability pL_k that drilling intrusion j will occur at location l_k , $k = 1, 2, \dots,$
 12 144 in Figure PA-14 is

13
$$pL_{k;k=1,2,3} = P[k = 1] = P[k = 2] = \dots = P[k = 144] = 1/144 = 6.94 \times 10^{-3} \tag{PA.9}$$



14 ● Discretized Locations for Drilling Intrusions ($i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, 144$)

15 **Figure PA-14. Discretized Locations for Drilling Intrusions**

1 **PA-3.6 Penetration of Pressurized Brine**

2 The conceptual models for the Castile include the possibility that pressurized brine reservoirs
 3 underlie the repository (Section PA-4.2.10). The variable b_j is a designator for whether or not
 4 the j^{th} drilling intrusion penetrates pressurized brine, where $b_j = 0$ signifies nonpenetration and b_j
 5 = 1 signifies penetration of pressurized brine. In PA, the probability $pB_1 = P[b_j = 1]$ is sampled
 6 from a uniform distribution ranging from 0.01 to 0.60 (see GLOBAL:PBRINE in Table PA-19).

7 **PA-3.7 Plugging Pattern**

8 Three borehole plugging patterns, p_k , are considered in PA: (1) p_1 , a full concrete plug through
 9 the Salado to the Bell Canyon Formation (hereafter referred to as Bell Canyon), (2) p_2 , a two-
 10 plug configuration with concrete plugs at the Rustler/Salado interface and the Castile/Bell
 11 Canyon interface, and (3) p_3 , a three-plug configuration with concrete plugs at the Rustler/
 12 Salado, Salado/Castile, and Castile/Bell Canyon interfaces. The probability that a given drilling
 13 intrusion will be sealed with plugging pattern p_k , $k = 1, 2, 3$, is given by pPL_k , where $pPL_1 = P[k$
 14 = 1] = 0.015, $pPL_2 = P[k = 2] = 0.696$, $pPL_3 = P[k = 3] = 0.289$ (Fox 2008, Table 46).

15 **PA-3.8 Activity Level**

16 The waste intended for disposal at the WIPP is represented by 767 distinct waste streams, with
 17 690 of these waste streams designated as CH-TRU waste and 77 designated as RH-TRU waste
 18 (Leigh, Trone and Fox 2005, Section 4.4). For the CRA-2009 PA, the 77 separate RH-TRU
 19 waste streams are represented by a single, combined RH-TRU waste stream. The activity levels
 20 for the waste streams are given in Fox (2008, Table 48 and Table 49). Each waste container
 21 emplaced in the repository contains waste from a single CH-TRU waste stream. Waste packaged
 22 in 55-gallon (gal) drums is stacked 3 drums high within the repository. Although waste in other
 23 packages (e.g., standard waste boxes, 10-drum overpacks, etc.) may not be stacked 3 high, PA
 24 assumes that each drilling intrusion into CH-TRU waste intersects 3 different waste streams. In
 25 contrast, all RH-TRU waste is represented by a single waste stream, and so each drilling
 26 intrusion through RH-TRU waste is assumed to intersect this single waste stream. Appendix
 27 MASS-2009, Section MASS-21.0 examines the sensitivity of PA results to the assumption that
 28 three waste streams are intersected by each drilling intrusion into CH-TRU waste.

29 The vector \mathbf{a}_j characterizes the type of waste penetrated by the j^{th} drilling intrusion. Specifically,

30
$$\mathbf{a}_j = 0 \text{ if } e_j = 0 \tag{PA.10}$$

31 (i.e., if the i^{th} drilling intrusion does not penetrate an excavated area of the repository);

32
$$\mathbf{a}_j = 1 \text{ if } e_j = 1 \text{ and RH-TRU is penetrated} \tag{PA.11}$$

33
$$\mathbf{a}_j = [iCH_{j1}, iCH_{j2}, iCH_{j3}] \text{ if } e_j = 1 \text{ and CH-TRU is penetrated} \tag{PA.12}$$

1 where iCH_{j1} , iCH_{j2} , and iCH_{j3} are integer designators for the CH-TRU waste streams intersected
 2 by the j^{th} drilling intrusion (i.e., each of iCH_{j1} , iCH_{j2} , and iCH_{j3} is an integer between 1 and
 3 690).

4 Whether the j^{th} intrusion penetrates a nonexcavated or excavated area is determined by the
 5 probabilities pE_0 and pE_1 discussed in Section PA-3.4. The type of waste penetrated is
 6 determined by the probabilities pCH and pRH . The excavated area used for disposal of CH-TRU
 7 waste (aCH) is 1.115×10^5 square meters (m^2) and the area used for disposal of RH-TRU waste
 8 (aRH) is $1.576 \times 10^4 m^2$ (Fox 2008, Table 45), for a total disposal area of $aEX = aCH + aRH =$
 9 $1.273 \times 10^5 m^2$. Given that the j^{th} intrusion penetrates an excavated area, the probabilities pCH
 10 and pRH of penetrating CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste are given by

11
$$pCH = P[\text{CH waste area penetrated}] = aCH / aEX = (1.115 \times 10^5 m^2) / (1.273 \times 10^5 m^2) = 0.876$$

 12 (PA.13)

13
$$pRH = P[\text{RH waste area penetrated}] = aRH / aEX = (1.576 \times 10^4 m^2) / (1.273 \times 10^5 m^2) = 0.124$$

 14 (PA.14)

15 As indicated in this section, the probabilistic characterization of \mathbf{a}_j depends on a number of
 16 individual probabilities. Specifically, pEx_0 and pEx_1 determine whether a nonexcavated or
 17 excavated area is penetrated (Section PA-3.5); pCH and pRH determine whether CH-TRU or
 18 RH-TRU waste is encountered, given penetration of an excavated area; and the individual waste
 19 stream probabilities in Fox (2008, Table 48 and Table 49), determine the specific waste streams
 20 iCH_{j1} , iCH_{j2} , and iCH_{j3} encountered given a penetration of CH-TRU waste. The probability of
 21 encountering a particular CH-TRU waste stream is computed as the ratio of the volume of that
 22 waste stream to the volume of CH-TRU waste.

23 **PA-3.9 Mining Time**

24 Full mining of known potash reserves within the LWB is assumed to occur at time t_{min} . The
 25 occurrence of mining within the LWB in the absence of institutional controls is specified as
 26 following a Poisson process with a rate of $\lambda_m = 1 \times 10^{-4} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (Fox 2008, Table 46). However,
 27 this rate can be reduced by AICs and PICs. Specifically, AICs are assumed to result in no
 28 possibility of mining for the first 100 years after decommissioning of the WIPP. In PA, PICs do
 29 not affect the mining rate. Thus, the mining rate $\lambda_m(t)$ is

30
$$\lambda_m(t) = 0 \text{ yr}^{-1} \quad \text{for } 0 \leq t < 100 \text{ yrs} \quad (\text{PA.15})$$

31
$$\lambda_m(t) = 1 \times 10^{-4} \text{ yr}^{-1} \quad \text{for } 100 \leq t \leq 10,000 \text{ yrs} \quad (\text{PA.16})$$

32 where t is the elapsed time since decommissioning of the WIPP.

33 In the computational implementation of the analysis, $\lambda_m(t)$ is used to define the distribution of
 34 time to mining. The use of $\lambda_m(t)$ to characterize t_{min} is analogous to the use of λ_d to

1 characterize the t_j , except that only one mining event is assumed to occur (i.e., $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ contains only
 2 one value for t_{min}) in order to be consistent with guidance given in Part 194 that mining within
 3 the LWB should be assumed to remove all economically viable potash reserves. Due to the
 4 10,000-year regulatory period specified in section 191.13, t_{min} is assumed to be bounded above
 5 by 10,000 years in the definition of $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$.

6 **PA-3.10 Scenarios and Scenario Probabilities**

7 A scenario is a subset of the sample space for aleatory uncertainty. The underlying goal of
 8 scenario definition is to define the state of repository conditions prior to and following intrusion
 9 events. Scenarios are specific cases of inputs or system states that are selected to cover the range
 10 of possible cases. Given the complexity of the futures $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ (see Equation (PA.2)), many different
 11 scenarios can be defined. The computational complexity of the function $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}|\mathbf{v}_{su})$ in Section
 12 PA-2.2.3 limits evaluation to only a few intrusion scenarios. As presented in Section PA-2.3.2,
 13 PA considers four fundamental intrusion scenarios:

14 E0 = no drilling intrusion through an excavated area of the repository

15 E1 = a drilling intrusion through an excavated area of the repository that penetrates
 16 pressurized brine in the Castile

17 E2 = a drilling intrusion through an excavated area of the repository that does not
 18 penetrate pressurized brine in the Castile

19 E1E2 = two or more previous intrusions, at least one of which is an E1 intrusion

20 These definitions of intrusion scenarios capture the most important events impacting the state of
 21 the repository: whether or not the repository is inundated by the penetration of a brine pocket,
 22 and whether or not there exists a possible route of release upward via a borehole. The state of the
 23 repository is also designated as E0, E1, E2, or E1E2. Scenarios for some of the process-level
 24 models consist of a single intrusion scenario occurring at specific times. CCDFGF is used to
 25 simulate multiple intrusions over 10,000 years.

26 If only the intrusion scenarios controlled the state of the repository, then the state would be
 27 defined by the sequence of drilling events alone. However, CCDFGF also considers the impact
 28 of plugging pattern on boreholes. A borehole with a full plugging pattern that penetrates the
 29 waste area is also assumed to have no impact, and leaves the repository in its previous state,
 30 including the undisturbed state (see Section PA-6.8.4.1 and Figure PA-41 for more details).
 31 Thus, an E2 intrusion event into an E0 repository will result in an E0 state if a full plugging
 32 pattern is used, or an E2 state otherwise. An E1 intrusion subsequent to an E2 intrusion will
 33 leave the repository in an E1E2 state, where it will remain, regardless of subsequent intrusions.
 34 It is therefore important to distinguish between the type of intrusion, listed above, and the state of
 35 the repository.

36 The probability that no excavated area will be penetrated during the 10,000-year interval can be
 37 computed using a distribution of the number of penetration events and the probability that a

1 drilling event will penetrate the excavated area. For the Poisson distribution of drilling events,
 2 the probability of there being n events in the 10,000-year history is

$$3 \quad \frac{e^{-\lambda_d \times 9900} (\lambda_d \times 9900)^n}{n!} \text{ for } n = 1, 2, 3, \dots \quad (\text{PA.17})$$

4 where λ_d is the mean drilling rate per year in the period following the period of AICs, 9,900 is
 5 the number of years in which drilling can occur after the institutional control period of 100 years,
 6 and n is the number of drilling events. The probability of having n events all within the
 7 nonexcavated area is pEx_0^n , or specifically 0.797^n . Thus, the probability of having only events
 8 in the nonexcavated area over 10,000 years, i.e., having no drilling intrusions into the excavated
 9 area, is just the sum across all n of the products of the probability of having exactly n drilling
 10 events and the probability that all n events penetrate the unexcavated area:

$$11 \quad \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-\lambda_d \times 9900} (\lambda_d \times 9900)^n}{n!} pEx_0^n = e^{-\lambda_d \times 9900 \times pEx_1} \quad (\text{PA.18})$$

12 The calculated probability becomes

$$13 \quad \exp(-0.203 \times 3.68 \times 10^{-3} \times (10000 - 100)) = 6.1 \times 10^{-4} \quad (\text{PA.19})$$

14 This probability is the lower bound on the probability of the repository being in an E0 state,
 15 given that it does not include the consideration of the plugging pattern.

16 The probability of a single E1, E2, or E1E2 intrusion over 10,000 years is relatively small.
 17 Assuming that pB_1 takes on its mean value of 0.305 (see Section PA-3.6), and ignoring the
 18 impact of the plugging pattern, for a constant rate of drilling, λ_d , these equations are

$$19 \quad e^{-pEx_1 \lambda_d \times 9900} (pEx_1 \lambda_d \times 9900) pB_1 = 1.4 \times 10^{-3} \quad (\text{PA.20})$$

20 and

$$21 \quad e^{-pEx_1 \lambda_d \times 9900} (pEx_1 \lambda_d \times 9900) pB_0 = 3.2 \times 10^{-3} \quad (\text{PA.21})$$

22 respectively, where $(pEx_1 \times \lambda_d)$ represents the annual rate of drilling into the excavated region of
 23 the repository which is multiplied by 9900 to give the rate per 9,900 years. The probability of an
 24 intrusion into the excavated area is subsequently multiplied by the probability of hitting or
 25 missing a brine pocket. In this form, it can be seen that the term for the probability for intrusion
 26 is equivalent to the PDF of the Poisson distribution for $n = 1$:

$$27 \quad f(n) = \frac{e^{-\lambda} \lambda^n}{n!} \quad (\text{PA.22})$$

1 The expressions defining the probability of being in the E0 state after 10,000 years and of having
2 a single E1 or E2 intrusion event after 10,000 years are relatively simple because the scenarios
3 E0, E1, and E2 are relatively simple. The scenario E1E2 is more complex and, as a result,
4 computing its probability is also more complex. Closed-form formulas for the probabilities of
5 quite complex scenarios can be derived, but they are very complicated and involve large
6 numbers of iterated integrals (Helton 1993). These probabilities of single E1 and E2 intrusions
7 are relevant to the scenarios used by the process-level models.

8 **PA-3.11 CCDF Construction**

9 CCDFGF simulates histories that can have many intrusion events (WIPP Performance
10 Assessment 2003a). The process-level models evaluate the releases at a small number of
11 specific times for each of the four intrusion scenarios. Releases from the repository are
12 calculated using results from these fundamental scenarios (Section PA-6.7 and Section PA-6.8).
13 Releases for an arbitrary future are estimated from the results of these fundamental scenarios
14 (Section PA-6.8); these releases are used to construct CCDFs by Equation (PA.4).

15 Previous WIPP PAs have used the Monte Carlo approach to construct the CCDF indicated in
16 Equation (PA.4). The Monte Carlo approach generates releases for 10,000 possible futures.
17 CCDFs are constructed by treating the 10,000 releases values as order statistics; each release is
18 assigned a probability of 1×10^{-4} , and the CCDF can be constructed by plotting the complement
19 of the sum of the probabilities ordered by the release value. The CRA-2009 PA uses the same
20 approach as the CRA-2004 PA.

1 **PA-4.0 Estimation of Releases**

2 This section describes how releases to the accessible environment are estimated for a particular
 3 future in PA.

4 **PA-4.1 Results for Specific Futures**

5 The function $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ estimates the radionuclide releases to the accessible environment associated
 6 with each of the possible futures ($\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$) that could occur at the WIPP site over the next 10,000
 7 years. In practice, $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ is quite complex and is constructed by the models implemented in
 8 computer programs used to simulate important processes and releases at the WIPP. In the
 9 context of these models, $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ has the form

$$\begin{aligned}
 f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}) = & f_C(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}) + f_{SP}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] + f_{DBR}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] \\
 & + f_{MB}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] + f_{DL}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] + f_S[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] \quad (\text{PA.23}) \\
 & + f_{ST}[f_{MF}(\mathbf{x}_{st,0}), f_{NP}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})]]
 \end{aligned}$$

11 where

- 12 $\mathbf{x}_{st,i} \sim$ particular future under consideration
- 13 $\mathbf{x}_{st,0} \sim$ future involving no drilling intrusions but a mining event at the same
 14 time t_{min} as in \mathbf{x}_{st}
- 15 $f_C(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}) \sim$ cuttings and cavings release to accessible environment for $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$
 16 calculated with CUTTINGS_S
- 17 $f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}) \sim$ two-phase flow in and around the repository calculated for $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ with
 18 BRAGFLO; in practice, $f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ is a vector containing a large amount
 19 of information, including pressure and brine saturation in various
 20 geologic members
- 21 $f_{SP}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] \sim$ spillings release to accessible environment for $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ calculated with the
 22 spillings model contained in DRSPALL and CUTTINGS_S; this
 23 calculation requires repository conditions calculated by $f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ as
 24 input
- 25 $f_{DBR}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] \sim$ DBR to accessible environment for $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ also calculated with
 26 BRAGFLO; this calculation requires repository conditions calculated
 27 by $f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ as input
- 28 $f_{MB}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] \sim$ release through anhydrite MBs to accessible environment for $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$
 29 calculated with NUTS; this calculation requires flows in and around
 30 the repository calculated by $f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ as input

- 1 $f_{DL}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})]$ ~ release through Dewey Lake to accessible environment for $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$
 2 calculated with NUTS; this calculation requires flows in and around
 3 the repository calculated by $f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ as input
- 4 $f_S[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})]$ ~ release to land surface due to brine flow up a plugged borehole for $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$
 5 calculated with NUTS; this calculation requires flows in and around
 6 the repository calculated by $f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ as input
- 7 $f_{MF}(\mathbf{x}_{st,0})$ ~ flow field in the Culebra calculated for $\mathbf{x}_{st,0}$ with MODFLOW; $\mathbf{x}_{st,0}$ is
 8 used as an argument to f_{MF} because drilling intrusions are assumed to
 9 cause no perturbations to the flow field in the Culebra
- 10 $f_{NP}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})]$ ~ release to Culebra for $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ calculated with NUTS or PANEL as
 11 appropriate; this calculation requires flows in and around the
 12 repository calculated by $f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ as input
- 13 $f_{ST}[f_{MF}(\mathbf{x}_{st,0}), f_{NP}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})]]$ ~ groundwater transport release through Culebra to
 14 accessible environment calculated with SECOTP2D. This calculation
 15 requires MODFLOW results (i.e., $f_{MF}(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$) and NUTS or PANEL
 16 results (i.e., $f_{NP}[\mathbf{x}_{st,i}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})]$) as input

17 The remainder of this section describes the mathematical structure of the mechanistic models
 18 that underlie the component functions of $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ in Equation (PA.23).

19 The Monte Carlo CCDF construction procedure, implemented in the code CCDFGF (WIPP
 20 Performance Assessment 2003a), uses a sample of size $nS = 10,000$ in PA. The individual
 21 programs that estimate releases do not run fast enough to allow this many evaluations of f . As a
 22 result, a two-step procedure is being used to evaluate f in calculating the summation in Equation
 23 (PA.23). First, f and its component functions are evaluated with the procedures (i.e., models)
 24 described in this section for a group of preselected futures. Second, values of $f(\mathbf{x}_{st})$ for the
 25 randomly selected futures $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ used in the numerical evaluation of the summation in Equation
 26 (PA.23) are then constructed from results obtained in the first step. These constructions are
 27 described in Section PA-6.7 and Section PA-6.8, and produce the evaluations of $f(\mathbf{x}_{st})$ that are
 28 actually used in Equation (PA.23).

29 For notational simplicity, the functions on the right-hand side of Equation (PA.23) will typically
 30 be written with only \mathbf{x}_{st} as an argument (e.g., $f_{SP}(\mathbf{x}_{st})$ will be used instead of $f_{SP}[\mathbf{x}_{st}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st})]$).
 31 However, the underlying dependency on the other arguments will still be present.

32 The major topics considered in this chapter are two-phase flow in the vicinity of the repository as
 33 modeled by BRAGFLO (i.e., f_B) (Section PA-4.2), radionuclide transport in the vicinity of the
 34 repository as modeled by NUTS (i.e., $f_{MB}, f_{DL}, f_S, f_{NP}$) (Section PA-4.3), radionuclide transport
 35 in the vicinity of the repository as modeled by PANEL (i.e., f_{NP}) (Section PA-4.4), cuttings and
 36 cavings releases to the surface as modeled by CUTTINGS_S (i.e., f_C) (Section PA-4.5), spillings
 37 releases to the surface as modeled by DRSPALL and CUTTINGS_S (i.e., f_{SP}) (Section PA-4.6),

1 DBRs to the surface as modeled by BRAGFLO (i.e., f_{DBR}) (Section PA-4.7), brine flow in the
 2 Culebra as modeled by MODFLOW (i.e., f_{MF}) (Section PA-4.8), and radionuclide transport in
 3 the Culebra as modeled by SECOTP2D (i.e., f_{ST}) (Section PA-4.9).

4 **PA-4.2 Two-Phase Flow: BRAGFLO**

5 Quantifying the effects of gas and brine flow on radionuclide transport from the repository
 6 requires a two-phase (brine and gas) flow code. The two-phase flow code BRAGFLO is used to
 7 simulate gas and brine flow in and around the repository (Nemer 2007b and 2007c).
 8 Additionally, the BRAGFLO code incorporates the effects of disposal room consolidation and
 9 closure, gas generation, and rock fracturing in response to gas pressure. This section describes
 10 the mathematical models on which BRAGFLO is based, the representation of the repository in
 11 the model, and the numerical techniques employed in the solution.

12 **PA-4.2.1 Mathematical Description**

13 Two-phase flow in the vicinity of the repository is represented by the following system of two
 14 conservation equations, two constraint equations, and three equations of state:

15 Gas Conservation

$$16 \quad \nabla \cdot \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_g K_g k_{rg}}{\mu_g} (\nabla P_g + \rho_g g \nabla h) \right] + \alpha q_g + \alpha q_{rg} = \alpha \frac{\partial (\phi \rho_g S_g)}{\partial t} \quad (\text{PA.24})$$

17 Brine Conservation

$$18 \quad \nabla \cdot \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_b K k_{rb}}{\mu_b} (\nabla P_b + \rho_b g \nabla h) \right] + \alpha q_b + \alpha q_{rb} = \alpha \frac{\partial (\phi \rho_b S_b)}{\partial t} \quad (\text{PA.25})$$

19 Saturation Constraint

$$20 \quad S_g + S_b = 1 \quad (\text{PA.26})$$

21 Capillary Pressure Constraint

$$22 \quad P_c = P_g - P_b = P_c(S_b) \quad (\text{PA.27})$$

23 Gas Density

$$24 \quad \rho_g \text{ (determined by Redlich-Kwong-Soave (RKS) equation of state; see Equation (PA.51))} \\ 25 \quad (\text{PA.28})$$

26 Brine Density

$$27 \quad \rho_b = \rho_{b0} \exp \left[c_b (P_b - P_{b0}) \right] \quad (\text{PA.29})$$

1 Formation Porosity

$$2 \quad \phi = \phi_0 \exp \left[c_\phi (P_b - P_{b0}) \right] \quad (\text{PA.30})$$

3 where

4 g = acceleration due to gravity (meters per second squared [m])5 h = vertical distance from a reference location (m)6 k_{rl} = relative permeability (dimensionless) to fluid l , $l = b$ (brine), g (gas)7 P_c = capillary pressure in Pascals (Pa)8 P_l = pressure of fluid l (Pa)9 q_{rl} = rate of production (or consumption, if negative) of fluid l due to chemical reaction
10 (kilograms per cubic meter per seconds [kg/m³/s])11 q_l = rate of injection (or removal, if negative) of fluid l (kg/m³/s)12 S_l = saturation of fluid l (dimensionless)13 t = time (s)14 α = geometry factor (m)15 ρ_l = density of fluid l (kg/m³)16 μ_l = viscosity of fluid l (Pa s)17 ϕ = porosity (dimensionless)18 ϕ_0 = reference (i.e., initial) porosity (dimensionless)19 P_{b0} = reference (i.e., initial) brine pressure (Pa), constant in Equation (PA.29) and spatially
20 variable in Equation (PA.30)21 ρ_0 = reference (i.e., initial) brine density (kg/m³)22 c_ϕ = pore compressibility (Pa⁻¹)23 c_b = brine compressibility (Pa⁻¹)24 K = permeability of the material (m²), isotropic for PA (Howarth and Christian-Frear
25 1997)26 For the brine transport Equation (PA.25), the intrinsic permeability of the material is used. For
27 the gas transport Equation (PA.24), the permeability K is modified to account for the
28 Klinkenberg effect (Klinkenberg 1941). Specifically,

$$29 \quad K_g = K \left(\frac{1 + bK^a}{P_g} \right) \quad (\text{PA.31})$$

30 where a and b are gas and formation-dependent constants. Values of $a = -0.3410$ and $b = 0.2710$
31 were determined from data obtained for MB 139 (Christian-Frear 1996), with these values used
32 for all regions in Figure PA-15.33 The conservation equations are valid in one (i.e., $\nabla = [\partial/\partial x]$), two (i.e., $\nabla = [\partial/\partial x, \partial/\partial y]$), and
34 three (i.e., $\nabla = [\partial/\partial x, \partial/\partial y, \partial/\partial z]$) dimensions. In PA, the preceding system of equations is used

1 to model two-phase fluid flow within the two-dimensional region shown in Figure PA-15. The
 2 details of this system are now discussed.

3 The α term in Equation (PA.24) and Equation (PA.25) is a dimension-dependent geometry factor
 4 and is specified by

$$\begin{aligned}
 5 \quad \alpha &= \text{area normal to flow direction in one-dimensional flow (i.e., } \Delta y \Delta z; \text{ units = m}^2\text{)} \\
 6 \quad &= \text{thickness normal to flow plane in two-dimensional flow (i.e., } \Delta z; \text{ units = m)} \\
 7 \quad &= 1 \text{ in three-dimensional flow (dimensionless)}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{PA.32}$$

8 PA uses a two-dimensional geometry to compute two-phase flow in the vicinity of the
 9 repository, and as a result, α is the thickness of the modeled region (i.e., Δz) normal to the flow
 10 plane (Figure PA-15). Due to the use of the two-dimensional grid in Figure PA-15, α is spatially
 11 dependent, with the values used for α defined in the column labeled “ Δz .” Specifically, α
 12 increases with distance away from the repository edge in both directions to incorporate the
 13 increasing pore volume through which fluid flow occurs. The method used in PA, called
 14 rectangular flaring, is illustrated in Figure PA-16 and ensures that the total volume surrounding
 15 the repository is conserved in the numerical grid. The equations and method used to determine α
 16 for the grid shown in Figure PA-15 are described in detail by Stein (2002).

17 The h term in Equation (PA.24) and Equation (PA.25) defines vertical distance from a reference
 18 point. In PA, this reference point is taken to be the center of MB 139 at the location of the shaft
 19 (i.e., $(x_{ref}, y_{ref}) = (23664.9 \text{ m}, 378.685 \text{ m})$, which is the center of cell 1266 in Figure PA-17).
 20 Specifically, h is defined by

$$21 \quad h(x, y) = (x - x_{ref}) \sin \theta + (y - y_{ref}) \cos \theta
 \tag{PA.33}$$

22 where θ is the inclination of the formation in which the point (x, y) is located. In PA, the Salado
 23 is modeled as having an inclination of 1 degree from north to south, and all other formations are
 24 modeled as being horizontal. Thus, $\theta = 1$ degree for points within the Salado, and $\theta = 0$ degrees
 25 otherwise. Treating the Salado as an inclined formation and treating the Castile, Castile brine
 26 reservoir, Rustler, and overlying units as horizontal creates discontinuities in the grid at the lower
 27 and upper boundaries of the Salado. However, this treatment does not create a computational
 28 problem, since the Salado is isolated from vertical flow; its upper boundary adjoins the
 29 impermeable Los Medaños Member (formerly referred to as the Unnamed Member) at the base
 30 of the Rustler, and its lower boundary adjoins the impermeable Castile.

31 In the solution of Equations (PA.24) through (PA.30), S_b and S_g are functions of location and
 32 time. Thus, P_c , k_{rb} , and k_{rg} are functions of the form $P_c(x, y, t)$, $k_{rb}(x, y, t)$, and $k_{rg}(x, y, t)$. In
 33 the computational implementation of the solution of the preceding equations, flow of phase l out
 34 of a computational cell (Figure PA-17) cannot occur when $S_l(x, y, t) \leq S_{lr}(x, y, t)$, where S_{lr}
 35 denotes the residual saturation for phase l . The values used for S_{lr} , $l = b, g$ are summarized in
 36 Table PA-3.

1 Values for ϕ_0 and c_ϕ (Equation (PA.30)) are also given in Table PA-3. Initial porosity ϕ_0 for the
 2 DRZ is a function of the uncertain parameter for initial halite porosity ϕ_{0H} (HALPOR; see Table
 3 PA-19) and is given by Martell (1996a) and Bean et al. (1996), Section 4):

$$4 \quad \phi_0 = \phi_{0H} + 0.0029 \quad (\text{PA.34})$$

5 Initial porosity ϕ_0 of the Castile brine reservoir is calculated from the uncertain sampled
 6 parameter for the bulk Castile rock compressibility (BPCOMP; see Table PA-19), according to
 7 the following relationship:

$$8 \quad \phi_0 = \frac{BPCOMP}{1.0860 \times 10^{-10}} \quad (\text{PA.35})$$

9 where 1.0860×10^{-10} is a scaling constant that ensures that the productivity ratio, PR , remains
 10 constant at $2.0 \times 10^{-3} \text{ m}^3/\text{Pa}$. The productivity ratio PR is computed by

$$11 \quad PR = V \frac{BPCOMP}{\phi_0} \quad (\text{PA.36})$$

12 where V is the volume of the grid block representing the Castile brine reservoir in Figure PA-15.
 13 Because of this relationship, the initial porosity of the brine reservoir ranges from 0.1842 to
 14 0.9208. This range of porosity is not meant to represent an actual reservoir, but rather allows a
 15 reservoir to supply a volume of brine to the repository in the event of an E1 intrusion consistent
 16 with observed brine flows in the Delaware Basin.

17 The compressibility c_ϕ in Equation (PA.30) and Table PA-3 is pore compressibility.
 18 Compressibility is treated as uncertain for Salado anhydrite, Salado halite, and regions of
 19 pressurized brine in the Castile. However, the sampled value for each of these variables
 20 corresponds to bulk compressibility rather than to the pore compressibility actually used in the
 21 calculation. Assuming all of the change in volume during compression occurs in the pore
 22 volume, the conversion from bulk compressibility c_r to pore compressibility c_ϕ is approximated
 23 by

$$24 \quad C_\phi = \frac{Cr}{\phi_0} \quad (\text{PA.37})$$

25 where ϕ_0 is the initial porosity in the region under consideration.

26 The primary model used in PA for capillary pressure P_c and relative permeability k_{rl} is a
 27 modification of the Brooks-Corey model (Brooks and Corey 1964). In this model, P_c , k_{rb} , and
 28 k_{rg} are defined by

$$29 \quad P_c = P_t(k) / S_{e2}^{1/\lambda} \quad (\text{PA.38})$$





Figure PA-15. Computational Grid Used in BRAGFLO for PA



1
2

Figure PA-16. Definition of Element Depth in BRAGFLO Grid

Table PA-3. Parameter Values Used in Representation of Two-Phase Flow

Region	Material	Material Description	Brooks-Corey Pore Distribution (PORE_DIS) ^a	Threshold Pressure Linear Parameter (PCT_A) ^a	Threshold Pressure Exponential Parameter (PCT_EXP) ^a	Residual Brine Saturation (SAT_RBRN) ^a	Residual Gas Saturation (SAT_RGAS) ^a	Porosity (POROSITY) ^a	Pore Compressibility ^a	Intrinsic Permeability (PRMX_LOG) ^a
			λ	a	η	S_{br}	S_{gr}	ϕ_0	$c\phi, \text{Pa}^{-1}$	k, m^2
Salado	S_HALITE	Undisturbed halite	0.7	0.56	-0.346	0.3	0.2	HALPOR ^b	f(HALCOMP) ^{b,d}	10 ^x , x = HALPRM ^b
DRZ	DRZ_0	DRZ, -5 to 0 years	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	f(HALPOR) ^{b,c}	f(HALCOMP) ^{b,d}	1.0 × 10 ⁻¹⁷
	DRZ_1	DRZ, 0 to 10,000 years	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	f(HALPOR) ^{b,c}	f(HALCOMP) ^{b,d}	10 ^x , x = DRZPRM ^b
MB 138	S_MB138	Anhydrite MB in Salado	ANHBCEXP ^b	0.26	-0.348	ANRBSAT ^b	ANRGSSAT ^b	0.011	f(ANHCOMP) ^{b,d}	10 ^x , x = ANHPRM ^b
Anhydrite AB	S_ANH_AB	Anhydrite layers A and B in Salado	ANHBCEXP ^b	0.26	-0.348	ANRBSAT ^b	ANRGSSAT ^b	0.011	f(ANHCOMP) ^{b,d}	10 ^x , x = ANHPRM ^b
MB 139	S_MB139	Anhydrite MB in Salado	ANHBCEXP ^b	0.26	-0.348	ANRBSAT ^b	ANRGSSAT ^b	0.011	f(ANHCOMP) ^{b,d}	10 ^x , x = ANHPRM ^b
Waste Panel	CAVITY_1	Single waste panel, -5 to 0 years	NA ^e	NA ^e	NA ^e	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0 × 10 ⁻¹⁰
—	WAS_AREA	Single waste panel, 0 to 10,000 years	2.89	0.0	0.0	WRBRNSAT ^b	WRGSSAT ^b	0.848 ^f	0.0	2.4 × 10 ⁻¹³
Rest of Repository (RoR)	CAVITY_2	RoR, -5 to 0 years	NA ^e	NA ^e	NA ^e	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0 × 10 ⁻¹⁰
—	REPOSIT	RoR, 0 to 10,000 years	2.89	0.0	0.0	WRBRNSAT ^b	WRGSSAT ^b	0.848 ^f	0.0	2.4 × 10 ⁻¹³
Ops and Exp	CAVITY_3	Operations area, -5 to 0 years	NA ^e	NA ^e	NA ^e	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0 × 10 ⁻¹⁰
—	OPS_AREA	Operations area, 0 to 10,000 years	NA ^e	NA ^e	NA ^e	0.0	0.0	0.18	0.0	1.0 × 10 ⁻¹¹
Exp	CAVITY_3	Experimental area, -5 to 0 years	NA ^e	NA ^e	NA ^e	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0 × 10 ⁻¹⁰

a Parenthetical parameter names are property names for the corresponding material, as indicated in.

b Uncertain variable; see Table PA-19.

c See Equation (PA.34).

d See Equation (PA.37); ϕ_0 can also be defined by an uncertain variable.

e These materials are using relative permeability model = 11; see Table PA-4.

f Initial value of porosity ϕ_0 ; porosity changes dynamically to account for creep closure (see Section PA-4.2.3).

g See Equation (PA.35).

Table PA-3. Parameter Values Used in Representation of Two-Phase Flow (Continued)

Region	Material	Material Description	Brooks-Corey Pore Distribution (PORE_DIS) ^a λ	Threshold Pressure Linear Parameter (PCT_A) ^a a	Threshold Pressure Exponential Parameter (PCT_EXP) ^a η	Residual Brine Saturation (SAT_RBRN) ^a S_{br}	Residual Gas Saturation (SAT_RGAS) ^a S_{gr}	Porosity (POROSITY) ^a ϕ_0	Pore Compressibility ^a $c\phi, \text{Pa}^{-1}$	Intrinsic Permeability (PRMX_LOG) ^a k, m^2
—	EXP_AREA	Experimental area, 0 to 10,000 years	NA ^c	NA ^c	NA ^c	0.0	0.0	0.18	0.0	1.0×10^{-11}
Castile	IMPERM_Z	Castile	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.005	0.0	1.0×10^{-35}
Castile Brine Reservoir	CASTILER	Brine Reservoir in Castile	0.7	0.56	-0.346	0.2	0.2	$f(\text{BPCOMP})^{\text{b,g}}$	$f(\text{BPCOMP})^{\text{b,d}}$	$10^x, x = \text{BPPRM}^{\text{b}}$
Culebra	CULEBRA	Culebra Member of Rustler	0.6436	0.26	-0.348	0.08363	0.07711	0.151	6.622517×10^{-10}	7.72681×10^{-14}
Magenta	MAGENTA	Magenta Member of Rustler	0.6436	0.26	-0.348	0.08363	0.07711	0.138	1.915942×10^{-9}	6.309576×10^{-16}
Dewey Lake	DEWYLAK	Dewey Lake Redbeds	0.6436	0.0	0.0	0.08363	0.07711	0.143	6.993007×10^{-8}	5.011881×10^{-17}
Santa Rosa	SANTAROS	Santa Rosa Formation	0.6436	0.0	0.0	0.08363	0.07711	0.175	5.714286×10^{-8}	1.0×10^{-10}
Los Medaños	UNNAMED	Los Medaños Member of Rustler	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.181	0.0	1.0×10^{-35}
Tamarisk	TAMARISK	Tamarisk Member of Rustler	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.064	0.0	1.0×10^{-35}
Forty-niner	FORTYNIN	Forty-niner Member of Rustler	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.082	0.0	1.0×10^{-35}
DRZ_PCS	DRZ_0	DRZ, -5 to 0 years	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	$f(\text{HALPOR})^{\text{b,c}}$	$f(\text{HALCOMP})^{\text{b,d}}$	1.0×10^{-17}
DRZ_PCS	DRZ_PCS	DRZ above the panel closures, 0 to 10,000 years	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	$f(\text{HALPOR})^{\text{b,c}}$	$f(\text{HALCOMP})^{\text{b,d}}$	$10^x, x = \text{DRZPCPRM}^{\text{b}}$

a Parenthetical parameter names are property names for the corresponding material, as indicated in Table PA-19.

b Uncertain variable; see Table PA-19.

c See Equation (PA.34).

d See Equation (PA.37); ϕ_0 can also be defined by an uncertain variable.

e These materials are using relative permeability model = 11; see Table PA-4.

f Initial value of porosity ϕ_0 ; porosity changes dynamically to account for creep closure (see Section PA-4.2.3).

g See Equation (PA.35).

Table PA-3. Parameter Values Used in Representation of Two-Phase Flow (Continued)

Region	Material	Material Description	Brooks-Corey Pore Distribution (PORE_DIS) ^a λ	Threshold Pressure Linear Parameter (PCT_A) ^a a	Threshold Pressure Exponential Parameter (PCT_EXP) ^a η	Residual Brine Saturation (SAT_RBRN) ^a S_{br}	Residual Gas Saturation (SAT_RGAS) ^a \bar{S}_{gr}	Porosity (POROSITY) ^a ϕ_0	Pore Compressibility ^a $c\phi, \text{Pa}^{-1}$	Intrinsic Permeability (PRMX_LOG) ^a k, m^2
CONC_PCS	CAVITY_4	Concrete portion of panel closures, -5 to 0 years	NA ^c	NA ^c	NA ^c	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0×10^{-10}
—	CONC_PCS	Concrete portion of panel closures, 0 to 10,000 years	CONBCEXP ^b	0.0	0.0	CONBRSAT ^b	CONGSSAT ^b	0.05	1.2×10^{-9}	$10^x, x = \text{CONPRM}^b$
DRF_PCS	CAVITY_4	Drift adjacent to panel closures, -5 to 0 years	NA ^c	NA ^c	NA ^c	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0×10^{-10}
—	DRF_PCS	Drift adjacent to panel closures, 0 to 10,000 years	2.89	0.0	0.0	WRBRNSAT ^b	WRGSSAT ^b	0.848 ^f	0.0	2.4×10^{-13}
CONC_MON	CAVITY_4	Concrete monolith portion of shaft seals, -5 to 0 years	NA ^c	NA ^c	NA ^c	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0×10^{-10}
—	CONC_MON	Concrete monolith portion of shaft seals, 0 to 10,000 years	0.94	0.0	0.0	SHURBRN ^b	SHURGAS ^b	0.05	1.2×10^{-9}	1.0×10^{-14}
Upper Shaft	CAVITY_4	Upper portion of shaft seals, -5 to 0 years	NA ^c	NA ^c	NA ^c	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0×10^{-10}
—	SHFTU	Upper portion of shaft seals, 0 to 10,000 years	CONBCEXP ^b	0.0	0.0	SHURBRN ^b	SHURGAS ^b	0.005	2.05×10^{-8}	$10^x, x = \text{SHUPRM}^b$

a Parenthetical parameter names are property names for the corresponding material, as indicated in Table PA-19.

b Uncertain variable; see Table PA-19.

c See Equation (PA.34).

d See Equation (PA.37); ϕ_0 can also be defined by an uncertain variable.

e These materials are using relative permeability model = 11; see Table PA-4.

f Initial value of porosity ϕ_0 ; porosity changes dynamically to account for creep closure (see Section PA-4.2.3).

g See Equation (PA.35).

Table PA-3. Parameter Values Used in Representation of Two-Phase Flow (Continued)

Region	Material	Material Description	Brooks-Corey Pore Distribution (PORE_DIS) ^a	Threshold Pressure Linear Parameter (PCT_A) ^a	Threshold Pressure Exponential Parameter (PCT_EXP) ^a	Residual Brine Saturation (SAT_RBRN) ^a	Residual Gas Saturation (SAT_RGAS) ^a	Porosity (POROSITY) ^a	Pore Compressibility ^a	Intrinsic Permeability (PRMX_LOG) ^a
			λ	a	η	S_{br}	S_{gr}	ϕ_0	$c\phi, \text{Pa}^{-1}$	k, m^2
Lower Shaft	CAVITY_4	Lower portion of shaft seals, -5 to 0 years	NA ^c	NA ^c	NA ^c	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0×10^{-10}
—	SHFTL_T1	Lower portion of shaft seals, 0 to 200 years	CONBCEXP ^b	0.0	0.0	SHURBRN ^b	SHURGAS ^b	0.005	4.28×10^{-9}	$10^x, x = \text{SHLPRM1}^b$
—	SHFTL_T2	Lower portion of shaft seals, 200 to 10,000 years	CONBCEXP ^b	0.0	0.0	SHURBRN ^b	SHURGAS ^b	0.005	4.28×10^{-9}	$10^x, x = \text{SHLPRM2}^b$
Borehole plugs	CONC_PLG	Concrete borehole plug, before plug degradation	0.94	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.32	1.1875×10^{-9}	$10^x, x = \text{PLGPRM}^b$
—	BH_SAND	Borehole after plug degradation, 200 years after intrusion	0.94	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.32	0.0	$10^x, x = \text{BHPRM}^b$
Upper Borehole	BH_OPEN	Borehole above repository before plug degradation	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.32	0.0	1.0×10^{-9}
—	BH_SAND	Borehole after plug degradation, 200 years after intrusion	0.94	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.32	0.0	$10^x, x = \text{BHPRM}^b$
Lower Borehole	BH_OPEN	Borehole below repository before creep closure	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.32	0.0	1.0×10^{-9}
—	BH_CREEP	Borehole below repository after creep closure, 1,000 years after intrusion	0.94	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.32	0.0	$10^x/10, x = \text{BHPRM}^d$

a Parenthetical parameter names are property names for the corresponding material, as indicated in Table PA-19.

b Uncertain variable; see Table PA-19.

c See Equation (PA.34).

d See Equation (PA.37); ϕ_0 can also be defined by an uncertain variable.

e These materials are using relative permeability model = 11; see Table PA-4.

f Initial value of porosity ϕ_0 ; porosity changes dynamically to account for creep closure (see Section PA-4.2.3).

g See Equation (PA.35).

1
$$k_{rb} = S_{e1}^{(2+3\lambda)/\lambda} \quad (\text{PA.39})$$

2
$$k_{rg} = (1 - S_{e2})^2 \left(1 - S_{e2}^{(2+\lambda)/\lambda}\right) \quad (\text{PA.40})$$

3 where

4 λ = pore distribution parameter (dimensionless)

5 $P_t(k)$ = capillary threshold pressure (Pa) as a function of intrinsic permeability k (Webb
6 1992)

7
$$= ak^\eta \quad (\text{PA.41})$$

8 S_{e1} = effective brine saturation (dimensionless) without correction for residual gas
9 saturation

10
$$= (S_b - S_{br}) / (1 - S_{br}) \quad (\text{PA.42})$$

11 S_{e2} = effective brine saturation (dimensionless) with correction for residual gas saturation

12
$$= (S_b - S_{br}) / (1 - S_{gr} - S_{br}) \quad (\text{PA.43})$$

13 The values used for λ , a , η , S_{br} , S_{gr} , and k are summarized in Table PA-3. The statement that
14 the Brooks-Corey model is in use means that P_c , k_{rb} , and k_{rg} are defined by Equation (PA.38)
15 through Equation (PA.40).

16 In the anhydrite MBs, either the Brooks-Corey model or the van Genuchten-Parker model is used
17 as determined by the subjectively uncertain parameter ANHBCVGP (see Table PA-19). A linear
18 model is used to represent two-phase flow in an open borehole (i.e., for the first 200 years after a
19 drilling intrusion for boreholes with two-plug or three-plug configurations, in the open cavities
20 [CAVITY_1, . . . , CAVITY_4], and for the experimental and operations areas). This is discussed
21 further below.

22 In the van Genuchten-Parker model, P_c , k_{rb} , and k_{rg} are defined by (van Genuchten 1978)

23
$$P_c = P_{VGP} \left(S_{e2}^{-1/m} - 1 \right)^{1-m} \quad (\text{PA.44})$$

24
$$k_{rb} = S_{e1}^{1/2} \left[1 - \left(1 - S_{e1}^{1/m} \right)^m \right]^2 \quad (\text{PA.45})$$

25
$$k_{rg} = (1 - S_{e2})^{1/2} \left(1 - S_{e2}^{1/m} \right)^{2m} \quad (\text{PA.46})$$

1 where $m = \lambda/(1 + \lambda)$ and the capillary pressure parameter P_{VGP} is determined by requiring that
 2 the capillary pressures defined in Equation (PA.38) and Equation (PA.44) are equal at an
 3 effective brine saturation of $S_{e2} = 0.5$ (Webb 1992). The van Genuchten-Parker model is only
 4 used for the anhydrite MBs in the Salado and uses the same values for λ , S_{br} , and S_{gr} as the
 5 Brooks-Corey model (Table PA-3).

6 In the linear model used for the open borehole (REL_P_MOD = 5), P_c , k_{rb} , and k_{rg} are defined by

7
$$P_c = 0, k_{rb} = S_{e1}, k_{rg} = 1 - S_{e1} \quad (\text{PA.47})$$

8 Another linear model (REL_P_MOD = 11) is used for the open cavities (CAVITY_1, . . . ,
 9 CAVITY_4) for the -5 to 0 year portion of the simulation (see Section PA-4.2.2) and the
 10 experimental and operations areas (t = 0 to 10,000 years) which, in PA, are modeled without a
 11 time-dependent creep closure:

12
$$k_{rl} = 0 \quad \text{for} \quad S_l < S_{lr} \quad (\text{PA.48})$$

13
$$k_{rl} = \frac{(S_l - S_{lr})}{tol} \quad \text{for} \quad S_{lr} \leq S_l \leq S_{lr} + tol \quad (\text{PA.49})$$

14
$$k_{rl} = 1 \quad \text{for} \quad S_l > S_{lr} + tol \quad (\text{PA.50})$$

15 where l = gas or brine and tol is a tolerance (slope) over which the relative permeability changes
 16 linearly from 0 to 1. In PA, $tol = 1 \times 10^{-2}$ (dimensionless). Thus, the relative permeabilities are
 17 ~ 1 for saturations away from residual saturation.

18 Capillary pressure P_c for both the van Genuchten-Parker and Brooks-Corey models becomes
 19 unbounded as brine saturation S_b approaches the residual brine saturation, S_{br} . To avoid
 20 unbounded values, P_c is capped at 1×10^8 Pa in selected regions (Table PA-4).

21 Gas density is computed using the RKS equation of state, with the gas assumed to be pure H₂.
 22 For a pure gas, the RKS equation of state has the form (Walas 1985, pp. 43–54)

23
$$P_g = \frac{RT}{V - b} - \frac{a\alpha}{V(V + b)} \quad (\text{PA.51})$$

24 where

25 $R = \text{gas constant} = 8.31451 \text{ Joules (J) mole (mol)}^{-1} \text{ K}^{-1}$

26 $T = \text{temperature (K)} = 300.15 \text{ K} (= 30 \text{ }^\circ\text{C}; 81 \text{ }^\circ\text{F})$

27 $V = \text{molar volume (m}^3 \text{ mol}^{-1}\text{)}$

28 $a = 0.42747 R^2 T_{crit}^2 / P_{crit}$

29 $b = 0.08664 RT_{crit} / P_{crit}$

1 **Table PA-4. Models for Relative Permeability and Capillary Pressure in Two-Phase Flow**

Material	Relative Permeability ^a (RELP_MOD)	Capillary Pressure ^b (CAP_MOD)	Material	Relative Permeability ^a (RELP_MOD)	Capillary Pressure ^b (CAP_MOD)
S_HALITE	4	2	WAS_AREA	12	1
DRZ_0	4	1	DRZ_1	4	1
S_MB139	ANHBCVGP ^c	2	DRZ_PCS	Sampled	1
S_ANH_AB	ANHBCVGP ^c	2	CONC_PCS	4	2
S_MB138	ANHBCVGP ^c	2	UNNAMED	4	1
CAVITY_1	11	1	TAMARISK	4	1
CAVITY_2	11	1	FORTYNIN	4	1
CAVITY_3	11	1	DRF_PCS	12	1
CAVITY_4	11	1	REPOSIT	12	1
IMPERM_Z	4	1	CONC_MON	4	2
CASTILER	4	2	SHFTU	4	1
OPS_AREA	11	1	SHFTL_T1	4	1
EXP_AREA	11	1	SHFTL_T2	4	1
CULEBRA	4	2	CONC_PLG	4	1
MAGENTA	4	2	BH_OPEN	5	1
DEWYLAKE	4	2	BH_SAND	4	1
SANTAROS	4	1	BH_CREEP	4	1

^a Relative permeability model, where 4 = Brooks-Corey model given by Equation (PA.38) through Equation (PA.40), 5 = linear model given by Equation (PA.47), 11 = linear model given by Equation (PA.48) through Equation (PA.50), 12 = modified Brooks-Corey model to account for cutoff saturation (Nemer 2007c), and ANHBCVGP ~ use of Brooks-Corey or van Genuchten-Parker model treated as a subjective uncertainty.

^b Capillary pressure model, where 1 = capillary pressure is unbounded, 2 = P_c bounded above by 1×10^8 Pa as S_b approaches S_{br} .

^c See ANHBCVGP in Table PA-19.

2

$$3 \quad \alpha = \left[1 + (0.48508 + 1.55171\omega - 0.15613\omega^2)(1 - T_r^{0.5}) \right]^2$$

$$4 \quad \approx 1.202 \exp(-0.30288T_r) \text{ for H}_2 \text{ (Graboski and Daubert 1979)}$$

5 T_{crit} = critical temperature (K)

6 P_{crit} = critical pressure (Pa)

7 $T_r = T / T_{crit}$ = reduced temperature

8 ω = acentric factor

9 = 0 for H₂ (Graboski and Daubert 1979)

10 In order to account for quantum effects in H₂, effective critical temperature and pressure values
 11 of $T_{crit} = 43.6$ K and $P_{crit} = 2.047 \times 10^6$ Pa are used instead of the true values for these
 12 properties (Prausnitz 1969). Equation (PA.51) is solved for molar volume V . The gas density ρ_g
 13 then is given by

$$1 \quad \rho_g = \frac{M_{w,H_2}}{V} \quad (\text{PA.52})$$

2 where M_{w,H_2} is the molecular weight of H_2 (i.e., 2.01588×10^{-3} kg/mol; see Weast 1969, p.
3 B-26).

4 Brine density ρ_b is defined by Equation (PA.29), with $\rho_{b0} = 1230.0$ kg/m³ at a pressure of $P_{b0} =$
5 1.0132×10^5 Pa and $c_b = 2.5 \times 10^{-10}$ Pa⁻¹ (Roberts 1996). Porosity, ϕ , is used as defined by
6 Equation (PA.30) with two exceptions: in the repository (see Section PA-4.2.3) and in the DRZ
7 and MBs subsequent to fracturing (see Section PA-4.2.4). The values of ϕ_0 and c_ϕ used in
8 conjunction with Equation (PA.30) are listed in Table PA-3. The reference pressure P_{b0} in
9 Equation (PA.30) is spatially variable and corresponds to the initial pressures $P_b(x, y, -5)$ (here,
10 -5 means at time equal to -5 years; see Section PA-4.2.2). The gas and brine viscosities μ_l , $l = g,$
11 b in Equation (PA.24) and Equation (PA.25) were assumed to have values of $\mu_g = 8.93 \times 10^{-6}$
12 Pa s (H2:VISCO; see Vargaftik 1975) and $\mu_b = 2.1 \times 10^{-3}$ Pa s (BRINESAL:VISCO; see
13 McTigue 1993).

14 The terms q_g , q_{rg} , q_b , and q_{rb} in Equation (PA.24) and Equation (PA.25) relate to well injection
15 or removal (i.e., q_g , q_b) and reaction, production, or consumption (i.e., q_{rg} , q_{rb}) of gas and brine,
16 with positive signs corresponding to injection or production and negative signs corresponding to
17 removal or consumption. In the long-term Salado flow calculations, no injection or removal of
18 gas or brine is calculated using q_g and q_b . Thus, q_g and q_b are equal to zero. That is, after an
19 intrusion, the borehole is treated as a porous media, rather than a point source or sink of brine
20 and gas. Furthermore, the mass and pressure lost to a DBR during the intrusion is conservatively
21 ignored in the BRAGFLO calculations. In the DBR calculations discussed in Section PA-4.7, q_g
22 and q_b are used to describe injection and production wells in the DBR grid.

23 In PA, no gas consumption occurs through the term q_{rg} (see below), and gas production has the
24 potential to occur (due to corrosion of steel or microbial degradation of CPR materials) only in
25 the waste disposal regions of the repository (i.e., Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR in
26 Figure PA-15). Thus,

$$27 \quad q_{rg} \geq 0 \text{ in waste disposal regions of Figure PA-15}$$

$$28 \quad = 0 \text{ elsewhere} \quad (\text{PA.53})$$

29 Gas consumption occurs due to the reaction of CO_2 with MgO in the waste panels, and
30 potentially from the sulfidation of steel. This gas consumption is not modeled using q_{rg} , but is
31 accounted for by reducing the gas generation rate q_{rg} , as discussed in Section PA-4.2.5. Finally,
32 no brine production occurs, and brine consumption has the potential to occur (due to the
33 consumption of brine during steel corrosion) only in the waste disposal regions of the repository.
34 Thus,

1 $q_{rb} \leq 0$ in waste disposal regions of Figure PA-15
 2 $= 0$ elsewhere (PA.54)

3 More detail on the definition of q_{rg} and q_{rb} is provided in Section PA-4.2.5.

4 **PA-4.2.2 Initial Conditions**

5 In each two-phase flow simulation, a short period of time representing disposal operations is
 6 simulated. This period of time is called the start-up period, and covers 5 years from $t = -5$ years
 7 to 0 years, corresponding to the amount of time a typical panel is expected to be open during
 8 disposal operations. All grid locations require initial brine pressure and gas saturation at the
 9 beginning of the simulation ($t = -5$ years).

10 The Rustler and overlying units (except in the shaft) are modeled as horizontal with spatially
 11 constant initial pressure in each layer (see Figure PA-15). Table PA-5 lists the initial brine
 12 pressure, P_b , and gas saturation, S_g , for the Rustler.

13 The Salado (Mesh Rows 3–24 in Figure PA-15) is assumed to dip uniformly $\theta = 1$ degree
 14 downward from north to south (right to left in Figure PA-15). Except in the repository
 15 excavations and the shaft, brine is initially assumed (i.e., at -5 years) to be in hydrostatic
 16 equilibrium relative to an uncertain initial pressure $P_{b,ref}$ (SALPRES; see Table PA-19) at a
 17 reference point located at shaft center at the elevation of the midpoint of MB 139, which is the
 18 center of Cell 1266 in Figure PA-17. This gives rise to the condition

19
$$P_b(x, y, -5) = P_{b,ref} + \frac{1}{c_b} \ln \left[\frac{\rho_b(x, y, -5)}{\rho_{b0}} \right] \quad (PA.55)$$

20
$$\rho_b(x, y, -5) = \frac{1}{g c_b \left[y_e - \Phi(x_{ref}, y_{ref}, -5) + \frac{1}{g c_b \rho_{b0}} \right]} \quad (PA.56)$$

21
$$\Phi(x_{ref}, y_{ref}, -5) = y_{ref} + \frac{1}{g c_b} \left[\frac{1}{\rho_{b0}} - \frac{1}{\rho_b(x_{ref}, y_{ref}, -5)} \right] \quad (PA.57)$$

22
$$\rho_b(x_{ref}, y_{ref}, -5) = \rho_{b0} \exp \left[-c_b (P_{b,ref} - P_{b0}) \right] \quad (PA.58)$$

23
$$y_e = y_{ref} + h(x, y) \quad (PA.59)$$

1

Table PA-5. Initial Conditions in the Rustler

Name	Mesh Row (Figure PA-15)	$P^b(x, y, -5)$, Pa	$S_g(x, y, -5)$
Santa Rosa ^c	33	1.013250×10^5	$1 - S_b = 0.916$ ($S_b = \text{SANTAROS:SAT_IBRN}$) ^a
Santa Rosa ^c	32	1.013250×10^5	$1 - S_b = 0.916$ ($S_b = \text{SANTAROS:SAT_IBRN}$) ^a
Dewey Lake ^c	31	1.013250×10^5	$1 - S_b = 0.916$ ($S_b = \text{SANTAROS:SAT_USAT}$) ^a
Dewey Lake ^c	30	7.355092×10^5	$1 - S_b = 0.916$ ($S_b = \text{SANTAROS:SAT_USAT}$) ^a
Forty-niner ^c	29	1.47328×10^6	0 ^b
Magenta	28	9.465×10^5 (MAGENTA:PRESSURE)	0 ^b
Tamarisk ^c	27	1.82709×10^6	0 ^b
Culebra	26	9.141×10^5 (CULEBRA:PRESSURE)	0 ^b
Los Medaños ^c	25	2.28346×10^6	0 ^b

^a The names in parenthesis are parameters in the WIPP PA Parameter Database.

^b The Rustler is assumed to be fully saturated. This initial condition is set in the program ICSET. See Nemer and Clayton (2008, Section 3.2).

^c These pressures are calculated in the ALGEBRA1 step analogously to Equation (PA.55) below, using the brine density of 1220 kg/m³. See subsequent discussion taking $\theta = 0$ and the reference point (x_{ref}, y_{ref}) at the top of the Dewey Lake. See the ALGEBRA input file ALG1_BF_CRA09.INP in library LIBCRA09_BF, class CRA09-1 on the WIPP PA cluster for details. See Nemer and Clayton (2008, Section 4.1.7) for details on the ALGEBRA1 step.

2

3 where

4 $h(x, y)$ is defined in Equation (PA.33)

5 $\rho_{b0} = 1220 \text{ kg/m}^3$ (BRINESAL:DNSFLUID)

6 $c_b = 3.1 \times 10^{-10} \text{ Pa}^{-1}$ (BRINESAL:COMPRES)

7 $g = 9.80665 \text{ m/s}^2$

8 $P_{b,ref} = 1.01325 \times 10^5 \text{ Pa}$ (BRINESAL:REF_PRES)

9 $P_{b0} =$ sampled far-field pressure in the undisturbed halite (S_HALITE:PRESSURE)

10 In the Salado, initial gas saturation $S_g(x, y, -5) = 0$ (see Nemer and Clayton 2008, Section 4.1.6).

11 The Castile (Mesh Rows 1 and 2) is modeled as horizontal, and initial brine pressure is spatially
 12 constant within each layer (no dip), except that the brine reservoir is treated as a different
 13 material from rest of Castile and has a different initial pressure which is a sampled parameter.
 14 Specifically, outside the brine reservoir, pressure is calculated using Equation (PA.55) above
 15 with no dip ($\theta = 0$) in the ALGEBRA1 step. Within the reservoir, $P_b(x, y, -5) = BPINTPRS$, the
 16 uncertain initial pressure in the reservoir (see Table PA-19). Initial gas saturation $S_g(x, y, -5) =$
 17 0.

1 Within the shaft (areas Upper Shaft, Lower Shaft, and CONC_MON) and panel closures (areas
2 CONC_PCS and DRF_PCS), $P_b(x, y, -5) = 1.01325 \times 10^5$ Pa and $S_g(x, y, -5) = 0$. Within the
3 excavated areas (Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR, Ops and Exp), $P_b(x, y, -5) = 1.01325$
4 $\times 10^5$ Pa and $S_g(x, y, -5) = 0$.

5 At the end of the initial five-year start-up period and the beginning of the regulatory period ($t = 0$
6 years), brine pressure and gas saturation are reset in the shaft, panel closures, and excavated
7 areas. In the shaft (areas Upper Shaft, Lower Shaft, and CONC_MON) and panel closures (areas
8 CONC_PCS and DRF_PCS), $P_b(x, y, 0) = 1.01325 \times 10^5$ Pa and $S_g(x, y, 0) = 1 \times 10^{-7}$ (see
9 CONC_MON:SAT_IBRN). In the waste disposal regions (areas Waste Panel, South RoR, and
10 North RoR), $P_b(x, y, 0) = 1.01325 \times 10^5$ Pa and $S_g(x, y, 0) = 0.985$ (see
11 WAS_AREA:SAT_IBRN). In the other excavated areas, $P_b(x, y, 0) = 1.01325 \times 10^5$ Pa and
12 $S_g(x, y, 0) = 1.0$.

13 **PA-4.2.3 Creep Closure of Repository**

14 Salt creep occurs naturally in the Salado halite in response to deviatoric stress. Inward creep of
15 rock is generally referred to as creep closure. Creep closure of excavated regions begins
16 immediately from excavation-induced deviatoric stress. If the rooms were empty, closure would
17 proceed to the point where the void volume created by the excavation would be eliminated as the
18 surrounding formation returned to a uniform stress state. In the waste disposal region, inward
19 creep of salt causes consolidation of the waste, and this waste consolidation continues until
20 loading in the surrounding rock is uniform, at which point salt creep and waste consolidation
21 ceases. The amount of waste consolidation that occurs and the time it takes to consolidate are
22 governed by the waste properties (e.g., waste strength, modulus, etc.), the surrounding rock
23 properties, the dimensions and location of the room, and relative quantities of brine and gas
24 present.

25 The porosity of the waste disposal regions and neighboring access drifts (i.e., Waste Panel, South
26 RoR, North RoR, and DRF_PCS in Figure PA-15) is assumed to change through time due to
27 creep closure of the halite surrounding the excavations. The equations on which BRAGFLO is
28 based do not incorporate this type of deformation. Therefore, the changes in repository porosity
29 due to halite deformation are modeled in a separate analysis with the geomechanical program
30 SANTOS, which implements a quasi-static, large-deformation, finite-element procedure (Stone
31 1997). Interpolation procedures are then used with the SANTOS results to define porosity (ϕ)
32 within the repository as a function of time, pressure, and gas generation rate.

33 For more information on the generation of the porosity surface for BRAGFLO in PA, see
34 Appendix PORSURF-2009.

35 **PA-4.2.4 Fracturing of MBs and DRZ**

36 Fracturing within the anhydrite MBs (i.e., regions MB 138, Anhydrite AB, and MB 139 in
37 Figure PA-15) and in the DRZ (region DRZ in Figure PA-15) is assumed to occur at pressures
38 slightly above lithostatic pressure, and is implemented through a pressure-dependent

1 compressibility $c_r(P_b)$ (Mendenhall and Gerstle 1995). Specifically, MB fracturing begins at a
 2 brine pressure of

$$3 \quad P_{bi} = P_{b0} + \Delta P_i \quad (\text{PA.60})$$

4 where P_{bi} and P_{b0} are spatially dependent (i.e., $P_{b0} = P(x, y, 0)$) as in Section PA-4.2.2) and ΔP_i
 5 $= 2 \times 10^5$ Pa (see S_MB138:PI_DELTA in Fox 2008, Table 30)

6 Fracturing ceases at a pressure of

$$7 \quad P_{ba} = P_{b0} + \Delta P_a \quad (\text{PA.61})$$

8 and a fully fractured porosity of

$$9 \quad \phi(P_{ba}) = \phi_a = \phi_0 + \Delta \phi_a \quad (\text{PA.62})$$

10 where $\Delta P_a = 3.8 \times 10^6$ Pa (see S_MB138:PF_DELTA in Fox 2008, Table 30), ϕ_0 is spatially
 11 dependent (Table PA-3), and $\Delta \phi_a = 0.04, 0.24,$ and 0.04 for anhydrite materials S_MB138,
 12 S_ANH_AB, and S_MB139, respectively (see S_MB138:DPHIMAX in Fox 2008, Table 30).

13 Once fractured, compressibility c_r becomes a linear function

$$14 \quad c_r(P_b) = c_r + \left(\frac{P_b - P_{bi}}{P_{ba} - P_{bi}} \right) (c_{ra} - c_r) \quad (\text{PA.63})$$

15 of brine pressure for $P_{bi} \leq P_b \leq P_{ba}$, with c_{ra} defined so that the solution ϕ of

$$16 \quad \frac{d\phi}{dP_b} = c_{ra}(P_b)\phi, \quad \text{where } \phi(P_{bi}) = \phi_0 \exp[c_r(P_{bi} - P_{b0})] \quad (\text{PA.64})$$

17 satisfies $\phi(P_{ba}) = \phi_a$; specifically, c_{ra} is given by

$$18 \quad c_{ra} = c_r \left[1 - \frac{2(P_{ba} - P_{b0})}{P_{ba} - P_{bi}} \right] + \left[\frac{2}{P_{ba} - P_{bi}} \right] \ln \left(\frac{\phi_a}{\phi_0} \right) \quad (\text{PA.65})$$

19 The permeability $k_f(P_b)$ of fractured material at brine pressure P_b is related to the permeability of
 20 unfractured material at brine pressure P_{bi} by

$$21 \quad k_f(P_b) = \left[\frac{\phi(P_b)}{\phi(P_{bi})} \right]^n k \quad (\text{PA.66})$$

1 where k is the permeability of unfractured material (i.e., at P_{bi}) and n is defined so that $k_f(P_{ba}) =$
 2 $1 \times 10^{-9} \text{ m}^2$ (i.e., n is a function of k , which is an uncertain input to the analysis; see ANHPRM
 3 in Table PA-19). When fracturing occurs, $k_f(P_b)$ is used instead of k in the definition of the
 4 permeability for the fractured areas of the anhydrite MBs.

5 Fracturing is also modeled in the DRZ region in Figure PA-15. The fracture model
 6 implementation is the same as for the anhydrite materials. In this case, fracturing would be in
 7 halite rather than anhydrite, but because of the limited extent of the DRZ and the proximity of
 8 the nearby interbeds, this representation was deemed acceptable by the Salado Flow Peer Review
 9 panel (Caporuscio, Gibbons, and Oswald 2003).

10 PA-4.2.5 Gas Generation

11 Gas production is assumed to result from anoxic corrosion of steel and the microbial degradation
 12 of CPR materials. Thus, the gas generation rate q_{rg} in Equation (PA.24) is of the form

$$13 \quad q_{rg} = q_{rgc} + q_{rgm} \quad (\text{PA.67})$$

14 where q_{rgc} is the rate of gas production per unit volume of waste ($\text{kg}/\text{m}^3/\text{s}$) due to anoxic
 15 corrosion of Fe-base metals, and q_{rgm} is the rate of gas production per unit volume of waste
 16 ($\text{kg}/\text{m}^3/\text{s}$) due to microbial degradation of CPR materials. Furthermore, q_{rb} in Equation (PA.25)
 17 is used to describe the consumption of brine during the corrosion process.

18 Gas generation takes place only within the waste disposal regions (i.e., Waste Panel, South RoR,
 19 and North RoR in Figure PA-15) and all the generated gas is assumed to have the same
 20 properties as H_2 (see discussion in Appendix MASS-2009, Section MASS-3.2). In PA, the
 21 consumable materials are assumed to be homogeneously distributed throughout the waste
 22 disposal regions (i.e., the concentration of Fe-base metals and CPR materials in the waste is not
 23 spatially dependent). A separate analysis examined the potential effects on PA results of
 24 spatially varying Fe-base metal and CPR material concentrations, and concluded that PA results
 25 are not affected by representing these materials with spatially varying concentrations (see
 26 Appendix MASS-2009, Section MASS-21.0).

27 The rates q_{rgc} , q_{rb} , and q_{rgm} ($\text{kg}/\text{m}^3/\text{s}$) are defined by

28 gas generation by corrosion

$$29 \quad q_{rgc} = (R_{ci}S_{b,eff} + R_{ch}S_g^*)D_s\rho_{Fe}X_c(\text{H}_2|\text{Fe})M_{\text{H}_2} \quad (\text{PA.68})$$

30 brine consumption by corrosion

$$31 \quad q_{rb} = (q_{rgc}/M_{\text{H}_2})X_c(\text{H}_2\text{O}|\text{H}_2)M_{\text{H}_2\text{O}} \quad (\text{PA.69})$$

32 and microbial gas generation

$$q_{rgm} = (R_{mi}S_{b,eff} + R_{mh}S_g^*)D_c y(H_2|C)M_{H_2} B_{fc} \quad (PA.70)$$

2 where

3 D_s = surface area concentration of steel in the repository (m² surface area steel/
4 m³ disposal volume)

5 D_c = mass concentration of cellulose in the repository (kg biodegradable
6 material/m³ disposal volume)

7 M_{H_2} = molecular weight of H₂ (kg H₂/mol H₂)

8 M_{H_2O} = molecular weight of water (H₂O) (kg H₂O/mol H₂O)

9 R_{ci} = corrosion rate under inundated conditions (m/s)

10 R_{ch} = corrosion rate under humid conditions (m/s)

11 R_{mi} = rate of cellulose biodegradation under inundated conditions (mol
12 C₆H₁₀O₅/kg C₆H₁₀O₅/s)

13 R_{mh} = rate of cellulose biodegradation under humid conditions (mol C₆H₁₀O₅/kg
14 C₆H₁₀O₅/s)

15 $S_{b,eff}$ = effective brine saturation due to capillary action in the waste materials (see
16 Equation (PA.90) in Section PA-4.2.6)

$$S_g^* = \begin{cases} 1 - S_{b,eff} & \text{if } S_{b,eff} > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } S_{b,eff} = 0 \end{cases}$$

18 $X_c(H_2|Fe)$ = stoichiometric coefficient for gas generation due to corrosion of steel, i.e.,
19 moles of H₂ produced by the corrosion of 1 mole of Fe (mol H₂/mol Fe)

20 $X_c(H_2O|H_2)$ = stoichiometric coefficient for brine consumption due to corrosion of steel,
21 i.e., moles of H₂O consumed per mole of H₂ generated by corrosion (mol
22 H₂O/mol H₂)

23 $y(H_2|C)$ = average stoichiometric factor for microbial degradation of cellulose, i.e.,
24 the moles of H₂ generated per mole of carbon consumed by microbial
25 action (mol H₂/mol C)

26 ρ_{Fe} = molar density of steel (mol/m³)

1 B_{fc} = parameter (WAS_AREA:BIOGENFC; discussed in detail later in this
 2 section) uniformly sampled from 0 to 1, used to account for the
 3 uncertainty in whether microbial gas generation could be realized in the
 4 WIPP at experimentally measured rates.

5 The products $R_{ci} D_s \rho_{Fe} X_c$, $R_{ch} D_s \rho_{Fe} X_c$, $R_{mi} D_c y$, and R_{mh} in Equation (PA.68) and Equation
 6 (PA.70) define constant rates of gas generation (mol/m³/s) that continue until the associated
 7 substrate (i.e., steel or cellulose) is exhausted (i.e., zero order kinetics are assumed). The terms
 8 $S_{b,eff}$ and S_g^* in Equation (PA.68) and Equation (PA.70), which are functions of location and
 9 time, correct for the amount of substrate exposed to inundated and humid conditions,
 10 respectively. All the corrosion and microbial action is assumed to cease when no brine is
 11 present, which is the reason that 0 replaces $S_g = 1$ in the definition of S_g^* . In PA, $R_{ch} = 0$ and R_{ci} ,
 12 R_{mh} , and R_{mi} are defined by uncertain variables (see WGRCOR, WGRMICH, WGRMICI in
 13 Table PA-19). However, R_{mh} is now sampled based on the sampled value of R_{mi} : see Nemer and
 14 Clayton (2008, Section 5.1.3). Further, $M_{H_2} = 2.02 \times 10^{-3}$ kg/mol (Lide 1991, pp. 1-7, 1-8),
 15 $M_{H_2O} = 1.80 \times 10^{-2}$ kg/mol (Lide 1991, pp. 1-7, 1-8), $\rho_{Fe} = 1.41 \times 10^5$ mol/m³ (Telander and
 16 Westerman 1993), and D_s , D_c , $X_c(H_2O|H_2)$, $X_c(H_2|Fe)$, and $y(H_2|C)$ are discussed below.

17 The concentration D_s in Equation (PA.68) is defined by

$$18 \quad D_s = A_d n_d / V_R \quad (\text{PA.71})$$

19 where

20 A_d = surface area of steel associated with a waste disposal drum (m²/drum)

21 V_R = initial volume of a single room in the repository (m³)

22 n_d = ideal number of waste drums that can be close-packed into a single room

23 In PA, $A_d = 6$ m²/drum (REFCON:ASDRUM), $V_R = 3,644$ m³ (REFCON:VROOM), and $n_d =$
 24 6804 drums (REFCON:DRROOM).

25 The biodegradable materials to be disposed at the WIPP consist of cellulosic materials, plastics,
 26 and rubbers. Cellulosics have been demonstrated experimentally to be the most biodegradable of
 27 these materials (Francis, Gillow, and Giles 1997). The occurrence of significant microbial gas
 28 generation in the repository will depend on whether (1) microbes capable of consuming the
 29 emplaced organic materials will be present and active, (2) sufficient electron acceptors will be
 30 present and available, and (3) enough nutrients will be present and available.

31 During the CRA-2004 PABC, the EPA (Cotsworth 2005) indicated that the probability that
 32 microbial gas generation could occur (WMICDFLG) should be set equal to 1 in PA calculations.
 33 In the CRA-2004, the probability that microbial gas generation could occur was assigned a value
 34 of 0.5. To comply with the EPA's letter, in the CRA-2004 PABC and the CRA-2009 PA the
 35 parameter WMICDFLG was changed so that the probability that microbial gas generation could
 36 occur was set to 1 while preserving the previous probability distribution on whether CPR could
 37 be degraded. This is summarized in Table PA-6, and is discussed further in Nemer and Stein
 38

1 **Table PA-6. Probabilities for Biodegradation of Different Organic Materials**
 2 **(WAS_AREA:PROBDEG) in the CRA-2009 PA and the CRA-2004 PA**

WAS_AREA:PROBDEG	Meaning	Probability CRA-2004	Probability CRA-2009
0	No microbial degradation can occur	0.5	0.0
1	Biodegradation of only cellulose can occur	0.25	0.75
2	Biodegradation of CPR materials can occur	0.25	0.25

3
 4 (2005, Section 5.4). Because there are significant uncertainties in whether the experimentally
 5 observed gas-generation rates could be realized in the WIPP repository, during the CRA-2004
 6 PABC the EPA agreed to allow the DOE to multiply the sampled microbial rates by a parameter
 7 (WAS_AREA:BIOGENFC) uniformly sampled from 0 to 1. This is discussed further in Nemer,
 8 Stein, and Zelinski (2005, Section 4.2.2).


9 In cases where biodegradation of rubbers and plastics occur, rubbers and plastics are converted
 10 to an equivalent quantity of cellulose based on their carbon equivalence (Wang and Brush
 11 1996a). This produces the density calculation

$$D_c = \begin{cases} m_{cel} / V_R & \text{for biodegradation of cellulose only} \\ (m_{cel} + m_r + 1.7m_p) / V_R & \text{for biodegradation of CPR materials} \end{cases} \quad (\text{PA.72})$$

12
 13 where m_{cel} is the mass of cellulose (kg), m_r is the mass of rubbers (kg), and m_p is the mass
 14 of plastics (kg).

15 In the CRA-2009 PA, the emplacement materials (cellulose and plastic) have been added to m_{cel}
 16 and m_p . This is discussed further in Nemer and Clayton (2008, Section 5.1.1). Density values
 17 for CPR materials can be found in Fox (2008, Table 34).


18 The most plausible corrosion reactions after closure of the WIPP are believed to be (Wang and
 19 Brush 1996a)



21 and



23 When normalized to 1 mole of Fe and linearly weighted by the factors x and $1-x$ ($0 \leq x \leq 1$), the
 24 two preceding reactions become



2 where x and $1-x$ are the fractions of Fe consumed in the reactions in Equation (PA.73) and
 3 Equation (PA.74), respectively. Although magnetite (Fe_3O_4) has been observed to form on Fe as
 4 a corrosion product in low-Mg anoxic brines at elevated temperatures (Telander and Westerman
 5 1997) and in oxic brine (Haberman and Frydrych 1988), there is no evidence that it will form at
 6 WIPP repository temperatures. If Fe_3O_4 were to form, H_2 would be produced (on a molar basis)
 7 in excess of the amount of Fe consumed. However, anoxic corrosion experiments (Telander and
 8 Westerman 1993) did not indicate the production of H_2 in excess of the amount of Fe consumed.
 9 Therefore, the stoichiometric factor x in Reaction (PA.75) is set to 1.0 (i.e., $x = 1$), which implies
 10 that Reaction (PA.73) represents corrosion. Thus, the stoichiometric factor for corrosion is


$$11 \quad X_c(\text{H}_2|\text{Fe}) = (4-x)/3 = 1 \text{ mol/mol} \quad (\text{PA.76})$$

12 which implies that one mole of H_2 is produced for each mole of Fe consumed, and the
 13 stoichiometric factor for brine consumption is

$$14 \quad X_c(\text{H}_2\text{O}|\text{H}_2) = (4+2x)/3 = 2 \text{ mol/mol} \quad (\text{PA.77})$$

15 which implies that two moles of H_2O are consumed for each mole of H_2 produced.

16 The most plausible biodegradation reactions after closure of the WIPP are believed to be (Wang
 17 and Brush 1996a)




21 Accumulation of CO_2 produced by the above reactions could decrease pH and add carbonate to
 22 increase An solubility in the repository (Wang and Brush 1996b).

23 However, in the CRA-2004 PABC, the EPA (Cotsworth 2005) directed the DOE to remove
 24 methanogenesis (Equation (PA.80)) from PA. The EPA cited the presence of calcium sulfate as
 25 gypsum and anhydrite in the bedded salt surrounding the repository as possible sources of
 26 sulfate. These sources of sulfate would, if accessible, promote sulfate reduction (Equation
 27 (PA.82)), which is energetically and kinetically favored over methanogenesis. In response, the
 28 DOE removed methanogenesis from PA. Additionally, the DOE removed Fe sulfidation from
 29 PA as a gas-consuming reaction because sulfidation of steel produces one mole of H_2 for every
 30 mole of H_2S consumed,




1 This and the removal of methanogenesis are discussed fully in Nemer and Zelinski (2005).
 2 To provide added assurance of WIPP performance, a sufficient amount of MgO is added to the
 3 repository to remove CO₂ (Bynum et al. 1997). MgO in polypropylene “supersacks” is
 4 emplaced on top of the three-layer waste stacks to create conditions that reduce An solubilities in
 5 the repository (see Appendix MgO-2009 and Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-2.3).
 6 If brine flows into the repository, MgO will react with water in brine and in the gaseous phase to
 7 produce brucite (Mg[OH]₂). MgO will react with essentially all of the CO₂ that could be
 8 produced by complete microbial consumption of the CPR materials in the waste, and will create
 9 hydromagnesite with the composition Mg₅(CO₃)₄(OH)₂·4H₂O (Appendix MgO-2009; Appendix
 10 SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-2.0). The most important MgO hydration and carbonation
 11 reactions that will occur in the WIPP are



14 In these equations, “aq and/or g” indicates that the H₂O or CO₂ that reacts with MgO and/or
 15 brucite could be present in the aqueous phase (brine) and/or the gaseous phase. The removal of
 16 CO₂ by MgO is not explicitly modeled as a separate reaction in PA. Rather, the effect of CO₂
 17 consumption is accounted for by modifying the stoichiometry of Reaction (PA.78), Reaction
 18 (PA.79), and Reaction (PA.80) to remove the CO₂ from the mass of gas produced by microbial
 19 action.

20 The average stoichiometry of Reaction (PA.78), Reaction (PA.79), and Reaction (PA.80), is



22 where the average stoichiometric factor *y* in Reaction (PA.84) represents the number of moles of
 23 gas produced and retained in the repository from each mole of carbon consumed. This factor *y*
 24 depends on the extent of the individual biodegradation pathways in Reaction (PA.84), and the
 25 consumption of CO₂ by MgO. A range of values for *y* is estimated by considering the maximum
 26 mass of gas that can be produced from consumption of cellulosics (*M_{cel}*) and Fe-base metals
 27 (*M_{Fe}*), and is derived as follows (Wang and Brush 1996b). Estimates of the maximum quantities
 28 *M_{cel}* and *M_{Fe}* (mol) of cellulosics (i.e., C₆H₁₀O₅) and steels that can be potentially consumed in
 29 10,000 years are given by

$$30 \quad M_{cel} = \min \left\{ \frac{6000m_{cel}}{162}, 3.2 \times 10^{11} R_m m_{cel} \right\} \quad (\text{PA.85})$$

$$31 \quad M_{Fe} = \min \left\{ \frac{1000m_{Fe}}{56}, 4.4 \times 10^{16} R_{ci} A_d n_d \right\} \quad (\text{PA.86})$$

32 where *m_{cel}* and *m_{Fe}* are the masses (kg) of cellulosics (see Equation (PA.72) for definition) and
 33 steels initially present in the repository. The mass of cellulosics that can be consumed is

1 determined by the uncertain parameter WMICDFLG (see Table PA-19). The mass of steels m_{Fe}
 2 = 5.16×10^7 kg; this value is calculated as

$$3 \quad V_{CH} (\rho_{WCH} + \rho_{CCH}) + V_{RH} (\rho_{WRH} + \rho_{CRH}) \quad (\text{PA.87})$$

4 where V_{CH} and V_{RH} are the volumes of CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste, ρ_{WCH} and ρ_{WRH} are the
 5 Fe densities in CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste, and ρ_{CCH} and ρ_{CRH} are the Fe densities of the
 6 containers of CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste (see Fox 2008, Table 34). The terms $6000 m_{cel}/162$
 7 and $1000 m_{Fe}/56$ in Equation (PA.85) and Equation (PA.86) equal the inventories in moles of
 8 cellulose and steel, respectively. The terms $3.2 \times 10^{11} R_m m_{cel}$ and $4.4 \times 10^{16} R_{ci} A_d n_d$ equal
 9 the maximum amounts of cellulose and steel that could be consumed over 10,000 years. In
 10 Equation (PA.85), $R_m = \max\{R_{mh}, R_{mi}\}$, where R_{mh} and R_{mi} are defined by uncertain variables
 11 (see WGRMICH and WGRMICI in Table PA-19, respectively), and $3.2 \times 10^{11} = (3.15569 \times 10^7$
 12 s/yr) (10^4 yr). In Equation (PA.86), $A_d n_d$ is the total surface area of all drums (m^2) and the factor
 13 $4.4 \times 10^{16} = (3.15569 \times 10^7$ s/yr) (10^4 yr) (1.41×10^5 mol/ m^3), where $\rho_{Fe} = 1.41 \times 10^5$ mol/ m^3
 14 (see Equation (PA.72)) (Telander and Westerman 1993), converts the corrosion rate from m/s to
 15 mol/ m^2 /s.

16 A range of possible values for the average stoichiometric factor y in Reaction (PA.84) can be
 17 obtained by considering individual biodegradation pathways involving M_{cel} and accounting for
 18 the removal of CO_2 by the MgO.

19 In the absence of methanogenesis and steel sulfidation, y from Equation (PA.84) becomes

$$20 \quad y = \frac{\left[\frac{2.4}{4.8} M_{NO_3} + \frac{1}{2} \left(M_{cel} - \frac{6}{4.8} M_{NO_3} \right) \right]}{M_{cel}} \quad (\text{PA.88})$$

$$21 \quad M_{NO_3} = \min \left\{ M_{NO_3}^0, \frac{4}{5} M_{cel} \right\} \quad (\text{PA.89})$$

22 where $M_{NO_3}^0$ is the quantity of NO_3^- (mols) initially present in the repository. Specifically,
 23 $M_{NO_3}^0 = 4.31 \times 10^7$ mol (Fox 2008, Table 39).

24 **PA-4.2.6 Capillary Action in the Waste**

25 Capillary action (wicking) is the ability of a material to carry a fluid by capillary forces above
 26 the level it would normally seek in response to gravity. In the current analysis, this phenomena
 27 is accounted for by defining an effective saturation given by

$$S_{b,eff} = \begin{cases} S_b - S_{min} + S_{wick} \left(1 - \text{Exp} \left(200 \alpha \left(\text{Max} (S_b - S_{min}, 0) \right)^2 \right) \right) & \text{if } 0 < S_b \leq 1 - S_{wick} + S_{min} \\ 0 & \text{if } S_b \leq S_{min} \\ 1 & \text{if } S_b > 1 - S_{wick} + S_{min} \end{cases} \quad (\text{PA.90})$$

where

$S_{b,eff}$ = effective brine saturation

S_b = brine saturation

S_{wick} = wicking saturation

S_{min} = minimum brine saturation at which code can run in the waste-filled areas

α = smoothing parameter = -1000

The effective saturation given by Equation (PA.90) differs from that in the CRA-2004 PA in that $S_{b,eff}$ now approaches zero as S_b approaches a small value S_{min} . In simulations where Fe corrosion dried out the repository, the time required to complete the simulation could be quite long. In order to speed up the code and increase robustness, the parameter S_{min} was added. For PA, $S_{min} = 0.015$, which was small enough to not affect the results, while greatly reducing run time. This is explained fully in Nemer and Clayton (2008, Section 5.2.2).

The effective saturation is used on a grid block basis within all waste regions (Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR in Figure PA-15). The wicking saturation, S_{wick} , is treated as an uncertain variable (see WASTWICK in Table PA-19). The effective brine saturation $S_{b,eff}$ is currently used only to calculate the corrosion of steel (Equation (PA.68)) and the microbial degradation of cellulose (Equation (PA.70)), and does not directly affect the two-phase flow calculations indicated.

PA-4.2.7 Shaft Treatment

The WIPP excavation includes four shafts that connect the repository region to the surface: the air intake shaft, salt handling shaft, waste handling shaft, and exhaust shaft. In PA, these four shafts are modeled as a single shaft. The rationale for this modeling treatment is set forth in SNL (Sandia National Laboratories 1992, Volume 5, Section 2.3).

The shaft seal model included in the PA grid (Column 43 in Figure PA-15) is the simplified shaft model used in the CRA-2004 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC. The simplified shaft seal model used in PA is described by Stein and Zelinski (2003) and is briefly discussed below; this model was approved by the Salado Flow Peer Review Panel (Caporuscio, Gibbons, and Oswald 2003).

The planned design of the shaft seals involves numerous materials, including earth, crushed salt, clay, asphalt, and Salado Mass Concrete (SMC) (see the CCA, Appendix SEAL). The design is intended to control both short-term and long-term fluid flow through the Salado portion of the

1 shafts. For the CCA PA, each material in the shaft seal was represented in the BRAGFLO grid.
2 Analysis of the flow results from the CCA PA and the subsequent CCA PAVT (Sandia National
3 Laboratories 1997 and U.S. Department of Energy 1997) indicated that no significant flows of
4 brine or gas occurred in the shaft during the 10,000-year regulatory period. As a result of these
5 analyses, a simplified shaft seal model was developed for the CRA-2004 PA.


6 A conceptual representation of the simplified shaft seal system used in PA is shown in Figure
7 PA-18. The simplified model divides the shaft into three sections: an upper section (shaft seal
8 above the Salado), a lower section (within the Salado), and a concrete monolith section within
9 the repository horizon. A detailed discussion of how the material properties were assigned for
10 the simplified shaft seal model is included in James and Stein (2003). The permeability value
11 used to represent the upper and lower sections is defined as the harmonic mean of the component
12 materials' permeability in the detailed shaft seal model (including permeability adjustments
13 made for the DRZ assumed to surround the lower shaft seal section within the Salado). Porosity
14 is defined as the thickness-weighted mean porosity of the component materials. Other material
15 properties are described in James and Stein (2003).

16 The lower section of the shaft experiences a change in material properties at 200 years. This
17 change simulates the consolidation of seal materials within the Salado and significantly
18 decreases permeability. This time was chosen as a conservative overestimate of the amount of
19 time expected for this section of the shaft to become consolidated. The concrete monolith
20 section of the shaft is unchanged from the CCA PA and is represented as being highly permeable
21 for 10,000 years to ensure that fluids can access the north end (operations and experimental
22 areas) in the model. In three thin regions at the stratigraphic position of the anhydrite MBs, the
23 shaft seal is modeled as MB material (Figure PA-18). This model feature is included so that
24 fluids flowing in the DRZ and MB fractures can access the interbeds to the north of the
25 repository "around" the shaft seals. Because these layers are so thin, they have virtually no
26 effect on the effective permeability of the shaft seal itself.


27 The simplified shaft model was tested in the AP-106 analysis (Stein and Zelinski 2003), which
28 supports the Salado Flow Peer Review (Caporuscio, Gibbons, and Oswald 2003). The results of
29 the AP-106 analysis demonstrate that vertical brine flow through the simplified shaft model is
30 comparable to brine flows seen through the detailed shaft model used in the CCA PA and
31 subsequent CCA PAVT calculations.

32 **PA-4.2.8 Option D Panel Closures**

33 PA includes panel closures models that represent the Option D panel closure design (see the
34 CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3), which are unchanged from the CRA-2004. Option D
35 closures (Figure PA-19) are designed to allow minimal fluid flow between panels. PA explicitly
36 represents selected Option D panel closures in the computational grid using a model approved by
37 the Salado Flow Peer Review Panel (Caporuscio, Gibbons, and Oswald 2003). The Option D
38 panel closure design has several components: an SMC monolith, which extends into the DRZ in
39 all directions; an empty drift section; and a block and mortar explosion wall (Figure PA-19).
40 Each set of panel closures are represented in the BRAGFLO grid by 4 materials in 13 grid cells
41 (Figure PA-20):



1
2 **Figure PA-18. Schematic View of the Simplified Shaft Model (numbers on right indicate**
3 **dimensions in meters)**



4
5 **Figure PA-19. Schematic Side View of Option D Panel Closure**

- 6
- Six cells of panel closure concrete (area CONC_PCS, material CONC_PCS)
- 7
- One cell above and one cell below the concrete material consisting of MB anhydrite
- 8
- (areas MB 139 and Anhydrite AB, materials S_MB139 and S_ANH_AB, respectively)
- 9
- Two cells of healed DRZ above Anhydrite AB and the panel closure system (PCS) (area
- 10
- DRZ_PCS, material DRZ_PCS)
- 11
- Three cells of empty drift and explosion wall (area DRF_PCS, material DRF_PCS)




Figure PA-20. Representation of Option D Panel Closures in the BRAGFLO Grid

Properties for the materials making up the panel closure system are listed in Table PA-3.

PA-4.2.8.1 Panel Closure Concrete

The Option D panel closure design requires the use of a salt-saturated concrete, identified as SMC, as specified for the shaft seal system. The design of the shaft seal system and the properties of SMC are described in the CCA, Appendix SEAL. The BRAGFLO grid incorporates the material CONC_PCS, which is assigned the material properties of undegraded SMC and is used to represent the concrete portion of the Option D panel closure system (Figure PA-15). A double-thickness concrete segment represents the northernmost set of panel closures (between the north RoR and the operations area). This feature represents the two sets of panel closures in series that will be employed between the waste-filled repository and the shaft.

PA-4.2.8.2 Panel Closure Abutment with MBs

In the BRAGFLO grid, regions where the Option D panel closures intersect the MBs are represented as blocks of MB material (Figure PA-15). This representation is warranted for two reasons:

1. The MB material has a very similar permeability distribution (10^{-21} to $10^{-17.1}$ m²) to the concrete portion of the Option D panel closures ($10^{-20.699}$ to 10^{-17} m²), and thus, assigning

1 this material as anhydrite MB in the model has essentially the same effect as calling it
2 concrete, as long as pressures are below the fracture initiation pressure.

3 2. In the case of high pressures, it is expected that fracturing may occur in the anhydrite MBs
4 and flow could go “around” the panel closures and out of the two-dimensional plane
5 considered in the model grid. In this case, the flow would be through the MB material,
6 which incorporates a fracture model, as described above.

7 **PA-4.2.8.3 DRZ Above the Panel Closure**

8 After constructing the concrete portion of the panel closure, the salt surrounding the monolith
9 will be subjected to compressive stresses, which will facilitate the rapid healing of disturbed
10 halite. The rounded configuration of the monolith creates a situation very favorable for concrete
11 durability: high compressive stresses and low stress differences. In turn, the compressive
12 stresses developed within the salt will quickly heal any damage caused by construction
13 excavation, thereby eliminating the DRZ along this portion of the panel closure. The
14 permeability of the salt immediately above and below the rigid concrete monolith component of
15 Option D will approach the intrinsic permeability of the undisturbed Salado halite.

16 To represent the DRZ above the monoliths, PA uses the material DRZ_PCS in the BRAGFLO
17 grid (Figure PA-15). The values assigned to DRZ_PCS are the same as those used for the DRZ
18 above the excavated areas (material DRZ_1, see Table PA-3), except for the properties
19 PRMX_LOG, PRMY_LOG, and PRMZ_LOG, the logarithms of permeability in the x, y, and z
20 directions, respectively. These permeability values are assigned the same distributions used for
21 the material CONC_PCS. In this instance, the values are based on the nature of the model setup,
22 not directly on experimental data (although the general range of the distribution agrees with
23 experimental observations of healed salt). The use of these permeabilities ensures that any fluid
24 flow is equally probable through or around the Option D panel closures, and represents the range
25 of uncertainty that exists in the performance of the panel closure system.

26 **PA-4.2.8.4 Empty Drift and Explosion Wall Materials**

27 The DRF_PCS is the material representing the empty drift and explosion wall. For simplicity,
28 this material is assumed to have hydrologic properties equivalent to the material representing the
29 waste panel and is used for the three sets of panel closures represented in the grid (Figure PA-
30 15). The creep closure model is applied to this material to be consistent with the neighboring
31 materials. The assignment of a high permeability to this region for the PA calculations, which
32 contains the explosion wall, is justified because the explosion wall is not designed to withstand
33 the stresses imposed by creep closure beyond the operational period and will be highly
34 permeable following rapid room closure.

35 **PA-4.2.9 Borehole Model**

36 The major disruptive event in PA is the penetration of the repository by a drilling intrusion. In
37 the undisturbed scenario (see Section PA-6.7.1), these blocks have the material properties of the
38 neighboring stratigraphic or excavated modeling unit, and there is no designation in the borehole
39 grid except for the reduced lateral dimensions of this particular column of grid blocks.

1 In the scenarios simulating drilling disturbance, these cells start out with the same material
 2 properties as in the undisturbed scenario, but at the time of intrusion, the borehole grid blocks are
 3 reassigned to borehole material properties. The drilling intrusion is modeled by modifying the
 4 permeability of the grid blocks in Column 26 of Figure PA-15 (values listed in Table PA-7).
 5 Furthermore, the drilling intrusion is assumed to produce a borehole with a diameter of 12.25 in.
 6 (0.31 m) (Vaughn 1996, Howard 1996), borehole fill is assumed to be incompressible, capillary
 7 effects are ignored, residual gas and brine saturations are set to zero, and porosity is set to 0.32
 8 (see materials CONC_PLG, BH_OPEN, BH_SAND, and BH_CREEP in Table PA-3). When a
 9 borehole that penetrates pressurized brine in the Castile is simulated (i.e., an E1 intrusion), the
 10 permeability modifications indicated in Table PA-7 extend from the ground surface (i.e., Grid
 11 Cell 2155 in Figure PA-17) to the base of the pressurized brine (i.e., Grid Cell 2225 in Figure
 12 PA-17). When a borehole that does not penetrate pressurized brine in the Castile is under
 13 consideration (i.e., an E2 intrusion), the permeability modifications indicated in Table PA-7 stop
 14 at the bottom of the lower DRZ (i.e., Grid Cell 1111 in Figure PA-17).

15 **PA-4.2.10 Castile Brine Reservoir**

16 High-pressure Castile brine was encountered in several WIPP-area boreholes, including the
 17 WIPP-12 borehole within the controlled area and the ERDA-6 borehole northeast of the site.
 18 Consequently, the conceptual model for the Castile includes the possibility that brine reservoirs
 19 underlie the repository. The E1 and E1E2 scenarios include borehole penetration of both the
 20 repository and a brine reservoir in the Castile.

21 Unless a borehole penetrates both the repository and a brine reservoir in the Castile, the Castile is
 22 conceptually unimportant to PA because of its expected low permeability. Two regions are
 23 specified in the disposal system geometry of the Castile horizon: the Castile (Rows 1 and 2 in
 24

25 **Table PA-7. Permeabilities for Drilling Intrusions Through the Repository**

Time After Intrusion	Assigned Permeabilities
0–200 years	Concrete plugs are assumed to be emplaced at the Santa Rosa (i.e., a surface plug with a length of 15.76 m; corresponds to Grid Cells 2113, 2155 in Figure PA-17) and the Los Medaños Member of the Rustler (i.e., a plug at the top of the Salado with a length of 36 m; corresponds to Grid Cell 1644 in Figure PA-17). Concrete plugs are assumed to have a permeability log-uniformly sampled between 10^{-19} m^2 to 10^{-17} m^2 (see material CONC_PLG in Table PA-4). The open portions of the borehole are assumed to have a permeability of $1 \times 10^{-9} \text{ m}^2$.
200–1200 years	Concrete plugs are assumed to fail after 200 years (U.S. Department of Energy 1995). An entire borehole is assigned a permeability typical of silty sand log-uniformly sampled between $10^{-16.3} \text{ m}^2$ and 10^{-11} m^2 (see parameter BHPRM in and material BH_SAND in Table PA-4).
> 1200 years	Permeability of borehole reduced by one order of magnitude in the Salado beneath the repository due to creep closure of borehole (Thompson et al. 1996) (i.e., $k = 10^x/10$, $x = \text{BHPRM}$, in Grid Cells 2225, 1576, 26, 94, 162, 230 of Figure PA-17). No changes are made within and above the lower DRZ (see material BH_CREEP in Table PA-4).

26

1 Figure PA-15) and a reservoir (Row 1, Columns 23 to 45 in Figure PA-15). The Castile region
2 has an extremely low permeability, which prevents it from participating in fluid flow processes.

3 It is unknown whether a brine reservoir exists below the repository. As a result, the conceptual
4 model for the brine reservoirs is somewhat different from those for known major properties of
5 the natural barrier system, such as stratigraphy. The principal difference is that a reasonable
6 treatment of the uncertainty of the existence of a brine reservoir requires assumptions about the
7 spatial distribution of such reservoir and the probability of intersection (see Attachment MASS-
8 2009, Section MASS.18.1). A range of probabilities for a borehole hitting a brine reservoir is
9 used (see Section PA-3.6).

10 In addition to the stochastic uncertainty in the location and hence in the probability of
11 intersecting reservoirs, there is also uncertainty in the properties of reservoirs. The manner in
12 which brine reservoirs would behave if penetrated is captured by parameter ranges and is
13 incorporated in the BRAGFLO calculations of disposal system performance. The conceptual
14 model for the behavior of such a brine reservoir is discussed below. The properties specified for
15 brine reservoirs are pressure, permeability, compressibility, and porosity, and are sampled from
16 parameter ranges (see Table PA-19).

17 Where they exist, Castile brine reservoirs in the northern Delaware Basin are believed to be
18 fractured systems, with high-angle fractures spaced widely enough that a borehole can penetrate
19 through a volume of rock containing a brine reservoir without intersecting any fractures, and
20 therefore not producing brine. Castile brine reservoirs occur in the upper portion of the Castile
21 (Popielak et al. 1983). Appreciable volumes of brine have been produced from several reservoirs
22 in the Delaware Basin, but there is little direct information on the areal extent of the reservoirs or
23 the existence of the interconnection between them. Data from WIPP-12 and ERDA-6 indicate
24 that fractures have a variety of apertures and permeabilities, and they deplete at different rates.
25 Brine occurrences in the Castile behave as reservoirs; that is, they are bounded systems.

26 **PA-4.2.11 Numerical Solution**

27 Determining gas and brine flow in the vicinity of the repository requires solving the two
28 nonlinear PDEs in Equation (PA.24) through Equation (PA.30) on the computational domain in
29 Figure PA-15, along with evaluating appropriate auxiliary conditions. The actual unknown
30 functions in this solution are P_b and S_g , although the constraint conditions also give rise to values
31 for P_g and S_b . As two dimensions in space and one dimension in time are in use, P_b , P_g , S_b , and
32 S_g are functions of the form $P_b(x, y, t)$, $P_g(x, y, t)$, $S_b(x, y, t)$, and $S_g(x, y, t)$.

33 Solving Equation (PA.24) through Equation (PA.30) requires both initial value and boundary
34 value conditions for P_b and S_g . The initial value conditions for P_b and S_g are given in Section
35 PA-4.2.2. As indicated there, the calculation starts at time $t = -5$ years, with a possible resetting
36 of values at $t = 0$ years, which corresponds to final waste emplacement and sealing of the
37 repository. The boundary conditions are such that no brine or gas moves across the exterior grid
38 boundary (Table PA-8). This Neumann-type boundary condition is maintained for all time.
39 Further, BRAGFLO allows the user to maintain a specified pressure and/or saturation at any grid
40

1 **Table PA-8. Boundary Value Conditions for P_g and P_b**

Boundaries below (Row 1, $y = 0$ m) and above (Row 33, $y = 1039$ m) system for $0 \leq x \leq 46630$ m (Columns 1-68) and $-5 \text{ yr} \leq t$. Below, j refers to the unit normal vector in the positive y direction.	
$(\nabla P_g + \rho_g g \nabla h) \Big _{(x,y,t)} \cdot \mathbf{j} = 0 \text{ Pa} / \text{m}$	No gas flow condition
$(\nabla P_b + \rho_b g \nabla h) \Big _{(x,y,t)} \cdot \mathbf{j} = 0 \text{ Pa} / \text{m}$	No brine flow condition
Boundaries at left (Column 1, $x = 0$ m) and right (Column 68, $x = 46630$ m) of system for $0 \leq y \leq 1039$ m (Rows 1-33) and $-5 \text{ yr} \leq t$. Below, i refers to the unit normal vector in the positive x direction.	
$(\nabla P_g + \rho_g g \nabla h) \Big _{(x,y,t)} \cdot \mathbf{i} = 0 \text{ Pa} / \text{m}$	No gas flow condition
$(\nabla P_b + \rho_b g \nabla h) \Big _{(x,y,t)} \cdot \mathbf{i} = 0 \text{ Pa} / \text{m}$	No brine flow condition

2
 3 block. This is not a boundary condition and is not required to close the problem. This feature is
 4 used to specify Dirichlet-type conditions at the surface grid blocks (Columns 1-68, Row 33,
 5 Figure PA-15) and at the far-field locations in the Culebra and Magenta (Columns 1 and 68, Row
 6 26, and Columns 1 and 68, Row 28, Figure PA-15). These auxiliary conditions are summarized
 7 in **Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.**

8 A fully implicit finite-difference procedure is used to solve Equation (PA.24) through Equation
 9 (PA.30). The associated discretization of the gas mass balance equation is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \frac{1}{\Delta x_i} \left\{ \frac{1}{x_{i+1} - x_i} \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_g k_x k_{rg}}{\mu_g} \right]_{i+1/2,j}^{n+1} \left(\Phi_{g_{i+1,j}}^{x-} - \Phi_{g_{i,j}}^{x+} \right)^{n+1} \right. \\
 & \left. - \frac{1}{x_i - x_{i-1}} \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_g k_x k_{rg}}{\mu_g} \right]_{i-1/2,j}^{n+1} \left(\Phi_{g_{i,j}}^{x-} - \Phi_{g_{i-1,j}}^{x+} \right)^{n+1} \right\} \\
 & + \frac{1}{\Delta y_j} \left\{ \frac{1}{y_{j+1} - y_j} \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_g k_y k_{rg}}{\mu_g} \right]_{i,j+1/2}^{n+1} \left(\Phi_{g_{i,j+1}}^{y-} - \Phi_{g_{i,j}}^{y+} \right)^{n+1} \right. \\
 & \left. - \frac{1}{y_j - y_{j-1}} \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_g k_y k_{rg}}{\mu_g} \right]_{i,j-1/2}^{n+1} \left(\Phi_{g_{i,j}}^{y-} - \Phi_{g_{i,j-1}}^{y+} \right)^{n+1} \right\}
 \end{aligned}$$

1

Table PA-9. Auxiliary Dirichlet Conditions for S_g and P_b

Surface Grid Blocks	
$S_g(i, j, t) = 0.08363$	Columns 1–42, 44–68, Row 33, $-5 \text{ yr} \leq t$ Saturation is not forced at the shaft cell on the surface because its saturation is reset to 1.0 at $t = 0 \text{ yr}$.
$P_b(i, j, t) = 1.01 \times 10^5 \text{ Pa}$	Columns 1–68, row 33, $-5 \text{ yr} \leq t$
Culebra and Magenta Far Field	
$P_b(i, 26, t) = 9.14 \times 10^5 \text{ Pa}$	$i = 1 \text{ and } 68, j = 26, -5 \text{ yr} \leq t$ (Culebra)
$P_b(i, 28, t) = 9.47 \times 10^5 \text{ Pa}$	$i = 1 \text{ and } 68, j = 28, -5 \text{ yr} \leq t$ (Magenta)

2

$$3 \quad +\alpha_{i,j}q_{g_{i,j}}^{n+1} + \alpha_{i,j}q_{rg_{i,j}}^{n+1} - \frac{(\alpha\phi\rho_g S_g)_{i,j}^{n+1} - (\alpha\phi\rho_g S_g)_{i,j}^n}{\Delta t} = 0 \quad (\text{PA.91})$$

4 where Φ represents the phase potentials given by

$$5 \quad \Phi_{g_{i,j}}^{x+} = P_{g_{i,j}} + \rho_{g_{i+1/2,j}} g h_{i,j}, \quad \Phi_{g_{i,j}}^{x-} = P_{g_{i,j}} + \rho_{g_{i-1/2,j}} g h_{i,j}$$

6 and

$$7 \quad \Phi_{g_{i,j}}^{y+} = P_{g_{i,j}} + \rho_{g_{i,j+1/2}} g h_{i,j}, \quad \Phi_{g_{i,j}}^{y-} = P_{g_{i,j}} + \rho_{g_{i,j-1/2}} g h_{i,j}$$

8 the subscripts are defined by

- 9 i = x-direction grid index
- 10 j = y-direction grid index
- 11 $i \pm 1/2$ = x-direction grid block interface
- 12 $j \pm 1/2$ = y-direction grid block interface
- 13 x_i = grid block center in the x-coordinate direction (m)
- 14 y_j = grid block center in the y-coordinate direction (m)
- 15 Δx_i = grid block length in the x-coordinate direction (m)
- 16 Δy_j = grid block length in the y-coordinate direction (m)

17 the superscripts are defined by

- 18 n = index in the time discretization, known solution time level
- 19 $n+1$ = index in the time discretization, unknown solution time level

20 and the interblock densities are defined by

$$1 \quad \rho_{g_{i+1/2,j}} = \frac{\Delta x_{i+1,j}}{\Delta x_{i,j} + \Delta x_{i+1,j}} \rho_{g_{i,j}} + \frac{\Delta x_{i,j}}{\Delta x_{i,j} + \Delta x_{i+1,j}} \rho_{g_{i+1,j}}$$

$$2 \quad \rho_{g_{i-1/2,j}} = \frac{\Delta x_{i,j}}{\Delta x_{i-1,j} + \Delta x_{i,j}} \rho_{g_{i-1,j}} + \frac{\Delta x_{i-1,j}}{\Delta x_{i-1,j} + \Delta x_{i,j}} \rho_{g_{i,j}}$$

$$3 \quad \rho_{g_{i,j+1/2}} = \frac{\Delta y_{i,j+1}}{\Delta y_{i,j} + \Delta y_{i,j+1}} \rho_{g_{i,j}} + \frac{\Delta y_{i,j}}{\Delta y_{i,j} + \Delta y_{i,j+1}} \rho_{g_{i,j+1}}$$

$$4 \quad \rho_{g_{i,j-1/2}} = \frac{\Delta y_{i,j}}{\Delta y_{i,j-1} + \Delta y_{i,j}} \rho_{g_{i,j-1}} + \frac{\Delta y_{i,j-1}}{\Delta y_{i,j-1} + \Delta y_{i,j}} \rho_{g_{i,j}}$$

5 The interface values of k_{rg} in Equation (PA.91) are evaluated using upstream weighted values
 6 (i.e., the relative permeabilities at each grid block interface are defined to be the relative
 7 permeabilities at the center of the adjacent grid block with the highest potential). Further,
 8 interface values for $\alpha \rho_g k_x / \mu_g$ and $\alpha \rho_g k_y / \mu_g$ are obtained by harmonic averaging of adjacent grid
 9 block values for these expressions. Currently all materials are isotropic, i.e. $k_x = k_y = k_z$.

10 The discretization of the brine mass balance equation is obtained by replacing the subscript for
 11 gas, g , by the subscript for brine, b . As a reminder, P_g and S_b are replaced in the numerical
 12 implementation with the substitutions indicated by Equation (PA.27) and Equation (PA.26),
 13 respectively. Wells are not used in the conceptual model for long-term Salado flow calculations,
 14 but they are used for DBR calculations. Thus, for long-term Salado flow calculations, the terms
 15 q_g and q_b are zero. For long-term Salado flow calculations, the wellbore is not treated by a well
 16 model, but rather is explicitly modeled within the grid as a distinct material region (i.e., Upper
 17 Borehole and Lower Borehole in Figure PA-15).

18 The resultant coupled system of nonlinear brine and gas mass balance equations is integrated in
 19 time using the Newton-Raphson method with upstream weighting of the relative permeabilities,
 20 as previously indicated. The primary unknowns at each computational cell center are brine
 21 pressure and gas saturation.

22 **PA-4.2.12 Gas and Brine Flow across Specified Boundaries**

23 The Darcy velocity vectors $v_g(x, y, t)$ and $v_b(x, y, t)$ for gas and brine flow ($m^3/m^2/s = m/s$) are
 24 defined by the expressions

$$25 \quad v_g(x, y, t) = k k_{rg} (\nabla P_g + \rho_g g \nabla h) / \mu_g \quad (\text{PA.92})$$

26 and

$$27 \quad v_b(x, y, t) = k k_{rb} (\nabla P_b + \rho_b g \nabla h) / \mu_b \quad (\text{PA.93})$$

1 Values for v_g and v_b are obtained and saved as the numerical solution of Equation (PA.24)
 2 through Equation (PA.30) is carried out. Cumulative flows of gas, $C_g(t, B)$, and brine, $C_b(t, B)$,
 3 from time 0 to time t across an arbitrary boundary B in the domain of (Figure PA-15) is then
 4 given by

$$5 \quad C_l(t, B) = \int_0^t \left[\int_B \alpha(x, y) \mathbf{v}_l(x, y, t) \cdot \mathbf{n}(x, y) ds \right] dt \quad (\text{PA.94})$$

6 for $l = g, b$, where $\alpha(x, y)$ is the geometry factor defined in Equation (PA.32), $\mathbf{n}(x, y)$ is an
 7 outward-pointing unit normal vector, and $\int_B ds$ denotes a line integral. As an example, B could
 8 correspond to the boundary of the waste disposal regions in Figure PA-15. The integrals
 9 defining $C_g(t, B)$ and $C_b(t, B)$ are evaluated using the Darcy velocities defined by Equation
 10 (PA.92) and Equation (PA.93). Due to the dependence of gas volume on pressure, $C_g(t, B)$ is
 11 typically calculated in moles or cubic meters at standard temperature and pressure, which
 12 requires an appropriate change of units for v_g in Equation (PA.95).

13 **PA-4.2.13 Additional Information**

14 Additional information on BRAGFLO and its use in the CRA-2009 PA can be found in the
 15 BRAGFLO user's manual (Nemer 2007c), the BRAGFLO design document (Nemer 2007b) and
 16 the analysis package for the Salado flow calculations in the CRA-2009 PA (Nemer and Clayton
 17 2008).

18 **PA-4.3 Radionuclide Transport in the Salado: NUTS**

19 The NUTS code is used to model radionuclide transport in the Salado. NUTS models
 20 radionuclide transport within all regions for which BRAGFLO computes brine and gas flow, and
 21 for each realization uses as input the corresponding BRAGFLO velocity field, pressures,
 22 porosities, saturations, and other model parameters, including, for example, the geometrical grid,
 23 residual saturation, material map, and compressibility. Of the radionuclides that are transported
 24 vertically due to an intrusion or up shaft, it is assumed that the lateral radionuclide transport is in
 25 the most transmissive unit, the Culebra. Therefore, the radionuclide transport through the Dewey
 26 Lake to the accessible environment (f_{DL} in Equation [PA.33]) and to the land surface due to
 27 long-term flow (f_S in Equation [PA.33]) are set to zero for consistency.

28 The PA uses NUTS in two different modes. First, the code is used in a computationally fast
 29 *screening* mode to identify those BRAGFLO realizations for which it is unnecessary to do full
 30 transport calculations because the amount of contaminated brine that reaches the Culebra or the
 31 LWB within the Salado is insufficient to significantly contribute to the total integrated release of
 32 radionuclides from the disposal system. For the remaining realizations, which have the
 33 possibility of consequential release, a more computationally intensive calculation of each
 34 radionuclide's full transport is performed (see Section PA-6.7.2).

1 This section describes the model used to compute radionuclide transport in the Salado for E0,
2 E1, and E2 scenarios (defined in Section PA-2.3.2). The model for transport in the E1E2
3 scenario, which is computed using the PANEL code, is described in Section PA-4.4.

4 NUTS models radionuclide transport by advection (see Attachment MASS-2009, Section
5 MASS-13.5). NUTS disregards sorptive and other retarding effects throughout the entire flow
6 region. Physically, some degree of retardation must occur at locations within the repository and
7 the geologic media; it is therefore conservative to ignore retardation processes. NUTS also
8 ignores reaction-rate aspects of dissolution and colloid formation processes, and mobilization is
9 assumed to occur instantaneously. Neither molecular nor mechanical dispersion is modeled in
10 NUTS. These processes are assumed to be insignificant compared to advection, as discussed
11 further in Attachment MASS-2009, Section MASS-13.5.

12 Colloidal actinides are subject to retardation by chemical interaction between colloids and solid
13 surfaces and by clogging of small pore throats (i.e., by sieving). There will be some interaction
14 of colloids with solid surfaces in the anhydrite interbeds. Given the low permeability of intact
15 interbeds, it is likely that pore apertures will be small and some sieving will occur. However,
16 colloidal particles, if not retarded, are transported slightly more rapidly than the average velocity
17 of the bulk liquid flow. Because the effects on transport of slightly increased average pore
18 velocity and retarded interactions with solid surfaces and sieving offset one another, the DOE
19 assumes residual effects of these opposing processes will be either small or beneficial, and does
20 not incorporate them when modeling An transport in the Salado interbeds.

21 If brine in the repository moves into interbeds, it is likely that mineral precipitation reactions will
22 occur. Precipitated minerals may contain actinides as trace constituents. Furthermore, colloidal-
23 sized precipitates will behave like mineral-fragment colloids, which are destabilized by brines,
24 quickly agglomerating and settling by gravity. The beneficial effects of precipitation and
25 coprecipitation are neglected in PA.

26 Fractures, channeling, and viscous fingering may also impact transport in Salado interbeds,
27 which contain natural fractures. Because of the low permeability of unfractured anhydrite, most
28 fluid flow in interbeds will occur in fractures. Even though some properties of naturally
29 fractured interbeds are characterized by in situ tests, other uncertainty exists in the characteristics
30 of the fracture network that may be created with high gas pressure in the repository. The PA
31 modeling system accounts for the possible effects on porosity and permeability of fracturing by
32 using a fracturing model (see Section PA-4.2.4). The processes and effects associated with
33 fracture dilation or fracture propagation not already captured by the PA fracture model are
34 negligible (see the CCA, Appendix MASS, Section MASS.13.3 and Appendix MASS
35 Attachment 13.2). Of those processes not already incorporated, channeling has the greatest
36 potential effect.

37 Channeling is the movement of fluid through the larger-aperture sections of a fracture network
38 with locally high permeabilities. It could locally enhance An transport. However, it is assumed
39 that the effects of channeled flow in existing or altered fractures will be negligible for the length
40 and time scales associated with the disposal system. The DOE believes this assumption is
41 reasonable because processes are likely to occur that limit the effectiveness of channels or the
42 dispersion of actinides in them. First, if gas is present in the fracture network, it will be present

1 as a nonwetting phase and will occupy the portions of the fracture network with relatively large
 2 apertures, where the highest local permeabilities will exist. The presence of gas thus removes
 3 the most rapid transport pathways from the contaminated brine and decreases the impact of
 4 channeling. Second, brine penetrating the Salado from the repository is likely to be completely
 5 miscible with in situ brine. Because of miscibility, diffusion or other local mixing processes will
 6 probably broaden fingers (reduce concentration gradients) until the propagating fingers are
 7 indistinguishable from the advancing front.

8 Gas will likely penetrate the liquid-saturated interbeds as a fingered front, rather than a uniform
 9 front. Fingers form when there is a difference in viscosity between the invading fluid (gas) and
 10 the resident fluid (liquid brine), and because of channeling effects. This process does not affect
 11 An transport, however, because actinides of interest are transported only in the liquid phase,
 12 which will not displace gas in the relatively high-permeability regions due to capillary effects.

13 **PA-4.3.1 Mathematical Description**

14 The following system of PDEs is used to model radionuclide transport in the Salado:

15
$$-\nabla \cdot \alpha \mathbf{v}_b C_{bl} + \alpha S_l = \alpha \frac{\partial}{\partial t} (\phi S_b C_{bl}) + (\alpha \phi S_b C_{bl}) \lambda_l - \alpha \phi S_b \sum_{p \in P(l)} C_{bp} \lambda_p \quad (\text{PA.95})$$

16
$$-S_l = \frac{\partial}{\partial t} (C_{sl}) + C_{sl} \lambda_l - \sum_{p \in P(l)} C_{sp} \lambda_p \quad (\text{PA.96})$$

17 for $l = 1, 2, \dots, n_R$, where

18 \mathbf{v}_b = Darcy velocity vector ($\text{m}^3/\text{m}^2/\text{s} = \text{m}/\text{s}$) for brine (supplied by BRAGFLO from solution
 19 of Equation (PA.93))

20 C_{bl} = concentration (kg/m^3) of radionuclide l in brine

21 C_{sl} = concentration (kg/m^3) of radionuclide l in solid phase (i.e., not in brine), with
 22 concentration defined with respect to total (i.e., bulk) formation volume (only used in
 23 repository; see Figure PA-15)

24 S_l = linkage term ($\text{kg}/\text{m}^3/\text{s}$) due to dissolution/precipitation between radionuclide l in brine
 25 and in solid phase (see Equation (PA.97))

26 ϕ = porosity (supplied by BRAGFLO from solution of Equation (PA.24) through Equation
 27 (PA.30))

28 S_b = brine saturation (supplied by BRAGFLO from solution of Equation (PA.24) through
 29 Equation (PA.30))

30 λ_l = decay constant (s^{-1}) for radionuclide l

31 $P(l) = \{p: \text{radionuclide } p \text{ is a parent of radionuclide } l\}$

32 n_R = number of radionuclides,

33 and α is the dimension-dependent geometry factor in Equation (PA.32). PA uses a two-
 34 dimensional representation for fluid flow and radionuclide transport in the vicinity of the

1 repository, with α defined by the element depths in Figure PA-15. Although omitted for brevity,
 2 the terms α , \mathbf{v}_b , C_{bl} , C_{sl} , S_l , S_b , and ϕ are functions $\alpha(x, y)$, $\mathbf{v}_b(x, y, t)$, $C_{bl}(x, y, t)$, $C_{sl}(x, y, t)$,
 3 $S_l(x, y, t)$, $S_b(x, y, t)$, and $\phi(x, y, t)$ of time t and the spatial variables x and y . Equation (PA.95)
 4 and Equation (PA.96) are defined and solved on the same computational grid (Figure PA-15)
 5 used by BRAGFLO for the solution of Equation (PA.24) through Equation (PA.30).

6 Radionuclides are assumed to be present in both brine (Equation (PA.95)) and in an immobile
 7 solid phase (Equation (PA.96)), although radionuclide transport takes place only by brine flow
 8 (Equation (PA.95)). The maximum radionuclide concentration is assumed to equilibrate
 9 instantly for each element (Section PA-4.3.2). Then each individual radionuclide equilibrates
 10 between the brine and solid phases based on the maximum concentration of its associated
 11 element and the mole fractions of other isotopes included in the calculation. The linkage
 12 between the brine and solid phases in Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) is accomplished
 13 by the term S_l , where

$$S_l = \begin{cases} \delta(\tau - t) \text{Dif}(S_T, C_{b,El(l)}) MF_{sl} & \text{if } 0 \leq \text{Dif}(S_T, C_{b,El(l)}) \leq \frac{C_{s,El(l)}}{\phi S_b} \text{ and } 0 < S_b \\ \delta(\tau - t) \left[\frac{C_{s,El(l)}}{\phi S_b} \right] MF_{sl} & \text{if } 0 \leq \frac{C_{s,El(l)}}{\phi S_b} < \text{Dif}(S_T, C_{b,El(l)}) \text{ and } 0 < S_b \\ \delta(\tau - t) \text{Dif}(S_T, C_{b,El(l)}) MF_{bl} & \text{if } \text{Dif}(S_T, C_{b,El(l)}) < 0 \text{ and } 0 < S_b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{PA.97}$$

16 where

17 $S_T [Br(t), Ox(l), El(l)]$ = maximum concentration (kg/m³) of element $El(l)$ in oxidation
 18 state $Ox(l)$ in brine type $Br(t)$, where $El(l)$ denotes the element of
 19 which radionuclide l is an isotope, $Ox(l)$ denotes the oxidation
 20 state in which element $El(l)$ is present, and $Br(t)$ denotes the type
 21 of brine present in the repository at time t (see Section PA-4.3.2
 22 for definition of $S_T [Br(t), Ox(l), El(l)]$).

23 $C_{p,El(l)}$ = concentration (kg/m³) of element $El(l)$ in brine ($p = b$) or solid (p
 24 = s), which is equal to the sum of concentrations of radionuclides
 25 that are isotopes of same element as radionuclide l , where $k \in$
 26 $El(l)$ only if k is an isotope of element $El(l)$:

$$C_{p,El(l)} = \sum_{k \in El(l)} C_{p,k} \tag{PA.98}$$

1 $Dif(S_T, C_{b,El(l)})$ = difference (kg/m³) between maximum concentration of element
 2 $El(l)$ in brine and existing concentration of element $El(l)$ in brine

3
$$Dif(S_T, C_{b,El(l)}) = S_T [Br(t), Ox(l), El(l)] - C_{b,El(l)} \quad (PA.99)$$

4 MF_{pl} = mole fraction of radionuclide l in phase p , where $p = b$ (brine) or
 5 $p = s$ (solid)

6
$$MF_{pl} = C_{pl}CM_l / \sum_{k \in El(l)} C_{pk}CM_k \quad (PA.100)$$

7 CM_l = conversion factor (mol/kg) from kilograms to moles for
 8 radionuclide l

9 $\delta(\tau - t)$ = Dirac delta function (s⁻¹) ($\delta(\tau - t) = 0$ if $\tau \neq t$ and

10
$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \delta(\tau - t) d\tau = 1$$
)

11 In the CCA and the CRA-2004, the function S_T had an additional parameter, Mi , representing the
 12 presence or absence of microbial activity. However, during preparations for the CRA-2004
 13 PABC, the EPA directed the DOE to change the probability of microbial activity to 1.0
 14 (Cotsworth 2005). The DOE therefore revised the probability distribution so that all vectors
 15 would have the possibility for microbial degradation of cellulose, while retaining the percentage
 16 of vectors showing microbial degradation of rubbers and plastic at 0.25 (Nemer 2005). This, in
 17 effect, sets Mi equal to “Yes” for all vectors. Mi is therefore suppressed as an argument of S_T in
 18 the remainder of this section.

19 The terms S_l , S_b , $C_{p,El(l)}$, MF_{pl} , and ϕ are functions of time t and the spatial variables x and y ,
 20 although the dependencies are omitted for brevity. The Dirac delta function, $\delta(\tau - t)$, appears in
 21 Equation (PA.97) to indicate that the adjustments to concentration are implemented
 22 instantaneously within the numerical solution of Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96)
 23 whenever a concentration imbalance is observed.

24 The velocity vector \mathbf{v}_b in Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) is defined in Equation (PA.93)
 25 and is obtained from the numerical solution of Equation (PA.24) through Equation (PA.30). If B
 26 denotes an arbitrary boundary (e.g., the LWB) in the domain of Equation (PA.95) and Equation
 27 (PA.96) (as shown in Figure PA-15), the cumulative transport of $C_l(t, B)$ of radionuclide l from
 28 time 0 to time t across B is given by

29
$$C_l(t, B) = \int_0^t \left[\int_B \mathbf{v}_b(x, y, t) C_l(x, y, t) \alpha(x, y) \cdot \mathbf{n}(x, y) ds \right] dt \quad (PA.101)$$

1 where $\mathbf{n}(x, y)$ is an outward-pointing unit normal vector and $\int_B ds$ denotes a line integral over
2 B .

3 Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) models advective radionuclide transport due to the
4 velocity vector \mathbf{v}_b . Although the effects of solubility limits are considered, no chemical or
5 physical retardation is included in the model. Molecular diffusion is not included in the model,
6 because the radionuclides under consideration have molecular diffusion coefficients on the order
7 of 10^{-10} m²/s, and thus can be expected to move only approximately 10 m over 10,000 years due
8 to molecular diffusion. Mechanical dispersion is also omitted in NUTS, as the uniform initial
9 radionuclide concentrations assumed within the repository and the use of time-integrated releases
10 in assessing compliance with section 191.13 mean that mechanical dispersion will have
11 negligible impact on overall performance.

12 **PA-4.3.2 Calculation of Maximum Concentration $S_T(Br, Ox, El)$**

13 A maximum concentration $S_T(Br, Ox, El)$ (mol/liter [L]) is calculated for each brine type ($Br \in$
14 $\{\text{Salado, Castile}\}$), oxidation state ($Ox \in \{\text{III, IV, V, VI}\}$), and element ($El \in \{\text{Am, Pu, U, Th}\}$).
15 The maximum concentration is given by

$$16 \quad S_T(Br, Ox, El) = S_D(Br, Ox) + S_C(Br, Ox, El) \quad (\text{PA.102})$$

17 where $S_D(Br, Ox)$ is the dissolved solubility (mol/L) and $S_C(Br, Ox, El)$ is the concentration
18 (mol/L) of the element sorbed to colloids.

19 The dissolved solubility $S_D(Br, Ox)$ is given by

$$20 \quad S_D(Br, Ox) = S_{FMT}(Br, Ox) \times 10^{UF(Ox)} \quad (\text{PA.103})$$

21 where

22 $S_{FMT}(Br, Ox)$ = dissolved solubility (mol/L) calculated by Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT)
23 model (WIPP Performance Assessment 1998a) for brine type Br and oxidation
24 state Ox
25 $UF(Ox)$ = logarithm (base 10) of uncertainty factor for solubilities calculated by FMT
26 expressed as a function of oxidation state Ox

27 Table PA-10 lists the calculated values of $S_{FMT}(Br, Ox)$; details of the calculation are provided
28 in Appendix SOTERM-2009 and Brush (2005). The uncertainty factors $UF(Ox)$ are determined
29 by the uncertain parameters WSOLVAR3 for the III oxidation state and WSOLVAR4 for the IV
30 oxidation state; definitions of these parameters are provided in Table PA-19, and further details
31 regarding the calculation of the solubilities is given in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section
32 SOTERM-5.1.3.

1 **Table PA-10. Calculated Values for Dissolved Solubility (see Appendix SOTERM-2009,**
 2 **Table SOTERM-16)**

Brine	Oxidation State			
	III	IV	V	VI ^a
Salado	3.87×10^{-7}	5.64×10^{-8}	3.55×10^{-6}	1.0×10^{-3}
Castile	2.88×10^{-7}	6.79×10^{-8}	8.24×10^{-7}	1.0×10^{-3}

^a Values for the VI solubilities were mandated by the EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2005).

3
 4 The concentration (mol/L) of the element sorbed to colloids $S_C(Br, Ox, El)$ is given by

5
$$S_C(Br, Ox, El) = S_{Hum}(Br, Ox, El) + S_{Mic}(Br, Ox, El) + S_{Act}(El) + S_{Mn} \quad (PA.104)$$

6 where

7 $S_{Hum}(Br, Ox, El)$ = solubility (concentration expressed in mol/L) in brine type Br of
 8 element El in oxidation state Ox resulting from humic colloid
 9 formation

10
$$= \min\{SF_{Hum}(Br, Ox, El) \times S_D(Br, Ox), UB_{Hum}\}$$

11 $SF_{Hum}(Br, Ox, El)$ = scale factor used as a multiplier on $S_D(Br, Ox)$ in definition of

12 $S_{Hum}(Br, Ox, El)$ (see $UB_{Mic}(Ox, El)$ = upper bound
 13 on solubility (concentration expressed in mol/L) of element El in
 14 oxidation state Ox resulting from microbial colloid formation (see
 15 Table PA-12)

16 Table PA-11)

17 UB_{Hum} = upper bound on solubility (concentration expressed in mol/L) of
 18 individual An elements resulting from humic colloid formation

19
$$= 1.1 \times 10^{-5} \text{ mol/L}$$

20 $S_{Mic}(Br, Ox, El)$ = solubility (concentration expressed in mol/L) in brine type Br of
 21 element El in oxidation state Ox resulting from microbial colloid
 22 formation

23
$$= \min\{SF_{Mic}(Ox, El) \times S_D(Br, Ox), UB_{Mic}(Ox, El)\}$$

24 $SF_{Mic}(Ox, El)$ = scale factor used as multiplier on $S_D(Br, Ox)$ in definition of $S_{Mic}(Br,$
 25 $Ox, El)$ (see Table PA-12)

$UB_{Mic}(Ox, El)$ = upper bound on solubility (concentration expressed in mol/L) of element El in oxidation state Ox resulting from microbial colloid formation (see Table PA-12)

Table PA-11. Scale Factor $SF_{Hum}(Br, Ox, El)$ Used in Definition of $S_{Hum}(Br, Ox, El)$ (see Appendix SOTERM-2009, Table SOTERM-21)

Brine	Element (Oxidation State)							
	Am(III)	Pu(III)	Pu(IV)	U(IV)	Th(IV)	Np(IV)	Np(V)	U(VI)
Salado	0.19	0.19	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	9.1×10^{-4}	0.12
Castile	WPHUMOX3 ^a	WPHUMOX3 ^a	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	7.4×10^{-3}	0.51

^a See Table PA-19.

Table PA-12. Scale Factor $SF_{Mic}(Ox, El)$ and Upper Bound $UB_{Mic}(Ox, El)$ (mol/L) Used in Definition of $S_{Mic}(Br, Ox, El)$ (see Appendix SOTERM-2009, Table SOTERM-21)

Parameter	Element (Oxidation State)							
	Am(III)	Pu(III)	Pu(IV)	U(IV)	Th(IV)	Np(IV)	Np(V)	U(VI)
$SF_{Mic}(Ox, El)$	3.6	0.3	0.3	0.0021	3.1	12.0	12.0	0.0021
$UB_{Mic}(Ox, El)$	1	6.8×10^{-5}	6.8×10^{-5}	0.0021	0.0019	0.0027	0.0027	0.0021

$S_{Act}(El)$ = solubility (concentration in mol/L) of element El resulting from An intrinsic colloid formation


$$= \begin{cases} 1 \times 10^{-9} \text{ mol/L} & \text{if } El = \text{Pu} \\ 0 \text{ mol/L} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

S_{Mn} = solubility (concentration in mol/L) of individual An element resulting from mineral fragment colloid formation

$$= 2.6 \times 10^{-8} \text{ mol/L}$$




PA-4.3.3 Radionuclides Transported

Since the solution of Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) for this many radionuclides and decay chains would be very time-consuming, the number of radionuclides for direct inclusion in the analysis was reduced using the algorithm shown in Figure PA-21. The CRA-2009 PA uses the same reduction algorithm as the CCA PA (see the CCA, Appendix WCA); the algorithm was found to be acceptable in the CCA review (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a, Section 4.6.1.1).



1
2 **Figure PA-21. Selecting Radionuclides for the Release Pathways Conceptualized by PA**




1 Using Figure PA-21, the number of radionuclides considered was reduced from 135 to a total of
 2 29 included in the decay calculations carried out by the PANEL code (Garner and Leigh 2005).
 3 These radionuclides belong to the following decay chains:



8 Radionuclides considered in the decay calculations that do not belong to one of the decay chains
 9 listed above are ${}^{147}\text{Pm}$, ${}^{137}\text{Cs}$, and ${}^{90}\text{Sr}$. In addition, some intermediates with extremely short
 10 half-lives, such as ${}^{240}\text{U}$, were omitted from the decay chains.

11 Further simplification of the decay chains is possible based on the total inventories. Releases of
 12 radionuclides whose inventories total less than one EPA unit are essentially insignificant, as any
 13 release that transports essentially all of a given species outside the LWB will be dominated by
 14 the releases of other species with much larger inventories. In addition, ${}^{137}\text{Cs}$ and ${}^{90}\text{Sr}$ can be
 15 omitted because their concentrations drop to below 1 EPA unit within 150 years, which makes it
 16 improbable that a significant release of these radionuclides will occur. Isotopes such as ${}^{241}\text{Pu}$,
 17 whose decay could affect the inventory of measurable isotopes, were reinstated.


18 After the reduction of radionuclides outlined in Figure PA-21 and the above paragraph, the
 19 following 10 radionuclides remained from the decay chains shown above:



24 ${}^{238}\text{Pu}$ does not significantly affect transport calculations because of its short half-life (87.8
 25 years). The remaining nine radionuclides were then further reduced by combining those with
 26 similar decay and transport properties. In particular, ${}^{234}\text{U}$, ${}^{230}\text{Th}$, and ${}^{239}\text{Pu}$ were used as
 27 surrogates for the groups $\{ {}^{234}\text{U}, {}^{233}\text{U} \}$, $\{ {}^{230}\text{Th}, {}^{229}\text{Th} \}$, and $\{ {}^{242}\text{Pu}, {}^{240}\text{Pu}, {}^{239}\text{Pu} \}$, with the

1 initial inventories of ^{234}U , ^{230}Th , and ^{239}Pu being increased to account for the additional
 2 radionuclide(s) in each group.

3 In increasing the initial inventories, the individual radionuclides were combined on either a mole
 4 or curie basis (i.e., moles added and then converted back to curies, or curies added directly). In
 5 each case, the method that maximized the combined inventory was used; thus, ^{233}U was added to
 6 ^{234}U , ^{240}Pu to ^{239}Pu , and ^{229}Th to ^{230}Th by curies, while ^{242}Pu was added to ^{239}Pu by moles. In
 7 addition, ^{241}Pu was added to ^{241}Am by moles because ^{241}Pu has a half-life of 14 years and will
 8 quickly decay to ^{241}Am , and neglect of this ingrowth would underestimate the ^{241}Am inventory
 9 by about 4% (Table PA-13). The outcome of this process was the following set of five
 10 radionuclides in three simplified decay chains:



12 which were then used with Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) for transport in the vicinity
 13 of the repository. As ^{238}Pu does not significantly affect transport calculations, only the
 14 remaining four radionuclides are used in the Culebra transport calculations (Section PA-4.9).
 15 These radionuclides account for 99% of the EPA units in the waste after 2,000 years (Garner and
 16 Leigh 2005), and hence will dominate any releases by transport.

17 **Table PA-13. Combination of Radionuclides for Transport**

Combination	Isotope Initial Values	Combination Procedure	Combined Inventory
$^{233}\text{U} \rightarrow ^{234}\text{U}$	$1.23 \times 10^3 \text{ Ci } ^{233}\text{U}$ $3.44 \times 10^2 \text{ Ci } ^{234}\text{U}$	$1.23 \times 10^3 \text{ Ci } ^{233}\text{U}$ $\rightarrow 1.23 \times 10^3 \text{ Ci } ^{234}\text{U}$	$1.57 \times 10^3 \text{ Ci } ^{234}\text{U}$
$^{242}\text{Pu} \rightarrow ^{239}\text{Pu}$	$1.27 \times 10^1 \text{ Ci } ^{242}\text{Pu}$	$1.27 \times 10^1 \text{ Ci } ^{242}\text{Pu}$ $= 1.32 \times 10^1 \text{ moles } ^{242}\text{Pu}$ $\rightarrow 1.32 \times 10^1 \text{ moles } ^{239}\text{Pu}$ $= 1.98 \times 10^2 \text{ Ci } ^{239}\text{Pu}$	$6.78 \times 10^5 \text{ Ci } ^{239}\text{Pu}$
$^{240}\text{Pu} \rightarrow ^{239}\text{Pu}$	$9.55 \times 10^4 \text{ Ci } ^{240}\text{Pu}$ $5.82 \times 10^5 \text{ Ci } ^{239}\text{Pu}$	$9.55 \times 10^4 \text{ Ci } ^{240}\text{Pu}$ $\rightarrow 9.55 \times 10^4 \text{ Ci } ^{239}\text{Pu}$	
$^{229}\text{Th} \rightarrow ^{230}\text{Th}$	$5.21 \times 10^0 \text{ Ci } ^{229}\text{Th}$ $1.80 \times 10^{-1} \text{ Ci } ^{230}\text{Th}$	$5.21 \times 10^0 \text{ Ci } ^{229}\text{Th}$ $\rightarrow 5.21 \times 10^0 \text{ Ci } ^{230}\text{Th}$	$5.39 \times 10^0 \text{ Ci } ^{230}\text{Th}$
$^{241}\text{Pu} \rightarrow ^{241}\text{Am}$	$4.48 \times 10^5 \text{ Ci } ^{241}\text{Pu}$ $5.18 \times 10^5 \text{ Ci } ^{241}\text{Am}$	$5.38 \times 10^5 \text{ Ci } ^{241}\text{Pu}$ $= 1.79 \times 10^1 \text{ moles } ^{241}\text{Pu}$ $\rightarrow 1.79 \times 10^1 \text{ moles } ^{241}\text{Am}$ $= 1.50 \times 10^4 \text{ Ci } ^{241}\text{Am}$	$5.33 \times 10^5 \text{ Ci } ^{241}\text{Am}$

18

19 **PA-4.3.4 NUTS Tracer Calculations**

20 All BRAGFLO realizations are first evaluated using NUTS in a screening mode to identify those
 21 realizations for which a significant release of radionuclides to the LWB cannot occur. The
 22 screening simulations consider an infinitely soluble, nondecaying, nondispersive, and nonsorbing
 23 species as a tracer element. The tracer is given a unit concentration in all waste disposal areas of
 24 1 kg/m^3 . If the amount of tracer that reaches the selected boundaries (the top of the Salado and

1 the LWB within the Salado) does not exceed a cumulative mass of 10^{-7} kg within 10,000 years,
 2 it is assumed there is no consequential release to these boundaries. If the cumulative mass
 3 outside the boundaries within 10,000 years exceeds 10^{-7} kg, a complete transport analysis is
 4 conducted. The value of 10^{-7} kg is selected because, regardless of the isotopic composition of
 5 the release, it corresponds to a normalized release less than 10^{-6} EPA units, the smallest release
 6 displayed in CCDF construction (Stockman 1996). The largest normalized release would be
 7 9.98×10^{-7} EPA units, corresponding to 10^{-7} kg of ^{241}Am if the release was entirely ^{241}Am .

8 **PA-4.3.5 NUTS Transport Calculations**

9 For BRAGFLO realizations with greater than 10^{-7} kg reaching the boundaries in the tracer
 10 calculations, NUTS models the transport of five different radionuclide species (^{241}Am , ^{239}Pu ,
 11 ^{238}Pu , ^{234}U , and ^{230}Th). These radionuclides represent a larger number of radionuclides: as
 12 discussed in Section PA-4.3.3, radionuclides were grouped together based on similarities, such as
 13 isotopes of the same element and those with similar half-lives, to simplify the calculations. For
 14 transport purposes, solubilities are lumped to represent both dissolved and colloidal forms.
 15 These groupings simplify and expedite calculations.

16 **PA-4.3.6 Numerical Solution**

17 Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) are numerically solved by the NUTS program (WIPP
 18 Performance Assessment 1997a) on the same computational grid (Figure PA-15) used by
 19 BRAGFLO for the solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation
 20 (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30). In the solution procedure,
 21 Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) are numerically solved with $S_l = 0$ for each time step,
 22 with the instantaneous updating of concentrations indicated in Equation (PA.97) and the
 23 appropriate modification to C_{sl} in Equation (PA.96) taking place after the time step. The
 24 solution is carried out for the five radionuclides indicated in Equation (PA.113).

25 The initial value and boundary value conditions used with Equation (PA.95) and Equation
 26 (PA.96) are given in Table PA-14. At time $t = 0$ (corresponding to the year 2033), the total
 27 inventory of each radionuclide is assumed to be in brine; the solubility constraints associated
 28 with Equation (PA.97) then immediately adjust the values for $C_{bl}(x, y, t)$ and $C_{sl}(x, y, t)$ for
 29 consistency with the constraints imposed by $S_T(\text{Br}, \text{Ox}, \text{El})$ and available radionuclide inventory.

30 The n_R PDEs in Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) are discretized in two dimensions and
 31 then developed into a linear system of algebraic equations for numerical implementation. The
 32 following conventions are used in the representation of each discretized equation:

- 33 • The subscript b is dropped from C_{bl} , so that the unknown function is represented by C_l .
- 34 • A superscript n denotes time t_n , with the assumption that the solution C_l is known at time
 35 t_n and is to be propagated to time t_{n+1} .
- 36 • The grid indices are i in the x-direction and j in the y-direction, and are the same as the
 37 BRAGFLO grid indices.

1 **Table PA-14. Initial and Boundary Conditions for $C_{bl}(x, y, t)$ and $C_{sl}(x, y, t)$**

Initial Conditions for $C_{bl}(x, y, t)$ and $C_{sl}(x, y, t)$	
$C_{bl}(x, y, t) = A_l(0)/V_b(0)$ if (x, y) is a point in the repository (i.e., areas Waste Panel, South RoR and North RoR, in Figure PA-15), where $A_l(0)$ is the amount (kg) of radionuclide l present at time $t = 0$ (Table PA-13) and $V_b(0)$ is the amount (m^3) of brine in repository at time $t = 0$ (from solution of Equation (PA.24) through Equation (PA.30) with BRAGFLO) for all (x, y) . $= 0$ otherwise.	
$C_{sl}(x, y, t) = 0$ if (x, y) is a point in the repository.	
Boundary Conditions for $C_{bl}(x, y, t)$	
$f_l(B, t) = \int_B \mathbf{v}_b(x, y, t) C_{bl}(x, y, t) \alpha(x, y) \cdot \mathbf{n}(x, y) ds$, where B is any subset of the outer boundary of the computational grid in Figure PA-15, $f_l(B, t)$ is the flux (kg/s) at time t of radionuclide l across B , $\mathbf{v}_b(x, y, t)$ is the Darcy velocity ($m^3/m^2/s$) of brine at (x, y) on B and is obtained from the solution of Equation (PA.24) through Equation (PA.30) by BRAGFLO, $\mathbf{n}(x, y)$ denotes an outward-pointing unit normal vector, and $\int_B ds$ denotes a line integral along B .	

- 2
- 3
- Fractional indices refer to quantities evaluated at grid block interfaces.
 - Each time step by NUTS is equal to 20 BRAGFLO time steps because BRAGFLO stores results (here, v_b , ϕ , and S_b) every 20 time steps.
- 4
- 5

6 The following finite-difference discretization is used for the l^{th} equation in each grid block (i, j) :

$$q_{b,i+1/2,j}^{n+1} C_{l,i+1/2,j}^{n+1} - q_{b,i-1/2,j}^{n+1} C_{l,i-1/2,j}^{n+1} + q_{b,i,j+1/2}^{n+1} C_{l,i,j+1/2}^{n+1} - q_{b,i,j-1/2}^{n+1} C_{l,i,j-1/2}^{n+1} =$$

7

$$\frac{V_{R,i,j}}{\Delta t} \left[\left\{ \phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} C_{l,i,j} \right\}^{n+1} - \left\{ \phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} C_{l,i,j} \right\}^n \right] \tag{PA.114}$$

$$+ V_{R,i,j} \left\{ \phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} C_{l,i,j} \right\}^{n+1} \lambda_l - V_{R,i,j} \left(\phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} \right)^{n+1} \sum_{p \in P(l)} C_{p,i,j}^{n+1} \lambda_p$$

8 where q_b is the grid block interfacial brine flow rate (m^3/s) and V_R is the grid block volume (m^3).

9 The quantity q_b is based on v_b and α in Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96), and the

10 quantity V_R is based on grid block dimensions (Figure PA-15) and α .

11 The interfacial values of concentration in Equation (PA.114) are discretized using the one-point

12 upstream weighting method (Aziz and Settari 1979), which results in

$$\begin{aligned}
 & q_{b,i+1/2,j}^{n+1} \left(\omega_{i+1} C_{l,i,j}^{n+1} + (1 - \omega_{i+1}) C_{l,i+1,j}^{n+1} \right) - q_{b,i-1/2,j}^{n+1} \left(\omega_i C_{l,i-1,j}^{n+1} + (1 - \omega_i) C_{l,i,j}^{n+1} \right) \\
 & + q_{b,i,j+1/2}^{n+1} \left(\omega_{j+1} C_{l,i,j}^{n+1} + (1 - \omega_{j+1}) C_{l,i,j+1}^{n+1} \right) - q_{b,i,j-1/2}^{n+1} \left(\omega_j C_{b,i,j-1}^{n+1} + (1 - \omega_j) C_{l,i,j}^{n+1} \right) = \\
 & \frac{V_{R,i,j}}{\Delta t} \left[\left\{ \phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} C_{l,i,j} \right\}^{n+1} - \left\{ \phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} C_{l,i,j} \right\}^n \right] + V_{R,i,j} \left\{ \phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} C_{l,i,j} \right\}^{n+1} \lambda_l \\
 & - V_{R,i,j} \left(\phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} \right)^{n+1} \sum_{p \in P(l)} C_{p,i,j}^{n+1} \lambda_p
 \end{aligned} \tag{PA.115}$$

1

2 where ω derives from the upstream weighting for flow between adjacent grid blocks and is
3 defined by

4

$$\omega_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if flow is from grid block } (i-1, j) \text{ to grid block } (i, j) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

5

$$\omega_j = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if flow is from grid block } (i, j-1) \text{ to grid block } (i, j) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

6 By collecting similar terms, Equation (PA.115) can be represented by the linear equation

$$AC_{l,i,j-1}^{n+1} + BC_{l,i-1,j}^{n+1} + DC_{l,i,j}^{n+1} + EC_{l,i+1,j}^{n+1} + FC_{l,i,j+1}^{n+1} = R_{l,i,j} \tag{PA.116}$$

8 where

9

$$\begin{aligned}
 A &= -\omega_j q_{b,i,j-1/2}^{n+1} & B &= -\omega_j q_{b,i-1/2,j}^{n+1} \\
 E &= (1 - \omega_{i+1}) q_{b,i+1/2,j}^{n+1} & F &= (1 - \omega_{j+1}) q_{b,i,j+1/2}^{n+1}
 \end{aligned}$$

10

$$\begin{aligned}
 D &= -(1 - \omega_j) q_{b,i,j-1/2}^{n+1} - (1 - \omega_i) q_{b,i-1/2,j}^{n+1} + \omega_{j+1} q_{b,i,j+1/2}^{n+1} + \omega_{i+1} q_{b,i+1/2,j}^{n+1} \\
 & - \left(\frac{V_{R,i,j}}{\Delta t} - V_{R,i,j} \lambda_l \right) \left\{ \phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} \right\}^{n+1}
 \end{aligned}$$

11

$$R_{l,i,j} = -\frac{V_{R,i,j}}{\Delta t} \left\{ \phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} C_{l,i,j} \right\}^n - V_{R,i,j} \left(\phi_{i,j} S_{b,i,j} \right)^{n+1} \sum_{p \in P(l)} C_{p,i,j}^{n+1} \lambda_p$$

12 Given the form of Equation (PA.116), the solution of Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96)
13 has now been reduced to the solution of $n_R \times n_G$ linear algebraic equations in $n_R \times n_G$ unknowns,
14 where n_R is the number of equations for each grid block (i.e., the number of radionuclides) and
15 n_G is the number of grid blocks into which the spatial domain is discretized (Figure PA-15).

16 The system of PDEs in Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) is strongly coupled because of
17 the contribution from parental decay to the equation governing the immediate daughter.

1 Consequently, a sequential method is used to solve for the radionuclide concentrations by
 2 starting at the top of a decay chain and working down from parent to daughter. This implies that
 3 when solving Equation (PA.116) for the l^{th} isotope concentration, all parent concentrations
 4 occurring in the right-hand-side term R are known. The system of equations is then linear in the
 5 concentrations of the l^{th} isotope. As a result, solving Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) is
 6 reduced from the solution of one algebraic equation at each time step with $n_R \times n_G$ unknowns to
 7 the solution of n_R algebraic equations each with n_G unknowns at each time step, which can result
 8 in a significant computational savings.

9 The matrix resulting from one-point upstream weighting has the following structural form for a
 10 3×3 system of grid blocks, and a similar structure for a larger number of grid blocks:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	X	X	0	X					
2	X	X	X	0	X				
3	0	X	X	0	0	X			
4	X	0	0	X	X	0	X		
5		X	0	X	X	X	0	X	
6			X	0	X	X	0	0	X
7				X	0	0	X	X	0
8					X	0	X	X	X
9						X	0	X	X

11
 12 where X designates possible nonzero matrix entries, and 0 designates zero entries within the
 13 banded structure. All entries outside of the banded structure are zero. Because of this structure, a
 14 banded direct elimination solver (Aziz and Settari 1979, Section 8.2.1) is used to solve the linear
 15 system for each radionuclide. The bandwidth is minimized by first indexing equations in the
 16 coordinate direction with the minimum number of grid blocks. The coefficient matrix is stored
 17 in this banded structure, and all infill coefficients calculated during the elimination procedure are
 18 contained within the band structure. Therefore, for the matrix system in two dimensions, a
 19 pentadiagonal matrix of dimension $I_{BW} \times n_G$ is inverted instead of a full $n_G \times n_G$ matrix, where
 20 I_{BW} is the bandwidth.

21 The numerical implementation of Equation (PA.96) enters the solution process through updates
 22 to the radionuclide concentrations in Equation (PA.115) between each time step, as indicated in
 23 Equation (PA.97). The numerical solution of Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96) also
 24 generates the concentrations required to integrate numerically evaluating the integral that defines
 25 $C_l(t, B)$ in Equation (PA.101).

26 **PA-4.3.7 Additional Information**

27 Additional information on NUTS and its use in WIPP PA can be found in the NUTS users
 28 manual (WIPP Performance Assessment 1997a) and in the analysis package of Salado transport

1 calculations for the CRA-2009 PA (Ismail and Garner 2008). Furthermore, additional
 2 information on dissolved and colloidal actinides is given in Appendix SOTERM-2009.

3 **PA-4.4 Radionuclide Transport in the Salado: PANEL**

4 This section describes the model used to compute radionuclide transport in the Salado for the
 5 E1E2 scenario. The model for transport in E0, E1, and E2 scenarios is described in Section PA-
 6 4.3.

7 **PA-4.4.1 Mathematical Description**

8 A relatively simple mixed-cell model is used for radionuclide transport in the vicinity of the
 9 repository after an E1E2 intrusion, when connecting flow between two drilling intrusions into the
 10 same waste panel is assumed to take place. With this model, the amount of radionuclide l
 11 contained in a waste panel is represented by

12
$$\frac{dA_l}{dt} = -r_b C_{bl} - \lambda_l A_l + \sum_{p \in P(l)} \lambda_p A_p \quad (\text{PA.117})$$

13 where

14 $A_l(t)$ = amount (mol) of radionuclide l in waste panel at time t

15 $C_{bl}(t)$ = concentration (mol/m³) of radionuclide l in brine in waste panel at time t (Equation
 16 (PA.118) and Equation (PA.119))

17 $r_b(t)$ = rate (m³/s) at which brine flows out of the repository at time t (supplied by
 18 BRAGFLO from solution of Equation (PA.93))

19 and λ_l and $P(l)$ are defined in conjunction with Equation (PA.95) and Equation (PA.96).

20 The brine concentration C_{bl} in Equation (PA.117) is defined by

21
$$C_{bl}(t) = S_T [Br, Ox, El] MF_l(t) \quad \text{if } S_T [Br(t), Ox, El] \leq \sum_{k \in El(l)} A_k(t) / V_b(t) \quad (\text{PA.118})$$

22
$$= A_l(t) / V_b(t) \quad \text{if } \sum_{k \in El(l)} A_k(t) / V_b(t) < S_T [Br, Ox, El] \quad (\text{PA.119})$$

23 where

24 $MF_l(t)$ = mole fraction of radionuclide l in waste panel at time t

$$1 \quad = \frac{A_l(t)}{\sum_{k \in El(l)} A_k(t)} \quad (\text{PA.120})$$

2 $V_b(t)$ = volume (m³) of brine in waste panel at time t (supplied by BRAGFLO from
3 solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation
4 (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30))

5 and $S_T[Br, Ox, El]$ is supplied by Equation (PA.102).

6 For Equation (PA.118) and Equation (PA.119), $S_T[Br, Ox, El]$ must be expressed in units of
7 mol/L. In other words, $C_{bl}(t)$ is defined to be the maximum concentration (S_T in Equation
8 (PA.102)) if there is sufficient radionuclide inventory in the waste panel to generate this
9 concentration (Equation (PA.118)); otherwise, $C_{bl}(t)$ is defined by the concentration that results
10 when all the relevant element in the waste panel is placed in solution (Equation (PA.119)). The
11 dissolved and colloidal An equilibrate instantly for each element.

12 Given r_b and C_{bl} , evaluation of the integral

$$13 \quad R_l(t) = \int_0^t C_{bl}(\tau) r_b(\tau) d\tau \quad (\text{PA.121})$$

14 provides the cumulative release $R_l(t)$ of radionuclide l from the waste panel through time t .

15 **PA-4.4.2 Numerical Solution**

16 Equation (PA.117) is numerically evaluated by the PANEL model (WIPP Performance
17 Assessment 1998b) using a discretization based on time steps of 50 years or less. Specifically,
18 Equation (PA.117) is evaluated with the approximation

$$19 \quad A_l(t_{n+1}) = A_l(t_n) - \left[\int_{t_n}^{t_{n+1}} r_b(\tau) d\tau \right] C_{bl}(t_n) - A_l(t_n) \exp(-\lambda_l \Delta t) + G_l(t_n, t_{n+1})$$

20 (PA.122)

21 where

22 $G_l(t_n, t_{n+1})$ = gain in radionuclide l due to the decay of precursor radionuclides between t_n

23 and t_{n+1} (see Equation (PA.123)), $\Delta t = t_{n+1} - t_n = 50 \text{ yr}$.

24 As the solution progresses, values for $C_{bl}(t_n)$ are updated in consistency with Equation (PA.118)
25 and Equation (PA.119), and the products $r_b(t_n)C_{bl}(t_n)$ are accumulated to provide an
26 approximation to R_l in Equation (PA.121).

1 The term $G_l(t_n, t_{n+1})$ in Equation (PA.122) is evaluated with the Bateman equations (Bateman
 2 1910), with PANEL programmed to handle decay chains of up to five (four decay daughters for
 3 a given radionuclide). As a single example, if radionuclide l is the third radionuclide in a decay
 4 chain (i.e., $l = 3$) and the two preceding radionuclides in the decay chain are designated by $l = 1$
 5 and $l = 2$, then

$$G_3(t_n, t_{n+1}) = \frac{\lambda_2 A_2(t_n)}{(\lambda_3 - \lambda_2)} [\exp(-\lambda_2 \Delta t) - \exp(-\lambda_3 \Delta t)]$$

$$+ \lambda_1 \lambda_2 A_1(t_n) \left\{ \frac{\exp(-\lambda_1 \Delta t)}{(\lambda_2 - \lambda_1)(\lambda_3 - \lambda_1)} + \frac{\exp(-\lambda_2 \Delta t)}{(\lambda_3 - \lambda_2)(\lambda_1 - \lambda_2)} + \frac{\exp(-\lambda_3 \Delta t)}{(\lambda_1 - \lambda_3)(\lambda_2 - \lambda_3)} \right\} \quad (\text{PA.123})$$

7 in Equation (PA.122).

8 **PA-4.4.3 Implementation in PA**

9 The preceding model is used in two ways in PA. First, Equation (PA.121) estimates releases to
 10 the Culebra associated with E1E2 intrusion scenarios (see Section PA-6.7.3). Second, the
 11 radionuclide concentrations are computed using the minimum brine volume for a significant
 12 release to estimate DBRs (see Section PA-6.8.2.3). The calculation of the minimum brine
 13 volume used in the CRA-2009 PA is found in Stein (2005). The calculated concentrations are the
 14 S_l term indicated in Equation (PA.97) which are used in the NUTS calculations discussed in
 15 Section PA-4.3.

16 For E1E2 intrusions, the initial amount A_l of radionuclide l is the inventory of the decayed
 17 isotope at the time of the E1 intrusion. PANEL calculates the inventory of each of the 29
 18 radioisotopes throughout the regulatory period. The initial concentration C_{bl} of radionuclide l is
 19 computed by Equation (PA.117), Equation (PA.118), and Equation (PA.119). For the DBR
 20 calculations, the initial amount A_l of radionuclide l is the inventory of the isotope at the time of
 21 repository closure.

22 **PA-4.4.4 Additional Information**

23 Additional information on PANEL and its use in the CRA-2009 PA calculations can be found in
 24 the PANEL user's manual (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003b), the analysis package for
 25 PANEL calculations (Garner and Leigh 2005), and the analysis package for Salado transport
 26 calculations in the CRA-2009 PA (Ismail and Garner 2008).

27 **PA-4.5 Cuttings and Cavings to Surface: CUTTINGS_S**

28 Cuttings are waste solids contained in the cylindrical volume created by the cutting action of the
 29 drill bit passing through the waste, while cavings are additional waste solids eroded from the
 30 borehole by the upward-flowing drilling fluid within the borehole. The releases associated with
 31 these processes are computed within the CUTTINGS_S code (WIPP Performance Assessment
 32 2003c). The mathematical representations used for cuttings and cavings are described in this
 33 section.

1 PA-4.5.1 Cuttings

2 The uncompacted volume of cuttings removed and transported to the surface in the drilling fluid,
3 V_{cut} , is given by

$$4 \quad V_{cut} = AH_i = \pi D^2 H_i / 4 \quad (\text{PA.124})$$

5 where A is the drill bit area (m^2), H_i is the initial (or uncompacted) repository height (3.96 m),
6 and D is the drill-bit diameter (0.31115 m) (Fox 2008, Table 13). For drilling intrusions through
7 RH-TRU waste, $H_i = 0.509$ m is used (Fox 2008, Table 45).

8 PA-4.5.2 Cavings

9 The cavings component of the direct surface release is caused by the shearing action of the
10 drilling fluid on the waste as it flows up the borehole annulus. Like the cuttings release, the
11 cavings release is assumed to be independent of the conditions that exist in the repository during
12 a drilling intrusion.

13 The final diameter of the borehole depends on the diameter of the drillbit and on the extent to
14 which the actual borehole diameter exceeds the drill-bit diameter. Although a number of factors
15 affect erosion within a borehole (Chambre Syndicale de la Recherche et de la Production du
16 Petrole et du Gaz Naturel 1982), the most important is the fluid shear stress on the borehole wall
17 (i.e., the shearing force per unit area, N/m^2) resulting from circulating drilling fluids (Darley
18 1969, Walker and Holman 1971). As a result, PA estimates cavings removal with a model based
19 on the effect of shear stress on the borehole diameter. In particular, the borehole diameter is
20 assumed to grow until the shear stress on the borehole wall is equal to the shear strength of the
21 waste, which is the limit below which waste erosion ceases.

22 The final eroded diameter D_f (m) of the borehole through the waste determines the total volume
23 V (m^3) of uncompacted waste removed to the surface by circulating drilling fluid. Specifically,

$$24 \quad V = V_{cut} + V_{cav} = \pi D_f^2 H_i / 4 \quad (\text{PA.125})$$

25 where V_{cav} is the volume (m^3) of waste removed as cavings.

26 Most borehole erosion is believed to occur in the vicinity of the drill collar (Figure PA-22)
27 because of decreased flow area and consequent increased mud velocity (Rechard, Iuzzolino, and
28 Sandha 1990, Letters 1a and 1b, App. A). An important determinant of the extent of this erosion
29 is whether the flow of the drilling fluid in the vicinity of the collar is laminar or turbulent. PA
30 uses Reynolds numbers to distinguish between the occurrence of laminar flow and turbulent
31 flow. The Reynolds number is the ratio between inertial and viscous (or shear) forces in a fluid,
32 and can be expressed as (Fox and McDonald 1985)

$$33 \quad \text{Re} = \frac{\rho_f D_e v}{\eta} \quad (\text{PA.126})$$

1 where Re is the Reynolds number (dimensionless), ρ_f is the fluid density (kg/m^3), D_e is the
 2 equivalent diameter (m), $v = \|\mathbf{v}\|$ is the fluid speed (m s^{-1}), and η is the fluid viscosity (kg m^{-1}
 3 s^{-1}).

4 Typically, ρ_f , v , and η are averages over a control volume with an equivalent diameter of D_e ,
 5 where $\rho_f = 1.21 \times 10^3 \text{ kg/m}^3$ (Fox 2008, Table 13), $v = 0.7089 \text{ m s}^{-1}$ (based on 40 gal/min/in of
 6 drill diameter) (Berglund 1992), and $D_e = 2(R - R_i)$, as shown in Figure PA-22. The diameter of
 7 the drill collar (i.e., $2R_i$ in Figure PA-22) is 8.0 in = 0.2032 m (Ismail 2008). The determination
 8 of η is discussed below. PA assumes that Reynolds numbers less than 2100 are associated with
 9 laminar flow, while Reynolds numbers greater than 2100 are associated with turbulent flow
 10 (Walker 1976).

11 Drilling fluids are modeled as non-Newtonian, which means that the viscosity η is a function of
 12 the shear rate within the fluid (i.e., the rate at which the fluid velocity changes normal to the flow
 13 direction, m/s/m). PA uses a model proposed by Oldroyd (1958) to estimate the viscosity of
 14 drilling fluids. As discussed in the *Drilling Mud and Cement Slurry Rheology Manual* (Chambre
 15 Syndicale de la Recherche et de la Production du Petrole et du Gaz Naturel 1982), the Oldroyd
 16 model leads to the following expression for the Reynolds number associated with the helical
 17 flow of a drilling fluid within an annulus:

$$18 \quad Re = \frac{0.8165 \rho_f D_e v}{\eta_\infty} \quad (\text{PA.127})$$

19 where ρ_f , D_e , and v are defined as in Equation (PA.126), and η_∞ is the asymptotic value for the
 20 derivative of the shear stress (τ , $\text{kg m}^{-1} \text{ s}^{-2}$) with respect to the shear rate (Γ , s^{-1}) obtained as
 21 the shear rate increases (i.e., $\eta_\infty = d\tau / d\Gamma$ as $\Gamma \rightarrow \infty$). PA uses Equation (PA.127) to determine
 22 whether drilling fluids in the area of the drill collar are undergoing laminar or turbulent flow.


23 The Oldroyd model assumes that the shear stress τ is related to the shear rate Γ through the
 24 relationship

$$25 \quad \tau = \eta_0 \left(\frac{1 + \sigma_2 \Gamma^2}{1 + \sigma_1 \Gamma^2} \right) \Gamma \quad (\text{PA.128})$$

26 where η_0 is the asymptotic value of the viscosity ($\text{kg m}^{-1} \text{ s}^{-1}$) that results as the shear rate Γ
 27 approaches zero, and σ_1 and σ_2 are constants (s^2). The expression leads to

$$28 \quad \eta_\infty = \eta_0 \left(\frac{\sigma_2}{\sigma_1} \right) \quad (\text{PA.129})$$

29 PA uses values of $\eta_0 = 1.834 \times 10^{-2} \text{ kg m}^{-1} \text{ s}^{-1}$, $\sigma_1 = 1.082 \times 10^{-6} \text{ s}^2$, and $\sigma_2 = 5.410 \times 10^{-7} \text{ s}^2$
 30 (Berglund 1996), from which viscosity in the limit of infinite shear rate is found to be $\eta_\infty =$



1
2 **Figure PA-22. Detail of Rotary Drill String Adjacent to Drill Bit**

3 $9.17 \times 10^{-3} \text{ kg m}^{-1} \text{ s}^{-1}$. The quantity η_{∞} is comparable to the plastic viscosity of the fluid
4 (Chambre Syndicale de la Recherche et de la Production du Petrole et du Gaz Naturel 1982).

5 As previously indicated, different models are used to determine the eroded diameter D_f of a
6 borehole depending on whether flow in the vicinity of the drill collar is laminar or turbulent. The
7 model for borehole erosion in the presence of laminar flow is described next, and then the model
8 for borehole erosion in the presence of turbulent flow is described.

1 **PA-4.5.2.1 Laminar Flow Model**

2 As shown by Savins and Wallick (1966), the shear stresses associated with the laminar helical
 3 flow of a non-Newtonian fluid, as a function of the normalized radius, r , can be expressed as

4
$$\tau(R, r) = \sqrt{\left(\frac{C}{r^2}\right)^2 + \left[\frac{RJ}{2r}(r^2 - \lambda^2)\right]^2} \quad (\text{PA.130})$$

5 for $R_i/R \leq r \leq 1$, where R_i and R are the inner and outer radii within which the flow occurs, as
 6 indicated in Figure PA-22; $\tau(R, \rho)$ is the shear stress ($\text{kg m}^{-1} \text{s}^{-2}$) at a radial distance ΔR beyond
 7 the inner boundary (i.e., at $r = (R_i + \Delta R)/R$); and the variables C , J , and λ depend on R and
 8 satisfy conditions Equation (PA.132) through Equation (PA.134) indicated below. The shear
 9 stress at the outer radius R is given by

10
$$\tau(R, 1) = \sqrt{C^2 + \left[\frac{RJ}{2}(1 - \lambda^2)\right]^2} \quad (\text{PA.131})$$

11 As previously indicated, the borehole radius R is assumed to increase as a result of erosional
 12 processes until a value of R is reached at which $\tau(R, 1)$ is equal to the shear strength of the
 13 waste. In PA, the shear strength of the waste is treated as an uncertain parameter (see
 14 WTAUFAIL in Table PA-19). Computationally, determining the eroded borehole diameter R
 15 associated with a particular value of the waste shear strength requires repeated evaluation of
 16 $\tau(R, 1)$, as indicated in Equation (PA.131), until a value of R is determined for which $\tau(R, 1)$
 17 equals the shear strength.

18 The quantities C , J , and λ must satisfy the following three conditions (Savins and Wallick 1966)
 19 for Equation (PA.131) to be valid:

20
$$\int_{R_i/R}^1 \left(\frac{x^2 - \lambda^2}{\eta x}\right) dx = 0 \quad (\text{PA.132})$$

21
$$C \int_{R_i/R}^1 \frac{dx}{\eta x^3} = \Delta\Omega \quad (\text{PA.133})$$

22
$$J \int_{R_i/R}^1 \left(\frac{(R_i/R)^2 - x^2}{\eta x}\right) \left(\frac{x^2 - \lambda^2}{\eta x}\right) dx = -\frac{2Q}{\pi R^4} \quad (\text{PA.134})$$

23 where η , the drilling fluid viscosity ($\text{kg m}^{-1} \text{s}^{-1}$), is a function of R and ρ ; $\Delta\Omega$ is the drill string
 24 angular velocity (rad s^{-1}); and Q is the drilling fluid flow rate ($\text{m}^3 \text{s}^{-1}$).

1 The viscosity η in Equation (PA.132) through Equation (PA.134) is introduced into the analysis
 2 by assuming that the drilling fluid follows the Oldroyd model for shear stress in Equation
 3 (PA.128). By definition of the viscosity η ,

$$4 \quad \tau = \eta\Gamma \quad (\text{PA.135})$$

5 and from Equation (PA.128)

$$6 \quad \Gamma^2 = \frac{\eta - \eta_0}{\eta_0\sigma_2 - \eta\sigma_1} \quad (\text{PA.136})$$

7 thus the expression in Equation (PA.130) can be reformulated as

$$8 \quad \frac{\eta^2(\eta - \eta_0)^2}{(\eta_0\sigma_2 - \eta\sigma_1)^2} = \left(\frac{C}{r^2}\right)^2 + \left[\frac{RJ}{2r}(r^2 - \lambda^2)\right]^2 \quad (\text{PA.137})$$

9 As discussed by Savins and Wallick (1966) and Berglund (1992), the expressions in Equation
 10 (PA.132) through Equation (PA.134) and Equation (PA.136) can be numerically evaluated to
 11 obtain C , J , and λ for use in Equation (PA.130) and Equation (PA.131). In PA, the drill string
 12 angular velocity $\Delta\Omega$ is treated as an uncertain parameter (see DOMECA in Table PA-19), and

$$13 \quad Q = v(\pi R^2 - \pi R_i^2) \quad (\text{PA.138})$$

14 where $v = 0.7089 \text{ m s}^{-1}$ as used in Equation (PA.126), and η_0 , σ_1 , and σ_2 are defined as in
 15 Equation (PA.128) and Equation (PA.129).

16 PA-4.5.2.2 Turbulent Flow Model

17 The model for borehole erosion in the presence of turbulent flow is now described. Unlike the
 18 theoretically derived relationship for erosion in the presence of laminar flow, the model for
 19 borehole erosion in the presence of turbulent flow is empirical. In particular, pressure loss for
 20 axial flow in an annulus under turbulent flow conditions can be approximated by (Chambre
 21 Syndicale de la Recherche et de la Production du Petrole et du Gaz Naturel 1982)

$$22 \quad \Delta P = \frac{2fL\rho_f v^2}{0.8165D_e} \quad (\text{PA.139})$$

23 where ΔP is the pressure change (Pa), f is the Fanning friction factor (dimensionless), L is the
 24 distance (m) over which pressure change ΔP occurs, and ρ_f , v , and D_e are defined in Equation
 25 (PA.126).

26 For turbulent pipe flow, f is empirically related to the Reynolds number Re defined in Equation
 27 (PA.126) by (Whittaker 1985)

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{f}} = -4 \log_{10} \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{3.72D} + \frac{1.255}{\text{Re} \sqrt{f}} \right) \quad (\text{PA.140})$$

where D is the inside diameter (m) of the pipe and ε is a “roughness term” equal to the average depth (m) of pipe wall irregularities. In the absence of a similar equation for flow in an annulus, Equation (PA.140) is used in PA to define f for use in Equation (PA.139), with D replaced by the effective diameter $D_e = 2(R - R_i)$ and ε equal to the average depth of irregularities in the waste-borehole interface. In the present analysis, $\varepsilon = 0.025$ m (Fox 2008, Table 34), which exceeds the value often selected in calculations involving very rough concrete or riveted steel piping (Streeter 1958).

The pressure change ΔP in Equation (PA.139) and the corresponding shear stress τ at the walls of the annulus are approximately related by

$$(\Delta P) \pi (R^2 - R_i^2) = 2\pi L \tau (R + R_i) \quad (\text{PA.141})$$

where $\pi (R^2 - R_i^2)$ is the cross-sectional area of the annulus (see Figure PA-22) and $2\pi L (R + R_i)$ is the total surface area of the annulus. Rearranging Equation (PA.139) and using the relationship in Equation (PA.135) yields

$$\tau(R) = \frac{f \rho_f v^2}{2(0.8165)} \quad (\text{PA.142})$$

which was used in the 1991 and 1992 WIPP PAs to define the shear stress at the surface of a borehole of radius R . The radius R enters into Equation (PA.132) through Equation (PA.134) through the use of $D = 2(R - R_i)$ in the definition of f in Equation (PA.140). As with laminar flow, the borehole radius R is assumed to increase until a value of $\tau(R)$ is reached that equals the sample value for the shear strength of the waste (i.e., the uncertain parameter WTAUFAIL in Table PA-19). Computationally, the eroded borehole diameter is determined by solving Equation (PA.142) for R under the assumption that $\tau(R)$ equals the assumed shear strength of the waste.

For the CRA-2004 PA, a slight modification to the definition of τ in Equation (PA.142) was made to account for drill string rotation when fluid flow in the vicinity of the drill collars is turbulent (Abdul Khader and Rao 1974; Bilgen, Boulos, and Akgungor 1973). Specifically, an axial flow velocity correction factor (i.e., a rotation factor), F_r , was introduced into the definition of τ . The correction factor F_r is defined by

$$F_r = v_{2100} / v \quad (\text{PA.143})$$

where v_{2100} is the norm of the flow velocity required for the eroded diameters to be the same for turbulent and laminar flow at a Reynolds number of $\text{Re} = 2100$, and is obtained by solving

$$1 \quad \tau_{fail} = \frac{f\rho_f v_{2100}^2}{2(0.8165)} \quad (\text{PA.144})$$

2 for v_{2100} with D in the definition of f in Equation (PA.140) assigned the final diameter value that
 3 results for laminar flow at a Reynolds number of $Re = 2100$ (that is, the D in $D_e = 2(R - R_i) = D$
 4 $- 2R_i$ obtained from Equation (PA.127) with $Re = 2100$). The modified definition of τ is

$$5 \quad \tau(R) = \frac{f\rho_f (F_r v)^2}{2(0.8165)} \quad (\text{PA.145})$$

6 and results in turbulent and laminar flow with the same eroded diameter at a Reynolds number of
 7 2100, where PA assumes that the transition between turbulent and laminar flow takes place.

8 **PA-4.5.2.3 Calculation of R_f**

9 The following algorithm was used to determine the final eroded radius R_f of a borehole and
 10 incorporates a possible transition from turbulent to laminar fluid flow within a borehole:

11 Step 1. Use Equation (PA.127) to determine an initial Reynolds number Re , with R initially set
 12 to the drill-bit radius, $R_0 = 0.31115$ m (Fox 2008, Table 13).

13 Step 2. If $Re < 2100$, the flow is laminar and the procedure in Section PA-4.5.2.1 is used to
 14 determine R_f . Because any increase in the borehole diameter will cause the Reynolds
 15 number to decrease, the flow will remain laminar and there is no need to consider the
 16 possibility of turbulent flow as the borehole diameter increases, with the result that R_f
 17 determined in this step is the final eroded radius of the borehole.

18 Step 3. If $Re \geq 2100$, then the flow is turbulent, and the procedure discussed in Section PA-
 19 4.5.2.2 is used to determine R_f . Once R_f is determined, the associated Reynolds number
 20 Re is recalculated using Equation (PA.127) and $R = R_f$. If the recalculated $Re > 2100$, a
 21 transition from turbulent to laminar flow cannot take place, and the final eroded radius is
 22 R_f determined in this step. If not, go to Step 4.

23 Step 4. If the Reynolds number Re with the new R_f in Step 3 satisfies the inequality $Re \leq 2100$,
 24 a transition from turbulent to laminar flow is assumed to have taken place. In this case,
 25 R_f is recalculated assuming laminar flow, with the outer borehole radius R initially
 26 defined to be the radius associated with $Re = 2100$. In particular, the initial value for R is
 27 given by the radius at which the transition from laminar to turbulent flow takes place:

$$28 \quad R = R_i + \frac{2100\eta_\infty}{2(0.8165)\nu\rho} \quad (\text{PA.146})$$

29 which is obtained from Equation (PA.127) by solving for R with $Re = 2100$. A new
 30 value for R_f is then calculated with the procedure discussed in Section PA-4.5.2.1 for

1 laminar flow, with this value of R_f replacing the value from Step 3 as the final eroded
2 diameter of the borehole.

3 Step 5. Once R_f is known, the amount of waste removed to the surface is determined using
4 Equation (PA.125) with $D_f = 2R_f$.

5 **PA-4.5.3 Additional Information**

6 Additional information on CUTTINGS_S and its use in the CRA-2004 PA to determine cuttings
7 and cavings releases can be found in the CUTTINGS_S user's manual (WIPP Performance
8 Assessment 2003c) and in the analysis package for cuttings and cavings releases (Ismail 2008).

9 **PA-4.6 Spallings to Surface: DRSPALL and CUTTINGS_S**

10 Spallings are waste solids introduced into a borehole by the movement of waste-generated gas
11 towards the lower-pressure borehole. In engineering literature, the term "spalling" describes the
12 dynamic fracture of a solid material, such as rock or metal (Antoun et al. 2003). In WIPP PA,
13 the spallings model describes a series of processes, including tensile failure of solid waste,
14 fluidization of failed material, entrainment into the wellbore flow, and transport up the wellbore
15 to the land surface. Spallings releases could occur when pressure differences between the
16 repository and the wellbore cause solid stresses in the waste exceeding the waste material
17 strength and gas velocities sufficient to mobilize failed waste material.

18 The spallings model is described in the following sections. Presented first are the primary
19 modeling assumptions used to build the conceptual model. Next, the mathematical model and its
20 numerical implementation in the computer code DRSPALL are described. Finally,
21 implementation of the spallings model in WIPP PA by means of the code CUTTINGS_S is
22 discussed.

23 **PA-4.6.1 Summary of Assumptions**

24 Assumptions underlying the spallings model include the future state of the waste, specifications
25 of drilling equipment, and the driller's actions at the time of intrusion. Consistent with the other
26 PA models, the spallings model assumes massive degradation of the emplaced waste through
27 mechanical compaction, corrosion, and biodegradation. Waste is modeled as a homogeneous,
28 isotropic, weakly consolidated material with uniform particle size and shape. The rationale for
29 selecting the spallings model material properties is addressed in detail by Hansen et al. (1997)
30 and Hansen, Pfeifle, and Lord (2003).


31 Drilling equipment specifications, such as bit diameter and drilling mud density, are based on
32 surveys of drillers in the Delaware Basin (Hansen, Pfeifle, and Lord 2003). Assumptions about
33 the driller's actions during the intrusion are conservative. Typically, the drilling mud density is
34 controlled to maintain a slightly "overbalanced" condition so that the mud pressure is always
35 slightly higher than the fluid pressures in the formation. If the borehole suddenly passes through
36 a high-pressure zone, the well can quickly become "underbalanced," with a resulting fluid
37 pressure gradient driving formation fluids into the wellbore. This situation is known as a *kick*
38 and is of great concern to drillers because a violent kick can lead to a blowout of mud, gas, and

1 oil from the wellbore, leading to equipment damage and worker injury. Standard drilling
 2 practice is to watch diligently for kicks. The first indicator of a kick is typically an increase in
 3 mud return rate, leading to an increase in mud pit volume (Frigaard and Humphries 1997).
 4 Downhole monitors detect whether the kick is air, H₂S, or brine. If the kick fluid is air, the
 5 standard procedure is to stop drilling and continue pumping mud in order to circulate the air
 6 pocket out. If the mud return rate continues to grow after drilling has stopped and the driller
 7 believes that the kick is sufficiently large to cause damage, the well may be shut in by closing the
 8 blowout preventer. Once shut in, the well pressure may be bled off slowly and mud weight
 9 eventually increased and circulated to offset the higher formation pressure before drilling
 10 continues. The spallings model simulates an underbalanced system in which a gas kick is
 11 assured, and the kick proceeds with no intervention from the drill operation. Therefore, drilling
 12 and pumping continue during the entire blowout event.


13 PA-4.6.2 Conceptual Model

14 The spallings model calculates transient repository and wellbore fluid flow before, during, and
 15 after a drilling intrusion. To simplify the calculations, both the wellbore and the repository are
 16 modeled by one-dimensional geometries. The wellbore assumes a compressible Newtonian fluid
 17 consisting of a mixture of mud, gas, salt, and waste solids; viscosity of the mixture varies with
 18 the fraction of waste solids in the flow. In the repository, flow is viscous, isothermal,
 19 compressible single-phase (gas) flow in a porous medium.

20 The wellbore and repository flows are coupled by a cylinder of porous media before penetration,
 21 and by a cavity representing the bottom of the borehole after penetration. Schematic diagrams of
 22 the flow geometry prior to and after penetration are shown in Figure PA-23 and Figure PA-24,
 23 respectively. The drill bit moves downward as a function of time, removing salt or waste
 24 material. After penetration, waste solids freed by drilling, tensile failure, and associated
 25 fluidization may enter the wellbore flow stream at the cavity forming the repository-wellbore
 26 boundary.




27
 28 **Figure PA-23. Schematic Diagram of the Flow Geometry Prior to Repository Penetration**



1
2 **Figure PA-24. Schematic Diagram of the Flow Geometry After Repository Penetration**

3 **PA-4.6.2.1 Wellbore Flow Model**

4 Flow in the well is modeled as a one-dimensional pipe flow with cross-sectional areas
 5 corresponding to the appropriate flow area at a given position in the well, as shown in Figure
 6 PA-25 and Figure PA-26. This model is conceptually similar to that proposed by Podio and
 7 Yang (1986) for use in the oil and gas industry. Drilling mud is added at the wellbore entrance
 8 by the pump. Flow through the drill bit is treated as a choke with cross-sectional area
 9 appropriate for the bit nozzle area. At the annulus output to the surface, the mixture is ejected at
 10 a constant atmospheric pressure. The gravitational body force acts in its appropriate direction
 11 based on position before or after the bit.



12
13 **Figure PA-25. Effective Wellbore Flow Geometry Before Bit Penetration**




Figure PA-26. Effective Wellbore Flow Geometry After Bit Penetration

Prior to drill bit penetration into the repository, gas from the repository can flow through drilling-damaged salt into the well. After penetration, the cavity at the bottom of the wellbore couples the wellbore flow and the repository flow models; gas and waste material can exit the repository domain into the cavity. The cavity radius increases as waste materials are moved into the wellbore.

The system of equations representing flow in the wellbore consists of four equations for mass conservation, one for each phase (salt, waste, mud, and gas); one equation for conservation of total momentum; two equations relating gas and mud density to pressure; the definition of density for the fluid mixture; and one constraint imposed by the fixed volume of the wellbore. The conservation of mass and momentum is described by

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t}(\rho_q V_q) + \frac{\partial}{\partial z}(\rho_q V_q u) = S_q \quad (\text{PA.147})$$

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t}(\rho V u) + \frac{\partial}{\partial z}(\rho V u^2) = -V \left(\frac{\partial P}{\partial z} - \rho g + F \right) + S_{mom} \quad (\text{PA.148})$$

where

- q = phase (w for waste, s for salt, m for mud, and g for gas)
- V_q = volume (m^3) of phase q
- V = total volume (m^3)
- ρ_q = density (kg/m^3) of phase q , constant for salt and waste (2,180 and 2,650 kg/m^3 , respectively) and pressure-dependent for gas and mud (see Equation (PA.149) and Equation (PA.150))
- ρ = density of fluid mixture (kg/m^3) determined by Equation (PA.151)
- u = velocity (m/s) of fluid mixture in wellbore
- t = time (s)
- z = distance (m) from inlet at top of well
- S_q = rate of mass (kg/s) in phase q entering and exiting wellbore domain at position z (Equation (PA.162))

- 1 S_{mom} = rate of momentum (kg m/s²) entering and exiting wellbore domain at position z
 2 (Equation (PA.165))
 3 P = pressure (Pa) at position z
 4 g = standard gravity (9.8067 kg/m/s²)
 5 F = friction loss using pipe flow model (kg/m²/s²) determined by Equation (PA.153)

6 Gas is treated as isothermal and ideal, so the pressure and density are related by Boyle's law:

$$7 \quad \frac{\rho}{\rho_{g,0}} = \frac{P}{P_{atm}} \quad (\text{PA.149})$$

8 where $\rho_{g,0}$ is the density of H₂ gas at atmospheric pressure and 298 K (8.24182×10^{-2} kg/m³).

9 The mud is assumed to be a compressible fluid, so

$$10 \quad \rho_m = \rho_{m,0} [1 + c_m (P - P_{atm})] \quad (\text{PA.150})$$

11 where $\rho_{m,0}$ is the density of the mud at atmospheric pressure (1,210 kg/m³) and c_m is the
 12 compressibility of the mud (3.1×10^{-10} Pa⁻¹).

13 The density of the fluid mixture is determined from the densities and volumes occupied by the
 14 phases:

$$15 \quad \rho = \frac{\rho_g V_g + \rho_m V_m + \rho_s V_s + \rho_w V_w}{V} \quad (\text{PA.151})$$

16 The volume of each phase is constrained by the fixed total volume of the wellbore:

$$17 \quad V = V_g + V_m + V_s + V_w \quad (\text{PA.152})$$

18 The friction loss is a standard formulation for pipe flow (Fox and McDonald 1985), where the
 19 head loss per unit length is given as

$$20 \quad F = \frac{\Delta P}{L} = \frac{f \rho u^2}{2d_h} \quad (\text{PA.153})$$

21 where the hydraulic diameter d_h is given by

$$22 \quad d_h = \frac{4A}{\pi(D_i + D_o)} \quad (\text{PA.154})$$

23 In PA, $D_o = 0.31115$ m throughout the domain. From the bit to the top of the collar, $D_i =$
 24 0.2032 m; above the collar, $D_i = 0.1143$ m. The area A is calculated as the area of the annulus
 25 between the outer and inner radii:

1
$$A = \frac{\pi}{4} (D_o^2 - D_i^2) \quad (\text{PA.155})$$

2 Thus, $d_h = 0.108$ m from the bit to the top of the collar, and $d_h = 0.197$ m above the collar.

3 The Darcy friction factor f in Equation (PA.153) is determined by the method of Colebrook (Fox
4 and MacDonald 1985). In the laminar regime, which is assumed to be characterized by
5 Reynolds numbers below 2100 (Walker 1976),

6
$$f = \frac{64}{\text{Re}} \quad (\text{PA.156})$$

7 and in the turbulent regime ($\text{Re} > 2100$)

8
$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{f}} = -2.0 \log_{10} \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{3.72 d_h} + \frac{2.51}{\text{Re} \sqrt{f}} \right) \quad (\text{PA.157})$$

9 where $\text{Re} = \frac{u \rho d_h}{\eta}$ is the Reynolds number of the mixture, and η is the viscosity calculated in
10 Equation (PA.158), below. As the wellbore mixture becomes particle-laden, the viscosity of the
11 mixture is determined from an empirical relationship developed for proppant slurry flows in
12 channels for the oil and gas industry (Barree and Conway 1995). Viscosity is computed by an
13 approximate slurry formula based on the volume fraction of waste solids:

14
$$\eta = \eta_0 \left(1 - \frac{w}{w_{\max}} \right)^s \quad (\text{PA.158})$$

15 where η_0 is a base mixture viscosity (9.17×10^{-3} Pa s), $w = V_w/V$ is the current volume fraction
16 of waste solids, w_{\max} is an empirically determined maximal volume fraction above which flow is
17 choked (0.615), and s is an empirically determined constant (-1.5) (Hansen, Pfeifle, and Lord
18 2003).

19 **PA-4.6.2.1.1 Wellbore Initial Conditions**

20 Initial conditions in the wellbore approximate mixture flow conditions just prior to waste
21 penetration. The wellbore is assumed to contain only mud and salt. Initial conditions for the
22 pressure, fluid density, volume fractions of mud and salt, and the mixture velocity are set by the
23 following algorithm:

24 Step 1. Set pressure in the wellbore to hydrostatic: $P(z) = P_{\text{atm}} - \rho_m g z$.

25 Step 2. Set mud density using Equation (PA.150).

- 1 Step 3. Set mixture velocity: $u(z) = R_m/A(z)$, where R_m is the volume flow rate of the
 2 pump (0.0202 m³/s), and $A(z)$ is the cross-sectional area of the wellbore.
- 3 Step 4. Set volume of salt in each cell: $V_{s,i} = R_{drill}A_{bit}\Delta z_i/u_i$, where R_{drill} is the rate of
 4 drilling (0.004445 m/s), $A_{bit} = \pi d_{bit}^2 / 4$ is the area of the bottom of the
 5 wellbore, and d_{bit} is the diameter of the bit (0.31115 m).
- 6 Step 5. Set volume fraction of mud in each cell: $V_{m,i} = V_i - V_{s,i}$.
- 7 Step 6. Recalculate mixture density using Equation (PA.151), assuming no waste or gas
 8 in the wellbore.

9 The initial conditions set by this algorithm approximate a solution to the wellbore flow (Equation
 10 (PA.147) and Equation (PA.148)) for constant flow of mud and salt in the well. The
 11 approximation rapidly converges to a solution for wellbore flow if steady-state conditions are
 12 maintained (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003d).

13 PA-4.6.2.1.2 Wellbore Boundary Conditions

14 For simplicity, DRSPALL does not model flow of mud down the pipe to the bit. Mass can enter
 15 the wellbore below the drill bit and exit at the wellbore outlet. Below the bit, mud, salt, gas, and
 16 waste can enter the wellbore. PA assumes a constant volume of mud flow down the drilling
 17 pipe; therefore, the source term for mud, $S_{m,in}$, is set by the volumetric flow rate of the pump R_m
 18 (0.0202 m³/s) and the density of the mud at the bottom of the wellbore:

$$19 \quad S_{m,in} = \rho_m R_m \quad (\text{PA.159})$$

20 Until the drill bit penetrates the repository, salt enters the wellbore at a constant rate:

$$21 \quad S_{s,in} = \rho_s R_{drill} A_{bit} \quad (\text{PA.160})$$

22 Additional mass enters the wellbore by gas flow from the repository ($S_{gas,in}$) and spalling of
 23 waste material ($S_{w,in}$); these mass sources are discussed in Section PA-4.6.2.3. The outlet of the
 24 wellbore is set to atmospheric pressure. Mass exiting the wellbore is determined from the
 25 mixture velocity, the area of the outlet A_{out} (0.066 m²), and the density and volume fraction of
 26 each phase at the outlet of the wellbore:

$$27 \quad S_{q,out} = \rho u_{out} A_{out} \frac{V_q}{V} \quad (\text{PA.161})$$

28 Finally, the net change in mass and momentum for phase q is

$$29 \quad S_q = S_{q,in} - S_{q,out} \quad (\text{PA.162})$$

$$1 \quad S_{mom,in} = \frac{\rho_{0,m}}{A_p} R_{mudpump} \quad (\text{PA.163})$$

2 The outlet of the wellbore is set to atmospheric pressure. Momentum exiting the wellbore is
3 determined from the fluid velocity and the area of the outlet A_{out} (0.066 m^2):

$$4 \quad S_{mom,out} = -\rho A_{out} u_{out}^2 \quad (\text{PA.164})$$

5 No momentum is added by mass flow into the wellbore from the repository; thus

$$6 \quad S_{mom} = S_{mom,in} - S_{mom,out} \quad (\text{PA.165})$$

7 **PA-4.6.2.2 Repository Flow Model**

8 The repository is modeled as a radially symmetric domain. A spherical coordinate system is
9 used for this presentation and for most DRSPALL calculations. In a few circumstances,
10 cylindrical coordinates are used in PA calculations, where spall volumes are large enough that
11 spherical coordinates are not representative of the physical process (Lord, Rudeen, and Hansen
12 2003). Cylindrical coordinates are also available; the design document for DRSPALL (WIPP
13 Performance Assessment 2003e) provides details on implementing the repository flow model in
14 cylindrical coordinates.

15 Flow in the repository is transient, compressible, viscous, and single-phase (gas) flow in a porous
16 medium. Gas is treated as isothermal and ideal. The equations governing flow in the repository
17 are the equation of state for ideal gases (written in the form of Boyle's law for an ideal gas at
18 constant temperature), conservation of mass, and Darcy's law with the Forchheimer correction
19 (Aronson 1986, Whitaker 1996):

$$20 \quad \frac{\rho_g}{\rho_{g,0}} = \frac{P}{P_{atm}} \quad (\text{PA.166})$$

$$21 \quad \phi \frac{\partial \rho_g}{\partial t} + \nabla \cdot (\rho_g u) = 0 \quad (\text{PA.167})$$

$$22 \quad \nabla P = -\frac{\eta_g}{k} (1 + F) u \quad (\text{PA.168})$$

23 where

24 P = pressure in pore space (Pa)

25 ρ_g = density of gas (kg/m^3)

26 u = velocity of gas in pore space (m/s)

27 ϕ = porosity of the solid (unitless)

28 η_g = gas viscosity ($8.934 \times 10^{-6} \text{ Pa s}$)

1 k = permeability of waste solid (m^2)
 2 F = Forchheimer correction (unitless)

3 The Forchheimer correction is included in Equation (PA.168) to account for inertia in the
 4 flowing gas, which becomes important at high gas velocities (Ruth and Ma 1992). When the
 5 Forchheimer coefficient is zero, Equation (PA.168) reduces to Darcy's law. A derivation of
 6 Equation (PA.168) from the Navier-Stokes equations is given by Whitaker (1996); the derivation
 7 suggests that F is a linear function of gas velocity for a wide range of Reynolds numbers.

8 In PA, the Forchheimer correction takes the form

$$9 \quad F = \beta_{nd} \rho u \quad (\text{PA.169})$$

10 where β_{nd} is the non-Darcy coefficient, which depends on material properties such as the
 11 tortuosity and area of internal flow channels, and is empirically determined (Belhaj et al. 2003).
 12 DRSPALL uses a value from Li et al. (2001) that measured high-velocity nitrogen flow through
 13 porous sandstone wafers, giving the result

$$14 \quad \beta_{nd} = \frac{1.15 \times 10^{-6}}{k \phi} \quad (\text{PA.170})$$

15 Equation (PA.166) through Equation (PA.168) combines into a single equation for pressure in
 16 the porous solid:

$$17 \quad \frac{\partial P}{\partial t} = \frac{k'}{2\phi\eta_g} \nabla^2 P^2 + \frac{1}{2\phi\eta_g} \nabla P^2 \cdot \nabla k' \quad (\text{PA.171})$$

18 where

$$19 \quad k' = \frac{k}{1+F} = \frac{k}{1+\beta_{nd} \rho u} \quad (\text{PA.172})$$

20 and the Laplacian operator in a radially symmetric coordinate system is given by

$$21 \quad \nabla^2 = \frac{1}{r^{n-1}} \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left(r^{n-1} \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \right) \quad (\text{PA.173})$$

22 where $n = 2$ and $n = 3$ for polar and spherical coordinates, respectively.

23 In DRSPALL, the permeability of the waste solid is a subjectively uncertain parameter that is
 24 constant for waste material that has not failed and fluidized. In a region of waste that has failed,
 25 the permeability increases as the waste fluidizes by a factor of $1 + F_f$, where F_f is the fraction of
 26 failed material that has fluidized and is based on the fluidization relaxation time. This
 27 approximately accounts for the material bulking as it fluidizes.

1 Initial pressure in the repository is set to a constant value P_{ff} . A no-flow boundary condition is
 2 imposed at the outer boundary ($r = R$):

$$3 \qquad \qquad \qquad \nabla P(R) = 0 \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{(PA.174)}$$

4 At the inner boundary ($r = r_{cav}$), the pressure is specified as $P(r_{cav}, t) = P_{cav}(t)$, where $P_{cav}(t)$ is
 5 defined in the next section. The cavity radius r_{cav} increases as drilling progresses and waste
 6 material fails and moves into the wellbore; calculation of r_{cav} is described in Section PA-
 7 4.6.2.3.3.

8 **PA-4.6.2.3 Wellbore to Repository Coupling**

9 Prior to penetration, a cylinder of altered-permeability salt material with diameter equal to the
 10 drill bit is assumed to connect the bottom of the wellbore to the repository. At the junction of the
 11 repository and this cylinder of salt, a small, artificial cavity is used to determine the boundary
 12 pressure for repository flow. After penetration, the cavity merges with the bottom of the
 13 wellbore to connect the wellbore to the repository.

14 **PA-4.6.2.3.1 Flow Prior to Penetration**

15 The cylinder of salt connecting the wellbore to the repository is referred to as the DDZ in Figure
 16 PA-23. The permeability of the DDZ, k_{DDZ} , is $1 \times 10^{-14} \text{ m}^2$. The spillings model starts with the
 17 bit 0.15 m above the repository; the bit advances at a rate of $R_{drill} = 0.004445 \text{ m/s}$.

18 To couple the repository to the DDZ, the model uses an artificial pseudo-cavity in the small
 19 hemispherical region of the repository below the wellbore with the same surface area as the
 20 bottom of the wellbore (Figure PA-26). The pseudo-cavity is a numerical device that smoothes
 21 the discontinuities in pressure and flow that would otherwise occur upon bit penetration of the
 22 repository. The pseudo-cavity contains only gas, and is initially at repository pressure. The
 23 mass of gas in the cavity m_{cav} is given by

$$24 \qquad \qquad \qquad \frac{dm_{cav}}{dt} = S_{rep} - S_{g,in} \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{(PA.175)}$$

25 where

26 S_{rep} = gas flow from repository into pseudo-cavity (kg/s); see Equation (PA.176)
 27 $S_{g, in}$ = gas flow from pseudo-cavity through DDZ into wellbore (kg/s); see Equation
 28 (PA.177)

29 Flow from the repository into the pseudo-cavity is given by

$$30 \qquad \qquad \qquad S_{rep} = \rho_{g,rep} u_{rep} \phi A_{cav} \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{(PA.176)}$$

31 where

- 1 $\rho_{g,rep}$ = gas density in repository at cavity surface (kg/m³) = $\rho_g(r_{cav})$
 2 u_{rep} = gas velocity (m/s) in repository at cavity surface = $u(r_{cav})$
 3 ϕ = porosity of waste (unitless)
 4 A_{cav} = surface area of hemispherical part of the cavity (m²)
 5 = $\pi d_{bit}^2 / 4$, where d_{bit} is the diameter of the bit (m)

6 Flow out of the pseudo-cavity through the DDZ and into the wellbore is modeled as steady-state
 7 using Darcy's Law:

8
$$S_{g,in} = \frac{k_{DDZ} \pi M_w}{2 \eta_g RTL} \left(\frac{d_{bit}}{2} \right)^2 (P_{cav}^2 - P_{BH}^2) \quad (\text{PA.177})$$

9 where

- 10 η_g = viscosity of H₂ gas (8.934 × 10⁻⁶ Pa s)
 11 M_w = molecular weight of H₂ gas (0.00202 kg / mol)
 12 R = ideal gas constant (8.314 J/mol K)
 13 T = repository temperature (constant at 300 K (27 °C; 80 °F))
 14 L = length (m) of DDZ (from bottom of borehole to top of repository)
 15 P_{cav} = pressure in pseudo-cavity (Pa)
 16 P_{BH} = pressure at bottom of wellbore (Pa)

17 A justification for using this steady-state equation is provided in the design document for
 18 DRSPALL (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003e). The pseudo-cavity is initially filled with
 19 gas at a pressure of P_{ff} . The boundary pressure on the well side (P_{BH}) is the pressure
 20 immediately below the bit, determined by Equation (PA.147) and Equation (PA.148). The
 21 pressure in the pseudo-cavity (P_{cav}) is determined by the ideal gas law:

22
$$P_{cav} = \frac{m_{cav} R_0 T}{V_{cav}} \quad (\text{PA.178})$$

23 where m_{cav} is the number of moles of gas in the cavity and the cavity volume V_{cav} is given by

24
$$V_{cav} = \frac{\pi d_{bit}^3}{24\sqrt{2}} \quad (\text{PA.179})$$

25 In PA, the drilling rate into the ground is assumed constant at 0.004445 m/s; thus $L = L_i -$
 26 $0.004445t$ until $L = 0$, at which time the bit penetrates the waste. The term L_i is the distance from
 27 the bit to the waste at the start of calculation (0.15 m).

1 **PA-4.6.2.3.2 Flow After Penetration**

2 After waste penetration, the bottom of the wellbore is modeled as a hemispherical cavity in the
 3 repository, the radius of which grows as drilling progresses and as material fails and moves into
 4 the cavity. Gas, drilling mud, and waste are assumed to thoroughly mix in this cavity; the
 5 resulting mixture flows around the drill collars and then up the annulus between the wellbore and
 6 the drill string. Gas flow from the repository into the cavity is given by Equation (PA.176);
 7 however, A_{cav} is now dependent on the increasing radius of the cavity (see Section PA-
 8 4.6.2.3.3). Mudflow into the cavity from the wellbore is given by Equation (PA.159). Waste
 9 flow into the cavity is possible if the waste fails and fluidizes; these mechanisms are discussed in
 10 Section PA-4.6.2.3.4 and Section PA-4.6.2.3.5. Pressure in the cavity is equal to that at the
 11 bottom of the wellbore, and is computed by Equation (PA.178).

12 **PA-4.6.2.3.3 Cavity Volume After Penetration**

13 The cylindrical cavity of increasing depth created by drilling is mapped to a hemispherical
 14 volume at the bottom of the wellbore to form the cavity. This mapping maintains equal surface
 15 areas in order to preserve the gas flux from the repository to the wellbore. The cavity radius
 16 from drilling is thus

17
$$r_{drill} = \sqrt{\frac{d_{bit}^2 + 4d_{bit}\Delta H}{8}} \quad (\text{PA.180})$$

18 where ΔH is the depth of the drilled cylinder. In PA, the drilling rate into the ground is assumed
 19 constant at 0.004445 m/s; thus $\Delta H = 0.004445t$ until $\Delta H = H$, the height of compacted waste (m).
 20 Since the initial height of the repository is 3.96 m, H is computed from the porosity ϕ by
 21 $H = 3.96(1 - \phi_0) / (1 - \phi)$, where ϕ_0 is the initial porosity of a waste-filled room.

22 The cavity radius r_{cav} is increased by the radius of failed and fluidized material r_{fluid} , which is
 23 the depth to which fluidization has occurred beyond the drilled radius. That is,

24
$$r_{cav} = r_{drill} + r_{fluid} \quad (\text{PA.181})$$

25 **PA-4.6.2.3.4 Waste Failure**

26 Gas flow from the waste creates a pressure gradient within the waste, which induces elastic
 27 stresses in addition to the far-field confining stress. These stresses may lead to tensile failure of
 28 the waste material, an assumed prerequisite to spallings releases. While the fluid calculations
 29 using Equation (PA.166) through Equation (PA.168) are fully transient, the elastic stress
 30 calculations are assumed to be quasi-static (i.e., sound-speed phenomena in the solid are
 31 ignored). Elastic effective stresses are (Timoshenko and Goodier 1970)

32
$$\sigma_r(r) = \sigma_{sr}(r) + \sigma_{ff} \left(1 - \left(\frac{r_{cav}}{r} \right)^3 \right) + P(r_{cav}) \left(\frac{r_{cav}}{r} \right)^3 - \beta P(r) \quad (\text{PA.182})$$

$$\sigma_{\theta}(r) = \sigma_{s\theta}(r) + \sigma_{ff} \left[1 + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{r_{cav}}{r} \right)^2 \right] - \frac{P(r_{cav})}{2} \left(\frac{r_{cav}}{r} \right)^3 - \beta P(r) \quad (\text{PA.183})$$

2 where β is Biot's constant (assumed here to be 1.0) and σ_{ff} is the confining far-field stress
3 (assumed constant at 14.8 MPa).

4 The flow-related radial and tangential stresses (σ_{sr} and $\sigma_{s\theta}$, respectively) are computed by
5 equations analogous to differential thermal expansion (Timoshenko and Goodier 1970):

$$\sigma_{sr}(r) = \frac{2\beta}{r^3} \left(\frac{1-2\nu}{1-\nu} \right) \int_{r_{cav}}^r (P(s) - P_{ff}) s^2 ds \quad (\text{PA.184})$$

$$\sigma_{s\theta}(r) = -\beta \left(\frac{1-2\nu}{1-\nu} \right) \left(\frac{1}{r^3} \int_{r_{cav}}^r (P(s) - P_{ff}) s^2 ds - (P(r) - P_{ff}) \right) \quad (\text{PA.185})$$

8 where P_{ff} is the initial repository pressure and ν is Poisson's ratio (0.38).

9 Since stresses are calculated as quasi-static, an initial stress reduction caused by an instantaneous
10 pressure drop at the cavity face propagates instantaneously through the waste. The result of
11 calculating Equation (PA.182) can be an instantaneous early-time tensile failure of the entire
12 repository if the boundary pressure is allowed to change suddenly. This is nonphysical and
13 merely a result of the quasi-static stress assumption, combined with the true transient pore
14 pressure and flow-related stress equations. To prevent this nonphysical behavior, tensile failure
15 propagation is limited by a tensile failure velocity (1000 m/s; see Hansen et al. 1997). This limit
16 has no quantitative effect on results, other than to prevent nonphysical tensile failure.

17 At the cavity face, Equation (PA.182) and Equation (PA.184) evaluate to zero, consistent with
18 the quasi-static stress assumption. This implies that the waste immediately at the cavity face
19 cannot experience tensile failure; however, tensile failure may occur at some distance into the
20 waste material. Consequently, the radial effective stress σ_r is averaged from the cavity boundary
21 into the waste over a characteristic length L_t (0.02 m). If this average radial stress $\bar{\sigma}_r$ is tensile
22 and its magnitude exceeds the material tensile strength ($|\bar{\sigma}_r| > \text{TENSLSTR}$), the waste is no
23 longer capable of supporting radial stress and fails, permitting fluidization. The waste tensile
24 strength is an uncertain parameter in the analysis (see TENSLSTR in Table PA-15).

25 Equation (PA.183) and Equation (PA.185) evaluate shear stresses in the waste. DRSPALL does
26 not use the waste shear stresses to calculate waste failure for spall releases. These stresses are
27 included in this discussion for completeness.

28 **PA-4.6.2.3.5 Waste Fluidization**

29 Failed waste material is assumed to be disaggregated, but not in motion; it remains as a porous,
30 bedded material lining the cavity face, and is treated as a continuous part of the repository from
31 the perspective of the porous flow calculations. The bedded material may be mobilized and enter
32 the wellbore if the gas velocity in the failed material (see Equation (PA.168)) exceeds a

1 minimum fluidization velocity, U_f . The minimum fluidization velocity is determined by solving
 2 the following quadratic equation (Cherimisinoff and Cherimisinoff 1984, Ergun 1952)

$$3 \quad \frac{1.75 \left(\frac{d_p U_f \rho_g}{\eta_g} \right)^2}{a \phi^3} + 150 \left(\frac{1 - \phi}{a^2 \phi^3} \right) \left(\frac{d_p U_f \rho_g}{\eta_g} \right) = \frac{d_p^3 \rho_g (\rho_w - \rho_g) g}{\eta_g^2} \quad (\text{PA.186})$$

4 where

5 a = particle shape factor (unitless)

6 d_p = particle diameter (m)

7 Fluidization occurs in the failed material to the depth at which gas velocity does not exceed the
 8 fluidization velocity; this depth is denoted by r_{fluid} and is used to determine cavity radius
 9 (Section PA-4.6.2.3.3). If fluidization occurs, the gas and waste particles mix into the cavity at
 10 the bottom of the wellbore. Because this mixing cannot be instantaneous, which would be
 11 nonphysical (much as allowing instantaneous tensile failure propagation would be nonphysical),
 12 a small artificial relaxation time, equal to the cavity radius r_{cav} divided by the superficial gas
 13 velocity $u(r_{cav})$, is imposed upon the mixing phenomenon. The fluidized material is released
 14 into the cavity uniformly over the relaxation time.

15 **PA-4.6.3 Numerical Model**

16 The numerical model implements the conceptual and mathematical models described above
 17 (Section PA-4.6.2). Both the wellbore and the repository domain calculations use time-marching
 18 finite differences. These are part of a single computational loop and therefore use the same time
 19 step. The differencing schemes for the wellbore and repository calculations are similar, but not
 20 identical.

21 **PA-4.6.3.1 Numerical Method—Wellbore**

22 The wellbore is zoned for finite differencing, as illustrated in Figure PA-27, which shows zones,
 23 zone indices, grid boundaries, volumes, and interface areas. The method is Eulerian: zone
 24 boundaries are fixed, and fluid flows across the interfaces by advection. Quantities are zone-
 25 centered and integration is explicit in time.

26 To reduce computation time, an iterative scheme is employed to update the wellbore flow
 27 solution. The finite-difference scheme first solves Equation (PA.147) and Equation (PA.148) for
 28 the mass of each phase in each grid cell and the momentum in each grid cell.

29 The updated solution to Equation (PA.147) and Equation (PA.148) is then used to compute the
 30 volume of each phase, the pressure, and the mixture velocity in each grid cell.

31 All of the materials (mud, salt, gas, and waste) are assumed to move together as a mixture.
 32 Because fluid moves through the cell boundaries, the calculation requires a value for the flow
 33 through each cell boundary during a time step. These values are obtained by averaging the fluid
 34 velocities at the zone centers, given by




Figure PA-27. Finite-Difference Zoning for Wellbore

$$u_{i+1/2} = \frac{1}{2} (u_{i+1}^{n-1} + u_i^{n-1}) \quad (\text{PA.187})$$

The mass transport equation, prior to any volume change, becomes

$$V_i \rho_i^* = V_i \rho_i^{n-1} - (A_{i+1/2} \rho_{i+1/2}^{n-1} u_{i+1/2} - A_{i-1/2} \rho_{i-1/2}^{n-1} u_{i-1/2}) \Delta t + S_{m,i} \Delta t \quad (\text{PA.188})$$

Here, the source terms $S_{m,i}$ correspond to material entering or exiting at the pump, cavity, and surface. The “upwind” zone-centered densities are used for the interfaces values, $\rho_{i+1/2}^{n-1}$ and $\rho_{i-1/2}^{n-1}$.

Finally, any changed volumes are incorporated and numerical mass diffusion is added for stability:

$$V_i \rho_i^n = V_i \rho_i^* + \Delta z_i s \sum_{q \in \{w, m, s, g\}} \zeta_q D_{i,q} \quad (\text{PA.189})$$

where

$$D_{i,q} = \left[A_{i+1/2} \left((\rho f_q)_{i+1}^{n-1} - (\rho f_q)_i^{n-1} \right) - A_{i-1/2} \left((\rho f_q)_i^{n-1} - (\rho f_q)_{i-1}^{n-1} \right) \right]$$

and ζ_q is the diffusion coefficient for phase q . The density ρf_q for phase q being diffused is calculated from the mixture density, ρ , and the mass fraction, f_q , of phase q in the referenced cell ($f_q = \rho V_{q,i} / \rho V_i$). The numerical diffusion coefficient ζ_q is chosen empirically for stability. Separate diffusion coefficients could be used for the different materials (mud, gas, etc.); however, sufficient stability is obtained by diffusing only mud and salt using the same coefficient ($\zeta_m = \zeta_s = 0.0001$ and $\zeta_w = \zeta_g = 0$).

1 Momentum is differenced as

$$\begin{aligned}
 V_i (\rho u)_i^* &= V_i (\rho u)_i^{n-1} - \Delta t \left(A_{i+1/2} (\rho u)_{i+1/2}^{n-1} u_{i+1/2} - A_{i-1/2} (\rho u)_{i-1/2}^{n-1} u_{i-1/2} \right) \\
 &- V_i \Delta t \left(\frac{P_{i+1}^{n-1} - P_{i-1}^{n-1}}{2\Delta z} - \rho_i^{n-1} g + F_i^{n-1} \right) + S_{mom,i} \Delta t
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{PA.190}$$

3 where the dissipation term F_i^{n-1} is obtained from Equation (PA.153) and is constrained by

$$|F_i^{n-1}| \leq \left| \frac{P_{i+1}^{n-1} - P_{i-1}^{n-1}}{2\Delta z} - \rho_i^{n-1} g \right|
 \tag{PA.191}$$

5 and the sign of F_i^{n-1} is chosen to oppose flow. Finally, numerical momentum diffusion is added
 6 without distinguishing between phases in the mixture (ρ is the mixture density):

$$V_i (\rho u)_i^n = V_i (\rho u)_i^* - \zeta_p \Delta x_i \left[A_{i+1/2} \left((\rho u)_{i+1}^{n-1} - (\rho u)_i^{n-1} \right) - A_{i-1/2} \left((\rho u)_i^{n-1} - (\rho u)_{i-1}^{n-1} \right) \right]
 \tag{PA.192}$$

9 In PA, $\zeta_p = 0.01$.

10 Equation (PA.150), Equation (PA.151), and Equation (PA.152) comprise a simultaneous system
 11 of equations for the volumes of gas and mud and the pressure in the wellbore. The volumes of
 12 salt and waste are known, since they are considered incompressible. Equation (PA.150) and
 13 Equation (PA.151) combine into a quadratic equation for gas volume:

$$aV_g^2 + bV_g - c = 0
 \tag{PA.193}$$

15 where

$$\begin{aligned}
 a &= 1 - c_m P_{atm}, \\
 b &= c_m P_{atm} V_{g,0} - aV^* + V_{m,0}, \\
 c &= V^* c_m P_{atm} V_{g,0}, \\
 V_{g,0} &= m_g / \rho_{g,0}, \\
 V_{m,0} &= m_m / \rho_{m,0}, \\
 V^* &= V_m + V_g = V - V_s - V_w
 \end{aligned}$$

18 The volume of the mud phase follows from Equation (PA.150) and the pressure from Equation
 19 (PA.149). Once the mixture density in each cell (ρ_i) is updated by Equation (PA.151), the
 20 mixture velocity in each cell (u_i) is computed by

1
$$u_i = \frac{(\rho u)_i}{\rho_i} \tag{PA.194}$$

2 where the quantity ρu is determined by Equation (PA.192).

3 **PA-4.6.3.2 Numerical Method—Repository**

4 The time integration method for the repository flow is implicit, with spatial derivatives
 5 determined after the time increment. This method requires the inversion of a matrix for the
 6 entire repository, which is usually straightforward. The implicit scheme is unconditionally
 7 stable. However, it is still necessary to use small time steps to ensure gradient accuracy.

8 The numerical method follows Press et al. (1989). For simplicity, the equations are presented for
 9 constant zone size, although DRSPALL implements difference equations that allow for a
 10 variable zone size. Near the cavity, a small, constant zone size is used, and then zones are
 11 allowed to grow geometrically as the outer boundary is approached. This procedure greatly
 12 increases computational efficiency without sacrificing accuracy in the region of interest.

13 For an isothermal ideal gas, the pseudopressure ψ is defined as

14
$$\psi = \frac{P^2}{\eta} \tag{PA.195}$$

15 Using Equation (PA.195), Equation (PA.171) is expanded to

16
$$\frac{\partial \psi}{\partial t} = D(\psi) \left[\frac{\partial^2 \psi}{\partial r^2} + \frac{(m-1)}{r} \frac{\partial \psi}{\partial r} + \frac{1}{k'} \frac{\partial k'}{\partial r} \frac{\partial \psi}{\partial r} \right] \tag{PA.196}$$

17 where $D(\psi) = \frac{k'}{\phi} \sqrt{\frac{\psi}{\eta}} = \frac{k'P}{\phi\eta}$; Equation (PA.196) is then converted to a difference equation by

18 treating $D(\psi)$ as constant over a zone, using its zone-centered value at the current time D_j^n :

19
$$\frac{\psi_j^{n+1} - \psi_j^n}{\Delta t} = \frac{D_j^n}{\Delta r} \left[\frac{\psi_{j+1}^{n+1} - 2\psi_j^{n+1} + \psi_{j-1}^{n+1}}{\Delta r} + \frac{(m-1)(\psi_{j+1}^{n+1} - \psi_{j-1}^{n+1})}{2r_j} \right. \\ \left. + \frac{(k'_{j+1}{}^{n+1} - k'_{j-1}{}^{n+1})(\psi_{j+1}^{n+1} - \psi_{j-1}^{n+1})}{4k'\Delta r} \right] \tag{PA.197}$$

20 Collecting similar terms in ψ leads to a tridiagonal system:

21
$$-\alpha_1 \psi_{j-1}^{n+1} + (1 + 2\alpha) \psi_j^{n+1} - \alpha_2 \psi_{j+1}^{n+1} = \psi_j^n, j = 1, 2, \dots \tag{PA.198}$$

1 where

$$2 \quad \alpha = \frac{D_j^n \Delta t}{(\Delta r)^2}$$

$$3 \quad \alpha_1 = \left(\frac{D_j^n}{\Delta r} \right) \left(\frac{1}{\Delta r} - \frac{(m-1)}{2r_j} - \frac{k_{i+1}'^{n+1} - k_{i-1}'^{n+1}}{4k' \Delta r} \right) \Delta t$$

$$4 \quad \alpha_2 = \left(\frac{D_j^n}{\Delta r} \right) \left(\frac{1}{\Delta r} + \frac{(m-1)}{2r_j} + \frac{k_{i+1}'^{n+1} - k_{i-1}'^{n+1}}{4k' \Delta r} \right) \Delta t$$

5 Equation (PA.198) may be solved by simplified LU decomposition, as presented in Press et al.
6 (1989).

7 The boundary condition at the inner radius is implemented by noting that for $i = 1$ (the first intact
8 or nonfluidized cell), ψ_{i-1} is the cavity pseudopressure, which is known, and therefore can be
9 moved to the right-hand side of Equation (PA.198):

$$10 \quad (1 + 2\alpha)\psi_1^{n+1} - \alpha_2\psi_2^{n+1} = \psi_1^n + \alpha_1\psi_{cav}^{n+1} \quad (\text{PA.199})$$

11 The far-field boundary condition is a zero gradient, which is implemented by setting
12 $\psi_{j+1}^{n+1} = \psi_j^{n+1}$ in Equation (PA.199), recognizing that $1 + 2\alpha = 1 + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2$ and rearranging, which
13 gives

$$14 \quad -\alpha_1\psi_{j-1}^{n+1} + (1 + \alpha_1)\psi_j^{n+1} = \psi_j^n \quad (\text{PA.200})$$

15 where j is the index of the last computational cell.

16 PA-4.6.3.3 Numerical Method—Wellbore to Repository Coupling

17 The term u_{rep} , appearing in Equation (PA.176), is the gas velocity in the repository at the waste-
18 cavity interface and is determined from the pressure gradient inside the waste. DRSPALL uses
19 the pressure (P_1) at the center of the first numerical zone in the waste to determine u_{rep} :

$$20 \quad u_{rep} = \frac{k(P_1 - P_{cav})}{\eta_g \phi \Delta r} \quad (\text{PA.201})$$

1 PA-4.6.4 Implementation

2 During development of the spallings model, a total of five parameters were determined to be
 3 both uncertain and potentially significant to model results (Hansen, Pfeifle, and Lord 2003; Lord
 4 and Rudeen 2003). All five parameters relate to the repository conditions or the state of the
 5 waste at the time of intrusion. Table PA-15 lists the uncertain parameters in the DRSPALL
 6 calculations; these parameters are also listed in Table PA-19.

7 **Table PA-15. Uncertain Parameters in the DRSPALL Calculations**

Parameter	Variable	Implementation
Repository Pressure	REPIPRES	Initial repository pressure (Pa); spall calculated for values of 10, 12, 14, and 14.8 MPa. Defines initial repository pressure in Equation (PA.171) (see Section PA-4.6.2.2) and P_{ff} in Equation (PA.184).
Repository Permeability	REPIPERM	Permeability (m^2) of waste, implemented by parameter SPALLMOD/REPIPERM. Log-uniform distribution from 2.4×10 to 2.4×10^{-12} . Defines k in Equation (PA.168).
Repository Porosity	REPIPOR	Porosity (dimensionless) of waste, implemented by parameter SPALLMOD/REPIPOR. Uniform distribution from 0.35 to 0.66. Defines ϕ in Equation (PA.167).
Particle Diameter	PARTDIAM	Particle diameter of waste (m) after tensile failure, implemented by parameter SPALLMOD/PARTDIAM. Log-uniform distribution from 0.001 to 0.1 (m). Defines d_p in Equation (PA.186).
Tensile Strength	TENSLSTR	Tensile strength of waste (Pa), implemented by parameter SPALLMOD/TENSLSTR. Uniform distribution from 0.12 MPa to 0.17 MPa. Defines maximum $\bar{\sigma}_r$ for Section PA-4.6.2.3.4.

8

9 The computational requirements of DRSPALL prohibit calculation of spall volumes for all
 10 possible combinations of initial conditions and parameter values. Since repository pressure is a
 11 time-dependent value computed by the BRAGFLO model (see Section PA-4.2), DRSPALL
 12 calculations were performed for a small number of pressures. Sensitivity studies showed that
 13 spall does not occur at pressures below 10 MPa; this value was used as the lower bound on
 14 pressure. In DRSPALL, the repository pressure cannot exceed the far-field confining stress
 15 (14.8 MPa); consequently, 14.8 MPa was used as the upper bound on pressure. Computations
 16 were also performed for intermediate pressures of 12 and 14 MPa. The remaining four
 17 parameters listed in Table PA-15 are treated as subjectively uncertain. The uncertainty
 18 represented by these parameters pertains to the future state of the waste, which is modeled in PA
 19 as a homogeneous material with uncertain properties (see Section PA-5.0).

20 Spall volumes are computed for each combination of initial pressure and sample element, for a
 21 total of $4 \times 300 = 1,200$ model runs. Although repository porosity could be treated as an initial
 22 condition (using the time-dependent value computed by BRAGFLO), to reduce the number of
 23 computational cases and ensure that extreme porosity values were represented, repository
 24 porosity was included as a sampled parameter.

1 The spallings submodel of the code CUTTINGS_S uses the DRSPALL results to compute the
2 spall volume for a given initial pressure P . If $P < 10$ MPa or $P > 14.8$ MPa, the spall volume is
3 the value computed for REPIPRESS = 10 MPa or REPIPRESS = 14.8 MPa, respectively. If P
4 falls between 10 and 14.8 MPa, the spall volume is constructed by linear interpolation between
5 the DRSPALL results for pressures that bracket P .

6 **PA-4.6.5 Additional Information**

7 Additional information on DRSPALL and its use in PA to determine spallings releases can be
8 found in the DRSPALL user's manual (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003f) and in the
9 analysis package for spallings releases (Ismail 2008). Additional information on the construction
10 of spall volumes by the code CUTTINGS_S can be found in the CUTTINGS_S design document
11 (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003g).

12 **PA-4.7 DBR to Surface: BRAGFLO**

13 This section describes the model for DBR volumes, which are volumes of brine released to the
14 surface at the time of a drilling intrusion. DBR volumes are calculated by the code BRAGFLO,
15 the same code used to compute two-phase flow in and around the repository (see Section PA-
16 4.2).


17 **PA-4.7.1 Overview of Conceptual Model**

18 DBRs could occur if the pressure in the repository at the time of a drilling intrusion exceeds
19 8 MPa, which is the pressure exerted by a column of brine-saturated drilling fluid at the depth of
20 the repository (Stoelzel and O'Brien 1996). For repository pressures less than 8 MPa, no DBRs
21 are assumed to occur. However, even if the repository pressure exceeds 8 MPa at the time of a
22 drilling intrusion, a DBR is not assured, as there might not be sufficient mobile brine in the
23 repository to result in movement towards the borehole.

24 DBRs are estimated for the following cases: (1) an initial intrusion into the repository into either
25 a lower (down-dip), middle, or upper (up-dip) panel; (2) an intrusion into a waste panel preceded
26 by an E1 intrusion into either the same waste panel, an adjacent panel, or a nonadjacent panel;
27 and (3) an intrusion into a waste panel preceded by an E2 intrusion into either the same waste
28 panel, an adjacent panel, or a nonadjacent panel (see Section PA-6.7). To determine releases for
29 the above cases, the DBR calculations use a computational grid that explicitly includes all 10
30 waste panels (Figure PA-28).

31 For perspective, the following list provides a comparison of the BRAGFLO mesh for the Salado
32 flow calculations (Figure PA-15) and the DBR mesh used for the DBR calculations (Figure PA-
33 28):

- 34 1. The DBR mesh is defined in the areal plane with the z dimension (height) one element thick;
35 the BRAGFLO mesh is defined as a cross section, with multiple layers in height and the
36 thickness (y dimension) one element thick.



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Figure PA-28. DBR Grid Used in PA

2. The DBR mesh uses constant thickness, while the BRAGFLO mesh uses rectangular flaring to account for three-dimensional volumes in a two-dimensional grid (Figure PA-16).
3. The DBR mesh represents flow only in the waste area. The BRAGFLO model includes the surrounding geology as well as the entire WIPP excavation (including operations, experimental, and shaft regions).
4. Local scale heterogeneities are included in the DBR mesh, including the salt pillars, rooms, panel closures, and passageways that contain waste. These are not fully represented in the BRAGFLO mesh.
5. The DRZ is included in both models, but exists above and below the excavated regions in the BRAGFLO model, whereas the DRZ surrounds the waste rooms on the sides of the DBR mesh.
6. Both models include a one-degree formation dip through the excavated regions (Equation (PA.33)).

The DBRs are assumed to take place over a relatively short period of time (i.e., 3 to 4.5 days; see Section PA-4.7.8) following the drilling intrusion. The initial value conditions for determining DBR volumes are obtained by mapping solutions of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30)

1 obtained from BRAGFLO with the computational grid in Figure PA-15 onto the grid in Figure
2 PA-28.

3 In concept, the DBR for a drilling intrusion has the form

$$4 \quad DBR = \int_0^{t_e} rDBR(t) dt \quad (PA.202)$$

5 where

6 DBR = DBR volume (m³) for drilling intrusion

7 $rDBR(t)$ = rate (m³) at time t at which brine flows up intruding borehole

8 t = elapsed time (s) since drilling intrusion

9 t_e = time (s) at which DBR ends

10 The definition of $rDBR(t)$ is discussed in the following sections. It is based on the two-phase
11 flow relationships in Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27),
12 Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30) and use of the Poettmann-Carpenter
13 correlation (Poettmann and Carpenter 1952) to determine a boundary pressure at the connection
14 between the intruding borehole and the repository. The time t_e is based on current drilling
15 practices in the Delaware Basin (Section PA-4.7.8).

16 **PA-4.7.2 Linkage to Two-Phase Flow Calculation**

17 The mesh in Figure PA-28 was linked to the mesh in Figure PA-15 by subdividing the waste
18 disposal area in the mesh in Figure PA-15 into three regions (Figure PA-29). The upper region
19 represents the northern rest of repository (North RoR) area in Figure PA-15. The middle region
20 represents the southern rest of repository (South RoR) area in Figure PA-15. The lower region
21 represents the farthest down-dip repository area (Waste Panel) in Figure PA-15 that contained
22 waste and thus corresponds to the single down-dip waste panel. The linkage between the
23 solutions to Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation
24 (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30) and the DBR calculations was made by
25 assigning quantities calculated by BRAGFLO for each region in Figure PA-15 to the
26 corresponding waste region in Figure PA-28.

27 The height of the grid in Figure PA-28 was assigned a value that corresponded to the crushed
28 height, h (m), of the waste as predicted by the solution of Equation (PA.24) through Equation
29 (PA.30). Specifically,

$$30 \quad h = h_i \frac{1 - \phi_i}{1 - \phi} \quad (PA.203)$$

31 where h_i and ϕ_i are the initial height (m) and porosity of the waste and ϕ is the volume-averaged
32 porosity of the waste at the particular time under consideration (Section PA-4.2.3). The areas
33 designated equivalent panel closures, DRZ, and impure halite in Figure PA-28 were assigned the
34




Figure PA-29. Assignment of Initial Conditions for DBR Calculation

same pressures and saturations as the corresponding grid blocks in the 10,000-year BRAGFLO calculations. The area designated equivalent DRZ/concrete (Figure PA-28) was assigned the same pressures and saturations as the DRZ. These areas were assigned porosities that resulted in a conservation of the initial pore volumes used in the solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30) on the grid in Figure PA-15. Specifically, the pore volumes associated with the panel closures, DRZ, and impure halite do not change with time the constant values being given by the definitions of $\phi(x, y, 0)$ in Table PA-16.

The initial brine pressure $p_b(x, y, 0)$ and gas saturation $S_g(x, y, 0)$ in the grid in Figure PA-28 are assigned by

$$p_b(x, y, 0) = \frac{\int_R \tilde{p}_b(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, t_{int}) dV}{\int_R dV} \quad (\text{PA.204})$$

$$S_g(x, y, 0) = \frac{\int_R \tilde{S}_g(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, t_{int}) dV}{\int_R dV} \quad (\text{PA.205})$$

where (x, y) designates a point in the grid in Figure PA-28, \tilde{p}_b and \tilde{S}_g denote solutions to Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30), \tilde{x} and \tilde{y} denote the variables of integration, t_{int} is the time at which the drilling intrusion occurs, and R corresponds to the region in the BRAGFLO computational grid (Figure PA-15) that is mapped into the region in the DBR computational grid

1 (Figure PA-28) that contains the point (x, y) (Figure PA-29). Note that t_{int} defines a time in the
 2 solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation
 3 (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30); $t = 0$ defines the start time for the DBR
 4 calculation and corresponds to t_{int} in the solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25),
 5 Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation
 6 (PA.30).

7 The initial porosity $\phi(x, y, 0)$ in the grid in Figure PA-28 is set by the equations listed in Table
 8 PA-15. In Table PA-16, h_i is the initial height of the waste panels (3.96 m), $\phi_{WP,i}$ is the initial
 9 porosity of the waste panels (0.848), $h(t_{int})$ is the height of the repository at the time of intrusion
 10 (typically 1 to 1.5 m; corresponds to h in Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26),
 11 Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30)), $h_{DRZ,i}$ is the
 12 initial DRZ height (43.60 m) that results in the DRZ in Figure PA-28 having the same pore
 13 volume as the initial pore volume of the DRZ in Figure PA-15, A_{DRZ} is the area associated with
 14 DRZ in Figure PA-28, and $\phi_{DRZ,i}$ is the initial porosity of DRZ (see Table PA-3). The quantity
 15 $h_{DRZ,i} \times A_{DRZ} \times \phi_{DRZ,i}$ is equal to the pore volume of DRZ above and below the waste filled
 16 regions in Figure PA-15. In Table PA-16, the term ϕ_C is the porosity of the panel closure
 17 concrete material (CONC_PCS; see Table PA-3), d_1 is the length of the drift/explosion wall
 18 portion of the panel closure (32.1 m; see Figure PA-20), and d_2 is the length of the concrete
 19 portion of the panel closure (7.9 m; see Figure PA-20). The porosity of the panel closure and the
 20 equivalent DRZ/concrete materials are defined as the volume-weighted mean porosity of the
 21 component materials; this definition results in the same brine volume within the pore space in
 22 each set of panel closures in Figure PA-15 and Figure PA-28. In Table PA-16, $h_{H,i}$ is the initial
 23 height of undisturbed halite in Figure PA-28, which is arbitrarily taken to be 8.98 m. However,
 24 this value is unimportant because of the extremely low permeability of the undisturbed halite
 25 ($\sim 3.16 \times 10^{-23}$ m²); any brine in the halite could not flow into the waste over the short time
 26 period of the DBR calculation, so no effort was made to preserve halite pore volume when
 27 mapping from the computational grid in Figure PA-15 to the computational grid in Figure PA-
 28 28. The quantity $\phi_{H,i}$ is the initial porosity of halite (HALPOR, see Table PA-19).

29 **PA-4.7.3 Conceptual Representation for Flow Rate $rDBR(t)$**

30 The driving force that would give rise to the DBR is a difference between waste panel pressure,
 31 p_w (Pa), and the flowing bottomhole pressure in the borehole, p_{wf} (Pa), at the time of the
 32 intrusion. The flowing bottomhole pressure p_{wf} , defined as the dynamic pressure at the inlet of
 33 the intruding borehole to the waste panel, is less than the static pressure p_w due to friction and
 34 acceleration effects. The rate at which brine and gas are transported up the intruding borehole is
 35 determined by the difference $p_w - p_{wf}$ and a productivity index J_p for the intruded waste panel
 36 (Mattax and Dalton 1990, p. 79):

$$37 \quad q_p(t) = J_p [p_w(t) - p_{wf}] \quad (\text{PA.206})$$

38 where

1

Table PA-16. Initial Porosity in the DBR Calculation

Grid Region	Initial Porosity
Waste (ϕ_W)	$1 - h_i \frac{1 - \phi_{WP,i}}{h(t_{int})}$
Panel Closures	$\frac{d_1 \phi_W + d_2 \phi_C}{d_1 + d_2}$
DRZ	$\phi_{DRZ,i} \frac{h_{DRZ,i}}{h(t_{int})}$
Impure Halite	$\phi_{H,i} \frac{h_{H,i}}{h(t_{int})}$
Equivalent DRZ/Concrete	$\frac{d_1 \phi_C + d_2 \phi_{DRZ,i}}{d_1 + d_2}$

2

3 $q_p(t)$ = flow rate (m³/s) at time t for phase p ($p = b \sim$ brine, $p = g \sim$ gas)

4 J_p = productivity index (m³/Pa·s) for phase p

5 and p_w and p_{wf} are defined above. As indicated by the inclusion/exclusion of a dependence on t ,
 6 the terms J_p and p_{wf} are constant during the determination of $q_p(t)$ for a particular drilling
 7 intrusion in the present analysis, and $p_w(t)$ changes as a function of time. In concept, the DBR is
 8 given by

9
$$DBR = \int_0^{t_e} rDBR(t) dt = \int_0^{t_e} J_b [p_w(t) - p_{wf}] dt \quad (PA.207)$$

10 once J_b (brine), p_w , and p_{wf} are determined. Section PA-4.7.4 discusses the determination of J_p
 11 (for both gas and brine), Section PA-4.7.5 presents the numerical determination of p_w and DBR,
 12 and the determination of p_{wf} is discussed in Section PA-4.7.6. The associated gas release is
 13 given by the corresponding integral with J_g (gas) rather than J_b (brine). In the computational
 14 implementation of the analysis, DBR is determined as part of the numerical solution of the
 15 system of PDEs that defines p_w (Section PA-4.7.5).

16 **PA-4.7.4 Determination of Productivity Index J_p**

17 In a radial drainage area with uniform saturation, which is assumed to be valid throughout the
 18 DBR, the following representation for J_p can be determined from Darcy's law (Mattax and
 19 Dalton 1990, p. 79; Williamson and Chappellear 1981; Chappellear and Williamson 1981):

$$J_p = \frac{2\pi k k_{rp} h}{\mu_p \left[\ln \left(\frac{r_e}{r_w} \right) + s + c \right]} \quad (\text{PA.208})$$

2 where

- 3 k = absolute permeability (assumed to be constant through time at $2.4 \times 10^{-13} \text{ m}^2$)
 4 k_{rp} = relative permeability to phase p (calculated with modified Brooks-Corey model in
 5 Equation (PA.139), Equation (PA.140), and Equation (PA.141) and brine and gas
 6 saturations, S_b and S_g , obtained by mapping solutions of Equation (PA.24), Equation
 7 (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29),
 8 and Equation (PA.30) obtained with the grid in Figure PA-15 onto the grid in Figure
 9 PA-28)
 10 h = crushed panel height (Equation (PA.203))
 11 μ_p = viscosity of fluid phase (assumed to be constant through time with $\mu_b = 1.8 \times 10^{-3} \text{ Pa}\cdot\text{s}$,
 12 and $\mu_g = 8.92 \times 10^{-6} \text{ Pa}\cdot\text{s}$ [Kaufmann 1960])
 13 r_e = external drainage radius (for use with the rectangular grid blocks in Figure PA-28, r_e is
 14 taken to be the equivalent areal radius; see Equation (PA.209))
 15 r_w = wellbore radius (assumed to be constant through time at 0.1556 m (Gatlin 1960, Table
 16 14.7))
 17 c = -0.50 for pseudo-steady-state flow
 18 s = skin factor, which is used to incorporate flow stimulation caused by cavings and
 19 spallings release (see Equation (PA.210))

20 In the present analysis,

$$r_e = \sqrt{(\Delta x)(\Delta y) / \pi} \quad (\text{PA.209})$$

22 where Δx is the x dimension (m) and Δy is the y dimension (m) of the grid block containing the
 23 down-dip well in Figure PA-28 ($\Delta x = 10 \text{ m}$ and $\Delta y = 32.7 \text{ m}$).

24 The skin factor s is derived from the cavings and spallings release. Due to the uncertainty in the
 25 cavings and spallings parameters, the calculated solid release volume can vary for each
 26 realization. The skin factor is calculated for each realization, based on the calculated solid
 27 release volume, through the following petroleum engineering well testing relationship (Lee 1982,
 28 pp. 5–7):

$$s = \left(\frac{k}{k_s} - 1 \right) \ln \left(\frac{r_s}{r_w} \right) \quad (\text{PA.210})$$

30 where

1 k_s = permeability (m^2) of an open channel as a result of spillings releases (assumed to be
 2 infinite)
 3 r_s = effective radius (m) of the wellbore with the cuttings, cavings, and spillings volume
 4 removed

5 The effective radius r_s is obtained by converting the cuttings, cavings, and spillings volume
 6 removed into a cylinder of equal volume with the initial height of the waste (h_i), and then
 7 computing the radius of the cylinder:

$$8 \quad r_s = \sqrt{\frac{V_i}{h_i \pi}} \quad (\text{PA.211})$$

9 and substitution of r_s into Equation (PA.210) with $k_s = \infty$ yields

$$10 \quad s = (-1) \ln \left(\frac{\sqrt{\frac{V_i}{h_i \pi}}}{r_w} \right) \quad (\text{PA.212})$$

11 **PA-4.7.5 Determination of Waste Panel Pressure $p_w(t)$ and DBR**

12 The repository pressure $p_w(t)$ in Equation (PA.207) after a drilling intrusion is determined with
 13 the same system of nonlinear PDEs discussed in Section PA-4.2. These equations are solved
 14 numerically by the code BRAGFLO used with the computational grid in Figure PA-28 and
 15 assumptions (i.e., parameter values, initial value conditions, and boundary value conditions)
 16 appropriate for representing brine flow to an intruding borehole over a relatively short time
 17 period immediately after the intrusion (e.g., 3 to 4.5 days). Due to the short time periods under
 18 consideration, the model for DBR does not include gas generation due to either corrosion or
 19 microbial action or changes in repository height due to creep closure. Furthermore, to stabilize
 20 the calculation and thus allow longer time steps in the numerical solution, the capillary pressure
 21 was assigned a value of 0 Pa in all modeled regions (Figure PA-28); in the analysis of the full
 22 system in Section PA-4.2, capillary pressure had a value of 0 Pa in the waste regions and the
 23 DRZ, but a nonzero value in the panel closures (Table PA-4). Use of a capillary pressure of 0 Pa
 24 results in the brine pressure $p_b(x, y, t)$ and the gas pressure $p_g(x, y, t)$ being equal, with the
 25 pressure $p_w(t)$ in Equation (PA.207) given by

$$26 \quad p_w(t) = p_b(x, y, t) \quad (\text{PA.213})$$

27 Although the determination of DBR can be conceptually represented by the integral in Equation
 28 (PA.202), in the numerical implementation of the analysis, DBR is determined within the
 29 numerical solution of the system of PDEs that defines $p_b(x, y, t)$.

1 With the specific assumptions for DBR, Equation (PA.24) , Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26),
 2 Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30) become

3 Gas Conservation
$$\nabla \cdot \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_g K_g k_{rg}}{\mu_g} (\nabla p_g + \rho_g g \nabla h) \right] = \alpha \frac{\partial (\phi \rho_g S_g)}{\partial t} \quad (\text{PA.214})$$

4 Brine Conservation
$$\nabla \cdot \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_b K_b k_{rb}}{\mu_b} (\nabla p_b + \rho_b g \nabla h) \right] = \alpha \frac{\partial (\phi \rho_b S_b)}{\partial t} \quad (\text{PA.215})$$

5 Saturation Constraint
$$S_g + S_b = 1 \quad (\text{PA.216})$$

6 Capillary Pressure Constraint
$$p_g - p_b = 0 \quad (\text{PA.217})$$

7 Gas Density
$$\rho_g \text{ determined by RKS equation of state (Equation (PA.54))} \quad (\text{PA.218})$$

8 Brine Density
$$\rho_b = \rho_0 \exp \left[c_b (p_b - p_{b0}) \right] \quad (\text{PA.219})$$

9 Formation Porosity
$$\phi = \phi_0 \exp \left[c_\phi (p_b - p_{b0}) \right] \quad (\text{PA.220})$$

10 with all symbols having the same definitions as in Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation
 11 (PA.26) Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30).

12 The primary differences between the BRAGFLO calculations described in Section PA-4.2 and
 13 the BRAGFLO calculations described in this section are in the computational meshes (Figure
 14 PA-28 and Figure PA-15), initial values (Table PA-3 and Section PA-4.7.2), and boundary
 15 conditions (Table PA-17). In particular, brine and gas flow associated with intruding boreholes
 16 in the DBR calculations are incorporated by the assignment of appropriate boundary conditions.
 17 Specifically, brine flow up an intruding borehole is incorporated into Equation (PA.214),
 18 Equation (PA.215), Equation (PA.216), Equation (PA.217), Equation (PA.218), Equation
 19 (PA.219), and Equation (PA.220) by using the Poettmann-Carpenter wellbore model to
 20 determine the pressure at the outflow point in a waste panel (Figure PA-28), with this pressure
 21 entering the calculation as a boundary value condition (Table PA-17). The details of this
 22 determination are discussed in Section PA-4.7.6. Furthermore, for calculations that assume a
 23 prior E1 intrusion, the effects of this intrusion are also incorporated into the analysis by
 24 specifying a pressure as a boundary condition (Table PA-17). The determination of this pressure
 25 is discussed in Section PA-4.7.6.

26 **PA-4.7.6 Boundary Value Pressure p_{wf}**

27 The boundary value pressure p_{wf} at the inlet of the intruding borehole is defined by a system of
 28 equations of the following form:

1

Table PA-17. Boundary Conditions for p_b and S_g in DBR Calculations

(x, y) on Upper (Northern) or Lower (Southern) Boundary in Figure PA-28, $0 \leq t$	
$(\nabla p_g + \rho_g g \nabla h) _{(x,y,t)} \cdot \mathbf{j} = 0 \text{ Pa/m}$	No gas flow condition
$(\nabla p_b + \rho_b g \nabla h) _{(x,y,t)} \cdot \mathbf{j} = 0 \text{ Pa/m}$	No brine flow condition
(x, y) on Right (Eastern) or Left (Western) Boundary in Figure PA-28, $0 \leq t$	
$(\nabla p_g + \rho_g g \nabla h) _{(x,y,t)} \cdot \mathbf{i} = 0 \text{ Pa/m}$	No gas flow condition
$(\nabla p_b + \rho_b g \nabla h) _{(x,y,t)} \cdot \mathbf{i} = 0 \text{ Pa/m}$	No brine flow condition
(x, y) at Location of Drilling Intrusion under Consideration (see indicated points in Figure PA-28), $0 \leq t$	
$p_b(x, y, t) = p_{wf}$ (see Section PA-4.7.6)	Constant pressure condition
(x, y) at Location of Prior Drilling Intrusion into Pressurized Brine (see indicated point in Figure PA-28), $0 \leq t$	
$p_b(x, y, t) = p_{wEI}$ (see Section PA-4.7.7)	Constant pressure condition

2

3
$$\frac{dp}{dh} = G(q_b[p(0)], q_g[p(0)], p(h), h), \quad 0 \leq h \leq 655m \quad (\text{PA.221})$$

4
$$p(655) = 1.013 \times 10^5 \text{ Pa} \quad (\text{PA.222})$$


5
$$q_b[p(0)] = J_b[p_w - p(0)] \quad (\text{PA.223})$$

6
$$q_g[p(0)] = J_g[p_w - p(0)] \quad (\text{PA.224})$$

7 where $p(h)$ is pressure (Pa) at elevation h in the borehole, with $h = 0$ m corresponding to the
 8 entry point of the borehole into the waste panel and $h = 655$ m corresponding to the land surface
 9 (Figure PA-30); G is a function (Pa/m) characterizing the change of pressure with elevation in
 10 the borehole; $p(655)$ is an initial value condition requiring that pressure at the land surface (i.e.,
 11 the outlet point of the borehole) be equal to atmospheric pressure; $q_b[p(0)]$ and $q_g[p(0)]$ define
 12 brine and gas flow rates (m^3/s) into the borehole; J_b and J_g are productivity indexes ($\text{m}^3/\text{Pa s}$)
 13 (see Equation (PA.208)); and p_w is the pressure (Pa) in the repository at the time of the drilling
 14 intrusion.

15 The boundary value pressure p_{wf} is defined by

16
$$p_{wf} = p(0) \quad (\text{PA.225})$$



1
2 **Figure PA-30. Borehole Representation Used for Poettmann-Carpenter Correlation**

3 Thus, p_{wf} is determined by the numerical solution of Equation (PA.221) for $p(0)$ subject to the
4 constraints in Equation (PA.222), Equation (PA.223), and Equation (PA.224).

5 The pressure p_w corresponds to the pressure $p_w(0)$ in Equation (PA.213) and is obtained from the
6 solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation
7 (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30) with the computational grid in Figure PA-15
8 (see Section PA-4.7.2). The production indexes J_b and J_g are defined in Equation (PA.208).

9 Thus, the only quantity remaining to be specified in Equation (PA.221), Equation (PA.222),
10 Equation (PA.223), and Equation (PA.224) is the function G .

11 Brine and gas flow up a borehole is governed by complex physics dependent on frictional effects
12 and two-phase fluid properties. This phenomenon has been widely studied in the petroleum
13 industry and many modeling procedures have been developed to predict flow rates and pressures
14 in vertical two-phase pipe flow (i.e., to define G in Equation (PA.221)) (Brill and Beggs 1986).

1 For this analysis, the Poettmann-Carpenter model (Poettmann and Carpenter 1952; Welchon,
 2 Bertuzzi, and Poettmann 1962) was used to define G because it accounts for multiphase
 3 frictional effects based on empirical (i.e., field) data from flowing wells, is one of the few
 4 modeling approaches that included annular flow data in its development, and is relatively easy to
 5 implement. Specifically, the Poettmann-Carpenter model defines G by

$$\begin{aligned}
 & G(q_b[p(0)], q_g[p(0)], p(h), h) \\
 & = gm(h) + f'(m(h), D(h), q_b[p(0)]) gm(h) F^2(h) / D^5(h)
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{PA.226}$$

8 where

9 g = acceleration due to gravity (9.8 m/s²)

10 $m(h)$ = density (kg/m³) of fluids (i.e., gas and brine) in wellbore at
 11 elevation h (Note: $m(h)$ is a function of $q_b[p(0)]$ and
 12 $q_g[p(0)]$; see Equation (PA.227) below)

13 $f'\{m(h), D(h), q_b[p(0)]\}$ = empirically defined scale factor (m/s²) (Note: f' is the scale
 14 factor in the Poettmann-Carpenter model for fluid flow in a
 15 wellbore [Poettmann and Carpenter 1952]; see discussion
 16 below)

17 $F(h)$ = flow rate (m³/s) of fluids (i.e., gas and brine) in wellbore at
 18 elevation h (Note: $F(h)$ is a function of $q_b[p(0)]$ and
 19 $q_g[p(0)]$; see Equation (PA.228))

20 $D(h)$ = effective diameter (m) of wellbore (see Equation (PA.231))

21 The first term, $gm(h)$, in Equation (PA.226) results from the contribution of elevation to
 22 pressure; the second term results from frictional effects (Poettmann and Carpenter 1952). The
 23 fluid density $m(h)$ at elevation h is given by

$$m(h) = \frac{q_b[p(0)]\rho_b[p(0)] + q_g[p(0)]\rho_g[p(0)]}{F(h)}
 \tag{PA.227}$$

25 where

$$F(h) = q_b[p(0)] + \frac{z(h)p(h)}{p(0)} q_g[p(0)]
 \tag{PA.228}$$

27 and

28 $\rho_b[p(0)]$ = density (kg/m³) of brine at pressure $p(0)$ and temperature 300.1 K, which is
 29 fixed at 1230 kg/m³

1 $\rho_g [p(0)]$ = density (kg/m³) of H₂ at pressure $p(0)$ and temperature 300.1 K (see Equation
2 (PA.229), below)

3 $z(h)$ = z-factor for compressibility of H₂ at elevation h (Note: $z(h)$ is a function of
4 $p(h)$; see Equation (PA.230), below), and $q_b[p(0)]$ and $q_g[p(0)]$ are defined in
5 Equation (PA.221), Equation (PA.222), Equation (PA.223), and Equation
6 (PA.224)

7 The gas density in Equation (PA.227) is obtained from the universal gas law, $PV = nRT$, by

$$8 \quad \rho_g [p(0)] = C_{m,kg} \frac{n}{V} = C_{m,kg} \frac{P}{RT} \quad (\text{PA.229})$$

9 where n is the amount of gas (mol) in a volume V , $C_{m,kg}$ is the conversion factor from moles to
10 kilograms for H₂ (i.e., 2.02×10^{-3} kg/mol), $P = p(0)$, $R = 8.3145$ J/mol K, and $T = 300.1$ K. The
11 z-factor is given by

$$12 \quad z(h) = 1 + (8.54 \times 10^{-8} \text{ Pa}^{-1}) p(h) \quad (\text{PA.230})$$

13 and was obtained from calculations performed with the SUPERTRAPP program (Ely and Huber
14 1992) for pure H₂ and a temperature of 300.1 K (Stoelzel and O'Brien 1996, Figure 4.7.4). The
15 preceding approximation to $z(h)$ was obtained by fitting a straight line between the results for
16 pressures of 0 psi and 3000 psi and a H₂ mole fraction of 1 in Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996, Figure
17 4.7.4); the actual calculations used the more complex, but numerically similar, regression model
18 given in Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996, Figure 4.7.4). The numerator and denominator in Equation
19 (PA.227) involve rates, with the time units canceling to give $m(h)$ in units of kg/m³.

20 The effective diameter $D(h)$ in Equation (PA.226) is defined with the hydraulic radius concept.
21 Specifically,

$$22 \quad D^5(h) = [D_o(h) + D_i(h)]^2 [D_o(h) - D_i(h)]^3 \quad (\text{PA.231})$$

23 where $D_i(h)$ and $D_o(h)$ are the inner and outer diameters (m) of the wellbore at elevation $h(m)$
24 (see Figure PA-30). The factor f' in Equation (PA.226) is a function of $m(h)$, $D(h)$, and
25 $q_b[p(0)]$.

26 Subsequent to submittal of the CCA PA, it was discovered that the factor of 2π was omitted
27 from Equation (PA.208). This error was determined to be of no consequence to the CCA PA
28 conclusions (Hadgu et al. 1999) and was corrected in the CRA-2004 PA. As a consequence of
29 the error correction, the regression models used to determine the boundary pressure p_{wf} were
30 recalculated (Hadgu et al. 1999). The corrected regression models are reported in this appendix.

31 The following iterative procedure based on the bisection method was used to approximate
32 solutions to Equation (PA.221), Equation (PA.222), Equation (PA.223), and Equation (PA.224).

1 Step 1. Estimate $p(0)$ using a bisection algorithm:

2 The initial guess for $p(0)$ is the midpoint $\frac{1}{2} p_w$ of interval $[0, p_w]$, where p_w is the
3 pressure in the repository at the time of the drilling intrusion used in Equation (PA.221),
4 Equation (PA.222), Equation (PA.223), and Equation (PA.224).

5 The next guess for $p(0)$ is at the midpoint of either $\left[0, \frac{1}{2} p_w\right]$ or $\left[\frac{1}{2} p_w, p_w\right]$, depending
6 on whether the resultant approximation to $p(655)$ is above or below atmospheric
7 pressure.

8 Subsequent guesses for $p(0)$ are made in a similar manner.

9 Step 2. Use $p(0)$, known values for J_b , J_g , and p_w , and Equation (PA.221), Equation (PA.222),
10 Equation (PA.223), and Equation (PA.224) to determine $q_b[p(0)]$ and $q_g[p(0)]$.

11 Step 3. Use the bisection method with $\Delta h = 25 \text{ ft} = 7.62 \text{ m}$ and appropriate changes in annular
12 diameter (Figure PA-30) to determine $p(655)$ (i.e., $p(h + \Delta h) = p(h) + G(q_b[p(0)]$,
13 $q_g[p(0)], p(h), h), \Delta h)$).

14 Step 4. Stop if $p(655)$ is within 0.07% of atmospheric pressure (i.e., if $|1.013 \times 10^5 \text{ Pa} - p(655)| \leq$
15 70 Pa). Otherwise, return to Step 1 and repeat process.

16 The preceding procedure is continued until the specified error tolerance (i.e., 0.07%) has been
17 met. The computational design of the PA has the potential to require more than 23,000 separate
18 DBR calculations (3 replicates \times 5 scenarios \times 3 drilling locations \times 100 vectors \times 5 to 6
19 intrusion times per scenario). In concept, each of these cases requires the solution of Equation
20 (PA.221), Equation (PA.222), Equation (PA.223), and Equation (PA.224) with the iterative
21 procedure just presented to obtain the boundary value condition $p_{wf} = p(0)$ (Table PA-17). To
22 help hold computational costs down, $p(0)$ was calculated for approximately 2,000 randomly
23 generated vectors of the form

$$24 \quad \mathbf{v} = [p_w, h, S_{br}, S_{gr}, S_b, A_i] \quad (\text{PA.232})$$

25 where p_w is the repository pressure (used in definition of $q_b[p(0)]$ and $q_g[p(0)]$ in Equation
26 (PA.221), Equation (PA.222), Equation (PA.223), and Equation (PA.224)), h is the crushed
27 height of the repository (used in definition of J_p in Equation (PA.208)), S_{br} and S_{gr} are the
28 residual saturations for gas and brine in the repository (used in definition of k_{rp} in Equation
29 (PA.208)), S_b is the saturation of brine in the repository (used in definition of k_{rp} in Equation
30 (PA.208)), and A_i is the equivalent area of material removed by cuttings, cavings, and spillings
31 (used in definition of skin factor s in Equation (PA.212)). The outcomes of these calculations
32 were divided into three cases:

33 1. Mobile brine only (i.e., $k_{rg} = 0$ in Equation (PA.214))

1 2. Brine-dominated flow (i.e., $k_{rb} > k_{rg}$)

2 3. Gas-dominated flow (i.e., $k_{rg} > k_{rb}$)

3 Regression procedures were then used to fit algebraic models that can be used to estimate $p(0)$.
 4 These regression models were then used to determine $p(0)$, and hence, p_{wf} . The resulting three
 5 regression models (or curve fit equations) for flowing bottomhole pressure (p_{wf}) are as follows:

6 1. For a system with only mobile brine ($k_{rg} = 0$)

$$7 \quad p_{wf} = a + bx + cy + dx^2 + ey^2 + fxy + gx^3 + hy^3 + ixy^2 + jx^2y \quad (\text{PA.233})$$

8 where $x = \log(jb)$ and $y = p_w$ (= repository pressure), the coefficients in Equation (PA.233)
 9 were determined to be

$$10 \quad a = 3.2279346 \times 10^{11}$$

$$11 \quad b = 9.4816648 \times 10^{10}$$

$$12 \quad c = -6.2002715 \times 10^3$$

$$13 \quad d = 9.2450601 \times 10^9$$

$$14 \quad e = 4.1464475 \times 10^{-6}$$

$$15 \quad f = -1.2886068 \times 10^3$$

$$16 \quad g = 2.9905582 \times 10^8$$

$$17 \quad h = 1.0857041 \times 10^{-14}$$

$$18 \quad i = 4.7119798 \times 10^{-7}$$

$$19 \quad j = -6.690712 \times 10^{-1}$$

20 with a resulting coefficient of determination $R^2 = 0.974$.

21 2. For brine-dominated flow ($k_{rb} > k_{rg}$)

$$22 \quad p_{wf} = \frac{a + bx + cx^2 + dy}{1 + ex + fx^2 + gx^3 + hy} \quad (\text{PA.234})$$

23 where $x = \log\left(\frac{k_{rg}}{k_{rb}}\right)$ and $y = p_w$ (= repository pressure), the coefficients in Equation (PA.234)

24 were determined to be

$$25 \quad a = 1.6065077 \times 10^6$$

$$26 \quad b = 2.6243397 \times 10^6$$

$$27 \quad c = 2.4768899 \times 10^6$$

$$28 \quad d = -5.3635476 \times 10^{-2}$$

$$29 \quad e = 7.0815693 \times 10^{-1}$$

$$30 \quad f = 3.8012696 \times 10^{-1}$$

$$g = 4.1916956 \times 10^{-3}$$

$$h = -2.4887085 \times 10^{-8}$$

with a resulting coefficient of determination $R^2 = 0.997$.

3. For gas-dominated flow ($k_{rg} > k_{rb}$)

$$p_{wf} = a + b \frac{1}{x} + cy + d \frac{1}{x^2} + ey^2 + f \frac{x}{y} + g \frac{1}{x^3} + hy^3 + i \frac{y^2}{x} + j \frac{y}{x^2} \quad (\text{PA.235})$$

where $x = \log(j_g)$ and $y = p_w$ (= repository pressure), the coefficients in Equation (PA.235) were determined to be

$$a = -1.0098405 \times 10^9$$

$$b = -2.3044622 \times 10^{10}$$

$$c = 9.8039146$$

$$d = -1.7426466 \times 10^{11}$$

$$e = 1.8309137 \times 10^{-7}$$

$$f = 1.7497064 \times 10^2$$

$$g = -4.3698224 \times 10^{11}$$

$$h = -1.4891198 \times 10^{-16}$$

$$i = 1.3006196 \times 10^{-6}$$

$$j = 7.5744833 \times 10^2$$

with a resulting coefficient of determination $R^2 = 0.949$.

PA-4.7.7 Boundary Value Pressure p_{wE1}

Some of the DBR calculations are for a drilling intrusion that has been preceded by an E1 intrusion in either the same waste panel, an adjacent waste panel, or a nonadjacent waste panel (Section PA-6.7.6). The effects of these prior E1 intrusions are incorporated into the solution of Equation (PA.214), Equation (PA.215), Equation (PA.216), Equation (PA.217), Equation (PA.218), Equation (PA.219), and Equation (PA.220), and hence into the DBR, by specifying a boundary pressure p_{wE1} at the location of the E1 intrusion into the repository (Table PA-17).

Two cases are considered for the definition of p_{wE1} : (1) an open borehole between the brine pocket and the repository and (2) a borehole filled with silty-sand-like material between the brine pocket and the repository. The first case corresponds to the situation in which the drilling intrusion occurs within 200 years of a prior drilling intrusion that penetrated the pressurized brine pocket, and the second case corresponds to the situation in which the drilling intrusion occurs more than 200 years after a prior drilling intrusion that penetrated the pressurized brine pocket.

1 PA-4.7.7.1 Solution for Open Borehole

2 In this case, p_{wE1} is set equal to the flowing well pressure p_{wfBP} of an open borehole between the
3 brine pocket and the repository, and is given by

$$4 \quad Q = f_1(p_{BP}, p_{wfBP}) \quad (\text{PA.236})$$

$$5 \quad Q = f_2(p_{wfBP}, p_{wfBI}) \quad (\text{PA.237})$$

$$6 \quad Q = f_3(p_{wfBI}, p_{wfBO}) \quad (\text{PA.238})$$

7 where

8 p_{BP} = pressure (Pa) in brine pocket

9 p_{wfBP} = flowing well pressure (Pa) at outlet from brine pocket

10 p_{wfBI} = flowing well pressure (Pa) at inlet to repository from brine pocket

11 p_{wfBO} = flowing well pressure (Pa) at outlet from repository due to intruding borehole
12 (Note: The boreholes associated with p_{wfBI} and p_{wfBO} arise from different drilling
13 intrusions and hence are at different locations; see Figure PA-28)

14 Q = brine flow rate (m^3/s) from brine pocket to repository, through repository, and then
15 to surface

16 and f_1 , f_2 , and f_3 are linear functions of their arguments. In the development, p_{BP} and p_{wfBO} are
17 assumed to be known, with the result that Equation (PA.236), Equation (PA.237), and Equation
18 (PA.238) constitutes a system of three linear equations in three unknowns (i.e., p_{wfBP} , p_{wfBI} and
19 Q) that can be solved to obtain p_{wfBI} . In the determination of p_{wfBI} for use in a particular
20 solution of Equation (PA.214), Equation (PA.215), Equation (PA.216), Equation (PA.217),
21 Equation (PA.218), Equation (PA.219), and Equation (PA.220), p_{BP} is the pressure in the brine
22 pocket at the time of the intrusion obtained from the solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation
23 (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and
24 Equation (PA.30) with BRAGFLO, and p_{wfBO} is the flowing well pressure obtained from
25 conditions at the time of the intrusion (from the solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25),
26 Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation
27 (PA.30)) and the solutions of the Poettmann-Carpenter model embodied in Equation (PA.233),
28 Equation (PA.234), and Equation (PA.235) (i.e., given pressure, k_{rg} and k_{rb} at the time of the
29 intrusion, and J_p , p_{wfBO} is determined from the regression models indicated in Equation
30 (PA.233), Equation (PA.234), and Equation (PA.235)).

31 The definition of Equation (PA.236), Equation (PA.237), and Equation (PA.238) is now
32 discussed. Equation (PA.236) characterizes flow out of the brine pocket into an open borehole
33 and has the form (Williamson and Chappellear 1981, Chappellear and Williamson 1981)

$$Q = \left(\frac{2\pi k_{BP} h_{BP}}{\mu [\ln(r_{eBP} / r_w) - 0.5]} \right) (p_{BP} - p_{wfBP}) \quad (\text{PA.239})$$

2 where

- 3 k_{BP} = brine pocket permeability (m²)
- 4 h_{BP} = effective brine pocket height (m)
- 5 r_{eBP} = effective brine pocket radius (m)
- 6 r_w = wellbore radius (m)
- 7 μ = brine viscosity (Pa s)

8 In the present analysis, k_{BP} is an uncertain analysis input (see BHPRM in Table PA-19); h_{BP} =
 9 125.83 m; r_{eBP} = 114 m (Stoelzel and O'Brien 1996), which corresponds to the size of the
 10 largest brine pocket that could fit under one waste panel; r_w = (8.921 in.)/2 = 0.1133 m, which is
 11 the inside radius of a 9 5/8 in. outside diameter casing (Gatlin 1960, Table 14.7); μ = 1.8×10^{-3}
 12 Pa s; and p_{BP} is determined from the solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation
 13 (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30), as
 14 previously indicated.

15 Equation (PA.237) characterizes flow up an open borehole from the brine pocket to the
 16 repository and is based on Poiseuille's Law (Prasuhn 1980, Eqs. 7-21, 7-22). Specifically,
 17 Equation (PA.237) has the form

$$Q = \left[\frac{\pi D^4}{128\mu (y_{BP} - y_{rep})} \right] \left[(p_{wfBP} - p_{wfBI}) + g\rho (y_{rep} - y_{BP}) \right] \quad (\text{PA.240})$$

19 where

- 20 D = wellbore diameter (m)
- 21 y_{rep} = elevation of repository (m) measured from surface
- 22 y_{BP} = elevation of brine pocket (m) measured from surface
- 23 g = acceleration due to gravity (9.8 m/s²)
- 24 ρ = density of brine (kg/m³)

25 and the remaining symbols have already been defined.

26 In the present analysis, $D = 2r_w = 0.2266$ m, $\rho = 1230$ kg/m³, and $y_{BP} - y_{rep} = 247$ m. With the
 27 preceding values,

$$128\mu (y_{BP} - y_{rep}) / \pi D^4 = 6.87 \times 10^3 \text{ Pa s} / \text{m}^3 \quad (\text{PA.241})$$

1
$$g\rho(y_{rep} - y_{BP}) = 2.98 \times 10^6 \text{ Pa} \quad (\text{PA.242})$$

2 Thus,

3
$$p_{wfBI} = p_{wfBP} - 2.98 \times 10^6 \text{ Pa} \quad (\text{PA.243})$$

4 when Q is small ($\leq 0.1 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$). When appropriate, this approximation can be used to simplify the
5 construction of solutions to Equation (PA.236), Equation (PA.237), and Equation (PA.238).

6 Equation (PA.238) characterizes flow through the repository from the lower borehole to the
7 bottom of the borehole associated with the drilling intrusion under consideration and has the
8 same form as Equation (PA.239). Specifically,

9
$$Q = \left(\frac{2\pi k_{rep} h_{rep}}{\mu [\ln(r_{e,rep} / r_w) - 0.5]} \right) (p_{wfBI} - p_{wfBO}) \quad (\text{PA.244})$$

10 where

11 k_{rep} = repository permeability (m^2)

12 h_{rep} = repository height (m)

13 $r_{e,rep}$ = effective repository radius (m)

14 and the remaining symbols have already been defined. In the present analysis, $k_{rep} = 2.4 \times 10^{-13}$
15 m^2 ; h_{rep} at the time of the drilling intrusion under consideration is obtained from the solution of
16 Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation (PA.28),
17 Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30) (see Equation (PA.203)); and $r_{e,rep}$ is the same as the
18 radius r_e defined in Equation (PA.209). As previously indicated, p_{wfBO} is obtained from the
19 solutions to the Poettmann-Carpenter model summarized in Equation (PA.233), Equation
20 (PA.234), and Equation (PA.235).

21 Three equations (i.e., Equation (PA.239), Equation (PA.240), and Equation (PA.244)) with three
22 unknowns (i.e., p_{wfBP} , p_{wfBI} and Q) have now been developed. The solution for p_{wfBI} defines
23 the initial value p_{wE1} in Table PA-17. When the simplification in Equation (PA.243) is used, the
24 resultant solution for p_{wfBI} is

25
$$p_{wfBI} = \frac{p_{wfBO} + (p_{BP} - 2.98 \times 10^6) K_1}{1 + K_1} \quad (\text{PA.245})$$

26 where

1
$$K_1 = \frac{k_{BP}h_{BP} \left[\ln \left(\frac{r_{e,rep}}{r_w} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right]}{k_{rep}h_{rep} \left[\ln \left(\frac{r_{eBP}}{r_w} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right]} \quad (PA.246)$$

2 and -2.98×10^6 comes from Equation (PA.242). The expression in Equation (PA.246) was used
 3 to define p_{wE1} in the CCA for the determination of DBRs resulting from a drilling intrusion that
 4 occurred within 200 years of a preceding E1 intrusion (see Table PA-7). The same approach was
 5 used for the CRA-2004 and the CRA-2009.

6 **PA-4.7.7.2 Solution for Sand-Filled Borehole**

7 The determination of the pressure p_{wfBI} , with the assumption that a borehole filled with silty-
 8 sand-like material connects the brine pocket and the repository, is now considered. The
 9 approach is similar to that used for the open borehole, except that Equation (PA.236) and
 10 Equation (PA.237) are replaced by a single equation based on Darcy’s Law. Specifically, flow
 11 from the brine pocket to the repository is represented by

12
$$Q = \frac{k_{BH} A_{BH} \left[(p_{wfBP} - p_{wfBI}) + g\rho \right]}{\mu (y_{BP} - y_{rep})} \quad (PA.247)$$

13 where

14 k_{BH} = borehole permeability (m²)

15 A_{BH} = borehole cross-sectional area (m²)

16 and the remaining symbols have been previously defined. In the present analysis, k_{BH} is an
 17 uncertain input (see BHPRM in Table PA-19) and A_{BH} is defined by the assumption that the
 18 borehole diameter is the same as the drill bit diameter (i.e., 12.25 in. = 0.31115 m).

19 The representation for flow from the brine pocket inlet point through the repository to the outlet
 20 point associated with the drilling intrusion under consideration remains as defined in Equation
 21 (PA.244). Thus, two equations (i.e., Equation (PA.244) and Equation (PA.247)) and two
 22 unknowns (i.e., p_{wfBI} and Q) are under consideration. Solution for p_{wfBI} yields

23
$$p_{wfBI} = \frac{p_{wfBO} + K_2 p_{BP} - 2.98 \times 10^6 K_2}{1 + K_2} \quad (PA.248)$$

24 where

$$K_2 = \frac{\pi k_{BH} r_w^2 \left[\ln \left(\frac{r_{eBP}}{r_w} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right]}{2\pi h_{rep} k_{rep} (y_{BP} - y_{rep})} \quad (\text{PA.249})$$

and -2.98×10^6 comes from Equation (PA.242). The expression in Equation (PA.249) was used to define p_{wE1} in the determination of DBRs for a drilling intrusion that occurred more than 200 years after a preceding E1 intrusion (see Table PA-7).

PA-4.7.8 End of DBR

The CRA-2009 PA has 23,400 cases that potentially require solution of Equation (PA.214) through Equation (PA.220) to obtain the DBR volume (See Section PA-6.7.6). However, the DBR was set to zero without solution of Equation (PA.214), Equation (PA.215), Equation (PA.216), Equation (PA.217), Equation (PA.218), Equation (PA.219), and Equation (PA.220) when there was no possibility of a release (i.e., at the time of the intrusion, the intruded waste panel had either a pressure less than 8 MPa or a brine saturation below the residual brine saturation S_{br}).

For the remaining cases, Equation (PA.214), Equation (PA.215), Equation (PA.216), Equation (PA.217), Equation (PA.218), Equation (PA.219), and Equation (PA.220) were solved for a time period of 50 days, although the value used for t_e was always less than 50 days. The minimum value used for t_e was three days, which is an estimate of the time required to drill from the repository through the Castile Formation and then cement the intermediate casing. If there is little or no gas flow associated with brine inflow into the borehole during drilling in the Salado Formation, the current industry practice is to allow the brine to “seep” into the drilling mud and be discharged to the mud pits until the salt section is cased.

If there is a significant amount of gas flow, it is possible that the driller will lose control of the well. In such cases, DBRs will take place until the gas flow is brought under control. Two possibilities exist: (1) the driller will regain control of the well when the gas flow drops to a manageable level, and (2) aggressive measures will be taken to shut off the gas flow before it drops to a manageable level. In the CCA PA, the driller was assumed to regain control of the well when the gas flow dropped to a “cut-off” rate of 1×10^5 standard cubic feet per day (SCF/d in commonly used oil field units). Experience at the South Culebra Bluff Unit #1, which blew out in January 1978, suggests that approximately 11 days may be needed to bring a well under control before the gas flow drops to a manageable level (i.e., 1×10^5 SCF/d) (the CCA, Appendix MASS, Attachment MASS 16-2). In particular, it took 11 days to assemble the equipment and personnel needed to bring that well under control.

A reevaluation of the current drilling practices, including a review of the historic information and interviews with current drilling personnel in the WIPP area, was conducted (Kirkes 2007). This analysis found

1. The South Culebra Bluff #1 is not a suitable analogue for a hypothetical WIPP blowout.

- 1 2. Basing the WIPP maximum DBR parameter on the single most catastrophic blowout event in
 2 the region’s history does not reasonably represent “current drilling practice” as directed by
 3 regulations.
- 4 3. Well-known drilling procedures are sufficient to stop or *kill* a WIPP blowout under the most
 5 extreme anticipated pressures in hours, not days.
- 6 4. Using 4.5 days for a maximum DBR duration is still quite conservative, in that it assumes
 7 flow into the wellbore continues throughout the kill procedure and casing/cementing
 8 procedures, even though this assumption is not consistent with current practice.

9 Therefore, for the CRA-2009 PA, a value of 4.5 days was used for the maximum value used for
 10 t_e .

11 Given the preceding, t_e is defined by

$$12 \quad t_e = \begin{cases} \max \{ 3 \text{ d}, t_f \} & \text{if } t_f \leq 4.5 \text{ d} \\ 4.5 \text{ d} & \text{if } t_f > 4.5 \text{ d} \end{cases} \quad (\text{PA.250})$$

13 in PA, where t_f is the time at which the gas flow out of the well drops below 1×10^5 SCF/d. As
 14 a reminder, gas flow out of the repository in the intruding borehole, and hence t_e , is determined
 15 as part of the solution to Equation (PA.214), Equation (PA.215), Equation (PA.216), Equation
 16 (PA.217), Equation (PA.218), Equation (PA.219), and Equation (PA.220).

17 **PA-4.7.9 Numerical Solution**

18 As previously indicated, the BRAGFLO program is used to solve Equation (PA.214), Equation
 19 (PA.215), Equation (PA.216), Equation (PA.217), Equation (PA.218), Equation (PA.219), and
 20 Equation (PA.220) with the computational grid in Figure PA-28, the initial value conditions in
 21 Section PA-4.7.2, the boundary value conditions in Table PA-17, and parameter values
 22 appropriate for modeling DBRs. Thus, the numerical procedures in use for Equation (PA.214),
 23 Equation (PA.215), Equation (PA.216), Equation (PA.217), Equation (PA.218), Equation
 24 (PA.219), and Equation (PA.220) are the same as those described in Section PA-4.2.11 for the
 25 solution of Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation
 26 (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30).

27 In this solution, the boundary value conditions associated with drilling intrusions (i.e., p_{wf} and
 28 p_{wE1} in Table PA-17) are implemented through the specification of fluid withdrawal terms (i.e.,
 29 q_g and q_b in Equation (PA.24), Equation (PA.25), Equation (PA.26), Equation (PA.27), Equation
 30 (PA.28), Equation (PA.29), and Equation (PA.30)), rather than as predetermined boundary value
 31 conditions. With this implementation, the representations in Equation (PA.214) and Equation
 32 (PA.215) for gas and brine conservation become

$$1 \quad \nabla \cdot \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_g K_g k_{rg}}{\mu_g} (\nabla p_g + \rho_g g \nabla h) \right] + \alpha q_g = \alpha \frac{\partial (\phi \rho_g S_g)}{\partial t} \quad (\text{PA.251})$$

$$2 \quad \nabla \cdot \left[\frac{\alpha \rho_b K_b k_{rb}}{\mu_b} (\nabla p_b + \rho_b g \nabla h) \right] + \alpha q_b = \alpha \frac{\partial (\phi \rho_b S_b)}{\partial t} \quad (\text{PA.252})$$

3 and the constraints in Equation (PA.214), Equation (PA.215), Equation (PA.216), Equation
 4 (PA.217), Equation (PA.218), Equation (PA.219), and Equation (PA.220) remain unchanged.
 5 As used in Equation (PA.251) and Equation (PA.252), q_g and q_b are independent of the
 6 computational grid in use (Figure PA-28). In practice, q_g and q_b are defined with a productivity
 7 index (see Equation (PA.208)) that is a function of the specific computational grid in use, with
 8 the result that these definitions are only meaningful in the context of the computational grid that
 9 they are intended to be used with. This specificity results because q_g and q_b as used in Equation
 10 (PA.251) and Equation (PA.252) are defined on a much smaller scale than can typically be
 11 implemented with a reasonably sized computational grid. As a result, the values used for q_g and
 12 q_b in the numerical solution of Equation (PA.251) and Equation (PA.252) must incorporate the
 13 actual size of the grid in use.

14 In the solution of Equation (PA.251) and Equation (PA.252) with the computational grid in
 15 Figure PA-28, q_g is used to incorporate gas flow out of the repository, and q_b is used to
 16 incorporate both brine inflow to the repository from a pressurized brine pocket and brine flow
 17 out of the repository. For gas flow out of the repository,

$$18 \quad q_g(x, y, t) = \frac{kk_{rg}(x, y, t)[p_g(x, y, t) - p_{wf}]}{\mu_g[\ln(r_e / r_w) + s + c]} \quad (\text{PA.253})$$

19 if (x, y) is at the center of the grid cell containing the drilling intrusion (Figure PA-28), and $q_g(x,$
 20 $y, t) = 0$ (kg/m³)/s otherwise, where k , k_{rg} , μ_g , r_e , r_w , s , and c are defined in conjunction with
 21 Equation (PA.208), p_g is gas pressure, and p_{wf} is the flowing well pressure at the outlet borehole
 22 (i.e., the boundary value condition in Table PA-17). The factor h in Equation (PA.208) is the
 23 crushed height of the repository as indicated in Equation (PA.208) and defines the factor α in
 24 Equation (PA.251) and Equation (PA.252). In the numerical solution, $q_g(x, y, t)$ defines $q_{g,i,j}^{n+1}$ in

25 Equation (PA.91), with $q_{g,i,j}^{n+1}$ having a nonzero value only when i, j correspond to the grid cell
 26 containing the borehole through which gas outflow is taking place (i.e., the grid cells containing
 27 the down-dip, middle, and up-dip wells in Figure PA-28).

28 For brine flow,

$$29 \quad q_b(x, y, t) = \frac{kk_{rb}(x, y, t)[p_b(x, y, t) - p_{wf}]}{\mu_b[\ln(r_e / r_w) + s + c]} \quad (\text{PA.254})$$

1 if (x, y) is at the center of the grid cell containing the drilling intrusion through which brine
2 outflow from the repository is taking place (Figure PA-28);

$$3 \quad q_b(x, y, t) = \frac{kk_{rb}(x, y, t)[p_{wE1} - p_b(x, y, t)]}{\mu_b[\ln(r_e / r_w) + c]} \quad (\text{PA.255})$$

4 if (x, y) is at the center of the grid cell containing a prior drilling intrusion into a pressurized
5 brine pocket (Figure PA-28), where p_{wE1} is the boundary value condition defined in Table PA-
6 17; and $q_b(x, y, t) = 0$ otherwise. In the numerical solution of Equation (PA.251), $q_g(x, y, t)$
7 defines $q_{b_{i,j}}^{n+1}$ in a discretization for Equation (PA.252) that is equivalent to the discretization for
8 Equation (PA.251) shown in Equation (PA.91), with $q_{b_{i,j}}^{n+1}$ having a nonzero value only when i, j
9 correspond to the grid cell containing the borehole through which brine outflow is taking place
10 (i.e., the grid cells containing the down-dip, middle, and up-dip wells in Figure PA-28), in which
11 case, Equation (PA.254) defines $q_{b_{i,j}}^{n+1}$, or when i, j corresponds to the grid cell containing the
12 borehole through which brine inflow to the repository from a pressurized brine pocket is taking
13 place (i.e., the grid cell containing the E1 intrusion in Figure PA-28), in which case Equation
14 (PA.255) defines $q_{b_{i,j}}^{n+1}$.

15 **PA-4.7.10 Additional Information**

16 Additional information on BRAGFLO and its use in the CRA-2009 PA to determine DBRs can
17 be found in the analysis package for DBR (Clayton 2008b) and in the BRAGFLO user's manual
18 (Nemer 2007c).

19 **PA-4.8 Groundwater Flow in the Culebra Dolomite**

20 Extensive site characterization and modeling activities conducted in the WIPP vicinity have
21 confirmed that the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation is the most transmissive
22 geologic unit above the Salado. Thus, the Culebra is the unit into which actinides are most likely
23 to be introduced from long-term flow up a hypothetical abandoned borehole.

24 The Culebra's regional variation in groundwater flow direction is influenced by the distribution
25 of rock types in the groundwater basin where the WIPP is located. Site characterization
26 activities have shown that the direction of groundwater flow in the Culebra varies somewhat
27 regionally, but in the area that overlies the site, flow is generally southward. Site
28 characterization activities have also demonstrated that there is no evidence of karst groundwater
29 systems in the controlled area, although groundwater flow in the Culebra is affected by the
30 presence of fractures, fracture fillings, and vuggy pore features.

31 Basin-scale regional modeling of three-dimensional groundwater flow in the units above the
32 Salado demonstrates that it is appropriate, for the purposes of estimating radionuclide transport,
33 to conceptualize the Culebra as a two-dimensional confined aquifer. Groundwater flow in the
34 Culebra is modeled as a steady-state process, but uncertainty in the flow field is incorporated in

1 the analysis by using 100 different geostatistically based T fields. The T fields are initially
 2 constructed to be consistent with available head, transmissivity, and well testing data. Each T
 3 field is subsequently modified to incorporate impacts of uncertain future processes (potash
 4 mining and climate change), as described below.

5 Potash mining in the McNutt Potash Zone (hereafter referred to as the McNutt) of the Salado,
 6 which occurs now in the Delaware Basin outside the controlled area and may continue in the
 7 future, could affect flow in the Culebra if subsidence over mined areas causes fracturing or other
 8 changes in rock properties. Consistent with regulatory criteria, mining outside the controlled
 9 area is assumed to occur in the near future, and mining within the controlled area is assumed to
 10 occur with a probability of 1 in 100 per century (adjusted for the effectiveness of AICs during
 11 the first 100 years following closure). Consistent with regulatory guidance, the effects of mine
 12 subsidence are incorporated in the PA by increasing the transmissivity of the Culebra over the
 13 areas identified as mineable by a factor sampled from a uniform distribution between 1 and 1000.
 14 T fields used in the PA are therefore adjusted to account for this and steady-state flow fields
 15 calculated accordingly, once for mining that occurs only outside the controlled area, and once for
 16 mining that occurs both inside and outside the controlled area. Mining outside the controlled
 17 area is considered in both undisturbed and disturbed performance.

18 Climatic changes during the next 10,000 years may also affect groundwater flow by altering
 19 recharge to the Culebra. The extent to which the climate will change during the next 10,000
 20 years and how such a change will affect groundwater flow in the Culebra are uncertain.
 21 However, regional three-dimensional modeling of groundwater flow in the units above the
 22 Salado indicates that flow velocities in the Culebra may increase by a factor of 1 to 2.25 for
 23 reasonably possible future climates (Corbet and Swift 1996a and 1996b). This uncertainty is
 24 incorporated in the PA by scaling the calculated steady-state specific discharge within the
 25 Culebra by a sampled parameter within this range.

26 **PA-4.8.1 Mathematical Description**

27 Groundwater flow in the Culebra is represented by the PDE

$$28 \quad S = \left(\frac{\partial h}{\partial t} \right) = \nabla \cdot (b\mathbf{K}\nabla h) - Q \quad (\text{PA.256})$$

29 where

30 S = medium storativity (dimensionless),

31 h = hydraulic head (m),

32 t = time (s),

33 b = aquifer thickness (m),

34 \mathbf{K} = hydraulic conductivity tensor (m/s),

35 Q = source/sink term expressed as the volumetric flux per unit area ((m³/m²)/s = m/s).

36 Further, the Culebra is assumed to be two-dimensional with isotropic hydraulic conductivity. As
 37 a result, \mathbf{K} is defined by

$$\mathbf{K}(x, y) = k(x, y) \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{PA.257})$$

2 where $k(x, y)$ is the hydraulic conductivity (m/s) at the point (x, y) . The following simplifying
 3 assumptions are also made: fluid flow in the Culebra is at steady state (i.e., $\partial h / \partial t = 0$), and
 4 source and sink effects arising from borehole intrusions and infiltration are negligible (i.e., $Q =$
 5 0). Given these assumptions, Equation (PA.256) simplifies to

$$\nabla \cdot (b\mathbf{K}\nabla h) = 0 \quad (\text{PA.258})$$

7 which is the equation actually solved to obtain fluid flow in the Culebra. In PA, $b = 7.75$ m, and
 8 $k(x, y)$ in Equation (PA.257) is a function of an imprecisely known T field, as discussed in
 9 Section PA-4.8.2.

10 PA-4.8.2 Implementation

11 This section describes the salient features of the Culebra flow field calculation implementation.
 12 One should note, however, that this implementation has not been changed for the CRA-2009 PA.
 13 Instead, the flow fields generated for the CRA-2004 PABC have been reused for the CRA-2009
 14 PA (Lowry and Kanney 2005).

15 The first step in the analysis of fluid flow in the Culebra is to generate T fields $T(x, y)$ (m^2/s) for
 16 the Culebra and to characterize the uncertainty in these fields. This was accomplished by
 17 generating a large number of plausible T fields. A description of the method used to construct
 18 these T fields is included in Appendix TFIELD-2009. A brief outline of the method is presented
 19 below.

20 The T fields used for PA are based on several types of information, including a regression model
 21 developed on WIPP-site geologic data, measured head levels in the Culebra for the year 2000,
 22 and well drawdown test results. The process that led to the final T fields used in the PA is
 23 discussed below.

24 Geologic data, including (1) depth to the top of the Culebra, (2) reduction in thickness of the
 25 upper Salado by dissolution, and (3) the spatial distribution of halite in the Rustler below and
 26 above the Culebra, were used to define a geologic regression model that relates transmissivity at
 27 any location to a set of geologically defined parameters.

28 Base T fields are defined for a modeling domain measuring 22.4 km (19 miles) east-west by
 29 30.7 km north-south using a method of stochastic simulation. The base T fields were constructed
 30 from information on the depth to the Culebra, indicator functions defining the location of Salado
 31 dissolution, halite occurrence, and high transmissivity zones.

32 Seed T fields are defined by conditioning base T fields to measured values of transmissivity.
 33 This conditioning is performed with a Gaussian geostatistical simulation algorithm.

1 The seed T fields are calibrated to transient water-level data from the year 2000 in 37 wells
 2 across the region using the parameter estimation program PEST (Doherty 2002). The PEST
 3 program iteratively changes the seed T field values to minimize an objective function, using
 4 MODFLOW 2000 (Harbaugh et al. 2000) to compute the flow solution for each iteration. The
 5 objective function minimized by PEST is a combination of the weighted sum of the squared
 6 residuals between the measured and modeled heads and a second weighted sum of the squared
 7 differences in the estimated transmissivity between pairs of pilot points. The second weighted
 8 sum is designed to keep the T field as homogeneous as possible and provide numerical stability
 9 when estimating more parameters than there are data.

10 The calibrated T fields produced by PEST and MODFLOW are screened according to specific
 11 acceptance criteria (Beauheim 2003). Calibrated T fields that meet the acceptance criteria are
 12 modified for the partial and full mining scenarios. This modification increases transmissivity by
 13 a random factor between 1 and 1000 in areas identified as containing potash reserves, as
 14 described below. Steady-state flow simulations are then run using the mining-modified T fields.

15 Because radionuclide transport calculations are performed using a grid with uniform cells of $50 \times$
 16 50 m, the final step in the flow simulation is to run MODFLOW with a 50×50 m grid to
 17 calculate the flow fields required for the transport code. The hydraulic conductivities for the
 18 finer grid are obtained by dividing each 100×100 m cell used in the T field calculations into
 19 four 50×50 m cells. The conductivity assigned to each of the four cells is equal to the
 20 conductivity of the larger cell (Leigh, Beauheim, and Kanney 2003).


21 The hydraulic conductivity $k(x, y)$ in Equation (PA.257) is defined in terms of the T fields $T(x, y)$
 22 by

$$23 \quad k(x, y) = T(x, y) / b \quad (\text{PA.259})$$

24 Fluid flow is determined (using MODFLOW to solve Equation (PA.258)) for two different
 25 cases: (1) a partial mining case (mining of potash deposits outside the LWB), and (2) a full
 26 mining case (mining of potash deposits inside and outside the LWB) (Figure PA-31; see Lowry
 27 and Kanney 2005, Section 3.2.5 for more details). As specified by guidance in 40 CFR Part 194,
 28 potash mining increases the Culebra's hydraulic conductivity in the vicinity of such mining by an
 29 uncertain factor with a value between 1 and 1000. As specified in section 194.32 and described
 30 in Section PA-3.9, economic potash reserves outside the LWB are assumed to have been fully
 31 mined by the end of the 100-year period of AICs, after which the occurrence of potash mining
 32 within the LWB follows a Poisson process with a rate constant of $\lambda_m = 1 \times 10^{-4} \text{ yr}^{-1}$.

33 In the partial mining case, the hydraulic conductivity $k_{PM}(x, y)$ is defined by Equation (PA.259)
 34 inside the WIPP boundary and by $k_{PM}(x, y) = k(x, y) \times MF$ outside the WIPP boundary, where
 35 MF is determined by the uncertain parameter CTRANSFM (see Table PA-19). In the full
 36 mining case, the hydraulic conductivity is defined by $k_{FM}(x, y) = k(x, y) \times MF$ in all areas of the
 37 modeling domain.

38 In turn, $k_{PM}(x, y)$ and $k_{FM}(x, y)$ result in the following definition for the hydraulic conductivity
 39 tensor \mathbf{K} :



1
2 **Figure PA-31. Areas of Potash Mining in the McNutt Potash Zone**

3
$$\mathbf{K}_i(x, y) = k_i(x, y) \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad i = PM, FM \quad (\text{PA.260})$$

4 In the analysis, Equation (PA.258) is solved with each of the preceding definitions of \mathbf{K}_i to
5 obtain characterizations of fluid flow in the Culebra for partially-mined conditions and fully
6 mined conditions.


7 The determination of fluid flow in the Culebra through the solution of Equation (PA.258) does
8 not incorporate the potential effects of climate change on fluid flow. Such effects are
9 incorporated into the analysis by an uncertain scale factor to introduce the potential effects of
10 climate change into the analysis (Corbet and Swift 1996a and 1996b). Specifically, the Darcy
11 fluid velocity $v_i(x, y)$ actually used in the radionuclide transport calculations is given by

1
$$\mathbf{v}_i(x, y) = [u_i(x, y), v_i(x, y)] = SFC [\mathbf{K}_i(x, y) \nabla h_i(x, y)]^T, i = PM, FM \quad (\text{PA.261})$$

2 where $u_i(x, y)$ and $v_i(x, y)$ represent Darcy fluid velocities (m/s) at the point (x, y) in the x and y
 3 directions, respectively; $\nabla h_i(x, y)$ is obtained from Equation (PA.258) with $\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{K}_i$; and SFC is a
 4 scale factor used to incorporate the uncertainty that results from possible climate changes. The
 5 scale factor SFC is determined by the uncertain parameter CCLIMSF (see Table PA-19).

6 **PA-4.8.3 Computational Grids and Boundary Value Conditions**


7 The representation for fluid flow in the Culebra in Equation (PA.258) is evaluated on a
 8 numerical grid 22.4 km (13 miles) east-west by 30.7 km (19 miles) north-south, aligned with the
 9 compass directions (Figure PA-32). The modeling domain is discretized into 68,768 uniform
 10 100×100 m cells. The northern model boundary is slightly north of the northern end of Nash
 11 Draw, 12 km (7.4 mi) north of the northern WIPP site boundary, and about 1 km (0.62 miles)
 12 north of Mississippi Potash Incorporated's east tailings pile. The eastern boundary lies in a low-
 13 transmissivity region that contributes little flow to the modeling domain. The southern boundary
 14



15
 16 **Figure PA-32. Modeling Domain for Groundwater Flow (MODFLOW) and Radionuclide**
 17 **Transport (SECOTP2D) in the Culebra**

1 lies 12.2 km (7.5 miles) south of the southern WIPP site boundary, far enough from the WIPP
 2 site to have little effect on transport rates on the site. The western model boundary passes
 3 through the Mosaic (formerly International Minerals and Chemicals) tailings pond (Laguna Uno;
 4 see Hunter [1985]) due west of the WIPP site in Nash Draw.

5 Two types of boundary conditions are specified: constant-head and no-flow (Figure PA-33).
 6 Constant-head conditions are assigned along the eastern boundary of the model domain, and
 7 along the central and eastern portions of the northern and southern boundaries. Values of these
 8 heads are obtained from a kriged initial head field. The western model boundary passes through
 9 the Mosaic tailings pond (Laguna Uno) due west of the WIPP site in Nash Draw. A no-flow
 10 boundary (a flow line) is specified in the model from this tailings pond up the axis of Nash Draw
 11 to the northeast, reflecting the concept that groundwater flows down the axis of Nash Draw,
 12 forming a groundwater divide. Similarly, another no-flow boundary is specified from the
 13 tailings pond down the axis of the southeastern arm of Nash Draw to the southern model
 14 boundary, coinciding with a flow line in the regional modeling of Corbet and Knupp (1996).
 15



16
 17 **Figure PA-33. Boundary Conditions Used for Simulations of Brine Flow in the Culebra**

1 Thus, the northwestern and southwestern corners of the modeling domain are specified as
2 inactive cells in MODFLOW.

3 **PA-4.8.4 Numerical Solution**

4 The flow model in Equation (PA.258) is evaluated on the computational grid described in
5 Section PA-4.8.3 using MODFLOW 2000 (Harbaugh et al. 2000). MODFLOW discretizes the
6 flow equation with a second-order difference procedure (McDonald and Harbaugh 1988, p. 126).
7 Specifically, the discretized form of Equation (PA.258) is

$$8 \quad 0 = CR_{i,j-1/2} (h_{i,j-1} - h_{i,j}) + CR_{i,j+1/2} (h_{i,j+1} - h_{i,j}) \\ 9 \quad + CC_{i-1/2,j} (h_{i-1,j} - h_{i,j}) + CC_{i+1/2,j} (h_{i+1,j} - h_{i,j}) \quad (\text{PA.262})$$

10 where CR and CC are the row and column hydraulic conductances at the cell interface between
11 node i, j and a neighboring node (m^2/s). Since the grid is uniform, the hydraulic conductance is
12 simply the harmonic mean of the hydraulic conductivity in the two neighboring cells multiplied
13 by the aquifer thickness. For example, the hydraulic conductance between cells (i, j) and $(i, j -$
14 $1)$ is given by $CR_{i,j-1/2}$, and the hydraulic conductance between cells (i, j) and $(i + 1, j)$ is given
15 by $CC_{i+1/2,j}$:

$$16 \quad CR_{i,j-1/2} = \frac{2k_{i,j}k_{i,j-1}}{k_{i,j} + k_{i,j-1}} \times b \quad \text{and} \quad CC_{i+1/2,j} = \frac{2k_{i,j}k_{i+1,j}}{k_{i,j} + k_{i+1,j}} \times b$$

17 where $k_{i,j}$ is the hydraulic conductivity in cell i, j (m/s) and b is the aquifer thickness (m).


18 Figure PA-34 illustrates the cell numbering convention used in the finite-difference grid for
19 MODFLOW. The determination of h is then completed by the solution of the linear system of
20 equations in Equation (PA.262) for the unknown heads $h_{i,j}$. Fluxes at cell interfaces are
21 calculated from the values for $h_{i,j}$ internally in MODFLOW.

22 **PA-4.8.5 Additional Information**

23 Additional information on MODFLOW and its use in WIPP PA to determine fluid flow in the
24 Culebra can be found in the MODFLOW-2000 user's manual (Harbaugh et al. 2000) and in
25 McKenna and Hart (2003), Lowry (2003), and Lowry and Kanney (2005). Calculation of the
26 flow fields used in the CRA-2009 PA is presented in Lowry and Kanney (2005).

27 **PA-4.9 Radionuclide Transport in the Culebra Dolomite**

28 Extensive laboratory and field investigations have focused on the physical mechanisms
29 influencing transport in the Culebra, as well as the behavior of dissolved and colloidal actinides
30 in the Culebra. Field tests have shown that the Culebra is best characterized as a double-porosity
31



1
2 **Figure PA-34. Finite-Difference Grid Showing Cell Index Numbering Convention Used by**
3 **MODFLOW**

4 medium when estimating radionuclide transport in groundwater. Groundwater flow and
5 advective transport of dissolved or colloidal species and particles occur primarily in a small
6 fraction of the rock's total porosity corresponding to the porosity of open and interconnected
7 fractures and vugs. Diffusion and (much slower) advective flow occur in the remainder of the
8 porosity, which is associated with the low-permeability dolomite matrix. Transported species,
9 including actinides, if present, will diffuse into this porosity.

10 Diffusion from the advective porosity into the dolomite matrix will retard An transport by two
11 mechanisms. Physical retardation occurs simply because actinides that diffuse into the matrix
12 are no longer transported with the flowing groundwater, so transport is interrupted until they
13 diffuse back into the advective porosity. In situ tracer tests have been conducted to demonstrate
14 this phenomenon (Meigs, Beauheim, and Jones 2000). Chemical retardation also occurs within
15 the matrix as actinides are sorbed onto dolomite grains. The relationship between sorbed and
16 liquid concentrations is assumed to be linear and reversible. The distribution coefficients (K_{ds})
17 that characterize the extent to which actinides will sorb on dolomite are based on experimental
18 data. After their review of the CCA, the EPA required the DOE to use the same ranges, but to
19 change the distribution from uniform to loguniform. The DOE continues to use the EPA's
20 distributions in the CRA-2009 PA.


21 Modeling, supported by field tests and laboratory experiments, indicates that physical and
22 chemical retardation will be extremely effective in reducing the transport of dissolved actinides
23 in the Culebra. Experimental work has demonstrated that transport of colloidal actinides is not a
24 significant mechanism in the Culebra. As a result, An transport through the Culebra to the
25 subsurface boundary of the controlled area is not a significant pathway for releases from the
26 WIPP. As discussed in Section PA-9.0, the location of the mean CCDF that demonstrates

1 compliance with the containment requirements of section 191.13 is determined almost entirely
 2 by direct releases at the ground surface during drilling (cuttings, cavings, and spillings).

3 Radionuclide transport in the Culebra is computed using the SECOTP2D computer code (WIPP
 4 Performance Assessment 1997b). The mathematical equations solved by SECOTP2D and the
 5 numerical methods used in the code are described in the following sections.

6 **PA-4.9.1 Mathematical Description**

7 Radionuclide transport in the Culebra is described by a parallel-plate, dual-porosity model
 8 (Meigs and McCord 1996). The parallel-plate, dual-porosity conceptualization assumes that the
 9 numerous fractures within the formation are aligned in a parallel fashion and treats the fractured
 10 porous media as two overlapping continua: one representing the fractures and the other
 11 representing the surrounding porous rock matrix (see Figure PA-35). In this model, one system
 12 of PDEs is used to represent advective transport in fractures within the Culebra and another PDE
 13 system is used to represent diffusive transport and sorption in the matrix that surrounds the
 14 fractures.



15
 16 **Figure PA-35. Parallel-Plate, Dual-Porosity Conceptualization**

17 **PA-4.9.1.1 Advective Transport in Fractures**

18 The PDE system used to represent advective transport in fractures is given by (WIPP
 19 Performance Assessment 1997b)

20
$$\nabla \cdot [\phi \mathbf{D}_k \nabla C_k - \mathbf{v} C_k] = \phi R_k \left(\frac{\partial C_k}{\partial t} \right) + \phi R_k \lambda_k C_k - \phi R_{k-1} \lambda_{k-1} C_{k-1} - Q_k - \Gamma_k, \quad (\text{PA.263})$$

21 for $k = 1, 2, \dots, nR$, where

22 nR = number of radionuclides under consideration

23 C_k = concentration of radionuclide k in brine (kg/m^3)

- 1 \mathbf{D}_k = hydrodynamic dispersion tensor (m^2/s)
- 2 \mathbf{v} = Darcy velocity (i.e., specific discharge) of brine ($\text{m}/\text{s} = (\text{m}^3/\text{m}^2)/\text{s}$)
- 3 ϕ = advective (i.e., fracture) porosity (dimensionless)
- 4 R_k = advective retardation coefficient (dimensionless)
- 5 λ_k = decay constant for radionuclide k (s^{-1})
- 6 Q_k = injection rate of radionuclide k per unit bulk volume of formation ($(\text{kg}/\text{s})/\text{m}^3$) (Note:
- 7 $Q_k > 0$ corresponds to injection into the fractures)
- 8 Γ_k = mass transfer rate of radionuclide k per unit bulk volume of formation due to
- 9 diffusion between fractures and surrounding matrix ($(\text{kg}/\text{s})/\text{m}^3$) (Note: $\Gamma_k > 0$
- 10 corresponds to diffusion into fractures)

11 The Darcy velocity \mathbf{v} is obtained from the solution of Equation (PA.258); specifically, \mathbf{v} is
 12 defined by the relationship in Equation (PA.261). The advective porosity ϕ , defined as the ratio
 13 of the interconnected fracture pore volume to the total volume, is determined by an uncertain
 14 parameter (see CFRCPOR in Table PA-19).

15 The hydrodynamic dispersion tensor is defined by (WIPP Performance Assessment 1997b; Bear
 16 1972)

$$17 \quad \mathbf{D}_k = \frac{1}{\|\mathbf{v}\|\phi} \begin{bmatrix} u & -v \\ v & u \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_L & 0 \\ 0 & \alpha_T \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} u & v \\ -v & u \end{bmatrix} + \tau D_k^* \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{PA.264})$$

18 where α_L and α_T are the longitudinal and transverse dispersivities (m); u and v are the x and y
 19 components of \mathbf{v} (i.e., $\mathbf{v} = [u, v]$); \mathbf{D}_k^* is the free water molecular diffusion coefficient ($\text{m}^2 \text{s}^{-1}$)
 20 for radionuclide k ; and τ is the advective tortuosity, defined as the ratio of the true length of the
 21 flow path of a fluid particle to the straight-line distance between the starting and finishing points
 22 of the particle's motion. As in the CCA PA (Helton et al. 1998), the CRA-2009 PA uses $\alpha_L = \alpha_T$
 23 $= 0$ m and $\tau = 1$. Thus, the definition of \mathbf{D}_k used in PA reduces to

$$24 \quad \mathbf{D}_k = \mathbf{D}_k^* \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{PA.265})$$

25 The diffusion coefficients, \mathbf{D}_k^* , for the oxidation states of the radionuclides under consideration
 26 are shown in Table PA-18 (see Fox 2008, Table 35). The existence of Pu in the (III) or (IV)
 27 oxidation state (i.e., as Pu(III) or Pu(IV)) and the existence of U in the (IV) or (VI) oxidation
 28 state (i.e., as U(IV) or U(VI)) is determined by an uncertain parameter (see WOXSTAT in Table
 29 PA-19).

30 **Table PA-18. Radionuclide Culebra Transport Diffusion Coefficients**

Oxidation State	III	IV	VI
Diffusion Coefficient (m^2/s)	3.00×10^{-10}	1.53×10^{-10}	4.26×10^{-10}

1 **Table PA-19. Variables Representing Epistemic Uncertainty in the CRA-2009 PA**

Material	Property	Name	Description
AM+3	MKD_AM	CMKDAM3	Matrix distribution coefficient (m^3/kg) for Am in the III oxidation state. Defines K_{dk} in Equation (PA.271).
BH_SAND	PRMX_LOG	BHPERM	Logarithm of intrinsic permeability (m^2) of the silty-sand-filled borehole (Table PA-7). Used in regions Upper Borehole and Lower Borehole in Figure PA-15.
BOREHOLE	DOMEGA	DOMEGA	Drill string angular velocity (rad/s). Defines $\Delta\Omega$ in Equation (PA.133).
BOREHOLE	TAUFAIL	WTAUFAIL	Shear strength of waste (Pa). Defines $\tau(R, 1)$ in Equation (PA.131).
CASTILER	COMP_RCK	BPCOMP	Bulk compressibility (Pa^{-1}) of Castile brine reservoir. Defines c_{fB} in Equation (PA.35) for region CASTILER of Figure PA-15.
CASTILER	PRESSURE	BPINTPRS	Initial brine pore pressure in the Castile brine reservoir (region CASTILER in Figure PA-15).
CASTILER	PRMX_LOG	BPPRM	Logarithm of intrinsic permeability (m^2) of the Castile brine reservoir. Used in region CASTILER in Figure PA-15.
CELLULS	FBETA	FBETA	Factor beta for microbial reaction rates.
CONC_PCS	PORE_DIS	CONBCEXP	Brooks-Corey pore distribution parameter (dimensionless) for panel closure concrete (Section PA-4.2.8.1). Defines λ in Equation (PA.38), Equation (PA.39), and Equation (PA.40) for region CONC_PCS of Figure PA-15 for use with Brooks-Corey model; defines λ in $m = \lambda/(1 + \lambda)$ in Equation (PA.44), Equation (PA.45), and Equation (PA.46) for use with van Genuchten-Parker model in region CONC_PCS.
CONC_PCS	PRMX_LOG	CONPRM	Logarithm of intrinsic permeability (m^2) for the concrete portion of the panel closure (Section PA-4.2.8.1). Used in region CONC_PCS in Figure PA-15.
CONC_PCS	SAT_RBRN	CONBRSAT	Residual brine saturation (dimensionless) in panel closure concrete (Section PA-4.2.8.1). Defines S_{br} in Equation (PA.43) for use in region CONC_PCS in Figure PA-15.
CONC_PCS	SAT_RGAS	CONGSSAT	Residual gas saturation (dimensionless) in panel closure concrete (Section PA-4.2.8.1). Defines S_{gr} in Equation (PA.43) for area CONC_PCS in Figure PA-15.
CONC_PLG	PRMX_LOG	PLGPRM	Logarithm of intrinsic permeability (m^2) of the concrete borehole plugs (Table PA-7). Used in region Borehole Plugs in Figure PA-15.
CULEBRA	APOROS	CFRACPOR	Culebra fracture (i.e., advective) porosity (dimensionless). Defines ϕ in Equation (PA.263).
CULEBRA	DPOROS	CMTRXPOR	Culebra matrix (i.e., diffusive) porosity (dimensionless). Defines ϕ' in Equation (PA.270).

2
3

Table PA-19. Variables Representing Epistemic Uncertainty in the CRA-2009 PA (Continued)

Material	Property	Name	Description
CULEBRA	HMBLKLT	CFRACSP	Culebra fracture spacing (m). Equal to half the distance between fractures (i.e., the Culebra half-matrix-block length). Defines B in Equation (PA.276) and Figure PA-34.
CULEBRA	MINP_FAC	CTRANSFM	Multiplier (dimensionless) applied to transmissivity of the Culebra within the LWB after mining of potash reserves. Defines MF in Equation (PA.256) (see Section PA-4.8.2).
DRZ_1	PRMX_LOG	DRZPRM	Logarithm of intrinsic permeability (m^2) of the DRZ. Used in regions Upper DRZ and Lower DRZ in Figure PA-15.
DRZ_PCS	PRMX_LOG	DRZPCPRM	Logarithm of intrinsic permeability (m^2) of the DRZ immediately above the panel closure concrete (Section PA-4.2.8.3). Used in region DRZ_PCS in Figure PA-15.
GLOBAL	CLIMITDX	CCLIMSF	Climate scale factor (dimensionless) for Culebra flow field. Defines SFC in Equation (PA.261).
GLOBAL	OXSTAT	WOXSTAT	Indicator variable for elemental oxidation states (dimensionless). $WOXSTAT \leq 0.5$ indicates radionuclides in lower oxidation states. $WOXSTAT > 0.5$ indicates radionuclides in higher oxidation states.
GLOBAL	PBRINE	BPPROB	Probability that a drilling intrusion penetrates pressurized brine in the Castile. Defines pB_1 ; see Section PA-3.6.
GLOBAL	TRANSIDX	CTRAN	Indicator variable for selecting T field. See Section PA-4.8.2.
PHUMOX3	PHUMCIM	WPHUMOX3	Ratio (dimensionless) of concentration of actinides attached to humic colloids to dissolved concentration of actinides for oxidation state III in Castile brine. Defines $SF_{Hum}(\text{Castile}, +3, \text{Am})$ and $SF_{Hum}(\text{Castile}, +3, \text{Pu})$ for Equation (PA.103).
PU(III)	MKD_PU	CMKDPU3	Matrix distribution coefficient (m^3/kg) for Pu in III oxidation state. Defines K_{dk} in Equation (PA.271).
PU(IV)	MKD_PU	CMKDPU4	Matrix distribution coefficient (m^3/kg) for Pu in IV oxidation state. Defines K_{dk} in Equation (PA.271).
S_HALITE	COMP_RCK	HALCOMP	Bulk compressibility of halite (Pa^{-1}). Defines c_T in Equation (PA.37) for Salado region of Figure PA-15.
S_HALITE	POROSITY	HALPOR	Halite porosity (dimensionless). Defines ϕ_0 in Equation (PA.30) for Salado region in Figure PA-15.
S_HALITE	PRESSURE	SALPRES	Initial brine pore pressure (Pa) in the Salado halite, applied at an elevation consistent with the intersection of MB 139. Defines $p_{b,ref}$ for Equation (PA.55) for Salado region in Figure PA-15.
S_HALITE	PRMX_LOG	HALPRM	Logarithm of intrinsic halite permeability (m^2). Used in region Salado in Figure PA-15.

Table PA-19. Variables Representing Epistemic Uncertainty in the CRA-2009 PA (Continued)

Material	Property	Name	Description
S_MB139	PORE_DIS	ANHBCEXP	Brooks-Corey pore distribution parameter for anhydrite (dimensionless). Defines λ in Equation (PA.38), Equation (PA.39), and Equation (PA.40) for regions MB 138, Anhydrite AB, and MB 139 of Figure PA-15 for use with Brooks-Corey model; defines λ in $m = \lambda/(1 + \lambda)$ in Equation (PA.44), Equation (PA.45), and Equation (PA.46) for use with van Genuchten-Parker model in the same regions.
S_MB139	PRMX_LOG	ANHPRM	Logarithm of intrinsic anhydrite permeability (m^2). Used in regions MB 138, Anhydrite AB, and MB 139 in Figure PA-15.
S_MB139	RELP_MOD	ANHBCVGP	Indicator for relative permeability model (dimensionless) for regions MB 138, Anhydrite AB, and MB 139 in Figure PA-15. See Table PA-4.
S_MB139	SAT_RBRN	ANRBR SAT	Residual brine saturation in anhydrite (dimensionless). Defines S_{br} in Equation (PA.43) for regions MB 138, Anhydrite AB, and MB 139 in Figure PA-15.
SHFTL_T1	PRMX_LOG	SHLPRM2	Logarithm of intrinsic permeability (m^2) of lower shaft-seal materials for the first 200 years after closure. Used in Lower Shaft region in Figure PA-15.
SHFTL_T2	PRMX_LOG	SHLPRM3	Logarithm of intrinsic permeability (m^2) of lower shaft-seal materials from 200 years to 10,000 years after closure. Used in Lower Shaft region in Figure PA-15.
SHFTU	PRMX_LOG	SHUPRM	Logarithm of intrinsic permeability (m^2) of upper shaft-seal materials. Used in Upper Shaft region in Figure PA-15.
SHFTU	SAT_RBRN	SHURBRN	Residual brine saturation in upper shaft-seal materials (dimensionless). Defines S_{br} in Equation (PA.43) for Upper Shaft region in Figure PA-15.
SHFTU	SAT_RGAS	SHURGAS	Residual gas saturation in upper shaft-seal materials (dimensionless). Defines S_{gr} in Equation (PA.42) for Upper Shaft region in Figure PA-15.
SOLMOD3	SOLVAR	WSOLVAR3	Solubility multiplier (dimensionless) for III oxidation states. Used by ALGEBRA prior to PANEL (Section PA-4.4, Garner and Leigh 2005).
SOLMOD4	SOLVAR	WSOLVAR4	Solubility multiplier (dimensionless) for IV oxidation states. Used by ALGEBRA prior to PANEL (Section PA-4.4, Garner and Leigh 2005).
SPALLMOD	PARTDIAM	SPLPTDIA	Particle diameter of waste (m) after tensile failure, implemented by parameter SPALLMOD/PARTDIAM. Loguniform distribution from 0.001 to 0.1 (m). Defines d_p in Equation (PA.186).
SPALLMOD	REPIPERM	REPIPERM	Waste permeability of gas (m^2) local to intrusion borehole. Defines k in Equation (PA.168).
SPALLMOD	REPIPOR	SPLRPOR	Waste porosity (dimensionless) at time of drilling intrusion. Defines ϕ in Equation (PA.167).

Table PA-19. Variables Representing Epistemic Uncertainty in the CRA-2009 PA (Continued)

Material	Property	Name	Description
SPALLMOD	TENSLSTR	TENSLSTR	Tensile strength (Pa) of waste. Defines $\bar{\sigma}_r$ in Section PA-4.6.2.3.4.
STEEL	CORRMCO2	WGRCOR	Rate of anoxic steel corrosion (m/s) under brine-inundated conditions with no CO ₂ present. Defines R_{ci} in Equation (PA.68) for areas Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR in Figure PA-15.
TH(IV)	MKD_TH	CMKDTH4	Matrix distribution coefficient (m ³ /kg) for Th in IV oxidation state. Defines K_{dk} in Equation (PA.271).
U(IV)	MKD_U	CMKDU4	Matrix distribution coefficient (m ³ /kg) for U in IV oxidation state. Defines K_{dk} in Equation (PA.271).
U(VI)	MKD_U	CMKDU6	Matrix distribution coefficient (m ³ /kg) for U in VI oxidation state. Defines K_{dk} in Equation (PA.271).
WAS_AREA	BIOGENFC	WBIOGENF	Probability of obtaining sampled microbial gas generation rates.
WAS_AREA	GRATMICH	WGRMICH	Rate of CPR biodegradation (mol C ₆ H ₁₀ O ₅ / kg C ₆ H ₁₀ O ₅ /s) under anaerobic, humid conditions. Defines R_{mi} in Equation (PA.70) for areas Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR in Figure PA-15.
WAS_AREA	GRATMICI	WGRMICI	Rate of CPR biodegradation (mol C ₆ H ₁₀ O ₅ / kg C ₆ H ₁₀ O ₅ /s) under anaerobic, brine-inundated conditions. Defines R_{mi} in Equation (PA.70) for areas Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR in Figure PA-15.
WAS_AREA	PROBDEG	WMICDFLG	Index for model of CPR material microbial degradation (dimensionless). Used in Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR areas in Figure PA-15.
WAS_AREA	SAT_RBRN	WRBRNSAT	Residual brine saturation in waste (dimensionless). Defines S_{br} in Equation (PA.42) for Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR areas in Figure PA-15; also used in waste material in Figure PA-28 for DBR calculation; see Section PA-4.7.
WAS_AREA	SAT_RGAS	WRGSSAT	Residual gas saturation in waste (dimensionless). Defines S_{gr} in Equation (PA.43) for Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR areas in Figure PA-15; also used in waste material in Figure PA-28 for DBR calculation; see Section PA-4.7.
WAS_AREA	SAT_WICK	WASTWICK	Increase in brine saturation of waste due to capillary forces (dimensionless). Defines S_{wick} in Equation (PA.90) for Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR areas in Figure PA-15.

1

2 The advective retardation coefficient R_k is defined by

$$R_k = 1 + (1 - \phi) \rho_A K_{Ak} / \phi \quad (\text{PA.266})$$

3

1 where

2 ρ_A = surface area density of fractures in Culebra ($m^2/m^3 = 1/m$) (i.e., surface area of
3 fractures (m^2) divided by volume of fractures (m^3))

4 K_{Ak} = surface area distribution coefficient ($(kg/m^2)/(kg/m^3) = m$) (i.e., concentration of
5 radionuclide k sorbed on fracture surfaces (kg/m^2) divided by concentration of
6 radionuclide k dissolved in brine within fractures (kg/m^3))

7 Following the logic used in the CCA (Helton et al. 1998), $K_{Ak} = 0$ and thus $R_k = 1$ are used in the
8 PA.

9 In concept, the term Q_k in Equation (PA.263) provides the link between the releases to the
10 Culebra calculated with NUTS and PANEL (Section PA-6.7) and transport within the Culebra.
11 In the computational implementation of PA, radionuclide transport calculations in the Culebra
12 were performed for unit radionuclide releases to the Culebra, and the outcomes of these
13 calculations were used to construct the release to the accessible environment associated with
14 time-dependent releases into the Culebra derived from NUTS and PANEL calculations (Section
15 PA-6.8.3). The definition of Q_k is discussed in more detail in Section PA-4.9.1.4.

16 The initial condition for Equation (PA.263) is

17
$$C_k(x, y, 0) = 0 \text{ kg/m}^3 \quad (\text{PA.267})$$

18 Furthermore, the boundary value conditions for Equation (PA.263) are defined at individual
19 points on the boundary of the grid in Figure PA-32 on the basis of whether the flow vector $v =$
20 $[u, v]$ defines a flow entering the grid or leaving the grid. The following Neumann boundary
21 value condition is imposed at points (x, y) where flow leaves the grid:

22
$$\nabla C_k(x, y, t) \cdot n(x, y) = 0 \text{ (kg/m}^3\text{)}/m^3 \quad (\text{PA.268})$$

23 where $n(x, y)$ is an outward-pointing unit normal vector defined at (x, y) . The following Dirichlet
24 boundary value condition is imposed at points (x, y) where flow enters the grid:

25
$$C_k(x, y, t) = 0 \text{ kg/m}^3 \quad (\text{PA.269})$$

26 **PA-4.9.1.2 Diffusive Transport in the Matrix**

27 The system of PDEs used to represent diffusive transport in the matrix surrounding the fractures
28 is given by (WIPP Performance Assessment 1997b)

29
$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \chi} \left(\phi'_k D'_k \frac{\partial C'_k}{\partial \chi} \right) = \phi'_k R'_k \left(\frac{\partial C'_k}{\partial t} \right) + \phi'_k R'_k \lambda_k C'_k - \phi'_k R'_{k-1} \lambda_{k-1} C'_{k-1} \quad (\text{PA.270})$$

30 where χ is the spatial coordinate in Figure PA-35, D'_k is the matrix diffusion coefficient (m^2/s)
31 for radionuclide k defined by $D'_k = D_k^* \tau'$, and τ' is the matrix tortuosity. The remaining terms

1 have the same meaning as those in Equation (PA.263), except that the prime denotes properties
 2 of the matrix surrounding the fractures. A constant value ($\tau' = 0.11$) for the matrix (i.e.,
 3 diffusive) tortuosity is used in PA (Meigs 1996). The matrix (i.e., diffusive) porosity ϕ' is an
 4 uncertain input to the analysis (see CMTRXPOR in Table PA-19). The matrix retardation R'_k is
 5 defined by

$$6 \quad R'_k = 1 + (1 - \phi') \rho_s K_{dk} / \phi' \quad (\text{PA.271})$$

7 where ρ_s is the particle density (kg/m^3) of the matrix and K_{dk} is the distribution coefficient
 8 ($(\text{Ci/kg})/(\text{Ci/m}^3) = \text{m}^3/\text{kg}$) for radionuclide k in the matrix. The density ρ_s is assigned a value of
 9 $2.82 \times 10^3 \text{ kg/m}^3$ (Martell 1996b). The distribution coefficients K_{dk} are uncertain inputs to the
 10 analysis and dependent on the uncertain oxidation state of the relevant element (see CMKDAM3,
 11 CMKDPU3, CMKDPU4, CMKDTH4, CMKDU4, CMKDU6, and WOXSTAT in Table PA-19).

12 The initial and boundary value conditions used in the formulation of Equation (PA.270) are

$$13 \quad C'_k(x, y, \chi, 0) = 0 \text{ kg/m}^3 \quad (\text{PA.272})$$

$$14 \quad \partial C'_k(x, y, 0, t) / \partial z = 0 \text{ kg/m}^2 \quad (\text{PA.273})$$

$$15 \quad C'_k(x, y, B, t) = C_k(x, y, t) \quad (\text{PA.274})$$

16 where (x, y) corresponds to a point in the domain on which Equation (PA.263) is solved and B is
 17 the matrix half-block length (m) in Figure PA-35 (i.e., $2B$ is the thickness of the matrix between
 18 two fractures). The initial condition in Equation (PA.272) means that no radionuclide is present
 19 in the matrix at the beginning of the calculation. The boundary value condition in Equation
 20 (PA.273) implies that no radionuclide movement can take place across the centerline of a matrix
 21 block separating two fractures. The boundary value condition in Equation (PA.274) ensures that
 22 the dissolved radionuclide concentration in the matrix at the boundary with the fracture is the
 23 same as the dissolved radionuclide concentration within the fracture. The matrix half-block
 24 length B is an uncertain input to the analysis (see CFRACSP in Table PA-19).

25 PA-4.9.1.3 Coupling Between Fracture and Matrix Equations

26 The linkage between Equation (PA.263) and Equation (PA.270) is accomplished through the
 27 term Γ_k , defining the rate at which radionuclide k diffuses across the boundary between a
 28 fracture and the adjacent matrix (see Figure PA-35). Specifically,

$$29 \quad \Gamma_k = -\frac{2\phi}{b} \left(\phi' D'_k \frac{\partial C'_k}{\partial \chi} \Big|_{z=\chi} \right) \quad (\text{PA.275})$$

30 where b is the fracture aperture (m) defined by

$$1 \qquad b = \phi B(1 - \phi) \qquad \text{(PA.276)}$$

2 **PA-4.9.1.4 Source Term**

3 As already indicated, Equation (PA.263) and Equation (PA.270) are solved for unit radionuclide
 4 releases to the Culebra. Specifically, a release of 1 kg of each of the four lumped radionuclides
 5 (^{241}Am , ^{234}U , ^{230}Th , and ^{239}Pu) under consideration was assumed to take place over a time
 6 interval from 0 to 50 years, with this release taking place into the computational cell WPAC,
 7 located at the center of the Waste Panel Area in Figure PA-32, that has dimensions of 50 m \times
 8 50 m. The volume of this cell is given by

$$9 \qquad V = (50\text{m})(50\text{m})(4\text{m}) = 1 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3 \qquad \text{(PA.277)}$$

10 where 4 m is the assumed thickness of the Culebra Dolomite (Meigs and McCord 1996). As a
 11 result, $Q_k(x, y, t)$ has the form

$$12 \qquad Q_k(x, y, t) = \frac{1 \text{ kg}}{(1 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3)(50 \text{ yr})(3.16 \times 10^7 \text{ s / yr})} = 6.33 \times 10^{-14} \text{ kg / m}^3 / \text{s}$$

13 \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{(PA.278)}

14 for $0 \leq t \leq 50 \text{ yr}$ and (x, y) in cell WPAC, and $Q_k(x, y, t) = 0 \text{ (kg/m}^3/\text{s)}$ otherwise.

15 **PA-4.9.1.5 Cumulative Releases**

16 If B denotes an arbitrary boundary (e.g., the LWB) in the domain of Equation (PA.263) (i.e.,
 17 Figure PA-32), then the cumulative transport of $C_k(t, B)$ of radionuclide k from time 0 to time t
 18 across B is given by

$$19 \qquad C_k(t, B) = \int_0^t \left[\int_B \{v(x, y)C_k(x, y, \tau) - \phi D_k(x, y, t) \nabla C_k(x, y, \tau)\} b \cdot n(x, y) ds \right] d\tau \qquad \text{(PA.279)}$$


20 where h is the thickness of the Culebra (4 m), ϕ is the advective porosity in Equation (PA.263),
 21 $n(x, y)$ is an outward pointing unit normal vector, and $\int_B ds$ denotes a line integral over B .

22 **PA-4.9.2 Numerical Solution**

23 The numerical solution to the coupled PDE system represented by Equation (PA.263) and
 24 Equation (PA.270) is computed using SECOTP2D, an implicit finite-volume code for the
 25 simulation of multispecies reactive transport. A high-level description of the numerical
 26 procedures implemented in SECOTP2D follows, with more detail available in WIPP
 27 Performance Assessment (1997b).

1 **PA-4.9.2.1 Discretization of Fracture Domain**

2 The fracture domain is discretized in space using the block-centered finite-difference method
 3 indicated in Figure PA-36. In this formulation, cell concentrations are defined at grid block
 4 centers while the velocity components $[u, v]$ are defined on grid cell faces. A uniform mesh with
 5 $50\text{ m} \times 50\text{ m}$ cells is used for the spatial discretization. Ghost cells are placed outside the
 6 problem domain for the purpose of implementing boundary conditions. The temporal
 7 discretization is accomplished using variable time step sizes.



11

12

11 The dispersive term, $\nabla \cdot (\phi D_k \nabla C_k)$, in Equation (PA.263) is approximated using a second-order
 12 central difference formula (Fletcher 1988).

13 The advective term, $\nabla \cdot \mathbf{v} C_k$, is approximated using the Total Variation Diminishing (TVD)
 14 method (Sweby 1984). The TVD method provides a way of accurately resolving advection-
 15 dominated transport problems without the occurrence of nonphysical oscillations commonly
 16 present in second-order solutions. This method invokes a weighted upstream differencing
 17 scheme that locally adjusts the weighting to prevent oscillatory behavior and maximize solution
 18 accuracy. The weighting parameters are known as the TVD flux limiters $\Phi(x, y, r)$, where r is a

1 function of the concentration gradient and direction of flow. PA uses the van Leer TVD limiter
 2 (Sweby 1984, p. 1005), which is defined as

$$3 \quad \Phi(x, y, r) = \max \left\{ 0, \min \left\{ 2r, \frac{r + |r|}{1 + |r|} \right\} \right\} \quad (\text{PA.280})$$

4 At locations where u (i.e., the Darcy velocity in the x direction) is positive, r is defined at the
 5 $j-1/2, k$ interface by

$$6 \quad r_{j-1/2,k} = \frac{\partial C / \partial x|_{j-3/2,k}}{\partial C / \partial x|_{j-1/2,k}} \quad (\text{PA.281})$$

7 and at locations where u is negative, r is defined by

$$8 \quad r_{j-1/2,k} = \frac{\partial C / \partial x|_{j+1/2,k}}{\partial C / \partial x|_{j-1/2,k}} \quad (\text{PA.282})$$

9 Similar definitions are made for r at the $j, k-1/2$ interface in the y -direction with v (i.e., the
 10 Darcy velocity in the y direction) used instead of u .

11 Because Φ_k is a function of C_k , the discretized set of equations is nonlinear. This nonlinearity is
 12 addressed by treating the flux limiters explicitly (i.e., time lagged). Explicit treatment of the
 13 limiter functions, however, can lead to oscillatory and sometimes unstable solutions when the
 14 Courant number exceeds unity ($Cr > 1$), where Cr is defined by

$$15 \quad Cr = \max \{ Cr_x, Cr_y \}, \text{ where } Cr_x = |u| \Delta t / \phi \Delta x \text{ and } Cr_y = |v| \Delta t / \phi \Delta y$$

16 (PA.283)

17 To avoid this behavior, the application of the TVD method is restricted to regions in which the
 18 Courant numbers are less than one. In regions where $Cr > 1$, a first-order full upwinding scheme
 19 is invoked, which is unconditionally stable and nonoscillatory.

20 The discretized form of Equation (PA.263) can be expressed in a delta formulation as

$$21 \quad (\mathbf{I} + \mathbf{L}_{xx} + \mathbf{L}_{yy} + \mathbf{S}) \Delta \mathbf{C}^{n+1} = \mathbf{RHS}^n \quad (\text{PA.284})$$

22 where \mathbf{I} is the identity matrix, \mathbf{L}_{xx} and \mathbf{L}_{yy} are finite-difference operators in the x and y
 23 directions, \mathbf{S} is an implicit source term that accounts for decay and mass transfer between the
 24 matrix and the fracture, \mathbf{RHS} consists of the right-hand-side known values at time level n , and
 25 $\Delta \mathbf{C}_{n+1} = \mathbf{C}_{n+1} - \mathbf{C}_n$. Direct inversion of Equation (PA.284) for a typical Culebra transport
 26 problem is very computationally intensive, requiring large amounts of memory and time. To
 27 reduce these requirements, the operator in Equation (PA.284) is factored as follows:

$$(\mathbf{I} + \mathbf{L}_{xx} + \alpha_x \mathbf{S})(\mathbf{I} + \mathbf{L}_{yy} + \alpha_y \mathbf{S})\Delta \mathbf{C}^{n+1} = \mathbf{RHS}^n \quad (\text{PA.285})$$

where α_x and α_y are constants that must sum to one (i.e., $\alpha_x + \alpha_y = 1$). The left-hand sides in Equation (PA.284) and Equation (PA.285) are not equivalent, with the result that the factorization of Equation (PA.284) and Equation (PA.285) is referred to as an approximate factorization (Fletcher 1988). The advantage of approximately factoring Equation (PA.284) is that the resulting equation consists of the product of two finite-difference operators that are easily inverted independently using a tridiagonal solver. Hence, the solution to the original problem is obtained by solving a sequence of problems in the following order:

$$(\mathbf{I} + \mathbf{L}_{xx} + \alpha_x \mathbf{S})\Delta \bar{\mathbf{C}} = \mathbf{RHS}^n \quad (\text{PA.286})$$

$$(\mathbf{I} + \mathbf{L}_{yy} + \alpha_y \mathbf{S})\Delta \mathbf{C}^{n+1} = \Delta \bar{\mathbf{C}} \quad (\text{PA.287})$$

$$\mathbf{C}^{n+1} = \mathbf{C}^n + \Delta \mathbf{C}^{n+1} \quad (\text{PA.288})$$

PA-4.9.2.2 Discretization of Matrix Equation

The nonuniform mesh used to discretize the matrix equation is shown in Figure PA-37. Straightforward application of standard finite-difference or finite-volume discretizations on nonuniform meshes results in truncation error terms that are proportional to the mesh spacing variation (Hirsch 1988). For nonuniform meshes, the discretization can be performed after a transformation from the Cartesian physical space (χ) to a stretched Cartesian computational space (ξ). The transformation is chosen so that the nonuniform grid spacing in physical space is transformed to a uniform spacing of unit length in computational space (the computational space is thus a one-dimensional domain with a uniform mesh). The transformed equations contain metric coefficients that must be discretized, introducing the mesh size influence into the difference formulas. Standard unweighted differencing schemes can then be applied to the governing equations in the computational space.




Figure PA-37. Illustration of Stretched Grid Used for Matrix Domain Discretization

The SECOTP2D code applies such a coordinate transformation to the nonuniform diffusion domain mesh, solving the transformed system of equations in the uniform computational space. The transformed matrix equation is written as

$$\phi' R'_k \frac{\partial \hat{C}'_k}{\partial t} - \frac{\partial \hat{F}'_v}{\partial \xi'} = -\phi' R'_k \lambda_k \hat{C}'_k + \phi' R'_{k-1} \lambda_{k-1} \hat{C}'_{k-1} \quad (\text{PA.289})$$

where

$$1 \quad \hat{C}'_k = \frac{C'_k}{J} \quad (\text{PA.290})$$

$$2 \quad \hat{F}'_v = D'_{\xi_x} \frac{\partial C'_k}{\partial \xi'} \quad (\text{PA.291})$$

3 In the uniform computational space, a first-order backwards difference formula is used to
4 approximate the temporal derivative, while a second-order accurate central difference is used to
5 approximate spatial derivatives.

6 **PA-4.9.2.3 Fracture-Matrix Coupling**

7 The equations for the fracture and the matrix are coupled through the mass transfer term, Γ_k . In
8 the numerical solution, these equations are coupled in a fully implicit manner and solved
9 simultaneously. A procedure outlined in Huyakorn, Lester, and Mercer (1983) was adapted and
10 redeveloped for an approximate factorization algorithm with the delta formulation and a finite-
11 volume grid. The coupling procedure consists of three steps:

12 Step 1. Write the mass transfer term Γ_k in a delta (Δ) form.

13 Step 2. Evaluate Δ terms that are added to the implicit part of the fracture equation. This is
14 accomplished using the inversion process (LU factorization) in the solution of the matrix
15 equation. After the construction of the lower tridiagonal matrix L and the intermediate
16 solution, there is enough information to evaluate the Δ terms. This new information is
17 fed into the fracture equation that is subsequently solved for concentrations in the
18 fracture at the new time level ($n+1$).

19 Step 3. Construct the boundary condition for the matrix equation at the fracture-matrix interface
20 using fracture concentrations at the ($n+1$) time level. Matrix concentrations are then
21 obtained using the upper tridiagonal matrix U by back substitution. A detailed
22 description of this technique and its implementation is given in the SECOTP2D user's
23 manual (WIPP Performance Assessment 1997b).

24 **PA-4.9.2.4 Cumulative Releases**

25 The cumulative transport $C_k(t, B)$ of individual radionuclides across specified boundaries
26 indicated in Equation (PA.279) is also accumulated during the numerical solution of Equation
27 (PA.263) and Equation (PA.270).

28 **PA-4.9.3 Additional Information**

29 Because neither the Culebra flow fields nor the random seed used in LHS sampling have been
30 changed from the CRA-2004 PABC, the radionuclide transport calculations from the CRA-2004
31 PABC were used in the CRA-2009 PA. Additional information on SECOTP2D and its use to
32 determine radionuclide transport in the Culebra can be found in the SECOTP2D user's manual

- 1 (WIPP Performance Assessment 1997b) and in the CRA-2004 PABC analysis package for
- 2 radionuclide transport in the Culebra Dolomite (Lowry and Kanney 2005).

1 PA-5.0 Probabilistic Characterization of Subjective Uncertainty

2 This section summarizes the treatment of uncertainty in the CRA-2009 PA parameters. This
3 uncertainty gives rise to the epistemic uncertainty in the CCDFs defined in Section PA-2.2.4.

4 PA-5.1 Probability Space

5 As discussed in Section PA-2.2.4, the statement of confidence in the CCDFs of releases from the
6 CRA-2009 PA is based on a probabilistic characterization of the uncertainty in important input
7 parameters to the analysis. The probability distribution for each parameter is based on all
8 available knowledge about the parameter, including measurements, and describes a degree of
9 belief as to the appropriate range of the parameter value. This degree of belief depends on the
10 numerical, spatial, and temporal resolution of the models selected for use in PA (Section PA-
11 4.0). Correlations and other dependencies between imprecisely known variables are also
12 possible. These relationships represent observed or logical dependencies between the possible
13 parameter values.

14 The probability space that characterizes epistemic uncertainty can be represented as $(\mathcal{S}_{su}, \mathbb{S}_{su},$
15 $p_{su})$. The subscript su indicates that epistemic (i.e., subjective) uncertainty is being considered;
16 the letters su are retained for historical context. The individual elements of \mathcal{S}_{su} are vectors \mathbf{v}_{su} of
17 the form

$$18 \quad \mathbf{v}_{su} = [v_1, v_2, \dots, v_{nv}] \quad (\text{PA.292})$$

19 where each v_j is an imprecisely known input to the analysis, and nv is the number of such inputs.

20 The uncertainty in the v_j , and hence in \mathbf{v}_{su} , is characterized by developing a distribution

$$21 \quad D_j, \quad j = 1, 2, \dots, nv \quad (\text{PA.293})$$

22 for each v_j . Each distribution is based on available knowledge about the corresponding variable
23 and describes a degree of belief as to the appropriate range of this variable. This degree of belief
24 depends on the numerical, spatial, and temporal resolution of the models selected for use in PA
25 (Section PA-4.0). When appropriate, correlations between imprecisely known variables are also
26 possible, indicating a dependency in the knowledge about the correlated variables. It is the
27 distributions in Equation (PA.292) and any associated correlations between the v_j that define
28 $(\mathcal{S}_{su}, \mathbb{S}_{su}, p_{su})$.

29 The uncertain parameters incorporated into the CRA-2009 PA are discussed in Section PA-5.2,
30 and the distributions and correlations assigned to these variables are described in Section PA-5.3
31 and Section PA-5.4. Finally, a discussion of the concept of a scenario is given in Section PA-
32 5.5.

1 **PA-5.2 Variables Included for Subjective Uncertainty**

2 The CRA-2009 PA identified 56 imprecisely known variables for inclusion in the analysis (Table
3 PA-19). Most of the variables listed in Table PA-19 were also treated as uncertain in the CRA
4 2004. Table PA-20 and Table PA-21 list the additions and removals between the sets of
5 uncertain parameters in the CRA-2004 PA and the CRA-2009 PA, that resulted from changes
6 made for the CRA-2004 PABC. All subjectively uncertain variables incorporated into the
7 CRA-2009 PA are used as input to the models discussed in Section PA-2.2.3 and Section PA-
8 4.0.

9 **Table PA-20. Sampled Parameters Added Since the CRA-2004 PA**

Material	Property
SOLMOD3	SOLVAR
SOLMOD4	SOLVAR
WAS_AREA	BIOGENFC

10

11 **Table PA-21. Sampled Parameters Removed Since the CRA-2004 PA**

Material	Property
SOLU4	SOLCIM
SOLTH4	SOLCIM
S_MB139	COMP_RCK
S_MB139	SAT_RGAS
SOLAM3	SOLSIM
SOLAM3	SOLCIM
SOLPU3	SOLSIM
SOLPU3	SOLCIM
SOLPU4	SOLSIM
SOLPU4	SOLCIM
SOLU4	SOLSIM
SOLU6	SOLSIM
SOLU6	SOLCIM
SOLTH4	SOLSIM
SPALLMOD	RNDSPALL

12

13 **PA-5.3 Variable Distributions**

14 Each uncertain variable is assigned a distribution that characterizes the subjective uncertainty in
15 that variable. Distributions for each parameter are described in Fox (2008), which also contains
16 documentation for each of the 56 parameters sampled by the LHS code during the PA.

1 **PA-5.4 Correlations and Dependencies**

2 Most of the variables in Table PA-19 are assumed to be uncorrelated. However, the pairs
 3 (S_HALITE:PRMX_LOG, S_HALITE:COMP_RCK), and (CASTILER:PRMX_LOG,
 4 CASTILER:COMP_RCK) are assumed to have rank correlations of -0.99 and -0.75,
 5 respectively (Figure PA-38 and Figure PA-39). These correlations result from a belief that the
 6 underlying physics imply that a large value for one variable in a pair should be associated with a
 7 small value for the other variable in the pair. The scatterplots in Figure PA-38 and Figure PA-39
 8 result from the Replicate 1 samples generated by the LHS code and described in Section PA-6.4,
 9 with the rank correlations within the pairs induced with the Iman and Conover (1982) restricted
 10 pairing technique.

11 A conditional relationship had previously been enforced between WAS_AREA:GRATMICH
 12 and WAS_AREA:GRATMICI using ALGEBRA prior to running the BRAGFLO code (Nemer
 13 and Stein 2005). This relationship was implemented by setting WAS_AREA:GRATMICH to the
 14 value of WAS_AREA:GRATMICI if WAS_AREA:GRATMICH exceeded WAS_AREA:
 15 GRATMICI in any particular sample of parameter values (vector). Changing these values in this
 16 way introduced a small error into the sensitivity analysis for WAS_AREA:GRATMICH because
 17 the regression analysis was based on the sampled values rather than the conditional values used
 18 in the code. For the CRA-2009 PA, it was assumed that WAS_AREA:GRATMICH was
 19 uniformly distributed between 0 and the minimum of either 1.02717E-9 (the upper bound of the
 20 uniform distribution specified in the parameter database for the variable) or the value selected for
 21 WAS_AREA:GRATMICI. The sampled value of WAS_AREA:GRATMICH was rescaled from
 22 the range 0 to 1.02717E-9 to the new range using the equation


23
$$v'_i = \frac{v_i - U_{V,lower}}{U_{V,upper} - U_{V,lower}} \times (\min(x_i, U_{V,upper}) - U_{V,lower}) + U_{V,lower} \quad (\text{PA.294})$$

24 where v'_i is the conditioned value of WAS_AREA:GRATMICH, v_i is the sampled value of
 25 WAS_AREA:GRATMICH, x_i is the sampled value of WAS_AREA:GRATMICI, and $U_{V,lower}$
 26 and $U_{V,upper}$ are the bounds of the uniform distribution assigned to WAS_AREA:GRATMICH
 27 (Figure PA-40). This method preserves the quantile associated with the value of
 28 WAS_AREA:GRATMICH. The nature of the correlation is fundamentally different than that
 29 which LHS could induce between the variables: if, instead of limiting the value of
 30 WAS_AREA:GRATMICH, a correlation had been specified between the variables in the input
 31 file to LHS, then LHS would have generated values for WAS_AREA:GRATMICH that
 32 exceeded the corresponding value for WAS_AREA:GRATMICI.

33 The distributions and associated dependencies indicated in Table PA-19 and Figure PA-38,
 34 Figure PA-39, and Figure PA-40 define the epistemic uncertainty described in Section PA-2.2.4.
 35 The set of sampled parameters constitutes a vector, \mathbf{v}_{su} , of the form


36
$$\mathbf{v}_{su} = [\text{ANHBCEXP, ANHBCVGP, ..., WTAUFAIL}] \quad (\text{PA.295})$$

37 where the individual elements of \mathbf{v}_{su} are the subjectively uncertain variables described in Table
 38 PA-19.




1
2
3

Figure PA-38. Correlation Between S_HALITE:PRMX_LOG and S_HALITE:COMP_RCK



4
5
6

Figure PA-39. Correlation between CASTILLER:PRMX_LOG and CASTILLER:COMP_RCK



1
 2 **Figure PA-40. Dependency between WAS_AREA:GRATMICI and**
 3 **WAS_AREA:GRATMICH**

4 **PA-5.5 Separation of Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty**

5 PA uses the term *scenario* to refer to specific types of events within the sample space for
 6 aleatory uncertainty (E0, E1, E2, or E1E2; see Section PA-3.10). This definition is consistent
 7 with the concept that a scenario is something that could happen in the future. To maintain the
 8 important distinction between the two sample spaces, subsets of the sample space for subjective
 9 uncertainty are not referred to as scenarios. A future contains events of the form defined in
 10 Equation (PA.2) and is associated with a probability, one that characterizes the likelihood that a
 11 possible future will match the occurrences that will take place at the WIPP over the next 10,000
 12 years. In contrast, the probability associated with a specific vector \mathbf{v}_{su} , i.e., a specific set of
 13 parameter values, characterizes a degree of belief that the vector contains the appropriate values
 14 for the 56 uncertain variables in Table PA-19. This probability represents the impact that
 15 epistemic uncertainty in the parameters has on the distribution of possible futures and is used to
 16 establish confidence in the results.

1 PA-6.0 Computational Procedures

2 This section outlines the computational procedures used to execute the CRA-2009 PA. First, the
3 sampling procedures applied to evaluate performance accounting for epistemic and aleatory
4 uncertainty are outlined. The mechanistic calculations used to evaluate the function $f(\mathbf{x}_{st})$ in
5 Equation (PA.23) are tabulated, followed by a description of the algorithms used to compute
6 releases. This section concludes with a discussion of sensitivity analysis techniques used to
7 identify which uncertain parameters are primary contributors to the uncertainty in the PA results.

8 PA-6.1 Sampling Procedures

9 Extensive use is made of sampling procedures in PA. In particular, simple random sampling is
10 used to generate individual CCDFs (Section PA-2.2.3) and LHS is used to assess the effects of
11 imprecisely known model parameters (Section PA-2.2.4).

12 Using simple random sampling, a possible future, $\mathbf{x}_{st,i,k}$, is thus characterized by the collection of
13 intrusion events occurring in that future (Equation (PA.2)). The subscript st denotes that
14 intrusion is modeled as a stochastic process, the subscript i indicates that the future is one of
15 many possible futures, and the subscript k indicates that the variable set is one of many possible
16 variable sets. The nR sets of values (possible futures) are selected according to the joint
17 probability distribution for the elements of \mathcal{S}_{st} as defined by $(\mathcal{S}_{st}, \mathbb{S}_{st}, p_{st})$. In practice, the joint
18 probability distribution is defined by specifying a distribution D_j for each element x_j of \mathcal{S}_{st} .
19 Points from different regions of the sample space occur in direct relationship to the probability of
20 occurrence of these regions. Furthermore, each sample element is selected independently of all
21 other sample elements. The values selected using simple random sampling provide unbiased
22 estimates for means, variances, and distributions of the variables. The collection of nR samples
23 can be denoted as a vector $\mathbf{x}_{st,k}$:

$$24 \quad \mathbf{x}_{st,k} = \left[\mathbf{x}_{st,1,k}, \mathbf{x}_{st,2,k}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{st,nR,k} \right] \quad (\text{PA.296})$$

25 The WIPP PA code CCDFGF is used to simulate possible futures based on the values of the
26 variables sampled. These variables control the stochastic processes defined within CCDFGF,
27 such as the time when a drilling intrusion can take place, where that drilling intrusion is located,
28 and whether the drilling intrusion encounters an excavated area. The code CCDFGF is capable
29 of generating and evaluating thousands of possible futures; PA uses a sample size (nR) of 10,000
30 to generate a distribution of possible repository releases. This sample size is sufficient to
31 estimate the 0.999 quantile for the distribution of releases to the accessible environment.

32 LHS is used to sample the parameters for which distributions of epistemic uncertainty were
33 defined to integrate over the probability space for subjective uncertainty $(\mathcal{S}_{su}, \mathbb{S}_{su}, p_{su})$. This
34 technique was first introduced by McKay, Beckman, and Conover (1979). In LHS, the range of
35 each uncertain parameter v_j is divided into $nLHS$ intervals of equal probability and one value is
36 selected at random from each interval. The $nLHS$ values thus obtained for v_1 are paired at
37 random without replacement with the $nLHS$ values obtained for v_2 . These $nLHS$ pairs are
38 combined in a random manner without replacement with the $nLHS$ values of v_3 to form $nLHS$

1 triples. This process is continued until a set of $nLHS$ nV -tuples is formed. These nV -tuples are
 2 of the form

$$3 \quad \mathbf{v}_{su,k} = [v_{k,1}, v_{k,2}, \dots, v_{k,nV}], k = 1, \dots, nLHS \quad (\text{PA.297})$$

4 and constitute the Latin hypercube sample. The individual v_{js} must be independent of each other
 5 for the preceding construction procedure to work; a method for generating Latin hypercube and
 6 random samples from correlated variables was developed by Iman and Conover (1982) and is
 7 used in WIPP PA. For more information about LHS and a comparison with other sampling
 8 techniques, see Helton and Davis (2003).

9 LHS stratifies the sampling to ensure that the sampled values cover the full range of each v_j in
 10 the $nLHS$ samples. LHS provides unbiased estimates for means and distribution functions of each
 11 sampled variable (McKay, Beckman, and Conover 1979). In particular, uncertainty and
 12 sensitivity analysis results obtained with LHS are robust even when relatively small samples
 13 (i.e., $nLHS = 50$ to 200) are used (Iman and Helton 1988 and 1991; Helton et al. 1995).

14 When sampling for both aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty are considered, the joint
 15 sample space, \mathbf{x} , consists of a vector of $nLHS$ vectors of possible futures:

$$16 \quad \mathbf{x} = [\mathbf{x}_{st,1}, \mathbf{x}_{st,2}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{st,nLHS}] \quad (\text{PA.298})$$

17 The differences between the $nLHS$ futures are due to the uncertainty in the v_j , i.e. the epistemic
 18 uncertainty in model parameters.

19 **PA-6.2 Sample Size for Incorporation of Subjective Uncertainty**

20 40 CFR § 194.34(d) states that

21 The number of CCDFs generated shall be large enough such that, at cumulative releases of 1 and
 22 10, the maximum CCDF generated exceeds the 99th percentile of the population of CCDFs with at
 23 least a 0.95 probability.

24 For an LHS of size $nLHS$, the preceding guidance is equivalent to the inequality

$$25 \quad 1 - 0.99^{nLHS} > 0.95 \quad (\text{PA.299})$$

26 which results in a minimum value of 298 for $nLHS$. PA uses a total sample size of 300 to
 27 represent the epistemic uncertainty. As discussed in the next section, the 300 samples are
 28 divided among 3 replicates of size 100 each to demonstrate convergence of the mean for the
 29 population of CCDFs.

30 **PA-6.3 Statistical Confidence on Mean CCDF**

31 40 CFR § 194.34(f) states,

1 Any compliance assessment shall provide information which demonstrates that there is at least a
 2 95% level of statistical confidence that the mean of the population of CCDFs meets the
 3 containment requirements of § 191.13 of this chapter.

4 Given that LHS is used, the confidence intervals required by section 194.34(f) are obtained with
 5 a replicated sampling technique proposed by Iman (1982). In this technique, the sampling in
 6 Equation (PA.300) is repeated nS times with different random seeds. These samples lead to a
 7 sequence $\bar{P}_r(R)$, $r = 1, 2, \dots, nS$ of estimated mean exceedance probabilities, where $\bar{P}_r(R)$
 8 defines the mean CCDF obtained for sample r (i.e., $\bar{P}_r(R)$ is the mean probability that a
 9 normalized release of size R will be exceeded; see Section PA-2.2.4) and nS is the number of
 10 independent samples generated with different random seeds. The seed of the random number
 11 generator determines the sequence of the numbers it generates. Then,

$$12 \quad \bar{P}(R) = \sum_{r=1}^{nS} \bar{P}_r(R) / nS \quad (\text{PA.300})$$

13 and

$$14 \quad SE(R) = \left\{ \sum_{r=1}^{nS} [\bar{P}_r(R) - \bar{P}(R)]^2 / nS(nS-1) \right\}^{1/2} \quad (\text{PA.301})$$

15 provide an additional estimate of the mean CCDF and an estimate of the standard error ($SE(R)$)
 16 associated with the mean exceedance probabilities. The t-distribution with $nS-1$ degrees of
 17 freedom can be used to place confidence intervals around the mean exceedance probabilities for
 18 individual R values (i.e., around $\bar{P}(R)$). Specifically, the $1-\alpha$ confidence interval is given by
 19 $\bar{P}_r(R) \pm t_{1-\alpha/2} SE(R)$, where $t_{1-\alpha/2}$ is the $1-\alpha/2$ quantile of the t-distribution with $nS-1$ degrees
 20 of freedom (e.g., $t_{1-\alpha/2} = 4.303$ for $\alpha = 0.05$ and $nS = 3$). The same procedure can also be used to
 21 place pointwise confidence intervals around percentile curves. The mean and its standard error
 22 could equally well be computed from one replicate of size 300. However, the use of three
 23 replicates, each with its own random seed, minimizes the impact of any one seed used in random
 24 number generation. The three replicates have also been useful in evaluating the presence of
 25 spurious correlations among parameters and releases in the sensitivity analyses.

26 PA-6.4 Generation of Latin Hypercube Samples

27 The LHS program (WIPP Performance Assessment 1996) is used to produce three independently
 28 generated Latin hypercube samples of size $nLHS = 100$ each, for a total of 300 sample elements.
 29 Each individual replicate is a Latin hypercube sample of the form

$$30 \quad \mathbf{v}_{su,k} = [v_{k,1}, v_{k,2}, \dots, v_{k,nV}], \quad k = 1, 2, \dots, nLHS = 100 \quad (\text{PA.302})$$

31 In the context of the replicated sampling procedure described in Section PA-6.2, $nS = 3$
 32 replicates of 100 are used. For notational convenience, the replicates are designated by R1, R2,
 33 and R3.

1 The restricted pairing technique described in Section PA-6.1 is used to induce requested
 2 correlations and also to assure that uncorrelated variables have correlations close to zero. The
 3 variable pairs (S_HALITE:PRMX_LOG, S_HALITE:COMP_RCK) and (CASTILER:
 4 PRMX_LOG, CASTILER:COMP_RCK) are assigned rank correlations of -0.99 and -0.75,
 5 respectively (Section PA-5.4). All other variable pairs are assigned rank correlations of zero.
 6 The restricted pairing technique successfully produces these correlations (Table PA-22 and Table
 7 PA-23). Specifically, the correlated variables have correlations that are close to their specified
 8 values and uncorrelated variables have correlations that are close to zero.

9 **Table PA-22. Correlation Observed Between Variables S_HALITE:PRMX_LOG and**
 10 **S_HALITE:COMP_RCK in Replicate 1. A Value of -0.99 was Specified.**

	CONC PCS: SAT_RGAS	CONC PCS: SAT_RBRN	CONC PCS: PORE_DIS	S_HALITE: POROSITY	S_HALITE: PRMX_LOG
CONC_PCS: SAT_RGAS	1.0000	-	-	-	-
CONC_PCS: SAT_RBRN	-0.0156	1.0000	-	-	-
CONC_PCS: PORE_DIS	0.0547	-0.0943	1.0000	-	-
S_HALITE:POROSITY	-0.0177	-0.0160	-0.0743	1.0000	-
S_HALITE:PRMX_LOG	-0.0022	0.0287	-0.0094	-0.0409	1.0000
S_HALITE:COMP_RCK	0.0119	-0.0249	-0.0066	0.0248	-0.9863

11
 12 **Table PA-23. Correlation Observed Between Variables CASTILER:PRMX_LOG and**
 13 **CASTILER:COMP_RCK in Replicate 1. A Value of -0.75 was Specified.**

	CASTILER: PRMX_LOG	CASTILER: COMP_RCK	BH_SAND: PRMX_LOG	DRZ_1: PRMX_LOG
CASTILER: PRMX_LOG	1.0000	-	-	-
CASTILER: COMP_RCK	-0.7362	1.0000	-	-
BH_SAND: PRMX_LOG	0.0365	-0.0414	1.0000	-
DRZ_1: PRMX_LOG	-0.0292	0.0630	0.0081	1.0000

14
 15 The code LHS_EDIT (Kirchner 2008a) was used to enforce a conditional relationship between
 16 WAS_AREA:GRATMICH and WAS_AREA:GRATMICI in the LHS transfer file, thus making
 17 the conditioned values available for use in the sensitivity analysis (Section PA-5.4). This code
 18 rescaled the sampled value of WAS_AREA:GRATMICH from the range 0 to 1.02717E-9 to the
 19 new range using the equation

20
$$v'_i = \frac{v_i - U_{V,lower}}{U_{V,upper} - U_{V,lower}} \times (\min(x_i, U_{V,upper}) - U_{V,lower}) + U_{V,lower} \quad (\text{PA.303})$$

21 where v'_i is the conditioned value of WAS_AREA:GRATMICH, v_i is the sampled value of
 22 WAS_AREA:GRATMICH, x_i is the sampled value of WAS_AREA:GRATMICI, and $U_{V,lower}$

1 and $U_{V,upper}$ are the bounds of the uniform distribution assigned to WAS_AREA:GRATMICH.
 2 This method preserves the cumulative probability associated with the original sampled value of
 3 WAS_AREA:GRATMICH.

4 **PA-6.5 Generation of Individual Futures**

5 Simple random sampling (Section PA-6.1) is used to generate 10,000 possible futures that are
 6 then used to construct CCDFs of potential releases. Table PA-24 outlines the algorithm used to
 7 generate a single future in PA.

8 **Table PA-24. Algorithm to Generate a Single Future**

1.	Sample $t_{i,1}$ with a time dependent λ_d given by $\lambda_d(t) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } 0 \leq t \leq t_A \\ \lambda_d & \text{if } t > t_A \end{cases}$ where $t_A = 100$ yr (i.e., time at which administrative control ends) and $\lambda_d = 3.68 \times 10^{-3} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (see Section PA-3.3). The index i is the number of the future and 1 represents the first intrusion event.
2.	Sample $e_{i,1}$ with a probability of $p[E_0] = 0.797$ that the intrusion will be in an unexcavated area and a probability of $p[E_1] = 0.203$ that the intrusion will be in an excavated area (see Section PA-3.4).
3.	Sample $l_{i,j}$ with a probability of $p[L_j] = 6.94 \times 10^{-3}$ for each of the $j = 1, 2, \dots, 144$ nodes in Figure PA-14 (see Section PA-3.5).
4.	Sample $b_{i,1}$ with a probability of $p[B_1]$ that the intrusion will penetrate pressurized brine (see Section PA-3.6). $p[B_1]$ is sampled from a uniform distribution ranging from 0.01 to 0.60.
5.	Sample $p_{i,l}$ with probabilities of $p[PL_1] = 0.015$, $p[PL_2] = 0.696$, and $p[PL_3] = 0.289$ that plugging pattern 1, 2, or 3, respectively, will be used (see Section PA-3.7).
6.	Sample $\mathbf{a}_{i,l}$ (see Section PA-3.8).
6.1	Penetration of nonexcavated area (i.e., $e_{i,l} = 0$): $\mathbf{a}_{i,l} = a_{i,l} = 0$.
6.2	Penetration of excavated area (i.e., $e_{i,l} = 1$): Sample to determine if intrusion penetrates RH-TRU or CH-TRU waste with probabilities of $p[RH] = 0.124$ and $p[CH] = 0.876$ of penetrating RH-TRU and CH-TRU waste, respectively.
6.3	Penetration of RH-TRU waste: $\mathbf{a}_{i,l} = a_{i,l} = 1$.
6.4	Penetration of CH-TRU waste: Use probabilities $p[CH_j]$ of intersecting waste stream j , $j = 1, 2, \dots, 690$, (see Fox 2005) to independently sample three intersected waste streams iCH_{11} , iCH_{12} , iCH_{13} (i.e., each of iCH_{11} , iCH_{12} , iCH_{13} is an integer between 1 and 690). Then, $\mathbf{a}_{i,l} = [2, iCH_{11}, iCH_{12}, iCH_{13}]$.
7.	Repeat Steps 1 – 6 to determine properties (i.e., $t_{i,j}$, $e_{i,j}$, $l_{i,j}$, $b_{i,j}$, $p_{i,j}$, $\mathbf{a}_{i,j}$) of the j^{th} drilling intrusion.
8.	Continue until $t_{n+1} > 10,000$ yr; the n intrusions thusly generated define the drilling intrusions associated with $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$.
9.	Sample t_{min} with a time dependent λ_m given by $\lambda_m(t) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } 0 \leq t \leq t_A \\ \lambda_m & \text{if } t > t_A \end{cases}$ where $t_A = 100$ yr and $\lambda_m = 1 \times 10^{-4} \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (see Section PA-3.9).

9

1 For each vector of the LHS sample, a total of $nS = 10,000$ individual futures of the form

$$2 \quad \mathbf{x}_{st,i} = \left[\left(t_{i,1}, e_{i,1}, l_{i,1}, b_{i,1}, p_{i,1}, \mathbf{a}_{i,1} \right), \left(t_{i,2}, e_{i,2}, l_{i,2}, b_{i,2}, p_{i,2}, \mathbf{a}_{i,2} \right), \right. \\ \left. \dots, \left(t_{i,n}, e_{i,n}, l_{i,n}, b_{i,n}, p_{i,n}, \mathbf{a}_{i,n} \right), t_{i,min} \right], i = 1, 2, \dots, nR = 10,000 \quad (\text{PA.304})$$

3 are generated in the construction of all CCDFs for that LHS vector. As 300 LHS vectors are
4 used in the analysis and 10,000 futures are sampled for each LHS vector, the total number of
5 futures used in the analysis for CCDF construction is 3×10^6 .

6 The drilling rate λ_d is used to generate the times at which drilling intrusions occur. For a Poisson
7 process with a constant λ_d (i.e., a stationary process), the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
8 for the time Δt between the successive events is given by (Ross 1987, p. 113)

$$9 \quad \text{prob}(t \leq \Delta t) = 1 - \exp(-\lambda_d \Delta t) \quad (\text{PA.305})$$

10 A uniformly distributed random number r_1 is selected from $[0, 1]$. Then, solution of

$$11 \quad r_1 = 1 - \exp(-\lambda_d t_1) \quad (\text{PA.306})$$

12 for t_1 gives the time of the first drilling intrusion. An initial period of 100 years of administrative
13 control is assumed; thus 100 years is added to the t_1 obtained in Equation (PA.306) to obtain the
14 time of the first drilling intrusion. Selecting a second random number r_2 and solving

$$15 \quad r_2 = 1 - \exp(-\lambda_d \Delta t_1) \quad (\text{PA.307})$$

16 for Δt_1 gives the time interval between the first and second drilling intrusions, with the outcome
17 that $t_2 = t_1 + \Delta t_1$. This process continues until t_{n+1} exceeds 10,000 years. The times t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n
18 then constitute the drilling times in that possible future..

19 The mining time t_{min} is sampled in a manner similar to the drilling times. Additional uniformly
20 distributed random numbers from $[0,1]$ are used to generate the elements $e_j, l_j, b_j, p_j, \mathbf{a}_j$ of $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$
21 from their assigned distributions (see Section PA-2.2.2).

22 PA-6.6 Construction of CCDFs

23 In PA, the sampling of individual futures (Section PA-6.5) and associated CCDF construction is
24 carried out by the CCDFGF program (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003b). The sampled
25 futures $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ in Equation (PA.304) are used to construct CCDFs for many different quantities
26 (e.g., cuttings and cavings releases, spallings releases, DBRs, etc.). The construction process is
27 the same for each quantity. For notational convenience, assume that the particular quantity under
28 consideration can be represented by a function $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$, with the result that 10,000 values

$$1 \quad f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}), i = 1, 2, \dots, 10,000 \quad (\text{PA.308})$$

2 are available for use in CCDF construction. Formally, the resultant CCDF is defined by the
3 expression in Equation (PA.3). In practice, the desired CCDF is obtained after ordering $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$
4 from smallest to largest or largest to smallest, as described below.

5 PA uses a binning procedure in CCDF construction to simplify sorting the individual $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ and
6 to reduce the number of plot points. Specifically, the range of $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ is divided into intervals
7 (i.e., bins) by the specified points

$$8 \quad f_{\min} = b_0 < b_1 < b_2 < \dots < b_n = f_{\max} \quad (\text{PA.309})$$

9 where f_{\min} is the minimum value of $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ to be plotted (typically 10^{-6} or 10^{-5} for an EPA-
10 normalized release), f_{\max} is the maximum value of f to be plotted (typically 100 for an EPA-
11 normalized release), n is the number of bins in use, and the b_i are typically loguniformly
12 distributed with 20 values per order of magnitude. A counter nB_j is used for each interval $[b_{j-1}, b_j]$.
13 All counters are initially set to zero. Then, as individual values $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ are generated, the
14 counter nB_j is incremented by 1 when the inequality

$$15 \quad b_{j-1} < f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}) \leq b_j \quad (\text{PA.310})$$

16 is satisfied. When necessary, f_{\max} is increased in value so that the inequality $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}) < f_{\max}$ will
17 always be satisfied. Once the 10,000 values for $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ have been generated, a value of nB_j exists
18 for each interval $[b_{j-1}, b_j]$. The quotient

$$19 \quad pB_j = nB_j / 10,000 \quad (\text{PA.311})$$

20 provides an approximation to the probability that $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ will have a value that falls in the interval
21 $[b_{j-1}, b_j]$. The resultant CCDF is then defined by the points

$$22 \quad (b_j, \text{prob}(\text{value} > b_j)) = \left(b_j, \sum_{k=j+1}^n pB_k \right) \quad (\text{PA.312})$$

23 for $j = 0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1$, where $\text{prob}(\text{value} > b_j)$ is the probability that a value greater than b_j will
24 occur.

25 The binning technique produces histograms that are difficult to read when multiple CCDFs
26 appear in a single plot. As the number of futures is increased and the bins are refined, the
27 histogram CCDF should converge to a continuous CCDF as additional points are used in its
28 construction. The continuous CCDF is approximated by drawing diagonal lines from the left end
29 of one bin to the left end of the next bin.

30 When multiple CCDFs appear in a single plot, the bottom of the plot becomes very congested as
31 the individual CCDFs drop to zero on the abscissa. For this reason, each CCDF stops at the
32 largest observed consequence value among the 10,000 values calculated for that CCDF.

1 Stopping at the largest consequence value, rather than the left bin boundary of the bin that
 2 contains this value, permits the CCDF to explicitly show the largest observed consequence.
 3 Because a sample size of 10,000 is used in the generation of CCDFs for comparison with the
 4 EPA release limits, the probability corresponding to the largest observed consequence is
 5 typically 10^{-4} ; Figure PA-6 shows an example of CCDFs from the CRA-2009 PA.

6 **PA-6.7 Mechanistic Calculations**

7 In the CRA-2009 PA, calculations were performed with the models described in Section PA-4.0
 8 for selected elements of S_{st} (see Section PA-3.10), and the results were used to determine the
 9 releases to the accessible environment for the large number (i.e., 10,000) of randomly sampled
 10 futures used to estimate individual CCDFs. The same set of mechanistic calculations was
 11 performed for each LHS element. This section summarizes the calculations performed with each
 12 of the models described in Section PA-4.0; Section PA-6.8 outlines the algorithms used to
 13 construct releases for the randomly sampled elements $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ of S_{st} from the results of the
 14 mechanistic calculations. Long (2008) documents execution of the calculations and archiving of
 15 calculation results.

16 **PA-6.7.1 BRAGFLO Calculations**

17 The BRAGFLO code (Section PA-4.2) computes two-phase (brine and gas) flow in and around
 18 the repository. BRAGFLO results are used as initial conditions in the models for Salado
 19 transport (implemented in NUTS and PANEL), spallings (implemented in CUTTINGS_S), and
 20 DBR (also calculated by BRAGFLO). Thus, the BRAGFLO scenarios are used to define
 21 scenarios for other codes.

22 The four fundamental scenarios for the CRA-2009 PA (Section PA-3.10) define four categories
 23 of calculations to be performed with BRAGFLO (i.e., E0, E1, E2, and E1E2). These four
 24 fundamental scenarios were expanded into six general scenarios by specifying the time of
 25 drilling intrusions. Table PA-25 summarizes the specific scenarios used in the CRA-2009 PA.
 26 A total of 6 scenarios $\times nR \times nLHS = 6 \times 3 \times 100 = 1,800$ BRAGFLO calculations were
 27 conducted for the CRA-2009 PA.

28 **Table PA-25. BRAGFLO Scenarios in the CRA-2009 PA**

Fundamental Scenario (Section PA-3.10)	Specific Scenario	Time of Drilling Intrusion(s)
E0: no drilling intrusions.	S1	N/A
E1: single intrusion into excavated area ($e_1 = 1$), pressurized brine is penetrated ($b_1 = 1$), and Plugging Pattern 2 is used ($p_1 = 2$).	S2	350 years
	S3	1,000 years
E2: single intrusion into excavated area ($e_1 = 1$), pressurized brine is penetrated ($b_1 = 1$) and Plugging Pattern 3 is used ($p_1 = 3$), or pressurized brine is not penetrated ($b_1 = 0$).	S4	350 years
	S5	1,000 years
E1E2: two intrusions into the same waste panel ($e_1 = e_2 = 1$), the first being an E2 intrusion and the second being an E1 intrusion.	S6	1,000 years for E2 intrusion 2,000 years for E1 intrusion

29

1 Values for the activity level \mathbf{a}_1 and mining time t_{min} are not needed for the mechanistic
2 calculations; these values are used in the construction of the releases from the results of the
3 mechanistic calculations (Section PA-6.8). Although a value for drilling location l_1 is not
4 specified, a drilling location is required for the BRAGFLO calculations. If equivalent grids were
5 used in the definition of $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ (Figure PA-14) and in the numerical solution of the PDEs on which
6 BRAGFLO is based (Figure PA-15), the location of the drilling intrusion used in the BRAGFLO
7 calculations could be specified as a specific value for l_1 , which in turn would correspond to one
8 of the 144 locations in Figure PA-14 designated by l in the definition of $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$. However, as these
9 grids are not the same, a unique pairing between a value for l_1 and the location of the drilling
10 intrusion used in the computational grid employed with BRAGFLO is not possible. The
11 BRAGFLO computational grid divides the repository into a lower waste panel (Waste Panel
12 area), a middle group of four waste panels (South RoR area), and an upper group of five waste
13 panels (North RoR area), with the drilling intrusion taking place through the center of the lower
14 panel (Figure PA-15). Thus, in the context of the locations in Figure PA-14 potentially indexed
15 by l_1 , the drilling intrusions in Scenarios S2-S5 occur at a location in Panel 5, which is the
16 southernmost panel. In Scenario S6, both intrusions occur at a location in Panel 5, with the
17 effects of flow between the two boreholes implemented through assumptions involving the time-
18 dependent behavior of borehole permeability (Table PA-7).

19 **PA-6.7.2 NUTS Calculations**

20 For Scenarios S1–S5, radionuclide transport through the Salado is computed by the code NUTS
21 (Section PA-4.3) using the flow fields computed by BRAGFLO. Two types of calculations are
22 performed with NUTS. First, a set of screening calculations identifies elements of the sample
23 from \mathcal{S}_{su} for which radionuclide transport through the Salado to the LWB or Culebra is possible.
24 The screening calculations identify a subset of the sample from \mathcal{S}_{su} for which transport is
25 possible and for which release calculations are performed. Screening calculations are performed
26 for BRAGFLO Scenarios S1-S5, for a total of 1,500 screening calculations with NUTS (Table
27 PA-25).

28 Table PA-26 summarizes the NUTS release calculations for the CRA-2009 PA. Based on the
29 screening calculations, a total of 1,600 release calculations are performed for the CRA-2009 PA.
30 For each vector that is retained (based on the screening calculations), release calculations are
31 performed for a set of intrusion times.

32 Table PA-26 lists five scenarios for release calculations corresponding to the five BRAGFLO
33 scenarios. Each NUTS scenario uses the flow field computed for the corresponding BRAGFLO
34 scenario. The intrusion times for the NUTS scenarios are accommodated by shifting the
35 BRAGFLO flow fields in time so that the NUTS and BRAGFLO intrusions coincide. For
36 example, the NUTS S3 scenario with an intrusion at 3,000 years requires a flow field for the time
37 interval between (3,000 years and 10,000 years); this scenario uses the BRAGFLO S3 scenario
38 flow field for the time interval between (1,000 years and 8,000 years).

1

Table PA-26. NUTS Release Calculations in the CRA-2009 PA

NUTS Scenario	Number of Vectors with Releases				Flow field	Intrusion Time (t_1)
	R1	R2	R3	Total		
S1	1	0	0	1	BRAGFLO S1 scenario	N/A
S2	70	76	77	223	BRAGFLO S2 scenario	E1 intrusion at 100 and 350 years
S3	55	58	60	173	BRAGFLO S3 scenario	E1 intrusion at 1,000, 3,000, 5,000, 7,000, or 9,000 years
S4	15	14	15	44	BRAGFLO S4 scenario	E2 intrusion at 100 and 350 years
S5	14	13	13	40	BRAGFLO S5 scenario	E2 intrusion at 1,000, 3,000, 5,000, 7,000, or 9,000 years

2

3 Values for the variables indicating intrusion into an excavated area (e_1), penetration of
4 pressurized brine (b_1), plugging pattern (p_1), and drilling location (l_1) are the same as in the
5 corresponding BRAGFLO scenario. Values for the activity level \mathbf{a}_1 and mining time t_{min} are not
6 specified for the NUTS scenarios.

7 PA-6.7.3 PANEL Calculations

8 As outlined in Section PA-4.4, the code PANEL is used to estimate releases to the Culebra
9 associated with E1E2 scenarios and to estimate radionuclide concentrations in brine for use in
10 estimating DBRs. An E1E2 scenario assumes two drilling intrusions into the same waste panel:
11 the first an E2 intrusion (Table PA-25) occurring at time t_1 and the second an E1 intrusion (Table
12 PA-25) occurring at time t_2 . PANEL calculations are performed for $t_2 = 100, 350, 1,000, 2,000,$
13 $4,000, 6,000,$ and $9,000$ years using the flow field produced by the single BRAGFLO calculation
14 for Scenario S6, for a total of $7 \times nR \times nLHS = 7 \times 3 \times 100 = 2,100$ PANEL calculations. The
15 BRAGFLO flow field is shifted forward or backward in time as appropriate so that the time of
16 the second intrusion (t_2) coincides with the flow field. The shifting of the BRAGFLO flow field
17 results in values for the time (t_1) of the first intrusion (E2) for the PANEL calculations given by

$$18 \quad t_1 = \max \{100yr, t_2 - 1200yr\} \quad (\text{PA.313})$$

19 where the restriction that t_1 cannot be less than 100 years results from the definition of $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$,
20 which does not allow negative intrusion times, and from the assumption of 100 years of
21 administrative control during which there is no drilling (i.e., $\lambda_d(t) = 0 \text{ yr}^{-1}$ for $0 \leq t \leq 100 \text{ yr}$; see
22 Equation (PA.6)). Under this convention, the definition of Scenario S6 for the BRAGFLO
23 calculations differs from what is actually done computationally because t_1 does not always
24 precede t_2 by 1,000 years in the PANEL calculation. Values for the other variables defining the
25 element $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ of S_{st} for the PANEL E1E2 scenarios are the same as in the BRAGFLO S6
26 scenario.

27 Calculating radionuclide concentrations is not specific to any BRAGFLO scenario. The
28 concentration calculations compute the mobilized activity in two different brines (Castile and

1 Salado) and are performed at 100; 125; 175; 350; 1,000; 3,000; 5,000; 7,500; and 10,000 years
 2 for a total of $2 \times 9 \times nR = 54$ calculations.

3 **PA-6.7.4 DRSPALL Calculations**

4 The code DRSPALL calculates the spillings volume produced by gas buildup within the
 5 repository. Because of the computational expense associated with running the code, rather than
 6 evaluating all possible pressures for each vector, a set of four pressures is evaluated for each
 7 vector in each replicate. These values are then passed to CUTTINGS_S to act as a lookup table
 8 used by the latter code to linearly interpolate the spillings volume as a function of the repository
 9 pressure. DRSPALL does not compute releases to the environment, which is computed by the
 10 CUTTINGS_S code. A total of $4 \text{ pressures} \times nR \times nLHS = 4 \times 3 \times 100 = 1,200$ DRSPALL
 11 calculations were performed. As none of the changes implemented for the CRA-2009 PA
 12 affected the DRSPALL calculations, the results from the CRA-2004 PABC DRSPALL
 13 calculations were used in the CRA-2009 PA.

14 **PA-6.7.5 CUTTINGS_S Calculations**

15 The code CUTTINGS_S computes the volumes of solids removed from the repository by
 16 cuttings and cavings (see Section PA-4.5) and spillings (see Section PA-4.6). Table PA-27 lists
 17 the CUTTINGS_S calculations performed for the CRA-2009 PA, totaling $78 \times nR \times nLHS = 78$
 18 $\times 3 \times 100 = 23,400$ CUTTINGS_S calculations.

19 **Table PA-27. CUTTINGS_S Release Calculations in the CRA-2009 PA**

Scenario	Description
S1	Intrusion into lower, middle, or upper waste panel in undisturbed (i.e., E0 conditions) repository at 100; 350; 1,000; 3,000; 5,000; or 10,000 years: 18 combinations.
S2	Initial E1 intrusion at 350 years followed by a second intrusion into the same, adjacent, or nonadjacent waste panel at 550; 750; 2,000; 4,000; or 10,000 years: 15 combinations.
S3	Initial E1 intrusion at 1,000 years followed by a second intrusion into the same, adjacent, or nonadjacent waste panel at 1,200; 1,400; 3,000; 5,000; or 10,000 years: 15 combinations.
S4	Initial E2 intrusion at 350 years followed by a second intrusion into the same, adjacent, or nonadjacent waste panel at 550; 750; 2,000; 4,000; or 10,000 years: 15 combinations.
S5	Initial E2 intrusion at 1,000 years followed by a second intrusion into the same, adjacent, or nonadjacent waste panel at 1,200; 1,400; 3,000; 5,000; or 10,000 years: 15 combinations.

20

21 The CUTTINGS_S S1 scenario computes volumes of solid material released from the initial
 22 intrusion in the repository. Initial conditions for the CUTTINGS_S S1 scenario are taken from
 23 the results of the BRAGFLO S1 scenario during the intrusion of Waste Panel, South RoR, and
 24 North RoR areas in Figure PA-15, corresponding to the lower, middle, and upper waste panels.
 25 In this scenario, the excavated area is penetrated ($e_1 = 1$) and the drilling location (l_1) is defined
 26 as one of the nodes (Figure PA-14) in the appropriate panel of Figure PA-28. The actual
 27 locations where the intrusions are assumed to occur correspond to the points in Figure PA-28
 28 designated “Down-dip well,” “Middle well,” and “Up-dip well” for the lower, middle, and upper

1 waste panel, respectively. Values for the variables indicating penetration of pressurized brine
2 (b_1), plugging pattern (p_1), activity level (\mathbf{a}_1), and mining time (t_{min}) are not specified for the
3 CUTTINGS_S S1 scenario.

4 The other CUTTINGS_S scenarios (Scenarios S2-S5) compute volumes of solids released by a
5 second or subsequent intrusion. Initial conditions are taken from the results of the corresponding
6 BRAGFLO scenario at the time of the second intrusion. As in the BRAGFLO scenarios, the first
7 intrusion occurs in the lower waste panel (Waste Panel area in Figure PA-15), so the drilling
8 location (l_1) is defined as one of the nodes in Panel 5 (Figure PA-14). The second intrusion
9 occurs in the same waste panel as the first intrusion (area Waste Panel in Figure PA-15), an
10 adjacent waste panel (South RoR area in Figure PA-15), or a nonadjacent waste panel (North
11 RoR area in Figure PA-15); hence the drilling location (l_2) is defined as one of the nodes (Figure
12 PA-14) in the appropriate panel of Figure PA-28.

13 The activity level for the first intrusion a_1 takes a value that indicates CH-TRU waste penetration
14 (i.e., $\mathbf{a}_1 = [2, CH_{11}, CH_{12}, CH_{13}]$), but the specific waste streams penetrated (i.e. $CH_{11}, CH_{12},$
15 CH_{13}) are not specified. For the second intrusion, the excavated area is penetrated ($e_2 = 1$) and
16 the drilling location (l_2) is defined as one of the nodes in the appropriate panel (Figure PA-14),
17 as described above. As for the first intrusion, the activity level \mathbf{a}_2 only indicates CH-TRU waste
18 penetration. Values for the other variables defining the first intrusion ($e_1, b_1,$ and p_1) are the
19 same as in the corresponding BRAGFLO scenario. Values for the other variables defining the
20 second intrusion (b_2 and p_2) and the mining time t_{min} are not specified for the CUTTINGS_S
21 scenarios.

22 **PA-6.7.6 BRAGFLO Calculations for DBR Volumes**

23 Volumes of brine released to the surface during an intrusion are calculated using BRAGFLO, as
24 described in Section PA-4.7. Calculations of DBR volumes were conducted for the same
25 scenarios as CUTTINGS_S (Table PA-27). Thus, the elements of \mathcal{S}_{st} described in Section PA-
26 6.7.5 also characterize the elements for which DBR volumes are computed. A total of 23,400
27 BRAGFLO calculations were performed.

28 **PA-6.7.7 MODFLOW Calculations**

29 As described in Section PA-4.8, the MODFLOW calculations produce flow fields in the Culebra
30 for two categories of conditions: partially mined conditions in the vicinity of the repository and
31 fully mined conditions in the vicinity of the repository (Figure PA-31). As specified in 40 CFR
32 § 194.32(b), partially mined conditions are assumed to exist by the end of the administrative
33 control period (i.e., at 100 years after closure). After the time that mining occurs within the
34 LWB (t_{min} ; see Section PA-3.9), fully mined conditions are assumed for the remainder of the
35 10,000-year regulatory period. The flow fields for partially mined conditions are calculated by
36 MODFLOW using the T fields for partially mined conditions (see Section PA-4.8.2). Additional
37 MODFLOW calculations determine the flow fields for fully mined conditions and are performed
38 using the T fields for fully mined conditions. Thus, a total of $2 \times nR \times nLHS = 2 \times 3 \times 100 = 600$
39 MODFLOW calculations were performed (Table PA-28). As none of the changes implemented

1 for the CRA-2009 PA affected the Culebra flow and transport calculations, the results from the
 2 CRA-2004 PABC Culebra flow and transport calculations were used in the CRA-2009 PA.

3 **PA-6.7.8 SECOTP2D Calculations**

4 The SECOTP2D calculations are performed for the same elements $\mathbf{x}_{st,0}$ and $\mathbf{x}_{st,m}$ of \mathcal{S}_{st} defined
 5 in Section PA-6.7.7 for the MODFLOW calculations, giving a total of $2 \times nR \times nLHS = 2 \times 3 \times$
 6 $100 = 600$ SECOTP2D calculations (Table PA-29). As none of the changes implemented for the
 7 CRA-2009 PA affected the Culebra flow and transport calculations, the results from the
 8 CRA-2004 PABC Culebra flow and transport calculations were used in the CRA-2009 PA.

9 **Table PA-28. MODFLOW Scenarios in the CRA-2009 PA**

MODFLOW: 600 Flow-Field Calculations
PM: Partially mined conditions in vicinity of repository
FM: Fully mined conditions in vicinity of repository
Total calculations = $2 \times nR \times nLHS = 2 \times 3 \times 100 = 600$
Note: Only 100 unique T fields were constructed with PEST and MODFLOW for use in the analysis. The T fields are an input to the calculation of flow fields. In each replicate, the T field used for a particular flow field was assigned using an index value (CTAN; see Table PA-19) included in the LHS.

10

11 **Table PA-29. SECOTP2D Scenarios in the CRA-2004 PA**

SECOTP2D: 600 Calculations
PM: Partially mined conditions in vicinity of repository
FM: Fully mined conditions in vicinity of repository
Total calculations = $2 \times nR \times nLHS = 2 \times 3 \times 100 = 600$
Note: Each calculation includes a unit release for each of four radionuclides: ^{241}Am , ^{239}Pu , ^{230}Th , and ^{234}U .

12

13 **PA-6.8 Computation of Releases**

14 The mechanistic computations outlined in Section PA-6.7 are used to compute releases for each
 15 sampled element $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ of \mathcal{S}_{st} . Releases from the repository can be partitioned into three
 16 categories: undisturbed releases, which may occur in futures without drilling intrusions; direct
 17 releases, which occur at the time of a drilling event; and long-term releases, which occur as a
 18 consequence of a history of drilling intrusions. For a given future ($\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$ of \mathcal{S}_{st} in Equation
 19 (PA.304)) other than undisturbed conditions ($\mathbf{x}_{st,0}$), the direct and long-term releases are
 20 computed by the code CCDFGF (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003a) from the results of the
 21 mechanistic calculations summarized in Section PA-6.7, performed with the models presented in
 22 Section PA-4.0. Releases from an undisturbed repository are computed from the results of the
 23 NUTS S1 scenario (Section PA-6.7.2).

1 PA-6.8.1 Undisturbed Releases

2 Repository releases for the futures ($\mathbf{x}_{st,0}$) in which no drilling intrusions occur are computed by
 3 the NUTS release calculations for E0 conditions (Table PA-26). The NUTS model computes the
 4 activity of each radionuclide that reaches the accessible environment during the regulatory period
 5 via transport through the MBs, the Dewey Lake Red Beds and land surface due to brine flow up
 6 a plugged borehole. These releases are represented as $f_{MB}[\mathbf{x}_{st,0}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,0})]$, $f_{DL}[\mathbf{x}_{st,0}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,0})]$
 7 and $f_S[\mathbf{x}_{st,0}, f_B(\mathbf{x}_{st,0})]$ in Equation (PA.23). The undisturbed releases for the CRA-2009 PA are
 8 summarized in Section PA-7.2.

9 PA-6.8.2 Direct Releases

10 Direct releases include cuttings, cavings, spillings, and DBRs. The model for each direct release
 11 component computes a volume (solids or liquid) released directly to the surface for each drilling
 12 intrusion. These volumes are combined with an appropriate concentration of activity in the
 13 released waste. Summary information for the CRA-2009 PA direct releases are given in Section
 14 PA-8.5.

15 PA-6.8.2.1 Construction of Cuttings and Cavings Releases

16 Each drilling intrusion encountering waste is assumed to release a volume of solid material as
 17 cuttings, as described in Section PA-4.5.1. The uncompacted volume of waste removed by
 18 cuttings (V_{cut}) is computed by Equation (PA.124). In addition, drilling intrusions that encounter
 19 CH-TRU waste may release additional solid material as cavings, as described in Section PA-
 20 4.5.2. The uncompacted volume of material removed by cuttings and cavings combined ($V =$
 21 $V_{cut} + V_{cav}$) is computed by Equation (PA.125). For a drilling intrusion that encounters RH-
 22 TRU waste, the final eroded diameter D_f in Equation (PA.125) is equal to the bit diameter in
 23 Equation (PA.124). In PA, all drilling intrusions assume a drill bit diameter of 0.31115 m (Fox
 24 2008, Table 13).

25 The uncompacted volume of material removed is not composed entirely of waste material;
 26 rather, the uncompacted volume includes MgO and any void space initially present around the
 27 waste containers. The volume of waste removed (V_w) is determined by multiplying the
 28 uncompacted volume by the fraction of excavated repository volume (FVW) occupied by waste,
 29 thus

$$30 \quad V_w = V \times FVW \quad (\text{PA.314})$$

31 where $FVW = 0.385$ for CH-TRU waste and $FVW = 1.0$ for RH-TRU waste (Fox 2008, Table
 32 45). The activity in the material released by cuttings and cavings is determined by stochastically
 33 selecting a subset of all waste streams. The vector (\mathbf{a}_j) described in Section PA-3.8 determines
 34 which type of waste (CH-TRU or RH-TRU) and which waste streams are selected. The activity
 35 per cubic meter of waste stream volume is computed for each waste stream at a discrete set of
 36 times accounting for radioactive decay and ingrowth by the code EPAUNI (Fox 2005); the
 37 results of the EPAUNI calculations are presented in Fox (2005). Activities at other times are
 38 determined by linear interpolation. The cuttings and cavings release $f_C(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ is the product of the

1 average activity per cubic meter (C_r , computed as the average activity over the waste streams
 2 comprising the selected subset with the assumption that each waste stream contributes an equal
 3 volume to the release) and the volume of waste released (Equation (PA.315)):

$$4 \quad f_C(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}) = V_w \times C_r \quad (\text{PA.315})$$

5 **PA-6.8.2.2 Construction of Spallings Releases**

6 Spallings releases are calculated for all intrusions that encounter CH-TRU waste. The
 7 construction of the spallings release $f_{SP}(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ is nearly identical to that described in Section PA-
 8 6.8.2.3 for the calculation of DBRs, except that volumes of solid material released will be used
 9 rather than volumes of brine. These solid releases are calculated with the spallings submodel of
 10 the CUTTINGS_S program for the combinations of repository condition, distance from previous
 11 intrusions, and time between intrusions listed in Table PA-27. Linear interpolation determines
 12 the releases for other combinations of repository condition, distance, and time between intrusions
 13 (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003a).

14 The concentration of radionuclides in the spallings release volume is computed as the average
 15 activity per cubic meter in the CH-TRU waste at the time of intrusion. Activities in each waste
 16 stream are computed at a discrete set of times by the code EPAUNI (Fox 2005); activities at
 17 other times are determined by linear interpolation.

18 **PA-6.8.2.3 Construction of DBRs**

19 DBRs (also termed blowout releases) are calculated for all intrusions that encounter CH-TRU
 20 waste. DBRs $f_{DBR}(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ are constructed from the volume of brine released (V_{DBR}) to the surface
 21 (Equation (PA.202)) and radionuclide concentrations in brine (C_{bl} , see Equation (PA.96)). Brine
 22 volume released to the surface is computed by BRAGFLO (Section PA-4.7.3) for the times listed
 23 in Table PA-27; brine volumes released for intrusions at other times are computed by linear
 24 interpolation (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003b).

25 Calculating DBR volumes distinguishes between the first intrusion and subsequent intrusions.
 26 The release volumes for the initial intrusion (E0 repository conditions) are further distinguished
 27 by the panel group (upper, middle, and lower). As shown in Table PA-27, BRAGFLO computes
 28 release volumes for the initial intrusion at a series of intrusion times; the release volume for the
 29 initial intrusion at other times is computed by linear interpolation (WIPP Performance
 30 Assessment 2003a). Release volumes for subsequent intrusions are distinguished by the current
 31 state of the repository (E1 or E2) and the relative distance between the panel intruded by the
 32 current borehole and the panel of the initial intrusion (same, adjacent, nonadjacent). The
 33 algorithms for determining repository conditions and distance between intrusions are described
 34 in Section PA-6.7.5.

35 As indicated in Table PA-27, DBR volumes for a second intrusion are computed by BRAGFLO
 36 for combinations of repository condition, distance between intrusions, and time between
 37 intrusions. Brine release volumes for other combinations of condition, distance, and time are
 38 computed by linear interpolation (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003a). Brine releases from

1 the third and subsequent intrusions are computed as if the current intrusion was the second
2 intrusion into the repository.

3 Radionuclide concentrations in brine (C_{bl}) are calculated by PANEL (Section PA-6.7.3) for the
4 times listed in Table PA-26; concentrations at other times are computed by linear interpolation
5 (WIPP Performance Assessment 2003a). The type of intrusion (E1 or E2) determines the brine
6 (Salado or Castile brine) selected for the concentration calculation; Castile brine is used for E1
7 intrusions, and Salado brine is used for E2 intrusions.

8 The DBR is computed as the product of the release concentration and the volume, V_{DBR} .

$$9 \quad f_{DBR}(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}) = V_{DBR} \times C_{bl} \quad (\text{PA.316})$$

10 **PA-6.8.3 Radionuclide Transport Through the Culebra**

11 One potential path for radionuclides to leave the repository is through the boreholes to the
12 Culebra, then through the Culebra to the LWB (Ismail and Garner 2008). As indicated in Table
13 PA-26, the NUTS and PANEL models are used to estimate radionuclide transport through
14 boreholes to the Culebra $f_{NP}(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ for a fixed set of intrusion times; releases to the Culebra for
15 intrusions at other times are determined by linear interpolation (WIPP Performance Assessment
16 2003a). NUTS computes the release to the Culebra over time for E1 and E2 boreholes; PANEL
17 computes the release to the Culebra for an E1E2 borehole.

18 Each borehole may create a pathway for releases to the Culebra. The first E1 or E2 borehole in
19 each panel creates a release path, with the radionuclide release taken from the appropriate NUTS
20 data. Subsequent E2 boreholes into a panel with only E2 boreholes do not cause additional
21 releases; WIPP PA assumes that a subsequent E2 borehole into a panel having only earlier E2
22 intrusions does not provide a significant source of additional brine, and thus does not release
23 additional radionuclides to the Culebra.

24 An E1E2 borehole results from the combination of two or more intrusions into the same panel, at
25 least one of which is an E1 intrusion. A subsequent E1 borehole changes the panel's condition to
26 E1E2, as does an E2 borehole into a panel that has an earlier E1 intrusion. Once E1E2
27 conditions exist in a panel, they persist throughout the regulatory period. However, releases
28 from a panel with E1E2 conditions are restarted for each subsequent E1 intrusion into that panel,
29 since additional E1 intrusions may introduce new volumes of brine to the panel.

30 Releases to the Culebra are summed across all release pathways to the Culebra to obtain total
31 releases to the Culebra $r_k(t)$ for the k^{th} radionuclide at each time t . Releases to the Culebra
32 include both dissolved radionuclides and radionuclides sorbed to colloids. The WIPP PA
33 assumes that radionuclides sorbed to humic colloids disassociate and transport, as do dissolved
34 radionuclides; other colloid species do not transport in the Culebra (see Appendix SOTERM-
35 2009, Section SOTERM-4.7). The release to the Culebra is partitioned into dissolved and
36 colloid species by multiplying $r_k(t)$ by radionuclide-specific factors for the fraction dissolved and
37 the fraction on colloids. Dissolved radionuclides are always transported through the Culebra.

1 Radionuclide transport through the Culebra is computed by the code SECOTP2D (Section PA-
 2 4.9) for partially mined and fully mined conditions, as indicated in Table PA-29. These
 3 computations assume a 1 kg source of each radionuclide placed in the Culebra between 0 and 50
 4 years and result in the fraction of each source $f_{m,k}(t)$, where m is the mining condition and k is
 5 the index for the radionuclide, reaching the LWB at each subsequent time t . For convenience,
 6 the time-ordering of the data from SECOTP2D is reversed so that the fraction $f_{m,k}(t)$ associated
 7 with year $t = 200$, for example, represents the release at the boundary at year 10,000 for a release
 8 occurring between 150 and 200 years.

9 The total release through the Culebra $R_{Cul,k}$ is calculated for the k^{th} radionuclide by

$$10 \quad R_{Cul,k} = \sum_{t_i \leq t_m} r_k(t_i) f_{PM,k}(t_i) + \sum_{t_i > t_{min}} r_k(t_i) f_{FM,k}(t_i) \quad (\text{PA.317})$$

11 where $r_k(t_i)$ is the release of the k^{th} radionuclide to the Culebra in kg at time t_i , and $f_{PM,k}(t_i)$ and
 12 $f_{FM,k}(t_i)$ are the fractions of a unit source placed in the Culebra in the interval (t_{i-1}, t_i) that
 13 reaches the LWB by the end of the 10,000-year regulatory period for partially mined and fully
 14 mined conditions within the LWB, respectively. The function $f_{m,k}(t)$ ($m = PM, FM$) changes
 15 when mining is assumed to occur within the LWB; hence the sum in the equation above is
 16 evaluated in two parts, where t_{min} is the time that mining occurs. The total releases through the
 17 Culebra $f_{ST}(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ is computed by converting the release of each radionuclide $R_{Cul,k}$ from kg to
 18 EPA units, then summing over all radionuclides.

19 **PA-6.8.4 Determining Initial Conditions for Direct and Transport Releases**

20 A sequence of intrusions into the repository can change the conditions in and around the
 21 repository and, hence, affect releases from subsequent intrusions. This section describes how
 22 panel and repository conditions are determined for a given intrusion.

23 **PA-6.8.4.1 Determining Repository and Panel Conditions**

24 Direct releases by DBR and spallings, and subsequent releases by radionuclide transport, require
 25 determining the conditions in the intruded panel and the repository at the time of the intrusion.
 26 One of three conditions is assigned to the repository:

- 27 • E0 the repository is undisturbed by drilling,
- 28 • E1 the repository has at least one E1 intrusion, or
- 29 • E2 the repository has one or more E2 intrusions, but no E1 intrusions.

30 In addition, each panel is assigned one of four conditions:

- 31 • E0 the excavated regions of the panel have not been intruded by drilling,
- 32 • E1 the panel has one previous E1 intrusions (intersecting a brine reservoir in the
 33 Castile),

- 1 • E2 the panel has one or more previous E2 intrusions (none intersect brine reservoirs),
2 or
- 3 • E1E2 the panel has at least two previous intrusions, at least one of which is an E1
4 intrusion.

5 Repository conditions are used to determine direct releases for each intrusion by DBRs and
6 spallings. Panel conditions are used to determine releases by transport through the Culebra.

7 When an intrusion into CH-TRU waste occurs, the stochastic variables in Table PA-24 are used
8 in the algorithm shown in Figure PA-41 to determine the type of the intrusion (E1 or E2). The
9 type of the intrusion is used to update the conditions for the intruded panel and the repository
10 before stepping forward in time to the next intrusion.

11 **PA-6.8.4.2 Determining Distance from Previous Intrusions**

12 Direct releases by DBR and spallings require determining the distance between the panel hit by
13 the current intrusion and the panels hit by previous intrusions. In PA, the 10 panels are divided
14 into three groups: lower, consisting of only Panel 5; middle, including Panels 3, 4, 6, and 9; and
15 upper, including Panels 1, 2, 7, 8, and 10, as shown in Figure PA-29. These divisions are
16 consistent with the repository representation in the BRAGFLO model for Salado flow (Section
17 PA-4.2) and for DBRs (Section PA-4.7).

18 The initial intrusion can occur in any of the 10 actual waste panels, so the direct releases for the
19 initial intrusion are modeled as if the initial intrusion occurred in a lower, middle, or upper waste
20 panel based on the division discussed above. Initial conditions for direct releases from
21 subsequent intrusions are modeled by one of three cases: lower, middle, and upper,
22 corresponding to the three panel groups shown in Figure PA-29 and listed in Table PA-27. The
23 lower case represents a second intrusion into a previously intruded panel. The middle case
24 represents an intrusion into an undisturbed panel that is adjacent to a previously disturbed panel.
25 The upper case represents an intrusion into an undisturbed panel that is not adjacent to a
26 previously disturbed panel. Adjacent panels share one side in common, and nonadjacent panels
27 share no sides in common.

28 The time and location of the previous intrusion is used to determine distance from the current
29 intrusion and depends on the repository condition, which is determined by the intrusion of
30 greatest consequence across all panels prior to the current intrusion. E1 intrusions are assumed
31 to be of greater consequence than E2 intrusions. The previous intrusion is selected by finding
32 the closest panel (same, adjacent, nonadjacent) whose intrusion condition, excluding the current
33 intrusion, is equal to the repository condition. The time of the previous intrusion is the time of
34 the most recent intrusion with the greatest consequence and closest distance. Likewise, the
35 condition of each panel is equal to the intrusion of greatest consequence into the panel prior to
36 the current intrusion.




Figure PA-41. Logic Diagram for Determining the Intrusion Type

PA-6.8.5 CCDF Construction

For each vector $\mathbf{v}_{su,k}$ in the space of subjective uncertainty, the code CCDFGF samples a sequence $\mathbf{x}_{st,i}$, $i = 1, 2, \dots, nR$ of futures. In PA, $nR = 10,000$; this number of futures is sufficient to adequately estimate the mean CCDF of total releases for comparison with the boundary line specified in section 191.13, as demonstrated in Section PA-9.0. A release $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ for each future is then constructed as described in Section PA-6.8.1, Section PA-6.8.2, and Section PA-6.8.3. Once the $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ are evaluated, the CCDF can be approximated as indicated in Equation (PA.318).

1
$$prob(Rel > R) = \int_{S_{st}} \delta_R [f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] d_{st}(\mathbf{x}_{st,i}) dV_{st} \cong \sum_{i=1}^{nR} \delta_R [f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})] / nR \quad (PA.318)$$

2 A binning technique is used to construct the desired CCDF: the consequence axis is divided into
 3 a sequence of bins, and the number of values for $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ falling in each bin is accumulated. In
 4 addition, all values for $f(\mathbf{x}_{st,i})$ are saved and subsequently ordered to provide an alternative
 5 method for constructing the CCDFs. In addition to the total CCDF for all releases, it will be
 6 possible to obtain CCDFs for individual release modes (e.g., cuttings, spillings, DBRs, to
 7 Culebra, through MBs, through Culebra). The logic diagram for CCDF production is shown in
 8 Figure PA-42.

9 The CCDF construction indicated in this section is for a single sample element $\mathbf{v}_{su,k}$ of the form
 10 indicated in conjunction with Equation (PA.302). Repeated generation of CCDFs for individual
 11 sample elements $\mathbf{v}_{su,k}$, i.e. for the vectors representing epistemic uncertainty in the model results,
 12 will lead to the distribution of complete CCDFs.

13 **PA-6.9 Sensitivity Analysis**

14 Evaluating one or more of the models discussed in Section PA-4.0 with the LHS in Equation
 15 (PA.302) creates a mapping

16
$$\{\mathbf{v}_{su,k} \rightarrow \mathbf{y}_{su,k}\}, k = 1, 2, \dots, nLHS \quad (PA.319)$$

17 from analysis inputs (i.e., $\mathbf{v}_{su,k}$) to analysis results (i.e., $y(\mathbf{v}_{su,k})$), where $\mathbf{y}_{su,k}$ denotes the results
 18 obtained with the model or models under consideration. In other words, for each vector of
 19 parameters samples, there is a corresponding CCDF of releases, $y(\mathbf{v}_{su,k})$. A vector notation is
 20 used for y because, in general, a large number of predicted results are produced by each of the
 21 models used in PA. Sensitivity analysis explores the mapping in Equation (PA.319) to determine
 22 how the uncertainty in individual elements of $\mathbf{v}_{su,k}$ affects the uncertainty in individual elements
 23 of $y(\mathbf{v}_{su,k})$. Understanding how uncertainty in analysis inputs affects analysis results aids in
 24 understanding PA and improving the models for future PAs.

25 The presentation of results from each major model in the WIPP PA is accompanied by sensitivity
 26 analyses of the most important output of the model. In some cases, sensitivity analysis results
 27 are based on pooling the results obtained for the three replicated LHSs (i.e., R1, R2, R3)
 28 discussed in Section PA-6.4. In other cases, the sensitivity analysis is based on the results for
 29 each replicate, and statistics are compared across the three replicates. Note that pooling LHS
 30 replicates that include correlated variables can introduce a small bias into the statistics, although
 31 there are methods that allow for correlated variables when pooling replicates (Sallaberry, Helton,
 32 and Hora 2006).

33 Three principal techniques are used in the sensitivity analysis: scatterplots, regression analyses to
 34 determine standardized regression coefficients and partial correlation coefficients, and stepwise
 35 regression analyses. Each technique is briefly discussed.




Figure PA-42. Processing of Input Data to Produce CCDFs

PA-6.9.1 Scatterplots

Scatterplots, the simplest sensitivity analysis technique, are performed by plotting the points

$$1 \quad (v_{k,j}, y_k), k = 1, 2, \dots, nLHS \quad (PA.320)$$

2 for each element v_j of \mathcal{S}_{Su} . The resulting plots can reveal relationships between y and the
 3 elements of \mathcal{S}_{Su} . Scatterplots can be effective at revealing nonlinear relationships or threshold
 4 values. Examining such plots when LHS is used can be particularly revealing because of the full
 5 stratification over the range of each input variable. Iman and Helton (1988) provide an example
 6 where the scatterplots revealed a rather complex pattern of variable interactions.

7 **PA-6.9.2 Regression Analysis**

8 A more formal investigation of the mapping in Equation (PA.319) can be based on regression
 9 analysis. In this approach, a model of the form

$$10 \quad y = b_0 + \sum_{j=1}^n b_j x_j \quad (PA.321)$$

11 is developed from the mapping between analysis inputs and analysis results shown in Equation
 12 (PA.319), where the x_j are the input variables under consideration and the b_j are coefficients that
 13 must be determined. The coefficients b_j and other aspects of the regression model's construction
 14 in Equation (PA.321) can indicate the importance of the individual variables x_j with respect to
 15 the uncertainty in y . The PA employs the method of least squares to determine the coefficients b_j
 16 (Myers 1986).

17 Often the regression in Equation (PA.321) is performed after the input and output variables are
 18 normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one. The resulting coefficients b_j are called
 19 standardized regression coefficients (SRCs). When the x_j are independent, the absolute value of
 20 the SRCs can provide a measure of variable importance. Specifically, the coefficients provide a
 21 measure of importance based on the effect of moving each variable away from its expected value
 22 by a fixed fraction of its standard deviation while retaining all other variables at their expected
 23 values.

24 Partial correlation coefficients (PCCs) can also measure the linear relationships between the
 25 output variable y and the individual input variables. The PCC between y and an individual
 26 variable x_p is obtained through a sequence of regression models. First, the following two
 27 regression models are constructed:

$$28 \quad \hat{y} = b_0 + \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq p}}^n b_j x_j \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{x}_p = c_0 + \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq p}}^n c_j x_j \quad (PA.322)$$

29 The results of the two preceding regressions are then used to define the new variables $y - \hat{y}$ and
 30 $x_p - \hat{x}_p$. By definition, the PCC between y and x_p is the correlation coefficient between $y - \hat{y}$
 31 and $x_p - \hat{x}_p$. Thus, the PCC provides a measure of the linear relationship between y and x_p with
 32 the linear effects of the other variables removed.

1 Regression and correlation analyses often perform poorly when the relationships between the
2 input and output variables are nonlinear. This is not surprising, as such analyses assume linear
3 relationships between variables. The problems associated with poor linear fits to nonlinear data
4 can be avoided by use of the rank transformation (Iman and Conover 1979). The rank
5 transformation is a simple concept: data are replaced with their corresponding ranks, and then
6 the usual regression and correlation procedures are performed on these ranks. Specifically, the
7 smallest value of each variable is assigned Rank 1, the next largest value is assigned Rank 2, and
8 so on up to the largest value, which is assigned the rank m , where m denotes the number of
9 observations. The analysis is then performed with these ranks used as the values for the input
10 and output variables. A formal development of PCCs and the relationships between PCCs and
11 SRCs is provided by Iman, Shortencarier, and Johnson (1985).

12 **PA-6.9.3 Stepwise Regression Analysis**

13 Stepwise regression analysis provides an alternative to constructing a regression model
14 containing all the input variables. With this approach, a sequence of regression models is
15 constructed. The first regression model contains the single input variable with the largest impact
16 on the uncertainty in the output variable (i.e., the input variable that has the largest correlation
17 with the output variable y). The second regression model contains the two input variables with
18 the largest impact on the output variable: the input variable from the first step, plus whichever of
19 the remaining variables has the largest impact on uncertainty not accounted for by the first
20 variable (i.e., the input variable that has the largest correlation with the uncertainty in y that
21 cannot be accounted for by the first variable). Additional models in the sequence are defined in
22 the same manner, until further models are unable to meaningfully increase the amount of
23 uncertainty that can be accounted for in the output variable.

24 Stepwise regression analysis can provide insights into the importance of the individual variables.
25 First, the order in which the variables are selected in the stepwise procedure indicates their
26 importance, with the most important variable being selected first, the next most important
27 variable being selected second, and so on. Second, the R^2 values at successive steps of the
28 analysis also measure variable importance by indicating how much of the uncertainty in the
29 dependent variable can be accounted for by all variables selected at each step. When the input
30 variables are uncorrelated, the differences in the R^2 values for the regression models constructed
31 at successive steps equals the fraction of the total uncertainty in the output variable accounted for
32 by the individual input variable added at each step. Third, the absolute values of the SRCs in the
33 individual regression models indicate variable importance. Further, the sign of an SRC indicates
34 whether the input and output variable tend to increase and decrease together (a positive
35 coefficient) or tend to move in opposite directions (a negative coefficient).

1 **PA-7.0 Results for the Undisturbed Repository**

2 The PA tabulates releases from the repository for undisturbed conditions. Releases from the
3 undisturbed repository to the accessible environment fall under two sets of protection
4 requirements. The first, as set forth in section 191.15, protects individuals from radiological
5 exposure; the second, in Part 191 Subpart C, protects groundwater resources from contamination.
6 This section shows how WIPP complies with these two requirements by presenting brine and gas
7 flow (BRAGFLO) and radionuclide transport (NUTS) results from modeling the undisturbed
8 repository. The results discussed in Section PA-7.2 show that there are no releases to the
9 accessible environment from the undisturbed repository. Section PA-7.0 is taken from Clayton
10 et al. (2008, Section 4.0).

11 **PA-7.1 Salado Flow**


12 This section summarizes the Salado flow calculation results for the undisturbed (S1) scenario.
13 Pressure in the repository, brine saturation in the waste, and brine flow out of the repository are
14 presented, along with sensitivity analyses that identify the uncertain parameters to which these
15 results are most sensitive. The Salado flow model represents the repository as five regions in the
16 numerical grid: three waste-filled regions (the Waste Panel, South RoR, and North RoR in Figure
17 PA-15) and two excavated regions with no waste (the operations area and experimental area in
18 Figure PA-15). The analysis package for Salado flow contains a detailed presentation on the
19 BRAGFLO model, calculation results, and further sensitivity analyses (Nemer and Clayton
20 2008).

21 **PA-7.1.1 Pressure in the Repository**

22 In undisturbed conditions, pressure strongly influences the extent to which contaminated brine
23 might migrate from the repository to the accessible environment. In addition, pressure
24 developed under undisturbed conditions is an initial condition for the spillings and DBR models
25 (Section PA-8.5.2 and Section PA-8.5.3, respectively).

26 Figure PA-43 shows the pressure in the Waste Panel region for 100 vectors in replicate R1 for
27 the CRA-2009 PA. During the first 1,000 years, repository pressure may rapidly increase due to
28 several factors: rapid initial creep closure of rooms, initial inflow of brine causing gas generation
29 due to corrosion, and availability of CPR material to produce gas by microbial degradation.
30 Pressure generally approaches a steady-state value after 2,000 years as room closure ceases,
31 brine inflow slows (thereby reducing gas generation by corrosion), and CPR materials are
32 consumed.

33 In general, pressure increased for the CRA-2009 PA compared to the CRA-2004 PABC (Nemer
34 and Clayton 2008, Table 6-10). The increase was mainly caused by the correction of halite
35 porosity. The upper bound of the halite porosity distribution was increased, while the lower
36 bound and the mean remained the same. The halite porosity is positively correlated with
37 pressure, so the increase in porosity resulted in an increase in pressure (Nemer and Clayton
38 2008).



1
2 **Figure PA-43. Pressure in the Waste Panel Region, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009**
3 **PA**

4 Sensitivity analyses have determined the importance of parameter uncertainty to the uncertainty
5 in model results. Figure PA-44 shows partial rank correlation coefficients (PRCCs) generated by
6 the code PCCSRC (Gilkey 1995) from regression data between the pressure in the waste panel
7 (WAS_PRES) and the uncertain variables in the LHS (Section PA-5.2) for the CRA-2009 PA.
8 The figure shows that uncertain pressure in the waste panel is primarily determined by the
9 sampled halite porosity (HALPOR) (Nemer and Clayton 2008).

10 The positive correlation indicates that higher pressures result from higher values of halite
11 porosity (HALPOR). Increases in halite porosity linearly increases the DRZ porosity. This
12 increases the volume of brine available in the material overlying the waste, which, as the brine
13 flows, can then increase the amount of brine in the repository (Nemer and Clayton 2008).
14 Microbial gas generation rates are a function of the brine in the repository and increase as more
15 brine is available. Increased gas generation results in increased repository pressures. Increases
16 in the DRZ permeability (DRZPRM) accelerate brine flow into the waste, which then also
17 increases the gas generation rates, as seen by the positive correlation in Figure PA-44. The other
18 PRCCs in Figure PA-44 indicate that the uncertainty factor for microbial gas generation
19 (WBIOGENF), the corrosion rate for steel (WGRCOR), and the waste wicking parameter
20 (WASTWICK) determine the remaining variability in waste panel pressure, as they affect the gas
21 generation rate as well.

22 **PA-7.1.2 Brine Saturation in the Waste**

23 Brine saturation is an important result of the model for Salado flow because gas generation
24 processes, which tend to increase pressure, require brine. Brine saturation is also an initial
25 condition in the model for DBR (Section PA-8.5.3).





Figure PA-44. Primary Correlations of Pressure in the Waste Panel Region with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009 PA


Figure PA-45 shows brine saturation in the Waste Panel region of the repository for the 100 vectors of Replicate R1, Scenario S1 for the CRA-2009 PA. Brine saturation in the waste-filled areas is set initially to 0.015. Saturation increases very rapidly in the first 100 years in all excavated areas as brine flows toward the excavations, primarily from the DRZ above the excavation. Initially there is a large pressure differential between the DRZ and the excavated regions, and the relatively high permeability of the DRZ, compared to undisturbed halite, permits the rapid influx of brine. Brine inflow slows as the pressures equalize and as brine saturation in the DRZ decreases. Brine saturation in the waste areas decreases over time as brine is consumed by corrosion. Brine may also be driven out of the repository by high pressure.

The brine saturation patterns are similar, but are higher on average in the CRA-2009 PA than the CRA-2004 PABC (Nemer and Clayton 2008, Table 6-6 and Figure 6-8): there are more vectors with saturation greater than 60%. The increase in brine saturation is the result of the increased halite porosity (Nemer and Clayton 2008).

Computing PRCCs between the brine saturation in the waste panel (WAS_SATB) and the uncertain parameters in the LHS identifies a number of parameters that contribute to the uncertainty in brine saturation. The relative importance of these parameters varies over the 10,000-year modeling period, and none of the parameters are clearly dominant. Figure PA-46 shows positive correlations with anhydrite permeability (ANHPRM), DRZ permeability (DRZPRM), and halite porosity (HALPOR). Increases in halite porosity increase the volume of brine available in the material overlying the waste; increases in DRZ and anhydrite permeability accelerate brine flow into the waste. Negative correlations are found between brine saturation



1
 2 **Figure PA-45. Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region, Replicate R1, Scenario S1,**
 3 **CRA-2009 PA**



4
 5 **Figure PA-46. Primary Correlations of Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region with**
 6 **Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S1, CRA-2009 PA**


1 and the corrosion rate (WGRCOR) and the wicking factor (WASTWICK) because increases in
 2 these two variables increase the rate at which brine is consumed by corrosion, thus decreasing
 3 saturation.

4 **PA-7.1.3 Brine Flow Out of the Repository**


5 The anhydrite MBs and the shafts provide possible pathways for brine flow away from the
 6 repository in the undisturbed (S1) scenario. The Salado flow model only tabulates the volume of
 7 brine crossing boundaries within the model grid; it does not identify whether the brine contains
 8 radionuclides from the waste. Radionuclide transport is calculated separately from the flow and
 9 is discussed in Section PA-7.2.

10 Figure PA-47 shows cumulative brine outflow from the waste-filled regions of the repository
 11 (BRNREPOC), while Figure PA-48 shows the volumes of brine that cross the LWB through the
 12 MBs (BRAALLWC). The largest outflow across the LWB is $\sim 1,600 \text{ m}^3$. Brine crossing the
 13 LWB or moving up the shaft does not necessarily indicate releases from the repository, since the
 14 brine may not have been in contact with the waste; the brine may have been present in the MBs
 15 at the start of the regulatory period. Section PA-7.2 presents the results of the radionuclide
 16 transport calculations that determine the amount of radionuclides that may be released through
 17 brine transport.

18 Compared with the CRA-2004 PABC, an increase in the average and maximum cumulative brine
 19 flow away from the repository was observed for the CRA-2009 PA (see Nemer and Clayton
 20 [2008], Table 6-11). The cumulative brine flow to the LWB through the MBs also increased for



21
 22 **Figure PA-47. Brine Flow Away From the Repository, Replicate R1, Scenario S1,**
 23 **CRA-2009 PA**



1
2 **Figure PA-48. Brine Flow via All MBs Across the LWB, Replicate R1, Scenario S1,**
3 **CRA-2009 PA**


4 the CRA-2009 PA compared to the CRA-2004 PABC. These changes are the result of increased
5 repository pressure (see Section PA-7.1.1).

6 Regression analyses between total cumulative brine flow out of the waste-filled regions
7 (BRNREPOC) and the uncertain parameters are shown in Figure PA-49. The permeability of the
8 DRZ (DRZPRM) has the largest positive correlation, followed by the permeability of the
9 concrete panel seal (CONPRM) and the porosity of undisturbed halite (HALPOR). Increases in
10 the permeability of the DRZ and the concrete panel seal allow more brine to flow out of the
11 repository, as well as into the repository, which increases the gas generation and therefore the
12 pressure. The increase in the halite porosity also increases the pressure, which in turn increases
13 the amount of brine flow out of the repository. The largest negative correlation is with the waste
14 residual brine saturation (WRBRNSAT), which determines the immobile portion of the brine in
15 the waste-filled regions, and limits the amount of brine that can flow out.

16 PA-7.2 Radionuclide Transport

17 This section summarizes the radionuclide transport results for the undisturbed repository, both up
18 the shaft to the Culebra and through the Salado to the LWB. Ismail and Garner (2008) present a
19 detailed analysis of the NUTS results for the CRA-2009 PA.

20 Radionuclide transport in the undisturbed (S1) scenario is calculated by the code NUTS.
21 Screening runs using a conservative tracer determine which vectors have the potential to
22 transport radionuclides to the accessible environment. Full transport simulations are then
23 performed for all screened-in vectors (with the potential to transport radionuclides to the
24 accessible environment). Based upon results of the screening exercise, full radionuclide



1
2 **Figure PA-49. Primary Correlations of Total Cumulative Brine Flow Away from the**
3 **Repository with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S1,**
4 **CRA-2009 PA**

5 transport simulations were performed for only one vector in the undisturbed case: Replicate R1,
6 Vector 53. Radionuclide transport simulations were performed for other vectors in the
7 undisturbed case to postprocess fluid-flow conditions for use in the disturbed scenario
8 calculations.

9 PA-7.2.1 Radionuclide Transport to the Culebra

10 For the undisturbed repository, no vectors showed radionuclide transport through the shafts to
11 the Culebra. Consequently, no radionuclides could be transported through the Culebra to the
12 accessible environment under undisturbed conditions (Ismail and Garner 2008).

13 PA-7.2.2 Radionuclide Transport to the Land Withdrawal Boundary

14 Radionuclides can also be transported through the Salado MBs to the LWB. For the undisturbed
15 case, only one vector was screened in. The maximum total integrated activity across the LWB at
16 the Salado MBs for Replicate R1, Scenario S1, Vector 53 was 2.6×10^{-10} EPA units (Ismail and
17 Garner 2008), which is the same vector with the largest outflow of brine across the LWB of
18 $\sim 1,600 \text{ m}^3$. This is comparable to the CRA-2004 PABC results for replicate R1, Scenario S1,
19 Vector 53 (the only screened-in vector), which had 1.3×10^{-12} EPA units at the boundary
20 (Lowry 2005). Note that these magnitudes are smaller than the effective numerical precision of
21 the transport calculations. As explained in Lowry (2005), this value is most likely due to
22 numerical dispersion as a result of NUTS's finite-difference solution method. The magnitude of

- 1 the nonzero release is indicative of numerical dispersion resulting from the coarse grid spacing
2 between the repository and the LWB, rather than from actual transport of radionuclides.
- 3 Regardless of the significance attached to the numerical values reported above, the releases from
4 the undisturbed scenario are insignificant compared to releases from drilling intrusions (see
5 Section PA-8.4). Consequently, releases in the undisturbed (S1) scenario are omitted from the
6 calculation of total releases from the repository.

1 **PA-8.0 Results for a Disturbed Repository**

2 The WIPP repository might be disturbed by exploratory drilling for natural resources during the
3 10,000-year regulatory period. Drilling could create additional pathways for radionuclide
4 transport, especially in the Culebra, and could release material directly to the surface. In
5 addition, mining for potash within the LWB might alter flow in the overlying geologic units and
6 locally accelerate transport through the Culebra. The disturbed scenarios used in PA modeling
7 capture the range of possible releases resulting from drilling and mining.

8 Total releases are computed by the code CCDFGF. Total releases comprise transport releases
9 and direct releases. Transport releases generally involve movement of radionuclides up an
10 abandoned borehole into the Culebra, then through the Culebra to the LWB. Transport of
11 radionuclides to the Culebra is computed using the codes NUTS and PANEL (see Section PA-
12 6.7.2 and Section PA-6.7.3) using the brine flows computed by BRAGFLO (see Section PA-
13 6.7.1). Radionuclide transport through the Culebra is computed by the code SECOTP2D (see
14 Section PA-6.7.8) using flow fields calculated by MODFLOW (see Section PA-6.7.7).

15 Direct releases occur at the time of a drilling intrusion and include releases of solids (cuttings,
16 cavings, and spallings) computed using the code CUTTINGS_S (see Section PA-6.7.4) and
17 DBRs computed using BRAGFLO (see Section PA-6.7.6). Pressure and brine saturation within
18 the waste areas are used as initial conditions for the direct release models. Results from the
19 undisturbed repository (see Section PA-7.0) are used as the initial conditions for the first
20 intrusion. To calculate initial conditions for subsequent intrusions, and to compute the source of
21 radionuclides for transport in the Culebra, BRAGFLO uses a set of drilling scenarios to calculate
22 conditions within the repository after an intrusion (see Section PA-6.7.6).

23 This section first summarizes the scenarios used to represent drilling intrusions and the resulting
24 repository conditions calculated by BRAGFLO. Transport releases are presented next, followed
25 by cuttings, cavings, spallings, and DBRs. Section PA-8.0 is taken from Clayton et al. (2008,
26 Section 5.0).

27 **PA-8.1 Drilling Scenarios**

28 As shown in Table PA-25, the PA considers two types of drilling intrusions: E1 and E2. The E1
29 intrusion scenario represents the possibility that a borehole creates a pathway between the
30 repository and a pressurized brine reservoir located within the underlying Castile formation. The
31 E2 intrusion scenario represents a borehole that intrudes into the repository, but does not connect
32 the repository with an underlying brine reservoir. Repository conditions are calculated for the
33 E1 intrusion scenario at 350 and 1,000 years, and are referred to as the BRAGFLO S2 and S3
34 scenarios, respectively. The BRAGFLO Scenarios S4 and S5 represent E2 intrusions that occur
35 at 350 and 1,000 years, respectively. An additional BRAGFLO scenario, S6, simulates the
36 effects of an E2 intrusion at 1,000 years followed by an E1 intrusion 1,000 years later into the
37 same panel.

1 **PA-8.2 Mining Scenarios**

2 Long-term releases within the Culebra could be influenced by future mining activities that
3 remove all the known potash reserves within the LWB and cause the transmissivity within the
4 overlying Culebra to change (see Section PA-4.8). The full mining of known potash reserves
5 within the LWB in the absence of AICs and PICs is modeled as a Poisson process, with a rate of
6 10^{-4} yr^{-1} (see Section PA-3.9). For any particular future, this rate is used to determine a time at
7 which full mining has occurred. Flow fields are calculated for the Culebra for two conditions:
8 partial mining, which assumes all potash has been mined from reserves outside the LWB; and
9 full mining, which assumes all reserves have been mined both inside and outside the LWB.
10 Radionuclide transport through the Culebra uses the partial-mining flow fields prior to the time
11 at which full mining has occurred and the full-mining flow fields after that time.

12 **PA-8.3 Salado Flow**

13 This section summarizes the results of the Salado flow calculations for the disturbed scenarios.
14 Nemer and Clayton (2008) provide a detailed presentation on the BRAGFLO model, calculation
15 results, and further sensitivity analyses.


16 **PA-8.3.1 Pressure in the Repository**

17 Figure PA-50 and Figure PA-51 show pressure in the waste panel (WAS_PRES for Waste Panel
18 area in Figure PA-15) for the 100 vectors of replicate R1 for BRAGFLO Scenarios S2 and S4,
19 respectively. The pressure exhibits varying patterns depending on the type of intrusion.


20 Scenario S2 represents an E1 intrusion at 350 years. At the time of the intrusion, brine flow from
21 the Castile brine reservoir leads to an increase in pressure (Figure PA-50). However, pressure
22 drops sharply 200 years after the intrusion, when the borehole plugs above the repository are
23 assumed to fail and the permeability of the borehole generally increases. In vectors with low
24 borehole permeability, pressure does not change noticeably as a result of the borehole plug
25 failure (Nemer and Clayton 2008).

26 Scenario S4 represents an E2 intrusion at 350 years. The borehole plugs effectively prevent any
27 change in repository pressure from the time of the intrusion until the borehole plugs fail (Figure
28 PA-51). As in the scenarios for E1 intrusions, pressure generally drops sharply when the plugs
29 fail, except for vectors with low borehole permeability after plug failure. The pressure is
30 generally lower in the E2 intrusion scenarios compared to the undisturbed and E1 intrusion
31 scenarios (Nemer and Clayton 2008).

32 The pressure trends in the disturbed scenarios for the CRA-2009 PA are similar to the results
33 obtained for the CRA-2004 PABC. The average and maximum pressures are comparable
34 between the two analyses, as well (see Table 6-16 in Nemer and Clayton [2008]). As the
35 intrusion creates a pathway for brine and gas to flow into and away from the repository, the
36 effect of the increased halite porosity is minimized (Nemer and Clayton 2008).



1
2 **Figure PA-50. Pressure in the Waste Panel Region for Replicate R1, Scenario S2,**
3 **CRA-2009 PA**



4
5 **Figure PA-51. Pressure in the Waste Panel Region for Replicate R1, Scenario S4,**
6 **CRA-2009 PA**

1 Computing PRCCs between the pressure in the waste panel (WAS_PRES) and the uncertain
2 parameters in the LHS identifies a number of parameters that contribute to the uncertainty in
3 pressure for the disturbed scenarios. The relative importance of these parameters varies over the
4 10,000-year modeling period. Figure PA-52 and Figure PA-53 show the regression analysis
5 results for pressure in the Waste Panel with uncertain parameters versus time for Scenarios S2
6 and S4, Replicate R1 from the CRA-2009 PA, respectively.

7 For both scenarios, the borehole permeability (BHPERM) has the largest negative correlation
8 with pressure after the intrusion, as this is the primary means by which pressure may escape the
9 repository in the disturbed scenarios. For Scenario S2 (Figure PA-52), the initial Castile brine
10 pocket pressure (BPINTPRS) has the largest positive correlation after the intrusion, while for
11 Scenario S4 (Figure PA-53), the largest positive correlation for the majority of the time after the
12 intrusion, results from the halite porosity (HALPOR). The negative correlation of the borehole
13 permeability is stronger than the positive correlation of the initial Castile brine pocket pressure
14 and halite porosity for either scenario.


15 The higher initial Castile brine pocket pressure causes more brine at a higher pressure to flow
16 into the repository, while increasing the halite porosity increases the volume of brine available in
17 the material overlying the waste, which, as the brine flows into the waste panel, can then increase
18 the amount of brine in the repository. Microbial gas generation rates are a function of the brine
19 in the repository and increase as more brine is available. Increased gas generation results in
20 increased repository pressures.

21 The pressure in the waste panel is also controlled by the corrosion rate for steel (WGRCOR), the
22 waste wicking parameter (WASTWICK), and the index for the model of microbial degradation
23 (WMICDFLG), which all affect the gas generation rates and therefore the pressure. For Scenario
24 S2, increasing the brine pocket compressibility (BPCOMP) increases the brine inflow from the
25 brine pocket to the repository, and thus the pressure in the repository.


26 **PA-8.3.2 Brine Saturation**

27 Brine saturation tends to increase after a drilling intrusion. Figure PA-54 and Figure PA-55
28 show brine saturation in the waste panel (WAS_SATB for area Waste Panel in Figure PA-15) for
29 Replicate R1 for BRAGFLO Scenarios S2 and S4, respectively.


30 Scenario S2 represents an E1 intrusion at 350 years. At the time of the intrusion, brine flow from
31 the Castile brine reservoir increases saturation (Figure PA-54). However, saturation can drop
32 sharply 200 years after the intrusion when the borehole plugs above the repository are assumed
33 to fail and the permeability of the borehole generally increases. In vectors with low borehole
34 permeability, saturation does not change noticeably as a result of the borehole plug failure.
35 Twelve hundred years after the drilling intrusion, the permeability of the borehole connecting the
36 repository to the Castile is assumed to be reduced by an order of magnitude because of creep
37 closure. This material change reduces saturation in some vectors, but does not appear to have a
38 significant effect on the saturation in most vectors.



1
2 **Figure PA-52. Primary Correlations of Pressure in the Waste Panel Region with**
3 **Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA**



4
5 **Figure PA-53. Primary Correlations of Pressure in the Waste Panel Region with**
6 **Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA**



1
2 **Figure PA-54. Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region for Replicate R1, Scenario S2,**
3 **CRA-2009 PA**


4 Scenario S4 represents an E2 intrusion at 350 years. The borehole plugs effectively prevent any
5 change in repository saturation from the time of the intrusion until the borehole plugs fail (Figure
6 PA-55). Unlike the E1 intrusions scenarios, saturation generally increases sharply when the
7 plugs fail, except for vectors with low borehole permeability after plug failure. The saturation is
8 generally lower in the E2 intrusion scenarios compared to the E1 intrusion scenarios.

9 The brine saturation trends in the disturbed scenarios for the CRA-2009 PA are similar to the
10 results obtained for the CRA-2004 PABC. The average and maximum brine saturations are
11 comparable between the two analyses, as well (see Nemer and Clayton [2008, Table 6-15]).


12 As the intrusion creates a pathway for brine and gas to flow into and away from the repository,
13 the effect of the increased porosity is minimized (Nemer and Clayton 2008).

14 Computing PRCCs between the saturation in the waste panel (WAS_SATB) and the uncertain
15 parameters in the LHS identifies a number of parameters that contribute to the uncertainty in
16 pressure for the disturbed scenarios. The relative importance of these parameters varies over the
17 10,000-year modeling period. Figure PA-56 and Figure PA-57 show the regression analysis
18 results for saturation in the Waste Panel with uncertain parameters versus time for Scenarios S2
19 and S4, and Replicate R1 from the CRA-2009 PA, respectively.

20 For Scenario S2 (Figure PA-56), the DRZ permeability (DRZPRM) and the borehole
21 permeability (BHPERM) have positive correlations. Increases in DRZ and borehole
22 permeability accelerate brine flow into the waste. The corrosion rate for steel (WGRCOR) and
23




1
 2 **Figure PA-55. Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region for Replicate R1, Scenario S4,**
 3 **CRA-2009 PA**



4
 5 **Figure PA-56. Primary Correlations of Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region with**
 6 **Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA**

1 the waste wicking parameter (WASTWICK) are negatively correlated with the saturation, as
 2 these control the brine-consuming reactions. The halite porosity (HALPOR) has a high positive
 3 correlation before the intrusion, which then decreases.

4 For Scenario S4 (Figure PA-57), the largest positive correlation results from borehole
 5 permeability (BHPERM), with the DRZ permeability (DRZPRM), anhydrite permeability
 6 (ANHPRM), and the halite porosity (HALPOR) also showing high positive correlations.
 7 Increases in DRZ, borehole, and anhydrite permeability accelerate brine flow into the waste,
 8 while increases in halite porosity increase the volume of brine available in the material overlying
 9 the waste, all of which control the amount of brine flow into and out of the repository. The
 10 corrosion rate for steel (WGRCOR) is negatively correlated with the saturation, as this is a brine-
 11 consuming reaction.




12
 13 **Figure PA-57. Primary Correlations of Brine Saturation in the Waste Panel Region with**
 14 **Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA**

15 PA-8.3.3 Brine Flow out of the Repository

16 This section describes the flow of brine up a borehole to the Culebra. Brine flow to the Culebra
 17 is important in calculating long-term releases to the Culebra. Direct brine flow up the borehole
 18 to the surface at the time of drilling is modeled separately in the DBR calculations, presented in
 19 Section PA-8.5.3.

20 Figure PA-58 shows cumulative brine flow out of the repository (BRNREPOC) for Scenario S2.
 21 Scenario S2 represents an E1 intrusion at 350 years. At the time of the intrusion, brine flow from
 22 the Castile brine reservoir fills the repository. At 200 years after the intrusion, when the
 23




1

2 **Figure PA-58. Total Cumulative Brine Outflow in Replicate R1, Scenario S2,**
 3 **CRA-2009 PA**

4 borehole plugs above the repository are assumed to fail and the permeability of the borehole
 5 generally increases, most of the brine leaving the repository flows up the borehole to the
 6 Culebra. In vectors with low borehole permeability, the brine flow out of the repository does not
 7 noticeably change as a result of the borehole plug failure. Twelve hundred years after the
 8 drilling intrusion, the permeability of the borehole between the repository and the Castile is
 9 reduced by an order of magnitude because of creep closure, reducing brine flow into the
 10 repository and causing a corresponding decrease in brine flow out of the repository. This
 11 material change reduces brine flow out of the repository in some vectors, but does not appear to
 12 have a significant effect on the brine flow out of the repository in most vectors.


13 Figure PA-59 shows the volumes of brine that cross the LWB through the MBs for Scenario S2.
 14 The largest outflow across the LWB is $\sim 127 \text{ m}^3$, which is significantly less than the undisturbed
 15 scenario results (see Section PA-7.1.3). As the intrusion creates a pathway to the Culebra, flow
 16 to the LWB is reduced. Brine crossing the LWB or moving up the shaft does not necessarily
 17 indicate releases from the repository because the brine may not have been in contact with the
 18 waste; the brine may have been present in the MBs at the start of the regulatory period. Section
 19 PA-8.4 presents the results of the radionuclide transport calculations that determine the amount
 20 of radionuclides that may be released by transport in brine for the disturbed scenarios.

21 The total cumulative brine flow away from the repository and the brine flow across the LWB in
 22 the disturbed scenarios for the CRA-2009 PA are similar to the results obtained for the CRA-
 23 2004 PABC. The average and maximum brine flows are comparable between the two analyses
 24 as well (see Nemer and Clayton [2008, Table 6-18]). As the intrusion creates a pathway for
 25 brine and gas to flow into and away from the repository, the effect of the increased porosity is
 26 minimized (Nemer and Clayton 2008).




1
 2 **Figure PA-59. Brine Flow via All MBs Across the LWB in Replicate R1, Scenario S2,**
 3 **CRA-2009 PA**

4 Figure PA-60 shows cumulative brine flow out of the repository (BRNREPOC) for the
 5 BRAGFLO Scenario S4, which represents an E2 intrusion at 350 years. The results for the S4
 6 scenario are very similar to the results for the Undisturbed Scenario S1 (see Section PA-7.1.3).



7
 8 **Figure PA-60. Total Cumulative Brine Outflow in Replicate R1, Scenario S4,**
 9 **CRA-2009 PA**

1 Figure PA-61 shows the volumes of brine that cross the LWB through the MBs for the
 2 BRAGFLO Scenario S4. The largest outflow across the LWB is $\sim 1,200 \text{ m}^3$, which is smaller
 3 than the undisturbed scenario results (see Section PA-7.1.3). As the intrusion creates a pathway
 4 to the Culebra, flow to the LWB is reduced. Brine crossing the LWB or moving up the shaft
 5 does not necessarily indicate releases from the repository, since the brine may not have been in
 6 contact with the waste; the brine may have been present in the MBs at the start of the regulatory
 7 period. Section PA-8.4 presents the results of the radionuclide transport calculations that
 8 determine the amount of radionuclides that may be released by transport in brine for the
 9 disturbed scenarios.




10


11 **Figure PA-61. Brine Flow via All MBs Across the LWB in Replicate R1, Scenario S4,**
 12 **CRA-2009 PA**

13 Regression between total cumulative brine flow out of the waste-filled regions (BRNREPOC)
 14 and the uncertain parameters are shown in Figure PA-62 and Figure PA-63 for the BRAGFLO
 15 Scenarios S2 and S4, respectively. For the S2 and S4 scenarios, the permeability of the DRZ
 16 (DRZPRM), the borehole permeability (BHPERM), and the porosity of undisturbed halite
 17 (HALPOR) have positive correlations. Increases in the DRZ and borehole permeability allow
 18 more brine to flow out of the repository. The increase in the halite porosity is correlated with the
 19 increase in pressure, and an increase in pressure increases the amount of brine flow out of the
 20 repository.

21 A negative correlation with the waste residual brine saturation (WRBRNSAT) is shown for both
 22 the S2 and S4 scenarios, which determines the immobile portion of the waste brine saturation,
 23 limiting the amount of brine that can flow out of the waste-filled regions. The permeability of
 24 the concrete panel seal (CONPRM) is negatively correlated for the S2 scenario and positively
 25



1
 2 **Figure PA-62. Primary Correlations of Cumulative Brine Flow Away from the Repository**
 3 **with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA**



4
 5 **Figure PA-63. Primary Correlations of Cumulative Brine Flow Away from the Repository**
 6 **with Uncertain Parameters, Replicate R1, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA**

1 correlated for the S4 scenario. The increased permeability of the concrete panel seal allows more
2 brine to flow from the intruded panel to the remainder of the repository (flow into another panel
3 is not considered out of the repository), reducing the higher-pressure conditions in the intruded
4 panel in the S2 scenario, and therefore the flow out of the repository through the borehole. In
5 contrast, in the S4 scenario, the increased permeability allows the brine from the remainder of
6 the repository to flow into the depressurized intruded panel, increasing the pressure and flow out
7 of the repository up the borehole.

8 **PA-8.4 Radionuclide Transport**

9 In the disturbed scenarios, radionuclide transport in the Salado is calculated by the code NUTS
10 (see Section PA-6.7.2). Radionuclide transport from the Salado to the Culebra is calculated by
11 NUTS and PANEL (see Section PA-6.7.2 and Section PA-6.7.3). Radionuclide transport within
12 the Culebra is calculated by SECOTP2D (see Section PA-6.7.8). For all radionuclide transport
13 calculations, mobilized concentrations of radionuclides in Salado and Castile brines are
14 computed by the code PANEL (see Section PA-6.7.3).


15 This section summarizes the radionuclide transport results for the disturbed scenarios. Nemer
16 and Clayton (2008) describe the brine and gas flow in the Salado. Detailed analysis of the
17 radionuclide transport in the Salado is presented in Ismail and Garner (2008). Garner and Leigh
18 (2005) provide an analysis of the mobilized concentrations of radionuclides in Salado and Castile
19 brines. Lowry and Kanney (2005) present an analysis of the flow and radionuclide transport
20 within the Culebra.

21 **PA-8.4.1 Radionuclide Source Term**


22 The code PANEL calculates the time-varying concentration of radionuclides mobilized in brine,
23 either as dissolved isotopes or as isotopes sorbed to mobile colloids (see Equation (PA.118) and
24 Equation (PA.119)). Two different brines are considered: Generic Weep Brine (GWB), a
25 magnesium-rich interstitial brine present in the Salado Formation; and ERDA-6, a sodium-rich
26 brine in the Castile. Radionuclide solubility in the two brines can be considerably different.
27 Before an E1 intrusion, PA assumes that the brine in the repository is GWB; after an E1
28 intrusion, brine in the repository is assumed to be ERDA-6.

29 Figure PA-64 and Figure PA-65 show the concentration of radioactivity mobilized in Salado and
30 Castile brines, respectively, as a function of time for all vectors in Replicate R1 for the
31 CRA-2009 PA. Because the inventory is unchanged from the CRA-2004 PABC, the results are
32 identical to the CRA-2004 PABC results. Concentrations are expressed as EPA units/m³ to
33 combine the radioactivity in different isotopes and reduce the computational time required for
34 the transport calculations.

35 Short-lived radionuclides, such as ²³⁸Pu, decay rapidly in the first few years. After this initial
36 decay, the mobilized concentration is dominated by Am (Garner and Leigh 2005); the
37 concentration of Am is limited by its solubility until all the inventory of Am is in solution. After
38 all Am is in solution, the total radionuclide concentration generally decreases as the Am decays,
39 until the mobilized concentration becomes dominated by Pu (Garner and Leigh 2005). The
40



1
2 **Figure PA-64. Total Mobilized Concentrations in Salado Brine, Replicate R1,**
3 **CRA-2009 PA**



4
5 **Figure PA-65. Total Mobilized Concentrations in Castile Brine, Replicate R1,**
6 **CRA-2009 PA**

1 horizontal lines in the figures indicate periods of time when the total radionuclide concentration
2 is limited by the solubility of Am (before about 3,000 years) or Pu (after about 6,000 years).
3 Thus, the uncertainty in total radionuclide concentration is determined by the uncertainty factors
4 used to calculate solubilities for Am and Pu.

5 **PA-8.4.2 Transport through MBs and Shaft**

6 In the disturbed scenarios, of the 300 realizations, only Vectors 53 and 59 in Replicate R1
7 resulted in transport of radionuclides through the MBs and across the LWB, with a maximum
8 total integrated activity of 3.6×10^{-10} EPA units (Ismail and Garner 2008). This is comparable
9 to the CRA-2004 PABC results for maximum integrated activity, which had 2.4×10^{-12} EPA
10 units at the boundary (Lowry 2005). The releases through the MBs and across the LWB are
11 insignificant compared to releases from drilling intrusions. In addition, no realization showed
12 transport of radionuclides through the shaft to the Culebra.

13 **PA-8.4.3 Transport to the Culebra**

14 Radionuclide transport to the Culebra via a single intrusion borehole (Disturbed Scenarios S2,
15 S3, S4, and S5) is modeled with the code NUTS (Section PA-4.3). Transport to the Culebra in
16 the multiple intrusion scenario (S6) is modeled with the code PANEL (Section PA-4.4).
17 Detailed discussion of the radionuclide transport to the Culebra calculations can be found in
18 Ismail and Garner (2008).


19 **PA-8.4.3.1 Single Intrusion Scenarios**

20 Figure PA-66 through Figure PA-69 show cumulative radioactivity transported up the borehole
21 to the Culebra in the single intrusion scenarios. Transport to the Culebra is larger and occurs for
22 more vectors in the S2 and S3 scenarios (E1 intrusions) than in the S4 or S5 scenarios (E2
23 intrusions). For most vectors that show significant transport, most of the transport occurs over a
24 relatively short period of time immediately after the borehole plugs fail.


25 When compared to the results of the CRA-2004 PABC, the CRA-2009 PA showed minor
26 differences (see Ismail and Garner [2008, Section 4.2.4]). The primary changes from the CRA-
27 2004 PABC to the CRA-2009 PA that affected the calculations of transport to the Culebra are the
28 correction of the input files (Ismail 2007b) and the correction of the halite porosity (Ismail
29 2007a). Neither change significantly affected the results (Ismail and Garner 2008).

30 **PA-8.4.3.2 Multiple Intrusion Scenario**


31 Figure PA-70 shows total EPA units transported to the Culebra via the borehole in the S6
32 scenario. Only two vectors show radionuclide transport after the E2 intrusion at 1,000 years;
33 most radionuclide transport occurs immediately following the E1 intrusion at 2,000 years. The
34 results from the CRA-2009 PA are almost identical to the results from the CRA-2004 PABC (see
35 Ismail and Garner [2008, Section 4.3.2]). As the disturbed results from BRAGFLO are similar
36 and the source term for the two calculations are the same, it follows that the radionuclide
37 transport to the Culebra results would be the same (Ismail and Garner 2008).




1
2 **Figure PA-66. Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Scenario S2, CRA-2009 PA**




3
4 **Figure PA-67. Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Scenario S3, CRA-2009 PA**



1
2 **Figure PA-68. Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Scenario S4, CRA-2009 PA**



3
4 **Figure PA-69. Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Scenario S5, CRA-2009 PA**



1
2 **Figure PA-70. Cumulative Normalized Release to the Culebra, Replicate R1, Scenario S6,**
3 **CRA-2009 PA**

4 **PA-8.4.4 Transport Through the Culebra**

5 Radionuclide transport through the Culebra for a given set of uncertain parameters is calculated
6 with the code SECOTP2D (see Section PA-6.7.8). Note that the total release of radionuclides
7 across the LWB at the Culebra for given futures is calculated with the code CCDFGF by
8 convolving the SECOTP2D results with the radionuclide transport to the Culebra calculated by
9 NUTS and PANEL. This section discusses the SECOTP2D results; total releases through the
10 Culebra are presented in Section PA-9.4. As none of the changes implemented for the
11 CRA-2009 PA affected the Culebra flow and transport calculations, the results from the
12 CRA-2004 PABC Culebra flow and transport calculations were used in the CRA-2009 PA.

13 Culebra radionuclide transport calculations were performed for three replicates of 100 vectors
14 each for both partial-mining and full-mining scenarios (600 total simulations). Each of the 600
15 radionuclide transport simulations used a unique flow field computed separately with the code
16 MODFLOW (see Section PA-6.7.7 and Lowry and Kanney [2005]). The partial-mining scenario
17 assumes the extraction of all potash reserves outside the LWB, while the full-mining scenario
18 assumes that all potash reserves both inside and outside the LWB are exploited.

19 In each radionuclide transport simulation, 1 kg of each of four radionuclides (^{241}Am , ^{234}U ,
20 ^{230}Th , and ^{239}Pu) are released in the Culebra above the center of the waste panel area.
21 Radionuclide transport of the ^{230}Th daughter product of ^{234}U decay is calculated and tracked as
22 a separate species. In the following discussion, ^{230}Th will refer to the ^{234}U daughter product and
23 ^{230}ThA will refer to that released at the waste panel area.

1 All SECOTP2D results, regardless of magnitude, are included in the calculation of releases
 2 through the Culebra. In practice, most nonzero releases computed by SECOTP2D are
 3 vanishingly small and result from numerical dispersion (Lowry and Kanney 2005).
 4 Consequently, the analysis of SECOTP2D results focused on realizations in which at least one
 5 billionth (10^{-9}) of the 1-kg source was transported to the LWB.

6 More detailed information on the results of the Culebra radionuclide transport calculations can
 7 be found in the Analysis Package for the Culebra Flow and Transport Calculations: Compliance
 8 Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculations (Lowry and Kanney
 9 2005).

10 **PA-8.4.4.1 Partial Mining Results**

11 Under partial-mining conditions, only the ^{234}U species and its ^{230}Th decay product were
 12 transported to the LWB in any significant amount during the course of the 10,000-year
 13 simulation (Lowry and Kanney 2005). Table PA-30 shows that no releases greater than one
 14 billionth of the 1-kg source were calculated for Replicates R1 and R3. For Replicate R2, 3
 15 vectors produced ^{234}U releases greater than 10^{-9} kg. One of the 3 vectors also resulted in a
 16 ^{230}Th release greater than 10^{-9} kg. These results are identical to the CRA-2004 PABC results.

17 **Table PA-30. Number of Realizations with Radionuclide Transport to the LWB Under**
 18 **Partial-Mining Conditions^{a,b}**

Replicate	^{241}Am	^{239}Pu	^{234}U	^{230}Th	^{230}ThA
R1	0	0	0	0	0
R2	0	0	3	1	0
R3	0	0	0	0	0

^a Number of vectors that have releases (transport to LWB) greater than one billionth of the 1-kg source released at center of waste panel.
^b ^{230}ThA refers to Th released at the waste panel area. ^{230}Th refers to thorium resulting from ^{234}U decay.

19
 20 Sensitivity analysis indicates that releases of ^{234}U in the partial-mining condition is associated
 21 with the VI oxidation state (Lowry and Kanney 2005; Kanney 2003). This result is reasonable
 22 because the matrix distribution coefficients for U in the IV state are much lower than for the VI
 23 state.

24 **PA-8.4.4.2 Full Mining Results**

25 Under full-mining conditions, only the ^{234}U species and its ^{230}Th decay product were
 26 transported to the LWB in any significant amount during the course of the 10,000-year
 27 simulation. More vectors resulted in releases greater than 10^{-9} kg for the full-mining scenario
 28 than were seen under partial-mining conditions. In addition, releases greater than 10^{-9} kg were
 29 calculated for all three replicates. Table PA-31 shows that 3 vectors in Replicate R1, 6 vectors in
 30 Replicate R2, and 3 vectors in Replicate R3 had ^{234}U releases greater than 10^{-9} kg. None of the
 31 3 vectors in Replicate R1, 3 of the 6 in Replicate R2, and 1 of the 3 in Replicate R3 showed a
 32

1 **Table PA-31. Number of Realizations with Radionuclide Transport to the LWB Under**
 2 **Full-Mining Conditions^{a,b}**

Replicate	²⁴¹ Am	²³⁹ Pu	²³⁴ U	²³⁰ Th	²³⁰ ThA
R1	0	0	3	0	0
R2	0	0	6	3	0
R3	0	0	3	1	0

^a Number of vectors that have releases (transport to LWB) greater than one billionth of the 1-kg source released at center of waste panel.

^b ²³⁰ThA refers to Th released at the waste panel area. ²³⁰Th refers to Th resulting from ²³⁴U decay.

3

4 release of the ²³⁰Th daughter product greater than 10⁻⁹ kg. These results are identical to the
 5 CRA-2004 PABC results.

6 Sensitivity analysis indicates that releases of ²³⁴U in the full-mining condition is associated with
 7 the VI oxidation state (Lowry and Kanney 2005, Kanney 2003). This result is reasonable
 8 because the matrix distribution coefficients for U in the IV state are much lower than for the VI
 9 state.

10 PA-8.5 Direct Releases

11 Direct releases occur at the time of a drilling intrusion, and include cuttings and cavings,
 12 spallings, and DBRs. This section presents an analysis of the volume released by each
 13 mechanism.


14 Ismail (2008) provides additional information about the cuttings, cavings, and spallings releases
 15 calculated for the CRA-2009 PA. Clayton (2008b) provides a detailed analysis of DBRs in the
 16 CRA-2009 PA.

17 PA-8.5.1 Cuttings and Cavings

18 Cuttings and cavings are the solid waste material removed from the repository and carried to the
 19 surface by the drilling fluid during borehole drilling. Cuttings are the materials removed directly
 20 by the drill bit, and cavings are the material eroded from the walls of the borehole by shear
 21 stresses from the circulating drill fluid. The volume of cuttings and cavings material removed
 22 from a single drilling intrusion into the repository is assumed to be in the shape of a cylinder.
 23 The code CUTTINGS_S calculates the area of the base of this cylinder, and cuttings and cavings
 24 results in this section are reported in terms of these areas. The volumes of cuttings and cavings
 25 removed can be calculated by multiplying these areas with the initial repository height 3.96 m
 26 (BLOWOUT:HREPO).

27 Cuttings and cavings areas calculated for the CRA-2009 PA range between 0.076 m² and
 28 0.86 m², with a mean area of 0.25 m² (Table PA-32). None of the changes implemented in the
 29 CRA-2009 PA affect the cuttings and cavings calculations, so the results are identical to the
 30 CRA-2004 PABC results (Ismail 2008).

1 Two uncertain sampled parameters affect the cavings calculations. The uncertainty in cavings
 2 areas arises primarily from the uncertainty in the shear strength of the waste (Ismail 2008).
 3 Lower shear strengths tend to result in larger cavings (Ismail 2008, Figure 1). The uncertainty in
 4 the drill string angular velocity has a smaller impact on the cavings results, but the combination
 5 of a low angular velocity and high shear strength can prohibit cavings from occurring (Figure
 6 PA-71). In fact, cavings did not occur in 10% of all vectors (Table PA-32).



7
 8 **Figure PA-71. Scatterplot of Waste Particle Diameter Versus Spallings Volume,**
 9 **CRA-2009 PA**

10 **Table PA-32. CRA-2009 PA Cuttings and Cavings Area Statistics**

Replicate	Minimum (m ²)	Maximum (m ²)	Mean (m ²)	Vectors Without Cavings
R1	0.076	0.82	0.25	9
R2	0.076	0.86	0.25	10
R3	0.076	0.83	0.25	11


11
 12 **PA-8.5.2 Spallings**

13 Calculating the volume of solid waste material released to the surface due to spallings from a
 14 single drilling intrusion into the repository is a two-part procedure. The code DRSPALL
 15 calculates the spallings volumes from a single drilling intrusion at four values of repository
 16 pressure (10, 12, 14, and 14.8 MPa). Following this, spallings volumes from a single intrusion
 17 are calculated using the code CUTTINGS_S; this code linearly interpolates the spallings
 18 volumes calculated using DRSPALL, based on the pressure calculated by BRAGFLO. Results
 19 from both of these calculations are documented in this section.

1 PA-8.5.2.1 DRSPALL Results

2 None of the changes implemented in the CRA-2009 PA affect the DRSPALL calculations, so the
 3 results from the CRA-2004 PABC were used in the CRA-2009 PA. In the CRA-2004 PABC, the
 4 code DRSPALL was run for each of 100 vectors in 3 replicates and for 4 values of repository
 5 pressure (10, 12, 14, and 14.8 MPa, see Section PA-4.6.4). No spallings occurred at 10 MPa for
 6 any vector.

7 The uncertainty in the spallings volumes arises from four uncertain variables in the DRSPALL
 8 calculations: waste permeability, waste porosity, waste tensile strength, and waste particle
 9 diameter after tensile failure (Table PA-15). Figure PA-72 indicates that the largest spallings
 10 volumes occur when waste permeability is less than $1.0 \times 10^{-13} \text{ m}^2$, but larger permeability
 11 values result in a higher frequency of nonzero spallings volumes. This observation can be
 12 explained as follows: the higher permeability values sampled result in smaller tensile stresses
 13 and less tensile failure, but promote fluidization. Lower permeability leads to greater tensile
 14 stresses and tensile failure, but failed material may not be able to fluidize at this low
 15 permeability.



16
 17 **Figure PA-72. Scatterplot of Waste Permeability Versus Spallings Volume, CRA-2009 PA**

18 Smaller particle diameter values (see Figure PA-71) tend to result in larger spallings volumes
 19 and a higher frequency of nonzero spallings volumes. The uncertainty in the spallings volumes
 20 from a single intrusion is largely determined by the uncertainty in these two parameters.
 21 Obvious correlations between spallings volumes and the other two parameters could not be
 22 established.

1 **PA-8.5.2.2 CUTTINGS_S Results**

2 Two factors directly affect the CUTTINGS_S calculation of spallings volumes for the drilling
 3 scenarios: the volumes calculated by DRSPALL and the repository pressures calculated by
 4 BRAGFLO.

5 Table PA-33 summarizes the statistics for the CRA-2009 PA spallings volumes. Of the 7,800
 6 (26 intrusion time-scenario combinations × 3 drilling locations × 100 vectors) spallings volumes
 7 calculated per replicate, more than 92% of each replicate’s calculations resulted in no spallings.
 8 Only about a third of the vectors in each replicate had spallings occur in at least one of the
 9 scenarios; therefore, spallings will not contribute to the total releases calculated for the other
 10 vectors.

11 **Table PA-33. CRA-2009 PA Spallings Volume Statistics**

Scenario	# of Calculations	Maximum Volume (m ³)			Average Volume (m)			Number of Nonzero Volumes		
		R1	R2	R3	R1	R2	R3	R1	R2	R3
S1	1,800	2.52	2.52	5.33	0.10	0.10	0.17	158	177	183
S2	1,500	8.31	2.87	6.32	0.14	0.12	0.12	120	135	122
S3	1,500	7.99	2.13	3.15	0.12	0.10	0.09	129	138	133
S4	1,500	1.67	2.40	1.99	0.04	0.07	0.04	69	64	56
S5	1,500	1.67	2.20	3.00	0.07	0.09	0.06	91	93	91
All	7,800	8.31	2.87	6.32	0.09	0.10	0.10	564	607	585

12
 13 Scenarios S2 and S3 resulted in the largest maximum spallings volume, while Scenarios S1, S2,
 14 and S3 resulted in the largest average spallings volume. For the CRA-2009 PA, Scenarios S2
 15 and S3 have the highest maximum pressures because in these scenarios, the drill bit intrudes into
 16 a pressurized brine pocket (Nemer and Clayton 2008). These higher pressures lead to larger
 17 spallings volumes. Scenarios S4 and S5 resulted in the lowest maximum and average volumes
 18 as, in general, these scenarios have the lowest pressure (see Section PA-8.3.1). Scenario S1
 19 resulted in the largest number of nonzero spallings volumes per time intrusion. Without a prior
 20 intrusion creating a pathway for brine and gas flow to decrease the pressure, there are more
 21 vectors that result in pressures above 10 MPa and, hence, a nonzero spallings volume.

22 The frequency of nonzero spallings volumes increased for the CRA-2009 PA compared to the
 23 CRA-2004 PABC (see Ismail [2008, Table 8]). The maximum spallings volumes are similar
 24 between the two analyses, while the CRA-2009 PA average spallings volume increased
 25 compared with the CRA-2004 PABC results (see Ismail [2008, Table 8]). As the spallings
 26 volumes are calculated from BRAGFLO pressure and an increase in pressure was observed (see
 27 Section PA-7.1.1 and Section PA-8.3.1), an increase in the spallings releases is expected.

1 PA-8.5.3 DBRs

2 DBRs to the surface can occur during or shortly after a drilling intrusion. For each element of
 3 the Latin hypercube sample, the code BRAGFLO calculates volumes of brine released for a total
 4 of 78 combinations of intrusion time, intrusion location, and initial conditions (see Section PA-
 5 6.7.6). Initial conditions for the DBR calculations are obtained from the BRAGFLO Salado flow
 6 model results from Scenarios S1 through S5. Salado flow model results from the S1 scenario
 7 (Section PA-7.1) are used as initial conditions for DBR when modeling a first intrusion into the
 8 repository that may have a DBR. Salado flow model results from the S2 through S5 scenarios
 9 (Section PA-8.3) are used as initial conditions for DBR when modeling second or subsequent
 10 drilling intrusions that may have a DBR.

11 Summary statistics of the calculated DBR volumes for Replicate R1 of the CRA-2009 PA are
 12 shown in Table PA-34. As seen in Table PA-34, 1,001 of the 7,800 DBR calculations (100
 13 vectors \times 78 combinations) resulted in a nonzero DBR volume to the surface, the majority of
 14 which resulted from Scenarios S2 and S3. The maximum DBR volume is approximately 59 m³,
 15 with an average volume of 0.9 m³. Only intrusions into a lower panel (see Clayton [2008b,
 16 Section 6.2]) resulted in significant DBR volumes. In the S1 scenario, the lower panel represents
 17 an undisturbed panel at the south end of the repository. In the S2 and S3 scenarios, the lower
 18 panel represents any panel that has had a previous E1 intrusion; in the S4 and S5 scenarios, the
 19 lower panel represents any panel that has had a previous E2 intrusion. DBR volumes are larger
 20 and occur more frequently in the S2 and S3 scenarios, because the lower panel has a much higher
 21 saturation after an E1 intrusion.

22 **Table PA-34. CRA-2009 PA DBR Volume Statistics**


Scenario	Maximum Volume (m ³)	Average Volume (m ³)	Number of Nonzero Volumes
S1	19	0.1	122
S2	59	2.9	385
S3	44	1.5	317
S4	19	0.1	70
S5	21	0.1	107
All	59	0.9	1,001

23
 24 The frequency of nonzero DBR volumes increased for the CRA-2009 PA compared to the
 25 CRA-2004 PABC (see Clayton [2008b, Table 6-1]). The maximum DBR volume is lower for
 26 the CRA-2009 PA (see Clayton [2008b, Table 6-1]). The CRA-2009 PA average DBR volume
 27 increased compared to the CRA-2004 PABC results (see Clayton [2008b, Table 6-2, Table 6-3,
 28 Table 6-4, and Table 6-5]). The increase in the frequency of nonzero and average DBR volume
 29 is due to the porosity correction, while the decrease in the maximum DBR volume is from the
 30 reduction in the maximum DBR duration parameter (Clayton 2008b).

31 Previous sensitivity analyses have determined that a DBR volume from a single intrusion is most
 32 sensitive to the initial pressure and brine saturation in the intruded panel. This analysis is

1 repeated below for Scenario S2 in the CRA-2009 PA. The initial pressure and brine saturation in
 2 the DBR calculations are transferred from the Salado flow calculations, as described above.
 3 Thus, the uncertain parameters that are most influential to the uncertainty in pressure and brine
 4 saturation in the Salado flow calculations (see Section PA-7.1 and Section PA-8.3) are also most
 5 influential to the uncertainty in DBR volumes.

6 The combination of relatively high pressure and brine saturation in the intruded panel is required
 7 for DBR to the surface. Figure PA-73 shows a scatterplot of pressure in the waste panel versus
 8 DBR volumes for scenario S2, lower intrusion, with symbols indicating the value of the mobile
 9 brine saturation (defined as brine saturation minus residual brine saturation in the waste). The
 10 figure clearly shows that there are no releases until pressures exceed about 8 MPa, as indicated
 11 by the vertical line. Above 8 MPa, a significant number of vectors have zero releases, but these
 12 vectors have mobile brine saturations less than zero, and thus no brine is available to be released.
 13 When mobile brine saturation approaches one, relative permeability of the gas becomes small
 14 enough that no gas flows into the well, and in these circumstances, DBR releases end after three
 15 days. Thus, in vectors with high mobile brine saturations, DBR releases increase proportionally
 16 with increases in pressure, as evidenced by the linear relationship between DBR volume and
 17 pressure for mobile brine saturation between 0.8 and 1.0. For vectors with mobile saturations
 18 between 0.2 and 0.8, both gas and brine can flow in the well, and the rate of gas flow can be high
 19 enough that the ending time of DBR releases may be as long as 4.5 days. Although brine may be
 20 flowing at slower rates in these vectors than in vectors with high mobile saturations, brine flow
 21 may continue longer and thus result in larger DBR volumes.



22
 23 **Figure PA-73. Sensitivity of DBR Volumes to Pressure and Mobile Brine Saturation,**
 24 **Replicate R1, Scenario S2, Lower Panel, CRA-2009 PA. (Symbols Indicate**
 25 **the Range of Mobile Brine Saturation Given in the Legend.)**

1 **PA-9.0 Normalized Releases**

2 The radioactive waste disposal regulations of Part 191, Subparts B and C include containment
3 requirements for radionuclides. The containment requirements of section 191.13 specify that
4 releases from a disposal system to the accessible environment must not exceed the release limits
5 set forth in 40 CFR Part 191, Appendix A, Table 1. As set forth in section 194.34, the results of
6 PA are required to be expressed as CCDFs of total releases.


7 This section discusses each of the four categories of releases that constitute the total release:
8 cuttings and cavings, spallings, DBRs, and transport releases, followed by the total normalized
9 releases for the CRA-2009 PA. A comparison between the CRA-2009 PA and the CRA-2004
10 PABC results is also presented. In summary, despite the changes and corrections made between
11 the CRA-2004 PABC and the CRA-2009 PA, there were no major changes in the overall pattern
12 of releases. Cuttings, cavings, and DBRs remain the most significant pathways for release of
13 radioactive material to the land surface. Release by subsurface transport in the Salado or Culebra
14 continue to make essentially no contribution to total releases. Finally, the resulting CCDFs of
15 total normalized releases for the CRA-2009 PA are within the regulatory limits defined in section
16 191.13. Section PA-9.0 is taken from Clayton et al. (2008, Section 6.0).

17 Rank regression analysis was used to evaluate the sensitivity of the normalized releases to the
18 sampled parameters. Scatterplots of the dependent versus independent rank-transformed
19 variables resulting from the sensitivity analysis were examined to determine if there were any
20 obvious nonmonotonic relationships. Obvious nonmonotonic relationships were not found,
21 although there are cases where inputs are categorized as discrete variables (e.g., OXSTAT) and
22 cases where large proportions of the vectors show no release (e.g., CULREL). Application of
23 linear regression to such cases is somewhat problematic with respect to the assumptions of
24 normally distributed residuals and homogeneous variance among the residuals. However, with
25 respect to ranking the relative importance of the parameters, these issues are probably not
26 significant. Details of the analysis can be found in Kirchner (2008b).

27 **PA-9.1 Cuttings and Cavings**

28 The overall mean CCDFs for cuttings and cavings releases from the CRA-2009 PA and the
29 CRA-2004 PABC are shown in Figure PA-74. These resulting overall mean CCDFs are very
30 similar, with only a slight increase in the CRA-2009 PA mean due to the increase in the drilling
31 rate.

32 The rank regression analysis showed that the uncertainty in waste shear strength (WTAUFAIL in
33 Table PA-19) contributes about 98% of the variability in mean cuttings and cavings releases in
34 both the CRA-2009 PA and CRA-2004 PABC (Kirchner 2008b). Cuttings and caving releases
35 are primarily controlled by the volume of cuttings and cavings produced, which in turn is a
36 highly nonlinear function of the waste shear strength (Ismail 2008).



1
2 **Figure PA-74. Overall Mean CCDFs for Cuttings and Cavings Releases: CRA-2009 PA**
3 **and CRA-2004 PABC**


4 **PA-9.2 Spallings**

5 Figure PA-75 shows the overall mean spallings release CCDFs from the CRA-2009 PA and the
6 CRA-2004 PABC. This increase in overall mean spallings release values can be directly
7 attributed to an increase in overall mean spallings volumes, with a small increase due to the
8 increase in the drilling rate. The frequency of nonzero spallings volumes calculated by
9 CUTTINGS_S increased. CUTTINGS_S calculates the spallings volume released from a single
10 intrusion for the WIPP PA intrusion scenarios by interpolating the volumes calculated by
11 DRSPALL using the repository pressures calculated by BRAGFLO. These increases are largely
12 attributable to the increase in repository pressure resulting from the larger amounts of brine
13 available (Ismail 2008).

14 The rank regression analysis indicates that the intact halite porosity (HALPOR in Table PA-19)
15 is the dominant uncertain parameter with regard to the uncertainty in spallings releases in the
16 CRA-2009 PA (Kirchner 2008b). Its higher ranking in the CRA-2009 PA analysis compared to
17 the CRA-2004 PABC analysis is due to the increase in the maximum value of its distribution
18 (Kirchner 2008b). Increases in halite porosity lead to increases in repository pressure (see
19 Section PA-7.1.1 and Section PA-8.3.1) and thus to increases in spallings releases.


20 **PA-9.3 Direct Brine**

21 The overall mean CCDFs for DBRs from the CRA-2009 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC are
22 shown in Figure PA-76. At all probabilities, the CRA-2009 PA mean DBRs increased from the
23



1

2 **Figure PA-75. Overall Mean CCDFs for Spallings Releases: CRA-2009 PA and**
 3 **CRA 2004 PABC**



4

5 **Figure PA-76. Overall Mean CCDFs for DBRs: CRA-2009 PA and CRA-2004 PABC**

1 CRA-2004 PABC values, particularly at higher probabilities. In the CRA-2009 PA, at any level
2 of release, the mean probability that DBRs exceed the release level is increased from the
3 CRA-2004 PABC. This increase in the CCDFs for DBRs can be directly attributed to an
4 increase in DBR volumes (Section PA-8.5.3), with a small increase due to the increase in the
5 drilling rate (Clayton 2008a). The frequency of nonzero DBR volumes also increased (Section
6 PA-8.5.3). The frequency and volume of the DBR are strongly correlated to the repository
7 pressure. These increases are largely attributable to the increase in repository pressure resulting
8 from of the larger amounts of brine available. The increase of the brine in the repository is due
9 to higher intact halite porosities for higher probabilities and drilling rate at lower probabilities
10 (Clayton 2008b).


11 The rank regression analysis shows that four variables, the “solubility multiplier” representing
12 solubility uncertainty for all actinides in the III oxidation state (WSOLVAR3 in Table PA-19),
13 the initial brine pore pressure in the Castile (BPINTPRS in Table PA-19), the inundated
14 corrosion rate for steel (WGRCOR in Table PA-19), and the frequency with which Castile brine
15 intrudes the repository as a result of a drilling event (BPPROB in Table PA-19), account for
16 more than 50% of the uncertainty in DBRs for the CRA-2009 PA (Kirchner 2008b). These
17 variables are also important in the CRA-2004 PABC analysis, although the third- and fourth-
18 ranked variables are in reverse order relative to the CRA-2009 PA (Kirchner 2008b).

19 The solubility of actinides defines the concentration in DBRs. The corrosion of Fe is expected to
20 produce gas, but at the same time it consumes water. When the repository is flooded with brine
21 from the intrusion of a brine pocket, the influence on DBR would likely be positive, because the
22 production of H₂ would outweigh the minimal impact of the consumption of water. However, a
23 negative correlation is observed between the ranked variables, suggesting that the corrosion of
24 steel has its strongest influence when the repository is not saturated and DBRs are expected to be
25 small. The frequency with which Castile brine intrudes the repository as a result of a drilling
26 event and the initial pressure of that brine affect the pressure in the repository. As DBR volumes
27 are a strong function of pressure, a positive correlation is expected and shown (Kirchner 2008b).

28 **PA-9.4 Groundwater Transport**

29 Figure PA-77 shows the mean CCDFs for normalized releases due to transport through the
30 Culebra for Replicate R2 of the CRA-2009 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC. No transport releases
31 larger than 10⁻⁶ EPA units occurred in Replicates R1 and R3. Normalized transport releases for
32 the CRA-2009 PA are qualitatively similar to the CRA-2004 PABC results, in that only one
33 replicate (R2) exhibits releases that are significantly larger than the numerical error inherent in
34 the transport calculations. Overall, the mean releases for Replicate R2 of the two analyses are
35 quite similar and the numbers of vectors that had releases are identical, with only a slight
36 increase in the CRA-2009 PA due to the increase in the drilling rate (Dunagan 2008).

37 A Culebra release represents the potential release of radioactivity from the Culebra at the LWB
38 over 10,000 years. Analyzing sensitivity of Culebra releases to the input parameters using linear
39 regression is problematic (Kirchner 2008b). In the CRA-2009 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC,
40 ~83% of the vectors had Culebra releases of zero (Ismail and Garner 2008). Releases of zero are
41 found across the entire range of every parameter. This is undoubtedly due, for the most part, to
42




1
 2 **Figure PA-77. Mean CCDFs for Releases from the Culebra for Replicate R2: CRA-2009**
 3 **PA and CRA-2004 PABC**


4 transport rates frequently being too small to enable contaminants to reach the boundary within
 5 the 10,000-year simulation period. Thus, the release data are strongly skewed. The times of the
 6 intrusions giving rise to flows to the Culebra are also likely to influence whether or not such
 7 releases occur. These times are not represented in the sampled input parameters, and thus cannot
 8 be associated with the releases. In addition, the preponderance of zero values tends to negate the
 9 assumption of linear regression that errors (residuals) are normally distributed. In many cases, it
 10 appears that it is the distribution of zeros along the independent axis that determines whether a
 11 positive or negative correlation is observed. For example, Figure PA-78 shows the ranks of
 12 releases from the Culebra versus the ranks of the parameter CFRACPOR(CULEBRA:APOROS)
 13 for Replicate 1. The average rank of the zero values was 42 and was assigned to all cases where
 14 no release was observed. Because releases of zero were associated with high values of
 15 CFRACPOR, as well as low values, and because there were no nonzero releases for the futures
 16 having the highest values of CFRACPOR, the arrangement of the data would lead to a negative
 17 correlation. Because of these issues, the linear ranked regression analysis is unlikely to yield a
 18 definitive identification of the sensitivity of Culebra releases to the sampled parameters, and
 19 most of the variability in Culebra releases remains unexplained by the regression model
 20 (Kirchner 2008b).

21 **PA-9.5 Total Normalized Releases**

22 Total releases are calculated by totaling the releases from each release pathway: cuttings and
 23 cavings releases, spallings releases, DBRs, and transport releases (there were no undisturbed
 24 releases to contribute to total release). Figure PA-79 shows the 300 CCDFs for total releases in
 25




1
2 **Figure PA-78. The Preponderance and Distribution of Zeros Can Control the Regression**



3
4 **Figure PA-79. Total Normalized Releases, Replicates R1, R2, and R3, CRA-2009 PA**

1 Replicates R1, R2, and R3 of the CRA-2009 PA. As seen in Figure PA-79, all of the CCDFs lie
 2 below and to the left of the limits specified in section 191.13(a).

3 The overall mean CCDF is computed as the arithmetic mean of the mean CCDFs from each
 4 replicate. To quantitatively determine the sufficiency of the sample size, a confidence interval is
 5 computed about the overall mean CCDF using the Student's t-distribution and the mean CCDFs
 6 from each replicate. Figure PA-80 shows 95% confidence intervals about the overall mean. The
 7 CCDF and confidences intervals lie below and to the left of the limits specified in 40 CFR
 8 § 191.13(a). Thus, the WIPP continues to comply with the containment requirements of Part
 9 191.




10
 11 **Figure PA-80. Confidence Interval on Overall Mean CCDF for Total Normalized**
 12 **Releases, CRA-2009 PA**


13 Figure PA-81, Figure PA-82, and Figure PA-83 show the mean CCDFs for each component of
 14 total releases for Replicates R1, R2, and R3 of the CRA-2009 PA, respectively. The
 15 contributions to total releases for each release pathway in the CRA-2009 PA are the same as
 16 those observed in the CRA-2004 PABC (Dunagan 2008).

17 Figure PA-84 provides a comparison between the CRA-2009 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC. At
 18 any level of release, the overall mean probability that total releases exceed the release level is
 19 similar between the two analyses. A small increase in the probability is mainly due to the change
 20 in the drilling rate parameter (Dunagan 2008).


21 Table PA-35 shows the level of release at the probability of 0.1 and 0.001 from the overall mean
 22 CCDF. The CCDF value of the upper and lower 95% confidence levels on the mean CCDF at
 23




1
 2 **Figure PA-81. Mean CCDFs for Components of Total Normalized Releases, Replicate R1,**
 3 **CRA-2009 PA**



4
 5 **Figure PA-82. Mean CCDFs for Components of Total Normalized Releases, Replicate R2,**
 6 **CRA-2009 PA**



1
 2 **Figure PA-83. Mean CCDFs for Components of Total Normalized Releases, Replicate R3,**
 3 **CRA-2009 PA**



4
 5 **Figure PA-84. Overall Mean CCDFs for Total Normalized Releases: CRA-2009 PA and**
 6 **CRA-2004 PABC**

1 **Table PA-35. CRA-2009 PA and CRA-2004 PABC^a Statistics on the Overall Mean for**
 2 **Total Normalized Releases in EPA Units at Probabilities of 0.1 and 0.001**

Probability	Analysis	Mean Total Release	Lower 95% CL	Upper 95% CL	Release Limit
0.1	CRA-2004 PABC	0.09	0.08	0.09	1
	CRA-2009 PA	0.10	0.10	0.11	1
0.001	CRA-2004 PABC	0.60	0.52	0.68	10
	CRA-2009 PA	0.72	0.48	0.92	10

^a CRA-2004 PABC data was initially reported in Vugrin and Dunagan (2005).

3
 4 the 0.1 and 0.001 probability, along with the release limit, are also included. The overall mean
 5 total release CCDFs differ by ~0.01 EPA units at a probability of 0.1 and by ~0.1 EPA units at a
 6 probability of 0.001 (Table PA-35). These increases in the total releases primarily result from
 7 the increase in the drilling rate parameter.

8 There are some definite similarities between the CCDFs for the two analyses. First, for most
 9 probabilities, cuttings and cavings are the most significant pathways for release of radioactive
 10 material to the land surface. Second, release by spallings and subsurface transport in the Salado
 11 or Culebra make essentially no contribution to total releases. Finally, the resulting CCDFs of
 12 both analyses are within regulatory limits.

13 As in the CRA-2004 PABC, cuttings, cavings, and DBRs account for the majority of the total
 14 releases estimated in the CRA-2009 PA. As indicated in the rank regression analysis, in both the
 15 CRA-2009 PA and the CRA-2004 PABC, the uncertainty in waste shear strength (WTAUFAIL
 16 in Table PA-19) contributes to a large portion of the uncertainty in total normalized releases
 17 (Kirchner 2008b). The volumes of cuttings and cavings are primarily controlled by shear
 18 strength (Kirchner 2008b). The “solubility multiplier,” which represents uncertainty in
 19 solubilities for all actinides in the III oxidation state (WSOLVAR3 in Table PA-19), remained
 20 the second-most dominant parameter contributing to variability in total releases in all replicates
 21 (Kirchner 2008b). Solubility of actinides defines the concentration in DBRs. The variability in
 22 total releases explained by the waste shear strength in the CRA-2009 PA dropped from previous
 23 levels. The waste shear strength only accounts for about 81% of the total variability in total
 24 releases in the CRA-2009 PA, whereas in the CRA-2004 PABC it accounted for 88% of the
 25 variability (Kirchner 2008b). This decrease is due to the relative increase in the DBR
 26 contribution to total releases.

1 PA-10.0 References

- 2 Abdul Khader, M.H., and H.S. Rao. 1974. "Flow Through Annulus with Large Radial
3 Clearance." *American Society of Civil Engineers, Journal of the Hydraulics Division*, vol. 100,
4 no. HY1: 25–39.
- 5 Antoun, T., L. Seanman, D.R. Curran, G.I. Kanel, S.V. Razorenor, and A.V. Utkin. 2003. *Spall*
6 *Fracture*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- 7 Aronson, D.G. 1986. "The Porous Medium Equation." *Nonlinear Diffusion Problems*. Lecture
8 Notes in Mathematics 1224. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- 9 Aziz, K., and A. Settari. 1979. *Petroleum Reservoir Simulation*. New York: Elsevier.
- 10 Barree, R.D., and M.W. Conway. 1995 "Experimental and Numerical Modeling of Convective
11 Proppant Transport." *Journal of Petroleum Technology*, vol. 47 (March): 216–22.
- 12 Bateman, H. 1910. "The Solution of a System of Differential Equations Occurring in the
13 Theory of Radio-Active Transformations." *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical*
14 *Society*, vol. 15: 423–27.
- 15 Bean, J.E., M.E. Lord, D.A. McArthur, R.J. MacKinnon, J.D. Miller, and J.D. Schreiber. 1996.
16 *Analysis Package for the Salado Flow Calculations (Task 1) of the Performance Assessment*
17 *Analysis Supporting the Compliance Certification Application (CCA)*. ERMS 420238.
18 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories. (EPA Air Docket A-93-02, Item II-G-08).
- 19 Bear, J. 1972. *Dynamics of Fluids in Porous Media*. New York: Dover.
- 20 Beauheim, R.L. 2003. *AP-100 Task 1: Development and Application of Acceptance Criteria*
21 *for Culebra Transmissivity (T) Fields, Analysis Report*. ERMS 531136. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
22 National Laboratories.
- 23 Belhaj, H.A., K.R. Agha, A.M. Nouri, S.D. Butt, H.F. Vaziri, and M.R. Islam. 2003. *Numerical*
24 *Simulation of Non-Darcy Flow Utilizing the New Forchheimer's Diffusivity Equation*. SPE
25 81499. Paper presented at the SPE 13th Middle East Oil Show & Conference, Bahrain, April
26 2003.
- 27 Berglund, J.W. 1992. *Mechanisms Governing the Direct Removal of Wastes from the Waste*
28 *Isolation Pilot Plant Repository Caused by Exploratory Drilling*. SAND92-7295. Albuquerque:
29 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Berglund, J.W. 1996. *Analysis Package for the Cuttings and Spallings Calculations (Task 5 and*
31 *6) of the Performance Assessment Calculation Supporting the Compliance Certification*
32 *Application (CCA), AP-015 and AP-016*. ERMS 240521. Albuquerque: Sandia National
33 Laboratories.

- 1 Bilgen, E., R. Boulos, and A.C. Akgungor. 1973. "Leakage and Frictional Characteristics of
2 Turbulent Helical Flow In Fine Clearance." *Journal of Fluids Engineering, Transactions of the*
3 *ASME, Series I*, vol. 95: 493–97.
- 4 Brill, J.P., and H.D. Beggs. 1986. *Two-Phase Flow in Pipes*. 5th ed. Tulsa: University of
5 Tulsa.
- 6 Brooks, R.H., and A.T. Corey. 1964. "Hydraulic Properties of Porous Media." *Hydrology*
7 *Paper No. 3*. Fort Collins, CO: Colorado State University. ERMS 241117.
- 8 Brush, L.H. 2005. *Results of Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP Performance-*
9 *Assessment Baseline Calculations* (May 18). ERMS 539800. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
10 Laboratories.
- 11 Brush, L. H. and Y. Xiong. 2005. *Calculation of Organic Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP*
12 *Performance Assessment Baseline Calculations* (May 4). ERMS 539635. Carlsbad, NM:
13 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Bynum, R.V., C. Stockman, Y. Wang, A. Peterson, J. Krumhansl, J. Nowak, J. Cotton, M.S.Y.
15 Chu, and S.J. Patchett. 1997. "Implementation of Chemical Controls Through a Backfill System
16 for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)." SAND96-2656C. *Proceedings of the Sixth*
17 *International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management and Environmental Remediation,*
18 *ICEM '97, Singapore, October 12-16, 1997* (pp. 357–61). Eds. R. Baker, S. Slate, and G. Benda.
19 New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
- 20 Caporuscio, F., J. Gibbons, and E. Oswald. 2003. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: Salado Flow*
21 *Conceptual Models Final Peer Review Report*. ERMS 526879. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area
22 Office, Office of Regulatory Compliance.
- 23 Carlsbad Area Office Technical Assistance Contractor (CTAC). 1997. *Expert Elicitation on*
24 *WIPP Waste Particle-Size Distribution(s) During the 10,000-Year Regulatory Post-Closure*
25 *Period* (Final Report, June 3). ERMS 541365. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 26 Chambre Syndicale de la Recherche et de la Production du Petrole et du Gaz Naturel. 1982.
27 *Drilling Mud and Cement Slurry Rheology Manual*. English translation. Houston: Gulf
28 Publishing.
- 29 Chappelle, J.E., and A.S. Williamson. 1981. "Representing Wells in Numerical Reservoir
30 Simulation: Part 2—Implementation." *Society of Petroleum Engineers Journal*, vol. 21:
31 339–44.
- 32 Cherimisinoff, N.P., and P.N. Cherimisinoff. 1984. *Hydrodynamics of Gas-Solids Fluidization*.
33 Houston: Gulf Publishing.
- 34 Christian-Frear, T.L. 1996. *Salado Halite Permeability from Room Q Analysis*. ERMS 414996.
35 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Clayton, D.J. 2007. *Corrections to Input Files for DBR PABC Calculations*. ERMS 546311.
2 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 3 Clayton, D.J. 2008a. *Analysis Plan for the Performance Assessment for the 2009 Compliance*
4 *Recertification Application* (Revision 1). AP-137. ERMS 547905. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
5 National Laboratories.
- 6 Clayton, D.J. 2008b. *Analysis Package for Direct Brine Releases: Compliance Recertification*
7 *Application–2009*. ERMS 548571. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 8 Clayton, D.J., S. Dunagan, J.W. Garner, A.E. Ismail, T.B. Kirchner, G.R. Kirkes, and M.B.
9 Nemer. 2008. *Summary Report of the 2009 Compliance Recertification Application*
10 *Performance Assessment*. ERMS 548862. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 11 Corbet, T.F., and P.M. Knupp. 1996. *The Role of Regional Groundwater Flow in the*
12 *Hydrogeology of the Culebra Member of the Rustler Formation at the Waste Isolation Pilot*
13 *Plant (WIPP), Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND96-2133. Albuquerque: Sandia National
14 Laboratories.
- 15 Corbet, T., and P. Swift. 1996a. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Distribution for Non-
16 Salado Parameter for SECOFL2D: Climate Index). 12 April 1996. ERMS 237465. U.S.
17 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 18 Corbet, T., and P. Swift. 1996b. *Parameters Required for SECOFL2D: Climate Index*. Record
19 Package. ERMS 237465. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 Cotsworth, E. 2005. Letter to U.S. Department of Energy (1 Enclosure). March 4, 2005.
21 ERMS 538858. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation,
22 Washington, DC.
- 23 Cranwell, R.M., R.V. Guzowski, J.E. Campbell, and N.R. Ortiz. 1990. *Risk Methodology for*
24 *Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Scenario Selection Procedure*. NUREG/CR-1667.
25 SAND80-1429. ERMS 226750. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Darley, H.C.H. 1969. “A Laboratory Investigation of Borehole Stability.” *JPT Journal of*
27 *Petroleum Technology*, July: 883–92.
- 28 Dogherty, J. 2002. *Design Document (DD) for PEST Version 5.5*. ERMS 523970. Los
29 Alamos: Los Alamos National Laboratories.
- 30 Dunagan, S. 2007. *Parameter Problem Report (PPR), PPR-2007-001, for REFCON:FVW*.
31 ERMS 545481. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 32 Dunagan, S. 2008. *Analysis Package for CCDFGF: 2009 Compliance Recertification*
33 *Application*. ERMS 548776. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 34 Ely, J.F., and M.L. Huber. 1992. *NIST Thermophysical Properties of Hydrocarbon Mixtures*
35 *Database (SUPERTRAPP), Version 1.0, User’s Guide*. Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. Department of

- 1 Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Standard Reference Data Program.
2 ERMS 242589.
- 3 Ergun, S. 1952. "Fluid Flow Through Packed Columns." *Chemical Engineering Progress*, vol.
4 48: 89–94.
- 5 Fletcher, C.A.J. 1988. *Computational Techniques for Fluid Dynamics*. 2nd ed. Vols. 1 and 2.
6 New York: Springer-Verlag.
- 7 Fox, B. 2005. *Analysis Package for EPA Unit Loading Calculations, Performance Assessment*
8 *Baseline Calculation*. ERMS 540378. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Fox, B. 2008. *Parameter Summary Report for the CRA-2009 PA (Revision 0)*. ERMS 549747.
10 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 11 Fox, R.W., and A.T. McDonald. 1985. *Introduction to Fluid Mechanics*. 3rd ed. New York:
12 Wiley.
- 13 Francis, A.J., J.B. Gillow, and M.R. Giles. 1997. *Microbial Gas Generation Under Expected*
14 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Repository Conditions*. SAND96-2582. Albuquerque: Sandia
15 National Laboratories.
- 16 Frigaard, I.A., and N.L. Humphries. 1997. "High Penetration Rates: Hazards and Well
17 Control—A Case Study." *Proceedings, March 1997 Society of Petroleum*
18 *Engineers/International Association of Drilling Contractors Drilling Conference* (SPE paper
19 37953). Amsterdam: Society of Petroleum Engineers.
- 20 Garner, J., and C. Leigh. 2005. *Analysis Package for PANEL, CRA-2004 PA Baseline*
21 *Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 540572. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 Gatlin, C. 1960. *Petroleum Engineering: Drilling and Well Completions*. Englewood Cliffs,
23 NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- 24 Gilkey, A.P. 1995. *PCCSRC, Version 2.21, Software Installation and Checkout Form*. ERMS
25 227771. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Graboski, M.S., and T.E. Daubert. 1979. "A Modified Soave Equation of State for Phase
27 Equilibrium Calculations: 3: Systems Containing Hydrogen." *Industrial and Engineering*
28 *Chemistry Process Design and Development*, vol. 18: 300–06.
- 29 Haberman, J.H., and D.J. Frydrych. 1988. "Corrosion Studies of A216 Grade WCA Steel in
30 Hydrothermal Magnesium-Containing Brines." *Materials Research Society Symposium*
31 *Proceedings: Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management XI* (pp. 761–72). Eds. M.J. Apted
32 and R.E. Westerman. Pittsburgh: Materials Research Society.
- 33 Hadgu, T., P. Vaughn, J. Bean, D. Johnson, J. Johnson, K. Aragon, and J. Helton. 1999.
34 Memorandum to M. Marietta (Subject: Modifications to the 96 CCA Direct Brine Release

- 1 Calculations). 2 November 1999. ERMS 511276. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National
2 Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 3 Hansen, F.D., M.K. Knowles, T.W. Thompson, M. Gross, J.D. McLennan, and J.F. Schatz.
4 1997. *Description and Evaluation of a Mechanistically Based Conceptual Model for Spall*.
5 SAND97-1369. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 6 Hansen, F.D., T.W. Pfeifle, and D.L. Lord. 2003. *Parameter Justification Report for DRSPALL*.
7 ERMS 531057. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 8 Harbaugh, A.W., E.R. Banta, M.C. Hill, and M.G. McDonald. 2000. *MODFLOW-2000: The*
9 *U.S. Geological Survey Modular Ground-Water Model—User Guide to Modularization Concepts*
10 *and the Ground-Water Flow Process*. Open File Report 00-92. Reston, VA: U.S. Geological
11 Survey.
- 12 Helton, J.C. 1993. “Drilling Intrusion Probabilities for Use in Performance Assessment for
13 Radioactive Waste Disposal.” *Reliability Engineering and System Safety*, vol. 40: 259–75.
- 14 Helton, J.C., J.D. Johnson, M.D. McKay, A.W. Shiver, and J.L. Sprung. 1995. “Robustness of
15 an Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis of Early Exposure Results with the MACCS Reactor
16 Accident Consequence Model.” *Reliability Engineering and System Safety*, vol. 48, no. 2:
17 129–48.
- 18 Helton, J.C., J.E. Bean, J.W. Berglund, F.J. Davis, K. Economy, J.W. Garner, J.D. Johnson, R.J.
19 MacKinnon, J. Miller, D.G. O’Brien, J.L. Ramsey, J.D. Schreiber, A. Shinta, L.N. Smith, D.M.
20 Stoelzel, C. Stockman, and P. Vaughn. 1998. *Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Results*
21 *Obtained in the 1996 Performance Assessment for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. SAND98-
22 0365. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 Helton, J.C., and F.J. Davis. 2003. “Latin Hypercube Sampling and the Propagation of
24 Uncertainty in Analyses of Complex Systems.” *Reliability Engineering and System Safety*.
25 vol. 81, no. 1: 23–69.
- 26 Hirsch, C. 1988. “Numerical Computation of Internal and External Flows.” *Fundamentals of*
27 *Numerical Discretization*. Vol. 1. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
- 28 Howard, B.A. 1996. Memorandum to Sandia National Laboratories (Subject: Performance
29 Assessment Parameter Input). 23 February 1996. ERMS 247595. Westinghouse Electric
30 Corporation, Carlsbad, NM.
- 31 Howarth, S.M., and T. Christian-Frear. 1997. *Porosity, Single-Phase Permeability, and*
32 *Capillary Pressure Data from Preliminary Laboratory Experiments on Selected Samples from*
33 *Marker Bed 139 at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. SAND94-0472/1/2/3. Albuquerque: Sandia
34 National Laboratories.
- 35 Hunter, R.L. 1985. *A Regional Water Balance for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site*
36 *and Surrounding Area*. SAND84-2233. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Huyakorn, P.S., B.H. Lester, and J.W. Mercer. 1983. "An Efficient Finite Element Technique
2 for Modelling Transport in Fractured Porous Media: 1. Single Species Transport." *Water*
3 *Resources Research*, vol. 19: 841–54.
- 4 Iman, R.L. 1982. "Statistical Methods for Including Uncertainties Associated with the Geologic
5 Isolation of Radioactive Waste Which Allow for a Comparison with Licensing Criteria."
6 *Proceedings of the Symposium on Uncertainties Associated with the Regulation of the Geologic*
7 *Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste, March 9-13, 1981* (pp. 145–57). Ed. D.C. Kocher.
8 NUREG/CP-0022, CONF-810372. Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
9 Directorate of Technical Information and Document Control.
- 10 Iman, R.L., M.J. Shortencarier, and J.D. Johnson. 1985. *A FORTRAN 77 Program and User's*
11 *Guide for the Calculation of Partial Correlation and Standardized Regression Coefficients*.
12 SAND85-0044. NUREG/CR-4122. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 13 Iman, R.L., and W.J. Conover. 1979. "The Use of the Rank Transform in Regression."
14 *Technometrics*, vol. 21: 499–509.
- 15 Iman, R.L., and W.J. Conover. 1982. "A Distribution-Free Approach to Inducing Rank
16 Correlation Among Input Variables." *Communications in Statistics: Simulation and*
17 *Computation*, vol. B11, no. 3: 311–34.
- 18 Iman, R.L., and J.C. Helton. 1988. "An Investigation of Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
19 Techniques for Computer Models." *Risk Analysis*, vol. 8: 71–90.
- 20 Iman, R.L., and J.C. Helton. 1991. "The Repeatability of Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses
21 for Complex Probabilistic Risk Assessments." *Risk Analysis*, vol. 11: 591–606.
- 22 Ismail, A.E. 2007a. *Revised Porosity Estimates for the DRZ*. ERMS 545755. Carlsbad, NM:
23 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 24 Ismail, A.E. 2007b. *Errors in Input Files for NUTS for CRA-2004 PABC Calculations*. ERMS
25 546200. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Ismail, A. E. 2008. *Analysis Package for CUTTINGS_S: Compliance Recertification*
27 *Application 2009* (Revision 1). ERMS 548618. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 28 Ismail, A.E., and J.W. Garner. 2008. *Analysis Package for Salado Transport Calculations:*
29 *Compliance Recertification Application 2009*. ERMS 548845. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
30 Laboratories.
- 31 James, S.J., and J. Stein. 2003. *Analysis Report for the Development of a Simplified Shaft Seal*
32 *Model for the WIPP Performance Assessment* (Rev 1). ERMS 525203. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
33 National Laboratories.
- 34 Kanney, J. 2003. *Analysis Package for the Culebra Transport Calculation: Compliance*
35 *Recertification Application*. ERMS 532320. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Kaufmann, D.W., ed. 1960. *Sodium Chloride: The Production and Properties of Salt and*
2 *Brine*. American Chemical Society Monograph 145. New York: Reinhold.
- 3 Kirchner, T. 2008a. *Generation of the LHS Samples for the AP-137 Revision 0 (CRA-09) PA*
4 *Calculations*. ERMS 547971. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 5 Kirchner, T. 2008b. *Sensitivity of the CRA-2009 Performance Assessment Calculation Releases*
6 *to Parameters*. ERMS 548788. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Kirkes, R. 2007. *Evaluation of the Duration of Direct Brine Release in WIPP Performance*
8 *Assessment (Revision 0)*. ERMS 545988. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Klinkenberg, L.J. 1941. "The Permeability of Porous Media to Liquids and Gases" (pp. 200–
10 13). *API Drilling and Production Practice*. ERMS 208556. Albuquerque: Sandia National
11 Laboratories.
- 12 Lee, J. 1982. *Well Testing*. SPE Textbook Series Vol. 1. New York: Society of Petroleum
13 Engineers of AIME.
- 14 Leigh, C.D., and J.R. Trone. 2005. *Calculation of the Waste Unit Factor For the Performance*
15 *Assessment Baseline Calculation (Rev. 0)*. ERMS 539613. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
16 Laboratories.
- 17 Leigh, C., R. Beauheim, and J. Kanney. 2003. *SNL WIPP Analysis Plan AP-100, Revision 0,*
18 *Analysis Plan for Calculation of Culebra Flow and Transport, Compliance Recertification*
19 *Application*. ERMS 530172. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 Leigh, C., J. Kanney, L. Brush, J. Garner, G. Kirkes, T. Lowry, M. Nemer, J. Stein, E. Vugrin, S.
21 Wagner, and T. Kirchner. 2005. *2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance*
22 *Assessment Baseline Calculation (Revision 0)*. ERMS 541521. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
23 Laboratories.
- 24 Leigh, C., J. Trone, and B. Fox. 2005. *TRU Waste Inventory for the 2004 Compliance*
25 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (Revision 0)*. ERMS
26 541118. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 Li, D., R.K. Svec, T.W. Engler, and R.B. Grigg. 2001. *Modeling and Simulation of the Wafer*
28 *Non-Darcy Flow Experiments*. SPE 68822. Paper presented at the SPE Western Regional
29 Meeting, Bakersfield, CA, March 26–30.
- 30 Lide, D.R., ed. 1991. *CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics*. 72nd ed. Boca Raton: CRC
31 Press.
- 32 Long, J. 2008. *SNL CPG WIPP Execution of Performance Assessment Codes for the 2009*
33 *Compliance Recertification Application Performance Assessment (Revision 0)*. ERMS 548350.
34 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Lord, D.L., D.K. Rudeen, and C.W. Hansen. 2003. *Analysis Package for DRSPALL:*
2 *Compliance Recertification Application Part I: Calculation of Spall Volume.* ERMS 532766.
3 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Lord, D.L., and D.K. Rudeen. 2003. *Sensitivity Analysis Report: Parts I and II: DRSPALL*
5 *Version 1.00: Report for Conceptual Model Peer Review July 7–11.* ERMS 524400. Carlsbad,
6 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Lowry, T. 2003. *Analysis Package for Salado Transport Calculations: Compliance*
8 *Recertification Application (Revision 0).* ERMS 530163. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
9 Laboratories.
- 10 Lowry, T.S. 2005. *Analysis Package for Salado Transport Calculations: CRA-2004 PA*
11 *Baseline Calculation.* ERMS 541084. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Lowry, T.S., and J. Kanney. 2005. *Analysis Report for the CRA-2004 PABC Culebra Flow and*
13 *Transport Calculations.* ERMS 541508. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Martell, M. 1996a. Memorandum to C. Lattier (Subject: Additional Information for the DRZ
15 [Disturbed Rock Zone] Porosity). 14 November 1996. ERMS 242257. U.S. Department of
16 Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 17 Martell, M. 1996b. Memorandum to C. Lattier (Subject: Additional Information for the
18 Culebra Transport Parameter Id: 843, idpram: DNSGRAIN, idmtrl: CULEBRA, WIPP Data
19 Entry Form 464 at WPO # 32689). 10 December 1996. ERMS 232689. U.S. Department of
20 Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 21 Mattax, C.C., and R.L. Dalton. 1990. *Reservoir Simulation.* SPE Monograph 13. Richardson,
22 TX: Henry L. Doherty Memorial Fund of Society of Petroleum Engineers, Inc.
- 23 McDonald, M.G., and A.W. Harbaugh. 1988. "A Modular Three-Dimensional Finite-
24 Difference Ground-Water Flow Model." *U.S. Geological Survey Techniques of Water-*
25 *Resources Investigations.* Book 6, Chap. A1. U.S. Government Printing Office.
- 26 McKay, M.D., R.J. Beckman, and W.J. Conover. 1979. "A Comparison of Three Methods for
27 Selecting Values of Input Variables in the Analysis of Output from a Computer Code."
28 *Technometrics*, vol. 21: 239–45.
- 29 McKenna, S.A., and D.B. Hart. 2003. *Analysis Report: Task 4 of AP-088 Conditioning of Base*
30 *T-Fields to Transient Heads.* ERMS 531124. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 McTigue, D.F. 1993. *Permeability and Hydraulic Diffusivity of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*
32 *Repository Salt Inferred from Small-Scale Brine Inflow Experiments.* SAND92-1911.
33 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 34 Meigs, L. 1996. Memorandum to J. Ramsey (Subject: Non-Salado: Diffusive Tortuosity for
35 the Culebra Dolomite). 16 May 1996. ERMS 238940. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia
36 National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.

- 1 Meigs, L., and J. McCord. 1996. *Physical Transport in the Culebra Dolomite*. ERMS 239167.
2 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 3 Meigs, L., R.L. Beauheim, and T.L. Jones (eds). 2000. *Interpretations of Tracer Tests*
4 *Performed in the Culebra Dolomite at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site*. SAND97-3109.
5 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 6 Mendenhall, F.T., and W. Gerstle. 1995. *WIPP Anhydrite Fracture Modeling, Systems*
7 *Prioritization Method - Iteration 2 Baseline Position Paper: Disposal Room and Cutting*
8 *Models*. ERMS 239830. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Myers, R.H. 1986. *Classical and Modern Regression with Applications*. Boston: Duxbury.
- 10 Nemer, M.B. 2005. *Updated Value of WAS_AREA:PROBDEG*. ERMS 539441. Carlsbad,
11 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Nemer, M.B. 2007a. *Effects of Not Including Emplacement Materials in CPR Inventory on*
13 *Recent PA Results*. ERMS 545689. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Nemer, M.B. 2007b. *Design Document for BRAGFLO Version 6.0*. ERMS 545015. Carlsbad,
15 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 Nemer, M.B. 2007c. *Users Manual for BRAGFLO, Version 6.0*. ERMS 545016. Carlsbad,
17 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 Nemer, M.B., and D.J. Clayton. 2008. *Analysis Package for Salado Flow Modeling, 2009*
19 *Compliance Recertification Application Calculation*. ERMS 548607. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
20 National Laboratories.
- 21 Nemer, M.B., and J.S. Stein. 2005. *Analysis Package for BRAGFLO, 2004 Compliance*
22 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (June 28)*. ERMS
23 540527. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 24 Nemer, M.B., J.S. Stein, and W. Zelinski. 2005. *Analysis Report for BRAGFLO Preliminary*
25 *Modeling Results With New Gas Generation Rates Based Upon Recent Experimental Results*.
26 ERMS 539437. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 Nemer, M.B. and W. Zelinski. 2005. *Analysis Report for BRAGFLO Modeling Results with the*
28 *removal of Methanogenesis from the Microbial-Gas-Generation Model*. ERMS 538748.
29 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Oldroyd, J.G. 1958. "Non-Newtonian Effects in Steady Motion of Some Idealized Elastico-
31 Viscous Liquids." *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London: Series A: Mathematical and*
32 *Physical Sciences*, vol. 245, no. 1241: 278–97. ERMS 243211.
- 33 Podio, A.L., and A.P. Yang. 1986. *Well Control Simulator for IBM Personal Computer*.
34 IADC/SPE 14737. Paper presented at the International Association of Drilling
35 Engineers/Society of Petroleum Engineers Drilling Conference. Dallas, TX, February 10–12.

- 1 Poettmann, F.H., and P.G. Carpenter. 1952. "Multiphase Flow of Gas, Oil, and Water Through
2 Vertical Flow Strings with Application to the Design of Gas-lift Installations." *Drilling and*
3 *Production Practice* (1952): 257–317.
- 4 Popielak, R.S., R.L. Beauheim, S.R. Black, W.E. Coons, C.T. Ellingson, and R.L. Olsen. 1983.
5 *Brine Reservoirs in the Castile Formation Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project*
6 *Southeastern New Mexico*. TME-3153. Carlsbad, NM: Westinghouse Electric Corp.
- 7 Prasuhn, A.L. 1980. *Fundamentals of Fluid Mechanics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- 8 Prausnitz, J.M. 1969. *Molecular Thermodynamics of Fluid—Phase Equilibria*. Englewood
9 Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- 10 Press, W.H., B.P. Flannery, S.A. Teukolsky, and W.T. Vetterling. 1989. *Numerical Recipes in*
11 *Pascal: The Art of Scientific Computing*. Cambridge: Cambridge U P.
- 12 Rechard, R.P., H. Iuzzolino, and J.S. Sandha. 1990. *Data Used in Preliminary Performance*
13 *Assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (1990)*. SAND89-2408. Albuquerque: Sandia
14 National Laboratories.
- 15 Roberts, R. 1996. *Salado: Brine Compressibility*. Records Package. ERMS 412842.
16 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 17 Ross, S.M. 1987. *Introduction to Probability and Statistics for Engineers and Scientists*. New
18 York: John Wiley & Sons.
- 19 Ruth, D., and H. Ma. 1992. "On the Derivation of the Forchheimer Equation by Means of the
20 Averaging Theorem." *Transport in Porous Media*, vol. 7: 255–64.
- 21 Sallaberry, C.J., J.C. Helton, and S.C. Hora. 2006. *Extension of Latin Hypercube Samples with*
22 *Correlated Variables*. SAND2006-6135. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 1992. *Preliminary Performance Assessment for the Waste*
24 *Isolation Pilot Plant, December 1992*. 5 vols. SAND92-0700/1-5. Albuquerque: Sandia
25 National Laboratories.
- 26 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). 1997. *Summary of Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis*
27 *Results for the EPA-Mandated Performance Assessment Verification Test*. ERMS 420667.
28 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 29 Savins, J.G., and G.C. Wallick. 1966. "Viscosity Profiles, Discharge Rates, Pressures, and
30 Torques for a Rheologically Complex Fluid in a Helical Flow." *A.I.Ch.E. Journal*, vol. 12:
31 357–63.
- 32 Stein, J.S. 2002. Memorandum to M.K. Knowles (Subject: Methodology behind the TBM
33 BRAGFLO Grid), 13 May 2002. ERMS 522373. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National
34 Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.

- 1 Stein, J.S. 2005. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Estimate of Volume of Brine in
2 Repository That Leads to a Brine Release). 19 April 2005. ERMS 539372. U.S. Department of
3 Energy, Sandia National Laboratories. Carlsbad, NM.
- 4 Stein, J.S. and W. Zelinski. 2003. *Analysis Report for: Testing of a Proposed BRAGFLO Grid*
5 *to be used for the Compliance Recertification Application Performance Assessment*
6 *Calculations*. ERMS 526868. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Stockman, C., A. Shinta, and J. Garner, J. 1996. *Analysis Package for the Salado Transport*
8 *Calculations (Task 2) of the Performance Assessment Analysis Supporting the Compliance*
9 *Certification Application*. ERMS 422314. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Stoelzel, D.M., and D.G. O'Brien. 1996. *Analysis Package for the BRAGFLO Direct Release*
11 *Calculations (Task 4) of the Performance Assessment Calculations Supporting the Compliance*
12 *Certification Application (CCA), AP-029, Brine Release Calculations*. ERMS 240520.
13 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Stone, C.M. 1997. *SANTOS—A Two-Dimensional Finite Element Program for the Quasistatic,*
15 *Large Deformation, Inelastic Response of Solids*. SAND90-0543. Albuquerque: Sandia
16 National Laboratories.
- 17 Streeter, V.L. 1958. *Fluid Mechanics*. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- 18 Sweby, P.K. 1984. "High Resolution Schemes Using Flux Limiters for Hyperbolic
19 Conservation Laws." *SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis*, vol. 21: 995–1011.
- 20 Telander, M.R., and R.E. Westerman. 1993. *Hydrogen Generation by Metal Corrosion in*
21 *Simulated Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environments: Progress Report for the Period November*
22 *1989 Through December 1992*. SAND92-7347. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 Telander, M.R., and R.E. Westerman. 1997. *Hydrogen Generation by Metal Corrosion in*
24 *Simulated Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environments*. SAND96-2538. Albuquerque: Sandia
25 National Laboratories.
- 26 Thompson, T.W., W.E. Coons, J.L. Krumhansl, and F.D. Hansen. 1996. *Inadvertent Intrusion*
27 *Borehole Permeability* (July). ERMS 241131. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 28 Tierney, M.S. 1990. *Constructing Probability Distributions of Uncertain Variables in Models*
29 *of the Performance of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: the 1990 Performance Simulations*.
30 SAND 90-2510. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 Timoshenko, S.P., and J.N. Goodier. 1970. *Theory of Elasticity*. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-
32 Hill.
- 33 Trovato, E.R. 1997. Letter to A. Alm (6 Enclosures). 19 March 1997. ERMS 245835. U.S.
34 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1995. *Waste Isolation Plant Sealing System Design Report*.
2 DOE/WIPP-95-3117. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
4 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
5 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 6 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1997. *Supplemental Summary of EPA-Mandated*
7 *Performance Assessment Verification Test (All Replicates) and Comparison with the Compliance*
8 *Certification Application Calculations* (August 8). WPO 46702. ERMS 414879. Carlsbad,
9 NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
11 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
12 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1985. “40 CFR 191: Environmental Standards
14 for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic
15 Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 50 (September 19, 1985): 38066–089.
- 16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR 191: Environmental Radiation
17 Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and
18 Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December 20, 1993):
19 66398–416.
- 20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
21 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40
22 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
23 5223–45.
- 24 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996b. *Background Information Document for*
25 *40 CFR Part 194* (January). EPA 402-R-96-002. Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
26 Indoor Air.
- 27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
28 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
29 Disposal Regulations: Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
30 1998): 27353–406.
- 31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. *Technical Support Document for 194.23:*
32 *Parameter Justification Report* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 33 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998c. *Technical Support Document for 194.32:*
34 *Scope of Performance Assessments* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor
35 Air.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2005. Teleconference with U.S. Department of
2 Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory
3 (LANL), Carlsbad, NM. March 2, 2005.
- 4 van Genuchten, R. 1978. *Calculating the Unsaturated Hydraulic Conductivity with a New*
5 *Closed-Form Analytical Model*. Report 78-WR-08. ERMS 249486. Princeton: Princeton
6 University, Department of Civil Engineering, Water Resources Program.
- 7 Vargaftik, N.B. 1975. *Tables on the Thermophysical Properties of Liquids and Gases in Normal*
8 *and Dissociated States*. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Hemisphere.
- 9 Vaughn, P. 1996. Memorandum (with attachments) to M. Tierney (WAS_AREA and REPOSIT
10 SAT_RBRN Distribution). 13 February 1996. ERMS 234902. U.S. Department of Energy,
11 Sandia National Laboratories. Albuquerque, NM.
- 12 Vugrin, E.D. 2005. *Analysis Package for DRSPALL: CRA 2004 Performance Assessment*
13 *Baseline Calculation*. ERMS 540415. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Vugrin, E.D., and S. Dunagan. 2005. *Analysis Package for CCDFGF: CRA-2004 Performance*
15 *Assessment Baseline Calculation*. ERMS 540771. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
16 Laboratories.
- 17 Vugrin, E.D., T.B. Kirchner, J.S. Stein, and W.P. Zelinski. 2005. *Analysis Report for Modifying*
18 *Parameter Distributions for S_MB139:COMP_RCK and S_MB139:SAT_RGAS*. ERMS 539301.
19 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 Walas, S.M. 1985. *Phase Equilibria in Chemical Engineering*. Boston: Butterworth.
- 21 Walker, R.E. 1976. "Hydraulic Limits are Set by Flow Restrictions." *Oil and Gas Journal*, vol.
22 74, no. 40: 86–90.
- 23 Walker, R.E., and W.E. Holman. 1971. "Computer Program Predicting Drilling-Fluid
24 Performance." *Oil and Gas Journal*, vol. 69, no. 13: 80–90.
- 25 Wang, Y., and L. Brush. 1996a. Memorandum to M. Tierney (Subject: Estimates of Gas-
26 Generation Parameters for the Long-Term WIPP Performance Assessment). 26 January 1996.
27 ERMS 231943. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories. Albuquerque, NM.
- 28 Wang, Y., and L. Brush. 1996b. Memorandum to M. Tierney (Subject: Modify the
29 Stoichiometric Factor γ in BRAGFLO to Include the Effect of MgO Added to WIPP Repository
30 as Backfill). 23 February 1996. ERMS 232286. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National
31 Laboratories. Albuquerque, NM.
- 32 Weast, R.C., ed. 1969. *Handbook of Chemistry and Physics*. 50th ed. Cleveland: Chemical
33 Rubber Pub. Co.
- 34 Webb, S.W. 1992. "Appendix A: Uncertainty Estimates for Two-Phase Characteristic Curves
35 for 1992 40 CFR 191 Calculations," *Preliminary Performance Assessment for the Waste*

- 1 *Isolation Pilot Plant, December 1992* (pp. A-147 through A-155). Volume 3: Model
2 Parameters. SAND92-0700/3. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 3 Welchon, J.K., A.F. Bertuzzi, and F.H. Poettmann. 1962. "Wellbore Hydraulics." *Petroleum*
4 *Production Handbook* (pp. 31-1 through 31-36). Eds. T.C. Frick and R.W. Taylor. Dallas:
5 Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME.
- 6 Whittaker, A., ed. 1985. *Theory and Application of Drilling Fluid Hydraulics*. Boston:
7 International Human Resources Development Corporation.
- 8 Whitaker, S. 1996. "The Forchheimer Equation: A Theoretical Development." *Transport in*
9 *Porous Media*, vol. 25: 27–61.
- 10 Williamson, A.S., and J.E. Chappellear. 1981. "Representing Wells in Numerical Reservoir
11 Simulation: Part 1—Theory." *Society of Petroleum Engineers Journal*, vol. 21: 323–38.
- 12 WIPP Performance Assessment. 1996. *User's Manual for LHS, Version 2.41*. ERMS 230732.
13 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 WIPP Performance Assessment. 1997a. *User's Manual for NUTS, Version 2.05*. ERMS
15 246002. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 WIPP Performance Assessment. 1997b. *User's Manual for SECOTP2D, Version 1.41*. ERMS
17 245734. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 WIPP Performance Assessment. 1998a. *User's Manual for FMT (Version 2.40)*. ERMS
19 243037. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 WIPP Performance Assessment. 1998b. *Design Document for PANEL (Version 4.00)*. ERMS
21 52169. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 WIPP Performance Assessment. 2003a. *Design Document/User's Manual for CCDFGF*
23 *(Version 5.00)*. ERMS 530471. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 24 WIPP Performance Assessment. 2003b. *User's Manual for PANEL Version 4.02*. ERMS
25 526652. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 WIPP Performance Assessment. 2003c. *User's Manual for CUTTINGS_S, Version 5.10*.
27 ERMS 532340. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 28 WIPP Performance Assessment. 2003d. *Verification and Validation Plan and Validation*
29 *Document for DRSPALL (Version 1.00)*. ERMS 524782. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
30 Laboratories.
- 31 WIPP Performance Assessment. 2003e. *Design Document for DRSPALL (Version 1.00)*.
32 ERMS 529878. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 WIPP Performance Assessment. 2003f. *User's Manual for DRSPALL Version 1.00*. ERMS
- 2 524780. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 3 WIPP Performance Assessment. 2003g. *Design Document for CUTTINGS* (Version 5.10).

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Appendix PORSURF-2009
Porosity Surface**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix PORSURF-2009
Porosity Surface

Table of Contents

PORSURF-1.0 Introduction..... PORSURF-1
PORSURF-2.0 Creep Closure Method..... PORSURF-2
PORSURF-3.0 Conceptual Model for Porosity Surface..... PORSURF-4
PORSURF-4.0 SANTOS Numerical Analyses PORSURF-5
PORSURF-5.0 Implementation of Porosity Surface in BRAGFLO PORSURF-9
PORSURF-6.0 Dynamic Closure of the North End and Hallways PORSURF-12
PORSURF-7.0 Additional Information PORSURF-13
PORSURF-8.0 References..... PORSURF-14

List of Figures

Figure PORSURF-1. Stratigraphy Used for the Porosity Surface Calculations PORSURF-6
Figure PORSURF-2. Mesh Discretization and Boundary Conditions Used for the
Porosity Surface Calculations..... PORSURF-7
Figure PORSURF-3. Disposal Room Porosity for Various Values of the Scaling
Factor f PORSURF-8
Figure PORSURF-4. Disposal Room Pressure for Various Values of the Scaling
Factor f PORSURF-8

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
K	Kelvin
mol	mole
PA	Performance Assessment
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **PORSURF-1.0 Introduction**

2 Both creep closure of the salt and the presence of either brine or gas in the waste disposal region
3 influence time-dependent changes in void volume in the waste disposal area. As a consequence,
4 these processes influence two-phase fluid flow of brine and gases through the disposal area and
5 its capacity for storing fluids. For performance assessment (PA), a porosity surface method is
6 used to indirectly couple mechanical closure with two-phase fluid flow calculations implemented
7 in the BRAGFLO code (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2). The porosity surface
8 approach is used because current codes are not capable of fully coupling creep closure, waste
9 consolidation, brine availability, and gas production and migration. The porosity surface method
10 incorporates the results of closure calculations obtained from the SANTOS code, a quasistatic,
11 large-deformation, finite-element structural analysis code (Stone 1997a). The adequacy of the
12 method is documented in Freeze (1996), who concludes that the approximation is valid so long
13 as the rate of room pressurization in final calculations is bounded by the room pressurization
14 history used to develop the porosity surface.

15 The porosity surface used in the 2009 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2009) PA
16 is the same surface used for the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department
17 of Energy 1996) and the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S.
18 Department of Energy 2004). Consequently, the models and parameters used to calculate this
19 surface are unchanged from the CCA PA. For information on the porosity surface used in the
20 CCA PA, see the CCA, Appendix PORSURF.

21 A separate analysis considered the potential effects on repository performance of uncertainty in
22 the porosity surface (Appendix MASS-2009, Section MASS-21.0). Uncertainty in the porosity
23 surface can arise from heterogeneity in the rigidity of waste packages and from uncertain spatial
24 arrangements of waste in the repository. The analysis considered four porosity surfaces,
25 including the surface from the CCA, which represented various bounding combinations of waste
26 package rigidity and waste initial porosity. The analysis concluded that uncertainty in the
27 porosity surface did not have significant effects on repository performance, and recommended
28 the continued use of the CCA porosity surface in PA.

1 **PORSURF-2.0 Creep Closure Method**

2 Creep closure is accounted for in BRAGFLO by changing the porosity of the waste disposal area
3 according to a table of porosity values, termed the porosity surface. The porosity surface is
4 generated using SANTOS, a nonlinear finite element code. Disposal room porosity is calculated
5 over time, for different rates of gas generation and gas production potential, to construct a three-
6 dimensional porosity surface representing changes in porosity as a function of pressure and time
7 over the 10,000-year simulation period.

8 The completed porosity surface is compiled in tabular form and is used in the solution of the gas
9 and brine mass balance equations presented in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.1. Porosity is
10 interpolated from the porosity surface corresponding to the calculated gas pressure at time step
11 t_n . This is done iteratively, as decreases in the porosity will increase the pressure. The closure
12 data provided by SANTOS can be viewed as a series of surfaces, with any gas generation history
13 computed by BRAGFLO constrained to fall on this surface. Various techniques described in
14 Freeze, Larson, and Davies (1995) were used to check the validity of this approach, and it was
15 found to be a reasonable representation of the behavior observed in the complex models.

16 In SANTOS, the gas pressure in the disposal room at time t_n is computed from the ideal gas law
17 by the following relationship:

$$18 \quad p_g = \frac{NRT}{V}$$

19 where N is the number of moles of gas at time t_n , R is the universal gas constant (8.31
20 $\text{m}^3 \cdot \text{Pa} / \text{mol} \cdot \text{K}$), T is the absolute temperature in degrees Kelvin (constant at 300 K), and V is the
21 free volume of the room at time t_n . The number of moles of gas is computed as

$$22 \quad N_t = N_{t-1} + N_{drums} \times f \times r(t) \times (t_n - t_{n-1})$$

23 where $r(t)$ is the gas generation rate (mol/drum/yr) at time t for the scaling factor f and N_{drums} is
24 the number of drums of waste in the room (6804 drums/room). The base gas generation rate in
25 SANTOS is

$$26 \quad r(t) = \begin{cases} 2 \text{ mol / drum / yr,} & 0 \leq t \leq 550 \text{ yr} \\ 1 \text{ mol / drum / yr,} & 550 \text{ yr} < t \leq 1050 \text{ yr} \\ 0 \text{ mol / drum / yr,} & 1050 \text{ yr} < t \end{cases}$$

27 The base gas generation rate $r(t)$ is representative of relatively high gas production rates from
28 both microbial degradation of cellulosic, plastic, and rubber materials and from anoxic corrosion
29 of Fe-base metals (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.5; Butcher 1997a). To provide a range of
30 SANTOS results that spans the possible range of pressure computed by BRAGFLO, the gas
31 generation rate is varied by the scaling factor f . Thirteen values of f are used to construct the
32 porosity surface: $f = 0.0, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.6,$ and 2.0 . The
33 condition $f = 0$ represents the state of the repository when no gas is produced; $f = 2$ represents
34 twice the base gas generation rate.

- 1 In SANTOS, gas generation is included to introduce a range of values for gas pressure during
- 2 room closure, thereby capturing the effects of gas pressure on room closure; the use of the
- 3 scaling factor f ensures that SANTOS results span a wide range of possible gas generation rates
- 4 and potentials.

1 **PORSURF-3.0 Conceptual Model for Porosity Surface**

2 The ability of salt to deform with time, eliminate voids, and create an impermeable barrier
3 around the waste was one of the principal reasons for locating the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
4 (WIPP) repository in a bedded salt formation (National Academy of Sciences-National Research
5 Council 1957, pp. 4–5). The creep closure process is a complex and interdependent series of
6 events starting after a region within the repository is excavated. Immediately upon excavation,
7 the equilibrium state of the rock surrounding the repository is disturbed, and the rock begins to
8 deform and return to equilibrium. Eventually, at equilibrium, deformation ceases, as the waste
9 region has undergone as much compaction as is possible under the prevailing lithostatic stress
10 field and the differential stresses in the salt approach zero.

11 Creep closure of a room begins immediately upon excavation and causes the volume of the
12 cavity to decrease. If the room were empty, rather than partially filled with waste, closure would
13 proceed until the void volume created by the excavation is eliminated; the surrounding halite
14 would then return to its undisturbed, uniform stress state. In a waste-filled room, the rock will
15 contact the waste and the rate of closure will decrease as the waste compacts and stiffens;
16 eventually, closure will cease when the waste can take the full overburden load without further
17 deformation. Initially, unconsolidated waste can support only small loads, but as the room
18 continues to close after contact with the waste, the waste will consolidate and support a greater
19 portion of the overburden load.

20 The presence of gas in the room will retard the closure process due to pressure buildup. As the
21 waste consolidates, pore volume is reduced and pore pressure increases (using the ideal gas law).
22 In this process, the waste can be considered to be a skeleton structure immersed in a pore fluid
23 (the gas). As the pore pressure increases, less overburden weight is carried by the skeleton, and
24 more support is provided by the gas. If the gas pressure increases to lithostatic pressure, the pore
25 pressure alone is sufficient to support the overburden.

1 **PORSURF-4.0 SANTOS Numerical Analyses**


2 Computing repository creep closure is a particularly challenging structural engineering problem
3 because the rock surrounding the repository continually deforms with time until equilibrium is
4 reached. Not only is the deformation of the salt inelastic, but it also involves larger deformations
5 that are not customarily addressed with conventional structural deformation codes. In addition,
6 the formation surrounding the repository is inhomogeneous in composition, containing various
7 parting planes and interbeds with different properties than the salt.

8 Waste deformation is also nonlinear, with large strains, and the response of a waste-filled room
9 is complicated by the presence of gas. These complex characteristics of the materials making up
10 the repository and its surroundings require the use of highly specialized constitutive models.
11 Appropriate models have been built into the SANTOS code over a number of years. Principal
12 components of these models include the following:

- 13 1. Disposal Room Configuration and Idealized Stratigraphy. Disposal room dimensions,
14 computational configuration, and idealized stratigraphy are defined in the CCA, Appendix
15 PORSURF, Attachment 1. The idealized stratigraphy is reproduced in Figure PORSURF-1.
- 16 2. Discretized Finite Element Model. A two-dimensional plane strain model, shown in Figure
17 PORSURF-2, is used for the SANTOS analyses. The discretized model represents the room
18 as one of an infinite number of rooms located at the repository horizon. The model contains
19 1,680 quadrilateral uniform-strain elements and 1,805 nodal points. Contact surfaces
20 between the emplaced waste and the surfaces of the room are addressed. The justification for
21 this model and additional detail on initial and boundary conditions are provided in the CCA,
22 Appendix PORSURF, Attachment 1.
- 23 3. Geomechanical Model. Mechanical material response models and their corresponding
24 property values are assigned to each region of the configuration. These models include:
 - 25 A. A combined transient-secondary creep constitutive model for clean and argillaceous
26 halite
 - 27 B. An inelastic constitutive model for anhydrite
 - 28 C. A volumetric plasticity model for the emplaced waste


29 Material properties are provided in the CCA, Appendix PORSURF, Attachment 1.

30 The results of the SANTOS calculations are illustrated in Figure PORSURF-3 and Figure
31 PORSURF-4. Figure PORSURF-3 shows disposal room porosity as a function of time for
32 various values of the gas generation scaling factor f . Figure PORSURF-4 shows disposal room
33 pressure as a function of time for various values of f . When $f=0$, no gas is present in the
34 disposal room; thus, disposal room pressure is identically zero for all times. This pressure curve
35 is omitted from Figure PORSURF-4.




1
2


Figure PORSURF-1. Stratigraphy Used for the Porosity Surface Calculations



1
2 **Figure PORSURF-2. Mesh Discretization and Boundary Conditions Used for the Porosity**
3 **Surface Calculations**



1
2 **Figure PORSURF-3. Disposal Room Porosity for Various Values of the Scaling Factor f**



3
4 **Figure PORSURF-4. Disposal Room Pressure for Various Values of the Scaling Factor f**

1 **PORSURF-5.0 Implementation of Porosity Surface in BRAGFLO**

2 As outlined above, the SANTOS program is used to calculate time-dependent porosities and
 3 pressures in the repository for a range of gas generation rates determined by the scaling factor f .
 4 Calculation with each value of f results in the porosity and pressure curves in Figure PORSURF-
 5 3 and Figure PORSURF-4.

6 The porosity calculated by SANTOS is the intrinsic, or true, porosity, which is defined as the
 7 ratio of the void volume to the current volume of a (deformable) element of waste. In contrast,
 8 porosity in BRAGFLO is defined as the ratio of void volume to the original volume of an
 9 element of waste. Mathematically, the BRAGFLO porosity, ϕ_B , and the intrinsic porosity in
 10 SANTOS, ϕ , are defined as

$$11 \quad \phi_B = \frac{V_{void}}{V_0}$$

$$\phi = \frac{V_{void}}{V}$$

12 where V_{void} is the current void volume, V_0 is the original (total) volume, and V is the current
 13 (total) volume of a waste element.

14 The porosities shown in Figure PORSURF-3 are the porosities calculated by SANTOS to be
 15 used in BRAGFLO. The BRAGFLO porosities are related to the porosities calculated by
 16 SANTOS by correcting for deformation of the waste during repository closure. The relationship
 17 between ϕ_B and ϕ is given by

$$18 \quad \phi_B = \frac{1 - \phi_0}{1 - \phi} \phi$$

19 where ϕ_0 is the initial porosity of the waste. Note that the values of ϕ_B and ϕ are equal at the
 20 initial porosity before the waste starts to compact.

21 Brine pressures $p_b(t)$ obtained in the waste disposal regions are used in conjunction with the
 22 results in Figure PORSURF-3 and Figure PORSURF-4 to estimate porosity in the waste-filled
 23 regions for the BRAGFLO calculations. In the CRA-2009 PA, brine pressure and gas pressure
 24 are set as equal in the waste-filled regions, i.e. capillary pressure is not included (see Appendix
 25 PA-2009, Section PA-4.2). This is unchanged from the CCA and CRA-2004 PAs.

26 Given a value for $p(t)$, BRAGFLO looks at the porosity surface to find indices for times in the
 27 porosity table so that

$$28 \quad t_1 \leq t \leq t_2$$

29 Next, BRAGFLO determines whether the current pressure is above the pressure curve in the
 30 interpolation table corresponding to the maximum f value or corresponding to the minimum f


1 value in the table. If p lies above the curve formed by the points $(t_1, p(t_1, f_{\max}))$ and
 2 $(t_2, p(t_2, f_{\max}))$, the porosity is calculated by interpolation using the following formula:

3
$$\phi = \phi(t_1, f_{\max}) + \frac{\phi(t_2, f_{\max}) - \phi(t_1, f_{\max})}{t_2 - t_1} (t - t_1)$$

4 Similarly, if p lies below the curve formed by the points $(t_1, p(t_1, f_{\min}))$ and $(t_2, p(t_2, f_{\min}))$, the
 5 porosity is calculated by interpolation using the following formula:

6
$$\phi = \phi(t_1, f_{\min}) + \frac{\phi(t_2, f_{\min}) - \phi(t_1, f_{\min})}{t_2 - t_1} (t - t_1)$$

7 For values of p that do not lie above or below the maximum and minimum $p(t, f)$ curves in the
 8 interpolation table, BRAGFLO finds f values f_1 and f_2 so that the point (t, p) lies between two
 9 curves $(t, p(t, f_1))$ and $(t, p(t, f_2))$. This is illustrated in Figure PORSURF-5.



10
 11 **Figure PORSURF-5. Location of Points in Porosity Table around Point (t, p)**


12 Interpolation is performed on the triangle formed by the set of points that encloses the point $(t,$
 13 $p)$. For example, in Figure PORSURF-5, the points constituting the lower triangle would be used
 14 for interpolation. Interpolation on the triangle is calculated from the areas of the three triangles
 15 in the plane of t and p that can be formed from the point (t, p) and the vertices of the enclosing
 16 triangle, as illustrated in Figure PORSURF-6. The porosity is then calculated from

17
$$\phi(t, p) = \frac{A_1}{A} \phi(t_1, f_2) + \frac{A_2}{A} \phi(t_1, f_1) + \frac{A_3}{A} \phi(t_2, f_1)$$

18 where A is the total area of the triangles $(A_1 + A_2 + A_3)$ in Figure PORSURF-6.

19 At $t = 0$ (i.e., immediately after the operational period; see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2),
 20 interpolation is performed using the points $(t_1, p(t_1, f_1), \phi(t_1, f_1))$, $(t_2, p(t_2, f_1), \phi(t_2, f_1))$, and

21



1
2 **Figure PORSURF-6. Triangular Interpolation to Determine the Porosity at (t, p)**

3 $(t_2, p(t_2, f_2), \phi(t_2, f_2))$. This is because at $t = 0$, the two points vertically separated in Figure
4 PORSURF-6 at t_1 are equal (the porosity is equal to the initial value at $t = 0$ for all values of f).

1 **PORSURF-6.0 Dynamic Closure of the North End and Hallways**

2 The porosity surface method is not used to model the north end of the repository occupied by the
3 experimental and operational regions. During development of the CCA PA, a supporting
4 analysis compared brine and gas flow results for two models for closure of the north end of the
5 repository: a dynamic closure model and a baseline model, in which the porosity and
6 permeability of these regions were held constant (Vaughn, Lord, and MacKinnon 1995). The
7 study examined the effect of these two approaches on brine releases to the accessible
8 environment for both disturbed and undisturbed conditions, as well as the effects on brine
9 pressures and brine saturations in the modeled regions. The study concluded that the baseline
10 case (assuming constant low porosity and high permeability) consistently led to either similar or
11 more conservative brine pressures and brine saturations, thereby overestimating potential
12 releases relative to the dynamic consolidation case. Consequently, PA uses the simplifying case
13 of constant porosity and permeability in the north end of the repository, rather than modeling
14 dynamic closure of these areas.

1 **PORSURF-7.0 Additional Information**

2 The following attachments were included in the CCA, Appendix PORSURF to document
3 additional details of the porosity surface method:

- 4 1. The CCA, Appendix PORSURF, Attachment 1, *Proposed Model for the Final Porosity*
5 *Surface Calculations*. This memo documents preliminary configuration and constitutive
6 property values for the final porosity surface calculations. Tables in the memo include
7 elastic and creep properties for clean halite and argillaceous halite, volumetric strain data and
8 material constants used in the volumetric-plasticity model for waste, and elastic and Drucker-
9 Prager constants assigned to anhydrite Marker Bed 139. This attachment was supplemented
10 and updated subsequent to the CCA by Butcher (1997a and 1997b).
- 11 2. The CCA, Appendix PORSURF, Attachment 2, *Baseline Inventory Assumptions for the*
12 *Final Porosity Surface Calculations*. This memo discusses the effect of changes in the
13 Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report on the SANTOS analyses.
- 14 3. The CCA, Appendix PORSURF, Attachment 3, *Corrosion and Microbial Gas Generation*
15 *Potentials*. This memo discusses the rationale for the base gas production potentials of 1,050
16 mol per drum for corrosion and 550 mol per drum for microbial decay in the SANTOS
17 analyses.
- 18 4. The CCA, Appendix PORSURF, Attachment 4, *Resolution of Remaining Issues for the Final*
19 *Disposal Room Calculations*. This memo provides additional detail on the disposal room
20 elevation, determination of plastic constants for transuranic waste, and determination of
21 SANTOS input constants for clean halite, argillaceous halite, and anhydrite.
- 22 5. The CCA, Appendix PORSURF, Attachment 5, *Sample SANTOS Input File for Disposal*
23 *Room Analysis*. A representative sample input file is provided in this attachment. The only
24 difference between this input file and the file used in the CCA calculations (see Stone 1997b)
25 is a subroutine modifying the gas generation variable.
- 26 6. The CCA, Appendix PORSURF, Attachment 6, *Final Porosity Surface Data*. This
27 attachment provides SANTOS results for selected gas generation scaling factors $f = 0.5, 1.0,$
28 and 2.0 . This attachment was updated and published as a formal SAND report (Stone 1997b)
29 subsequent to submittal of the CCA.
- 30 7. The CCA, Appendix PORSURF, Attachment 7, *SANTOS – A Two-Dimensional Finite*
31 *Element Program for the Quasistatic, Large Deformation, Inelastic Response of Solids*. This
32 report documents the SANTOS code.

1 **PORSURF-8.0 References**

- 2 Butcher, B.M. 1997a. *A Summary of the Sources of Input Parameter Values for the Waste*
3 *Isolation Pilot Plant Final Porosity Surface Calculations*. SAND97-0796. Albuquerque:
4 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 5 Butcher, B.M. 1997b. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Disposal Room Model*. SAND97-0794.
6 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Freeze, G.A. 1996. *Repository Closure—Reasoned Argument for FEP Issue DR12*. ERMS
8 413328. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Freeze, G.A., K.W. Larson, and P.B. Davies. 1995. *Coupled Multiphase Flow and Closure*
10 *Analysis of Repository Response to Waste-Generated Gas at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*
11 *(WIPP)*. SAND93-1986. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC). 1957. *The Disposal of*
13 *Radioactive Waste on Land*. Publication 519. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.
- 14 Stone, C.M. 1997a. *SANTOS—A Two-Dimensional Finite-Element Program for the*
15 *Quasistatic, Large Deformation, Inelastic Response of Solids*. SAND90-0543. Albuquerque:
16 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 17 Stone, C.M. 1997b. *Final Disposal Room Structural Response Calculations*. SAND97-0795.
18 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
20 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
21 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 22 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
23 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
24 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 25 Vaughn, P., M. Lord, and B. MacKinnon. 1995. Memorandum to D.R. Anderson (Subject: FEP
26 Screening Issue DR-3). 21 December 1995. ERMS 230794. U.S. Department of Energy,
27 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix QAPD-2009
Quality Assurance Program Document**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix QAPD-2009
Quality Assurance Program Document

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
CARLSBAD FIELD OFFICE
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM DOCUMENT

DOE/CBFO-94-1012

REVISION 9

Prepared by: //signature on file// **Date:** 11/20/2007
QA Manager, CBFO

Approved by: //signature on file// **Date:** 11/20/2007
Manager, CBFO

POLICY STATEMENT

The mission of the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is to protect human health and the environment by operating the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for safe disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste and by establishing an effective system for management of TRU waste from generation to disposal.

To help fulfill this mission and to ensure that the risks and environmental impacts are identified and minimized and that safety, reliability, and performance are optimized, it is the policy of the CBFO to establish, implement, and maintain an effective quality assurance (QA) program that supports compliance with applicable Federal, State, and local regulations and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) orders and requirements.

Further, it is the intent of the CBFO to establish a culture and work environment that encourages setting and maintaining effective standards, identifying and resolving problems, emphasizing a continual pursuit of improvement, and fostering mutual respect and effective communication within the CBFO and among its participants, their suppliers, the public, and other stakeholders.

The *CBFO Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD)* establishes QA program requirements for all quality-affecting programs, projects, and activities sponsored by the CBFO. The CBFO and organizations supporting the CBFO shall implement the applicable requirements of this QAPD within their systems for management and control of these activities.

It is the responsibility of all personnel assigned to CBFO-sponsored activities to achieve quality, identify problems, and recommend improvements. CBFO organizations define and achieve quality, recommend and promote improvements in the quality of items and processes, and identify, document, and resolve problems. CBFO quality assurance organizations verify the achievement of quality. CBFO management establishes and cultivates principles and practices that integrate QA program requirements and performance standards into their management approach and control systems. Additionally, CBFO management provides personnel who perform work with the proper qualifications, training, resources, oversight, and support to achieve the CBFO organizational and mission objectives.

The CBFO QA program requirements, as described in this QAPD, have my full endorsement and complete support. Implementation of the applicable QAPD requirements, responsibilities, and authorities is mandatory for all CBFO personnel.

In support of this policy statement, all CBFO personnel are expected to demonstrate their personal commitment to the achievement of quality through their active involvement in the implementation of the CBFO QA program.

David C. Moody
Manager, Carlsbad Field Office

Date

CHANGE HISTORY

Revision: Changes to the QAPD

- Rev 1 The QAPD has been substantially rewritten, the structure has been reorganized, and the content has been supplemented to broaden its scope from a CAO internal requirements and participant guidance document to a CAO program-wide requirements document. The document elements that defined the extent of applicability regarding specific QA program requirements have been clarified through the identification of "general" and "additional" requirements. Requirements for the grading of management controls have been clarified and more fully developed. The requirement for Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Westinghouse Waste Isolation Division (WID) QAPDs was deleted. A requirement was added for each organization to prepare, submit for review, and maintain a QA implementing procedures matrix. Revisions were made to incorporate all the requirements of 40 CFR Part 194, ANSI/NCSL Z540-1, and stakeholder comments. The use of the terms "will" and "shall" are interchangeable and denote requirements. Editorial changes were made throughout.
- Rev 2 The section describing the organization and responsibilities for CAO personnel have been deleted from section QAPD-1.0 and incorporated into a policy statement ([Attachment A](#) and [Attachment B](#)). The QA program document hierarchy (Table QAPD-1), has been updated to reflect current regulatory requirements commitment and guidance documents.
- Requirements have been clarified in the areas of 1) grading, 2) the control of conditions adverse to quality, and 3) the preparation and maintenance of document review comments.
- Section QAPD-7.0, *Software*, has been rewritten to include both general and additional requirements. Definitions in the glossary have been added, deleted, and clarified. Editorial changes have been made throughout the document.
- Rev 3 Changes in Revision 3 have been limited to those necessary to achieve full compliance with the Waste Analysis Plan (WAP) in the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit and to incorporate certain TRU waste QA requirements contained in the CAO QAPP, which is to be inactivated. Refer to the following list of pages affected by Revision 3.

List of Pages Affected by QAPD Revision 3

Change History	iv to v
Table of Contents	vi to xii
List of Acronyms	xiii to xiv
Introduction	I-1 to I-2
Section I - Management	1-1 to 1-23
Appendix A - Glossary	A-1 to A-10
Appendix B - References	B-1
Appendix C - CAO Organization	C-1 to C-2
Appendix D - CAO QA Manager Responsibilities	D-1 to D-2
Appendix E - TRU Sites Organization	E-1 to E-4

The pages in Revision 3 that are not listed above (Sections 2.0 through 6.0) remain effective.

Rev 4 The changes in Revision 4 were made to incorporate the DOE name change from the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) to the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and reflect current CBFO organization titles and responsibilities, rewrite the Quality Improvement section, update the source requirements documents listed in Table I-1, make changes to capture the wording used in the requirements documents, add more specific detail to the QA functional responsibilities of the CBFO management, and eliminate divisions between “general requirements” and “additional requirements.” Editorial, formatting, and paragraph number changes have been made throughout the document. Change markings are present for those revisions that affect content. Changes related to editorial and formatting revisions are not marked. Technical revisions were made to the following specific sections:

	List of Acronyms and Abbreviations	ix - x
Table I-1	QA Program Source Documents	xii
1.1.1	Organization	1-1
1.1.1.4.B	Interface Responsibilities	1-4
1.1.2.2	Procedures Matrix	1-5
1.1.2.3	Applicability of QAPD Requirements	1-5
1.1.2.4	Grading Items and Activities and Applying Management Controls	1-6
1.2.1	Qualification Requirements	1-8
1.2.2	Training Requirements	1-8
1.3	Quality Improvement	1-9 to 1-15
1.4.B	Documents	1-15
1.5.2	Generating QA Records	1-17 to 1-18
1.5.4	Classifying QA Records	1-19 to 1-20
1.5.6.1	Records Classification and Disposition	1-22
2.1.3.A	Item Identification and Control	2-2
2.2	Design Control	2-5
2.2.9	Design Change	2-11

2.3.5.A	Procurement Document Review and Approval	2-14
2.3.7.1	Source Verification	2-16
2.3.7.4	Supplier Certificate of Conformance	2-17
2.3.9	Commercial Grade Items	2-18
2.4.2	Qualification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel	2-21
3.2.A	Independent Assessment	3-1
3.2.2.8.B	Reporting Audit Results	3-8 to 3-9
5.4	Qualification of Existing Data	5-4 to 5-6
5.5	Quality Assurance Compliance Data (new section)	5-6
Appendix A	Glossary	A-1 to A-2, A-5 to A-7, A-9 to A-10
Appendix C	CBFO Organization, Responsibilities, and Interfaces	C-1
Appendix D	CBFO Quality Assurance Manager Responsibilities	D-1 to D-2
Appendix E	TRU Waste Characterization and Certification Organizational and Individual Responsibilities	E-1

Rev 5

The changes in revision 5 were made to address an EPA finding from the annual EPA QA audit conducted on January 7 – 9, 2003. This finding concerned the language in the QAPD regarding the responsibilities for achievement and verification of quality not matching the requirements from NQA-1. In addition to the change made to address the EPA finding, the following changes were made:

- The requirement for program participants to maintain a QAPD procedures matrix has been deleted; because this matrix is not required by NQA-1, 2, or 3, or other regulatory document.
- The requirement for organizations receiving records to return a receipt acknowledgment to the sender has been deleted, because this also is not required by NQA-1, 2, or 3, or other regulatory document.
- The requirement that CBFO and participant organization ensure that they comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulations was deleted because the QAPD is not the appropriate document to specify this requirement.
- The requirement to maintain records related to the characterization of the mixed transuranic waste form as lifetime QA records was deleted. Records classification of mixed waste characterization records is specified in the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit.
- The requirement to maintain audit and surveillance checklists as QA records was deleted, because this is not a requirement of NQA-1, 2, or 3, or other regulatory document.
- The requirement for calibration laboratories to comply with ANSI/NCSL Z540-1 was deleted because this is not a requirement of NQA-1, 2, or 3, or

other regulatory document.

- The safety analysis report for the HalfPACT shipping package was added as a regulatory source document to Table QAPD-1
- Section 5.5 was deleted. The requirements for data quality evaluation during scientific investigation planning are addressed in Section 5.1.G of the QAPD. Section 5.5 was redundant and specified requirements for the content of compliance applications, which was not appropriate for the QAPD.
- Changes were also made to correct typographical errors and incorrect section references.

Technical revisions were made to the following specific sections:

Section	Section Title
	Policy Statement
	Introduction
1.1.1	Organization
1.1.1.1.D	Management
1.1.1.3	Quality Assurance Management
1.1.2.2	Procedures Matrix (deleted)
1.2.1	Qualification Requirements
1.3.2.5	Disposition of Nonconforming Items or Data
1.5.4.B and E	Classifying QA Records
1.5.6.A	Storage, Preservation, Safekeeping, and Disposition of QA Records
2.1.B	Work Processes
2.3	Procurement
2.3.4	Procurement Document Requirements
2.4.6	Use and Control of M&TE
2.4.7	Calibration
3.2.2.10	Audit Records
Appendix C	CBFO Organization, Responsibilities, and Interfaces
Appendix D	CBFO Quality Assurance Manager Responsibilities

Rev. 6 The changes in Revision 6 were made to implement the new CBFO organization chart that was approved on May 15, 2004.

Revisions were made to the following specific sections

	List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
	Introduction
Appendix C	CBFO Organization, Responsibilities, and Interfaces
Appendix D	CBFO Quality Assurance Manager Responsibilities
Appendix E	TRU Waste Characterization and Certification Organizational and Individual Responsibilities

Rev. 7 The changes in Revision 7 were the direct result of DOE EM 3-2 comments relative to compliance with DOE O 414.1B.

Revisions were made to the following specific sections:

	Policy Statement
	List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
	Section 1.3
	Section 2.3
	Program Source Documents
	Appendices C and D

Rev. 8 The changes in Revision 8 were made to address thirteen minor findings and one concern from an EPA inspection of CBFO’s QA program (Ref: Letter from Gitlin to Moody dated April 18, 2006). Document citations were added to include remote-handled waste packaging. The exemption of NEPA-related software from the requirements of the QAPD was deleted. The applicability of software QA to safety software was clarified. Editorial changes related to the June 26, 2006 reorganization of the CBFO were also incorporated.

Revisions were made to the following specific sections:

	List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
	Introduction
1.1.2.1	Quality Assurance Program Documents
1.2.2	Training Requirements
1.3.2.3	Reporting Nonconformances
1.5.3	Indexing QA Records
1.5.6	Storage, Preservation, Safekeeping, and Disposition of QA Records
1.5.6.1	Records Disposition
2.3.1	Procurement Planning Requirements
2.3.7	Acceptance of Items or Services
2.3.8	Control of Supplier Nonconformances
2.4.2	Qualification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel
2.4.7	Calibration
3.2.2.1	Scheduling Audits
6.1	Applicability
6.6.2.4	Testing Phase
6.7.3	Validation
Appendix A	Glossary
Appendix B	References
Appendix C	CBFO Organization, Responsibilities, and Interfaces
Appendix D	CBFO Quality Assurance Manager Responsibilities

Appendix E	TRU Waste Characterization and Certification Organizational and Individual Responsibilities
------------	---

Rev. 9 The QAPD was revised to clarify that reliance on administrative controls alone is not sufficient for differentiating between waste that is acceptable for shipment to WIPP and waste that does not meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria. The classification of conditions adverse to quality related to the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit was also clarified. The language regarding reporting nonconformances was revised to comport with the November 16, 2006 Permit Modification. The requirements for records disposition were revised to comport with the Class 1 Permit Modification that was approved by NMED on September 13, 2007.

Revisions were made to the following specific sections:

1.3.2.3	Reporting Nonconformances
1.3.2.4	Segregating Nonconforming Items
1.3.3.2	Classification of Conditions Adverse to Quality
1.3.3.5	Corrective Action Planning
1.5.6.1	Records Disposition

Table of Contents

QAPD-1.0 Introduction..... QAPD-1

QAPD-2.0 Management Requirements QAPD-3

 QAPD-2.1 Organization and Quality Assurance Program QAPD-3

 QAPD-2.1.1 Organization QAPD-3

 QAPD-2.1.1.1 Management QAPD-3

 QAPD-2.1.1.2 Employees..... QAPD-4

 QAPD-2.1.1.3 QA Management..... QAPD-4

 QAPD-2.1.1.4 Communication and Interface Responsibilities QAPD-5

 QAPD-2.1.1.5 Delegation of Work QAPD-6

 QAPD-2.1.1.6 Resolution of Disputes..... QAPD-6

 QAPD-2.1.2 Implementation of the CBFO QA Program..... QAPD-6

 QAPD-2.1.2.1 Quality Assurance Program Documents..... QAPD-6

 QAPD-2.1.2.2 Applicability of QAPD Requirements..... QAPD-6

 QAPD-2.1.2.3 Grading Items and Activities and Applying Management Controls..... QAPD-7

 QAPD-2.1.2.4 Planning Work..... QAPD-8

 QAPD-2.1.2.5 Peer Reviews QAPD-9

 QAPD-2.2 Personnel Qualification and Training..... QAPD-9

 QAPD-2.2.1 Qualification Requirements QAPD-9

 QAPD-2.2.2 Training Requirements QAPD-9

 QAPD-2.3 Quality Improvement..... QAPD-10

 QAPD-2.3.1 Quality-Affecting Problems..... QAPD-10

 QAPD-2.3.1.1 Problem Identification QAPD-10

 QAPD-2.3.1.2 Problem Types QAPD-11

 QAPD-2.3.2 Nonconformances QAPD-11

 QAPD-2.3.2.1 Documenting and Evaluating Nonconforming Items..... QAPD-11

 QAPD-2.3.2.2 Identifying Nonconforming Items or Data QAPD-11

 QAPD-2.3.2.3 Reporting Nonconformances QAPD-12

 QAPD-2.3.2.4 Segregating Nonconforming Items..... QAPD-12

 QAPD-2.3.2.5 Disposition of Nonconforming Items or Data QAPD-12

 QAPD-2.3.2.6 Quality Trending of Nonconformances QAPD-13

 QAPD-2.3.3 Corrective Action..... QAPD-13

 QAPD-2.3.3.1 Identifying Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ) QAPD-13

 QAPD-2.3.3.2 Classification of Conditions Adverse to Quality QAPD-13

 QAPD-2.3.3.3 Conditions Adverse to Quality QAPD-13

 QAPD-2.3.3.4 Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality..... QAPD-14

 QAPD-2.3.3.5 Corrective Action Planning QAPD-14

 QAPD-2.3.3.6 Work Suspension QAPD-14

 QAPD-2.3.3.7 Corrective Action Follow-up..... QAPD-14

 QAPD-2.3.3.8 Recurring Conditions Adverse to Quality QAPD-15

 QAPD-2.3.3.9 Quality Trending..... QAPD-15

 QAPD-2.4 Documents QAPD-15

 QAPD-2.4.1 Document Preparation, Review, Approval, and Issuance QAPD-16

 QAPD-2.4.2 Document Distribution and Use QAPD-16

QAPD-2.4.3 Document Changes	QAPD-17
QAPD-2.5 Records	QAPD-18
QAPD-2.5.1 Records System	QAPD-18
QAPD-2.5.2 Generating QA Records	QAPD-18
QAPD-2.5.3 Indexing QA Records	QAPD-19
QAPD-2.5.4 Classifying QA Records	QAPD-19
QAPD-2.5.5 Receiving QA Records	QAPD-20
QAPD-2.5.6 Storage, Preservation, Safekeeping, and Disposition of QA Records	QAPD-21
QAPD-2.5.6.1 Records Disposition	QAPD-22
QAPD-2.5.7 Correcting Information in QA Records	QAPD-24
QAPD-3.0 Performance Requirements	QAPD-25
QAPD-3.1 Work Processes	QAPD-25
QAPD-3.1.1 Work	QAPD-25
QAPD-3.1.2 Implementing Procedures	QAPD-25
QAPD-3.1.3 Item Identification and Control	QAPD-26
QAPD-3.1.4 Special Processes	QAPD-27
QAPD-3.1.5 Handling, Storage, and Shipping	QAPD-28
QAPD-3.2 Design Control	QAPD-29
QAPD-3.2.1 Design Input	QAPD-29
QAPD-3.2.2 Design Process	QAPD-30
QAPD-3.2.3 Design Analyses	QAPD-30
QAPD-3.2.4 Design Interface	QAPD-31
QAPD-3.2.5 Design Verification	QAPD-31
QAPD-3.2.6 Design Reviews	QAPD-32
QAPD-3.2.7 Alternative Calculations	QAPD-33
QAPD-3.2.8 Qualification Testing	QAPD-33
QAPD-3.2.9 Design Change	QAPD-34
QAPD-3.3 Procurement	QAPD-34
QAPD-3.3.1 Procurement Planning Requirements	QAPD-34
QAPD-3.3.2 Supplier Selection	QAPD-35
QAPD-3.3.3 Proposal/Bid Evaluation	QAPD-36
QAPD-3.3.4 Procurement Document Requirements	QAPD-36
QAPD-3.3.5 Procurement Document Review and Approval	QAPD-37
QAPD-3.3.6 Supplier Performance Evaluation	QAPD-38
QAPD-3.3.7 Acceptance of Items or Services	QAPD-38
QAPD-3.3.7.1 Source Verification	QAPD-38
QAPD-3.3.7.2 Receiving Inspection	QAPD-39
QAPD-3.3.7.3 Post-Installation Testing	QAPD-39
QAPD-3.3.7.4 Supplier Certificate of Conformance	QAPD-39
QAPD-3.3.8 Control of Supplier Nonconformances	QAPD-40
QAPD-3.3.8.1 Commercial Grade Items	QAPD-41
QAPD-3.4 Inspection and Testing	QAPD-41
QAPD-3.4.1 Qualification of Inspection and Test Personnel	QAPD-42
QAPD-3.4.2 Qualification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel	QAPD-43
QAPD-3.4.3 Inspection	QAPD-43

QAPD-3.4.3.1 Inspection Planning	QAPD-43
QAPD-3.4.3.2 Inspection Hold Points.....	QAPD-44
QAPD-3.4.3.3 In-Process Inspections and Monitoring	QAPD-44
QAPD-3.4.3.4 Final Inspections.....	QAPD-45
QAPD-3.4.3.5 In-service Inspections	QAPD-45
QAPD-3.4.3.6 Inspection Documentation	QAPD-45
QAPD-3.4.4 Test Requirements	QAPD-46
QAPD-3.4.4.1 Test Planning	QAPD-46
QAPD-3.4.4.2 Test Documentation.....	QAPD-46
QAPD-3.4.4.3 Test Results.....	QAPD-47
QAPD-3.4.5 Monitoring, Measuring, Testing, and Data Collection Equipment.....	QAPD-47
QAPD-3.4.6 Use and Control of M&TE	QAPD-47
QAPD-3.4.7 Calibration	QAPD-48
QAPD-4.0 Assessment Requirements	QAPD-50
QAPD-4.1 Management Assessment.....	QAPD-50
QAPD-4.2 Independent Assessment.....	QAPD-50
QAPD-4.2.1 Surveillances.....	QAPD-51
QAPD-4.2.2 Audits.....	QAPD-51
QAPD-4.2.2.1 Scheduling Audits.....	QAPD-51
QAPD-4.2.2.2 Planning and Preparation for Audits.....	QAPD-52
QAPD-4.2.2.3 Audit Team Selection	QAPD-52
QAPD-4.2.2.4 Auditor Qualification.....	QAPD-53
QAPD-4.2.2.5 Technical Specialist Qualification	QAPD-53
QAPD-4.2.2.6 Lead Auditor Qualification.....	QAPD-53
QAPD-4.2.2.7 Performing Audits	QAPD-56
QAPD-4.2.2.8 Reporting Audit Results	QAPD-56
QAPD-4.2.2.9 Audit Response and Follow Up.....	QAPD-57
QAPD-4.2.2.10 Audit Records	QAPD-57
QAPD-5.0 Sample Control Requirements	QAPD-58
QAPD-5.1 Sample Control	QAPD-58
QAPD-5.2 Sample Identification.....	QAPD-58
QAPD-5.3 Handling, Storing, and Shipping Samples.....	QAPD-59
QAPD-5.4 Disposition of Nonconforming Samples	QAPD-60
QAPD-6.0 Scientific Investigation Requirements.....	QAPD-61
QAPD-6.1 Planning Scientific Investigations	QAPD-61
QAPD-6.2 Performing Scientific Investigations	QAPD-61
QAPD-6.3 Data Documentation, Control, and Validation	QAPD-63
QAPD-6.3.1 Data Identification and Usage	QAPD-63
QAPD-6.3.2 Data Validation.....	QAPD-63
QAPD-6.4 Qualification of Existing Data	QAPD-64
QAPD-7.0 Software Requirements.....	QAPD-66
QAPD-7.1 Applicability	QAPD-66
QAPD-7.2 Basic Requirements for Inventory and Classification of Software	QAPD-67

QAPD-7.3 Software Quality Assurance	QAPD-67
QAPD-7.3.1 Basic Requirements for Software Quality Assurance.....	QAPD-67
QAPD-7.3.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements for Software Quality Assurance	QAPD-67
QAPD-7.4 Software Procurement	QAPD-68
QAPD-7.4.1 Basic Requirements for Software Procurement.....	QAPD-68
QAPD-7.4.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements for Software Procurement	QAPD-68
QAPD-7.5 Software Developed Under Other QA Programs	QAPD-68
QAPD-7.5.1 Basic Requirements	QAPD-68
QAPD-7.5.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements.....	QAPD-69
QAPD-7.6 Software Development and Life Cycle.....	QAPD-69
QAPD-7.6.1 Basic Requirements	QAPD-69
QAPD-7.6.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements.....	QAPD-69
QAPD-7.6.2.1 Requirements Phase.....	QAPD-70
QAPD-7.6.2.2 Design Phase.....	QAPD-70
QAPD-7.6.2.3 Implementation Phase.....	QAPD-70
QAPD-7.6.2.4 Testing Phase	QAPD-70
QAPD-7.6.2.5 Installation and Checkout Phase.....	QAPD-72
QAPD-7.6.2.6 Operations and Maintenance Phase	QAPD-72
QAPD-7.6.2.7 Retirement Phase	QAPD-73
QAPD-7.7 Software Verification and Validation.....	QAPD-73
QAPD-7.7.1 Basic Requirements	QAPD-73
QAPD-7.7.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements.....	QAPD-73
QAPD-7.7.2.1 Verification	QAPD-73
QAPD-7.7.2.2 Requirements	QAPD-73
QAPD-7.7.2.3 Design	QAPD-74
QAPD-7.7.2.4 Implementation.....	QAPD-74
QAPD-7.7.2.5 Testing	QAPD-74
QAPD-7.7.2.6 Installation and Checkout	QAPD-74
QAPD-7.7.3 Validation	QAPD-74
QAPD-7.8 Software Configuration Management.....	QAPD-75
QAPD-7.8.1 Basic Requirements	QAPD-75
QAPD-7.8.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements.....	QAPD-75
QAPD-7.8.2.1 Configuration Identification	QAPD-75
QAPD-7.8.2.2 Configuration Change Control	QAPD-75
QAPD-7.8.2.3 Configuration Status Accounting	QAPD-76
QAPD-7.9 Documentation.....	QAPD-76
QAPD-7.9.1 Basic Requirements	QAPD-76
QAPD-7.9.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements.....	QAPD-76
QAPD-7.9.2.1 Procurement Documentation	QAPD-76
QAPD-7.9.2.2 Requirements Documentation	QAPD-76
QAPD-7.9.2.3 Design and Implementation Documentation	QAPD-77
QAPD-7.9.2.4 Verification and Validation Documentation.....	QAPD-77
QAPD-7.9.2.5 Change Documentation	QAPD-77
QAPD-7.9.2.6 User Documentation	QAPD-77
QAPD-7.9.2.7 Error Documentation	QAPD-78
QAPD-7.10 Problem Reporting and Corrective Action	QAPD-78

QAPD-7.10.1 Basic Requirements	QAPD-78
QAPD-7.10.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements.....	QAPD-78
QAPD-7.11 Access Control.....	QAPD-79
QAPD-8.0 Glossary	QAPD-80
QAPD-9.0 References.....	QAPD-91
ATTACHMENT A: CBFO Organization, Responsibilities, and Interfaces.....	QAPD-92
ATTACHMENT B: CBFO Quality Assurance Manager Responsibilities	QAPD-94
ATTACHMENT C: TRU Waste Characterization and Certification Organizational and Individual Responsibilities.....	QAPD-96

List of Tables

Table QAPD-1. QA Program Source Documents	QAPD-2
---	--------

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANSI	American National Standards Institute
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASNT	American Society of Nondestructive Testing
ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CAQ	Condition Adverse to Quality
CATS	Corrective Action Tracking System
CBFO	Carlsbad Field Office
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DQO	Data Quality Objective
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
HWFP	Hazardous Waste Facility Permit
M&DC	Monitoring and Data Collection Equipment
M&TE	Measuring and Test Equipment
M&O	Management and Operating Contractor
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NDE	Nondestructive Examination
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NMED	New Mexico Environment Department
NQA	Nuclear Quality Assurance
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTP	National TRU Program
NUREG	Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report designation
OD	Office Director
QA	Quality Assurance
QAPD	Quality Assurance Program Document
QAPjP	Quality Assurance Project Plan
QAPP	Transuranic Waste Characterization Quality Assurance Program Plan (CAO-94-1010)

QC	Quality Control
RIDS	Records Inventory and Disposition Schedule
SCAQ	Significant Condition Adverse to Quality
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SQA	Software Quality Assurance
TRAMPAC	TRUPACT-II Authorization Methods for Payload Control
TRU	Transuranic
TRUPACT-II	Transuranic Package Transporter, Model II
UL	Underwriter's Laboratory
WAP	Waste Analysis Plan
WID	Westinghouse Waste Isolation Division
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WTS	Washington TRU Solutions

This page intentionally left blank.

1 **QAPD-1.0 Introduction**

2 The Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) is the
3 document that describes and establishes the CBFO Quality Assurance (QA) program. The
4 provisions of this QAPD apply to all programs and projects managed by the CBFO which
5 require a QA program, including activities related to compliance application, waste
6 characterization, repository performance assessment, waste isolation, waste transportation,
7 nuclear safety, environmental protection, and management and operation of the Waste Isolation
8 Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility. This document identifies the sources of all applicable QA program
9 requirements. The subject requirements are based on criteria contained, or incorporated by
10 reference, in source documents listed in Table QAPD-1. These documents have been placed into
11 one of three categories:

- 12 1. Regulatory documents, including those incorporated by reference, that define the
13 requirements necessary for the WIPP to be granted a certificate of compliance by the Federal
14 Government and permit(s) by State governmental agencies to dispose of transuranic (TRU)
15 and mixed TRU wastes in the WIPP repository, or that define requirements applicable to the
16 management of the WIPP as a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) non-reactor nuclear facility
- 17 2. Commitment documents that are imposed by DOE management
- 18 3. Guidance documents that provide additional information that is useful in developing and
19 implementing the CBFO QA program

20 The purpose of the QAPD is to describe the applicability and requirements of the CBFO QA
21 program as applied within the CBFO management infrastructure. In this context, the
22 management infrastructure includes all CBFO program participants (e.g., Sandia National
23 Laboratories [SNL] as Science Advisor; Washington TRU Solution [WTS] as the Management
24 and Operating [M&O] contractor of the WIPP, and various DOE organizations and contractors
25 performing work under the direction of the CBFO). This program is developed and maintained
26 through an ongoing process that selectively applies the varied QA program criteria. This process
27 provides due consideration to the extent of source requirement applicability, a graded-approach,
28 available guidance, and the current foreseeable activities expected to be performed under the
29 direction of CBFO.

30 The requirements in this QAPD are based on the principle that work shall be planned,
31 documented, performed under controlled conditions, and periodically assessed to establish work
32 item quality and process effectiveness and to promote improvement. Management, line
33 personnel, and organizations are responsible for planning and achieving quality and for
34 promoting continuous improvement. Quality assurance organizations and personnel are
35 responsible for the verification of the achievement of quality. This QAPD further delineates the
36 quality contributions expected of all personnel and encourages their active participation in
37 implementing the CBFO QA program.

38

1

Table QAPD-1. QA Program Source Documents

MAJOR REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS	TITLE
40 CFR Part 191	Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes
40 CFR Part 194	Criteria for the Certification and Re-Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations
10 CFR Part 830	Nuclear Safety Management
10 CFR Part 71	Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material
10 CFR Part 21	Reporting of Defects and Nonconformances
ASME NQA-1-1989 (incorporated by reference in 40 CFR Part 194)	Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facilities
ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda, Part 2.7 (incorporated by reference in 40 CFR Part 194)	Quality Assurance Requirements of Computer Software for Nuclear Facility Applications
ASME NQA-3-1989 excluding Section 2.1(b) and (c) and Section 17.1 (incorporated by reference in 40 CFR Part 194)	Quality Assurance Program Requirements for the Collection of Scientific and Technical Information for Site Characterization of High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories
NM 48901 39088 – TSDF/WIPP	WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit
NRC Certificate Number 9212	RH-TRU 72-B Certificate of Compliance
NRC Certificate Number 9218	TRUPACT-II Certificate of Compliance
NRC Certificate Number 9279	HalfPACT Certificate of Compliance
NRC Certificate Number 9204	10-160B Certificate of Compliance
NUREG-1297 (1988) (incorporated by reference in 40 CFR Part 194)	Peer Review for High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories
COMMITMENT DOCUMENTS	TITLE
DOE O 414.1C	Quality Assurance
DOE O 226.1	Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy
SNT-TC-1A-1980	American Society of Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) "Recommended Practice No. 1 SNT-TC-1A, Personnel Qualification and Certification in Nondestructive Testing," August 1980
GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS	TITLE
DOE, G-414.1-2A	Quality Assurance Management System Guide for Use with 10 CFR Part 830.120 and DOE O 414.1
NUREG/BR-0167 (1993)	Software Quality Assurance Program and Guidelines

2

1 **QAPD-2.0 Management Requirements**

2 This section describes the fundamental elements related to the organization and management of
3 the CBFO QA program, as well as the fundamentals to be applied in managing the work of the
4 program.

5 **QAPD-2.1 Organization and Quality Assurance Program**

6 This section describes the requirement for the organizational structure, primary interfaces,
7 functional responsibilities, and levels of authority required to implement the CBFO QA program.
8 In addition, this section describes the basic elements of the QA program and their applicability.

9 **QAPD-2.1.1 Organization**

10 Effective implementation of the CBFO QA program is dependent on the efforts at all levels of
11 the program participants. The organizational structures and the responsibility assignments of
12 program participants shall be such that those organizations that have been assigned responsibility
13 for performing the work are responsible for achieving and maintaining quality. Management is
14 responsible for defining quality, developing appropriate plans to attain quality, and supporting
15 the workers in pursuit of quality. QA organizations of the program participants are responsible
16 for verifying the achievement of quality in the implementation of the CBFO QA program.
17 CBFO organizational and individual responsibilities are addressed in [Attachment A](#) and [B](#).
18 Organizational and individual responsibilities for TRU waste characterization, repository
19 performance assessment, waste isolation, waste transportation, nuclear safety, environmental
20 protection, and management and operation of the WIPP facility are addressed in Section QAPD-
21 2.3.3.1.

22 **QAPD-2.1.1.1 Management**

- 23 1. Management has overall responsibility for successfully accomplishing activities subject to
24 this QAPD. Management provides the necessary planning, organization, direction, control,
25 resources, and support to achieve their defined objectives. Management is responsible for
26 planning, performing, and improving the work.
- 27 2. Management is responsible for establishing and implementing policies, plans, and procedures
28 that control the quality of work, consistent with the provisions of this QAPD.
- 29 3. Management quality responsibilities include:
- 30 A. Ensuring that adequate technical and QA training is provided for personnel performing
31 activities subject to this QAPD
- 32 B. Ensuring compliance with all applicable regulations, DOE orders and requirements, and
33 applicable Federal, State, and local laws
- 34 C. Ensuring that personnel adhere to procedures for the generation, identification, control,
35 and protection of QA records

- 1 D. Exercising the authority and responsibility to stop unsatisfactory work such that cost and
2 schedule do not override environmental, safety, or health considerations
- 3 E. Developing, implementing, and maintaining plans, policies, and procedures that
4 implement this QAPD
- 5 F. Identifying, investigating, reporting, and correcting quality problems
- 6 4. Quality achievement is the responsibility of those performing the work. Line organizations
7 are responsible for achieving quality in their areas.
- 8 5. Management empowers employees by delegating authority and decision making to the
9 lowest appropriate level in the organization.

10 **QAPD-2.1.1.2 Employees**

11 Each program participant employee is responsible for the quality of his or her work and for
12 promptly reporting all existing, developing, or potential conditions adverse to quality to the
13 responsible management for evaluation and action.

14 **QAPD-2.1.1.3 QA Management**

15 An organization's QA management has the authority and overall responsibility to independently
16 assess the organization's effective implementation of the QA program to verify the achievement
17 of quality.

- 18 1. QA management shall:
 - 19 A. Schedule and conduct QA assessments
 - 20 B. Maintain liaison with participant QA organizations and other affected organizations
 - 21 C. Ensure preparation, review, and issuance of QA plans and procedures that implement the
22 provisions of this QAPD
 - 23 D. Review and approve supplier and subcontractor QA plans
 - 24 E. Track or perform trend analysis of quality problems, and report quality problem areas
 - 25 F. Provide for the administrative processing of documentation concerning conditions
26 adverse to quality
 - 27 G. Have direct access to responsible management at a level where appropriate action can be
28 effected
 - 29 H. Be sufficiently independent from cost and schedule considerations
 - 30 I. Have the organizational freedom to communicate with management

- 1 J. Have no assigned responsibilities unrelated to the QA program that would prevent
- 2 appropriate attention to QA matters
- 3 K. Develop, establish, and interpret QA policy and ensure effective implementation
- 4 L. Interface, as appropriate, with the CBFO staff, participants, and other stakeholders on QA
- 5 matters
- 6 M. Assist subordinate organizations with quality planning, documentation, quality
- 7 measurement, and problem identification and resolution
- 8 N. Provide guidance to all applicable subordinate organizations concerning identification,
- 9 control, and protection of QA records
- 10 2. The QA organization shall have sufficient authority, access to work areas, and organizational
- 11 freedom to:
- 12 A. Identify quality problems
- 13 B. Recommend solutions
- 14 C. Verify implementation of solutions
- 15 D. Ensure that unsatisfactory conditions are controlled until proper disposition has occurred

16 **QAPD-2.1.1.4 Communication and Interface Responsibilities**

17 1. Communication Responsibilities

18 Participating organizations at all management levels shall establish communication channels that
19 provide timely and wide dissemination of information pertinent to quality performance, such as:

- 20 A. The status of development and implementation of the QA program
- 21 B. The status and resolution of significant quality problems
- 22 C. The lessons learned from significant quality problems and adverse conditions
- 23 D. Quality management practices and improvements
- 24 E. Trend analysis results

25 2. Interface Responsibilities

- 26 A. Where more than one organization is involved in the execution of activities covered by
- 27 this QAPD, the responsibility and authority of each organization shall be clearly
- 28 established, defined, and documented. The external interfaces between organizations, the
- 29 internal interfaces between organizational units, and interface changes shall be

1 documented. Interface responsibilities shall be defined and documented and shall include
2 the requirements for management, performance, and assessment.

- 3 B. CBFO-sponsored activities, performed by organizations external to the CBFO, include,
4 but are not limited to, compliance application, waste characterization, repository
5 performance assessment, waste isolation, waste transportation, nuclear safety,
6 environmental protection, and management and operation of the WIPP facility.
7 Responsible CBFO organizations shall ensure the effective implementation of the CBFO
8 QA program.

9 **QAPD-2.1.1.5 Delegation of Work**

10 Individuals or organizations responsible for establishing, planning, accomplishing, and assessing
11 the work may delegate work to other individuals or organizations. However, the individuals or
12 organizations making the delegation shall retain overall responsibility for the delegated work.

13 **QAPD-2.1.1.6 Resolution of Disputes**

14 Differences of opinion involving the definition and implementation of QA program requirements
15 will be brought to the attention of the appropriate QA manager and the responsible manager. If
16 not resolved, the issues will be elevated progressively to successively higher levels of
17 management as necessary.

18 **QAPD-2.1.2 Implementation of the CBFO QA Program**

19 **QAPD-2.1.2.1 Quality Assurance Program Documents**

20 Program participants shall develop and follow plans and procedures that effectively implement
21 the requirements described in this QAPD along with those requirements contained within the
22 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Waste Analysis Plan (WAP), Quality
23 Assurance Project Plans (QAPjPs), Certification QA Plans, Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC),
24 and Certificates of Compliance for NRC licensed nuclear packaging, as applicable.

25 **QAPD-2.1.2.2 Applicability of QAPD Requirements**

26 The terminology “items or activities important to compliance application, waste characterization,
27 repository performance assessment, waste isolation, waste transportation, nuclear safety,
28 environmental protection, and management and operation of the WIPP facility” is used
29 generically throughout this QAPD to refer to the following:

- 30 1. WIPP site activities or operations that process or store radioactive liquid or solid waste,
31 perform waste management activities involving radioactive materials, or design,
32 manufacture, or assemble items for use with radioactive materials in such a form and
33 quantity that a nuclear hazard exists
- 34 2. Waste characterization activities

- 1 3. Environmental monitoring, monitoring the performance of the disposal system, and sampling
2 and analysis activities
- 3 4. Field measurements of geological factors, ground water, meteorology, and topography
- 4 5. Computations, codes, models, and methods used to demonstrate compliance with disposal
5 regulations
- 6 6. Expert judgment elicitation to support applications for recertification or determination of
7 compliance
- 8 7. Design of the disposal system and actions taken to ensure compliance with design
9 specifications
- 10 8. The collection of data and information used to support compliance application(s) and/or any
11 modifications to the compliance application
- 12 9. Other systems, structures, components, and activities important to the isolation of waste in
13 the disposal system
- 14 10. Those items and activities related to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensed
15 packaging (e.g., Transuranic Package Transporter Model II [TRUPACT-II], RH-72B, CNS
16 10-160B), design, purchase, fabrication, handling, shipping, storage, cleaning, assembly,
17 inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification or components of
18 packaging that are important to safety

19 **QAPD-2.1.2.3 Grading Items and Activities and Applying Management Controls**

- 20 1. The graded approach is the process by which the level of analysis, documentation,
21 verification, and other controls necessary to comply with QA program requirements are
22 developed commensurate with the following factors:
 - 23 A. The importance of an item or activity with respect to safety, waste isolation, and
24 regulatory compliance
 - 25 B. The importance of the data to be generated
 - 26 C. The need to demonstrate compliance with specific regulatory design and QA
27 requirements
 - 28 D. The impact on the results of performance assessments and engineering analyses
 - 29 E. The magnitude of a hazard or the consequences of failure
 - 30 F. The life-cycle stage of a facility or item
 - 31 G. The programmatic mission of a facility

- 1 H. The particular characteristics of a facility, item, or activity (e.g., complexity, uniqueness,
2 history, or the necessity for special controls or processes)
- 3 I. The relative importance of radiological and non-radiological hazards
- 4 2. The extent of management and QA controls applied to an item or activity will vary as a
5 function of the degree of confidence needed to achieve the desired quality of the item or
6 activity. The grading process provides the flexibility to design and implement controls that
7 best suit the facility or activity. Each organization should develop their own method to
8 determine that the defined grading process is effective. The use of the graded approach shall
9 determine the appropriate level of controls necessary to manage the items, systems, and
10 activities necessary to ship TRU waste to WIPP.
- 11 3. Grading methods for each organization shall provide for:
 - 12 A. The assignment of management and QA control levels
 - 13 B. The definitive criteria used in selecting those levels
 - 14 C. Detailed descriptions of the management and QA control provisions corresponding to
15 those levels, based on the above requirements
- 16 4. Program participant procedures that establish and implement a graded approach for items and
17 activities under the cognizance of the CBFO shall be submitted to the CBFO QA Manager
18 for approval for use in CBFO programs.

19 **QAPD-2.1.2.4 Planning Work**

- 20 Planning shall be performed and documented to ensure that work is accomplished under suitably
21 controlled conditions. As appropriate, planning elements shall include:
- 22 1. Definition of work scope, objectives, and a listing of the primary tasks involved
 - 23 2. Identification of scientific approaches or technical methods used to collect, analyze, or study
24 results of applicable work
 - 25 3. Identification of field and laboratory testing standards and quality criteria
 - 26 4. Identification of applicable implementation documents (appropriate nationally recognized
27 standards shall be used whenever possible)
 - 28 5. Identification of field and laboratory testing equipment or other equipment
 - 29 6. Identification of, or provisions for the identification of, required records and the recording of
30 objective evidence of the results of the work performed
 - 31 7. Identification of prerequisites, special controls, specific environmental conditions, processes,
32 or skills

1 8. Identification of computer software

2 **QAPD-2.1.2.5 Peer Reviews**

3 Peer reviews performed in support of WIPP compliance activities shall be documented, as shall
4 all peer review processes. Peer reviews of the following activities shall be conducted in a
5 manner consistent with NUREG-1297, *Generic Technical Position on Peer Review for High-*
6 *Level Nuclear Waste Repositories*:

- 7 1. Conceptual models selected and developed by the DOE
- 8 2. Waste characterization analysis as required in 40 CFR § 194.24(b)
- 9 3. Engineered barrier evaluation as required in 40 CFR § 194.44

10 **QAPD-2.2 Personnel Qualification and Training**

11 Personnel shall be trained and qualified to ensure they are capable of performing their assigned
12 tasks and to ensure that job proficiency is maintained.

13 **QAPD-2.2.1 Qualification Requirements**

14 Qualification requirements for CBFO and participant positions or job functions shall be
15 established for activities important to compliance application, waste characterization, repository
16 performance assessment, waste isolation, waste transportation, nuclear safety, environmental
17 protection, and management and operation of the WIPP facility. The evaluation shall be
18 documented. At a minimum, these positions include managers, designers, scientists, independent
19 assessment personnel, operators, maintenance personnel, technicians, and inspectors.

20 The responsible organization shall:

- 21 1. Analyze each job position to determine the task responsibilities of the position subject to the
22 QAPD. The analysis shall identify minimum education, experience, and training
23 prerequisites for each position involved in the planning, performance, or verification of
24 activities subject to the QAPD, commensurate with the scope, complexity, and nature of the
25 work.
- 26 2. Ensure that personnel selected to perform or verify activities subject to the QAPD have
27 education, experience, and training commensurate with the minimum requirements specified.
28 The qualification of an individual shall be based upon evaluation of education and
29 experience, which is compared to the established requirements for the position.

30 **QAPD-2.2.2 Training Requirements**

31 CBFO and participant personnel performing activities important to compliance application,
32 waste characterization, repository performance assessment, waste isolation, waste transportation,
33 nuclear safety, environmental protection, and management and operation of the WIPP facility
34 shall receive related training in accordance with the following requirements. Training shall

1 emphasize the correct performance of work, describe why the applicable quality and nuclear
2 safety requirements exist, and describe the fundamentals of the work and the context. Training
3 shall be subject to ongoing review to determine instruction and training program effectiveness
4 and shall be upgraded whenever needed improvements or enhancements are identified.

5 Management shall:

6 1. Ensure that personnel receive indoctrination and training, including on-the-job and hands-on
7 training, as needed, to achieve initial proficiency; maintain proficiency; and adapt to changes
8 in technology, methods, job responsibilities and authority, and quality assurance
9 implementing procedures, prior to performing any tasks subject to the QAPD.

10 2. Ensure that personnel receive indoctrination in the following:

11 A. General criteria, including applicable QA plans, codes, regulations, and standards

12 B. Specific criteria, including applicable QAPjPs and implementing procedures

13 3. Ensure that records generated during qualification, general indoctrination and training, or
14 specific skill training activities are collected and maintained as QA records.

15 **QAPD-2.3 Quality Improvement**

16 Quality improvement is a management process carried out to improve items, services, products,
17 or processes. All aspects of work that affect quality and the management system are subject to
18 continuous improvement through assessment and feedback processes.

19 For findings identified by the organizations listed in DOE O 414.1C, Attachment 4, Paragraph 1,
20 the implementation process described in DOE G 450.4-1B, Appendix G will be invoked. The
21 CBFO Office Director, Office of Disposal, is responsible for the management of the identified
22 issues as required by the DOE Corrective Action Tracking System (CATS) User's Guide. This
23 function is applicable only to safety issues identified at the CBFO. The waste generator sites are
24 required to implement the process of the Corrective Action Management Program as directed by
25 the appropriate site office.

26 Quality-related program deficiencies are addressed as indicated in Section QAPD-2.3.3.3.

27 **QAPD-2.3.1 Quality-Affecting Problems**

28 Quality-affecting problems and items, services, and processes that do not meet established
29 requirements shall be identified, documented, reported, controlled, and corrected. Quality
30 problems may be identified by the organization or by an external source.

31 **QAPD-2.3.1.1 Problem Identification**

32 All personnel shall be responsible for identifying quality problems and shall be encouraged by
33 management to suggest improvements. CBFO and participant organizations foster a "no-fault"
34 attitude for quality problems and prioritize and focus resources on preventive actions and on
35 those quality problems that have the greatest potential for:

- 1 1. Posing adverse risks to the environment and human health
- 2 2. Adversely impacting the quality, safety, and reliability of waste operations
- 3 3. Affecting the ability to meet quality requirements

4 **QAPD-2.3.1.2 Problem Types**

5 Quality-affecting problems may involve:

- 6 1. Noncompliance with a QA program requirement. A noncompliance is classified as a
7 Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ) or Significant Condition Adverse to Quality (SCAQ)
- 8 2. Nonconforming items, including suspect/counterfeit items or data, that do not conform to
9 specified requirements.

10 **QAPD-2.3.2 Nonconformances**

11 Items or data that do not conform to established requirements shall be controlled to prevent
12 inadvertent installation or use.

13 **QAPD-2.3.2.1 Documenting and Evaluating Nonconforming Items**

14 The documentation and evaluation of nonconforming items shall be accomplished by:

- 15 1. Clearly identifying and describing the characteristics that do not conform to specified criteria
- 16 2. Reviewing nonconformance documentation and proposed recommended disposition of the
17 nonconforming item or data. The review shall include a determination of the need for
18 corrective action in accordance with the requirements of Section QAPD-2.3.3, *Corrective*
19 *Action*. In addition, organizations affected by the nonconformance shall be notified.
- 20 3. Evaluating and approving of recommended dispositions
- 21 4. Ensuring that personnel performing evaluation or recommending disposition have
22 demonstrated competence in the specific area they are evaluating or dispositioning, and have
23 an adequate understanding of the requirements
- 24 5. Implementing procedures that specify the responsibility and authority for reviewing,
25 evaluating, approving the disposition, and closure of the nonconformance

26 **QAPD-2.3.2.2 Identifying Nonconforming Items or Data**

- 27 1. Nonconforming items shall be physically identified by marking, tagging, segregation, or
28 other methods that do not adversely affect the end use. The identification shall be legible and
29 easily recognizable, and shall be traceable to the reporting documentation.

- 1 2. If physical identification of each nonconforming item is not practical, the container, package,
2 or segregated storage area, as appropriate, shall be physically identified as in A above.

3 **QAPD-2.3.2.3 Reporting Nonconformances**

4 Organizations affected by a nonconformance shall be notified. The CBFO shall be notified in
5 writing within 5 calendar days of identification of any non-administrative nonconformance
6 related to applicable requirements specified in the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit
7 (HWFP) Waste Analysis Plan (WAP), which is first identified at the site project manager's
8 signature release level (i.e., a failure to meet a data quality objective [DQO]). Notification is also
9 required if the results sampling and analysis specified in Permit Attachment B are inconsistent
10 with acceptable knowledge documentation. The nonconformance report shall be submitted to
11 CBFO within 30 calendar days of identification of the deficiency.

12 Nonconformances related to defects or failure to comply with requirements applicable to NRC
13 licensed packaging (e.g., TRUPACT II, RH 72-B) shall be reported to the CBFO Office of the
14 National TRU Program. The WIPP M&O contractor will evaluate issues and nonconformances
15 for reporting to the NRC under 10CFR Part 21 or Part 71 and provide the results of this
16 evaluation to CBFO.

17 **QAPD-2.3.2.4 Segregating Nonconforming Items**

- 18 1. Further processing, delivery, installation, or use of nonconforming items shall be controlled
19 pending the evaluation and approval of the disposition.
- 20 2. Nonconforming items shall be segregated, when practical, by placing them in a clearly
21 identified and designated hold area until properly dispositioned.
- 22 3. If segregation is impractical or impossible due to physical condition, other precautions shall
23 be employed to preclude inadvertent use.
- 24 4. Reliance solely on other precautions (i.e., administrative controls) to differentiate waste
25 containers that are acceptable for shipment to WIPP from those containers that do not meet
26 the WIPP acceptance criteria is not allowed.

27 **QAPD-2.3.2.5 Disposition of Nonconforming Items or Data**

28 The disposition of nonconforming characteristics shall be accomplished as follows:

- 29 1. The nonconformance characteristics shall be reviewed, and recommended dispositions of
30 nonconforming items or data shall be proposed and approved in accordance with documented
31 procedures. Personnel performing evaluations to determine a disposition shall have
32 demonstrated competence in the specific area they are evaluating, have adequate
33 understanding of the requirements, and have access to pertinent background information.
- 34 2. The dispositions "use-as-is," "reject," "repair," or "rework" for nonconforming items or data
35 shall be identified and documented.

- 1 3. The technical justification for the acceptability of a nonconforming item or data that has been
2 disposed of “use-as-is” or “repair” shall be documented.
- 3 4. Items that do not meet original design requirements that are disposed of “use-as-is” or
4 “repair” shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the
5 original design, and
 - 6 A. If changes to the specifying document are required to reflect the as-built condition, then
7 the disposition shall require action to change the specifying document to reflect the
8 accepted nonconformance.
 - 9 B. Any document or QA record change required by the disposition of the nonconformance
10 shall be identified in the nonconformance documentation and, when a document or record
11 is changed, the justification for the change shall reference the nonconformance
12 documentation.
- 13 5. The disposition of an item to be reworked or repaired shall contain a requirement to re-
14 examine (inspect, test, or examine by nondestructive examination) the item to verify
15 acceptability. Repaired or reworked items shall be re-examined using the original process
16 and acceptance criteria unless the nonconforming item disposition has established alternate
17 acceptance criteria.

18 **QAPD-2.3.2.6 Quality Trending of Nonconformances**

19 Nonconformance documentation shall be periodically analyzed by the QA organization to
20 identify quality trends in accordance with Section QAPD-2.3.3, *Corrective Action*.

21 **QAPD-2.3.3 Corrective Action**

22 **QAPD-2.3.3.1 Identifying Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ)**

23 A CAQ occurs when a QA requirement has not been met.

24 **QAPD-2.3.3.2 Classification of Conditions Adverse to Quality**

25 Classification of CAQs is based on the effect the CAQ has on compliance to regulatory
26 requirements for safety, operability, TRU waste characterization, TRU waste site certification,
27 TRU waste containment, and the effective implementation of the QAPD. Any CAQs that are
28 determined to be noncompliant with an HWFP condition or requirement require corrective action
29 plans (CAPs) that meet the requirements of Section QAPD-2.3.3.5.

30 **QAPD-2.3.3.3 Conditions Adverse to Quality**

- 31 1. CAQs shall be documented and reported to the appropriate levels of management responsible
32 for the condition and to the QA organization for tracking.
- 33 2. Responsible management shall determine the extent and impact of the adverse condition and,
34 at a minimum, complete remedial action as soon as practical.

1 **QAPD-2.3.3.4 Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality**

- 2 1. Implementing documents shall include criteria for determining if a condition adverse to
3 quality is significant. These criteria shall be based on the criteria in the definition of
4 conditions adverse to quality included in Section QAPD-8.0.
- 5 2. SCAQs shall be investigated, documented (including the extent of the condition and the
6 impact on completed work), and reported to the management responsible for the condition,
7 their senior management, and the QA organization for tracking.
- 8 3. Responsible management shall determine when an SCAQ related to the WIPP HWFP (i.e., a
9 waste characterization process currently certified by the CBFO at a TRU waste site) requires
10 accelerated corrective action. The required time interval for accelerated corrective action
11 shall be established by the CBFO QA Manager.

12 **QAPD-2.3.3.5 Corrective Action Planning**

13 CAPs are required for all SCAQs. SCAQ CAPs shall address:

- 14 1. Remedial Action: actions necessary to resolve the initial problem
- 15 2. Investigative Actions: assessment of the extent and impact of the SCAQ
- 16 3. Root Cause Determination: identification of the root cause of the SCAQ
- 17 4. Actions to Preclude Recurrence: actions necessary to prevent recurrence of the SCAQ
- 18 5. Schedule: milestones for completion of the CAP, including expected completion dates and
19 identification of responsible individuals

20 **QAPD-2.3.3.6 Work Suspension**

21 If a work suspension condition has been identified, responsible management shall take
22 appropriate action to lift and close the work suspension, based on the resolution of the related
23 SCAQ. The QA organization shall verify and document the completion of applicable corrective
24 actions prior to any management action releasing the work suspension.

25 **QAPD-2.3.3.7 Corrective Action Follow-up**

26 A system shall be established to verify the effective implementation of scheduled corrective
27 actions and to complete corrective actions in a timely manner. The QA organization shall
28 evaluate the adequacy of corrective actions planned, assign responsibility for follow-up
29 verification, and perform and document verification results. If results of verification are
30 unsatisfactory, the CAP shall be revised appropriately, and corrective actions and verification
31 performed.

1 **QAPD-2.3.3.8 Recurring Conditions Adverse to Quality**

2 For recurring CAQs, management shall:

- 3 1. Determine the events leading up to the occurrences
- 4 2. Develop an understanding of the technical and work activities associated with the CAQ
- 5 3. Ascertain and identify any generic implications and impacts on completed work
- 6 4. Determine the extent to which similar quality problems, or precursors to the problem, have
7 been identified
- 8 5. Determine the effectiveness of corrective actions that have been taken
- 9 6. Consider suspending work associated with the applicable activity, as appropriate
- 10 7. Suggest actions that can be taken by the responsible organization to preclude recurrence, as
11 appropriate

12 **QAPD-2.3.3.9 Quality Trending**

13 The need for quality improvement is accomplished through quality analysis and trending. To
14 provide reliable trending information, the following activities shall be performed:

- 15 1. Quality performance data shall be identified, collected, and routinely analyzed to identify
16 opportunities to improve items, services, activities, and processes. This analysis shall
17 consider information from external sources and not be limited to one type of work or to one
18 organization.
- 19 2. The analyses shall be performed semi-annually to provide for prompt identification of trends
20 adverse to quality. Reports of CAQs, including those identified during quality assurance
21 audits as Corrected During the Audit/Surveillance (CDAs/CDSs), shall be evaluated to
22 identify adverse quality trends and root causes, with results reported to the organization
23 responsible for corrective actions.
- 24 3. Program participants will report trending information to responsible management and to the
25 applicable organization.

26 **QAPD-2.4 Documents**

- 27 1. Documents shall be prepared, reviewed, approved, issued, used, and revised to prescribe
28 processes, specify requirements, or establish design.
- 29 2. Documents that specify requirements, prescribe processes, or establish design important to
30 the compliance application, waste characterization, repository performance assessment,
31 waste isolation, waste transportation, nuclear safety, environmental protection, and
32 management and operation of the WIPP facility, such as instructions, procedures, drawings,

1 test plans, management plans, technical reports, performance reports, and test reports, shall
2 be controlled according to the requirements listed below to ensure that the correct documents
3 are being used.

4 **QAPD-2.4.1 Document Preparation, Review, Approval, and Issuance**

- 5 1. Documents shall be reviewed for adequacy, correctness, and completeness prior to approval
6 and issuance. Program participants shall identify the individuals or organizations responsible
7 for the preparation, review, approval, and issuance of controlled documents.
- 8 2. Documents shall be controlled during the review and approval phase in accordance with
9 approved procedures.
- 10 3. The requesting organization shall identify the applicable criteria for the review. These
11 criteria shall consider technical adequacy, accuracy, completeness, and compliance with
12 established requirements.
- 13 4. Pertinent background information or data shall be made available by the organization
14 requesting the review if the information is not readily available to the reviewer.
- 15 5. The review will be performed by individuals other than the originator.
- 16 6. Reviewers will be technically competent in the subject area being reviewed.
- 17 7. The organization or technical discipline affected by the document shall review the document
18 according to the established review criteria.
- 19 8. The appropriate quality assurance organization shall review documents that translate CBFO
20 QAPD or other CBFO requirements.
- 21 9. Review comment documentation shall be resolved in accordance with approved procedures.
22 Evidence of review comment resolution shall be maintained by the originating organization.
- 23 10. Documents shall be approved for release by authorities designated in accordance with
24 approved procedures.
- 25 11. Documents shall be issued by designated individuals or organizations in accordance with
26 approved procedures.

27 **QAPD-2.4.2 Document Distribution and Use**

28 The distribution and use of controlled documents and forms that document or prescribe work,
29 including changes and editorial corrections to documents, shall be controlled to meet the
30 following requirements:

- 31 1. Documents shall be distributed to affected personnel and used at the work location.
- 32 2. Effective dates shall be established and identified on the approved documents.

- 1 3. The disposition of obsolete or superseded documents and forms shall be controlled to avoid
2 their inadvertent use.
- 3 4. Controls shall be established and maintained to identify the current status or revision of
4 controlled documents and forms.
- 5 5. Controls shall provide for identification of documents to be controlled and their distribution.

6 **QAPD-2.4.3 Document Changes**

- 7 1. Changes to documents, other than those defined below as editorial changes, shall be
8 reviewed and approved by the same organizations that performed the original review and
9 approval, unless other organizations are specifically designated in accordance with approved
10 procedures.
- 11 2. Document changes shall be:
 - 12 A. Reviewed by the organizations or technical disciplines affected
 - 13 B. Clearly indicated in the changed document
- 14 3. Editorial or minor changes may be made without the same level of review and approval as
15 the original or otherwise changed document. The following items are considered editorial or
16 minor changes:
 - 17 A. Correcting grammar or spelling (the meaning has not changed)
 - 18 B. Renumbering sections or attachments
 - 19 C. Updating organizational titles
 - 20 D. Changes to non-quality affecting schedules
 - 21 E. Revising or reformatting forms, providing the original intent of the form has not been
22 altered
 - 23 F. Attachments marked “Example,” or “Sample,” or exhibits that are clearly intended to be
24 representative only
 - 25 G. Clarification changes that do not affect the purpose of the document
- 26 4. A change in an organizational title accompanied by a change in responsibilities is not
27 considered an editorial change.
- 28 5. The organization responsible for preparing the document shall identify and approve editorial
29 changes.

1 **QAPD-2.5 Records**

- 2 1. Records shall be specified, prepared, reviewed, approved, and maintained.
- 3 2. A “QA record” is an authenticated record that provides objective evidence of the quality of
- 4 items or activities. QA records shall be controlled in accordance with the following
- 5 requirements.

6 **QAPD-2.5.1 Records System**

- 7 1. A QA records system shall be established by the responsible organization at the earliest
- 8 practical time, consistent with the schedule for accomplishing work activities. The QA
- 9 records system shall be defined, implemented, and enforced in accordance with written
- 10 procedures, instructions, or other documentation.
- 11 2. This does not prohibit the management of QA records within a general records system, nor
- 12 does this require a separate records system for QA records, as long as the applicable
- 13 provisions of this section are satisfied for the control of QA records.

14 **QAPD-2.5.2 Generating QA Records**

- 15 1. Prior to conducting a work activity, the responsible organization shall:
- 16 A. Identify those documents that shall become QA records
- 17 B. Identify the organization responsible for submitting the QA records to the records system
- 18 2. QA records shall be legible, accurate, and completed appropriate to the work accomplished.
- 19 3. Individuals handling documents intended to become QA records shall provide reasonable
- 20 protection for the records from damage or loss until the records are submitted to the records
- 21 system (this includes documents generated during field operations).
- 22 4. Documents shall be considered valid QA records only if stamped, initialed, or signed and
- 23 dated by authorized personnel, or otherwise authenticated. If the nature of the record (such
- 24 as magnetic or optical media) precludes stamping or signing, then other means of
- 25 authentication by authorized personnel are required. This authentication represents a
- 26 certification as to the content of the record by those individuals with knowledge of the related
- 27 facts, whether by direct personal knowledge or through the direct reports of others. The
- 28 authentication should not be confused with any subsequent reviews of the content.
- 29 5. Once authenticated, QA records shall be submitted to the records system as prescribed by
- 30 approved procedures. Upon completion of a project or other discrete task or activity,
- 31 responsible management shall verify that the contents of the applicable QA records package
- 32 are stored in the records system.
- 33 6. QA records may be originals or reproducible copies unless otherwise required.

- 1 7. Documents referenced by final reports, except readily available references such as
2 encyclopedias, dictionaries, engineering handbooks, and national codes and standards, shall
3 be retrievable from records files. Preparers of such records shall ensure that the documents
4 are entered into the records system.

5 **QAPD-2.5.3 Indexing QA Records**

6 The records system shall provide for the indexing of QA records according to the following
7 requirements:

- 8 1. An individual or organization shall be assigned the responsibility of indexing and
9 maintaining QA records.
- 10 2. The indexing system shall include, at a minimum, record retention times and the location of
11 the record within the records system. These and other features of the records system shall
12 facilitate the disposition of scheduled QA records and ensure the retrievability of any QA
13 records entered in accordance with planned retrieval times based upon the record type.
- 14 3. Records and/or indexing system(s) shall provide sufficient information to permit
15 identification between the record and the item(s) to which it applies.

16 **QAPD-2.5.4 Classifying QA Records**

- 17 1. QA records shall be classified as either “post-closure,” “lifetime,” or “nonpermanent.” Post-
18 closure QA records may be required to be maintained for periods of several hundred years
19 and in a manner that will permit future generations to maintain them longer, if desired, using
20 reasonably available technology. Records that fall into one or more of the following
21 categories shall be classified as “post-closure” QA records:
- 22 A. Records assisting prevention of actions that could impair the long-term isolation of the
23 waste
- 24 B. Records preserving information that would prevent inadvertent human intrusion, such as
25 the nature and hazard of the waste and the locations of the geologic repository operations
26 area, the underground facility, boreholes and shafts, and boundaries of the controlled area
- 27 C. Records providing information relevant to post-closure monitoring and assessment of
28 performance of the repository system
- 29 D. Records preserving for future generations information regarding the geologic setting
30 relevant to mitigation of releases of radioactive materials
- 31 E. Records of significant value in exercising the retrieval option for waste packages after
32 decommissioning and closure of the repository
- 33 2. Records not falling into the categories listed above, but falling into one or more of the
34 following categories, shall be classified as “lifetime” QA records:

- 1 A. Records used for repository permitting or certification
- 2 B. Records used to identify and assess the performance capabilities of those engineered and
3 natural barriers important to waste isolation
- 4 C. Records of computer programs and mathematical models needed to perform ongoing
5 correlations between performance assessment predictions and actual tests and data
6 analyses
- 7 D. Records of significant value in demonstrating the capability for safe operation of the
8 WIPP repository or in determining the cause of an accident or a malfunction of an item in
9 the WIPP repository
- 10 E. Records of significant value in maintaining, reworking, repairing, replacing, or modifying
11 WIPP repository systems, components, or structures
- 12 F. Records needed during decommissioning and closure of the repository
- 13 G. Records relating to site characterization samples and data
- 14 H. Records relating to data used in performance assessment of the WIPP facility
- 15 I. Records documenting regulatory compliance
- 16 J. Records providing required baseline data for in-service inspections
- 17 3. Lifetime QA records are required to be retained and preserved in an acceptable condition for
18 the operating life of the repository (i.e., until termination of the repository permit). Prior to
19 destruction of any lifetime record, it shall be evaluated for upgrade to a post-closure record
- 20 4. Records that provide objective evidence that the QA program has been properly
21 implemented, but that do not meet the above criteria for post-closure or lifetime records shall
22 be classified as “nonpermanent” QA records. The retention period for nonpermanent records
23 shall be established in writing.
- 24 5. Records shall be classified in accordance with the requirements of the major regulatory
25 requirements documents listed in Table QAPD-1. In the case of conflicts between the
26 records requirements contained in these documents, the most stringent requirements shall be
27 used in determining the records classification.

28 **QAPD-2.5.5 Receiving QA Records**

29 Each organization responsible for the receipt of QA records shall designate the person or
30 organization responsible for receiving the records. The designee shall be responsible for
31 organizing and implementing a system of controls for the receipt of QA records for permanent
32 and temporary storage. At a minimum, the receipt control system shall include:

- 33 1. Provisions to permit a current and accurate assessment of the status of QA records

- 1 2. A method for identifying the records required to be included in the records system
- 2 3. A method for identifying the records that have been received
- 3 4. Procedures for the receipt and inspection of incoming records, including verification that the
- 4 QA records received are in agreement with the transmittal document and that the records are
- 5 legible
- 6 5. Provisions to control and protect the records from damage or loss during the receiving
- 7 processes
- 8 6. A method for submittal of completed records to the storage facility without unnecessary
- 9 delay

10 **QAPD-2.5.6 Storage, Preservation, Safekeeping, and Disposition of QA**
11 **Records**

- 12 1. QA records shall be stored and preserved in predetermined storage facilities in accordance
- 13 with approved QA implementing procedures that provide :
 - 14 A. A description of the storage facility
 - 15 B. A description of the filing and indexing systems used
 - 16 C. For records submitted to the WIPP Records Center for final storage, provisions for
 - 17 providing a receipt acknowledgement to the sender.
 - 18 D. A description of controls governing QA records access, retrieval, and removal
 - 19 E. A method for filing supplemental information and documenting the authorization for
 - 20 corrections
- 21 2. The records storage arrangements shall provide adequate protection of records, including
- 22 special processed records (such as radiographs, photographs, negatives, microfilm, and
- 23 magnetic media) to preclude damage from:
 - 24 A. Natural disasters such as winds, floods, or fires
 - 25 B. Environmental conditions such as high and low temperatures and humidity
 - 26 C. Infestation of insects, mold, or rodents
- 27 3. Records shall be firmly attached in binders or placed in folders or envelopes in steel file
- 28 cabinets or on shelving in containers.
- 29 4. Records that require special processing and control, such as software and related
- 30 documentation or information on high density media or optical disks, or hardware and

1 software required to maintain and access records, shall be controlled to ensure that the
2 records are useable.

3 **QAPD-2.5.6.1 Records Disposition**

- 4 1. Lifetime QA records shall be retained and preserved in an acceptable condition for the
5 operating life of the WIPP repository (i.e., until termination of the operating permits), or for
6 the particular item while it is installed in the repository or is being stored for future use.
7 Lifetime records shall be evaluated for the need to be upgraded to post-closure records prior
8 to their destruction.
- 9 2. Waste characterization data and related QA/Quality Control (QC) records in the
10 generator/storage site project files for TRU waste to be shipped to the WIPP facility are
11 designated as either lifetime records or non-permanent records as specified in Attachment B
12 of the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit. Records that are designated as lifetime
13 records shall be maintained for the life of the waste characterization program at a
14 participating generator/storage site plus six years, or transferred for permanent archival
15 storage to the WIPP Records Archive facility. Waste characterization records designated as
16 non-permanent records shall be maintained for ten years from the date of (record) generation
17 at the participating generator/storage site, or at the WIPP Records Archive facility and then
18 dispositioned according to their approved records inventory and disposition schedule (RIDS).
19 If a generator/storage site ceases to operate, records shall be transferred before closeout for
20 management at the WIPP Records Archive facility.
- 21 3. Records relevant to an enforcement action under the WIPP Hazardous Waste Permit,
22 regardless of assigned dispositions, shall be maintained at the TRU waste site until the
23 NMED determines that they are no longer needed for enforcement actions, and then
24 dispositioned as required.
- 25 4. Waste characterization data for each TRU mixed waste container transmitted to WIPP shall
26 be maintained by CBFO for the active life of the WIPP facility plus two years. The active
27 life of the WIPP facility is defined as the period from the initial receipt of TRU mixed waste
28 at the facility until NMED receives certification of final closure of the facility. After their
29 active life, records shall be retired to the WIPP Records Archive facility and maintained for
30 30 years.
- 31 5. Design and construction of a single records storage facility shall meet the applicable
32 requirements of NQA-1-1989, NQA-3-1989, 10 CFR 71, and current requirements of the
33 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
- 34 6. The construction details shall be reviewed by a person who is competent in the technical field
35 of fire protection and fire extinguishing to determine the adequacy of protection of contents.
36 If the facility is located within a building or structure, the environments and construction of
37 that building can provide a portion or all of these criteria.
- 38 7. The following criteria are acceptable alternatives to the current NARA requirements and
39 NQA-1-1989 criteria for a single storage facility:

- 1 A. Two-hour fire-rated vault meeting the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 232-
2 1986, *Standards for the Protection of Records*, or NFPA 232AM-1986, or both
- 3 B. Two-hour fire-rated Class B file containers meeting the requirements of NFPA 232-1986,
4 or NFPA 232AM-1986, or both
- 5 C. Two-hour fire-rated file room meeting the requirements of NFPA 232-1986, or NFPA
6 232AM-1986, or both, with the following additional provisions:
 - 7 i. Early warning fire detection and automatic fire suppression capability with electronic
8 supervision at a constantly attended central station
 - 9 ii. Records storage in fully enclosed metal cabinets
 - 10 iii. Adequate access and aisle ways
 - 11 iv. Prohibition in the room of work not directly associated with record storage or
12 retrieval
 - 13 v. Prohibition of smoking, eating, or drinking
 - 14 vi. Two-hour fire-rated dampers or doors in all boundary penetrations
- 15 8. If storage at dual facilities for each record is provided, the facilities shall be at locations
16 sufficiently remote from each other to eliminate the chance of exposure to a simultaneous
17 hazard. Each facility is not required to satisfy the requirements of paragraphs 5, 6, or 7
18 above, but shall meet all other records storage requirements prescribed in this QAPD.
- 19 9. When temporary storage of records (such as for processing, review, or use) is required by an
20 organization's procedures, the records shall be stored in a 1-hour fire-rated container. The
21 procedures shall specify the maximum allowable time limit for temporary storage. The
22 container shall bear a UL label (or equivalent) certifying one-hour fire protection, or be
23 certified by a person competent in fire protection.
- 24 10. Access to storage facilities shall be controlled. A list designating personnel who are
25 permitted access to the QA records shall be maintained and posted. Measures shall be
26 established to preclude the entry of unauthorized personnel into the storage area. These
27 measures shall guard against theft and vandalism.
- 28 11. Measures shall be taken to provide for replacement, restoration, or substitution of lost or
29 damaged records.
- 30 12. QA records shall not be destroyed until the following conditions are met:
 - 31 A. The appropriately assigned NARA authorized disposition specifies destruction
 - 32 B. Regulatory requirements are satisfied
 - 33 C. Operational status permits the disposal of such records

- 1 D. The related contractual requirements have been satisfied
- 2 E. In cases of conflicting requirements concerning records retention requirements, the most
- 3 stringent requirements shall be used in determining the final disposition.

4 **QAPD-2.5.7 Correcting Information in QA Records**

- 5 1. Corrections to records will include the initials or signature of the authorized person making
- 6 the correction and the date the correction was made.
- 7 2. Corrections to QA records shall be authorized by the originating organization.
- 8 3. Corrections to QA records should be made using a single line through and shall not obliterate
- 9 the prior entry. QA records shall not be corrected with correction fluids or tapes.

1 **QAPD-3.0 Performance Requirements**

2 **QAPD-3.1 Work Processes**

- 3 1. Work shall be performed in accordance with established technical standards and
4 administrative controls. Work shall be performed under controlled conditions using
5 approved instructions, procedures, or other appropriate means. Items shall be identified and
6 controlled to ensure their proper use. Items shall be maintained to prevent their damage, loss,
7 or deterioration. Equipment used for process monitoring or data collection shall be calibrated
8 and maintained.
- 9 2. The intent of this section is to establish the policy that those who have been assigned
10 responsibility for performing work are responsible for achieving and maintaining quality.
11 Those performing work have the goal of doing work correctly the first time. To ensure that
12 those doing the work achieve that goal, management is responsible for establishing processes
13 and procedures to ensure that all work is planned and performed under controlled conditions
14 by personnel who are knowledgeable of the work requirements, and that these individuals are
15 capable of accomplishing the work in accordance with the requirements of this QAPD.
- 16 3. This section further establishes management involvement in the work processes through their
17 interactions with personnel performing the work and through their review and assessment of
18 ongoing and completed work. This helps to ensure that the definition of “acceptable work
19 performance” is clearly communicated and that personnel are provided the necessary
20 training, resources, and administrative controls to properly accomplish their tasks.

21 **QAPD-3.1.1 Work**

- 22 1. Personnel performing work are responsible for the quality of their work. Because the
23 individual worker is the first line in ensuring quality, personnel will be knowledgeable of
24 requirements for work they perform and the capability of the tools and processes they use.
- 25 2. Line managers will ensure that personnel working under their supervision are qualified and
26 are provided the necessary training, resources, and administrative controls to accomplish
27 assigned tasks. Criteria describing acceptable work performance shall be defined for the
28 worker.
- 29 3. Line managers will review work and related information to ensure that the desired quality is
30 achieved and to identify areas needing improvement.
- 31 4. Work shall be planned, authorized, and accomplished under controlled conditions using
32 technical standards, QA requirements, and implementing procedures commensurate with
33 applicable control levels.

34 **QAPD-3.1.2 Implementing Procedures**

- 35 1. Implementing procedures shall be developed, reviewed, and approved by technically
36 competent personnel.

- 1 2. Implementing procedures shall include the following information, as appropriate to the work
2 to be performed:
 - 3 A. Responsibilities of the organizations affected by the document
 - 4 B. Technical, regulatory, quality assurance, or other program requirements
 - 5 C. Sequential description of the work to be performed, including any allowance for out-of-
6 sequence processing
 - 7 D. Quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria sufficient for determining that activities
8 were satisfactorily accomplished
 - 9 E. Prerequisites, limits, precautions, process parameters, and environmental conditions
 - 10 F. Special qualification and training requirements
 - 11 G. Verification points and hold points
 - 12 H. Methods for demonstrating that the work was performed as required (such as provisions
13 for recording inspection and test results, check-off lists, or sign-off blocks)
 - 14 I. Identification and classification of QA records to be generated by the implementing
15 procedure
- 16 3. Individuals performing work shall comply with implementing procedures; however, when
17 work cannot be accomplished as described in the implementing procedure or
18 accomplishment of such work would result in an undesirable situation, a condition adverse to
19 quality, or an unacceptable safety risk, the work shall be suspended until the appropriate
20 procedure change provisions are implemented.

21 **QAPD-3.1.3 Item Identification and Control**

- 22 1. Processes shall be established and maintained to identify, control, and maintain items to
23 prevent their damage, loss, or deterioration. The identification of items shall be maintained
24 to ensure appropriate traceability. Traceability requirements shall be specified in design
25 documents or implementing procedures. Processes shall be established and implemented to
26 control consumables and items with limited operating or shelf life and to prevent the use of
27 incorrect or defective items.
- 28 2. The following controls shall be established to ensure that only correct and accepted items are
29 used or installed:
 - 30 A. Items shall be identified and traced from the time of receipt, up to and including
31 installation or end use. Records shall be maintained to ensure that the item can be traced
32 at all times, from its source through installation or end use.

- 1 B. Item identification methods shall include physical markings. If physical markings are
2 either impractical or insufficient, other appropriate means shall be employed (such as
3 physical separation, labels or tags attached to containers, or procedural controls). When
4 used, physical markings shall:
- 5 i. Be applied using materials and methods that provide clear, permanent, and legible
6 identification
- 7 ii. Not be detrimental to the function or service life of the item
- 8 iii. Be transferred to each part of an identified item when the item is subdivided
- 9 iv. Not be obliterated or hidden by surface treatments, coatings, or installation unless
10 other means of identification are substituted
- 11 C. If codes, standards, or specifications include specific identification or traceability
12 requirements (such as identification or traceability of the item to applicable specification
13 or grade of material; heat, batch, lot, part, or serial number; or specified inspection, test,
14 or other record(s)), then identification and traceability methods shall be implemented to
15 ensure the special requirements are met.
- 16 D. Item identification control system records shall provide the inspection, test, and operating
17 status of items. Items that have satisfactorily passed the required inspections and tests
18 shall be identified. The identification methods shall preclude the inadvertent installation,
19 use, or operation of items that have not passed required inspections and tests.
- 20 E. The status of inspections and tests shall be identified either on the items or in documents
21 traceable to the items. Status shall be maintained through the use of status indicators
22 (such as tags, markings, labels, or stamps) or other means (such as inspection or test
23 records), and the authority for applying and removing status indicators shall be specified.

24 **QAPD-3.1.4 Special Processes**

- 25 1. Processes shall be considered as special processes if they meet any one or a combination of
26 the following criteria:
- 27 A. The results are highly dependent on the control of the process
- 28 B. The results are highly dependent on the skill of the operator
- 29 C. The quality of the results cannot be readily determined by inspection or test of the
30 product
- 31 2. Implementing procedures shall be developed and implemented to ensure that special process
32 parameters are controlled and specified environmental conditions are maintained. In addition
33 to the requirements provided in Section QAPD-3.1.2, special process implementing
34 procedures shall include or reference:

- 1 A. The requirements for training/qualification of personnel and quality processes/equipment
- 2 B. The conditions necessary for completion of the special process, including equipment,
- 3 statistical process control, controlled parameters of the process, and calibration
- 4 requirements

5 **QAPD-3.1.5 Handling, Storage, and Shipping**

- 6 1. Handling, storage, cleaning, shipping, and other means of preserving, transporting, and
- 7 packaging of items shall be conducted in accordance with established work and inspection
- 8 procedures, shipping instructions, or other specified documents.

- 9 2. If required for critical, sensitive, perishable, or high-value articles, specific implementing
- 10 procedures for handling, storage, cleaning, packaging, shipping, and other preservation shall
- 11 be prepared and used.

- 12 3. Measures shall be established and implemented for the marking and labeling of items for
- 13 packaging, shipping, handling, and storage as necessary to adequately identify, maintain, and
- 14 preserve the item. Markings and labels shall indicate the presence of special environments or
- 15 the need for special controls, as necessary, and shall be applied and removed by authorized
- 16 personnel.

- 17 4. If required for protection or maintenance of particular items, special equipment (such as
- 18 containers, shock absorbers, and accelerometers) and special protective environments (such
- 19 as inert gas and specific moisture and temperature levels) shall be specified, planned for, and
- 20 provided.
 - 21 A. If special protective equipment and environments are used, provisions shall be made for
 - 22 verifying their adequacy.
 - 23 B. Special handling tools and equipment shall be used and controlled, as necessary, to
 - 24 ensure safe and adequate handling.
 - 25 C. Special handling tools and equipment shall be inspected and tested at specified intervals
 - 26 and in accordance with implementing procedures to verify that the tools and equipment
 - 27 are adequately maintained.
 - 28 D. Operators of special handling and lifting equipment shall be sufficiently experienced and
 - 29 trained to use the equipment.

- 30 5. If storage of items is required, methods shall be established for the control of item
- 31 identification records that are commensurate with the planned duration and conditions of
- 32 storage. These methods shall provide for, as applicable:
 - 33 A. Maintenance or replacement of markings and identification tags damaged during
 - 34 handling or aging

- 1 B. Protection of identification markings that are subject to excessive deterioration due to
- 2 environmental exposure
- 3 C. Update of related identification records and documentation
- 4 6. Status indicators, such as tagging valves and switches to prevent inadvertent operation, shall
- 5 be used to indicate the operating status of items. Status indicators, such as lockout tags, shall
- 6 also be used where appropriate and shall be applied and removed by authorized personnel.

7 **QAPD-3.2 Design Control**

- 8 1. Items and processes shall be designed using sound engineering and scientific principles and
- 9 appropriate standards. Design work, including changes, shall incorporate appropriate
- 10 requirements, such as general design criteria and design bases. Design interfaces shall be
- 11 identified and controlled.
- 12 2. The adequacy of design products shall be verified by individuals or groups other than those
- 13 who performed the design work. Required verification and validation shall be completed
- 14 before approval and implementation of the design.
- 15 3. Designs (from conceptual through final) shall be defined, controlled, and verified. In
- 16 establishing design controls, management is responsible for ensuring that design inputs are
- 17 technically correct; that design interfaces are identified; that authorities, responsibilities, and
- 18 lines of communication are clearly defined; and that the design processes clearly define the
- 19 acceptance criteria for the product.

20 **QAPD-3.2.1 Design Input**

21 Applicable design inputs such as design bases, conceptual design reports, performance
22 requirements, regulatory requirements, codes, and standards shall be controlled by those
23 responsible for the design in accordance with the following requirements:

- 24 1. Design inputs shall be identified and documented and their selection reviewed and approved
- 25 by those responsible for the design.
- 26 2. Design inputs shall be specified and approved on a timely basis to the level of detail
- 27 necessary to permit the design work to be carried out correctly in a manner that provides a
- 28 consistent basis for making design decisions, accomplishing design verification, and
- 29 evaluating design changes.
- 30 3. Changes from approved design inputs and reasons for the changes shall be identified,
- 31 approved, documented, and controlled.
- 32 4. Design inputs based on assumptions that require reverification shall be identified and
- 33 controlled.

1 **QAPD-3.2.2 Design Process**

2 The design process shall be controlled according to the following requirements:

- 3 1. Appropriate standards shall be identified and documented and their selection reviewed and
4 approved. Changes from specified standards, including the reasons for the change, shall be
5 identified, approved, documented, and controlled.
- 6 2. Design work shall be prescribed and documented on a timely basis and to the level of detail
7 necessary to permit the design process to be carried out correctly.
- 8 3. Design documents shall be adequate to support design, fabrication, construction, and
9 operation.
- 10 4. Design documents shall be sufficiently detailed as to purpose, method, assumptions, design
11 input, references, and units such that a person technically qualified in the subject can
12 understand the documents and verify their adequacy without recourse to the originator.
- 13 5. Controls for identifying assemblies or components that are part of the item being designed
14 shall be established. If a commercial grade assembly or component is modified or selected
15 by special inspection or testing to meet requirements that are more restrictive than the
16 supplier's published product description, then the assembly or component shall be
17 represented as different from the commercial grade item in a manner traceable to a
18 documented definition of the difference.
- 19 6. Controls for selecting and reviewing design methods, materials, parts, equipment, and
20 processes essential to the function of an item shall be established.
- 21 7. Drawings, specifications, and other design output documents shall contain appropriate
22 inspection and testing acceptance criteria.

23 **QAPD-3.2.3 Design Analyses**

- 24 1. Design analyses shall be planned, controlled, and documented.
- 25 2. Documentation of design analyses shall include
 - 26 A. Definition of the objective of the analyses
 - 27 B. Definition of design inputs and their sources
 - 28 C. Results of literature searches or other applicable background data
 - 29 D. Identification of assumptions and designation of those assumptions that shall be verified
30 as the design proceeds

1 E. Identification of any computer calculations, including computer type, computer software
2 name, revision identification, inputs, outputs, and the bases (or reference thereto)
3 supporting application of the software to the specific physical problem.

4 F. Identification of the reviewer and the approver

5 3. Calculations shall be identifiable by subject (including structure, system, or component to
6 which the calculation applies), originator, reviewer, and date, or by other designator such that
7 the calculations are traceable.

8 4. Computer software used to perform design analyses shall be developed, qualified, and used
9 according to the requirements of QAPD-7.0.

10 **QAPD-3.2.4 Design Interface**

11 1. Design interfaces shall be identified, documented, and controlled so that efforts are
12 coordinated among participating organizations.

13 2. Design interface controls shall including the assignment of responsibility and the
14 establishment of implementing procedures among participating design organizations for the
15 review, approval, release, distribution, and revision of documents involving design interfaces

16 3. Design information transmitted across interfaces shall be documented and controlled.

17 4. The status of the design information or issued design documents shall be identified in
18 transmittals. Where necessary, incomplete designs that require further evaluation, review, or
19 approval shall be identified.

20 **QAPD-3.2.5 Design Verification**

21 The acceptability of design work and documents, including design inputs, processes, outputs, and
22 changes, shall be verified. The following design control requirements shall be applied to verify
23 the adequacy of design:

24 1. Design verification shall be performed using one or a combination of the following methods:

25 A. Design review

26 B. Alternate calculations

27 C. Qualification testing

28 2. The particular design verification method shall be identified and its use justified.

29 3. The results of design verification shall be clearly documented, including the identification of
30 the verifier.

- 1 4. Design verification shall be performed by competent individuals or groups other than those
2 who performed the original design (but they may be from the same organization). If
3 necessary, this design verification may be performed by the originator's supervisor, provided
4 that:
 - 5 A. The supervisor did not specify a singular design approach or rule out certain design
6 considerations and did not establish the design inputs used in the design.
 - 7 B. The supervisor is the only individual in the organization competent to perform the
8 verification.
 - 9 C. The determination to use the supervisor is documented and approved in advance.
- 10 5. Design verification shall be performed at appropriate times during the design process.
 - 11 A. Verification shall be performed before release for procurement, manufacture,
12 construction, or release to another organization for use in other design work.
 - 13 B. Design verification shall be completed before relying on an item to perform its function.
- 14 6. The extent of the design verification required shall be based on the complexity, risk,
15 uniqueness of design, complexity of design, degree of standardization, state of the art, and
16 similarity to previously proven designs. When the design has been subjected to a verification
17 process in accordance with this QAPD, the verification process need not be duplicated for
18 identical designs.
- 19 7. Use of previously proven designs shall be controlled according to the following
20 requirements:
 - 21 A. The applicability of standardized or previously proven designs shall be verified with
22 respect to meeting pertinent design inputs for each application.
 - 23 B. Known problems affecting standard or previously proven designs and their effects on
24 other features shall be considered.
 - 25 C. The original design and associated verification measures shall be adequately documented
26 and referenced in the files of subsequent application of the design.
 - 27 D. Changes in previously verified designs shall require reverification. Such reverifications
28 shall include the evaluation of the effects of those changes on the overall previously
29 verified design and on any design analyses upon which the design is based.

30 **QAPD-3.2.6 Design Reviews**

- 31 1. Design reviews shall be controlled, documented, and performed, and shall consider the
32 following:
 - 33 A. Design inputs were correctly selected and incorporated.

- 1 B. Assumptions necessary to perform the design work were adequately described,
2 reasonable, and reverified as necessary.
- 3 C. Appropriate design methods were used.
- 4 D. Design output is reasonable compared to design inputs.
- 5 E. The necessary design input and verification requirements for interfacing organizations
6 were specified in the design documents or in supporting implementing procedures.
- 7 2. Disposition of design review comments shall be documented.

8 **QAPD-3.2.7 Alternative Calculations**

9 Alternative calculations are calculations or analyses that are made using alternate methods to
10 verify correctness of the original calculations or analyses. The appropriateness of any
11 assumptions, the input data used, any computer programs, or other calculation methods used,
12 shall be evaluated.

13 **QAPD-3.2.8 Qualification Testing**

14 If design adequacy is to be verified by qualification tests, the tests shall be pre-identified. When
15 qualification testing is used, the following requirements shall apply:

- 16 1. The test configuration shall be defined and documented.
- 17 2. Testing shall demonstrate the adequacy of performance under conditions that simulate the
18 most adverse design conditions. Operating modes and environmental conditions in which the
19 item must perform satisfactorily shall be considered in determining the most adverse
20 conditions.
- 21 3. If the tests verify only specific design features, the other features of the design shall be
22 verified by other means.
- 23 4. Test results shall be documented and evaluated by the responsible design organization to
24 ensure that test requirements have been met.
- 25 5. If qualification testing indicates that a modification to an item is necessary to obtain
26 acceptable performance, the modification shall be documented and the modified item retested
27 or otherwise verified to ensure satisfactory performance.
- 28 6. Scaling laws shall be established and verified when tests are being performed on models or
29 mockups.
- 30 7. The results of model test work shall be subject to error analysis, where applicable, before the
31 results are used in final design work.

1 **QAPD-3.2.9 Design Change**

2 Design changes shall be controlled in accordance with the following requirements:

- 3 1. Changes to final designs, field changes, and nonconforming items dispositioned “use as is”
4 or “repair” shall be justified and shall be subject to design control measures commensurate
5 with those applied to the original design.
- 6 2. Design control measures for changes shall include provisions to ensure that the design
7 analyses for the item are still valid.
- 8 3. Changes shall be approved by the same groups or organizations that reviewed and approved
9 the original design documents, with the following considerations:
- 10 A. If an organization that originally was responsible for approving a particular design
11 document is no longer responsible, the new responsible organization shall be designated.
- 12 B. The cognizant design organization shall have demonstrated competence in the specific
13 design area of interest and have an adequate understanding of the requirements and intent
14 of the original design.
- 15 4. When a design change is approved other than by revision to the affected design documents,
16 measures shall be established to incorporate the change into these documents, where such
17 incorporation is appropriate.
- 18 5. If a significant design change becomes necessary because of an incorrect original design, the
19 design process and design verification methods and implementing procedures shall be
20 reviewed and modified as appropriate. These design deficiencies shall be documented
21 according to the requirements provided in Section QAPD-2.3.2.
- 22 6. Field changes shall be incorporated into the applicable design documents.
- 23 7. Design changes that affect related implementing procedures or training programs shall be
24 communicated to the appropriate organizations.

25 **QAPD-3.3 Procurement**

26 CBFO and participant organizations shall ensure that procured items and services meet
27 established technical and QA requirements, and that they perform as specified. Prospective
28 suppliers shall be evaluated and selected on the basis of documented criteria. The responsible
29 organization shall verify that approved suppliers continue to provide acceptable items and
30 services.

31 **QAPD-3.3.1 Procurement Planning Requirements**

32 The processes for procurement and design control described in this QAPD are sufficient to
33 implement the requirements associated with Suspect/Counterfeit Items (S/CI) Prevention
34 described in DOE O 414.1C, Attachment 3. The process of this section is consistent with the

1 CBFO activity hazards and mission impact. The CBFO Program Participant in Procurement and
2 Engineering Managers are responsible for compliance with the applicable requirements.

3 The waste generator sites are responsible for developing a S/CI Prevention program/process in
4 accordance with DOE O 414.1C, Attachment 3, as directed by the appropriate site office.

5 Procurement activities shall be planned as early as possible. At a minimum, the activities shall be
6 planned no later than the start of those procurement activities that are required to be controlled.
7 Procurement planning shall be documented to ensure a systematic approach to the procurement
8 process. Procurement planning shall:

- 9 1. Identify procurement methods and organizational responsibilities, including the appropriate
10 QA organization
- 11 2. Identify and document the sequence of actions and milestones needed to effectively complete
12 the procurement
- 13 3. Provide for the integration of the following activities:
 - 14 A. Procurement document preparation, review, and change control
 - 15 B. Selection of procurement sources
 - 16 C. Proposal or bid evaluation and award
 - 17 D. Purchaser evaluation of supplier performance
 - 18 E. Purchaser verifications including any hold-point and witness-point notifications
 - 19 F. Control of nonconformances
 - 20 G. Corrective action
 - 21 H. Acceptance of the item or service
 - 22 I. Identification of QA records

23 **QAPD-3.3.2 Supplier Selection**

- 24 1. Supplier selection shall be based on evaluation of the supplier's capability to provide items or
25 services in accordance with procurement document requirements
- 26 2. Organizations responsible for supplier source selection shall be identified and shall include
27 the appropriate QA organization.
- 28 3. Measures for selecting procurement sources shall include one or more of the following
29 elements:

- 1 A. An evaluation of the supplier's history for providing an identical or similar product that
2 performs satisfactorily in actual use
- 3 B. An evaluation of the supplier's current QA documentation, supported by any documented
4 qualitative and quantitative information
- 5 C. An evaluation of the supplier's technical and QA capability, based on an evaluation of the
6 supplier's facilities, personnel, and quality program implementation
- 7 4. D. The results of procurement source selection shall be documented.

8 **QAPD-3.3.3 Proposal/Bid Evaluation**

- 9 1. The proposal or bid evaluation process shall include a determination of the extent of
10 conformance to the procurement document requirements. This evaluation shall be performed
11 by designated, technically qualified personnel, including the quality assurance organization,
12 and shall include, at a minimum, the following:
 - 13 A. Technical considerations
 - 14 B. QA program requirements
 - 15 C. Supplier personnel skills
 - 16 D. Supplier production capabilities
 - 17 E. Supplier past performance
 - 18 F. Alternatives proposed by the supplier
 - 19 G. Exceptions taken by the supplier
- 20 2. Before the contract is awarded, the purchaser shall resolve, or obtain commitments to
21 resolve, deficiencies identified during the proposal or bid evaluation.
- 22 3. Supplier QA provisions shall be accepted by the purchaser QA management before the
23 supplier is authorized to start work.

24 **QAPD-3.3.4 Procurement Document Requirements**

- 25 Procurement documents shall include the following, as applicable to the item or service being
26 procured:
- 27 1. The scope of work
 - 28 2. Technical requirements, including the following:
 - 29 A. Design bases shall be identified or referenced.

- 1 B. Specific documents (such as drawings, codes, standards, regulations, DOE orders,
2 procedures, or instructions) that describe the technical requirements of the items or
3 services to be furnished shall be identified. The revision level or change status of these
4 documents shall also be identified.
- 5 C. Tests, inspections, hold points, or acceptance criteria that the purchaser shall use to
6 monitor and evaluate the performance of the supplier shall be specified.
- 7 3. QA provisions specified by the purchaser QA organization shall include:
- 8 A. The requisite QA and documentation requirements, depending on the control level of the
9 item or service being procured
- 10 B. The pass-down requirements that the supplier shall incorporate into any sub-tier
11 procurement document
- 12 C. When deemed appropriate, the purchaser may permit some or all supplier work to be
13 performed under the purchaser QA program, provided that the requirements are
14 adequately implemented. In these cases, procurement documents shall specify that the
15 purchaser's QA implementing procedures are applicable to the supplier and that the
16 purchaser shall provide these applicable documents to the supplier.
- 17 D. Right of access to supplier facilities and records for inspection and audit by the
18 purchaser, CBFO, or other designee authorized by the purchaser
- 19 E. The requirements of Section QAPD-2.5 and provisions for disposition, if the supplier is
20 required to maintain QA records
- 21 F. Requirements for the supplier to report nonconformances and obtain purchaser approval
22 of supplier-recommended dispositions
- 23 G. Spare and replacement parts or assemblies and the appropriate technical and QA
24 requirements for ordering

25 **QAPD-3.3.5 Procurement Document Review and Approval**

- 26 1. A review of the procurement documents and any changes thereto shall be made to verify that
27 documents include appropriate provisions to ensure that items or services meet the prescribed
28 requirements. Procurement document changes shall be subject to the same degree of control
29 as the original documents.
- 30 2. Procurement document reviews shall be performed and documented prior to the document
31 being issued to the supplier.
- 32 3. Reviews shall be performed by personnel who have access to pertinent information and who
33 have adequate understanding of the requirements and scope of the procurement.

- 1 4. Procurement document reviews shall include representatives from the technical and QA
2 organizations and shall be approved by responsible management.

3 **QAPD-3.3.6 Supplier Performance Evaluation**

4 The purchaser of items and services shall establish measures to interface with the supplier and to
5 verify supplier performance, as deemed necessary by the purchaser. The measures shall include:

- 6 1. Establishing an understanding between the purchaser and supplier of the requirements and
7 specifications identified in the procurement documents
- 8 2. Requiring the supplier to identify planning techniques and processes to be used in fulfilling
9 procurement document requirements
- 10 3. Reviewing supplier documents that are prepared or processed during work performed to
11 fulfill procurement requirements
- 12 4. Identifying and processing necessary change information
- 13 5. Establishing the method to be used to document information exchanges between purchaser
14 and supplier
- 15 6. Establishing the extent of assessment activities and inspection

16 **QAPD-3.3.7 Acceptance of Items or Services**

- 17 1. Methods shall be established for the acceptance of an item or service being furnished by a
18 supplier.
- 19 2. Prior to offering an item or service for acceptance, the supplier shall verify that the item or
20 service complies with the procurement requirements.

21 **QAPD-3.3.7.1 Source Verification**

- 22 1. The purchaser may accept an item or service by monitoring, auditing, surveilling, witnessing,
23 or observing activities performed by the supplier. This method of acceptance is called source
24 verification.
- 25 2. The extent of source verification shall be a function of the relative importance, complexity,
26 and quantity of items or services being procured, as well as the supplier's quality of
27 performance. Source verifications shall be accomplished as early as possible, but prior to the
28 start of those activities that are required to be controlled, and shall include the active
29 involvement of the purchaser's QA organization. In addition:
- 30 A. Source verification shall be accomplished consistent with the supplier's planned
31 inspections, examinations, or tests and performed at intervals consistent with the
32 importance and complexity of the item.

1 B. Documented evidence of acceptance of source-verified items or services shall be
2 furnished to the party receiving the item, to the purchaser, and to the supplier.

3 C. Source verification shall be performed by qualified personnel.

4 3. For procurement of services only (such as third party inspection, engineering and consulting
5 services), and installation, repair, overhaul, or maintenance work, the purchaser shall accept
6 the service by any or all of the following methods:

7 A. Technical verification of data produced

8 B. Surveillance and/or audit of the activity

9 C. Review of objective evidence for conformance to the procurement document
10 requirements such as certifications or test reports

11 **QAPD-3.3.7.2 Receiving Inspection**

12 When a receiving inspection is used to accept an item:

13 1. The inspection shall include consideration of source assessments, verifications and audits and
14 the demonstrated quality performance of the supplier.

15 2. The inspection shall be performed in accordance with established inspection procedures or
16 instructions.

17 3. The inspection shall verify, as applicable, proper configuration; identification; dimensional,
18 physical, and other characteristics; freedom from shipping damage; and cleanliness.

19 4. The inspection shall be planned and executed in accordance with the applicable requirements
20 of Section QAPD-3.4.

21 5. Receiving inspection shall include a review of the adequacy and completeness of any
22 required supplier documentation.

23 **QAPD-3.3.7.3 Post-Installation Testing**

24 When post-installation testing is used as a method of acceptance, post-installation test
25 requirements and acceptance documentation shall be mutually established and agreed upon by
26 the purchaser and supplier.

27 **QAPD-3.3.7.4 Supplier Certificate of Conformance**

28 When a certificate of conformance is used, the following, at a minimum, shall be met:

29 1. The certificate shall identify the purchased material or equipment, including the purchase
30 order and item number or other identification that is traceable to the requirements of the
31 procurement document.

- 1 2. The certificate shall identify the specific procurement requirements met by the purchased
2 material or equipment, such as codes, standards, and other specifications. The procurement
3 requirements identified shall include any approved changes, waivers, or deviations applicable
4 to the subject material or equipment.
- 5 3. The certificate shall identify any procurement requirements that have not been met, together
6 with an explanation and the means for resolving the nonconformances.
- 7 4. The certificate shall be signed or otherwise authenticated by an official of the supplier
8 organization, whose function and position are described in the supplier's QA program.
- 9 5. The certification system, including the procedures to be followed in filling out a certificate
10 and the administrative procedures for review and approval of the certificate, shall be
11 described in the purchaser or supplier QA program.
- 12 6. Means shall be provided to verify the validity of supplier certificates and the effectiveness of
13 the certification system, such as during the performance of audits of the supplier or
14 independent inspection or test of the items. Such verification shall be conducted by the
15 purchaser at intervals commensurate with the supplier's past quality performance.

16 **QAPD-3.3.8 Control of Supplier Nonconformances**

17 The purchaser and supplier shall establish and document the process for dispositioning items and
18 services that do not meet procurement document requirements in accordance with the following:

- 19 1. The supplier shall submit a report of nonconformance to the purchaser that includes supplier-
20 recommended disposition (for example, "use as is" or "repair") and provide technical
21 justification for such disposition.
- 22 2. Reports of nonconformances to procurement document requirements or documents approved
23 by the purchaser shall be submitted to the purchaser for approval. Examples of conditions
24 requiring a report of nonconformance include:
 - 25 A. Failure to meet technical or material requirements
 - 26 B. Failure to meet a requirement in supplier documents that have been approved by the
27 purchaser
 - 28 C. The nonconformance cannot be corrected by continuation of the original manufacturing
29 process or by rework
 - 30 D. The item does not conform to the original requirement even though the item can be
31 restored to a condition such that its capability to function is unimpaired (i.e., a waiver is
32 requested)
- 33 3. The purchaser shall evaluate the supplier-recommended disposition.
- 34 4. The purchaser shall verify implementation of the disposition.

1 **QAPD-3.3.8.1 Commercial Grade Items**

2 Where the design specifies the use of commercial grade items, the following requirements are an
3 acceptable alternative to other requirements of this section.

4 1. The commercial grade item shall be identified in an approved design output document, such
5 as a drawing, specification, or other document translated from a design input document. An
6 alternative commercial grade item may be applied as long as the responsible design
7 organization provides verification that the alternative commercial grade item performs the
8 intended function and meets design requirements that are applicable to both the replaced item
9 and its application.

10 2. Source evaluation and selection, where determined necessary by the purchaser based on
11 complexity and importance to compliance application, waste characterization, repository
12 performance assessment, waste isolation, waste transportation, nuclear safety, environmental
13 protection, and management and operation of the WIPP facility, shall be in accordance with
14 Section QAPD-3.3.2.

15 3. Commercial grade items shall be identified in the procurement document by the
16 manufacturer's published product description.

17 4. After receipt of a commercial grade item, the purchaser shall ensure that:

18 A. Damage was not sustained during shipment

19 B. The item received was the item ordered

20 C. Inspection or testing is accomplished, to the extent determined by the purchaser, to
21 ensure conformance with the manufacturer's published requirements

22 D. Documentation, as applicable to the item, was received and is acceptable

23 **QAPD-3.4 Inspection and Testing**

24 1. Inspections and testing shall be performed in accordance with approved implementing
25 procedures. An essential part of the work planning process is to identify the items and
26 processes to be inspected or tested, the parameters or characteristics to be evaluated, the
27 techniques to be used, the acceptance criteria, any hold points, and the organizations
28 responsible for performing the tests and inspections. Inspection for acceptance shall be
29 performed by personnel other than those who performed or directly supervised the work
30 being inspected. Inspection and testing of specified items and processes shall be conducted
31 using established acceptance and performance criteria. The acceptance of items and
32 processes shall be made by and documented by qualified and authorized personnel.
33 Equipment used for inspections and tests shall be calibrated and maintained.

34 2. Inspection and testing activities shall be conducted in accordance with the following
35 requirements, as applicable.

1 **QAPD-3.4.1 Qualification of Inspection and Test Personnel**

2 This section provides amplified requirements for the qualification of personnel who perform
3 inspection and testing to verify conformance to specified requirements for the purpose of
4 acceptability. The requirements of this section do not apply to the qualification of personnel for
5 performance of nondestructive examination. Qualification of personnel for nondestructive
6 examination is addressed in Section QAPD-3.4.2.

- 7 1. The responsible organization shall designate those activities that require qualified inspection
8 and test personnel and the minimum requirements for such personnel. Further, the
9 responsible organization shall establish written procedures for the qualification of inspection
10 and test personnel and for the assurance that only those personnel who meet the requirements
11 of this section are permitted to perform applicable inspection and test activities.
- 12 2. When a single inspection or test requires implementation by a team or a group, personnel not
13 meeting the requirements of this section may be used in data-taking assignments or in plant
14 or equipment operation, provided they are supervised or overseen by a qualified individual.
- 15 3. Personnel selected for performing inspection and test activities shall have the experience or
16 training commensurate with the scope, complexity, or special nature of the activities.
- 17 4. Provisions shall be made for the indoctrination of personnel to the technical objectives and
18 requirements of the applicable codes and standards and the QA program controls that are to
19 be employed.
- 20 5. The need for a formal training program shall be determined, and such training activities shall
21 be conducted as required to qualify personnel that perform such inspections and tests. On-
22 the-job training shall also be included in the program, as appropriate, with emphasis on first-
23 hand experience gained through actual performance of inspections and tests.
- 24 6. The capabilities of a candidate for certification shall be initially determined by a suitable
25 evaluation of the candidate's previous education, experience, training, and either test results
26 or capability demonstration.
- 27 7. The job performance of inspection and test personnel shall be reevaluated for capability at
28 periodic intervals, not to exceed three years. Reevaluation shall be by evidence of continued
29 satisfactory performance or redetermination of capability in accordance with the above
30 requirements. If, during this evaluation or at any other time, it is determined by the
31 responsible organization that the capabilities of an individual are not in accordance with the
32 qualification requirements specified for the job, that person shall be removed from that
33 activity until such time as the required capability has been demonstrated. Any person who
34 has not performed inspection or testing activities in their qualified area for a period of one
35 year shall be reevaluated for the required capability in accordance with the above
36 requirements.
- 37 8. The qualification of personnel shall be certified in writing in an appropriate form and shall
38 include the following information:

- 1 A. Employer's name
- 2 B. Identification of person being certified
- 3 C. Activities certified to perform
- 4 D. Basis used for certification, including such factors as: (1) education, experience,
5 indoctrination, and training; (2) test results, where applicable; and (3) results of capability
6 demonstration
- 7 E. Results of periodic evaluation
- 8 F. Results of physical examinations, when required
- 9 G. Signature of the employer's designated representative responsible for such certification
- 10 H. The date of certification and date of certification expiration
- 11 9. The responsible organization shall identify any special physical characteristics needed in the
12 performance of each activity, including the need for initial and subsequent physical
13 examination.
- 14 10. Records of personnel qualification shall be established and maintained by the employer.
15 These records shall include the information required above for certification.

16 **QAPD-3.4.2 Qualification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel**

17 This section identifies the requirements for the qualification of personnel who perform
18 nondestructive examination (NDE) (radiographic, magnetic particle, ultrasonic, liquid penetrant,
19 eddy current, neutron radiographic, leak testing, and visual testing) to verify conformance to
20 specified requirements, for nondestructive examination activities.

- 21 1. The American Society of Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) Recommended Practice No. SNT-
22 TC-1A, June 1980 Edition, and its applicable supplements, shall apply as requirements for
23 personnel performing the above methods of NDE. Later editions of SNT-TC-1A may be
24 used as the basis for the qualification of NDE personnel, as long as the minimum
25 requirements of the June 1980 edition are met.
- 26 2. The responsible organization shall establish written procedures for the control and
27 administration of the training, examination, and certification of NDE personnel.
- 28 3. Records of personnel qualification shall be established and maintained by the employer.

29 **QAPD-3.4.3 Inspection**

30 **QAPD-3.4.3.1 Inspection Planning**

- 31 1. Inspection planning shall be performed and documented and shall include:

- 1 A. Identification of work operations where inspections are necessary
- 2 B. Identification of the characteristics to be inspected and when during the work process
3 inspections are to be performed
- 4 C. Identification of inspection or process monitoring methods to be employed
- 5 D. Identification of acceptance criteria
- 6 E. Identification of sampling requirements
- 7 F. Methods to record inspection results
- 8 G. Selection and identification of the measuring and test equipment (M&TE) to be used to
9 perform the inspection
- 10 H. Process used to ensure that the equipment being utilized for inspection or testing is
11 calibrated and is of the proper type, range, accuracy, and tolerance to accomplish the
12 intended function
- 13 2. When statistical sampling is to be used to verify the acceptability of a group of items, the
14 sampling method shall be based on recognized standard practices.

15 **QAPD-3.4.3.2 Inspection Hold Points**

16 Hold points are used to control work that is not to proceed without the specific consent of the
17 organization placing the hold point. The specific hold points shall be indicated in appropriate
18 documents. Only the organization responsible for the hold point may waive the hold point.
19 Approval to waive specified hold points shall be documented before continuing work beyond the
20 designated hold point.

21 **QAPD-3.4.3.3 In-Process Inspections and Monitoring**

- 22 1. Items in process shall be inspected as necessary to verify quality. If inspection of processed
23 items is impossible or disadvantageous, indirect control by monitoring of processing
24 methods, equipment, and personnel shall be provided. Both inspection and process
25 monitoring shall be conducted when control is deemed inadequate, using only one of these
26 methods.
- 27 2. When a combination of inspection and process monitoring methods is used, monitoring shall
28 be performed systematically to ensure that the specified requirements for control of the
29 process and the quality of the item are met throughout the duration of the process.
- 30 3. Controls shall be established and documented for the coordination and sequencing of the
31 work at established inspection points during successive stages of the process.

1 **QAPD-3.4.3.4 Final Inspections**

- 2 1. Final inspections shall include a review of the results and the verification of the resolution of
3 all nonconformances identified by earlier inspections.
- 4 2. Finished items shall be inspected for completeness, markings, calibration, protection from
5 damage, or other characteristics, as required to verify the quality and conformance of the
6 item to the applicable requirements.
- 7 3. Records review shall be performed to ensure adequacy and completeness.
- 8 4. Item modifications, repairs, or replacements that are performed subsequent to final inspection
9 shall require reinspection or retest, as appropriate, to verify acceptability.

10 **QAPD-3.4.3.5 In-service Inspections**

- 11 1. Required in-service inspection or surveillance of structures, systems, or components shall be
12 planned and executed by or for the organization responsible for their operation.
- 13 2. Inspection methods shall be established and executed to verify that the characteristics of an
14 item continue to remain within specified limits.
- 15 3. Inspection methods shall include evaluations of performance capability of essential
16 emergency and safety systems and equipment, verification of calibration and integrity of
17 instruments and instrument systems, and verification of maintenance, as appropriate.

18 **QAPD-3.4.3.6 Inspection Documentation**

19 Inspection documentation shall identify:

- 20 1. The item inspected and the date of the inspection
- 21 2. The name or unique identifier of the inspector who documented, evaluated, and determined
22 acceptability
- 23 3. The method of inspection
- 24 4. The inspection criteria, sampling plan, or reference documents (including revision
25 designation) used to determine acceptance
- 26 5. The results
- 27 6. The M&TE used during the inspection, including the identification number and the
28 calibration due date
- 29 7. Reference to any information on actions taken in connection with nonconformances, as
30 applicable

1 **QAPD-3.4.4 Test Requirements**

2 Testing shall be used to determine the capability of an item to meet specified requirements by
3 subjecting the item to a set of physical, chemical, environmental, or operating conditions.
4 Examples of such tests include prototype qualification tests, production tests, proof tests prior to
5 installation, construction tests, and pre-operational tests.

6 **QAPD-3.4.4.1 Test Planning**

7 Test planning shall include:

- 8 1. The identification of the implementing procedures to be developed to control and perform the
9 test. In lieu of specially prepared written test procedures, appropriate sections of related
10 documents such as American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) methods may be
11 used. If used, they shall incorporate the information directly into the approved test
12 implementing procedure, or shall be incorporated by reference.
- 13 2. The identification of the item to be tested and the test requirements and acceptance limit,
14 including the required levels of precision and accuracy
- 15 3. The identification of the M&TE to be used to perform the test to ensure that the equipment
16 being utilized is calibrated and is of the proper type, range, accuracy, and tolerance to
17 accomplish the intended function
- 18 4. Any test prerequisites, including test equipment, instrumentation and software needs,
19 personnel training and qualification, and suitably controlled environmental conditions
- 20 5. Any mandatory hold points
- 21 6. The methods to be used to record data and results
- 22 7. The provisions for ensuring that prerequisites for the given test have been met

23 **QAPD-3.4.4.2 Test Documentation**

24 Test documentation shall identify:

- 25 1. The applicable test requirements, plans, and procedures, including revisions
- 26 2. The item or work product tested
- 27 3. The date of the test
- 28 4. The name of the tester and data recorders
- 29 5. The type of observation and method of testing
- 30 6. The identification of test criteria or reference documents used to determine acceptance

- 1 7. The results and acceptability of the test
- 2 8. The actions taken in connection with any noted nonconformances
- 3 9. The name of the person evaluating the test results
- 4 10. The identification of the M&TE used during the test (including the identification number and
- 5 calibration due date)

6 **QAPD-3.4.4.3 Test Results**

7 Test results shall be documented and their conformance with acceptance criteria shall be
8 evaluated by a qualified individual within the responsible organization to ensure that all test
9 requirements have been satisfied.

10 **QAPD-3.4.5 Monitoring, Measuring, Testing, and Data Collection Equipment**

11 The following sections establish requirements to ensure that equipment used for inspection and
12 testing is properly controlled, calibrated, and maintained. Equipment discussed in the following
13 sections includes inspection and test equipment, measuring and data collection equipment,
14 equipment (either hand-held or installed) used for data indication, and other equipment used for
15 data indication, collection, or evaluation. These are called M&TE.

16 Calibration and control measures may not be required for rulers, tape measures, levels, and other
17 such devices, if normal commercial equipment provides adequate accuracy.

18 **QAPD-3.4.6 Use and Control of M&TE**

19 Each organization using M&TE shall:

- 20 1. Establish and document a system to control the use and calibration of M&TE
- 21 2. Have a program to recall for calibration, or remove from service, M&TE that has exceeded
22 its calibration interval; has broken calibration seals; has been modified, repaired, or has had
23 components replaced; or is suspected to be malfunctioning because of mishandling, misuse,
24 or unusual results
- 25 3. Establish and maintain documented procedures to evaluate the adequacy of the calibration
26 system and to ensure compliance with the requirements of this QAPD
- 27 4. Maintain records documenting that established M&TE schedules and procedures have been
28 followed. These records shall include an individual record of calibration, or other means of
29 control, providing:
 - 30 A. A description or identification of the item
 - 31 B. Calibration interval

- 1 C. Date calibrated
- 2 D. Identification of the calibration source
- 3 E. Calibration results (data and status)
- 4 F. Calibration action taken (e.g., adjusted, repaired, new value assigned, derated)
- 5 G. Evaluation and corrective action taken in response to out-of-calibration conditions
- 6 5. Label all M&TE to indicate the calibration status, the date calibrated, the calibration due date
7 or usage equivalent, and the identification of any limitations. (When it is impractical to apply
8 a label directly to an item, the label may be affixed to the instrument container or some other
9 suitable means may be used to reflect calibration status.)
- 10 6. Evaluate the validity of previous inspection and test results and the acceptability of related
11 items, data collected, and processes monitored, when M&TE is found to be out-of-calibration
- 12 7. Handle, store, and transport M&TE in a manner that does not adversely affect the accuracy
13 of the equipment
- 14 8. Give due consideration to temperature, humidity, lighting, vibration, dust control,
15 cleanliness, electromagnetic interference, and any other factors affecting the results of
16 measurements. Where pertinent, these factors shall be monitored and recorded and, when
17 appropriate, correcting compensations shall be applied to measurement results.

18 **QAPD-3.4.7 Calibration**

- 19 1. M&TE requiring calibration shall be calibrated at periodic intervals established and
20 maintained to ensure acceptable reliability, where reliability is described as the probability
21 that M&TE will remain in tolerance throughout the interval.
- 22 2. M&TE shall be calibrated to provide traceability of the calibration against certified
23 equipment having known valid relationships to nationally recognized standards. If nationally
24 recognized standards do not exist, the bases for calibration shall be documented.
- 25 3. Intervals shall be established for all M&TE requiring calibration unless the equipment is
26 regularly monitored through the use of check standards in a documented measurement
27 assurance process. Check standards must closely represent the item parameters normally
28 tested in the process, and the check standard must be verified periodically.
- 29 4. Where intervals are used to ensure reliability, the interval setting system must be
30 systematically applied and shall have stated reliability goals and a method of verifying that
31 the goals are being attained.
- 32 5. Intervals may be based on usage or time since last calibration.
- 33 6. All exemptions from periodic calibration shall be approved and documented.

- 1 7. The recall system may provide for the temporary extension of the calibration due date for
2 limited periods of time under specified conditions that do not unreasonably impair the
3 satisfaction of task objectives.

- 4 8. If any M&TE is found to be significantly out-of-tolerance during the calibration process, the
5 cognizant organization shall provide for the notification to the user and cognizant QA
6 management of the out-of-tolerance condition, with the associated measurement data, so that
7 appropriate action can be taken.

1 **QAPD-4.0 Assessment Requirements**

2 **QAPD-4.1 Management Assessment**

3 Managers at every level shall periodically assess the performance of their organization to
4 determine the effectiveness of QA program provisions that enable the organization to meet
5 customer requirements and expectations. This assessment shall emphasize the use of human and
6 material resources to achieve organizational goals and objectives.

- 7 1. The management assessment should include an introspective evaluation to determine if the
8 entire integrated management system effectively focuses on meeting strategic goals.
- 9 2. Managers shall retain overall responsibility for management assessments. Direct
10 participation by senior management is essential to the success of the process because
11 management is in the position to view the organization as a total system.
- 12 3. Management assessments should focus on the identification and resolution of both systemic
13 and management issues and problems. Strengths and weaknesses affecting the achievement
14 of organizational objectives should be identified so that meaningful action can be taken to
15 improve quality.
- 16 4. Processes being assessed should also include strategic planning, organizational interfaces,
17 cost control, use of performance indicators, staff training and qualifications, and supervisory
18 oversight and support. Effective management assessments should evaluate such conditions
19 as the state of employee knowledge, motivation, and morale; the amount of mutual trust and
20 communication among workers and organizations; the existence of an atmosphere of
21 creativity and improvement; and the adequacy of human and material resources.
- 22 5. Management assessments of the QA program shall be conducted regularly and reported at
23 least annually to an identified senior management level with sufficient authority to effect
24 corrective measures, as necessary.
- 25 6. Management assessment results should be used as input to the organizational continuous
26 improvement process.

27 **QAPD-4.2 Independent Assessment**

- 28 1. Planned and periodic independent assessments shall be conducted to measure item and
29 service quality, process effectiveness, and promote improvement. The organization
30 performing assessments shall have sufficient authority and freedom from the activities being
31 assessed to carry out its responsibilities. Persons conducting independent assessments shall
32 be technically qualified and knowledgeable of the items and activities being assessed.
- 33 2. The types and frequencies of independent assessments shall be based upon the relevant
34 control levels assigned to the items and activities under the cognizance of the organization.

- 1 3. The CBFO and participant organizations responsible for the performance of activities
2 important to compliance application, waste characterization, repository performance
3 assessment, waste isolation, waste transportation, nuclear safety, environmental protection,
4 and management and operation of the WIPP site shall implement a program of surveillance
5 and audits. The program shall be planned and documented and shall include both routine
6 surveillance of those activities and audits to verify compliance with all aspects of the quality
7 assurance program and to determine its adequacy and effectiveness.

8 **QAPD-4.2.1 Surveillances**

- 9 1. A program of surveillance of the activities referenced above shall be planned, performed,
10 documented, and reported to appropriate management personnel. The surveillance process
11 consists of monitoring or observing to verify whether an item, activity, system, or process
12 conforms to specified requirements.
- 13 2. Surveillances shall accomplish the following:
- 14 A. Monitor work in progress
- 15 B. Document compliance or noncompliance with established requirements and procedures
- 16 C. Identify actual and potential conditions adverse to quality
- 17 D. Obtain timely corrective action commitment from cognizant managers for identified
18 conditions adverse to quality
- 19 E. Provide notification to responsible managers of the status and performance of work under
20 surveillance
- 21 F. Verify timely implementation of corrective actions
- 22 3. Audits or other independent assessments of the subject activities, conducted by the
23 responsible organization, may be counted as satisfying the requirement to do surveillances of
24 related activities in the corresponding surveillance schedule period.

25 **QAPD-4.2.2 Audits**

26 The following sections describe the audit process requirements.

27 **QAPD-4.2.2.1 Scheduling Audits**

- 28 1. Audits shall be scheduled to begin as early in the life of a project or activity as practicable
29 and continue at intervals consistent with the schedule for accomplishing the work and
30 commensurate with assigned control level. The audit schedule shall be reviewed periodically
31 and revised as necessary to assure that coverage is maintained current.

- 1 2. Periodically scheduled QA program audits shall be supplemented by, or integrated with,
2 either audits or surveillances of a technical nature (e.g., performance-based audits) which
3 assess the quality of selected work products and work processes.

4 **QAPD-4.2.2.2 Planning and Preparation for Audits**

5 The organization performing the audit shall develop and document a plan for each audit.

- 6 1. The plan shall include the scope, requirements, purpose, audit personnel, activities to be
7 audited, organizations to be notified, applicable documents, schedule, and written procedures
8 or checklists to be used.
- 9 2. Audit planning shall include a review of past assessment results to determine the nature of
10 problems that have occurred. When recurring problems are found, the audit team shall
11 review corrective actions that have been taken and attempt to determine whether the
12 corrective actions were effective in preventing recurrence.
- 13 3. Audit preparation shall include review of pertinent background information, procedures, and
14 technical documents so that audit team members are familiar with the work being audited.
- 15 4. Audits shall include technical evaluations of the applicable procedures, instructions,
16 activities, and items, as appropriate.
- 17 5. The scope shall include related corrective actions taken since the previous assessment.

18 **QAPD-4.2.2.3 Audit Team Selection**

- 19 1. Audit team members shall be identified prior to the start of the audit activity. The team
20 members shall be selected on the basis of technical qualifications and knowledge of the item
21 or process being audited and shall be independent from the items or processes being audited.
22 Audit team members shall have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to carry out
23 their assigned responsibilities. In the case of internal audits, personnel having direct
24 responsibility for performing the activities being audited shall not be involved in the
25 selection of the audit team.
- 26 2. An audit team leader shall be appointed to provide indoctrination and supervision of the
27 team, organize and direct the audit, and coordinate the preparation and issuance of the audit
28 report.
- 29 3. Before starting the audit, the audit team leader shall ensure that the assigned personnel
30 collectively have experience and training commensurate with the scope, complexity, or
31 special nature of the work to be audited.
- 32 4. Technical specialists, with appropriate technical expertise or experience in the work being
33 audited, shall be used when auditing the adequacy of technical processes.

1 **QAPD-4.2.2.4 Auditor Qualification**

2 Auditors shall be technically qualified in their assigned roles. In addition, they shall have
3 appropriate training or orientation to develop their competence for performing audits.
4 Competence of personnel performing various audit functions shall be developed by one or more
5 of the following methods:

- 6 1. Orientation to provide a working knowledge and understanding of the QA program
7 requirements and the auditing organization's implementing procedures used to perform
8 audits and report audit results
- 9 2. Training programs that provide general and specialized training in audit performance,
10 including fundamentals, objectives, characteristics, organization, performance, and results of
11 quality auditing. Training shall include methods of examining, questioning, evaluating, and
12 documenting specific audit items and methods of evaluating the effectiveness of corrective
13 actions for conditions adverse to quality.
- 14 3. On-the-job training, guidance, and counseling under the direct supervision of a lead auditor.
15 Such training shall include audit planning, performing, reporting, and follow-up actions.

16 **QAPD-4.2.2.5 Technical Specialist Qualification**

17 Technical specialists selected for audit assignments shall receive indoctrination commensurate
18 with the scope, complexity, or special nature of the work being audited. In addition, they shall
19 be trained to the requirements of the audit process associated with their duties.

20 **QAPD-4.2.2.6 Lead Auditor Qualification**

21 A lead auditor shall be capable of organizing and directing audits, reporting audit results, and
22 evaluating planned and implemented corrective action. A lead auditor also shall be certified as
23 meeting the requirements provided in this section for education and experience, communication
24 skills, training, audit participation, and the successful completion of a lead auditor examination.

25 1. Lead Auditor Education and Experience:

26 The prospective lead auditor shall have verifiable evidence that a minimum of 10 credits have
27 been accumulated under the following scoring system:

28 A. Education (four credits maximum)

- 29 i. An associate's degree from an accredited institution scores one credit. If the degree is
30 in engineering, physical sciences, mathematics, or QA, it scores two credits.
- 31 ii. A bachelor's degree from an accredited institution scores two credits. If the degree is
32 in engineering, physical sciences, mathematics, or QA, it scores three credits. In
33 addition, score one more credit for a master's degree (or higher) in engineering,
34 physical sciences, business management, or QA from an accredited institution.

1 B. Experience (nine credits maximum)

- 2 i. The prospective lead auditor shall have participated in a minimum of five QA audits
3 or equivalent verifications (such as management assessments, pre-award surveys, or
4 comprehensive surveillance, as long as the parameters of the audit process are met)
5 within three years prior to the date of certification, one of which shall be a nuclear
6 QA audit within the year prior to qualification. In addition, for technical experience
7 in such areas as scientific investigation, site characterization, nuclear waste
8 management, production, transportation, engineering, manufacturing, construction,
9 operation, or maintenance, or experience applicable to the auditing organization's area
10 of responsibility, score one credit for each full year, with a maximum of five credits.
- 11 ii. If two years of this experience have been in a nuclear field, score one additional
12 credit; or
- 13 iii. If two years of this experience have been in QA, score two additional credits; or
- 14 iv. If two years of this experience have been in auditing or assessment, score three
15 additional credits; or
- 16 v. If two years of this experience have been in nuclear-related QA, score three additional
17 credits; or
- 18 vi. If two years of this experience have been in nuclear-related QA auditing or
19 assessment, score four additional credits.

20 C. Professional Competence (two credits maximum)

21 For certification of competency in engineering, science, or QA specialties, issued and
22 approved by a state agency or national professional or technical society, score two
23 credits.

24 D. Rights of Management (two credits maximum)

25 When determined appropriate, the organization performing the qualification may grant up
26 to two credits for other performance factors applicable to auditing that are not explicitly
27 called out in this section (such as leadership, sound judgment, maturity, analytical ability,
28 tenacity, past performance, and completed QA training courses).

29 2. Lead Auditor Communication Skills

30 The prospective lead auditor shall have the capability to communicate effectively both in writing
31 and orally. These skills shall be attested to in writing by the candidate's supervisor.

32 3. Lead Auditor Training

33 Prospective lead auditors shall be trained to the extent necessary to ensure their competence in
34 skills as established by the organization responsible for performing audits. Training in the

1 following areas shall be accomplished and its completion verified based upon a management
2 evaluation of the particular needs of each prospective lead auditor:

3 A. Knowledge and understanding of the participant organization's QA program and other
4 program-related procedures, codes, standards, regulations, DOE orders, and regulatory
5 guides, as applicable

6 B. General structure of QA plans and implementation procedures as a whole

7 C. Auditing techniques of examining, questioning, evaluating, reporting, and methods of
8 identifying, following up, and closing corrective actions

9 D. Audit planning in functional areas of nuclear QA

10 4. Lead Auditor Examination

11 The prospective lead auditor shall pass an examination that evaluates his or her
12 comprehension of, and ability to apply, the audit knowledge described in this section. The
13 examination may be oral, written, practical, or any combination thereof.

14 The development and administration of the examination for a lead auditor is the
15 responsibility of the organization responsible for the auditing program. This organization
16 shall:

17 A. Maintain the integrity of the examination through confidentiality of files and, where
18 applicable, proctor examinations

19 B. Develop and maintain objective evidence regarding the type and content of the
20 examination

21 5. Lead Auditor Certification

22 Lead auditors shall be certified by the organization responsible for the auditing program as being
23 qualified to lead audits. This certification will document the:

24 A. Name of the organization performing the certification

25 B. Name of the lead auditor

26 C. Date of certification or recertification

27 D. Basis of certification (such as education, experience, communication skills, and training)

28 E. Signature of the designated representative of the organization responsible for the
29 certification

30 6. Lead Auditor Proficiency Maintenance

- 1 A. Lead auditors shall maintain their proficiency through one or a combination of the
2 following:
- 3 i. Regular and active participation in the audit process
- 4 ii. Review and study of codes, standards, QA implementation procedures, instructions,
5 and other documents related to QA program auditing
- 6 iii. Participation in training programs
- 7 iv. Management of the auditing organization shall evaluate the proficiency of lead
8 auditors annually. Based on the evaluation, management shall choose to extend the
9 qualification, require retraining, or require requalification. Management evaluations
10 shall be documented.
- 11 B. Lead auditors who fail to maintain their proficiency for a two-year period shall require
12 requalification to the requirements of this section of the QAPD. However, participation
13 in only one nuclear audit is required.

14 **QAPD-4.2.2.7 Performing Audits**

- 15 1. Audits shall be performed using the written procedures or checklists related to the activity
16 being audited.
- 17 2. Elements that have been selected for audit shall be evaluated against specified requirements.
18 Objective evidence shall be examined to the depth necessary to determine if those elements
19 are being implemented effectively.
- 20 3. Audit results shall be documented by audit personnel and reported to and reviewed by
21 management having responsibility for the area audited. Conditions requiring prompt
22 corrective action shall be reported immediately to management of the audited organization.
- 23 4. Conditions adverse to quality shall be documented and corrected according to the
24 requirements of Section QAPD-2.3.3.

25 **QAPD-4.2.2.8 Reporting Audit Results**

- 26 1. The audit report shall be prepared and signed by the audit team leader and issued to the
27 management of the audited organization and any affected organizations. The audit report
28 shall include the following, as appropriate:
- 29 A. A description of the audit scope
- 30 B. Identification of the auditors
- 31 C. Identification of persons contacted during the audit

- 1 D. A summary of the documents reviewed, persons interviewed, and the specific results of
2 the reviews and interviews (i.e., a summary of the checklist contents)
- 3 E. A summary of audit results, including a statement of the QA program adequacy,
4 implementation, and effectiveness, as appropriate to the scope
- 5 F. A description of each reported condition adverse to quality in sufficient detail to enable
6 corrective action to be taken by the audited organization
- 7 G. A description of commendable quality practices
- 8 2. Additionally, common audit findings shall be grouped in the report whenever possible so that
9 related or systematic breakdowns in the QA program are identified. Findings or deficiencies
10 shall be categorized based on their relative importance to indicate their degree of impact on
11 compliance application, waste characterization, repository performance assessment, waste
12 isolation, waste transportation, nuclear safety, environmental protection, or management and
13 operation of the WIPP facility.

14 **QAPD-4.2.2.9 Audit Response and Follow Up**

15 Management of the audited organization will investigate conditions adverse to quality; determine
16 and schedule corrective actions, including measures to preclude recurrence; and notify the
17 auditing organization in writing of the actions planned or taken. The adequacy of audit
18 responses shall be evaluated by or for the auditing organization. Follow-up action shall be taken
19 to verify that corrective action is accomplished as scheduled.

20 **QAPD-4.2.2.10 Audit Records**

21 The following documents, when developed in fulfillment of the audit requirements of this
22 QAPD, shall be controlled as QA records in accordance with Section QAPD-2.5 of this QAPD:
23 audit plans, audit reports, audit responses, and documentation of corrective action completion
24 and follow-up.

1 **QAPD-5.0 Sample Control Requirements**

2 This section identifies the requirements for controlling samples of waste and environmental
3 media. The control measures shall include provisions for the identification, handling, storage,
4 shipping, archiving, and disposition of the samples, including those identified as nonconforming.

5 **QAPD-5.1 Sample Control**

- 6 1. Samples shall be controlled and identified in a manner consistent with their intended use.
- 7 2. Implementing procedures shall define responsibilities, including organizational interfaces,
8 related to documenting and tracking sample possession from sample collection and
9 identification through handling, preservation, shipment, transfer, analysis, storage, and final
10 disposition.
- 11 3. Sample control measures shall include provisions for the identification of the in situ
12 orientation of samples, where appropriate.
- 13 4. A chain-of-custody record form shall be maintained. The chain-of-custody record shall
14 provide a document trail of all persons who have custody of a given sample, including the
15 date and time of its transfer.
- 16 5. Sample control measures, including identification and documentation, shall ensure that
17 samples can be traced at all times, from collection through final disposition.
- 18 6. Where samples have a maximum life expectancy or expiration date, methods shall be
19 employed that preclude the use of the sample beyond its specified life.
- 20 7. Representative archival samples from difficult-to-repeat sample collection activities, such as
21 principal bore holes, shall be maintained.
- 22 8. Implementing procedures shall specify the representative samples to be archived if the need
23 to archive samples is identified.

24 **QAPD-5.2 Sample Identification**

- 25 1. Each sample shall be uniquely identified from its initial collection through the final
26 disposition of the sample.
- 27 2. Sample identification shall be verified and documented before each transfer or release for
28 testing, analysis, or disposition.
- 29 3. Identification shall be maintained by placing the identification directly on the samples
30 wherever possible or in a manner that ensures identification is maintained. If direct physical
31 markings are either impractical or insufficient, other appropriate means shall be employed
32 (e.g., physical separation, labels or tags attached to containers, or procedural control). When
33 used, physical markings shall:

- 1 A. Be applied using materials and methods that provide clear and legible identification
- 2 B. Not effect the sample content or form
- 3 C. Be transferable to each identified sample part when the sample is subdivided
- 4 D. Not be obliterated or hidden by surface treatments or sample preparation unless other
- 5 means of identification are substituted
- 6 4. If sample storage is required, methods shall be established for the control of sample
- 7 identification that are commensurate with the planned duration and storage conditions. As
- 8 applicable, these methods shall provide for:
 - 9 A. The maintenance or replacement of markings and identification tags that have been
 - 10 damaged because of age or during handling
 - 11 B. The protection of identification markings from excessive deterioration due to
 - 12 environmental exposure

13 **QAPD-5.3 Handling, Storing, and Shipping Samples**

- 14 1. Handling, storing, cleaning, packaging, shipping, and preserving samples shall be conducted
- 15 in accordance with established work and inspection implementing procedures. Controls shall
- 16 provide for the maintenance of sample characteristics, sample integrity, and sample
- 17 identification during storage.
- 18 2. The controls shall be consistent with planned duration and storage conditions and shall
- 19 describe actions to be taken where maximum sample life expectancy limits are identified.
- 20 3. Storage methodology shall be developed and implemented to ensure that samples are
- 21 maintained in predetermined environmental conditions commensurate with their intended use
- 22 and purpose.
- 23 4. Samples shall be controlled to preclude the mixing of like samples.
- 24 5. Samples on which analysis or tests have been performed shall be identified and maintained in
- 25 a separate part of the storage area.
- 26 6. If required for critical, sensitive, perishable, or high-value samples, specific measures for the
- 27 handling, storage, cleaning, packaging, shipping, and sample preservation shall be identified
- 28 and used.
- 29 7. Measures shall be established for sample marking and labeling for packaging, shipping,
- 30 handling, and storage as necessary to adequately identify, maintain, and preserve the sample.
- 31 Markings and labels shall indicate the need for and the presence of special environments or
- 32 the need for other special controls, if necessary.

- 1 8. Samples requiring special protective equipment (such as containers) and special protective
2 environments (such as inert gas or limits on moisture and temperature) shall be specified,
3 employed, verified, and documented.

4 **QAPD-5.4 Disposition of Nonconforming Samples**

- 5 1. Samples that do not conform to requirements specified in work controlling documents (such
6 as job packages, travelers, or work requests) shall be identified, documented, evaluated, and
7 segregated in accordance with Section QAPD-2.3.
- 8 2. The disposition for nonconforming samples shall be identified and documented and shall be
9 limited to “use-as-is,” “limited use,” or “discard.”
- 10 3. Samples that have lost their identity shall be documented as nonconforming and shall not be
11 used.

1 **QAPD-6.0 Scientific Investigation Requirements**

2 Scientific investigations shall be defined, controlled, verified, and documented. Process
3 variables affecting scientific investigations shall be measured and controlled. Test processes
4 conducted in support of such investigations shall be controlled in accordance with the
5 requirements of Sections QAPD-3.4, *Inspection and Testing*, QAPD-3.4.4, *Test Requirements*,
6 and QAPD-3.4.5, *Monitoring, Measuring, Testing, and Data Collection Equipment*, as
7 applicable, and as supplemented by the requirements of this section.

8 **QAPD-6.1 Planning Scientific Investigations**

- 9 1. Variables that affect interrelated scientific investigations shall be identified and controlled
10 appropriately in each related investigation.
- 11 2. The intended use of the data shall be documented before collection as part of the planning for
12 data processing. Any alternate use of the data shall be evaluated for appropriateness and the
13 justification for use shall be documented.
- 14 3. Planning shall consider the compatibility of data processing with any conceptual or
15 mathematical models used at each applicable stage.
- 16 4. The technical adequacy of procedures for conducting scientific investigations and their
17 implementation shall be reviewed and approved by qualified persons other than those who
18 prepared the procedures. Changes to procedures for conducting scientific investigations shall
19 be reviewed and approved in a manner commensurate with the original procedure.
- 20 5. Development activities used to establish new methods or procedures for conducting scientific
21 investigations shall be documented. The results of developmental testing shall be reviewed
22 for adequacy and approved by qualified persons prior to implementation of the procedures
23 for data collection.
- 24 6. Planning shall be coordinated with organizations providing input to or using the results of the
25 investigation.
- 26 7. Planning shall include the establishment of acceptance criteria for data quality evaluation to
27 ensure that the data generated are valid and satisfy documented requirements for the
28 following characteristics, as appropriate: data precision, data accuracy, data
29 representativeness, data comparability, and data completeness.
- 30 8. Planning shall include the identification of known sources of error and uncertainty, as well as
31 any input data that are suspect or whose quality is beyond the control of the performing
32 organizations.

33 **QAPD-6.2 Performing Scientific Investigations**

- 34 1. Scientific investigations shall be performed in accordance with requirements documented in
35 test plans, procedures, and scientific notebooks.

- 1 2. If deviation from test standards or the establishment of specially prepared test procedures is
2 deemed appropriate (e.g., no nationally recognized test standards exist), the modified or new
3 test procedures shall be documented in sufficient detail to be repeatable and shall be justified,
4 evaluated, and approved by the cognizant technical organization.
- 5 3. Scientific notebooks shall contain, at a minimum:
 - 6 A. A statement of the objectives and description of work to be performed or reference to an
7 approved plan that describes the work
 - 8 B. The methods used
 - 9 C. Identification of the samples
 - 10 D. The M&TE used
 - 11 E. A description of the work performed and the results obtained, the names of individuals
12 performing the work, and dated initials or signature, as appropriate, of individuals
13 making the entries
 - 14 F. A description of changes made to methods used, as appropriate
 - 15 G. The potential sources of uncertainty and error in test plans, procedures, and parameters
16 that must be controlled and measured to ensure that tests are valid
- 17 4. Scientific results shall be periodically reviewed by an independent qualified individual to
18 verify that there is sufficient detail to retrace the investigation and confirm the results, if
19 feasible, or repeat the investigation and achieve comparable results without recourse to the
20 original investigator.
- 21 5. Practices, techniques, equipment, and manual or computerized methods used to obtain and
22 analyze data shall be verified to ensure that they are technically sound and have been
23 properly selected. Controls shall be established for these processes to ensure that they are
24 properly implemented, including controls to prevent tampering.
- 25 6. Data collection and analysis shall be controlled by procedures of sufficient detail to allow the
26 processes to be repeated. Where appropriate, quality control checks shall be performed using
27 recognized methods such as replicate, spike, and split samples;
- 28 7. control charts; blanks; reagent checks; replication of the methods used to obtain the results;
29 or alternate analysis methods.
- 30 8. Test media (e.g., fluids), when used, shall be characterized and controlled in accordance with
31 test procedures.
- 32 9. Scientific notebooks and technical implementation documents shall be maintained as QA
33 records.

1 **QAPD-6.3 Data Documentation, Control, and Validation**

2 **QAPD-6.3.1 Data Identification and Usage**

3 A. All data shall be recorded so that they are clearly identifiable and traceable to the test,
4 experiment, study, or other source from which they were generated. Identification and
5 traceability of the data shall be maintained for the lifetime of the WIPP.

6 B. The method of data recording (e.g., scientific notebooks, log books, data sheets, or
7 computerized instrumentation systems) shall be controlled to avoid data loss and permit data
8 retrievability. Controls shall be established to ensure that data integrity and security are
9 maintained wherever data are stored. Controls shall prescribe how specific types of data will
10 be stored with respect to media, conditions, location, retention time, security, and access.
11 Data shall be suitably protected from damage and destruction during their prescribed lifetime
12 and shall be readily retrievable.

13 C. Data transfer and reduction controls shall be established to ensure that data transfer is error
14 free (or within a prescribed permissible error rate), that no information is lost in transfer, and
15 that the input is completely recoverable. Data transfer and reduction will be controlled to
16 permit independent reproducibility by another qualified individual. Examples of data
17 transfer include copying raw data from a notebook into computerized data form, or copying
18 from computer tape to disk.

19 D. Data that are determined to be erroneous, rejected, superseded, or otherwise unsuited for their
20 intended use shall be controlled to prevent their inadvertent use.

21 Controls shall include the identification, segregation, and disposition of inadequate data. The
22 basis for the disposition of erroneous data shall be justified and documented.

23 E. All processes which change either the form of expression or quantity of data, values, or
24 number of data items (data reduction) shall be controlled by prescribed methods that allow
25 for the validation of the conversion process.

26 F. Data collection and analysis shall be critically reviewed and questions resolved before the
27 results are either used or reported. Uncertainty limits shall be assigned to the data prior to
28 their use.

29 **QAPD-6.3.2 Data Validation**

30 Data validation is a systematic process used to review data to ensure that the required data
31 quality characteristics have been obtained. Results of the review may require that qualifiers be
32 placed on the use of the data.

33 1. Validation methods shall be planned and documented. The documentation shall include the
34 acceptance criteria used to determine if the data are valid.

35 2. All applicable data collected shall be validated. Validation shall include the following:

- 1 A. The relevant documentation is reviewed to evaluate the technical adequacy, the suitability
2 for the intended use, and the adequacy of the QA record.
- 3 B. The results of the data review shall be documented.
- 4 C. The reviewer shall be independent of the collection activities.
- 5 3. Data validation shall be controlled to permit independent reproducibility by another qualified
6 individual.
- 7 4. Data considered as established fact by the scientific and engineering community, such as
8 engineering handbook data or critical tables, do not require validation.

9 **QAPD-6.4 Qualification of Existing Data**

- 10 1. This section contains requirements unique to the post-qualification of data and information
11 that are relied upon to support the WIPP compliance application and were collected prior to
12 the implementation of this QAPD. While the qualification process shall be conducted in
13 accordance with the program control requirements of the CBFO QAPD, it is not intended
14 that the QAPD identify the data that are subject to this process or the technical requirements
15 of the qualification process. The qualification process shall be conducted in accordance with
16 approved procedures that provide for documentation of the decision process, the factors used
17 in arriving at the choice of the qualification method, and the decision that the data are
18 qualified for their intended use.
- 19 2. Existing data shall be qualified using one or a combination of the following methods:
 - 20 A. Determination that the data were collected under a QA program that is equivalent in
21 effect to ASME NQA-1-1989 edition; ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda, Part 2.7, to ASME
22 NQA-2-1989 edition; and NQA-3-1989. Factors to be considered include:
 - 23 i. Qualifications of personnel or organizations generating the data
 - 24 ii. Technical adequacy of the equipment and procedures used to collect and analyze
25 the data
 - 26 iii. Environmental conditions under which the data were obtained (if germane)
 - 27 iv. Quality and reliability of the measurement control program under which the data
28 were generated
 - 29 v. Extent to which data demonstrate properties of interest (e.g., physical, chemical,
30 geologic, or mechanical)
 - 31 vi. Extent to which conditions generating the data may partially meet requirements of
32 this QAPD
 - 33 vii. Prior uses of the data and the associated verification processes

- 1 viii. Prior peer or other professional reviews of data and their results
- 2 ix. Extent and reliability of the documentation associated with the data
- 3 x. Extent and quality of corroborating data or confirmatory testing results
- 4 xi. Degree to which data generating processes were independently audited
- 5 xii. The importance of the data in showing that the repository design meets the
- 6 performance objectives

- 7 B. The use of corroborating data, with the data relationships and inferences clearly identified
- 8 and justified

- 9 C. Confirmatory testing that is performed and documented

- 10 D. Peer review conducted in a manner that is compatible with NUREG-1297, *Peer Review*
- 11 *for High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories*

- 12 i. Peer reviews shall be performed when the adequacy of information or the suitability
- 13 of procedures and methods essential to showing that a repository system meets its
- 14 performance requirements with respect to safety and calculations, or reference to
- 15 previously established standards and practices.

- 16 ii. Peer reviews performed in support of WIPP compliance activities shall be
- 17 documented, as shall all peer review processes.

- 18 E. Peer reviews are used for the following activities:

- 19 i. Conceptual models selected and developed by DOE
- 20 ii. Waste characterization analysis as required in 40 CFR 194.24(b)
- 21 iii. Engineered barrier evaluation as required in 40 CFR 194.44

1 **QAPD-7.0 Software Requirements**

2 This section of the QAPD establishes software quality assurance (SQA) requirements for CBFO
3 participants who develop, acquire, maintain, or use computer software that is important to
4 compliance application and waste characterization.

5 **QAPD-7.1 Applicability**

- 6 1. The requirements in this section apply to computer software used in the manipulation or
7 production of data that are, in turn, used in the processing, gathering, or generation of
8 information whose output is relied upon to make design, analytical, operational, or
9 compliance-related decisions with respect to the performance of the waste confinement,
10 waste characterization, waste transportation, or waste acceptance processes. The
11 requirements also apply to safety software used by CBFO and its contractors. The
12 application of these requirements shall be prescribed in written plan(s), policies, procedures,
13 or instructions.
- 14 2. The **basic requirements** defined in this section apply to those activities involved in the
15 processing, control, or measurement of the hazardous, radioactive, and waste matrix
16 materials of the TRU or TRU mixed waste. Waste matrix materials include but are not
17 limited to metals, cellulose, chelating agents, water, and other liquids, plastics, and rubber.
18 The requirements also apply to safety software used by CBFO and its contractors.
- 19 3. The **NQA-2 Part 2.7 requirements** defined in this section apply to software used in the
20 processing, control, or measurement of the radioactive and waste matrix materials of the
21 TRU waste. These requirements also apply to software used to model the performance of the
22 WIPP for purposes of compliance application and/or reapplication. The requirements also
23 apply to safety software used by CBFO and its contractors.
- 24 4. Exempt from the requirements of this section of the QAPD is software that is considered to
25 be “systems software” (e.g., operating systems, administrative and management systems,
26 system utilities, compilers, assemblers, translators, interpreters, query languages, word
27 processing programs, spreadsheets, database managers, and graphing programs) or other
28 software that does not generate data that are used in the formulation of conclusions. Specific
29 applications supporting Section QAPD-7.1, written for use within these types of software
30 (e.g., detailed formulas or macros) that can be verified by hand calculations or other means,
31 shall meet the following requirements of this section:
- 32 A. A listing of the software code (i.e., details of formulas, file/table/cell references, and/or
33 macros) shall be developed and maintained.
- 34 B. Documentation shall be prepared to demonstrate by hand or other independent
35 calculations that the specific application provides the correct results for the specified
36 range of input parameters.

1 **QAPD-7.2 Basic Requirements for Inventory and Classification of Software**

- 2 1. An inventory of all applicable software shall be maintained that identifies the software name,
3 version, classification, exemption status, operating environment, and the person and
4 organization responsible for the software.
- 5 2. Software governed by this section of the QAPD shall be categorized. The criteria for
6 classification shall be documented in the inventory and shall address the purpose of the
7 software relative to its use in engineering, scientific, testing, data collection, design, analysis,
8 and operations activities, as well as its importance to safety or its significance in managing
9 information or augmenting mission-essential decisions.

10 **QAPD-7.3 Software Quality Assurance**

11 **QAPD-7.3.1 Basic Requirements for Software Quality Assurance**

12 Controls governing applicable software development projects shall be identified in controlled
13 and documented plans. The plans shall be formally reviewed and approved. Controls governing
14 the configuration and use of the software shall be identified in plans or procedures appropriate to
15 the organizations using the software. The following activities shall be addressed in plans or
16 procedures:

- 17 1. Software development
- 18 2. Software verification and validation
- 19 3. Software configuration control
- 20 4. Software operation and maintenance

21 Plans may be issued separately or as a single, composite plan, depending on the nature and
22 complexity of the project. The software control plans may be a section of the overall project
23 plan, provided that each software item is addressed and the software control portion of the plan
24 prescribes the documentation, reviews, and controls required by this section.

25 **QAPD-7.3.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements for Software Quality Assurance**

26 Plans for ensuring software quality shall be prepared for each new software project at the start of
27 the software life cycle. For acquired software, the software quality plan shall be prepared before
28 the software enters the purchaser organization. Plans may be prepared individually for each
29 software project, may exist as a generic document to be applied to software prepared within or
30 procured by an organization, or may be incorporated into the overall QA program. The plan
31 shall identify:

- 32 1. The software products governed by the plan
- 33 2. The types of documentation to be prepared, reviewed, and maintained during the software
34 design, development, implementation, test, and use

- 1 3. The organizations responsible for performing the work and achieving software quality, and
2 their tasks and responsibilities
- 3 4. The process for reporting and documenting software discrepancies, evaluating the impact of
4 discrepancies on previous calculations, and determining the appropriate corrective action(s)
- 5 5. The standards, conventions, techniques, or methodologies that guide the software
6 development, as well as the methods used to ensure implementation of requirements
- 7 6. The procedure(s) used for establishing and maintaining the integrity of data, embodied
8 mathematical models, and output files

9 **QAPD-7.4 Software Procurement**

10 **QAPD-7.4.1 Basic Requirements for Software Procurement**

11 This section of the QAPD identifies responsibilities of the sponsoring organization for acquired
12 software upon receipt of the software.

13 All procured software governed by this section shall be tested in accordance with documented
14 and approved test procedures using approved test-case specifications to ensure that the acquired
15 software will perform satisfactorily in its operating environment. The installation tests (including
16 the test procedures), the test case specifications, and the results of the installation tests shall be
17 identified, documented, and maintained as records according to established procedures.

18 **QAPD-7.4.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements for Software Procurement**

- 19 1. The procurement of software and related services shall be performed in accordance with
20 Section QAPD-3.3 of this QAPD.
- 21 2. Once the software has been installed, but before its use, the sponsoring organization shall
22 perform user acceptance to verify the functional capability of the software and the
23 acceptability of the supplier's supporting documentation (e.g., the user manual, technical
24 specifications, and the results of supplier testing).
- 25 3. For procured software, the supplier shall report software errors and failures to the sponsoring
26 organization. The sponsoring organization shall also report software errors to the supplier.

27 **QAPD-7.5 Software Developed Under Other QA Programs**

28 **QAPD-7.5.1 Basic Requirements**

29 Software that has not been developed or approved in accordance with this QAPD shall be
30 evaluated to determine its adequacy to perform intended functions. The evaluation shall be
31 documented. The software shall be uniquely identified and controlled prior to the evaluation,
32 clearly traceable to the software requirements, accepted by the sponsoring organization, and
33 placed under configuration control prior to use.

1 **QAPD-7.5.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements**

2 The evaluation of existing software developed in accordance with other QA programs shall serve
3 as the basis to:

- 4 1. Determine the adequacy of existing verification and validation activities and software
5 documentation to support operations and maintenance.
- 6 2. Identify the activities to be performed and the documentation necessary to accept the
7 software for its intended use and place it under configuration control. The evaluation shall be
8 documented and shall contain, at a minimum:
 - 9 A. User application requirements
 - 10 B. Test plans and test cases required to validate software acceptability
 - 11 C. User documentation as described in Section QAPD-7.9.2.6

12 **QAPD-7.6 Software Development and Life Cycle**

13 **QAPD-7.6.1 Basic Requirements**

14 The developmental activities of software projects subject to this QAPD shall be identified in
15 documented and approved plans to ensure that the project proceeds in an orderly and traceable
16 manner. Sufficient information shall be provided to clearly indicate the necessary tasks, the
17 deliverables and baselines for each phase, the required reviews, appropriate milestones, and the
18 responsibilities associated with each task.

19 Software project development plans shall identify the items that need to be baselined and the
20 methods to be used for controlling the configuration of those baselines throughout the
21 development process. Configuration control planning for software are addressed in Section
22 QAPD-7.8 of this QAPD.

23 **QAPD-7.6.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements**

- 24 1. The activities associated with the evolution of the software shall be accomplished using an
25 iterative or sequential approach. The approach shall include the analysis of the problem
26 under study, the transformation of the analysis into the design, the implementation of the
27 design into validated computer software, and the development of sufficient documentation to
28 demonstrate that the specified requirements have been successfully included in the computer
29 software.
- 30 2. The iterative or sequential approach to software development consists of phases, with each
31 phase leading to the development of a specific work product representing components of the
32 software baseline. The software phases are:
 - 33 A. Definition of requirements

- 1 B. Design
- 2 C. Implementation
- 3 D. Testing
- 4 E. Installation and checkout
- 5 F. Operations and maintenance
- 6 G. Retirement

7 3. Following the development of the software quality plan, no strict sequence of performing
8 activities is required (i.e., activities may be performed serially or recursively) provided that
9 all the specified requirements for each software development phase have been met and the
10 intent of the requirements has not been subverted.

11 **QAPD-7.6.2.1 Requirements Phase**

12 Software requirements shall be specified, documented, and reviewed. These requirements shall
13 pertain to functionality, performance, design constraints, data attributes, and external interfaces
14 (e.g., hardware limitations) as outlined in Section QAPD-7.9.2.2. Each requirement shall be
15 specified in sufficient detail to permit the accomplishment of design and validation activities.
16 Software requirements shall be traceable throughout the software development cycle, and a
17 verification and validation plan shall be prepared after the software requirements have been
18 documented and approved.

19 **QAPD-7.6.2.2 Design Phase**

20 The software design shall be based on the software requirements and shall be documented and
21 reviewed. The design shall specify the overall structure (control and data flow) and the reduction
22 of the overall structure into physical solutions (algorithms, equations, control logic, and data
23 structures). The design may necessitate the modification of the requirements documentation and
24 the verification and validation plans.

25 **QAPD-7.6.2.3 Implementation Phase**

26 The software design shall be translated into a form (programming language) suitable for
27 processing by a computer. The executable software shall be analyzed to identify and correct
28 errors.

29 **QAPD-7.6.2.4 Testing Phase**

30 1. Test requirements and acceptance criteria shall be specified, documented, and reviewed and
31 shall be based upon applicable design or other pertinent technical bases. Appropriate tests,
32 such as verification tests, requirements-driven tests, hardware integration tests, and in-use
33 tests, shall be controlled. Software testing, using documented test plans, test cases, and test
34 results are the primary methods of software validation.

- 1 2. Testing of software shall be performed to the extent that unintended functions are identified
2 and reviewed and their impact determined and corrected. If appropriate, determine if
3 modifications are needed to the requirements, design, implementation, or test plans and test
4 cases.

- 5 3. Design-driven tests shall be used to demonstrate the capability of the software to produce
6 valid results for test problems encompassing the range of intended use as defined by the
7 software documentation. Testing of software used for operational control shall demonstrate
8 the required performance over the entire range of the controlled function or process.
9 Acceptable test methods consist of:
 - 10 A. Hand calculations
 - 11 B. Calculations using comparable proven problems
 - 12 C. Empirical data and information from confirmed published data and correlations or
13 technical literature
 - 14 D. Comparison with other validated software of similar purpose
 - 15 E. Manual inspections or qualitative checks not involving numerical manipulation
16 (examples include visual inspection of database reformatting or data plotting)

- 17 4. Requirements-driven tests shall be used to validate software by comparing test results of
18 software execution with objective evidence obtained by the above methods. The results of
19 this evaluation shall be of sufficient scope and depth to prove the capabilities and limitations
20 delineated in the software documentation.

- 21 5. Test records shall identify each of the following:
 - 22 A. Computer program tested
 - 23 B. Computer hardware used
 - 24 C. Test equipment and calibrations, where applicable
 - 25 D. Date of test
 - 26 E. Tester or data recorder
 - 27 F. Simulation models used, where applicable
 - 28 G. Test problems
 - 29 H. Results and acceptability
 - 30 I. Action taken in connection with any deviations noted
 - 31 J. Persons evaluating test results

1 **QAPD-7.6.2.5 Installation and Checkout Phase**

2 1. During installation and checkout, the software becomes part of a system consisting of
3 applicable software components, hardware, and data. The process of integrating the software
4 with other applicable components may consist of installing both the hardware and software,
5 converting or creating databases, and verifying that all components of the system have been
6 included in the installation. Test problems shall be developed and documented to permit
7 confirmation of the acceptable performance of the software in its operating environment.
8 Installation and checkout of software shall consist of:

9 A. Execution of tests for installation and integration

10 B. Documented acceptance of the software for operational use

11 C. Placement of the software under configuration control prior to use

12 2. Completion of the installation and checkout activities establishes the software baseline.

13 **QAPD-7.6.2.6 Operations and Maintenance Phase**

14 1. Operation of the software is conducted by the user in accordance with the operation and
15 usage instructions described in the software user documentation. Once the software has been
16 made available for use, the software requirements and the design integrity shall be
17 maintained. Maintenance activities shall be performed and documented in a traceable,
18 planned, and orderly manner.

19 2. In all cases, verification and validation of software shall be completed and approved and
20 corrective actions performed, as necessary, prior to relying upon the software to perform its
21 intended function.

22 A. Post Installation Maintenance

23 Software shall be maintained to remove latent errors (corrective maintenance), to respond to
24 new or revised requirements (perfective maintenance), or to adapt the software to changes in
25 the operating environment (adaptive maintenance). Software modifications shall be approved
26 by authorized personnel, documented, verified, validated, and controlled.

27 B. In-Use Tests

28 Test problems shall be run whenever the software is installed on a different computer or
29 when significant hardware or system software configuration changes are made. These tests
30 shall be documented, performed by an individual technically competent in the subject area(s),
31 and serve as the basis for determining if the software still meets specified requirements.

32 Periodic in-use manual or automatic self-check routines shall be prescribed and performed
33 for that software where computer failure or electronic drift can affect required outcomes.

1 **QAPD-7.6.2.7 Retirement Phase**

2 Criteria shall be developed to determine when software can be retired from use. Methods shall
3 be developed to prevent the use of software that is no longer controlled. Upon retirement, user
4 support for a software product is terminated.

5 **QAPD-7.7 Software Verification and Validation**

6 **QAPD-7.7.1 Basic Requirements**

7 1. Verification and validation of software shall include the review of software activities,
8 documentation, and tests to ensure that the software:

9 A. Adequately and correctly performs all intended functions

10 B. Does not perform any unintended function that either by itself, or in combination with
11 other functions, can degrade the intended outcomes of the software

12 2. Verification and validation shall be performed by any competent individual(s) or group(s)
13 other than those who performed the software design. The individuals may be from the same
14 organization and may include the designer's supervisor, provided the supervisor:

15 A. Did not specify a singular design approach

16 B. Did not rule out certain design considerations

17 C. Did not establish the design inputs used

18 D. Is the only individual in the organization competent to perform the verification or
19 validation

20 **QAPD-7.7.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements**

21 **QAPD-7.7.2.1 Verification**

22 Verification is a formal checking activity performed throughout the evolution of the software life
23 cycle. Verification activities shall be clearly documented, including the identification of those
24 performing and approving the verification. The reviewed documents shall be updated and placed
25 under configuration control. Documentation of review comments and their disposition shall be
26 retained. Unincorporated comments and their disposition shall also be retained in accordance
27 with established procedures.

28 **QAPD-7.7.2.2 Requirements**

29 Verification review(s) of software requirements shall ensure that the requirements are complete,
30 verifiable through testing, consistent, and technically feasible as described in Section QAPD-
31 7.6.2.1.

1 **QAPD-7.7.2.3 Design**

2 Verification review of software design shall evaluate the technical adequacy of the design
3 approach and ensure that all the requirements have been addressed and that the design is
4 complete, verifiable (through testing, using approved test plans and test cases), consistent,
5 technically feasible, and traceable to the software requirements as described in Section QAPD-
6 7.6.2.2.

7 **QAPD-7.7.2.4 Implementation**

8 Verification of the implementation of software design shall consist of the examination of
9 software logic and source code to ensure adherence to standards and conventions and to ensure
10 that the design has been implemented as described in Section QAPD-7.6.2.3.

11 **QAPD-7.7.2.5 Testing**

12 Verification of software testing shall consist of reviews to ensure that the specified test criteria,
13 the expected results, and the software development documentation have been met as described in
14 Section QAPD-7.6.2.4.

15 **QAPD-7.7.2.6 Installation and Checkout**

16 Verification of installation and checkout activities consists of reviews to ensure that the software
17 baseline has been established.

18 **QAPD-7.7.3 Validation**

- 19 1. Software validation is primarily a formal testing activity that shall be performed prior to
20 installation and checkout. It shall be used to demonstrate that the computational model
21 embodied in the software is an acceptable representation of the process or system for which it
22 is intended and that the software produces correct solutions within defined limits for each
23 parameter employed.
- 24 2. Validation methods, test data, software-generated results, and conclusions shall be
25 documented in a form that can be understood by an independent individual technically
26 competent to use the software for the particular problem under study. The documentation
27 shall be reviewed to assure the test requirements have been satisfied .
- 28 3. When the adequacy of the conceptual, mathematical, or computational models or the
29 suitability of procedures and methods cannot be established through testing, alternate
30 calculations, or reference to previously established standards and practices, a documented
31 peer review shall be performed to meet the software validation requirements.
- 32 4. The validation of software modifications shall be subject to selective regression testing to
33 A. Detect errors introduced during the modification of the systems or system components
34 B. Verify that the modifications have not caused unintended adverse effects

1 C. Verify that the modified systems or system components still meet specified requirements

2 **QAPD-7.8 Software Configuration Management**

3 **QAPD-7.8.1 Basic Requirements**

4 1. A. Implementation of baseline and change control processes are fundamental to
5 configuration management. A baseline is a collection of all approved components of the
6 software development cycle. As each component is approved, it is added to the overall
7 software baseline. A software baseline serves as the basis for further development and
8 maintenance that can be changed only through the use of formal change control procedures.
9 Change control is the process by which a change to a baseline is proposed, evaluated, and
10 approved or rejected.

11 2. B. Software configuration controls shall be planned, including the identification of
12 organizational positions that are authorized to make changes, and the methods, procedures,
13 and instructions to be used to control the identification of, access to, changes to, and the
14 status of computer software. Configuration control documents shall indicate how changes
15 will be validated, including regression testing, and how the tests will be documented. These
16 control documents shall be formally reviewed, approved, and in place before the software is
17 released for use.

18 **QAPD-7.8.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements**

19 **QAPD-7.8.2.1 Configuration Identification**

20 Software shall be placed under configuration control as each configuration item is approved. A
21 software baseline shall define the most recent approved software configuration. The
22 configuration items and their associated documentation shall be traceable to one another. A
23 labeling system for configuration items shall be implemented that:

- 24 1. Uniquely identifies each configuration item
- 25 2. Identifies changes to configuration items by revision or version identifier
- 26 3. Provides the ability to uniquely identify each approved configuration of the revised software
27 that is available for use

28 **QAPD-7.8.2.2 Configuration Change Control**

- 29 1. Changes to software shall be systematically proposed, evaluated, documented, and approved
30 to ensure that the impact and rationale for making the change is carefully assessed prior to
31 updating the software baseline. Changes to previously accepted software shall be subject to
32 the same level of control as the original software.
- 33 2. Information concerning approved changes shall be transmitted to all affected organizations.
34 All changes shall be formally evaluated and approved by the organization responsible for the

1 original design, unless an alternate organization has been given the authority to approve the
2 changes. Only authorized changes shall be made to software baselines. Software
3 verification activities shall be performed for the change as necessary to ensure that the
4 change is appropriately reflected in the software documentation and to ensure that
5 traceability is maintained. The degree of software validation shall be commensurate with the
6 nature and scope of the change.

7 **QAPD-7.8.2.3 Configuration Status Accounting**

8 Information shall be maintained that reflects the current status of the software baseline. This
9 includes the identity and version of the approved configuration and the status of any proposed
10 and approved changes to the baseline components. This information shall be available to all
11 designated users of the software upon request.

12 **QAPD-7.9 Documentation**

13 **QAPD-7.9.1 Basic Requirements**

14 Software shall be described in one or more documents that detail user instructions, technical
15 bases, functional requirements, and maintenance-related information sufficient to allow
16 independent verification and maintenance and to provide traceability of the documentation to the
17 software. The documentation shall be reviewed by an individual competent in the technical
18 subject area for which the use of the software is intended. The review shall verify that the
19 documentation adequately and accurately reflects the software that constitutes the system, and is
20 sufficient to objectively demonstrate that the software requirements have been successfully
21 implemented. Appropriate documentation shall be made available to all designated users of the
22 software.

23 **QAPD-7.9.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements**

24 **QAPD-7.9.2.1 Procurement Documentation**

25 The applicable quality assurance requirements shall be specified and the required vendor-
26 supplied software documentation, plans, and procedures shall be identified in the software
27 procurement documentation.

28 **QAPD-7.9.2.2 Requirements Documentation**

- 29 1. Software requirements documentation shall outline the requirements that the proposed
30 software must satisfy. The software requirements shall, as applicable, address the following:
- 31 A. Functionality – the functions the software performs
- 32 B. Performance – the time-related issues of software operation such as speed, recovery time,
33 and response time

1 C. Constraints – limits imposed on implementation activities; any elements that will restrict
2 design options

3 D. Attributes – non-time-related issues of software operation such as portability, acceptance
4 criteria, access control, and maintainability

5 E. External interfaces – interactions with people, hardware, and other software

6 2. Software requirements shall be traceable throughout the software development cycle.

7 **QAPD-7.9.2.3 Design and Implementation Documentation**

8 Software design and implementation documentation consists of a document or series of
9 documents that:

10 1. Describe the major components of the software design as they relate to the software
11 requirements

12 2. Describe the theoretical basis, embodied mathematical model, control flow, control logic,
13 and data structure(s) of the software

14 3. Describe the allowable or prescribed ranges for inputs and outputs

15 4. Describe the design in a manner that can be translated into executable code

16 **QAPD-7.9.2.4 Verification and Validation Documentation**

17 1. Software verification and validation documentation shall consist of associated plans and shall
18 describe the activities (including the results of reviews and tests) and the criteria for
19 accomplishing the verification of the software throughout the software evolution process.
20 The documentation shall also specify the hardware and software configurations pertinent to
21 the software verification and validation.

22 2. Software verification and validation documentation shall be organized in a manner that
23 allows traceability from the software requirements to both the software design and to the
24 validated capabilities of the software.

25 **QAPD-7.9.2.5 Change Documentation**

26 Changes to software shall be formally documented. This documentation shall contain a
27 description of the change, the rationale for the change, and the identification of affected
28 configuration items of the software baseline.

29 **QAPD-7.9.2.6 User Documentation**

30 User documentation should be sufficient to allow any qualified user (i.e., one having adequate
31 technical background) to install and run the software and properly respond to errors. User
32 documentation, at a minimum, shall include:

- 1 1. The software name and version identifier
- 2 2. Statements of functional requirements and system limitations, including hardware
- 3 3. An explanation of the mathematical models and derivation of the numerical methods used in
4 the software design (physical and mathematical assumptions on which the software is based
5 shall be included, along with an explanation of the capabilities and limitations inherent in the
6 software)
- 7 4. Instructions that describe user interaction with the software, user messages initiated as a
8 result of improper input and how the user can respond, the identification and description of
9 input and output specifications and formats, and input parameters
- 10 5. A description of any required training necessary to use the software
- 11 6. Information for obtaining operation and maintenance support

12 **QAPD-7.9.2.7 Error Documentation**

13 Documentation of errors detected during the use of the software following installation and
14 checkout shall be maintained. This documentation can be used for process improvement and to
15 prevent recurrence of errors during the development and maintenance of other software. This
16 documentation shall contain the identity of the software, the classification of the error in terms of
17 its significance to the integrity of the software output, and the corrective action(s).

18 **QAPD-7.10 Problem Reporting and Corrective Action**

19 **QAPD-7.10.1 Basic Requirements**

20 Problems (e.g., errors, faults, failures) detected in released software shall be promptly reported in
21 accordance with documented procedures. When problems are detected in a software item, work
22 previously performed using versions of the software that contain that problem shall be evaluated
23 to determine the impact on the completed work. The evaluations shall be documented and
24 retained in accordance with records requirements.

25 **QAPD-7.10.2 NQA-2 Part 2.7 Requirements**

- 26 1. A system shall be established and maintained to record, classify, analyze, track, and report
27 software problems (in released versions) and the associated corrective actions. Problems
28 shall be promptly reported to any affected organizations and the resolution shall be formally
29 processed.
- 30 2. When problems are discovered in software or software results, the sponsoring organization
31 shall determine the affect on previous uses and the need for corrective action based on
32 sufficient information obtained from the affected users. Corrective action shall ensure that
33 A. Problems are identified, evaluated, documented and, if required, corrected

- 1 B. Problems are assessed for their impact on past and present uses of the software
- 2 C. Changes to software are in accordance with the software configuration management
3 requirements of this section of the QAPD
- 4 D. Results are provided to the affected users, along with any revised software documentation
- 5 3. Problems that could significantly affect decisions based upon prior use or that require
6 significant modification to the software shall be identifiable to all users. Errors that have
7 been determined to represent a condition adverse to quality shall be controlled in accordance
8 with Section QAPD-2.3 of this QAPD.

9 **QAPD-7.11 Access Control**

10 To the extent appropriate, controls shall be established to permit authorized and prevent
11 unauthorized access to software that has been accepted in accordance with this section.

1 **QAPD-8.0 Glossary**

2 **Acceptance:** The documented determination by the receiving organization that a work project is
3 suitable for the intended purpose.

4 **Acquired Software:** Computer software obtained that was not developed by the user
5 organization.

6 **Alternative Calculations:** Calculations that are made with alternative methods to verify
7 correctness of the original calculation.

8 **Approval:** The documented determination by a responsible individual that a work product is
9 suitable for the intended purpose and shall be used as required.

10 **Assessment/Evaluation:** The act of reviewing, inspecting, testing, checking, conducting
11 surveillances, auditing, or otherwise determining and documenting whether items, processes, or
12 services meet specified requirements. Assessments are performed by or for management.
13 Evaluations are performed by the line organization.

14 **Assessment, External:** An assessment of those portions of an organization's quality assurance
15 program not under the direct control or within the organizational structure of the auditing
16 organization.

17 **Assessment, Internal:** An assessment of those portions of an organization's quality assurance
18 program retained under its direct control and within its organizational structure.

19 **Assessor:** An individual who is qualified to perform assigned portions of an assessment.

20 **Audit:** A planned and documented independent assessment to determine by investigation,
21 examination, or evaluation of objective evidence the adequacy of and compliance with
22 established procedures, instructions, drawings, and other applicable documents, and the
23 effectiveness of implementation. An audit should not be confused with surveillance or
24 inspection activities performed for the sole purpose of process control or product acceptance.

25 **Auditor:** An individual who is qualified to perform assigned portions of an audit.

26 **Audit (or Assessment) Team Leader:** A lead auditor (or assessor) who is assigned to direct the
27 efforts of an audit (or assessment) team.

28 **Calibration:** The set of operations which establish, under specified conditions, the relationship
29 between values indicated by a measuring instrument or measuring system, and the corresponding
30 standard or known values derived from the standard.

31 **Certificate of Conformance:** A document signed or otherwise authenticated by an authorized
32 individual certifying the degree to which items or services meet specified requirements.

33 **Certification:** The act of determining, verifying, and attesting to, in writing the qualifications of
34 personnel, processes, procedures, or items in accordance with specified requirements.

1 **Characteristic:** A property or attribute of an item, process, or service that is distinct,
2 describable, and measurable.

3 **Commercial Grade Item:** An item that is (1) not subject to design or specification criteria
4 unique to a CBFO program or facility, (2) used in applications other than the nuclear industry,
5 and (3) ordered from the manufacturer or supplier on the basis of specifications set forth in the
6 manufacturer's published product description.

7 **Compliance Certification Application:** The compliance certification application submitted to
8 the EPA pursuant to section 8 (d) (1) of the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-
9 579, 106 Statue 4777) or any compliance re-certification applications submitted to the EPA
10 pursuant to section 8(f) of the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act.

11 **Condition Adverse to Quality:** An all-inclusive term used in reference to any of the following:
12 failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, defective items, nonconformances, and technical
13 inadequacies. A condition adverse to quality is considered significant when

- 14 • if uncorrected, the condition adverse to quality could have a serious effect on safety,
15 operability, waste isolation, TRU waste site certification, regulatory compliance
16 demonstration, or effective implementation of the QA program
- 17 • the condition adverse to quality requires immediate notification of regulatory entities (e.g.,
18 10 CFR Part 21, HWFP Module I.E.13)
- 19 • the condition adverse to quality indicates a significant failure or breakdown in the
20 implementation of QA Program requirements
- 21 • repeated attempts to resolve a condition adverse to quality have been unsuccessful
- 22 • the condition adverse to quality is identified in items or activities important to safety or waste
23 isolation and compromises the ability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident,
24 thereby presenting a significant hazard to safety and health of workers and/or the public

25 **Configuration Control:** The process of identifying and defining the configuration items in a
26 system, controlling the release and change of these items throughout the system life cycle, and
27 the recording and reporting of the status of configuration items and change requests.

28 **Configuration Item:** A collection of hardware or software elements treated as a unit for the
29 purpose of configuration control.

30 **Controlled Document:** A document that is prepared, reviewed, approved, and distributed in
31 accordance with established implementation procedures. Controlled documents are subject to
32 controlled distribution and to a defined and controlled change process.

33 **Corrective Action:** Measures that are taken to rectify conditions adverse to quality and, where
34 necessary, to preclude recurrence.

1 **Corrective Action Report (CAR):** A document used to identify and rectify conditions adverse
2 to quality (CAQ), and track the associated corrective actions. CARs address CAQs that are
3 primarily programmatic in nature, as opposed to nonconformance reports (NCRs) which address
4 CAQs relating to a specific item(s) such as a piece of hardware or data. The category of CARs
5 includes: corrective action reports or corrective action requests, nonconformance corrective
6 action reports (NCARs), management corrective action reports (MCARs), deficiency reports
7 (DRs), process deficiency reports (PDRs), audit findings, condition adverse to quality
8 reports(CAQR), etc.

9 **Data Accuracy:** The degree to which data agree with an accepted reference or true value.
10 Accuracy is a measure of the bias in a system.

11 **Data Comparability:** A measure of the confidence with which one data set can be compared to
12 another.

13 **Data Completeness:** A measure of the amount of valid data obtained compared to the amount
14 that was planned.

15 **Data Precision:** A measure of the mutual agreement between comparable data gathered or
16 developed under similar conditions, usually expressed in terms of a standard deviation.

17 **Data Representativeness:** The degree to which data accurately and precisely represent a
18 characteristic of a population, a parameter, variations at a sampling point, or environmental
19 conditions.

20 **Data Quality Objectives (DQOs):** Qualitative and quantitative statements derived from outputs
21 of the first six steps of the DQO Process (see below). DQOs 1) clarify the study objective, 2)
22 define the most appropriate type of data to collect, 3) determine the most appropriate conditions
23 from which to collect the data, and 4) specify tolerable limits on decision errors which will be
24 used as the basis for establishing the quantity and quality of data needed to support compliance
25 decisions. DQOs are used to develop a scientific and resource-effective data collection design.

26 **DQO Process:** A strategic planning approach based on the Scientific Method that is used to
27 prepare for a data collection activity. The DQO process provides a systematic procedure for
28 defining the criteria that a data collection design should satisfy, including when to collect
29 samples, where to collect samples, the tolerable level of decision errors for the study, and how
30 many samples to collect. By using the DQO process, DOE will assure that the type, quantity,
31 and quality of environmental data used in decision making will be appropriate for the intended
32 application. In addition, DOE will guard against committing resources to data collection efforts
33 that do not support a defensible decision. The DQO process consists of seven steps and is more
34 fully described in EPA 1994b.

35 **Design Basis:** Information that identifies the specific functions to be performed by items and the
36 specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for
37 design.

38 **Design Input:** Those criteria, parameters, bases, or other design requirements upon which the
39 detailed final design is based.

- 1 **Design Output:** Drawings, specifications, and other documents resulting from the translation of
2 design input requirements.
- 3 **Design Process:** The technical process that begins with the identification of design input and
4 ends with the issuance of design output documents.
- 5 **Design Review:** A documented evaluation of design output during the design process to
6 determine the design adequacy and the conformance to specified acceptance criteria.
- 7 **Disposal System:** Any combination of engineered and natural barriers that isolate transuranic
8 waste after disposal. For the purposes of the WIPP, this will include the combination of the
9 repository/shaft system and the controlled area.
- 10 **Document:** Written or pictorial information that describes, specifies, reports, or certifies
11 activities, requirements, procedures, or results.
- 12 **Document Control:** The process that provides for document adequacy review, approval for
13 release by authorized personnel, and distribution for use at the prescribed work locations.
- 14 **Error:** A discrepancy between a computed, observed, or measured value or condition and the
15 true, specified, or theoretically correct value or condition.
- 16 **Graded Approach:** The process by which the level of analysis, documentation, verification,
17 and other controls necessary to comply with QA program requirements are developed
18 commensurate with specified factors.
- 19 **Independent Assessment:** An assessment, conducted by a group or organization having
20 authority and freedom from the line organization, to evaluate the scope, status, adequacy,
21 programmatic implementation, or effectiveness of a program or process.
- 22 **Item:** An all-inclusive term used in place of any of the following: appurtenance, assembly,
23 component, equipment, material, module, part, structure, subassembly, subsystem, system, unit,
24 support system, or data.
- 25 **Lead Auditor:** An individual trained, qualified, and certified to organize and direct an audit,
26 report audit findings, and evaluate corrective actions.
- 27 **Lifetime Records:** Records required to be maintained for the useful life of the items to which
28 they pertain while the items are installed in the plant or facility (life of the item), or for the
29 lifetime of the equipment, facilities, or programs to which the records apply.
- 30 **Line Management:** Those management positions that are directly responsible for task products
31 and services. Includes CBFO supervisors and team leaders and contractor management within
32 the context of the definition.
- 33 **Line Organization:** The organization directly responsible for task products and services.
34 Includes CBFO offices and teams and contractor organizations within the context of the
35 definition.

- 1 **Macro:** Single computer instructions invoked by a symbol, name, or key that represents
2 commands, actions, or keystrokes.
- 3 **Management Assessment:** Assessment performed by management that focuses on how well the
4 integrated quality assurance program is working. The management assessment should identify
5 management problems that hinder the organization from achieving its objectives in accordance
6 with quality, safety, and environmental requirements.
- 7 **Measuring and Test Equipment:** All devices used to calibrate, measure, gage, test, inspect, or
8 otherwise determine compliance with prescribed technical requirements.
- 9 **Monitoring and Data Collection (M&DC) Equipment:** A subcategory of M&TE that is used
10 in the collection of measurement data for the establishment of test conditions and general
11 information and the collection of general measurement data not utilized to verify the
12 conformance of an item or equipment to specified criteria.
- 13 **Nonconformance:** A deficiency in a characteristic or record that renders the quality of an item
14 or sample unacceptable or indeterminate.
- 15 **Nonpermanent Records:** Records having value for a specific, limited time and authorized by
16 the National Archives and Records Administration to be destroyed after that time.
- 17 **Nonreactor Nuclear Facility:** Those activities or operations that involve radioactive or
18 fissionable materials in such form and quantity that a nuclear hazard potential exists to the
19 employees or the general public. Incidental use and the generation of radioactive materials in a
20 facility operation (e.g., check and calibration sources, radioactive isotopes used in research and
21 experimental and analytical laboratory activities, electron microscopes, and x-ray machines)
22 would not ordinarily require the facility to be included in this definition. The transportation of
23 radioactive materials, accelerators, and reactors and their operations are not included.
- 24 **Participant:** A DOE contractor organization that furnishes items or services in support of
25 CBFO-sponsored programs, including those TRU waste generator and storage sites
26 characterizing waste for shipment to WIPP.
- 27 **Peer:** A person having technical expertise in the subject matter to be reviewed to a degree at
28 least equivalent to that needed for the original work.
- 29 **Peer Review:** A documented, critical review performed by peers who are independent of the
30 work being reviewed. A peer review is an in-depth critique of assumptions, calculations,
31 extrapolations, alternate interpretations, methodology, and acceptance criteria employed, and of
32 conclusions drawn in the original work. Peer reviews confirm the adequacy of work.
- 33 **Periodic:** Occurring or recurring at regular intervals. For the purposes of this QAPD, these
34 intervals are determined by the responsible management unless otherwise specified.
- 35 **Post-Closure QA Records:** QA records required to be maintained beyond the operating life of
36 the WIPP repository, for periods of several hundreds of years, and in a manner that would permit

- 1 future generations to maintain them longer, if desired, using present reasonably available
2 technology.
- 3 **Procedure:** A document that specifies or describes how an activity is to be performed. The term
4 “procedure” also includes instructions and drawings.
- 5 **Process:** A series of actions that achieve an end or result.
- 6 **Procurement Document:** Purchase orders, contracts, specifications, or other documents used to
7 define technical and quality assurance requirements for the procurement of items or services.
- 8 **Qualification (Personnel):** The characteristics or abilities gained through education, training, or
9 experience, as measured against established requirements such as standards or tests, that qualify
10 an individual to perform a required function.
- 11 **Qualification Testing:** A test that is intended to provide a desired level of confidence that an
12 item meets specified criteria.
- 13 **Quality:** The condition achieved when an item, service, or process meets or exceeds the user's
14 requirements and expectations.
- 15 **Quality Assurance:** All those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate
16 confidence that an item will perform satisfactorily in service.
- 17 **Quality Assurance Objectives:** Objectives that represent the required quality of data necessary
18 to draw valid conclusions regarding program objectives.
- 19 **Quality Assurance Program:** The program established to assign responsibilities and
20 authorities, define policies and requirements, and provide for the performance and assessment of
21 work.
- 22 **Quality Assurance Record:** A completed record or any authenticated portion of a record that
23 provides objective evidence of the quality of items or activities.
- 24 **Quality System:** See *Quality Assurance Program*.
- 25 **RCRA Related Deficiency:** A deficiency that is a violation of the requirements of the WIPP
26 Hazardous Waste Facility Permit.
- 27 **Readiness Review:** A systematic documented review of the readiness for startup or continued
28 extended use of a facility, process, or activity. Readiness reviews are typically conducted before
29 proceeding beyond project milestones and prior to commencement of a major phase of work
30 activities.
- 31 **Receipt Inspection:** A method of accepting an item or related service from a supplier by
32 examination or testing of the item or related service to verify conformance to specified
33 requirements.

1 **Records:** Books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials or other documentary
2 materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of the
3 United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public
4 business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor
5 as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations or other
6 activities of the government or because of the informational value of the data they contain.

7 **Records Holding Facility:** A CBFO records storage facility meeting regulatory requirements
8 for the storage of inactive records pending their final disposition.

9 **Repair:** The process of restoring an item to a condition such that the capability of an item to
10 function reliably and safely is unimpaired even though that item still does not conform to the
11 original requirement.

12 **Rework:** The process by which an item is restored to original specifications by completion or
13 correction.

14 **Safety:** An all-inclusive term used synonymously with environment, safety, and health to
15 encompass protection of the public, the workers, and the environment.

16 **Safety Software:** Includes the following:

17 1. Safety System Software. Software for a nuclear facility that performs a safety function as
18 part of a structure, system, or component and is cited in either (a) a DOE approved
19 documented safety analysis or (b) an approved hazard analysis.

20 2. Safety and Hazard Analysis Software and Design Software. Software that is used to classify,
21 design, or analyze nuclear facilities. This software is not part of a structure, system, or
22 component (SSC) but helps to ensure the proper accident or hazards analysis of nuclear
23 facilities or an SSC that performs a safety function.

24 3. Safety Management and Administrative Controls Software. Software that performs a hazard
25 control function in support of nuclear facility or radiological safety management programs or
26 technical safety requirements or other software that performs a control function necessary to
27 provide adequate protection from nuclear facility or radiological hazards. This software
28 supports eliminating, limiting, or mitigating nuclear hazards to workers, the public, or the
29 environment.

30 **Sample:** A subset of a population (e.g., wastes, environmental media, materials, cores) whose
31 properties are used to gain information about the population.

32 **Scientific and Engineering Software:** Software that uses numerical methods to complete
33 scientific, engineering, and mathematical calculations.

34 **Scientific Investigation:** Any research, experiment, test, study, or activity that is performed for
35 the purpose of investigating a natural system or the man-made aspects of a geologic repository,
36 including the investigations that support design of the facilities and the waste package.

- 1 **Scientific Notebook:** A record of the methods and results of scientific investigations that is used
2 when the work involves a high degree of professional judgment or trial and error methods, or
3 both.
- 4 **Service:** The performance of work, such as design, construction, fabrication, inspection,
5 nondestructive examination, testing, environmental qualification, equipment qualification, repair,
6 installation, or similar activities.
- 7 **Significant Condition Adverse to Quality:** See *Condition Adverse to Quality*.
- 8 **Site Characterization:** The program of exploration and research both in the laboratory and the
9 field that is undertaken to establish the natural conditions and the ranges of parameters of a
10 particular site.
- 11 **Software:** Computer programs, procedures, rules, and associated documentation and data
12 pertaining to the operation of a computer system.
- 13 **Software Baseline:** An item or product that has been formally reviewed and agreed upon, that
14 serves as the basis for further development, and that can be changed only through formal change
15 control procedures.
- 16 **Software Quality Assurance Plan:** A plan for the development of software products necessary
17 to provide adequate confidence that the software conforms to established requirements.
- 18 **Software Routine:** A collection of computer macros or script files, a spreadsheet application, or
19 other stand-alone software application (either acquired or developed) that generally operates
20 within another program, such as a spreadsheet, and must be independently verified by visual
21 inspection and/or hand calculation.
- 22 **Software Validation:** The process of test and evaluation of the completed software to ensure
23 compliance with software requirements.
- 24 **Software Verification:** The process of determining whether or not the product of a given phase
25 of the software development cycle fulfills the requirements imposed by the previous phase.
- 26 **Software Verification and Validation:** The process of determining whether the requirements
27 for a system or component are complete and correct, the products of each development phase
28 fulfill the requirements or conditions imposed by the previous phase, and the final system or
29 component complies with specified requirements.
- 30 **Source Verification:** A purchaser method of accepting an item or related service from a
31 supplier by monitoring, auditing, surveillance, witnessing, or observing activities performed by
32 the supplier.
- 33 **Special Process:** A process, the results of which are highly dependent on the control of the
34 process or the skill of the operators, or both, and in which the specified quality cannot be readily
35 determined by inspection or test of the product.

1 **Supplier:** Any individual or organization who furnishes items or services in accordance with a
2 contract. An all-inclusive term used in place of any of the following: vendor, seller, source,
3 participant, contractor, or subcontractor.

4 **Surveillance:** The act of monitoring or observing to verify whether an item, activity, system, or
5 process conforms to specified requirements. Surveillance of a technical work activity is
6 normally done in real time (i.e., the surveillance is accomplished as the work is being
7 performed).

8 **Suspect/Counterfeit Items (S/CIs):** An item is suspect when inspection or testing indicates that
9 it may not conform to established Government or industry-accepted specifications or national
10 consensus standards or whose documentation, appearance, performance, material, or other
11 characteristics may have been misrepresented by the supplier or manufacturer. A counterfeit item
12 is one that has been copied or substituted without legal right or authority or whose material,
13 performance, or characteristics have been misrepresented by the supplier or manufacturer. Items
14 that do not conform to established requirements are not normally considered S/CIs if
15 nonconformity results from one or more of the following conditions (which must be controlled
16 by site procedures as nonconforming items):

- 17 1. defects resulting from inadequate design or production quality control;
- 18 2. damage during shipping, handling, or storage;
- 19 3. improper installation;
- 20 4. deterioration during service;
- 21 5. degradation during removal;
- 22 6. failure resulting from aging or misapplication; or
- 23 7. other controllable causes.

24 **System Software:** Software which is used exclusively in the preparation, installation, or
25 operation of executable software applications. Examples of such software include operating
26 systems, administrative and management systems, system utilities, compilers, assemblers,
27 translators, interpreters, automated protocols, utilities and tools, teleprocessing managers, and
28 query languages.

29 **Technical Review:** A documented critical review of work that has been performed within the
30 state of the art. The review is accomplished by one or more qualified reviewers who are
31 independent of the work but collectively have equivalent technical expertise to those who
32 performed the original work. The review is an in-depth analysis and evaluation of documents,
33 activities, material, data, or items that require technical verification or validation for
34 applicability, correctness, adequacy, completeness, and assurance that established requirements
35 are satisfied.

1 **Technical Specialist:** An individual assigned to an assessment team when the scope,
2 complexity, or special nature of the work to be examined warrants assessment of the technical
3 adequacy of the work or the effectiveness of the technical process.

4 **Testing:** An element of verification to determine the capability of an item to meet specified
5 requirements or processes that facilitate the collection of data in conducting scientific
6 investigations by subjecting the item or environment to a set of physical, chemical,
7 environmental, or operating conditions.

8 **Traceability:** The ability to trace the history, application, and location of an item, data, or
9 sample using recorded documentation. As related to metrology, traceability means the ability to
10 relate individual measurement results through an unbroken chain of calibrations to one or more
11 of the following:

- 12 • U.S. national standards maintained by National Institute of Standards and Technology or the
13 U.S. Naval Observatory
- 14 • Fundamental or natural physical constants with values assigned or accepted by the National
15 Institute of Standards and Technology
- 16 • National standards of other countries which are correlated with NIST

17 **Transuranic Waste:** Waste containing more than 100 nCi of alpha-emitting TRU isotopes per
18 gram of waste, with half-lives greater than 20 years, except for (1) high-level radioactive waste,
19 (2) waste that the Secretary has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator, does not
20 need the degree of isolation required by the disposal regulations, or (3) waste that the NRC has
21 approved for disposal on a case-by-case basis in accordance with 10 CFR § 61.

22 **TRU Mixed Waste:** TRU waste that is also a hazardous waste as defined by the Hazardous
23 Waste Act and 20 NMAC 4.1.200 (incorporating 40 CFR § 261.3).

24 **Use As Is:** A disposition permitted for a nonconforming item when it can be established that the
25 item is satisfactory for its intended use.

26 **Validation:** An activity that demonstrates or confirms that a process, item, data set, or service
27 satisfies the requirements defined by the user.

28 **Waiver:** Documented authorization to depart from specified requirements.

29 **WIPP:** The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, as authorized pursuant to Section 213 of the Department
30 of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of
31 1980 (Pub. L. 96-164; 93 Stat. 1259, 1265) to provide a research and development facility for
32 demonstrating the safe disposal of radioactive wastes produced by national defense activities.

33 **Work:** The process of performing a defined task or activity, for example, research and
34 development, operations, maintenance and repair, administration, software development and use,
35 inspection, safeguards and security, data collection, and analysis.

- 1 **Work Suspension:** A formal directive issued by management that work must be stopped until
- 2 the related significant condition adverse to quality or nonconformance has been resolved.

1 **QAPD-9.0 References**

- 2 10 CFR Part 71, Subpart H, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material, Quality
3 Assurance
- 4 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management
- 5 40 CFR Part 194, Criteria for the Certification and Re-Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot
6 Plant's Compliance with 40 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations
- 7 ASME NQA-1-1989, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities
- 8 ASME NQA-2a-1990 addenda, Part 2.7, Quality Assurance Requirements of Computer Software
9 for Nuclear Facility Applications
- 10 ASME NQA-3-1989, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for the Collection of Scientific
11 and Technical information for Site Characterization of High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories
- 12 DOE/WIPP- 02-3122, Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste
13 Isolation Pilot Plant
- 14 DOE, Division of Nuclear Safety, G-830.120, Implementation Guide for use with 10 CFR Part
15 830.120 Quality Assurance
- 16 DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance
- 17 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 232-1986, Standards for the Protection of
18 Records
- 19 NUREG-1297 (1988), Peer Review for High-Level Nuclear Waste Repositories
- 20 NUREG/BR-0167 (1993), Software Quality Assurance Program and Guidelines
- 21 SNT-TC-1A, Current Revision, The American Society of Nondestructive Testing (ASNT)
22 Recommended Practice
- 23 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Hazardous Waste Facility Final Permit, EPA No. NM4890139088
- 24 TRUPACT II Certificate of Compliance, Certificate Number 9218
- 25 HalfPACT Certificate of Compliance, Certificate Number 9279
- 26 RH 72-B Certificate of Compliance, Certificate Number 9212
- 27 10-160B Certificate of Compliance, Certificate Number 9204

1 **ATTACHMENT A: CBFO Organization, Responsibilities, and** 2 **Interfaces**

3 Effective implementation of the CBFO QA program is dependent on efforts at all CBFO levels.
4 The CBFO organization is structured such that those assigned responsibility for performing the
5 work are responsible for achieving and maintaining quality. Management is responsible for
6 defining quality, developing appropriate plans to attain quality, and providing support of the
7 workers in pursuit of quality. Persons or organizations not directly responsible for performing
8 the work verify quality achievement. Management empowers employees by delegating authority
9 and decision making to the lowest appropriate level in the organization.

10 The CBFO Manager is responsible for overall implementation of DOE programs, policies,
11 orders, and guidance pertaining to TRU waste disposal at WIPP. As such, the Manager provides
12 policy direction and oversight of activities that affect TRU waste characterization and grants
13 DOE waste certification authority to the TRU waste sites. This responsibility includes policy
14 direction and oversight for waste characterization, certification, packaging, and transportation
15 activities at participating sites. Overall responsibility for the development and implementation of
16 the CBFO QA program belongs to the CBFO Manager. Authority for execution of the QA
17 function, which ensures effective implementation, is delegated to the CBFO QA Manager in
18 accordance with the allowable delegations as defined by EM-1.

19 The Office Director of the National TRU Program (NTP) is responsible to ensure that program
20 requirements are met with regard to TRU waste testing, sampling, analysis, sample handling and
21 custody, associated data management, and waste transportation.

22 CBFO Deputy Manager, Assistant Manager for Operations, and Office Directors are responsible
23 for planning, organizing, directing, controlling, and evaluating those activities in their area of
24 responsibility that support the CBFO mission and implement the QAPD. Their responsibilities
25 include, but are not limited, to:

- 26 • Ensuring that adequate technical and QA training is provided for personnel performing
27 activities important to the satisfaction of CBFO organizational and quality objectives
- 28 • Ensuring compliance with all applicable regulations, DOE orders, applicable state, and local
29 laws, and other requirements applicable to CBFO programs
- 30 • Ensuring that personnel adhere to procedures for the generation, identification, control, and
31 protection of QA records
- 32 • Exercising the authority and responsibility to stop unsatisfactory work such that cost and
33 schedule do not override environmental, safety, health, or quality considerations
- 34 • Developing, implementing, and maintaining plans, policies, and procedures that implement
35 the QAPD
- 36 • Identifying, investigating, reporting, and correcting quality problems

1 Each CBFO employee, including contractor personnel working to CBFO procedures, is
2 responsible for the quality of his or her work and for promptly reporting all existing, developing,
3 or potential conditions adverse to quality to the responsible management for evaluation and
4 action.

5 Organizations at all management levels shall establish communication channels that provide
6 timely, routine, and wide dissemination of information pertinent to quality performance.

7 Where more than one CBFO organization is involved in the execution of activities covered by
8 the QAPD, the responsibility and authority of each organization shall be clearly established and
9 documented. The internal interfaces between organizational units are depicted in CBFO
10 organizational charts. CBFO external interfaces include other DOE elements, CBFO program
11 participants, suppliers, the Environmental Protection Agency, the independent oversight
12 contractor, and the New Mexico Environment Department.

1 **ATTACHMENT B: CBFO Quality Assurance Manager**
2 **Responsibilities**

3 The CBFO Manager has overall responsibility for the CBFO QA program. Authority for
4 execution of the CBFO QA function, including the independent verification of effective
5 implementation, is delegated to the CBFO QA Manager in accordance with the allowable
6 delegations as defined by EM-1. It is the policy of CBFO to grant the CBFO QA organization
7 sufficient authority, freedom, and access to all work areas to:

- 8 • Identify quality problems
- 9 • Recommend solutions
- 10 • Verify implementation of solutions
- 11 • Ensure that unsatisfactory conditions are controlled until proper disposition has occurred

12 The CBFO QA Manager shall:

- 13 • Have direct access to responsible management at a level where appropriate action can be
14 effected
- 15 • Be sufficiently independent from cost and schedule considerations
- 16 • Have the organizational freedom to communicate with management
- 17 • Have the authority and responsibility to stop unsatisfactory work such that cost and schedule
18 do not override environmental, safety, or health considerations
- 19 • Have no other assigned responsibilities related to the quality assurance program that would
20 prevent adequate attention to quality assurance matters

21 The CBFO QA Manager has the authority and overall responsibility to independently assess the
22 effective implementation of the CBFO QAPD, both within the CBFO organization and in those
23 participant organizations supporting CBFO.

24 The CBFO QA Manager has the following additional authorities and responsibilities:

- 25 • The organizational freedom to communicate with management
- 26 • Scheduling and conducting independent QA assessments, including WIPP core participant
27 organizations
- 28 • Scheduling and conducting audits of activities related to waste generating site certification
29 when notified by the Office Director of the Office of the National TRU Program, that the
30 waste generating site is ready

- 1 • Scheduling and conducting recertification audits and surveillances of waste generating sites
- 2 • Preparing, as appropriate, and reviewing internal procedures that implement the provision of
3 the QAPD
- 4 • Tracking, performing trend analysis, and reporting quality problem areas
- 5 • Developing, establishing, and interpreting CBFO QA policy and ensuring effective
6 implementation
- 7 • Preparing, issuing, and maintaining the CBFO QAPD
- 8 • Interfacing with the CBFO staff, participants, and other stakeholders on quality assurance
9 matters
- 10 • Reviewing and approving subordinate QA plans, including participant Quality Assurance
11 Project Plans
- 12 • Performing adequacy reviews of QA program documents
- 13 • Certifying all CBFO lead auditors and qualifying auditors and technical specialists
- 14 • Assuring the independence of lead auditors, auditors, and technical specialists

1 **ATTACHMENT C: TRU Waste Characterization and Certification**
2 **Organizational and Individual Responsibilities**

3 1. CBFO Office Director, Office of the National TRU Program

4 The Office Director (OD), Office of the National TRU Program (NTP) executes program
5 functions related to characterization of waste for disposal at the WIPP. The OD of the
6 NTP also manages activities that prepare waste sites for certification and notifies the
7 CBFO QA Manager when new sites are ready for independent audit.

8 2. CBFO Assistant Manager for Operations

9 The Assistant Manager for Operations is responsible for regulatory compliance of the
10 WIPP. The Assistant Manager for Operations manages the Compliance team, which is
11 responsible for environmental activities at the WIPP. The Assistant Manager for
12 Operations is responsible for the preparation of compliance documentation and the
13 implementation of programs to meet the requirements specified in final operating permits
14 for the WIPP facility.

15 3. CBFO Office Director, Office of Site Operations

16 The Office Director, Office of Disposal, is responsible for operations, safety and health
17 oversight at the WIPP.

18 4. DOE Site Offices

19 The DOE site offices are responsible for ensuring that the requirements of the QAPjPs
20 are in compliance with all DOE orders and that the resources and funding are available to
21 accomplish Program activities. The DOE site offices are responsible for providing a
22 liaison between the site contractors and the CBFO.

23 5. TRU Waste Sites

24 Each participating site shall develop and implement a QAPjP that demonstrates
25 compliance with and implementation of WIPP TRU waste characterization requirements
26 and the applicable requirements of the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit and its
27 associated Waste Analysis Plan. These QAPjPs shall include or reference the appropriate
28 management and technical criteria of the Program, as well as qualitative or quantitative
29 criteria for determining that Program activities are being satisfactorily performed.
30 QAPjPs shall identify the organizations and positions responsible for their
31 implementation. The QAPjPs shall also reference site-specific documentation that details
32 how each of the required elements of the Program will be performed. QAPjPs and
33 subsequent revisions must be reviewed for concurrence by the site project manager, site
34 project QA manager, the cognizant DOE site office, the CBFO OD NTP and the CBFO
35 QA Manager.

1 Prior to the implementation of Program activities at participating sites, standard operating
2 procedures (SOPs) will be developed for all activities affecting Program quality that
3 require written instructions or procedures. For the purposes of the Program, the term
4 SOP refers to any site-specific implementing document. Compliance with SOPs will
5 ensure that tasks are performed in a consistent manner that results in achieving the quality
6 required for the Program. The organization, format, content, and designation of SOPs
7 must be described in the QAPjPs.

8 6. Site Project Manager

9 Each participating site's contractor designates a site project manager to oversee
10 characterization program activities at the site. A description of the site project manager's
11 role in relation to the other organizational functions at the site must be included in the
12 site's QAPjP. The site project manager (or designee) reviews and recommends approval
13 of the site QAPjP and subsequent revisions before it is submitted to CBFO for review.
14 Specific Program responsibilities assigned to the site project manager include the
15 following:

- 16 • Waste selection and tracking
- 17 • Data validation/verification
- 18 • Data reconciliation with DQOs
- 19 • Assignment of EPA Hazardous Waste Numbers
- 20 • QA/QC reports to DOE site office
- 21 • Data transmission to CBFO

22 7. Site Project Quality Assurance Management.

23 Each participating site's contractor designates a site project QA manager. The site
24 project QA manager shall have the responsibilities and authorities described in section
25 QAPD-2.1.1.3 of this QAPD. This individual will have the authority to stop Program
26 activities at a participating site if quality is not assured or controlled.

27 The site project QA manager shall summarize all relevant information on the QA/QC
28 activities during the period in a semiannual report. This semiannual report shall be
29 distributed to the DOE site office and the site project manager at the same time. The site
30 project manager shall review the report, comment if appropriate, and then forward a copy
31 of the report with comments to the DOE site office.

- 32 8. Site Waste Certification Official. Each participating site's contractor designates a waste
33 certification official who must document and certify that all TRU waste payload
34 containers prepared for shipment to WIPP meet all the requirements specified in the
35 *Contact Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot*

1 *Plant* (CH-WAC; DOE 2002) and transmit the waste certification data to the WIPP M&O
2 contractor.

3 9. Site Transportation Certification Official. Each participating site's contractor designates
4 a transportation certification official who documents and certifies that payload assemblies
5 for shipment to WIPP meet all the requirements of the *TRUPACT-II Authorized Methods*
6 *for Payload Control* (TRAMPAC; NRC 1997).

7

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix SCR-2009
Feature, Event, and Process Screening for PA**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix SCR-2009
Feature, Event, and Process Screening for PA

Table of Contents

SCR-1.0 Introduction..... SCR-1

SCR-2.0 Basis for FEPs Screening Process..... SCR-4

 SCR-2.1 Requirement for FEPs..... SCR-4

 SCR-2.2 FEPs List Development for the CCA..... SCR-4

 SCR-2.3 Criteria for Screening of FEPs and Categorization of Retained FEPs..... SCR-6

 SCR-2.3.1 Regulation (SO-R)..... SCR-6

 SCR-2.3.2 Probability of Occurrence of a FEP Leading to Significant
 Release of Radionuclides (SO-P) SCR-6

 SCR-2.3.3 Potential Consequences Associated with the Occurrence of the
 FEPs (SO-C) SCR-6

 SCR-2.3.4 UP FEPs SCR-7

 SCR-2.3.5 DP FEPs SCR-7

 SCR-2.4 FEPs Categories and Timeframes SCR-7

 SCR-2.4.1 Description of Natural FEPs SCR-8

 SCR-2.4.2 Description of Human-Induced EPs..... SCR-8

 SCR-2.4.3 Description of Waste- and Repository-Induced FEPs..... SCR-11

SCR-3.0 FEPs SCR-12

SCR-4.0 Screening of Natural FEPs SCR-26

 SCR-4.1 Geological FEPs..... SCR-26

 SCR-4.1.1 Stratigraphy SCR-26

 SCR-4.1.2 Tectonics SCR-27

 SCR-4.1.3 Structural FEPs..... SCR-30

 SCR-4.1.4 Crustal Process SCR-37

 SCR-4.1.5 Geochemical Processes SCR-39

 SCR-4.2 Subsurface Hydrological FEPs SCR-44

 SCR-4.2.1 Groundwater Characteristics SCR-44

 SCR-4.2.2 Changes in Groundwater Flow..... SCR-46

 SCR-4.3 Subsurface Geochemical FEPs SCR-49

 SCR-4.3.1 Groundwater Geochemistry SCR-49

 SCR-4.4 Geomorphological FEPs SCR-53

 SCR-4.4.1 Physiography SCR-53

 SCR-4.5 Surface Hydrological FEPs..... SCR-59

 SCR-4.5.1 Depositional Processes..... SCR-59

 SCR-4.5.2 Streams and Lakes..... SCR-60

 SCR-4.5.3 Groundwater Recharge and Discharge..... SCR-61

 SCR-4.6 Climate EPs..... SCR-63

 SCR-4.6.1 Climate and Climate Changes SCR-63

 SCR-4.7 Marine FEPs..... SCR-65

 SCR-4.7.1 Seas, Sedimentation, and Level Changes..... SCR-65

 SCR-4.8 Ecological FEPs SCR-66

 SCR-4.8.1 Flora and Fauna SCR-66

SCR-5.0 Screening of Human-Induced EPs	SCR-69
SCR-5.1 Human-Induced Geological EPs	SCR-69
SCR-5.1.1 Drilling	SCR-69
SCR-5.1.2 Excavation Activities	SCR-74
SCR-5.1.3 Subsurface Explosions	SCR-77
SCR-5.2 Subsurface Hydrological and Geochemical EPs	SCR-79
SCR-5.2.1 Borehole Fluid Flow	SCR-79
SCR-5.2.2 Excavation-Induced Flow	SCR-113
SCR-5.2.3 Explosion-Induced Flow	SCR-123
SCR-5.3 Geomorphological EPS	SCR-124
SCR-5.3.1 Land Use Changes	SCR-124
SCR-5.4 Surface Hydrological EPs	SCR-127
SCR-5.4.1 Water Control and Use	SCR-127
SCR-5.5 Climatic EPs	SCR-130
SCR-5.5.1 Anthropogenic Climate Change	SCR-130
SCR-5.6 Marine EPs	SCR-131
SCR-5.6.1 Marine Activities	SCR-131
SCR-5.7 Ecological EPs	SCR-132
SCR-5.7.1 Agricultural Activities	SCR-132
SCR-5.7.2 Social and Technological Development	SCR-133
SCR-6.0 Waste and Repository-Induced FEPs	SCR-135
SCR-6.1 Waste and Repository Characteristics	SCR-135
SCR-6.1.1 Repository Characteristics	SCR-135
SCR-6.1.2 Waste Characteristics	SCR-135
SCR-6.1.3 Container Characteristics	SCR-136
SCR-6.1.4 Seal Characteristics	SCR-137
SCR-6.1.5 Backfill Characteristics	SCR-139
SCR-6.1.6 Post-Closure Monitoring Characteristics	SCR-140
SCR-6.2 Radiological FEPs	SCR-140
SCR-6.2.1 Radioactive Decay and Heat	SCR-140
SCR-6.2.2 Radiological Effects on Material Properties	SCR-146
SCR-6.3 Geological and Mechanical FEPs	SCR-146
SCR-6.3.1 Excavation-Induced Changes	SCR-146
SCR-6.3.2 Effects of Fluid Pressure Changes	SCR-151
SCR-6.3.3 Effects of Explosions	SCR-152
SCR-6.3.4 Thermal Effects	SCR-153
SCR-6.3.5 Mechanical Effects on Material Properties	SCR-156
SCR-6.4 Subsurface Hydrological and Fluid Dynamic FEPs	SCR-160
SCR-6.4.1 Repository-Induced Flow	SCR-160
SCR-6.4.2 Effects of Gas Generation	SCR-160
SCR-6.4.3 Thermal Effects	SCR-161
SCR-6.5 Geochemical and Chemical FEPs	SCR-163
SCR-6.5.1 Gas Generation	SCR-163
SCR-6.5.2 Speciation	SCR-174
SCR-6.5.3 Precipitation and Dissolution	SCR-176
SCR-6.5.4 Sorption	SCR-178

SCR-6.5.5 Reduction-Oxidation Chemistry	SCR-180
SCR-6.5.6 Organic Complexation	SCR-184
SCR-6.5.7 Chemical Effects on Material Properties	SCR-186
SCR-6.6 Contaminant Transport Mode FEPs.....	SCR-187
SCR-6.6.1 Solute and Colloid Transport	SCR-187
SCR-6.6.2 Particle Transport	SCR-189
SCR-6.6.3 Microbial Transport.....	SCR-190
SCR-6.6.4 Gas Transport	SCR-191
SCR-6.7 Contaminant Transport Processes	SCR-191
SCR-6.7.1 Advection	SCR-191
SCR-6.7.2 Diffusion.....	SCR-192
SCR-6.7.3 Thermochemical Transport Phenomena.....	SCR-192
SCR-6.7.4 Electrochemical Transport Phenomena.....	SCR-194
SCR-6.7.5 Physiochemical Transport Phenomena	SCR-196
SCR-6.8 Ecological FEPs	SCR-200
SCR-6.8.1 Plant, Animal, and Soil Uptake.....	SCR-200
SCR-6.8.2 Human Uptake.....	SCR-201
SCR-7.0 References.....	SCR-202

List of Figures

Figure SCR-1. Diffusion Penetration Distance in the WIPP as a Function of Diffusion Time	SCR-183
--	---------

List of Tables

Table SCR-1. FEPs Change Summary Since CRA-2004.....	SCR-2
Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results	SCR-12
Table SCR-3. Delaware Basin Brine Well Status.....	SCR-120
Table SCR-4. Changes in Inventory Quantities from the CCA to the CRA-2009	SCR-154
Table SCR-5. CCA and CRA Exothermic Temperature Rises.....	SCR-155

This page intentionally left blank.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

µm	micrometer
AIC	active institutional controls
BNL	Brookhaven National Laboratory
Bq	becquerels
CAG	Compliance Application Guidance
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CCDF	complementary cumulative distribution function
CDF	cumulative distribution function
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CH-TRU	contact-handled transuranic
Ci	curie
cm	centimeter
CPD	Carlsbad Potash District
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBDSP	Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program
DFR	driving force ratio
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DP	disturbed performance
DRZ	disturbed rock zone
EP	event and process
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERMS	Electronic Record Management System
FEP	feature, event, and process
FLAC	Fast Lagrangian Analysis Continua
FMT	Fracture-Matrix Transport
FSU	Florida State University
ft	foot
ft ²	square foot
ft ³	cubic foot
g	gram
gal	gallon

gpm	gallons per minute
H	human-initiated
HCN	historic, current, and near-future
hr	hour
IB	inside boundary
in	inch
K _d	retardation distribution coefficient
kg	kilogram
kg/m ³	kilograms per cubic meter
km	kilometer
km ²	square kilometer
kW	kilowatt
L	liter
lb/gal	pounds per gallon
LWA	Land Withdrawal Act
m	meter
m ²	square meter
m ³	cubic meter
Ma BP	million years before present
MB	marker bed
MeV	megaelectron volt
mi	mile
mL	milliliter
MPa	megapascal
MPI	Mississippi Potash Inc.
mV	millivolt
N	natural
NMBMMR	New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources
OB	outside boundary
oz	ounce
PA	performance assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test

PIC	passive institutional control
ppm	parts per million
psi	pounds per square inch
psia	pounds per square inch absolute
RH-TRU	remote-handled transuranic
s	second
SKI	Statens Kärnkraftinspektion
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SO-C	screened-out consequence
SO-P	screened-out probability
SO-R	screened-out regulatory
T field	transmissivity field
TRU	transuranic
TSD	Technical Support Document
TWBIR	Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report
UP	undisturbed performance
V	volt
W	waste and repository-induced
W	watt
W/Ci	watts per curie
W/g	watts per gram
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WPO	WIPP Project Office
yd ³	cubic yard
yr	year

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Al	aluminum
Am	americium
An	actinide
C	carbon
CH ₄	methane
CO ₂	carbon dioxide

Cs	cesium
EDTA	ethylenediaminetetraacetate
Fe	iron
MgO	magnesium oxide
Np	neptunium
Pm	promethium
Pu	plutonium
Rn	radon
Sr	strontium
Th	thorium
U	uranium

1 **SCR-1.0 Introduction**

2 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has developed the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in
3 southeastern New Mexico for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes generated by defense
4 programs. In May of 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certified that the
5 WIPP would meet the disposal standards (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a, p.
6 27405) established in 40 CFR Part 191 Subparts B and C (U.S. Environmental Protection
7 Agency 1993), thereby allowing the WIPP to begin waste disposal operations. This certification
8 was based, in part, on performance assessment (PA) calculations that were included in the
9 DOE's Compliance Certification Application (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996). These
10 calculations demonstrate that the cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible
11 environment will not exceed those allowed by the EPA standard.

12 The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) (U.S. Congress 1992) requires the WIPP to be
13 recertified (demonstrating continued compliance with the disposal standards) every five years.
14 As such, the DOE prepared the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S.
15 Department of Energy 2004), which demonstrated that the WIPP complied with the EPA's
16 requirements for radioactive waste disposal. The CRA-2004 included changes to the WIPP long-
17 term compliance baseline since the CCA. Similarly, and in compliance with the recertification
18 rules, the DOE has prepared the 2009 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2009) that
19 documents changes since the CRA-2004, and demonstrates compliance with the long-term
20 disposal requirements of 40 CFR Part 191 and the compliance criteria of 40 CFR Part 194.

21 To assure that PA calculations account for important aspects of the disposal system, features,
22 events, and processes (FEPs) considered to be potentially important to the disposal system are
23 identified. These FEPs are used as a tool for determining what phenomena and components of
24 the disposal system can and should be dealt with in PA calculations. For the WIPP CCA, a
25 systematic process was used to compile, analyze, screen, and document FEPs for use in PA. The
26 FEP screening process used in the CCA, the CRA-2004, and the CRA-2009 is described in detail
27 in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2. For recertification applications, this process evaluates any
28 new information that may have impacts on or present inconsistencies to those screening
29 arguments and decisions presented since the last certification or recertification. The FEPs
30 baseline is managed according to Sandia Activity/Project Specific Procedure 9-4, *Performing*
31 *FEPs Baseline Impact Assessment for Planned or Unplanned Changes* (Revision 1) (Kirkes
32 2006). For the CRA-2009, a reassessment of FEPs concluded that of the 235 FEPs considered
33 for the CRA-2004, 188 have not been changed, 35 have been updated with new information, 10
34 have been split into 20 similar, but more descriptive FEPs, 1 screening argument has been
35 changed to correct errors discovered during review, and 1 has had its screening decision
36 changed. Therefore, there are 245 WIPP FEPs for the CRA-2009. Note that none of these new
37 or updated FEPs require changes to PA models or codes; existing models represent these FEPs in
38 their current configurations.

39 Table SCR-1 lists the FEPs that have been added, separated, or had screening decision changes
40 since the CRA-2004.

Table SCR-1. FEPs Change Summary Since CRA-2004

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b}	FEP Name	Summary of Change
FEPs Combined or Separated		
H27	Liquid Waste Disposal – Outside Boundary (OB)	Name changed to “Liquid Waste Disposal Boundary – OB” to specify that this FEP pertains to those activities outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H28	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – OB	Name changed to “Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – OB” to specify that this FEP pertains to those activities outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H29	Hydrocarbon Storage – OB	Name changed to “Hydrocarbon Storage – OB” to specify that this FEP pertains to those activities outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
W6	Shaft Seal Geometry	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W7	Shaft Seal Physical Properties	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W8	Shaft Seal Chemical Composition	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W17	Radiological Effects on Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W36	Consolidation of Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W37	Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
W74	Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals	Name changed to be specific to shaft seals, rather than generic “seals,” which also included panel closures (seals).
FEPs With Changed Screening Decisions		
H41	Surface Disruptions	Screening changed from screened-out regulatory (SO-R) to screened-out consequence (SO-C) because of inconsistency with screening rationale.
New FEPs for CRA-2009		
H60	Liquid Waste Disposal – Inside Boundary (IB)	New FEP; separated from H27. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on regulatory provisions pertaining to activities within the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H61	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – IB	New FEP; separated from H28. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on regulatory provisions that pertain to activities within the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.
H62	Hydrocarbon Storage – IB	New FEP; separated from H29. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on regulatory provisions that pertain to activities within the WIPP land withdrawal boundary.

^a H = Human-induced FEP.^b W = Waste and Repository-Induced FEP.

Table SCR-1. FEPs Change Summary Since CRA-2004 (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b}	FEP Name	Summary of Change
W109	Panel Closure Geometry	New FEP; separated from W6. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W110	Panel Closure Physical Properties	New FEP; separated from W7. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W111	Panel Closure Chemical Composition	New FEP; separated from W8. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W112	Radiological Effects on Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W17. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W113	Consolidation of Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W36. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W114	Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W37. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.
W115	Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures	New FEP; separated from W74. The creation of this new FEP allows for more appropriate screening based on potential differences in design and composition of shaft seals versus panel closures.

^a H = Human-induced FEP.^b W = Waste and Repository-Induced FEP.

1 **SCR-2.0 Basis for FEPs Screening Process**

2 **SCR-2.1 Requirement for FEPs**

3 The origin of FEPs is related to the EPA's radioactive waste disposal standard's requirement to
4 use PA methodology. The DOE was required to demonstrate that the WIPP complied with the
5 containment requirements of 40 CFR § 191.13 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993).
6 These requirements state that the DOE must use PA to demonstrate that the probabilities of
7 cumulative radionuclide releases from the disposal system during the 10,000 years following
8 closure will fall below specified limits. The PA analyses supporting this determination must be
9 quantitative and must consider uncertainties caused by all significant processes and events that
10 may affect the disposal system, including inadvertent human intrusion into the repository during
11 the future. The scope of PA is further defined by the EPA at 40 CFR § 194.32 (U.S.
12 Environmental Protection Agency 1996a), which states,

13 Any compliance application(s) shall include information which:

- 14 (1) Identifies all potential processes, events or sequences and combinations of
15 processes and events that may occur during the regulatory time frame and may
16 affect the disposal system;
- 17 (2) Identifies the processes, events or sequences and combinations of processes and
18 events included in performance assessments; and
- 19 (3) Documents why any processes, events or sequences and combinations of
20 processes and events identified pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section were
21 not included in performance assessment results provided in any compliance
22 application.

23 Therefore, the PA methodology includes a process that compiles a comprehensive list of the
24 FEPs that are potentially relevant to disposal system performance. Those FEPs shown by
25 screening analysis to have the potential to affect performance are represented in scenarios and
26 quantitative calculations using a system of linked computer models to describe the interaction of
27 the repository with the natural system, both with and without human intrusion. For the CCA, the
28 DOE first compiled a comprehensive list of FEPs, which was then subjected to a screening
29 process that eventually lead to the set of FEPs used in PA to demonstrate the WIPP's compliance
30 with the long-term disposal standards.

31 **SCR-2.2 FEPs List Development for the CCA**

32 As a starting point, the DOE assembled a list of potentially relevant FEPs from the compilation
33 developed by Stenhouse, Chapman, and Sumerling (1993) for the Swedish Nuclear Power
34 Inspectorate (Statens Kärnkraftinspektion, or SKI). The SKI list was based on a series of FEP
35 lists developed for other disposal programs and is considered the best-documented and most
36 comprehensive starting point for the WIPP. For the SKI study, an initial raw FEP list was
37 compiled based on nine different FEP identification studies.

38 The compilers of the SKI list eliminated a number of FEPs as irrelevant to the particular disposal
39 concept under consideration in Sweden. These FEPs were reinstated for the WIPP effort, and

1 several FEPs on the SKI list were subdivided to facilitate screening for the WIPP. Finally, to
2 ensure comprehensiveness, other FEPs specific to the WIPP were added based on review of key
3 project documents and broad examination of the preliminary WIPP list by both project
4 participants and stakeholders. The initial unedited list is contained in the CCA, Appendix SCR,
5 Attachment 1. The initial unedited FEP list was restructured and revised to derive the
6 comprehensive WIPP FEP list used in the CCA. The number of FEPs was reduced to 237 in the
7 CCA to eliminate the ambiguities presented in a generic list. Restructuring the list did not
8 remove any substantive issues from the discussion. As discussed in more detail in the CCA,
9 Appendix SCR, Attachment 1, the following steps were used to reduce the initial unedited list to
10 the appropriate WIPP FEP list used in the CCA.

- 11 • References to subsystems were eliminated because the SKI subsystem classification was
12 not appropriate for the WIPP disposal concept. For example, in contrast to the Swedish
13 disposal concept, canister integrity does not have a role in post-operational performance
14 of the WIPP, and the terms near-field, far-field, and biosphere are not unequivocally
15 defined for the WIPP site.
- 16 • Duplicate FEPs were eliminated. Duplicate FEPs arose in the SKI list because individual
17 FEPs could act in different subsystems. FEPs had a single entry in the CCA list whether
18 they were applicable to several parts of the disposal system or to a single part only (for
19 example, the FEP Gas Effects). Disruption appears in the seals, backfill, waste, canister,
20 and near-field subsystems in the initial FEP list. These FEPs are represented by a single
21 FEP, Disruption Due to Gas Effects.
- 22 • FEPs that are not relevant to the WIPP design or inventory were eliminated. Examples
23 include FEPs related to high-level waste, copper canisters, and bentonite backfill.
- 24 • FEPs relating to engineering design changes were eliminated because they were not
25 relevant to a compliance application based on the DOE's design for the WIPP.
- 26 • FEPs relating to constructional, operational, and decommissioning errors were
27 eliminated. The DOE has administrative and quality control procedures to ensure that the
28 facility will be constructed, operated, and decommissioned properly.
- 29 • Detailed FEPs relating to processes in the surface environment were aggregated into a
30 small number of generalized FEPs. For example, the SKI list includes the biosphere
31 FEPs Inhalation of Salt Particles, Smoking, Showers and Humidifiers, Inhalation and
32 Biotic Material, Household Dust and Fumes, Deposition (Wet and Dry), Inhalation and
33 Soils and Sediments, Inhalation and Gases and Vapors (Indoor and Outdoor), and
34 Suspension in Air, which are represented by the FEP Inhalation.
- 35 • FEPs relating to the containment of hazardous metals, volatile organic compounds, and
36 other chemicals that are not regulated by Part 191 were not included.
- 37 • A few FEPs have been renamed to be consistent with terms used to describe specific
38 WIPP processes (for example, Wicking, Brine Inflow).

1 These steps resulted in a list of WIPP-relevant FEPs retained for further consideration in the first
2 certification PA. These FEPs were screened to determine which would be included in the PA
3 models and scenarios for the CCA PA.

4 **SCR-2.3 Criteria for Screening of FEPs and Categorization of Retained FEPs**

5 The purpose of FEP screening is to identify those FEPs that should be accounted for in PA
6 calculations, and those FEPs that need not be considered further. The DOE's process of
7 removing FEPs from consideration in PA calculations involved the structured application of
8 explicit screening criteria. The criteria used to screen out FEPs are explicit regulatory exclusion
9 (SO-R), probability (SO-P), or consequence (SO-C). All three criteria are derived from
10 regulatory requirements. FEPs not screened out as SO-R, SO-P, or SO-C were retained for
11 inclusion in PA calculations and are classified as either undisturbed performance (UP) or
12 disturbed performance (DP) FEPs.

13 **SCR-2.3.1 Regulation (SO-R)**

14 Specific FEP screening criteria are stated in Part 191 and Part 194. Such screening criteria
15 relating to the applicability of particular FEPs represent screening decisions made by the EPA.
16 That is, in the process of developing and demonstrating the feasibility of the Part 191 standard
17 and the Part 194 criteria, the EPA considered and made conclusions on the relevance,
18 consequence, and probability of particular FEPs occurring. In so doing, it allowed some FEPs to
19 be eliminated from consideration.

20 **SCR-2.3.2 Probability of Occurrence of a FEP Leading to Significant 21 Release of Radionuclides (SO-P)**

22 Low-probability events can be excluded on the basis of the criterion provided in 40 CFR
23 § 194.32(d), which states, "performance assessments need not consider processes and events that
24 have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years." In practice, for most FEPs
25 screened out on the basis of low probability of occurrence, it has not been possible to estimate a
26 meaningful quantitative probability. In the absence of quantitative probability estimates, a
27 qualitative argument was used.

28 **SCR-2.3.3 Potential Consequences Associated with the Occurrence of the 29 FEPs (SO-C)**

30 The DOE recognizes two uses for this criterion:

- 31 1. FEPs can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of insignificant consequence.
32 Consequence can refer to effects on the repository or site or to radiological consequence. In
33 particular, 40 CFR § 194.34(a) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a) states, "The
34 results of performance assessments shall be assembled into 'complementary, cumulative
35 distribution functions' (CCDFs) that represent the probability of exceeding various levels of
36 cumulative release caused by all significant processes and events." The DOE has omitted
37 events and processes (EPs) from PA calculations where there is a reasonable expectation that

1 the remaining probability distribution of cumulative releases would not be significantly
2 changed by such omissions.

3 2. FEPs that are potentially beneficial to subsystem performance may be eliminated from PA
4 calculations if necessary to simplify the analysis. This argument may be used when there is
5 uncertainty as to exactly how the FEP should be incorporated into assessment calculations or
6 when incorporation would incur unreasonable difficulties.

7 In some cases, the effects of the particular event or process occurring, although not necessarily
8 insignificant, can be shown to lie within the range of uncertainty of another FEP already
9 accounted for in the PA calculations. In such cases, the event or process may be included in PA
10 calculations implicitly, within the range of uncertainty associated with the included FEP.

11 Although some FEPs could be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of more than one
12 criterion, the most practical screening criterion was used for classification. In particular, a
13 regulatory screening classification was used in preference to a probability or consequence
14 screening classification. FEPs that have not been screened out based on any of the three criteria
15 were included in the PA.

16 **SCR-2.3.4 UP FEPs**

17 FEPs classified as UP are accounted for in calculations of UP of the disposal system. UP is
18 defined in 40 CFR § 191.12 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) as “the predicted
19 behavior of a disposal system, including consideration of the uncertainties in predicted behavior,
20 if the disposal system is not disrupted by human intrusion or the occurrence of unlikely natural
21 events.” The UP FEPs are accounted for in the PA calculations to evaluate compliance with the
22 containment requirements in section 191.13. Undisturbed PA calculations are also used to
23 demonstrate compliance with the individual and groundwater protection requirements of 40 CFR
24 § 191.15 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1993) and Part 191 Subpart C, respectively.

25 **SCR-2.3.5 DP FEPs**

26 The FEPs classified as DP are accounted for only in assessment calculations for DP. The DP
27 FEPs that remain following the screening process relate to the potential disruptive effects of
28 future drilling and mining events in the controlled area. Consideration of both DP and UP FEPs
29 is required to evaluate compliance with section 191.13.

30 **SCR-2.4 FEPs Categories and Timeframes**

31 In the following sections, FEPs are discussed under the categories Natural FEPs, Human-Induced
32 EPs, and Waste- and Repository-Induced FEPs. (IDs of Natural FEPs begin with “N,” and IDs
33 of Waste- and Repository-Induced FEPs begin with “W.”) The FEPs are also considered within
34 time frames during which they may occur. Because of the regulatory requirements concerning
35 human activities, two time periods were used when evaluating human-induced EPs. These time
36 frames were defined as Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human Activities (HCN) and Future
37 Human Activities (Future). These time frames are also discussed in the following section.

1 **SCR-2.4.1 Description of Natural FEPs**

2 Natural FEPs are those that relate to hydrologic, geologic, and climate conditions that have the
3 potential to affect long-term performance of the WIPP disposal system over the regulatory time
4 frame. These FEPs do not include the impacts of other human-related activities such as the
5 effect of boreholes on FEPs related to natural changes in groundwater chemistry. Only natural
6 FEPs are included in the screening process.

7 Consistent with section 194.32(d), the DOE has screened out several natural FEPs from PA
8 calculations on the basis of a low probability of occurrence at or near the WIPP site. In
9 particular, natural events for which there is no evidence indicating that they have occurred within
10 the Delaware Basin have been screened on this basis. For FEPs analysis, the probabilities of
11 occurrence of these events are assumed to be zero. Quantitative, nonzero probabilities for such
12 events, based on numbers of occurrences, cannot be ascribed without considering regions much
13 larger than the Delaware Basin, thus neglecting established geological understanding of the FEPs
14 that occur within particular geographical provinces.

15 In considering the overall geological setting of the Delaware Basin, the DOE has eliminated
16 many FEPs from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence. FEPs that have had little
17 effect on the characteristics of the region in the past are expected to be of low consequence for
18 the regulatory time period.

19 **SCR-2.4.2 Description of Human-Induced EPs**

20 Human-induced EPs (Human EPs) are those associated with human activities in the past, present,
21 and future. The EPA provided guidance in their regulations concerning which human activities
22 are to be considered, their severity, and the manner in which to include them in the future
23 predictions.

24 The scope of PAs is clarified with respect to human-induced EPs in section 194.32. At 40 CFR
25 § 194.32(a), the EPA states,

26 Performance assessments shall consider natural processes and events, mining, deep drilling, and
27 shallow drilling that may affect the disposal system during the regulatory time frame.

28 Thus PAs must include consideration of human-induced EPs relating to mining and drilling
29 activities that might take place during the regulatory time frame. In particular, PAs must
30 consider the potential effects of such activities that might take place within the controlled area at
31 a time when institutional controls cannot be assumed to completely eliminate the possibility of
32 human intrusion.

33 Further criteria concerning the scope of PAs are provided at 40 CFR § 194.32(c):

34 Performance assessments shall include an analysis of the effects on the disposal system of any
35 activities that occur in the vicinity of the disposal system prior to disposal and are expected to
36 occur in the vicinity of the disposal system soon after disposal. Such activities shall include, but
37 shall not be limited to, existing boreholes and the development of any existing leases that can be
38 reasonably expected to be developed in the near future, including boreholes and leases that may be
39 used for fluid injection activities.

1 In order to implement the criteria in section 194.32 relating to the scope of PAs, the DOE has
 2 divided human activities into three categories: (1) human activities currently taking place and
 3 those that took place prior to the time of the compliance application, (2) human activities that
 4 might be initiated in the near future after submission of the compliance application, and (3)
 5 human activities that might be initiated after repository closure. The first two categories of EPs,
 6 corresponding to the HCN time frame, are considered under UP, and EPs in the third category,
 7 which belong to the Future time frame, may lead to DP conditions. A description of these three
 8 categories follows.

- 9 1. Historical and current human activities include resource-extraction activities that have
 10 historically taken place and are currently taking place outside the controlled area. These
 11 activities are of potential significance insofar as they could affect the geological,
 12 hydrological, or geochemical characteristics of the disposal system or groundwater flow
 13 pathways outside the disposal system. Current human activities taking place within the
 14 controlled area are essentially those associated with development of the WIPP repository.
 15 Historic human activities include existing boreholes.
- 16 2. Near-future human activities include resource-extraction activities that may be expected to
 17 occur outside the controlled area based on existing plans and leases. Thus the near future
 18 includes the expected lives of existing mines and oil and gas fields, and the expected lives of
 19 new mines and oil and gas fields that the DOE expects will be developed based on existing
 20 plans and leases. These activities are of potential significance insofar as they could affect the
 21 geological, hydrological, or geochemical characteristics of the disposal system or
 22 groundwater flow pathways outside the disposal system. The only human activities expected
 23 to occur within the controlled area in the near future are those associated with development
 24 of the WIPP repository. The DOE expects that any activity initiated in the near future, based
 25 on existing plans and leases, will be initiated prior to repository closure. Activities initiated
 26 prior to repository closure are assumed to continue until their completion.
- 27 3. Future human activities include activities that might be initiated within or outside the
 28 controlled area after repository closure. This includes drilling and mining for resources
 29 within the disposal system at a time when institutional controls cannot be assumed to
 30 completely eliminate the possibility of such activities. Future human activities could
 31 influence the transport of contaminants within and outside the disposal system by directly
 32 removing waste from the disposal system or altering the geological, hydrological, or
 33 geochemical characteristics of the disposal system.

34 **SCR-2.4.2.1 Scope of Future Human Activities in PA**

35 PAs must consider the effects of future human activities on the performance of the disposal
 36 system. The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a),
 37 which limits the scope of consideration of future human activities in PAs to mining and drilling.

38 **SCR-2.4.2.1.1 Criteria Concerning Future Mining**

39 The EPA provides the following additional criteria concerning the type of future mining that
 40 should be considered by the DOE in 40 CFR § 194.32(b):

1 Assessments of mining effects may be limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the
2 hydrogeologic units of the disposal system from excavation mining for natural resources. Mining
3 shall be assumed to occur with a one in 100 probability in each century of the regulatory time
4 frame. Performance assessments shall assume that mineral deposits of those resources, similar in
5 quality and type to those resources currently extracted from the Delaware Basin, will be
6 completely removed from the controlled area during the century in which such mining is randomly
7 calculated to occur. Complete removal of such mineral resources shall be assumed to occur only
8 once during the regulatory time frame.

9 Thus consideration of future mining may be limited to mining within the controlled area at the
10 locations of resources that are similar in quality and type to those currently extracted from the
11 Delaware Basin. Potash is the only resource that has been identified within the controlled area in
12 quality similar to that currently mined from underground deposits elsewhere in the Delaware
13 Basin. The hydrogeological impacts of future potash mining within the controlled area are
14 accounted for in calculations of the DP of the disposal system. Consistent with section
15 194.32(b), all economically recoverable resources in the vicinity of the disposal system (outside
16 the controlled area) are assumed to be extracted in the near future.

17 **SCR-2.4.2.1.2 Criteria Concerning Future Drilling**

18 With respect to consideration of future drilling, in the preamble to Part 194, the EPA

19 ...reasoned that while the resources drilled for today may not be the same as those drilled for in
20 the future, the present rates at which these boreholes are drilled can nonetheless provide an
21 estimate of the future rate at which boreholes will be drilled.

22 Criteria concerning the consideration of future deep and shallow drilling in PAs are provided in
23 40 CFR § 194.33 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a). The EPA also provides a
24 criterion in 40 CFR § 194.33(d) concerning the use of future boreholes subsequent to drilling:

25 With respect to future drilling events, performance assessments need not analyze the effects of
26 techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of the borehole.

27 Thus PAs need not consider the effects of techniques used for resource extraction and recovery
28 that would occur subsequent to the drilling of a borehole in the future. These activities are
29 screened SO-R.

30 The EPA provides an additional criterion that limits the severity of human intrusion scenarios
31 that must be considered in PAs. In 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(1) the EPA states,

32 Inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for resources (other than those resources
33 provided by the waste in the disposal system or engineered barriers designed to isolate such waste)
34 is the most severe human intrusion scenario.

35 **SCR-2.4.2.1.3 Screening of Future Human EPs**

36 Future Human EPs accounted for in PA calculations for the WIPP are those associated with
37 mining and deep drilling within the controlled area at a time when institutional controls cannot
38 be assumed to completely eliminate the possibility of such activities. All other future Human
39 EPs, if not eliminated from PA calculations based on regulation, have been eliminated based on
40 low consequence or low probability. For example, the effects of future shallow drilling within

1 the controlled area were eliminated from CCA PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
2 to the performance of the disposal system.

3 **SCR-2.4.3 Description of Waste- and Repository-Induced FEPs**

4 The waste- and repository-induced FEPs are those that relate specifically to the waste material,
5 waste containers, shaft seals, magnesium oxide (MgO) backfill, panel closures, repository
6 structures, and investigation boreholes. All FEPs related to radionuclide chemistry and
7 radionuclide migration are included in this category. The FEPs related to radionuclide transport
8 resulting from future borehole intersections of the WIPP excavation are defined as waste- and
9 repository-induced FEPs.

1 SCR-3.0 FEPs

2 The reassessment of FEPs (Kirkes 2008) results in a new FEPs baseline for CRA-2009. As
3 discussed in Section SCR-1.0, 189 of the 235 WIPP FEPs have not changed since the
4 CRA-2004. However, 35 FEPs required updates to their FEP descriptions and/or screening
5 arguments, 10 FEPs have been split into 20 similar but more descriptive FEPs, and 1 FEP has
6 had its screening decision changed. The single screening decision change does not result in a
7 new FEP incorporated into PA calculations; the FEP continues to be screened out of PA. Thus
8 the CRA-2009 evaluates 245 WIPP FEPs.

9 Table SCR-2 outlines the results of the assessment, and subsequent sections of this document
10 present the actual screening decisions and supporting arguments. Those FEPs not separated by
11 gridlines in the first column of Table SCR-2 have been addressed by group because of close
12 similarity with other FEPs within that group. This grouping process was formerly used in the
13 CCA and also by the EPA in their Technical Support Document (TSD) for section 194.32 (U.S.
14 Environmental Protection Agency 1998b).

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N1	Stratigraphy	No	No change.	UP
N2	Brine Reservoirs	No	No change.	DP
N3	Changes in Regional Stress	No	No change.	SO-C
N4	Regional Tectonics	No	No change.	SO-C
N5	Regional Uplift and Subsidence	No	No change.	SO-C
N6	Salt Deformation	No	No change.	SO-P
N7	Diapirism	No	No change.	SO-P
N8	Formation of Fractures	No	No change.	SO-P UP (Repository)
N9	Changes in Fracture Properties	No	No change.	SO-C UP (Near Repository)
N10	Formation of New Faults	No	No change.	SO-P
N11	Fault Movement	No	No change.	SO-P
N12	Seismic Activity	No	Updated with new seismic data.	UP
N13	Volcanic Activity	No	No change.	SO-P
N14	Magmatic Activity	No	No change.	SO-C
N15	Metamorphic Activity	No	No change.	SO-P
N16	Shallow Dissolution	No	No change.	UP

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

1

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D. ^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N18	Deep Dissolution	No	No change.	SO-P
N20	Breccia Pipes	No	No change.	SO-P
N21	Collapse Breccias	No	No change.	SO-P
N22	Fracture Infills	No	No change.	SO-C - Beneficial
N23	Saturated Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	UP
N24	Unsaturated Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	UP
N25	Fracture Flow	No	No change.	UP
N27	Effects of Preferential Pathways	No	No change.	UP
N26	Density effects on Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	SO-C
N28	Thermal effects on Groundwater Flow	No	No change.	SO-C
N29	Saline Intrusion [Hydrogeological Effects]	No	No change.	SO-P
N30	Freshwater Intrusion [Hydrogeological effects]	No	No change.	SO-P
N31	Hydrological Response to Earthquakes	No	No change.	SO-C
N32	Natural Gas Intrusion	No	No change.	SO-P
N33	Groundwater Geochemistry	No	No change.	UP
N34	Saline Intrusion (Geochemical Effects)	No	No change.	SO-C
N38	Effects of Dissolution	No	No change.	SO-C
N35	Freshwater Intrusion (Geochemical Effects)	No	No change.	SO-C
N36	Changes in Groundwater Eh	No	No change.	SO-C
N37	Changes in Groundwater pH	No	No change.	SO-C
N39	Physiography	No	No change.	UP
N40	Impact of a Large Meteorite	No	Errors identified in screening argument corrected; no change in screening decision.	SO-P
N41	Mechanical Weathering	No	No change.	SO-C
N42	Chemical Weathering	No	No change.	SO-C
N43	Aeolian Erosion	No	No change.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

2

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
N44	Fluvial Erosion	No	No change.	SO-C
N45	Mass Wasting [Erosion]	No	No change.	SO-C
N46	Aeolian Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N47	Fluvial Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N48	Lacustrine Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N49	Mass Wasting [Deposition]	No	No change.	SO-C
N50	Soil Development	No	No change.	SO-C
N51	Stream and River Flow	No	No change.	SO-C
N52	Surface Water Bodies	No	No change.	SO-C
N53	Groundwater Discharge	No	No change.	UP
N54	Groundwater Recharge	No	No change.	UP
N55	Infiltration	No	No change.	UP
N56	Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge	No	No change.	UP
N57	Lake Formation	No	No change.	SO-C
N58	River Flooding	No	No change.	SO-C
N59	Precipitation (e.g. Rainfall)	No	No change.	UP
N60	Temperature	No	No change.	UP
N61	Climate Change	No	No change.	UP
N62	Glaciation	No	No change.	SO-P
N63	Permafrost	No	No change.	SO-P
N64	Seas and Oceans	No	No change.	SO-C
N65	Estuaries	No	No change.	SO-C
N66	Coastal Erosion	No	No change.	SO-C
N67	Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition	No	No change.	SO-C
N68	Sea Level Changes	No	No change.	SO-C
N69	Plants	No	No change.	SO-C
N70	Animals	No	No change.	SO-C
N71	Microbes	No	No change.	SO-C (UP - for colloidal effects and gas generation)
N72	Natural Ecological Development	No	No change.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H1	Oil and Gas Exploration	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H2	Potash Exploration	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H4	Oil and Gas Exploitation	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H8	Other Resources	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H9	Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H3	Water Resources Exploration	No	Updated with most recent monitoring information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H5	Groundwater Exploitation	No	Updated with most recent monitoring information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H6	Archaeological Investigations	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H7	Geothermal	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H10	Liquid Waste Disposal	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H11	Hydrocarbon Storage	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H12	Deliberate Drilling Intrusion	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H13	Conventional Underground Potash Mining	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H14	Other Resources (mining for)	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H15	Tunneling	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H16	Construction of Underground Facilities (for Example Storage, Disposal, Accommodation)	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H17	Archaeological Excavations	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H18	Deliberate Mining Intrusion	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-Induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H19	Explosions for Resource Recovery	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H20	Underground Nuclear Device Testing	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H21	Drilling Fluid Flow	No	Screening argument revised.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H22	Drilling Fluid Loss	No	Screening argument revised.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H23	Blowouts	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) DP (Future)
H24	Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H25	Oil and Gas Extraction	No	Screening argument updated.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H26	Groundwater Extraction	No	Screening argument updated.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H27	Liquid Waste Disposal–OB	No	FEP title has been modified to show that this event or process specifically applies to activities outside the WIPP boundary. Screening argument has also been updated with new information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H28	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production–OB	No	FEP title has been modified to show that this event or process specifically applies to activities outside the WIPP boundary. Screening argument has also been updated with new information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H29	Hydrocarbon Storage–OB	No	FEP title has been modified to show that this event or process specifically applies to activities outside the WIPP boundary. Screening argument has also been updated with new information.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H60	Liquid Waste Disposal–IB	N/A – new FEP	This is a new FEP that is similar to H27, except that it specifically applies to activities inside the WIPP boundary.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H61	Enhanced Oil and Gas Production–IB	N/A – new FEP	This is a new FEP that is similar to H28, except that it specifically applies to activities inside the WIPP boundary.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H62	Hydrocarbon Storage–IB	N/A – new FEP	This is a new FEP that is similar to H29, except that it specifically applies to activities inside the WIPP boundary.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H30	Fluid-injection Induced Geochemical Changes	No	No change.	UP (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H31	Natural Borehole Fluid Flow	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future, holes not penetrating waste panels) DP (Future, holes penetrating panels)
H32	Waste-Induced Borehole Flow	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) DP (Future)
H34	Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H35	Borehole-Induced Mineralization	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H36	Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future) SO-C (for units other than the Culebra)
H37	Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining	No	No change.	UP (HCN) DP (Future)
H38	Changes in Geochemistry Due to Mining	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H39	Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H40	Land Use Changes	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H41	Surface Disruptions	Yes	Screening decision changed from SO-R to SO-C to remove inconsistency with rationale.	UP (HCN) SO-C (Future)
H42	Damming of Streams or Rivers	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H43	Reservoirs	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H44	Irrigation	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H45	Lake Usage	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H46	Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H47	Greenhouse Gas Effects	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H48	Acid Rain	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H49	Damage to the Ozone Layer	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H50	Coastal Water Use	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H51	Sea water Use	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H52	Estuarine Water Use	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H53	Arable Farming	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H54	Ranching	No	No change.	SO-C (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H55	Fish Farming	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H56	Demographic Change and Urban Development	No	No change.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
H57	Loss of Records	No	No change.	NA (HCN) DP (Future)
H58	Solution Mining for Potash	No	Updated with information regarding solution activities and plans in the region.	SO-R (HCN) SO-R (Future)
H59	Solution Mining for Other Resources	No	Updated with new information regarding brine wells in the region.	SO-C (HCN) SO-C (Future)
W1	Disposal Geometry	No	No change.	UP
W2	Waste Inventory	No	Updated to reflect the inventory data sources used for the CRA-2009 PA.	UP
W3	Heterogeneity of Waste Forms	No	Updated to reflect the inventory data sources used for the CRA-2009 PA.	DP
W4	Container Form	No	Updated to reflect the inventory data sources used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-C – Beneficial
W5	Container Material Inventory	No	No change.	UP
W6	Shaft Seal Geometry	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W7	Shaft Seal Physical Properties	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W109	Panel Closure Geometry	N/A – new FEP.	Split from W6 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W110	Panel Closure Physical Properties	N/A – new FEP	Split from W7 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W8	Shaft Seal Chemical Composition	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	SO-C Beneficial
W111	Panel Closure Chemical Composition	N/A – new FEP	Split from W8 to be specific to panel closures.	SO-C Beneficial

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W9	Backfill Physical Properties	No	No change.	SO-C
W10	Backfill Chemical Composition	No	No change.	UP
W11	Post-Closure Monitoring	No	No change.	SO-C
W12	Radionuclide Decay and In-Growth	No	No change.	UP
W13	Heat from Radioactive Decay	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-C
W14	Nuclear Criticality: Heat	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-P
W15	Radiological Effects on Waste	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA.	SO-C
W16	Radiological Effects on Containers	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA.	SO-C
W17	Radiological Effects on Shaft Seals	No	FEP title changed to be specific to shaft seals; screening argument updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA.	SO-C
W112	Radionuclide Effects on Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W17 to be specific to panel closures.	SO-C
W18	Disturbed Rock Zone (DRZ)	No	No change.	UP
W19	Excavation-Induced Changes in Stress	No	No change.	UP
W20	Salt Creep	No	No change.	UP
W21	Changes in the Stress Field	No	No change.	UP
W22	Roof Falls	No	No change.	UP
W23	Subsidence	No	Source of subsidence monitoring data added.	SO-C
W24	Large Scale Rock Fracturing	No	Source of subsidence monitoring data added.	SO-P
W25	Disruption Due to Gas Effects	No	No change.	UP
W26	Pressurization	No	No change.	UP

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W27	Gas Explosions	No	No change.	UP
W28	Nuclear Explosions	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA.	SO-P
W29	Thermal Effects on Material Properties	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W30	Thermally-Induced Stress Changes	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W31	Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository Components	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W72	Exothermic Reactions	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W73	Concrete Hydration	No	Updated to reflect the inventory used for the CRA. New thermal calculations added.	SO-C
W32	Consolidation of Waste	No	No change.	UP
W36	Consolidation of Shaft Seals	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W37	Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W39	Underground Boreholes	No	No change.	UP
W113	Consolidation of Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W36 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W114	Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W37 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W33	Movement of Containers	No	Updated to reference new inventory data.	SO-C
W34	Container Integrity	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W35	Mechanical Effects of Backfill	No	Screening argument updated to reflect reduction in MgO.	SO-C
W40	Brine Inflow	No	No change.	UP
W41	Wicking	No	No change.	UP
W42	Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production	No	No change.	UP
W43	Convection	No	No change.	SO-C
W44	Degradation of Organic Material	No	New thermal rise calculations referenced.	UP
W45	Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation	No	New thermal rise calculations referenced.	UP
W48	Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation	No	New thermal rise calculations referenced.	UP
W46	Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation	No	No change.	SO-C
W47	Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation	No	Screening argument updated with new radionuclide inventory.	SO-C
W49	Gases from Metal Corrosion	No	No change.	UP
W51	Chemical Effects of Corrosion	No	No change.	UP
W50	Galvanic Coupling (Within the Repository)	No	No change.	SO-C
W52	Radiolysis of Brine	No	No change.	SO-C
W53	Radiolysis of Cellulose	No	Screening argument updated with new radionuclide inventory.	SO-C
W54	Helium Gas Production	No	Screening argument updated with new radionuclide inventory.	SO-C
W55	Radioactive Gases	No	Reference made to CRA-2009 inventory data.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W56	Speciation	No	No change.	UP in disposal rooms and Culebra. SO-C elsewhere, and SO-C Beneficial in cementitious seals
W57	Kinetics of Speciation	No	No change.	SO-C
W58	Dissolution of Waste	No	No change.	UP
W59	Precipitation of Secondary Minerals	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial
W60	Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution	No	No change.	SO-C
W61	Actinide Sorption	No	No change.	UP in the Culebra and Dewey Lake; SO-C—Beneficial in the disposal room, shaft seals, panel closures, and other geologic units.
W62	Kinetics of Sorption	No	No change.	UP in the Culebra and Dewey Lake; SO-C—Beneficial in the disposal room, shaft seals, panel closures, and other geologic units.
W63	Changes in Sorptive Surfaces	No	No change.	UP
W64	Effects of Metal Corrosion	No	No change.	UP
W66	Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics	No	No change.	UP
W65	Reduction-Oxidation Fronts	No	No change.	SO-P
W67	Localized Reducing Zones	No	No change.	SO-C
W68	Organic Complexation	No	No change.	UP
W69	Organic Ligands	No	No change.	UP
W71	Kinetics of Organic Complexation	No	No change.	SO-C
W70	Humic and Fulvic Acids	No	No change.	UP

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W74	Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals	No	Title changed to be specific to shaft seals.	UP
W76	Microbial Growth on Concrete	No	No change.	UP
W115	Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures	N/A – new FEP	Split from W74 to be specific to panel closures.	UP
W75	Chemical Degradation of Backfill	No	No change.	SO-C
W77	Solute Transport	No	No change.	UP
W78	Colloid Transport	No	No change.	UP
W79	Colloid Formation and Stability	No	No change.	UP
W80	Colloid Filtration	No	No change.	UP
W81	Colloid Sorption	No	No change.	UP
W82	Suspensions of Particles	No	No change.	DP
W83	Rinse	No	No change.	SO-C
W84	Cuttings	No	No change.	DP
W85	Cavings	No	No change.	DP
W86	Spallings	No	No change.	DP
W87	Microbial Transport	No	No change.	UP
W88	Biofilms	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial
W89	Transport of Radioactive Gases	No	Screening argument updated with CRA-2009 inventory data.	SO-C
W90	Advection	No	No change.	UP
W91	Diffusion	No	No change.	UP
W92	Matrix Diffusion	No	No change.	UP
W93	Soret Effect	No	New thermal values added for aluminum corrosion.	SO-C
W94	Electrochemical Effects	No	No change.	SO-C
W95	Galvanic Coupling (Outside the Repository)	No	No change.	SO-P
W96	Electrophoresis	No	No change.	SO-C

^a N = Natural FEP^b H = Human-induced EP^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

Table SCR-2. FEPs Reassessment Results (Continued)

EPA FEP I.D.^{a,b,c}	FEP Name	Screening Decision Changed	Change Summary	Screening Classification
W97	Chemical Gradients	No	No change.	SO-C
W98	Osmotic Processes	No	No change.	SO-C
W99	Alpha Recoil	No	No change.	SO-C
W100	Enhanced Diffusion	No	No change.	SO-C
W101	Plant Uptake	No	No change.	SO-R (for section 191.13) SO-C (for section 191.15)
W102	Animal Uptake	No	No change.	SO-R (for section 191.13) SO-C (for section 191.15)
W103	Accumulation in Soils	No	No change.	SO-C Beneficial (for section 191.13) SO-C (for section 191.15)
W104	Ingestion	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W105	Inhalation	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W106	Irradiation	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W107	Dermal Sorption	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)
W108	Injection	No	No change.	SO-R SO-C (for section 191.15)

^a N = Natural FEP

^b H = Human-induced EP

^c W = Waste- and Repository-induced FEP

1 **SCR-4.0 Screening of Natural FEPs**

2 This section presents the screening arguments and decisions for natural FEPs. Natural FEPs may
3 be important to the performance of the disposal system. Screening of natural FEPs is done in the
4 absence of human influences on the FEPs. Of the 70 natural FEPs, 68 remain completely
5 unchanged, one has had errors corrected in the screening argument, and one has been updated to
6 include additional information. No screening decisions (classifications) for natural FEPs were
7 changed, and no additional natural FEPs have been identified.

8 **SCR-4.1 Geological FEPs**

9 **SCR-4.1.1 Stratigraphy**

10 **SCR-4.1.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N1 and N2

11 **FEP Titles:** *Stratigraphy* (N1)
12 *Brine Reservoir* (N2)

13 **SCR-4.1.1.2 Screening Decision:** UP (N1)
14 DP (N2)

15 The *Stratigraphy* of the geological formations in the region of the WIPP is accounted for in PA
16 calculations. The presence of *Brine Reservoirs* in the Castile Formation (hereafter referred to as
17 the Castile) is accounted for in PA calculations.

18 **SCR-4.1.1.2.1 Summary of New Information**

19 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

20 **SCR-4.1.1.2.2 Screening Argument**

21 The stratigraphy and geology of the region around the WIPP, including the distribution and
22 characteristics of pressurized brine reservoirs in the Castile, are discussed in detail in the CCA,
23 Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.3. The stratigraphy of the geological formations in the region of the
24 WIPP is accounted for in PA calculations through the setup of the model geometries (Appendix
25 PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.1). The presence of brine reservoirs is accounted for in the treatment
26 of inadvertent drilling (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.10).

1 **SCR-4.1.2 Tectonics**

2 **SCR-4.1.2.1 FEP Numbers:** N3, N4, and N5

3 **FEP Titles:** *Changes in Regional Stress* (N3)

4 *Regional Tectonics* (N4)

5 *Regional Uplift and Subsidence* (N5)

6 **SCR-4.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

7 The effects of *Regional Tectonics*, *Regional Uplift and Subsidence*, and *Change in Regional*
8 *Stress* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
9 performance of the disposal system.

10 **SCR-4.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

11 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

12 **SCR-4.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

13 Regional tectonics encompasses two related issues of concern: the overall level of regional stress
14 and whether any significant changes in regional stress might occur.

15 The tectonic setting and structural features of the area around the WIPP are described in the
16 CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.5. In summary, there is no geological evidence for Quaternary
17 regional tectonics in the Delaware Basin. The eastward tilting of the region has been dated as
18 mid-Miocene to Pliocene by King (1948, pp. 120–21) and is associated with the uplift of the
19 Guadalupe Mountains to the west. Fault zones along the eastern margin of the basin, where it
20 flanks the Central Basin Platform, were active during the Late Permian. Evidence for this
21 includes the displacement of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as the Rustler) observed
22 by Holt and Powers (1988, pp. 4–14) and the thinning of the Dewey Lake Redbeds Formation
23 (hereafter referred to as the Dewey Lake) reported by Schiel (1994). There is, however, no
24 surface displacement along the trend of these fault zones, indicating that there has been no
25 significant Quaternary movement. Other faults identified within the evaporite sequence of the
26 Delaware Basin are inferred by Barrows' figures in Borns et al. (1983, pp. 58–60) to be the result
27 of salt deformation rather than regional tectonic processes. According to Muehlberger, Belcher,
28 and Goetz (1978, p. 338), the nearest faults on which Quaternary movement has been identified
29 lie to the west of the Guadalupe Mountains and are of minor regional significance. The effects
30 of regional tectonics and changes in regional stress have therefore been eliminated from PA
31 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 There are no reported stress measurements from the Delaware Basin, but a low-level, regional
33 stress regime with low deviatoric stress has been inferred from the geological setting of the area
34 (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.5). The inferred low level of regional stress and the lack
35 of Quaternary tectonic activity indicate that regional tectonics and any changes in regional stress
36 will be minor and therefore of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Even
37 if rates of regional tectonic movement experienced over the past 10 million years continue, the
38 extent of regional uplift and subsidence over the next 10,000 years would only be about several

1 feet (ft) (approximately 1 meter [m]). This amount of uplift or subsidence would not lead to a
2 breach of the Salado because the salt would deform plastically to accommodate this slow rate of
3 movement. Uniform regional uplift or a small increase in regional dip consistent with this past
4 rate could give rise to downcutting by rivers and streams in the region. The extent of this
5 downcutting would be little more than the extent of uplift, and reducing the overburden by 1 or
6 2 m would have no significant effect on groundwater flow or contaminant transport in units
7 above or below the Salado. Thus the effects of regional uplift and subsidence have been
8 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
9 disposal system.

10 **SCR-4.1.2.1.4 Tectonic Setting and Site Structural Features**

11 The DOE has screened out, on the basis of either probability or consequence or both, all tectonic,
12 magmatic, and structural processes. The screening discussions can be found in the CCA,
13 Appendix SCR. The information needed for this screening is included here and covers (1)
14 regional tectonic processes such as subsidence, uplift, and basin tilting; (2) magmatic processes
15 such as igneous intrusion and events such as volcanism; and (3) structural processes such as
16 faulting and loading and unloading of the rocks because of long-term sedimentation or erosion.
17 Discussions of structural events, such as earthquakes, are considered to the extent that they may
18 create new faults or activate old faults. The seismicity of the area is considered in the CCA,
19 Chapter 2.0, Section 2.6 for the purposes of determining seismic design parameters for the
20 facility.

21 **SCR-4.1.2.1.5 Tectonics**

22 The processes and features included in this section are those more traditionally considered part of
23 tectonics—processes that develop the broad-scale features of the earth. Salt dissolution is a
24 different process that can develop some features resembling those of tectonics.

25 Most broad-scale structural elements of the area around the WIPP developed during the Late
26 Paleozoic (see the CCA, Appendix GCR, pp. 3-58 through 3-77). There is little historical or
27 geological evidence of significant tectonic activity in the vicinity, and the level of stress in the
28 region is low. The entire region tilted slightly during the Tertiary, and activity related to Basin
29 and Range tectonics formed major structures southwest of the area. Seismic activity is
30 specifically addressed in a separate section.

31 Broad subsidence began in the area as early as the Ordovician, developing a sag called the
32 Tobosa Basin. By Late Pennsylvanian to Early Permian time, the Central Basin Platform
33 developed (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Figure 2-19), separating the Tobosa Basin into two parts:
34 the Delaware Basin to the west and the Midland Basin to the east. The Permian Basin refers to
35 the collective set of depositional basins in the area during the Permian Period. Southwest of the
36 Delaware Basin, the Diablo Platform began developing either in the Late Pennsylvanian or Early
37 Permian. The Marathon Uplift and Ouachita tectonic belt limited the southern extent of the
38 Delaware Basin.

39 According to Brokaw et al. (1972, p. 30), pre-Ochoan sedimentary rocks in the Delaware Basin
40 show evidence of gentle downwarping during deposition, while Ochoan and younger rocks do

1 not. A relatively uniform eastward tilt, generally from about 14 to 19 meters per kilometer
2 (m/km) (75 to 100 feet per mile [ft/mi]), has been superimposed on the sedimentary sequence.
3 King (1948, pp. 108 and 121) generally attributes the uplift of the Guadalupe and Delaware
4 mountains along the west side of the Delaware Basin to the later Cenozoic, though he also notes
5 that some faults along the west margin of the Guadalupe Mountains have displaced Quaternary
6 gravels.

7 King (1948, p. 144) also infers the uplift from the Pliocene-age deposits of the Llano Estacado.
8 Subsequent studies of the Ogallala of the Llano Estacado show that it varies in age from Miocene
9 (about 12 million years before present) to Pliocene (Hawley 1993). This is the most likely range
10 for uplift of the Guadalupe Mountains and broad tilting to the east of the Delaware Basin
11 sequence.

12 Analysis of the present regional stress field indicates that the Delaware Basin lies within the
13 Southern Great Plains stress province. This province is a transition zone between the extensional
14 stress regime to the west and the region of compressive stress to the east. An interpretation by
15 Zoback and Zoback (1991, p. 350) of the available data indicates that the level of stress in the
16 Southern Great Plains stress province is low. Changes to the tectonic setting, such as the
17 development of subduction zones and a consequent change in the driving forces, would take
18 much longer than 10,000 years to occur.

19 To the west of the Southern Great Plains province is the Basin and Range province, or
20 Cordilleran Extension province, where according to Zoback and Zoback (1991, pp. 348–51)
21 normal faulting is the characteristic style of deformation. The eastern boundary of the Basin and
22 Range province is marked by the Rio Grande Rift. Sanford, Jakasha, and Cash (1991, p. 230)
23 note that, as a geological structure, the Rift extends beyond the relatively narrow
24 geomorphological feature seen at the surface, with a magnetic anomaly at least 500 km (300 mi)
25 wide. On this basis, the Rio Grande Rift can be regarded as a system of axial grabens along a
26 major north-south trending structural uplift (a continuation of the Southern Rocky Mountains).
27 The magnetic anomaly extends beneath the Southern Great Plains stress province, and regional-
28 scale uplift of about 1,000 m (3,300 ft) over the past 10 million years also extends into eastern
29 New Mexico.

30 To the east of the Southern Great Plains province is the large Mid-Plate province that
31 encompasses central and eastern regions of the conterminous United States and the Atlantic
32 basin west of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. The Mid-Plate province is characterized by low levels of
33 paleo- and historic seismicity. Where Quaternary faulting has occurred, it is generally strike-slip
34 and appears to be associated with the reactivation of older structural elements.

35 Zoback et al. (1991) report no stress measurements from the Delaware Basin. The stress field in
36 the Southern Great Plains stress province has been defined from borehole measurements in west
37 Texas and from volcanic lineaments in northern New Mexico. These measurements were
38 interpreted by Zoback and Zoback (1991, p. 353) to indicate that the least principal horizontal
39 stress is oriented north-northeast and south-southwest and that most of the province is
40 characterized by an extensional stress regime.

1 There is an abrupt change between the orientation of the least principal horizontal stress in the
 2 Southern Great Plains and the west-northwest orientation of the least principal horizontal stress
 3 characteristic of the Rio Grande Rift. In addition to the geological indications of a transition
 4 zone as described above, Zoback and Zoback (1980, p. 6134) point out that there is also evidence
 5 for a sharp boundary between these two provinces. This is reinforced by the change in crustal
 6 thickness from about 40 km (24 mi) beneath the Colorado Plateau to about 50 km (30 mi) or
 7 more beneath the Southern Great Plains east of the Rio Grande Rift. The base of the crust within
 8 the Rio Grande Rift is poorly defined but is shallower than that of the Colorado Plateau
 9 (Thompson and Zoback 1979, p. 152). There is also markedly lower heat flow in the Southern
 10 Great Plains (typically $< 60 \text{ m W m}^{-2}$) reported by Blackwell, Steele, and Carter (1991, p. 428)
 11 compared with that in the Rio Grande Rift (typically $> 80 \text{ m W m}^{-2}$) reported by Reiter, Barroll,
 12 and Minier (1991, p. 463).

13 On the eastern boundary of the Southern Great Plains province, there is only a small rotation in
 14 the direction of the least principal horizontal stress. There is, however, a change from an
 15 extensional, normal faulting regime to a compressive, strike-slip faulting regime in the Mid-Plate
 16 province. According to Zoback and Zoback (1980, p. 6134), the available data indicate that this
 17 change is not abrupt and that the Southern Great Plains province can be viewed as a marginal
 18 part of the Mid-Plate province.

19 **SCR-4.1.3 Structural FEPs**

20 **SCR-4.1.3.1 Deformation**

21 **SCR-4.1.3.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N6 and N7
 22 **FEP Titles:** *Salt Deformation* (N6)
 23 *Diapirism* (N7)

24 **SCR-4.1.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-P**

25 Natural *Salt Deformation* and *Diapirism* at the WIPP site over the next 10,000 yrs on a scale
 26 severe enough to significantly affect performance of the disposal system have been eliminated
 27 from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence.

28 **SCR-4.1.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

29 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

30 **SCR-4.1.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

31 SCR-4.1.3.1.1.3.1 Deformation

32 Some of the evaporites in the northern Delaware Basin have been deformed and it has been
 33 proposed that the likely mechanism for deformation is gravity foundering of the more dense
 34 anhydrites in less dense halite (e.g., Anderson and Powers 1978, Jones 1981, Borns et al. 1983,
 35 and Borns 1987). Diapirism occurs when the deformation is penetrative, i.e., halite beds disrupt
 36 overlying anhydrites. As Anderson and Powers (1978) suggested, this may have happened
 37 northeast of the WIPP at the location of drillhole ERDA-6. This is the only location where
 38 diapirism has been suggested for the evaporites of the northern Delaware Basin. The geologic
 39 situation suggests that deformation occurred before the Miocene-Pliocene Ogallala Formation
 40 was deposited (Jones 1981). Mechanical modeling is consistent with salt deformation occurring

1 over about 700,000 yrs to form the deformed features known in the northern part of the WIPP
2 site (Borns et al. 1983). The DOE drew the conclusion that evaporites at the WIPP site deform
3 too slowly to affect performance of the disposal system.

4 Because brine reservoirs appear to be associated with deformation, Powers et al. (1996) prepared
5 detailed structure elevation maps of various units from the base of the Castile upward through
6 the evaporites in the northern Delaware Basin. Drillholes are far more numerous for this study
7 than at the time of the study by Anderson and Powers (1978). Subdivisions of the Castile appear
8 to be continuous in the vicinity of ERDA-6 and at ERDA-6. There is little justification for
9 interpreting diapiric piercement at that site. The location and distribution of evaporite
10 deformation in the area of the WIPP site is similar to that proposed by earlier studies (e.g.,
11 Anderson and Powers 1978, Borns et al. 1983, Borns and Shaffer 1985).

12 Surface domal features at the northwestern end of Nash Draw were of undetermined origin prior
13 to WIPP investigations (e.g., Vine 1963), but extensive geophysical studies were conducted of
14 these features as part of early WIPP studies (see Powers 1996). Two of the domal features were
15 drilled, demonstrating that they had a solution-collapse origin (breccia pipes) and were not
16 related in any way to salt diapirism (Snyder and Gard 1982).

17 A more recent study of structure for the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation
18 (hereafter referred to as the Culebra) (Powers 2003) shows that the larger deformation associated
19 with deeper units is reflected by the Culebra, although the structural relief is muted. In addition,
20 evaporite deformation in the northern part of the WIPP site, associated with the area earlier
21 termed the “disturbed zone” (Powers et al. 1978), is hardly observable on a map of Culebra
22 structure (Powers 2003). There is no evidence of more recent deformation at the WIPP site based
23 on such maps.

24 Deformed salt in the lower Salado and upper strata of the Castile has been encountered in a
25 number of boreholes around the WIPP site; the extent of existing salt deformation is summarized
26 in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.1, and further detail is provided in the CCA, Appendix
27 DEF.

28 A number of mechanisms may result in salt deformation: in massive salt deposits, buoyancy
29 effects or diapirism may cause salt to rise through denser, overlying units; and in bedded salt
30 with anhydrite or other interbeds, gravity foundering of the interbeds into the halite may take
31 place. Results from rock mechanics modeling studies (see the CCA, Appendix DEF) indicate
32 that the time scale for the deformation process is such that significant natural deformation is
33 unlikely to occur at the WIPP site over any time frame significant to waste isolation. Thus
34 natural salt deformation and diapirism severe enough to alter existing patterns of groundwater
35 flow or the behavior of the disposal system over the regulatory period has been eliminated from
36 PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 yrs.

1 **SCR-4.1.3.2 Fracture Development**

2 **SCR-4.1.3.2.1 FEP Number:** N8

3 **FEP Title:** *Formation of Fractures*

4 **SCR-4.1.3.2.1.1 Screening Decision: SO-P, UP (Repository)**

5 *Formation of Fractures* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of a low
6 probability of occurrence over 10,000 yrs. The *Formation of Fractures* near the repository is
7 accounted for in PA through treatment of the DRZ.

8 **SCR-4.1.3.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

10 **SCR-4.1.3.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

11 The formation of fractures requires larger changes in stress than are required for changes to the
12 properties of existing fractures to overcome the shear and tensile strength of the rock. It has been
13 concluded from the regional tectonic setting of the Delaware Basin that no significant changes in
14 regional stress are expected over the regulatory period. The EPA agrees that fracture formation
15 in the Rustler is likely a result of halite dissolution and subsequent overlying unit fracturing
16 loading/unloading, as well as the syn- and postdepositional processes. Intraformational
17 postdepositional dissolution of the Rustler has been ruled out as a major contributor to Rustler
18 salt distribution and thus to new fracture formation based on work by Holt and Powers in the
19 CCA (Appendix DEF, Section DEF3.2) and Powers and Holt (1999 and 2000), who believe that
20 depositional facies and syndepositional dissolution account for most of the patterns on halite
21 distribution in the Rustler. The argument against developing new fractures in the Rustler during
22 the regulatory period appears reasonable. The formation of new fracture sets in the Culebra has
23 therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of a low probability of occurrence
24 over 10,000 yrs.

25 Repository-induced fracturing of the DRZ and Salado interbeds is accounted for in PA
26 calculations.

27 A mechanism such as salt diapirism could develop fracturing in the Salado, but there is little
28 evidence of diapirism in the Delaware Basin. Salt deformation has occurred in the vicinity of the
29 WIPP, and fractures have developed in deeper Castile anhydrites as a consequence. Deformation
30 rates are slow, and it is highly unlikely that this process will induce significant new fractures in
31 the Salado during the regulatory time period. Surface domal features at the northwestern end of
32 Nash Draw were of undetermined origin prior to WIPP investigations (e.g., Vine 1963), but
33 extensive geophysical studies were conducted of these features as part of early WIPP studies (see
34 Powers 1996). Two of the domal features were drilled, demonstrating that they had a solution-
35 collapse origin (breccia pipes) and were not related in any way to salt diapirism (Snyder and
36 Gard 1982).

1 **SCR-4.1.3.2.2 FEP Number:** N9
2 **FEP Title:** *Changes in Fracture Properties*

3 **SCR-4.1.3.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C, UP (near repository)**

4 Naturally induced *Changes in Fracture Properties* that may affect groundwater flow or
5 radionuclide transport in the region of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on
6 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. *Changes in Fracture*
7 *Properties* near the repository are accounted for in PA calculations through treatment of the
8 DRZ.

9 **SCR-4.1.3.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

11 **SCR-4.1.3.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

12 Groundwater flow in the region of the WIPP and transport of any released radionuclides may
13 take place along fractures. The rate of flow and the extent of transport will be influenced by
14 fracture characteristics. Changes in fracture properties could arise through natural changes in the
15 local stress field; for example, through tectonic processes, erosion or sedimentation changing the
16 amount of overburden, dissolution of soluble minerals along beds in the Rustler or upper Salado,
17 or dissolution or precipitation of minerals in fractures.

18 Tectonic processes and features (changes in regional stress [N3]; tectonics [N4]; regional uplift
19 and subsidence [N5]; salt deformation [N6]; diapirism [N7]) have been screened out of PA.
20 These processes are not expected to significantly change the character of fractures during the
21 regulatory period.

22 Surface erosion or deposition (e.g., N41–N49) are not expected to significantly change the
23 overburden on the Culebra during the regulatory period. The relationship between Culebra
24 transmissivity and depth is significant (Holt and Yarbrough 2002, Holt and Powers 2002), but
25 the potential change to Culebra transmissivity based on deposition or erosion from these
26 processes over the regulatory period is insignificant.

27 Shallow dissolution (N16), where soluble beds from the upper Salado or Rustler are removed by
28 groundwater, has been extensively considered. There are no direct effects on the Salado at depths
29 of the repository. Extensive study of the upper Salado and Rustler halite units (Holt and Powers
30 1988, the CCA, Appendix FAC, Powers and Holt 1999 and 2000, Powers 2003) indicates little
31 potential for dissolution at the WIPP site during the regulatory period. Existing fracture
32 properties are expressed through the relationship between Culebra transmissivity values and
33 geologic factors at and near the WIPP site (Holt and Yarbrough 2002; Holt and Powers 2002,
34 p. 215). These will be incorporated in PA (see N16, Shallow Dissolution).

35 Mineral precipitation within fractures (N22) is expected to be beneficial to performance, and it
36 has been screened out on the basis of low consequence. Natural dissolution of fracture fillings
37 within the Culebra is incorporated within FEP N16 (Shallow Dissolution). There is no new
38 information on the distribution of fracture fillings within the Culebra. The effects of fracture
39 fillings are also expected to be represented in the distribution of Culebra transmissivity values
40 around the WIPP site and are thus incorporated into PA.

1 Repository-induced fracturing of the DRZ and Salado interbeds is accounted for in PA
2 calculations (UP), and is discussed further in FEPs W18 and W19.

3 **SCR-4.1.3.2.3 FEP Numbers:** N10 and N11
4 **FEP Titles:** *Formation of New Faults* (N10)
5 *Fault Movement* (N11)

6 **SCR-4.1.3.2.3.1 Screening Decision: SO-P**

7 Naturally induced *Fault Movement* and *Formation of New Faults* of sufficient magnitude to
8 significantly affect the performance of the disposal system have been eliminated from PA
9 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 yrs.

10 **SCR-4.1.3.2.3.2 Summary of New Information**

11 No changes have been made to this FEP.

12 **SCR-4.1.3.2.3.3 Screening Argument**

13 Faults are present in the Delaware Basin in both the units underlying the Salado and in the
14 Permian evaporite sequence (see the CCA, Section 2.1.5.3). According to Powers et al. (1978
15 included in the CCA, Appendix GCR), there is evidence that movement along faults within the
16 pre-Permian units affected the thickness of Early Permian strata, but these faults did not exert a
17 structural control on the deposition of the Castile, the Salado, or the Rustler. Fault zones along
18 the margins of the Delaware Basin were active during the Late Permian Period. Along the
19 eastern margin, where the Delaware Basin flanks the Central Basin Platform, Holt and Powers
20 (1988, also included in the CCA, Appendix FAC) note that there is displacement of the Rustler,
21 and Schiel (1994) notes that there is thinning of the Dewey Lake. There is, however, no surface
22 displacement along the trend of these fault zones, indicating that there has been no significant
23 Quaternary movement. Muehlberger et al. (1978, p. 338) note that the nearest faults on which
24 Quaternary movement has been identified lie to the west of the Guadalupe Mountains.

25 The WIPP is located in an area of tectonic quiescence. Seismic monitoring conducted for the
26 WIPP since the CCA continues to record small events at distance from the WIPP, and these
27 events are mainly in areas associated with hydrocarbon production. Two nearby events
28 (magnitude 3.5, October 1997, and magnitude 2.8, December 1998) are related to rockfalls in the
29 Nash Draw mine and are not tectonic in origin (U.S. Department of Energy 1999). These events
30 did not cause any damage at the WIPP. The absence of Quaternary fault scarps and the general
31 tectonic setting and understanding of its evolution indicate that large-scale, tectonically induced
32 fault movement within the Delaware Basin can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
33 of low probability over 10,000 yrs. The stable tectonic setting also allows the formation of new
34 faults within the basin over the next 10,000 yrs to be eliminated from PA calculations on the
35 basis of low probability of occurrence.

36 Evaporite dissolution at or near the WIPP site has the potential for developing fractures in the
37 overlying beds. Three zones with halite (top of Salado, M1/H1 of the Los Medaños Member, and
38 M2/H2 of the Los Medaños Member) underlie the Culebra at the site (Powers 2003). The upper
39 Salado is present across the site, and there is no indication that dissolution of this area will occur
40 in the regulatory period or cause faulting at the site. The Los Medaños units show both mudflat
41 facies and halite-bearing facies within or adjacent to the WIPP site (Powers 2003). Although the

1 distribution of halite in the Rustler is mainly the result of depositional facies and syndepositional
2 dissolution (Holt and Powers 1988, Powers and Holt 1999 and 2000), the possibility of past or
3 future halite dissolution along the margins cannot be ruled out (Holt and Powers 1988, Beauheim
4 and Holt 1999). If halite in the lower Rustler has been dissolved along the depositional margin, it
5 has not occurred recently or has been of no consequence, as there is no indication on the surface
6 or in Rustler structure of new (or old) faults in this area (e.g., Powers et al. 1978, Powers 2003).

7 The absence of Quaternary fault scarps and the general tectonic setting and understanding of its
8 evolution indicate that large-scale, tectonically induced fault movement within the Delaware
9 Basin can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability over 10,000 years.
10 The stable tectonic setting also allows the formation of new faults within the basin over the next
11 10,000 years to be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence.

12 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4 FEP Number:** N12
13 **FEP Title:** *Seismic Activity*

14 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.1 Screening Decision: UP**

15 The postclosure effects of *Seismic Activity* on the repository and the DRZ are accounted for in
16 PA calculations.

17 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**

18 Seismic monitoring conducted for the WIPP since the CRA-2004 continues to record small
19 events at a distance from the WIPP, mainly in areas associated with hydrocarbon production.
20 Three seismic events (magnitude 2.4, January 27, 2006; magnitude 3.8, December 19, 2005; and
21 magnitude 3.6, May 23, 2004) occurred within 300 km of the WIPP (see U.S. Department of
22 Energy 2005, 2006, 2007a). These events did not cause any damage at the WIPP.

23 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.3 Screening Argument**

24 The following subsections present the screening argument for seismic activity (groundshaking).

25 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.4 Causes of Seismic Activity**

26 Seismic activity describes transient ground motion that may be generated by several energy
27 sources. There are two possible causes of seismic activity that could potentially affect the WIPP
28 site: natural and human-induced. Natural seismic activity is caused by fault movement
29 (earthquakes) when the buildup of strain in rock is released through sudden rupture or
30 movement. Human-induced seismic activity may result from a variety of surface and subsurface
31 activities, such as explosions (H19 and H20), mining (H13, H14, H58, and H59), fluid injection
32 (H28), and fluid withdrawal (H25).

33 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.5 Groundshaking**

34 Ground vibration and the consequent shaking of buildings and other structures are the most
35 obvious effects of seismic activity. Once the repository and shafts have been sealed, however,
36 existing surface structures will be dismantled. Postclosure PAs are concerned with the effects of
37 seismic activity on the closed repository.

38 In regions of low and moderate seismic activity, such as the Delaware Basin, rocks behave
39 elastically in response to the passage of seismic waves, and there are no long-term changes in

1 rock properties. The effects of earthquakes beyond the DRZ have been eliminated from PA
2 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. An
3 inelastic response, such as cracking, is only possible where there are free surfaces, as in the roof
4 and walls of the repository prior to closure by creep. Seismic activity could, therefore, have an
5 effect on the properties of the DRZ.

6 An assessment of the extent of damage in underground excavations caused by groundshaking
7 depends largely on observations from mines and tunnels. Because such excavations tend to take
8 place in rock types more brittle than halite, these observations cannot be related directly to the
9 behavior of the WIPP. According to Wallner (1981, p. 244), the DRZ in brittle rock types is
10 likely to be more highly fractured and hence more prone to spalling and rockfalls than an
11 equivalent zone in salt. Relationships between groundshaking and subsequent damage observed
12 in mines will therefore be conservative with respect to the extent of damage induced at the WIPP
13 by seismic activity.

14 Dowding and Rozen (1978) classified damage in underground structures following seismic
15 activity and found that no damage (cracks, spalling, or rockfalls) occurred at accelerations below
16 0.2 gravities and that only minor damage occurred at accelerations up to 0.4 gravities. Lenhardt
17 (1988, p. 392) showed that a magnitude 3 earthquake would have to be within 1 km (0.6 mi) of a
18 mine to result in falls of loose rock. The risk of seismic activity in the region of the WIPP
19 reaching these thresholds is discussed below.

20 **SCR-4.1.3.2.4.6 Seismic Risk in the Region of the WIPP**

21 Prior to the introduction of a seismic monitoring network in 1960, most recorded earthquakes in
22 New Mexico were associated with the Rio Grande Rift, although small earthquakes were
23 detected in other parts of the region. In addition to continued activity in the Rio Grande Rift, the
24 instrumental record has shown a significant amount of seismic activity originating from the
25 Central Basin Platform and a number of small earthquakes in the Los Medaños area. Seismic
26 activity in the Rio Grande Rift is associated with extensional tectonics in that area. Seismic
27 activity in the Central Basin Platform may be associated with natural earthquakes, but there are
28 also indications that this activity occurs in association with oil-field activities such as fluid
29 injection. Small earthquakes in the Los Medaños region have not been precisely located, but
30 may be the result of mining activity in the region. The CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.6.2 contains
31 additional discussion of seismic activity and risk in the WIPP region.

32 The instrumental record was used as the basis of a seismic risk study primarily intended for
33 design calculations of surface facilities rather than for postclosure PAs. The use of this study to
34 define probable ground accelerations in the WIPP region over the next 10,000 yrs is based on the
35 assumptions that hydrocarbon extraction and potash mining will continue in the region and that
36 the regional tectonic setting precludes major changes over the next 10,000 yrs.

37 Three source regions were used in calculating seismic risk: the Rio Grande Rift, the Central
38 Basin Platform, and part of the Delaware Basin province (including the Los Medaños). Using
39 conservative assumptions about the maximum magnitude event in each zone, the study indicated
40 a return period of about 10,000 years (annual probability of occurrence of 10^{-4}) for events
41 producing ground accelerations of 0.1 gravities. Ground accelerations of 0.2 gravities would
42 have an annual probability of occurrence of about 5×10^{-6} .

1 The results of the seismic risk study and the observations of damage in mines caused by
2 groundshaking give an estimated annual probability of occurrence of between 10^{-8} and 10^{-6} for
3 events that could increase the permeability of the DRZ. The DRZ is accounted for in PA
4 calculations as a zone of permanently high permeability (see Appendix PA-2009, Section
5 PA-4.2.4); this treatment is considered to account for the effects of any potential seismic activity.

6 **SCR-4.1.4 Crustal Process**

7 **SCR-4.1.4.1 FEP Number:** N13
8 **FEP Title:** *Volcanic Activity*

9 **SCR-4.1.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

10 *Volcanic Activity* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
11 occurrence over 10,000 yrs.

12 **SCR-4.1.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

14 **SCR-4.1.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

15 The Paleozoic and younger stratigraphic sequences within the Delaware Basin are devoid of
16 locally derived volcanic rocks. Volcanic ashes (dated at 13 million years and 0.6 million years)
17 do occur in the Gatuña Formation (hereafter referred to as the Gatuña), but these are not locally
18 derived. Within eastern New Mexico and northern, central, and western Texas, the closest
19 Tertiary volcanic rocks with notable areal extent or tectonic significance to the WIPP are
20 approximately 160 km (100 mi) to the south in the Davis Mountains volcanic area. The closest
21 Quaternary volcanic rocks are 250 km (150 mi) to the northwest in the Sacramento Mountains.
22 No volcanic rocks are exposed at the surface within the Delaware Basin.

23 Volcanic activity is associated with particular tectonic settings: constructive and destructive plate
24 margins, regions of intraplate rifting, and isolated hot-spots in intraplate regions. The tectonic
25 setting of the WIPP site and the Delaware Basin is remote from plate margins, and the absence of
26 past volcanic activity indicates the absence of a major hot spot in the region. Intraplate rifting
27 has taken place along the Rio Grande some 200 km (120 mi) west of the WIPP site during the
28 Tertiary and Quaternary Periods. Igneous activity along this rift valley is comprised of sheet
29 lavas intruded on by a host of small-to-large plugs, sills, and other intrusive bodies. However,
30 the geological setting of the WIPP site within the large and stable Delaware Basin allows
31 volcanic activity in the region of the WIPP repository to be eliminated from performance
32 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.1.4.2 FEP Number:** N14
2 **FEP Title:** *Magmatic Activity*

3 **SCR-4.1.4.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 The effects of *Magmatic Activity* have been eliminated from the PA calculations on the basis of
5 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-4.1.4.2.2 Summary of New Information**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

8 **SCR-4.1.4.2.3 Screening Argument**

9 Magmatic activity is defined as the subsurface intrusion of igneous rocks into country rock.
10 Deep intrusive igneous rocks crystallize at depths of several kilometers (several miles) and have
11 no surface or near-surface expression until considerable erosion has taken place. Alternatively,
12 intrusive rocks may form from magma that has risen to near the surface or in the vents that give
13 rise to volcanoes and lava flows. Magma near the surface may be intruded along subvertical and
14 subhorizontal discontinuities (forming dikes and sills, respectively), and magma in volcanic
15 vents may solidify as plugs. The formation of such features close to a repository or the existence
16 of a recently intruded rock mass could impose thermal stresses, inducing new fractures or
17 altering the hydraulic characteristics of existing fractures.

18 The principal area of magmatic activity in New Mexico is the Rio Grande Rift, where extensive
19 intrusions occurred during the Tertiary and Quaternary Periods. The Rio Grande Rift, however,
20 is in a different tectonic province than the Delaware Basin, and its magmatic activity is related to
21 the extensional stress regime and high heat flow in that region.

22 Within the Delaware Basin, there is a single identified outcrop of a lamprophyre dike about
23 70 km (40 mi) southwest of the WIPP (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.5.4 and the CCA,
24 Appendix GCR for more detail). Closer to the WIPP site, similar rocks have been exposed
25 within potash mines some 15 km (10 mi) to the northwest, and igneous rocks have been reported
26 from petroleum exploration boreholes. Material from the subsurface exposures has been dated at
27 around 35 million years. Some recrystallization of the host rocks took place alongside the
28 intrusion, and there is evidence that minor fracture development and fluid migration also
29 occurred along the margins of the intrusion. However, the fractures have been sealed, and there
30 is no evidence that the dike acted as a conduit for continued fluid flow.

31 Aeromagnetic surveys of the Delaware Basin have shown anomalies that lie on a linear
32 southwest-northeast trend that coincides with the surface and subsurface exposures of magmatic
33 rocks. There is a strong indication, therefore, of a dike or a closely related set of dikes extending
34 for at least 120 km (70 mi) across the region (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.5.4). The
35 aeromagnetic survey conducted to delineate the dike showed a magnetic anomaly that is several
36 kilometers (several miles) wide at depth and narrows to a thin trace near the surface. This
37 pattern is interpreted as the result of an extensive dike swarm at depths of less than

1 approximately 4.0 km (2.5 mi) near the Precambrian basement, from which a limited number of
2 dikes have extended towards the surface.

3 Magmatic activity has taken place in the vicinity of the WIPP site in the past, but the igneous
4 rocks have cooled over a long period. Any enhanced fracturing or conduits for fluid flow have
5 been sealed by salt creep and mineralization. Continuing magmatic activity in the Rio Grande
6 Rift is too remote from the WIPP location to be of consequence to the performance of the
7 disposal system. Thus the effects of magmatic activity have been eliminated from PA
8 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-4.1.4.2.4 FEP Number:** N15
10 **FEP Title:** *Metamorphic Activity*

11 **SCR-4.1.4.2.4.1 Screening Decision: SO-P**
12 *Metamorphic Activity* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability
13 of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

14 **SCR-4.1.4.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**
15 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

16 **SCR-4.1.4.2.4.3 Screening Argument**
17 Metamorphic activity, that is, solid-state recrystallization changes to rock properties and
18 geologic structures through the effects of heat and/or pressure, requires depths of burial much
19 greater than the depth of the repository. Regional tectonics that would result in the burial of the
20 repository to the depths at which the repository would be affected by metamorphic activity have
21 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence; therefore,
22 metamorphic activity has also been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
23 probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

24 **SCR-4.1.5 Geochemical Processes**

25 **SCR-4.1.5.1 FEP Number:** N16
26 **FEP Title:** *Shallow Dissolution* (including lateral dissolution)

27 **SCR-4.1.5.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP
28 *Shallow Dissolution* is accounted for in PA calculations.

29 **SCR-4.1.5.1.2 Summary of New Information**

30 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

31 **SCR-4.1.5.1.3 Screening Argument**

32 This section discusses a variety of styles of dissolution that have been active in the region of the
33 WIPP or in the Delaware Basin. A distinction has been drawn between shallow dissolution
34 involving circulation of groundwater, mineral dissolution in the Rustler and at the top of the

1 Salado in the region of the WIPP, and deep dissolution taking place in the Castile and the base of
2 the Salado. Dissolution will initially enhance porosities, but continued dissolution may lead to
3 compaction of the affected units with a consequent reduction in porosity. Compaction may
4 result in fracturing of overlying brittle units and increased permeability. Extensive dissolution
5 may create cavities (karst) and result in the total collapse of overlying units. This topic is
6 discussed further in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.2.

7 **SCR-4.1.5.1.4 Shallow Dissolution**

8 In the region around the WIPP, shallow dissolution by groundwater flow has removed soluble
9 minerals from the upper Salado as well as the Rustler to form Nash Draw; extensive solution
10 within the closed draw has created karst features including caves and dolines in the sulfate beds
11 of the Rustler (see Lee, 1925, Bachman, 1980, 1985, and 1987a). An alluvial doline drilled at
12 WIPP 33, about 850 m (2800 ft) west of the WIPP site boundary, is the nearest karst feature
13 known in the vicinity of the site. Upper Salado halite dissolution in Nash Draw resulted in
14 fracture propagation upward through the overlying Rustler (Holt and Powers 1988). The margin
15 of dissolution of halite from the upper Salado has commonly been placed west of the WIPP site,
16 near, but east of, Livingston Ridge, the eastern boundary of Nash Draw. Halite occurs in the
17 Rustler east of Livingston Ridge, with the margin generally progressively eastward in higher
18 stratigraphic units (e.g., Snyder 1985; Powers and Holt 1995). The distribution of halite in the
19 Rustler has commonly been attributed to shallow dissolution (e.g., Powers et al. 1978; Lambert,
20 1983; Bachman 1985; Lowenstein 1987). During early studies for the WIPP, the variability of
21 Culebra transmissivity in the vicinity of the WIPP was commonly attributed to the effects of
22 Rustler halite dissolution and changes in fracturing as a consequence.

23 After a detailed sedimentologic and stratigraphic investigation of WIPP cores, shafts, and
24 geophysical logs from the region around WIPP, the distribution of halite in the Rustler was
25 attributed to depositional and syndepositional processes rather than postdepositional dissolution
26 (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and Holt 2000). Rustler exposures in shafts for the WIPP
27 revealed extensive sedimentary structures in clastic units (Holt and Powers 1984, 1986, 1990),
28 and the suite of features in these beds led these investigators (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and
29 Holt 1990, 2000) to reinterpret the clastic units. They conclude that the clastic facies represent
30 mainly mudflat facies tracts adjacent to a salt pan. Although some halite was likely deposited in
31 mudflat areas proximal to the salt pan, it was largely removed by syndepositional dissolution, as
32 indicated by soil structures, soft sediment deformation, bedding, and small-scale vertical
33 relationships (Holt and Powers 1988; Powers and Holt 1990, 1999, 2000). The depositional
34 margins of halite in the Rustler are the likely points for past or future dissolution (e.g., Holt and
35 Powers 1988; Beauheim and Holt 1990). Cores from drillholes at the H-19 drillpad near the
36 Tamarisk Member halite margin show evidence of some dissolution of halite in the Tamarisk
37 (Mercer et al. 1998), consistent with these predictions. The distribution of Culebra transmissivity
38 values is not considered related to dissolution of Rustler halite, and other geological factors (e.g.,
39 depth, upper Salado dissolution) correlate well with Culebra transmissivity (e.g., Powers and
40 Holt 1995; Holt and Powers 2002).

41 Since the CCA was completed, the WIPP has conducted additional work on shallow dissolution,
42 principally of the upper Salado, and its possible relationship to the distribution of transmissivity
43 values for the Culebra as determined through testing of WIPP hydrology wells.

1 Analysis Plan 088 (AP-088) (Beauheim 2002) noted that potentiometric surface values for the
 2 Culebra in many monitoring wells were outside the uncertainty ranges used to calibrate models
 3 of steady-state heads for the unit. AP-088 directed the analysis of the relationship between
 4 geological factors and values of transmissivity at Culebra wells. The relationship between
 5 geological factors, including dissolution of the upper Salado as well as limited dissolution in the
 6 Rustler, and Culebra transmissivity is being used to evaluate differences between assuming
 7 steady-state Culebra heads and changing heads.

8 Task 1 for AP-088 (Powers 2003) evaluated geological factors, including shallow dissolution in
 9 the vicinity of the WIPP site related to Culebra transmissivity. A much more extensive drillhole
 10 geological database was developed than was previously available, utilizing sources of data from
 11 WIPP, potash exploration, and oil and gas exploration and development. The principal findings
 12 related to shallow dissolution are (1) a relatively narrow zone (~ 200 – 400 m [656 – 1,312 ft]
 13 wide) could be defined as the margin of dissolution of the upper Salado in much of the area
 14 around WIPP, (2) the upper Salado dissolution margin commonly underlies surface escarpments
 15 such as Livingston Ridge, and (3) there are possible extensions or reentrants of incipient upper
 16 Salado dissolution extending eastward from the general dissolution margin. The WIPP site
 17 proper is not affected by this process.

18 Culebra transmissivity correlates well with depth or overburden, which affects fracture apertures
 19 (Powers and Holt 1995, Holt and Powers 2002; Holt and Yarbrough 2002). Dissolution of the
 20 upper Salado appears to increase transmissivity by one or more orders of magnitude (Holt and
 21 Yarbrough 2002). Because there is no indication of upper Salado dissolution at the WIPP site,
 22 Holt and Yarbrough (2002) did not include this factor for the WIPP site in estimates of base
 23 transmissivity values for the WIPP site and surroundings.

24 The effects of shallow dissolution (including the impacts of lateral dissolution) have been
 25 included in PA calculations.

26 **SCR-4.1.5.2 FEP Numbers:** N18, N20, and N21
 27 **FEP Titles:** *Deep Dissolution* (N18)
 28 *Breccia Pipes* (N20)
 29 *Collapse Breccias* (N21)

30 **SCR-4.1.5.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

31 *Deep Dissolution* and the formation of associated features (for example, solution chimneys or
 32 *Breccia Pipes*, *Collapse Breccias*) at the WIPP site have been eliminated from PA calculations
 33 on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

34 **SCR-4.1.5.2.2 Summary of New Information**

35 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

1 **SCR-4.1.5.2.3 Screening Argument**

2 This section discusses a variety of styles of dissolution that have been active in the region of the
3 WIPP or in the Delaware Basin. A distinction has been drawn between shallow dissolution,
4 involving circulation of groundwater and mineral dissolution in the Rustler and at the top of the
5 Salado in the region of the WIPP, and deep dissolution taking place in the Castile and the base of
6 the Salado. Dissolution will initially enhance porosities, but continued dissolution may lead to
7 compaction of the affected units with a consequent reduction in porosity. Compaction may
8 result in fracturing of overlying brittle units and increased permeability. Extensive dissolution
9 may create cavities (karst) and result in the total collapse of overlying units. This topic is
10 discussed further in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.2.

11 **SCR-4.1.5.2.4 Deep Dissolution**

12 Deep dissolution is limited to processes involving dissolution of the Castile or basal Salado and
13 features such as breccia pipes (also known as solution chimneys) associated with this process
14 (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.2). Deep dissolution is distinguished from shallow and
15 lateral dissolution not only by depth, but also by the origin of the water. Dissolution by
16 groundwater from deep water-bearing zones can lead to the formation of cavities. Collapse of
17 overlying beds leads to the formation of collapse breccias if the overlying rocks are brittle, or to
18 deformation if the overlying rocks are ductile. If dissolution is extensive, breccia pipes or
19 solution chimneys may form above the cavity. These pipes may reach the surface or pass
20 upwards into fractures and then into microcracks that do not extend to the surface. Breccia pipes
21 may also form through the downward percolation of meteoric waters, as discussed earlier. Deep
22 dissolution is of concern because it could accelerate contaminant transport through the creation
23 of vertical flow paths that bypass low-permeability units in the Rustler. If dissolution occurred
24 within or beneath the waste panels themselves, there could be increased circulation of
25 groundwater through the waste, as well as a breach of the Salado host rock.

26 Features identified as being the result of deep dissolution are present along the northern and
27 eastern margins of the Delaware Basin. In addition to features that have a surface expression or
28 that appear within potash mine workings, deep dissolution has been cited by Anderson et al.
29 (1972, p. 81) as the cause of lateral variability within evaporite sequences in the lower Salado.

30 Exposures of the McNutt Potash Member of the Salado within a mine near Nash Draw have
31 shown a breccia pipe containing cemented brecciated fragments of formations higher in the
32 stratigraphic sequence. At the surface, this feature is marked by a dome, and similar domes have
33 been interpreted as dissolution features. The depth of dissolution has not been confirmed, but the
34 collapse structures led Anderson (1978, p. 52) and Snyder et al. (1982, p. 65) to postulate
35 dissolution of the Capitan Limestone at depth; collapse of the Salado, Rustler, and younger
36 formations; and subsequent dissolution and hydration by downward percolating waters. San
37 Simon Sink (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.6.2), some 35 km (20 mi) east-southeast of
38 the WIPP site, has also been interpreted as a solution chimney. Subsidence has occurred there in
39 historical times according to Nicholson and Clebsch (1961, p. 14), suggesting that dissolution at
40 depth is still taking place. Whether this is the result of downward-percolating surface water or
41 deep groundwater has not been confirmed. The association of these dissolution features with the

1 inner margin of the Capitan Reef suggest that they owe their origins, if not their continued
2 development, to groundwaters derived from the Capitan Limestone.

3 **SCR-4.1.5.2.5 Dissolution within the Castile and Lower Salado**

4 The Castile contains sequences of varved anhydrite and carbonate (that is, laminae deposited on
5 a cyclical basis) that can be correlated between several boreholes. On the basis of these deposits,
6 a basin-wide uniformity in the depositional environment of the Castile evaporites was assumed.
7 The absence of varves from all or part of a sequence and the presence of brecciated anhydrite
8 beds have been interpreted by Anderson et al. (1972) as evidence of dissolution. Holt and
9 Powers (the CCA, Appendix FAC) have questioned the assumption of a uniform depositional
10 environment and contend that the anhydrite beds are lateral equivalents of halite sequences
11 without significant postdepositional dissolution. Wedges of brecciated anhydrite along the
12 margin of the Castile have been interpreted by Robinson and Powers (1987, p. 78) as gravity-
13 driven clastic deposits, rather than the result of deep dissolution.

14 Localized depressions at the top of the Castile and inclined geophysical marker units at the base
15 of the Salado have been interpreted by Davies (1983, p. 45) as the result of deep dissolution and
16 subsequent collapse or deformation of overlying rocks. The postulated cause of this dissolution
17 was circulation of undersaturated groundwaters from the Bell Canyon Formation (hereafter
18 referred to as Bell Canyon). Additional boreholes (notably WIPP-13, WIPP-32, and DOE-2) and
19 geophysical logging led Borns and Shaffer (1985) to conclude that the features interpreted by
20 Davies as being dissolution features are the result of irregularities at the top of Bell Canyon.
21 These irregularities led to localized depositional thickening of the Castile and lower Salado
22 sediments.

23 **SCR-4.1.5.2.6 Collapse Breccias at Basin Margins**

24 Collapse breccias are present at several places around the margins of the Delaware Basin. Their
25 formation is attributed to relatively fresh groundwater from the Capitan Limestone that forms the
26 margin of the basin. Collapse breccias corresponding to features on geophysical records that
27 have been ascribed to deep dissolution have not been found in boreholes away from the margins.
28 These features have been reinterpreted as the result of early dissolution prior to the deposition of
29 the Salado.

30 **SCR-4.1.5.2.7 Summary of Deep Dissolution**

31 Deep dissolution features have been identified within the Delaware Basin, but only in marginal
32 areas underlain by Capitan Reef. There is a low probability that deep dissolution will occur
33 sufficiently close to the waste panels over the regulatory period to affect groundwater flow in the
34 immediate region of the WIPP. Deep dissolution at the WIPP site has therefore been eliminated
35 from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.1.5.3 FEP Number:** N22
2 **FEP Title:** *Fracture Infill*

3 **SCR-4.1.5.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C – Beneficial

4 The effects of *Fracture Infill* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
5 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-4.1.5.3.2 Summary of New Information**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004. No changes have
8 been made.

9 **SCR-4.1.5.3.3 Screening Argument**

10 **SCR-4.1.5.3.3.1 Mineralization**

11 Precipitation of minerals as fracture infills can reduce hydraulic conductivities. The distribution
12 of infilled fractures in the Culebra closely parallels the spatial variability of lateral transmissivity
13 in the Culebra. The secondary gypsum veins in the Rustler have not been dated. Strontium
14 isotope studies (Siegel et al. 1991, pp. 5-53 to 5-57) indicate that the infilling minerals are locally
15 derived from the host rock rather than extrinsically derived, and it is inferred that they reflect an
16 early phase of mineralization and are not associated with recent meteoric waters.

17 Stable isotope geochemistry in the Rustler has also provided information on mineral stabilities in
18 these strata. Both Chapman (1986, p. 31) and Lambert and Harvey (1987, p. 207) imply that the
19 mineralogical characteristics of units above the Salado have been stable or subject to only minor
20 changes under the various recharge conditions that have existed during the past 0.6 million
21 years—the period since the formation of the Mescalero caliche and the establishment of a pattern
22 of climate change and associated changes in recharge that led to present-day hydrogeological
23 conditions. No changes in climate are expected other than those experienced during this period,
24 and for this reason, no changes are expected in the mineralogical characteristics other than those
25 expressed by the existing variability of fracture infills and diagenetic textures. Formation of
26 fracture infills will reduce transmissivities and will therefore be of beneficial consequence to the
27 performance of the disposal system.

28 **SCR-4.2 Subsurface Hydrological FEPs**

29 **SCR-4.2.1 Groundwater Characteristics**

30 **SCR-4.2.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N23, N24, N25, and N27
31 **FEP Titles:** *Saturated Groundwater Flow* (N23)
32 *Unsaturated Groundwater Flow* (N24)
33 *Fracture Flow* (N25)
34 *Effects of Preferential Pathways* (N27)

1 **SCR-4.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

2 *Saturated Groundwater Flow, Unsaturated Groundwater Flow, Fracture Flow, and Effects of*
3 *Preferential Pathways* are accounted for in PA calculations.

4 **SCR-4.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

5 No new information has been identified for these FEPs. They continue to be accounted for in
6 PA.

7 **SCR-4.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

8 Saturated groundwater flow, unsaturated groundwater flow, and fracture flow are accounted for
9 in PA calculations. Groundwater flow is discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1; and
10 Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5 and Section 6.4.6.

11 The hydrogeologic properties of the Culebra are also spatially variable. This variability,
12 including the effects of preferential pathways, is accounted for in PA calculations in the
13 estimates of transmissivity and aquifer thickness.

14 **SCR-4.2.1.2 FEP Number:** N26

15 **FEP Title:** *Density Effect on Groundwater Flow*

16 **SCR-4.2.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

17 *Density Effects on Groundwater Flow* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
18 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-4.2.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

20 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

21 **SCR-4.2.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

22 The most transmissive unit in the Rustler, and hence the most significant potential pathway for
23 transport of radionuclides to the accessible environment, is the Culebra. The properties of
24 Culebra groundwaters are not homogeneous, and spatial variations in groundwater density (the
25 CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4.1.2) could influence the rate and direction of groundwater
26 flow. A comparison of the gravity-driven flow component and the pressure-driven component in
27 the Culebra, however, shows that only in the region to the south of the WIPP are head gradients
28 low enough for density gradients to be significant (Davies 1989, p. 53). Accounting for this
29 variability would rotate groundwater flow vectors towards the east (down-dip) and hence fluid in
30 the high-transmissivity zone would move away from the zone. Excluding brine density
31 variations within the Culebra from PA calculations is therefore a conservative assumption, and
32 density effects on groundwater flow have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
33 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.2.2 Changes in Groundwater Flow**

2 **SCR-4.2.2.1 FEP Number:** N28

3 **FEP Title:** *Thermal Effects on Groundwater Flow*

4 **SCR-4.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

5 *Natural Thermal Effects on Groundwater Flow* have been eliminated from PA calculations on
6 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-4.2.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

9 **SCR-4.2.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

10 The geothermal gradient in the region of the WIPP has been measured at about 30 °C (54 °F) per
11 kilometer (50 °C [90 °F] per mile). Given the generally low permeability in the region and the
12 limited thickness of units in which groundwater flow occurs (for example, the Culebra), natural
13 convection will be too weak to have a significant effect on groundwater flow. No natural FEPs
14 have been identified that could significantly alter the temperature distribution of the disposal
15 system or give rise to thermal effects on groundwater flow. Such effects have therefore been
16 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
17 disposal system.

18 **SCR-4.2.2.2 FEP Number:** N29

19 **FEP Title:** *Saline Intrusion* (hydrogeological effects)

20 **SCR-4.2.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

21 Changes in groundwater flow arising from *Saline Intrusion* have been eliminated from PA
22 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

23 **SCR-4.2.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

24 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

25 **SCR-4.2.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

26 No natural events or processes have been identified that could result in saline intrusion into units
27 above the Salado or cause a significant increase in fluid density. Natural saline intrusion has
28 therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence
29 over the next 10,000 years. Saline intrusion arising from human events such as drilling into a
30 pressurized brine pocket is discussed in FEPs H21 through H24 (Section SCR-5.2.1.4).

1 **SCR-4.2.2.3 FEP Number:** N30
2 **FEP Title:** *Freshwater Intrusion* (hydrogeological effects)

3 **SCR-4.2.2.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

4 Changes in groundwater flow arising from *Freshwater Intrusion* have been eliminated from PA
5 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

6 **SCR-4.2.2.3.2 Summary**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

8 **SCR-4.2.2.3.2.1 Screening Argument**

9 A number of FEPs, including climate change, can result in changes in infiltration and recharge
10 (see discussions for FEPs N53 through N55, Section SCR-4.5.3.1). These changes will affect the
11 height of the water table and, hence, could affect groundwater flow in the Rustler through
12 changes in head gradients. The generally low transmissivity of the Dewey Lake and the Rustler,
13 however, will prevent any significant changes in groundwater density from occurring within the
14 Culebra over the timescales for which increased precipitation and recharge are anticipated. No
15 other natural events or processes have been identified that could result in freshwater intrusion
16 into units above the Salado or cause a significant decrease in fluid density. Freshwater intrusion
17 has therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence
18 over the next 10,000 years.

19 **SCR-4.2.2.4 FEP Number:** N31
20 **FEP Title:** Hydrological Response to Earthquakes

21 **SCR-4.2.2.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

22 *Hydrological Response to Earthquakes* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
23 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-4.2.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

26 **SCR-4.2.2.4.3 Screening Argument**

27 **SCR-4.2.2.4.3.1 Hydrological Effects of Seismic Activity**

28 There are a variety of hydrological responses to earthquakes. Some of these responses, such as
29 changes in surface-water flow directions, result directly from fault movement. Others, such as
30 changes in subsurface water chemistry and temperature, probably result from changes in flow
31 pathways along the fault or fault zone. According to Bredehoeft et al. (1987, p. 139), further
32 away from the region of fault movement, two types of changes to groundwater levels may take
33 place as a result of changes in fluid pressure.

- 1 • The passage of seismic waves through a rock mass causes a volume change, inducing a
2 transient response in the fluid pressure, which may be observed as a short-lived
3 fluctuation of the water level in wells.

- 4 • Changes in volume strain can cause long-term changes in water level. A buildup of strain
5 occurs prior to rupture and is released during an earthquake. The consequent change in
6 fluid pressure may be manifested by the drying up or reactivation of springs some
7 distance from the region of the epicenter.

8 Fluid-pressure changes induced by the transmission of seismic waves can produce changes of up
9 to several meters (several yards) in groundwater levels in wells, even at distances of thousands of
10 kilometers from the epicenter. These changes are temporary, however, and levels typically
11 return to pre-earthquake levels in a few hours or days. Changes in fluid pressure arising from
12 changes in volume strain persist for much longer periods, but they are only potentially
13 consequential in tectonic regimes where there is a significant buildup of strain. The regional
14 tectonics of the Delaware Basin indicates that such a buildup has a low probability of occurring
15 over the next 10,000 years (see FEPs N3 and N4, Section SCR-4.1.2.1).

16 The expected level of seismic activity in the region of the WIPP will be of low consequence to
17 the performance of the disposal system in terms of groundwater flow or contaminant transport.
18 Changes in groundwater levels resulting from more distant earthquakes will be too short in
19 duration to be significant. Thus hydrological response to earthquakes has been eliminated from
20 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-4.2.2.5 FEP Number:** N32

22 **FEP Title:** *Natural Gas Intrusion*

23 **SCR-4.2.2.5.1 Screening decision:** SO-P

24 Changes in groundwater flow arising from *Natural Gas Intrusion* have been eliminated from PA
25 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

26 **SCR-4.2.2.5.2 Summary of New Information**

27 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

28 **SCR-4.2.2.5.2.1 Screening Argument**

29 Hydrocarbon resources are present in formations beneath the WIPP (the CCA, Chapter 2.0,
30 Section 2.3.1.2), and natural gas is extracted from the Morrow Formation. These reserves are,
31 however, some 4,200 m (14,000 ft) below the surface, and no natural events or processes have
32 been identified that could result in natural gas intrusion into the Salado or the units above.
33 Natural gas intrusion has therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
34 probability of occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.3 Subsurface Geochemical FEPs**

2 **SCR-4.3.1 Groundwater Geochemistry**

3 **SCR-4.3.1.1 FEP Number:** N33

4 **FEP Title:** *Groundwater Geochemistry*

5 **SCR-4.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

6 *Groundwater Geochemistry* in the hydrological units of the disposal system is accounted for in
7 PA calculations.

8 **SCR-4.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information for this FEP has been identified since the CRA-2004.

10 **SCR-4.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

11 The most important aspect of groundwater geochemistry in the region of the WIPP in terms of
12 chemical retardation and colloid stability is salinity. Groundwater geochemistry is discussed in
13 detail in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2 and Section 2.4 and summarized here. The Delaware
14 Mountain Group, Castile, and Salado contain basinal brines. Waters in the Castile and Salado
15 are at or near halite saturation. Above the Salado, groundwaters are also relatively saline, and
16 groundwater quality is poor in all of the permeable units. Waters from the Culebra vary spatially
17 in salinity and chemistry. They range from saline sodium chloride-rich waters to brackish
18 calcium sulfate-rich waters. In addition, a range of magnesium-to-calcium ratios has been
19 observed, and some waters reflect the influence of potash mining activities, having elevated
20 potassium-to-sodium ratios. Waters from the Santa Rosa are generally of better quality than
21 those from the Rustler. Salado and Castile brine geochemistry is accounted for in PA
22 calculations of the actinide (An) source term (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.4). Culebra
23 brine geochemistry is accounted for in the retardation factors used in PA calculations of actinide
24 transport (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2).

25 **SCR-4.3.1.2 FEP Numbers:** N34 and N38

26 **FEP Titles:** *Saline Intrusion* (geochemical effects) (N34)

27 *Effects of Dissolution* (N38)

28 **SCR-4.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

29 The effects of *Saline Intrusion* and *Dissolution* on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated
30 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 **SCR-4.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

32 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

1 **SCR-4.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

2 Saline intrusion and effects of dissolution are considered together in this discussion because
3 dissolution of minerals such as halite (NaCl), anhydrite (CaSO₄), or gypsum (CaSO₄·2H₂O)
4 (N38) could – in the most extreme case – increase the salinity of groundwaters in the Culebra to
5 levels characteristic of those expected after saline intrusion (N34).

6 No natural events or processes have been identified that could result in saline intrusion into units
7 above the Salado. Injection of Castile or Salado brines into the Culebra as a result of human
8 intrusion, an anthropogenically induced event, was included in past PA calculations. Laboratory
9 studies carried out to evaluate radionuclide transport in the Culebra following human intrusion
10 produced data that can also be used to evaluate the consequences of natural saline intrusion.

11 The possibility that dissolution of halite, anhydrite, or gypsum might result in an increase in the
12 salinity of low- to moderate-ionic-strength groundwaters in the Culebra also appears unlikely,
13 despite the presence of halite in the Los Medaños under most of the WIPP site (Siegel and
14 Lambert 1991, Figure 1-13), including the expected Culebra off-site transport pathway (the
15 direction of flow from the point(s) at which brines from the repository would enter the Culebra,
16 flow towards the south or south-southeast, and eventually to the boundary of the WIPP site).
17 (The Los Medaños Member of the Rustler, formerly referred to as the unnamed lower member of
18 the Rustler, underlies the Culebra.) A dissolution-induced increase in the salinity of Culebra
19 groundwaters is unlikely because (1) the dissolution of halite is known to be rapid;
20 (2) (moderate-ionic-strength) groundwaters along the off-site transport pathway (and at many
21 other locations in the Culebra) have had sufficient time to dissolve significant quantities of
22 halite, if this mineral is present in the subjacent Los Medaños and if Culebra fluids have been in
23 contact with it; and (3) the lack of high-ionic-strength groundwaters along the off-site transport
24 pathway (and elsewhere in the Culebra) implies that halite is present in the Los Medaños but
25 Culebra fluids have not contacted it, or that halite is not present in the Los Medaños. Because
26 halite dissolves so rapidly if contacted by undersaturated solutions, this conclusion does not
27 depend on the nature and timing of Culebra recharge (i.e., whether the Rustler has been a closed
28 hydrologic system for several thousand to a few tens of thousands of years, or is subject to
29 significant modern recharge).

30 Nevertheless, saline intrusion would not affect the predicted transport of thorium (Th), uranium
31 (U), plutonium (Pu), and americium (Am) in the Culebra. This is because (1) the laboratory
32 studies that quantified the retardation of Th, U, Pu, and Am for the CCA PA were carried out
33 with both moderate-ionic-strength solutions representative of Culebra groundwaters along the
34 expected off-site transport pathway and high-ionic-strength solutions representative of brines
35 from the Castile and the Salado (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996); and (2) the results obtained
36 with the Castile and Salado brines were – for the most part – used to predict the transport of
37 Pu(III) and Am(III); Th(IV), U(IV), Np(IV), and Pu(IV); and U(VI). The results obtained with
38 the saline solutions were used for these actinide oxidation states because the extent to which
39 saline and Culebra brines will mix along the offsite transport pathway in the Culebra was unclear
40 at the time of the CCA PA; therefore, Brush (1996) and Brush and Storz (1996) recommended
41 that PA use the results that predict less retardation. In the case of Pu(III) and Am(III); Th(IV),
42 U(IV), Np(IV), and Pu(IV); and U(VI), the retardation distribution coefficient (K_{ds}) obtained
43 with the saline solutions were somewhat lower than those obtained with the Culebra fluids. The

1 K_{ds} recommended by Brush and Storz (1996) are being used for the CRA-2009 PA. These K_{ds}
2 are also based mainly on results obtained with saline solutions.

3 Finally, it is important to reiterate that the use of results from laboratory studies with saline
4 solutions to predict radionuclide transport in the Culebra for previous PAs and the CRA-2009 PA
5 implement the effects of saline intrusion caused by human intrusion, not natural saline intrusion.
6 The conclusions that natural saline intrusion is unlikely, that significant dissolution is unlikely,
7 and that these events or processes would have no significant consequence – in the unlikely event
8 that they occur – continue to be valid.

9 **SCR-4.3.1.3 FEP Numbers:** N35, N36, and N37

10 **FEP Titles:** *Freshwater Intrusion* (Geochemical Effects) (N35)
11 *Change in Groundwater Eh* (N36)
12 *Changes in Groundwater pH* (N37)

13 **SCR-4.3.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

14 The effects of *Freshwater Intrusion* on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA
15 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.
16 *Changes in Groundwater Eh* and *Changes in Groundwater pH* have been eliminated from PA
17 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

18 **SCR-4.3.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

19 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

20 **SCR-4.3.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

21 Natural changes in the groundwater chemistry of the Culebra and other units that resulted from
22 saline intrusion or freshwater intrusion could potentially affect chemical retardation and the
23 stability of colloids. Changes in groundwater Eh and groundwater pH could also affect the
24 migration of radionuclides (see FEPs W65 to W70, Section SCR-6.5.5.2, Section SCR-6.5.5.3,
25 Section SCR-6.5.6.1, and Section SCR-6.5.6.2). No natural EPs have been identified that could
26 result in saline intrusion into units above the Salado, and the magnitude of any natural temporal
27 variation from the effects of dissolution on groundwater chemistry, or because of changes in
28 recharge, is likely to be no greater than the present spatial variation. These FEPs related to the
29 effects of future natural changes in groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA
30 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 The most likely mechanism for (natural) freshwater intrusion into the Culebra (N35), changes in
32 groundwater Eh (N36), and changes in groundwater pH (N37) is (natural) recharge of the
33 Culebra. (Other FEPs consider possible anthropogenically induced recharge). These three FEPs
34 are closely related because an increase in the rate of recharge could reduce the ionic strength(s)
35 of Culebra groundwaters, possibly enough to saturate the Culebra with (essentially) fresh water,
36 at least temporarily. Such a change in ionic strength could, if enough atmospheric oxygen
37 remained in solution, also increase the Eh of Culebra groundwaters enough to oxidize Pu from
38 the relatively immobile III and IV oxidation states (Pu(III) and Pu(IV)) – the oxidation states

1 expected under current conditions (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996) – to the relatively mobile
2 V and VI oxidation states (Pu(V) and Pu(VI)). Similarly, recharge of the Culebra with
3 freshwater could also change the pH of Culebra groundwaters from the currently observed range
4 of about 6 to 7 to mildly acidic values, thus (possibly) decreasing the retardation of dissolved Pu
5 and Am. (These changes in ionic strength, Eh, and pH could also affect mobilities of Th, U, and
6 neptunium (Np), but the long-term performance of the WIPP is much less sensitive to the
7 mobilities of these radioelements than to those of Pu and Am.)

8 There is still considerable uncertainty regarding the extent and timing of recharge to the Culebra.
9 Lambert (1986), Lambert and Carter (1987), and Lambert and Harvey (1987) used a variety of
10 stable and radiogenic isotopic-dating techniques to conclude that the Rustler (and the Dewey
11 Lake) have been closed hydrologic systems for several thousand to a few tens of thousands of
12 years. In other words, the last significant recharge of the Rustler occurred during the late
13 Pleistocene in response to higher levels of precipitation and infiltration associated with the most
14 recent continental glaciation of North America, and the current flow field in the Culebra is the
15 result of the slow discharge of groundwater from this unit. Other investigators have agreed that
16 it is possible that Pleistocene recharge has contributed to present-day flow patterns in the
17 Culebra, but that current patterns are also consistent with significant current recharge (Haug et al.
18 1987; Davies 1989). Still others (Chapman 1986, 1988) have rejected Lambert's interpretations
19 in favor of exclusively modern recharge, at least in some areas. For example, the low salinity of
20 Hydrochemical Zone B south of the WIPP site could represent dilution of Culebra groundwater
21 with significant quantities of recently introduced meteoric water (see Siegel et al. 1991, pp. 2-
22 57–2-62 and Figure 2-17 for definitions and locations of the four hydrochemical facies in the
23 Culebra in and around the WIPP site).

24 The current program to explain the cause(s) of the rising water levels observed in Culebra
25 monitoring wells may elucidate the nature and timing of recharge. However, the justification of
26 this screening decision does not depend on how this issue is resolved. If recharge occurs mainly
27 during periods of high precipitation (pluvials) associated with periods of continental glaciation,
28 the consequences of such recharge are probably already reflected in the ranges of geochemical
29 conditions currently observed in the Culebra as a whole, as well as along the likely offsite
30 transport pathway (the direction of flow from the point(s) at which brines from the repository
31 would enter the Culebra in the event of human intrusion to the south or south-southeast and
32 eventually to the boundary of the WIPP site). Hence, the effects of recharge, (possible)
33 freshwater intrusion, and (possible) concomitant changes in groundwater Eh and pH can be
34 screened out on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the far-field barrier. The
35 reasons for the conclusion that the effects of pluvial recharge are inconsequential (i.e., are
36 already included among existing variations in geochemical conditions) are (1) as many as 50
37 continental glaciations and associated pluvials have occurred since the late Pliocene Epoch
38 2.5 million years ago (2.5 Ma BP); (2) the glaciations and pluvials that have occurred since about
39 0.5 to 1 Ma BP have been significantly more severe than those that occurred prior to 1 Ma BP
40 (see, for example, Servant 2001); (3) the studies that quantified the retardation of Th, U, Pu, and
41 Am for the CCA PA calculations and the CCA Performance Assessment Verification Test
42 (PAVT) were carried out under conditions that encompass those observed along the likely
43 Culebra off-site transport pathway (Brush 1996; Brush and Storz 1996); and (4) these studies
44 demonstrated that conditions in the Culebra are favorable for retardation of actinides despite the
45 effects of as many as 50 periods of recharge.

1 It is also worth noting that the choice of the most recent glacial maximum as an upper limit for
2 possible climatic changes during the 10,000-year (yr) WIPP regulatory period (Swift 1991; the
3 CCA, Appendix CLI) established conservative upper limits for precipitation and recharge of the
4 Culebra at the WIPP site. The review by Swift (1991), later incorporated in the CCA, Appendix
5 CLI, provides evidence that precipitation in New Mexico did not attain its maximum level (about
6 60-100% of current precipitation) until a few thousand years before the last glacial maximum.
7 Swift (1991) pointed out,

8 Prior to the last glacial maximum 22 to 18 ka BP, evidence from mid- Wisconsin faunal
9 assemblages in caves in southern New Mexico, including the presence of extralimital species such
10 as the desert tortoise that are now restricted to warmer climates, suggests warm summers and mild,
11 relatively dry winters (Harris 1987, 1988). Lacustrine evidence confirms the interpretation that
12 conditions prior to and during the glacial advance that were generally drier than those at the glacial
13 maximum. Permanent water did not appear in what was later to be a major lake in the Estancia
14 Valley in central New Mexico until sometime before 24 ka BP (Bachhuber 1989). Late-
15 Pleistocene lake levels in the San Agustin Plains in western New Mexico remained low until
16 approximately 26.4 ka BP, and the $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ record from ostracode shells suggests that mean annual
17 temperatures at that location did not decrease significantly until approximately 22 ka BP (Phillips
18 et al. 1992).

19 Therefore, it is likely that precipitation and recharge did not attain levels characteristic of the
20 most recent glacial maximum until about 70,000 to 75,000 years after the last glaciations had
21 begun. High-resolution, deep-sea $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ data (and other data) reviewed by Servant (2001, Figure
22 1 and Figure 2) support the conclusion that, although the volume of ice incorporated in
23 continental ice sheets can expand rapidly at the start of a glaciation, attainment of maximum
24 volume does not occur until a few thousand or a few tens of thousands of years prior to the
25 termination of the approximately 100,000-yr glaciations that have occurred during the last 0.5 to
26 1 Ma BP. Therefore, it is unlikely that precipitation and recharge will reach their maximum
27 levels during the 10,000-yr regulatory period.

28 If, on the other hand, significant recharge occurs throughout both phases of the glacial-
29 interglacial cycles, the conclusion that the effects of pluvial and modern recharge are
30 inconsequential (i.e., are already reflected by existing variations in geochemical conditions) is
31 also still valid. The effects of future natural changes in groundwater chemistry have been
32 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
33 disposal system.

34 **SCR-4.4 Geomorphological FEPs**

35 **SCR-4.4.1 Physiography**

36 **SCR-4.4.1.1 FEP Number:** N39

37 **FEP Title:** *Physiography*

38 **SCR-4.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

39 Relevant aspects of the *Physiography*, geomorphology, and topography of the region around the
40 WIPP are accounted for in PA calculations.

1 **SCR-4.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

3 **SCR-4.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

4 Physiography and geomorphology are discussed in detail in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.1.4,
5 and are accounted for in the setup of the PA calculations (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2).

6 **SCR-4.4.1.2 FEP Number: N40**

7 **FEP Title:** *Impact of a Large Meteorite*

8 **SCR-4.4.1.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P**

9 Disruption arising from the *Impact of a Large Meteorite* has been eliminated from PA
10 calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

11 **SCR-4.4.1.3 Summary of New Information**

12 This FEP has been modified to correct errors discovered in Equations (SCR.5) and (SCR.6). As
13 a result of these error corrections, it is necessary to select an upper bound on the distribution of
14 meteorite sizes; Ceres, the largest known asteroid, has been used to determine the upper bound.

15 **SCR-4.4.1.4 Screening Argument**

16 Meteors frequently enter the earth's atmosphere, but most of these are small and burn up before
17 reaching the ground. Of those that reach the ground, most produce only small impact craters that
18 would have no effect on the postclosure integrity of a repository 650 m (2,150 ft) below the
19 ground surface. While the depth of a crater may be only one-eighth of its diameter, the depth of
20 the disrupted and brecciated material is typically one-third of the overall crater diameter (Grieve
21 1987, p. 248). Direct disruption of waste at the WIPP would only occur with a crater larger than
22 1.8 km (1.1 mi) in diameter. Even if waste were not directly disrupted, the impact of a large
23 meteorite could create a zone of fractured rocks beneath and around the crater. The extent of
24 such a zone would depend on the rock type. For sedimentary rocks, the zone may extend to a
25 depth of half the crater diameter or more (Dence et al. 1977, p. 263). The impact of a meteorite
26 causing a crater larger than 1 km (0.6 mi) in diameter could thus fracture the Salado above the
27 repository.

28 Geological evidence for meteorite impacts on earth is rare because many meteorites fall into the
29 oceans and erosion and sedimentation serve to obscure craters that form on land. Dietz (1961)
30 estimated that meteorites that cause craters larger than 1 km (0.6 mi) in diameter strike the earth
31 at the rate of about one every 10,000 years (equivalent to about 2×10^{-13} impacts per square
32 kilometer per year). Using observations from the Canadian Shield, Hartmann (1965, p. 161)
33 estimated a frequency of between 0.8×10^{-13} and 17×10^{-13} impacts/km²/yr for impacts causing
34 craters larger than 1 km (0.6 mi). Frequencies estimated for larger impacts in studies reported by
35 Grieve (1987, p. 263) can be extrapolated to give a rate of about 1.3×10^{-12} impacts/km²/yr for
36 craters larger than 1 km (0.6 mi). It is commonly assumed that meteorite impacts are randomly

1 distributed across the earth's surface, although Halliday (1964, pp. 267-277) calculated that the
 2 rate of impact in polar regions would be some 50 to 60 percent of that in equatorial regions. The
 3 frequencies reported by Grieve (1987) would correspond to an overall rate of about 1 per 1,000
 4 years on the basis of a random distribution.

5 Assuming the higher estimated impact rate of 17×10^{-13} impacts per square kilometer per year
 6 for impacts leading to fracturing of sufficient extent to affect a deep repository, and assuming a
 7 repository footprint of 1.4 km \times 1.6 km (0.9 mi \times 1.0 mi) for the WIPP, yields a frequency of
 8 about 4×10^{-12} impacts per year for a direct hit above the repository. This impact frequency is
 9 several orders of magnitude below the screening threshold of 10^{-4} per 10,000 years provided in
 10 40 CFR \S 194.32(d).

11 Meteorite hits directly above the repository footprint are not the only impacts of concern,
 12 however, because large craters may disrupt the waste panels even if the center of the crater is
 13 outside the repository area. It is possible to calculate the frequency of meteorite impacts that
 14 could disrupt a deep repository such as the WIPP by using the conservative model of a cylinder
 15 of rock fractured to a depth equal to one-half the crater diameter, as shown in the CCA,
 16 Appendix SCR, Figure SCR-1. The area within which a meteorite could impact the repository is
 17 calculated by

$$18 \quad S_D = \left(L + 2 \times \frac{D}{2} \right) \times \left(W + 2 \times \frac{D}{2} \right), \quad (\text{SCR.1})$$

19 where

- 20 L = length of the repository footprint (km)
- 21 W = width of the repository footprint (km)
- 22 D = diameter of the impact crater (km)
- 23 S_D = area of the region where the crater would disrupt the repository (km²)

24 There are insufficient data on meteorites that have struck the earth to derive a distribution
 25 function for the size of craters directly. Using meteorite impacts on the moon as an analogy,
 26 however, Grieve (1987, p. 257) derived the following distribution function:

$$27 \quad F_D \propto D^{-1.8} \quad (\text{SCR.2})$$

28 where

- 29 F_D = frequency of impacts resulting in craters larger than D (impacts/km²/yr).

30 If $f(D)$ denotes the frequency of impacts giving craters of diameter D , then the frequency of
 31 impacts giving craters larger than D is

$$32 \quad F_D = \int_D^{\infty} f(D) dD \quad (\text{SCR.3})$$

1 and

$$2 \quad f(D) = F_1 \times 1.8 \times D^{-2.8}, \quad (\text{SCR.4})$$

3 where

- 4 F_1 = frequency of impacts resulting in craters larger than 1 km (impacts/km²/yr)
 5 $f(D)$ = frequency of impacts resulting in craters of diameter D ((impacts/km²/yr)

6 The overall frequency of meteorite impacts, in the size range of interest, that could disrupt or
 7 fracture the repository is thus given by

$$8 \quad N = \int_{2h}^M f(D) \times S_D dD, \quad (\text{SCR.5})$$

9 where

- 10 h = depth to repository (kilometers),
 11 M = maximum size of meteorite considered (kilometers)
 12 N = frequency of impacts leading to disruption of the repository (impacts per year),
 13 and

$$14 \quad N = 1.8F_1 \left[\frac{(M)^{0.2} - (2h)^{0.2}}{0.2} - LW \frac{(M)^{-1.8} - (2h)^{-1.8}}{1.8} - (L + W) \frac{(M)^{-0.8} - (2h)^{-0.8}}{0.8} \right]. \quad (\text{SCR.6})$$

15 Conservatively using the size (933 km [550 mi]) of the largest known asteroid, Ceres (Tedesco
 16 1992), for the maximum size considered and if it is assumed that the repository is located at a
 17 depth of 650 m (2,150 ft) and has a footprint area of 1.4 km × 1.6 km (0.9 mi × 1.0 mi) and that
 18 meteorites creating craters larger than 1 km in diameter hit the earth at a frequency (F_1) of $17 \times$
 19 10^{-13} impacts/km²/yr, then Equation (SCR.6) gives a frequency of approximately 5.6×10^{-11}
 20 impacts per year for impacts disrupting the repository. If impacts are randomly distributed over
 21 time, this corresponds to a probability of 5.6×10^{-7} over 10,000 years.

22 Similar calculations have been performed that indicate rates of impact of between 10^{-12} and 10^{-13}
 23 per year for meteorites large enough to disrupt a deep repository (see, for example, Hartmann
 24 1979, Kärnbränslesakerhet 1978, Claiborne and Gera 1974, Cranwell et al. 1990, and Thorne
 25 1992). Meteorite impact can thus be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 26 probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

27 Assuming a random or nearly random distribution of meteorite impacts, cratering at any location
 28 is inevitable given sufficient time. Although repository depth and host-rock lithology may
 29 reduce the consequences of a meteorite impact, there are no repository locations or engineered
 30 systems that can reduce the probability of impact over 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.4.1.5 FEP Number:** N41 and N42
2 **FEP Titles:** *Mechanical Weathering* (N41)
3 *Chemical Weathering* (N42)

4 **SCR-4.4.1.5.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

5 The effects of *Chemical Weathering* and *Mechanical Weathering* have been eliminated from PA
6 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-4.4.1.5.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

9 **SCR-4.4.1.5.3 Screening Argument**

10 Mechanical weathering and chemical weathering are assumed to be occurring at or near the
11 surface around the WIPP site through processes such as exfoliation and leaching. The extent of
12 these processes is limited and they will contribute little to the overall rate of erosion in the area
13 or to the availability of material for other erosional processes. The effects of chemical
14 weathering and mechanical weathering have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
15 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

16 **SCR-4.4.1.6 FEP Numbers:** N43, N44, and N45
17 **FEP Titles:** *Aeolian Erosion* (N43)
18 *Fluvial Erosion* (N44)
19 *Mass Wasting* (N45)

20 **SCR-4.4.1.6.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

21 The effects of *Fluvial Erosion*, *Aeolian Erosion*, and *Mass Wasting* in the region of the WIPP
22 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
23 of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-4.4.1.6.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

26 **SCR-4.4.1.6.3 Screening Argument**

27 The geomorphological regime on the Mescalero Plain (Los Medaños) in the region of the WIPP
28 is dominated by aeolian processes. Dunes are present in the area, and although some are
29 stabilized by vegetation, aeolian erosion will occur as they migrate across the area. Old dunes
30 will be replaced by new dunes, and no significant changes in the overall thickness of aeolian
31 material are likely to occur.

32 Currently, precipitation in the region of the WIPP is too low (about 33 centimeters [cm] [13
33 inches (in.)] per year) to cause perennial streams, and the relief in the area is too low for

1 extensive sheet flood erosion during storms. An increase in precipitation to around 61 cm
2 (24 in.) per year in cooler climatic conditions could result in perennial streams, but the nature of
3 the relief and the presence of dissolution hollows and sinks will ensure that these streams remain
4 small. Significant fluvial erosion is not expected during the next 10,000 years.

5 Mass wasting (the downslope movement of material caused by the direct effect of gravity) is
6 important only in terms of sediment erosion in regions of steep slopes. In the vicinity of the
7 WIPP, mass wasting will be insignificant under the climatic conditions expected over the next
8 10,000 years.

9 Erosion from wind, water, and mass wasting will continue in the WIPP region throughout the
10 next 10,000 years at rates similar to those occurring at present. These rates are too low to affect
11 the performance of the disposal system significantly. Thus the effects of fluvial erosion, aeolian
12 erosion, and mass wasting have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
13 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

14 **SCR-4.4.1.7 FEP Number:** N50
15 **FEP Title:** *Soil Development*

16 **SCR-4.4.1.7.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

17 *Soil Development* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to
18 the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-4.4.1.7.2 Summary of New Information**

20 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

21 **SCR-4.4.1.7.3 Screening Argument**

22 The Mescalero caliche is a well-developed calcareous remnant of an extensive soil profile across
23 the WIPP site and adjacent areas. Although this unit may be up to 3 m (10 ft) thick, it is not
24 continuous and does not prevent infiltration to the underlying formations. At Nash Draw, this
25 caliche, dated in Lappin et al. (1989, pp. 2-4) at 410,000 to 510,000 years old, is present in
26 collapse blocks, indicating some growth of Nash Draw in the late Pleistocene. Localized gypsite
27 spring deposits about 25,000 years old occur along the eastern flank of Nash Draw, but the
28 springs are not currently active. The Berino soil, interpreted as 333,000 years old (Rosholt and
29 McKinney 1980, Table 5), is a thin soil horizon above the Mescalero caliche. The persistence of
30 these soils on the Livingston Ridge and the lack of deformation indicates the relative stability of
31 the WIPP region over the past half-million years.

32 Continued growth of caliche may occur in the future but will be of low consequence in terms of
33 its effect on infiltration. Other soils in the area are not extensive enough to affect the amount of
34 infiltration that reaches underlying aquifers. Soil development has been eliminated from PA
35 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.5 Surface Hydrological FEPs**

2 **SCR-4.5.1 Depositional Processes**

- 3 **SCR-4.5.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N46, N47, N48, and N49
4 **FEP Titles:** *Aeolian Deposition* (N46)
5 *Fluvial Deposition* (47)
6 *Lacustrine Deposition* (N48)
7 *Mass Waste (Deposition)* (N49)

8 **SCR-4.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

9 The effects of *Aeolian Deposition*, *Fluvial Deposition*, and *Lacustrine Deposition* and
10 sedimentation in the region of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
11 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

12 **SCR-4.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

14 **SCR-4.5.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

15 The geomorphological regime on the Mescalero Plain (Los Medaños) in the region of the WIPP
16 is dominated by aeolian processes, but although some dunes are stabilized by vegetation, no
17 significant changes in the overall thickness of aeolian material are expected to occur.
18 Vegetational changes during periods of wetter climate may further stabilize the dune fields, but
19 aeolian deposition is not expected to significantly increase the overall thickness of the superficial
20 deposits.

21 The limited extent of water courses in the region of the WIPP, under both present-day conditions
22 and under the expected climatic conditions, will restrict the amount of fluvial deposition and
23 lacustrine deposition in the region.

24 Mass wasting (deposition) may be significant if it results in dams or modifies streams. In the
25 region around the WIPP, the Pecos River forms a significant water course some 19 km (12 mi)
26 away, but the broadness of its valley precludes either significant mass wasting or the formation
27 of large impoundments.

28 Sedimentation from wind, water, and mass wasting is expected to continue in the WIPP region
29 throughout the next 10,000 years at the low rates similar to those occurring at present. These
30 rates are too low to significantly affect the performance of the disposal system. Thus the effects
31 of aeolian deposition, fluvial deposition, and lacustrine deposition and sedimentation resulting
32 from mass wasting have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

1 **SCR-4.5.2 Streams and Lakes**

2 **SCR-4.5.2.1 FEPs Number:** N51

3 **FEPs Title:** *Stream and River Flow*

4 **SCR-4.5.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

5 *Stream and River Flow* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
6 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-4.5.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

9 **SCR-4.5.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

10 No perennial streams are present at the WIPP site, and there is no evidence in the literature
11 indicating that such features existed at this location since the Pleistocene (see, for example,
12 Powers et al. 1978; and Bachman 1974, 1981, and 1987b). The Pecos River is approximately
13 19 km (12 mi) from the WIPP site and more than 90 m (300 ft) lower in elevation. Stream and
14 river flow has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
15 performance of the disposal system.

16 **SCR-4.5.2.2 FEP Number:** N52

17 **FEP Title:** *Surface Water Bodies*

18 **SCR-4.5.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

19 The effects of *Surface Water Bodies* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
20 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-4.5.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

22 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

23 **SCR-4.5.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

24 No standing surface water bodies are present at the WIPP site, and there is no evidence in the
25 literature indicating that such features existed at this location during or after the Pleistocene (see,
26 for example, Powers et al. 1978; and Bachman 1974, 1981, and 1987b). In Nash Draw, lakes
27 and spoil ponds associated with potash mines are located at elevations 30 m (100 ft) below the
28 elevation of the land surface at the location of the waste panels. There is no evidence in the
29 literature to suggest that Nash Draw was formed by stream erosion or was at any time the
30 location of a deep body of standing water, although shallow playa lakes have existed there at
31 various times. Based on these factors, the formation of large lakes is unlikely and the formation
32 of smaller lakes and ponds is of little consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 The effects of surface water bodies have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the
2 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

3 **SCR-4.5.3 Groundwater Recharge and Discharge**

4 **SCR-4.5.3.1 FEP Numbers:** N53, N54, and N55

5 **FEP Titles:** *Groundwater Discharge (N53)*

6 *Groundwater Recharge (N54)*

7 *Infiltration (N55)*

8 **SCR-4.5.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

9 *Groundwater Recharge, Groundwater Discharge, and Infiltration* are accounted for in PA
10 calculations.

11 **SCR-4.5.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

12 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

13 **SCR-4.5.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

14 The groundwater basin described in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4 is governed by flow
15 from areas where the water table is high to areas where the water table is low. The height of the
16 water table is governed by the amount of groundwater recharge reaching the water table, which
17 in turn is a function of the vertical hydraulic conductivity and the partitioning of precipitation
18 between evapotranspiration, runoff, and Infiltration. Flow within the Rustler is also governed by
19 the amount of groundwater discharge that takes place from the basin. In the region around the
20 WIPP, the principal discharge areas are along Nash Draw and the Pecos River. Groundwater
21 flow modeling accounts for infiltration, recharge, and discharge (the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section
22 2.2.1.4 and Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.10.2).

23 **SCR-4.5.3.2 FEP Number:** N56

24 **FEP Title:** *Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge*

25 **SCR-4.5.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

26 *Changes in Groundwater Recharge and Discharge* arising as a result of climate change are
27 accounted for in PA calculations.

28 **SCR-4.5.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

29 No new information has become available that would change the screening decision for this FEP.

30 **SCR-4.5.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

31 Changes in recharge may affect groundwater flow and radionuclide transport in units such as the
32 Culebra and Magenta dolomites. Changes in the surface environment driven by natural climate

1 change are expected to occur over the next 10,000 years (see FEPs N59 to N63). Groundwater
2 basin modeling (the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4) indicates that a change in recharge will
3 affect the height of the water table in the area of the WIPP, and that this will in turn affect the
4 direction and rate of groundwater flow.

5 The present-day water table in the vicinity of the WIPP is within the Dewey Lake at about 980 m
6 (3,215 ft) above mean sea level (the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4.2.1). An increase in
7 recharge relative to present-day conditions would raise the water table, potentially as far as the
8 local ground surface. Similarly, a decrease in recharge could result in a lowering of the water
9 table. The low transmissivity of the Dewey Lake and the Rustler ensures that any such lowering
10 of the water table will be at a slow rate, and lateral discharge from the groundwater basin is
11 expected to persist for several thousand years after any decrease in recharge. Under the
12 anticipated changes in climate over the next 10,000 years, the water table will not fall below the
13 base of the Dewey Lake, and dewatering of the Culebra is not expected to occur during this
14 period (the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4).

15 Changes in groundwater recharge and discharge is accounted for in PA calculations through
16 definition of the boundary conditions for flow and transport in the Culebra (the CCA, Chapter
17 6.0, Section 6.4.9).

18 **SCR-4.5.3.3 FEP Numbers:** N57 and N58
19 **FEP Titles:** *Lake Formation* (N57)
20 *River Flooding* (N58)

21 **SCR-4.5.3.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

22 The effects of *River Flooding* and *Lake Formation* have been eliminated from PA calculations
23 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-4.5.3.3.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

26 **SCR-4.5.3.3.3 Screening Argument**

27 Intermittent flooding of stream channels and the formation of shallow lakes will occur in the
28 WIPP region over the next 10,000 years. These may have a short-lived and local effect on the
29 height of the water table, but are unlikely to affect groundwater flow in the Culebra.

30 Future occurrences of playa lakes or other longer-term floods will be remote from the WIPP and
31 will have little consequence on system performance in terms of groundwater flow at the site.
32 There is no reason to believe that any impoundments or lakes could form over the WIPP site
33 itself. Thus river flooding and lake formation have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
34 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.6 Climate EPs**

2 **SCR-4.6.1 Climate and Climate Changes**

3 **SCR-4.6.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N59 and N60

4 **FEP Titles:** *Precipitation (N59)*

5 *Temperature (N60)*

6 **SCR-4.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

7 *Precipitation and Temperature* are accounted for in PA calculations.

8 **SCR-4.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

10 **SCR-4.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

11 The climate and meteorology of the region around the WIPP are described in the CCA, Section
12 2.5.2. Precipitation in the region is low (about 33 cm [13 in.] per yr) and temperatures are
13 moderate with a mean annual temperature of about 63 °F (17 °C). Precipitation and temperature
14 are important controls on the amount of recharge that reaches the groundwater system and are
15 accounted for in PA calculations by use of a sampled parameter for scaling flow velocity in the
16 Culebra (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.4.6).

17 **SCR-4.6.1.2 FEP Number:** N61

18 **FEP Title:** *Climate Change*

19 **SCR-4.6.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

20 *Climate Change* is accounted for in PA calculations.

21 **SCR-4.6.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

22 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

23 **SCR-4.6.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

24 Climate changes are instigated by changes in the earth's orbit and by feedback mechanisms
25 within the atmosphere and hydrosphere. Models of these mechanisms, combined with
26 interpretations of the geological record, suggest that the climate will become cooler and wetter in
27 the WIPP region during the next 10,000 years as a result of natural causes. Other changes, such
28 as fluctuations in radiation intensity from the sun and variability within the many feedback
29 mechanisms, will modify this climatic response to orbital changes. The available evidence
30 suggests that these changes will be less extreme than those arising from orbital fluctuations.

1 The effect of a change to cooler and wetter conditions is considered to be an increase in the
2 amount of recharge, which in turn will affect the height of the water table (see FEPs N53 through
3 N56, Section SCR-4.5.3.1 and SCR-4.5.3.2). The height of the water table across the
4 groundwater basin is an important control on the rate and direction of groundwater flow within
5 the Culebra (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4), and hence potentially on transport of
6 radionuclides released to the Culebra through the shafts or intrusion boreholes. Climate change
7 is accounted for in PA calculations through a sampled parameter used to scale groundwater flow
8 velocity in the Culebra (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.8).

9 **SCR-4.6.1.3 FEP Numbers:** N62 and N63

10 **FEP Titles:** *Glaciation* (N62)

11 *Permafrost* (N63)

12 **SCR-4.6.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

13 *Glaciation* and the effects of *Permafrost* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
14 of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

15 **SCR-4.6.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

17 **SCR-4.6.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

18 No evidence exists to suggest that the northern part of the Delaware Basin has been covered by
19 continental glaciers at any time since the beginning of the Paleozoic Era. During the maximum
20 extent of continental glaciation in the Pleistocene Epoch, glaciers extended into northeastern
21 Kansas at their closest approach to southeastern New Mexico. There is no evidence that alpine
22 glaciers formed in the region of the WIPP during the Pleistocene glacial periods.

23 According to the theory that relates the periodicity of climate change to perturbations in the
24 earth's orbit, a return to a full glacial cycle within the next 10,000 years is highly unlikely
25 (Imbrie and Imbrie 1980, p. 951).

26 Thus glaciation has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
27 occurrence over the next 10,000 years. Similarly, a number of processes associated with the
28 proximity of an ice sheet or valley glacier, such as permafrost and accelerated slope erosion
29 (solifluction) have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
30 occurrence over the next 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-4.7 Marine FEPs**

2 **SCR-4.7.1 Seas, Sedimentation, and Level Changes**

3 **SCR-4.7.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N64 and N65

4 **FEP Titles:** *Seas and Oceans* (N64)
5 *Estuaries* (N65)

6 **SCR-4.7.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

7 The effects of *Estuaries* and *Seas and Oceans* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
8 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-4.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

11 **SCR-4.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

12 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the Pacific Ocean and from the Gulf of
13 Mexico. Estuaries and seas and oceans have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on
14 the basis of low consequence to the disposal system.

15 **SCR-4.7.1.2 FEPs Numbers:** N66 and N67

16 **FEPs Titles:** *Coastal Erosion* (N66)
17 *Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition* (N67)

18 **SCR-4.7.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

19 *Coastal Erosion* and *Marine Sediment Transport and Deposition* have been eliminated from PA
20 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-4.7.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

22 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

23 **SCR-4.7.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

24 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. The
25 effects of coastal erosion and marine sediment transport and deposition have therefore been
26 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
27 disposal system.

1 **SCR-4.7.1.3 FEP Number:** N68
2 **FEP Title:** *Sea Level Changes*

3 **SCR-4.7.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 The effects of both short-term and long-term *Sea Level Changes* have been eliminated from PA
5 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-4.7.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

8 **SCR-4.7.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

9 The WIPP site is some 1,036 m (3,400 ft) above sea level. Global sea level changes may result
10 in sea levels as much as 140 m (460 ft) below that of the present day during glacial periods,
11 according to Chappell and Shackleton (1986, p. 138). This can have marked effects on coastal
12 aquifers. During the next 10,000 years, the global sea level can be expected to drop towards this
13 glacial minimum, but this will not affect the groundwater system in the vicinity of the WIPP.
14 Short-term changes in sea level, brought about by events such as meteorite impact, tsunamis,
15 seiches, and hurricanes may raise water levels by several tens of meters. Such events have a
16 maximum duration of a few days and will have no effect on the surface or groundwater systems
17 at the WIPP site. Anthropogenic-induced global warming has been conjectured by Warrick and
18 Oerlemans (1990, p. 278) to result in longer-term sea level rise. The magnitude of this rise,
19 however, is not expected to be more than a few meters, and such a variation will have no effect
20 on the groundwater system in the WIPP region. Thus the effects of both short-term and long-
21 term sea level changes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
22 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 **SCR-4.8 Ecological FEPs**

24 **SCR-4.8.1 Flora and Fauna**

25 **SCR-4.8.1.1 FEP Numbers:** N69 and N70
26 **FEP Titles:** *Plants* (N69)
27 *Animals* (N70)

28 **SCR-4.8.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

29 The effects of the natural *Plants* and *Animals* (flora and fauna) in the region of the WIPP have
30 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
31 disposal system.

32 **SCR-4.8.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

33 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

1 **SCR-4.8.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 The terrestrial and aquatic ecology of the region around the WIPP is described in the CCA,
3 Chapter 2.0, Section 2.4.1. The plants in the region are predominantly shrubs and grasses. The
4 most conspicuous animals in the area are jackrabbits and cottontail rabbits. The effects of this
5 flora and fauna in the region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
6 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-4.8.1.2 FEP Number:** N71

8 **FEP Title:** *Microbes*

9 **SCR-4.8.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C *UP for colloidal effects and gas generation*

10 The effects of *Microbes* on the region of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations
11 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

12 **SCR-4.8.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

14 **SCR-4.8.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

15 Microbes are presumed to be present with the thin soil horizons. Gillow et al. (2000)
16 characterized the microbial distribution in Culebra groundwater at the WIPP site. Culebra
17 groundwater contained $1.51 \pm 1.08 \times 10^5$ cells/milliliter (mL). The dimension of the cells are
18 0.75 micrometer (μm) in length and 0.58 μm in width, right at the upper limit of colloidal
19 particle size. Gillow et al. (2000) also found that at pH 5.0, Culebra denitrifier CDn (0.90 ± 0.02
20 $\times 10^8$ cells/mL) removed 32% of the U added to sorption experiments, which is equivalent to 180
21 ± 10 milligrams U/g of dry cells. Another isolate from the WIPP (*Halomonas* sp.) ($3.55 \pm 0.11 \times$
22 10^8 cells/mL) sorbed 79% of the added U. Because of their large sizes, microbial cells as
23 colloidal particles will be rapidly filtered out in the Culebra formation. Therefore, the original
24 FEP screening decision that microbes in groundwater have an insignificant impact on
25 radionuclide transport in the Culebra formation remains valid. A similar conclusion has also been
26 arrived at for Swedish repository environments (Pedersen 1999).

27 **SCR-4.8.1.3 FEP Number:** N72

28 **FEP Title:** *Natural Ecological Development*

29 **SCR-4.8.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

30 The effects of *Natural Ecological Development* likely to occur in the region of the WIPP have
31 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
32 disposal system.

33 **SCR-4.8.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

34 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

1 **SCR-4.8.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

2 The region around the WIPP is sparsely vegetated as a result of the climate and poor soil quality.
3 Wetter periods are expected during the regulatory period, but botanical records indicate that,
4 even under these conditions, dense vegetation will not be present in the region (Swift 1992; see
5 the CCA, Appendix CLI, p. 17). The effects of the indigenous fauna are of low consequence to
6 the performance of the disposal system and no natural events or processes have been identified
7 that would lead to a change in this fauna that would be of consequence to system performance.
8 Natural ecological development in the region of the WIPP has therefore been eliminated from
9 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-5.0 Screening of Human-Induced EPs**

2 The following section presents screening arguments and decisions for human-induced EPs.
 3 Table SCR-2 provides summary information regarding changes to human-induced EPs since the
 4 CCA. Of the 58 human-induced EPs listed in the CRA-2004, 46 remain unchanged, 8 were
 5 updated with new information or were edited for clarity and completeness, 1 screening decision
 6 has been changed, and 3 EPs were split into 6 similar but more descriptive FEPs. Thus, for the
 7 CRA-2009, there are now 61 human-induced EPs in the FEPs baseline.

8 **SCR-5.1 Human-Induced Geological EPs**

9 **SCR-5.1.1 Drilling**

10 **SCR-5.1.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H1, H2, H4, H8, and H9

11 **FEP Titles:** *Oil and Gas Exploration (H1)*
 12 *Potash Exploration (H2)*
 13 *Oil and Gas Exploitation (H4)*
 14 *Other Resources (drilling for) (H8)*
 15 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery (drilling for) (H9)*

16 **SCR-5.1.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 17 DP (Future)

18 The effects of historical, current, and near-future drilling associated with *Oil and Gas*
 19 *Exploration, Potash Exploration, Oil and Gas Exploitation, Drilling for Other Resources,* and
 20 *Drilling for Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 21 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system (see screening discussion for
 22 H21, H22, and H23). Oil and gas exploration, potash exploration, oil and gas exploitation,
 23 drilling for other resources, and enhanced oil and gas recovery in the future is accounted for in
 24 DP scenarios through incorporation of the rate of future drilling as specified in section 194.33.

25 **SCR-5.1.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

26 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

27 **SCR-5.1.1.1.3 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

28 Resource exploration and exploitation are the most common reasons for drilling in the Delaware
 29 Basin and are the most likely reasons for drilling in the near future. The WIPP location has been
 30 evaluated for the occurrence of natural resources in economic quantities. Powers et al. (1978)
 31 (the CCA, Appendix GCR, Chapter 8) investigated the potential for exploitation of potash,
 32 hydrocarbons, caliche, gypsum, salt, uranium, sulfur, and lithium. Also, in 1995, the New
 33 Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources (NMBMMR) performed a reevaluation of the
 34 mineral resources at and within 1.6 km (1 mi) around the WIPP site (New Mexico Bureau of
 35 Mines and Mineral Resources 1995). While some resources do exist at the WIPP site, for the
 36 HCN time frames, such drilling is assumed to only occur outside the WIPP site boundary. This

1 assumption is based on current federal ownership and management of the WIPP during
2 operations, and assumed effectiveness of institutional controls for the 100-yr period immediately
3 following site closure.

4 Drilling associated with oil and gas exploration and oil and gas exploitation currently takes place
5 in the vicinity of the WIPP. For example, gas is extracted from reservoirs in the Morrow
6 Formation, some 4,200 m (14,000 ft) below the surface, and oil is extracted from shallower units
7 within the Delaware Mountain Group, some 2,150 to 2,450 m (7,000 to 8,000 ft) below the
8 surface.

9 Potash resources in the vicinity of the WIPP are discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section
10 2.3.1.1. Throughout the Carlsbad Potash District (CPD), commercial quantities of potash are
11 restricted to the McNutt, which forms part of the Salado above the repository horizon. Potash
12 exploration and evaluation boreholes have been drilled within and outside the controlled area.
13 Such drilling will continue outside the WIPP land withdrawal boundary, but no longer occurs
14 within the boundary because rights and controls have been transferred to the DOE. Moreover,
15 drilling for the evaluation of potash resources within the boundary will not occur throughout the
16 time period of active institutional controls (AICs).

17 Drilling for other resources has taken place within the Delaware Basin. For example, sulfur
18 extraction using the Frasch process began in 1969 and continued for three decades at the
19 Culberson County Rustler Springs mine near Orla, Texas. In addition, brine wells have been in
20 operation in and about the Delaware Basin for at least as long. Solution mining processes for
21 sulfur, salt (brine), potash, or any other mineral are not addressed in this FEP; only the drilling of
22 the borehole is addressed here. Resource extraction through solution mining and any potential
23 effects are evaluated in Section SCR-5.2.2.3 (*Solution Mining for Potash* [H58]). Nonetheless,
24 the drilling activity associated with the production of other resources is not notably different than
25 drilling for petroleum exploration and exploitation.

26 Drilling for the purposes of reservoir stimulation and subsequent enhanced oil and gas recovery
27 does take place within the Delaware Basin, although systematic, planned waterflooding has not
28 taken place near the WIPP. Instead, injection near the WIPP consists of single-point injectors,
29 rather than broad, grid-type waterflood projects (Hall et al. 2008). In the vicinity of the WIPP,
30 fluid injection usually takes place using boreholes initially drilled as producing wells. Therefore,
31 regardless of the initial intent of a deep borehole, whether in search of petroleum reserves or as
32 an injection point, the drilling event and associated processes are virtually the same. These
33 drilling-related processes are addressed more fully in Section SCR-5.2.1.1 (*Drilling Fluid Flow*
34 [H21]), Section SCR-5.2.1.2 (*Drilling Fluid Loss* [H22]), and Section SCR-5.2.1.3 (*Blowouts*
35 [H23]). Discussion on the effects subsequent to drilling a borehole for the purpose of enhancing
36 oil and gas recovery is discussed in Section SCR-5.2.1.6 (*Enhanced Oil and Gas Production*
37 [H28]).

38 In summary, drilling associated with oil and gas exploration, potash exploration, oil and gas
39 exploitation, enhanced oil and gas recovery, and drilling associated with Other Resources has
40 taken place and is expected to continue in the Delaware Basin. The potential effects of existing
41 and possible near-future boreholes on fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the disposal
42 system are discussed in FEPs H25 through H36 (Section SCR-5.2.1.5, Section SCR-5.2.1.6,

1 Section SCR-5.2.1.7, Section SCR-5.2.1.8, Section SCR-5.2.1.9, Section SCR-5.2.1.10, Section
2 SCR-5.2.1.11, Section SCR-5.2.1.12, and Section SCR-5.2.1.13), where low-consequence
3 screening arguments are provided.

4 **SCR-5.1.1.1.4 Future Human EPs**

5 Criteria in section 194.33 require the DOE to examine the historical rate of drilling for resources
6 in the Delaware Basin. Thus consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(3)(i), the DOE has used the
7 historical record of deep drilling associated with oil and gas exploration, potash exploration, oil
8 and gas exploitation, enhanced oil and gas recovery, and drilling associated with other resources
9 (sulfur exploration) in the Delaware Basin in calculations to determine the rate of future deep
10 drilling in the Delaware Basin (see Section 33 of this application).

11 **SCR-5.1.1.2 FEP Numbers:** H3 and H5

12 **FEP Titles:** *Water Resources Exploration* (H3)
13 *Groundwater Exploitation* (H5)

14 **SCR-5.1.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN) 15 SO-C (Future)

16 The effects of HCN and future drilling associated with *Water Resources Exploration* and
17 *Groundwater Exploitation* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
18 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Historical shallow drilling associated
19 with *Water Resources Exploration* and *Groundwater Exploitation* is accounted for in
20 calculations to determine the rate of future shallow drilling.

21 **SCR-5.1.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

22 The Delaware Basin Monitoring Program records and tracks the development of deep and
23 shallow wells within the vicinity of the WIPP. Updated drilling data is reported annually in the
24 Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report (U.S. Department of Energy 2007b). While this
25 information has been updated since the last recertification, it does not result in a change in the
26 screening arguments or decisions of these FEPs.

27 **SCR-5.1.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

28 Drilling associated with water resources exploration and groundwater exploitation has taken
29 place and is expected to continue in the Delaware Basin. For the most part, water resources in the
30 vicinity of the WIPP are scarce. Elsewhere in the Delaware Basin, potable water occurs in
31 places while some communities rely solely on groundwater sources for drinking water. Even
32 though water resources exploration and groundwater exploitation occur in the Basin, all such
33 exploration/exploitation is confined to shallow drilling that extends no deeper than the Rustler.
34 Thus it will not impact repository performance because of the limited drilling anticipated in the
35 future and the sizeable thickness of low-permeability Salado salt between the waste panels and
36 the shallow groundwaters. Given the limited groundwater resources and minimal consequence
37 of shallow drilling on performance, the effects of HCN and future drilling associated with water
38 resources exploration and groundwater exploitation have been eliminated from PA calculations

1 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The screening
2 argument therefore remains the same as given previously in the CCA.

3 Although shallow drilling for water resources exploration and groundwater exploitation have
4 been eliminated from PA calculations, the Delaware Basin Drilling Surveillance Program
5 (DBDSP) continues to collect drilling data related to water resources, as well as other shallow
6 drilling activities. As shown in the DBDSP 2007 Annual Report (U.S. Department of Energy
7 2007b), the total number of shallow water wells in the Delaware Basin is currently 2,296,
8 compared to 2,331 shallow water wells reported in the CCA. This decrease of 35 wells is
9 attributed primarily to the reclassification of water wells to other types of shallow boreholes.
10 Based on these data, the shallow drilling rate for water resources exploration and groundwater
11 exploitation is essentially the same as reported in the CCA. The distribution of groundwater
12 wells in the Delaware Basin was included in the CCA, Appendix USDW, Section USDW.3.

13 **SCR-5.1.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

14 Water is currently extracted from formations above the Salado, as discussed in the CCA, Chapter
15 2.0, Section 2.3.1.3. The distribution of groundwater wells in the Delaware Basin is included in
16 the CCA, Appendix USDW, Section USDW.3. Water resources exploration and groundwater
17 exploitation are expected to continue in the Delaware Basin.

18 In summary, drilling associated with water resources exploration, groundwater exploitation,
19 potash exploration, oil and gas exploration, oil and gas exploitation, enhanced oil and gas
20 recovery, and drilling to explore other resources has taken place and is expected to continue in
21 the Delaware Basin. The potential effects of existing and possible near-future boreholes on fluid
22 flow and radionuclide transport within the disposal system are discussed in Section SCR-5.2,
23 where low-consequence screening arguments are provided.

24 **SCR-5.1.1.2.5 Future Human EPs**

25 Criteria in section 194.33 require that, to calculate the rates of future shallow and deep drilling in
26 the Delaware Basin, the DOE should examine the historical rate of drilling for resources in the
27 Delaware Basin.

28 Shallow drilling associated with water, potash, sulfur, oil, and gas extraction has taken place in
29 the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years. However, of these resources, only water and potash
30 are present at shallow depths (less than 655 m (2,150 ft) below the surface) within the controlled
31 area. Thus, consistent with 40 CFR § 194.33(b)(4), the DOE includes drilling associated with
32 water resources exploration, potash exploration, and groundwater exploitation in calculations to
33 determine the rate of future shallow drilling in the Delaware Basin. However, the effects of such
34 events are not included in PA calculations because of low consequence to the performance of the
35 disposal system.

1 **SCR-5.1.1.3 FEP Numbers:** H6, H7, H10, H11, and H12
2 **FEP Titles:** *Archeological Investigations* (H6)
3 *Geothermal Energy Production* (H7)
4 *Liquid Waste Disposal* (H10)
5 *Hydrocarbon Storage* (H11)
6 *Deliberate Drilling Intrusion* (H12)

7 **SCR-5.1.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
8 SO-R (Future)

9 Drilling associated with *Archeological Investigations*, *Geothermal Energy Production*, *Liquid*
10 *Waste Disposal*, *Hydrocarbon Storage*, and *Deliberate Drilling Intrusion* have been eliminated
11 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

12 **SCR-5.1.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for these FEPs since the CRA-2004.

14 **SCR-5.1.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

15 **SCR-5.1.1.3.3.1 Historic, Current, and Near-Future EPs**

16 No drilling associated with archeology or geothermal energy production has taken place in the
17 Delaware Basin. Consistent with the future states assumptions in 40 CFR § 194.25(a) (U.S.
18 Environmental Protection Agency 1996), such drilling activities have been eliminated from PA
19 calculations on regulatory grounds.

20 While numerous archeological sites exist at and near the WIPP site, drilling for archeological
21 purposes has not occurred. Archeological investigations have only involved shallow surface
22 disruptions, and do not require deeper investigation by any method, drilling or otherwise.
23 Geothermal energy is not considered to be a potentially exploitable resource because
24 economically attractive geothermal conditions do not exist in the northern Delaware Basin.

25 Oil and gas production byproducts are disposed of underground in the WIPP region, but such
26 liquid waste disposal does not involve drilling of additional boreholes (see H27, Section SCR-
27 5.2.1.6); therefore drilling of boreholes for the explicit purpose of disposal has not occurred.

28 Hydrocarbon storage takes place in the Delaware Basin, but it involves gas injection through
29 existing boreholes into depleted reservoirs (see, for example, Burton et al. 1993, pp. 66-67).
30 Therefore, drilling of boreholes for the explicit purpose of hydrocarbon storage has not occurred.

31 Consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), all near-future Human EPs relating to deliberate drilling
32 intrusion into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
33 grounds.

1 **SCR-5.1.1.3.4 Future Human EPs**

2 Consistent with section 194.33 and the future states assumptions in section 194.25(a), drilling for
3 purposes other than resource recovery (such as WIPP site investigation) and drilling activities
4 that have not taken place in the Delaware Basin over the past 100 years need not be considered in
5 determining future drilling rates. Thus drilling associated with archeological investigations,
6 geothermal energy production, liquid waste disposal, hydrocarbon storage, and deliberate drilling
7 intrusion have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

8 **SCR-5.1.2 Excavation Activities**

9 **SCR-5.1.2.1 FEP Number:** H13

10 **FEP Title:** *Conventional Underground Potash Mining*

11 **SCR-5.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)
12 DP (Future)

13 As prescribed by section 194.32(b), the effects of HCN and future *Conventional Underground*
14 *Potash Mining* are accounted for in PA calculations (see also FEP H37).

15 **SCR-5.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified for this FEP since the CRA-2004.

17 **SCR-5.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 Potash is the only known economically viable resource in the vicinity of the WIPP that is
19 recovered by underground mining (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1). Potash is mined
20 extensively by conventional techniques in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 2.4 km (1.5 mi)
21 from the boundaries of the controlled area of the WIPP. According to existing plans and leases
22 (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1), potash mining is expected to continue in the vicinity
23 of the WIPP in the near future. The DOE assumes that all economically recoverable potash in
24 the vicinity of the disposal system will be extracted in the near future, although there are no
25 economical reserves above the WIPP waste panels (Griswold and Griswold 1999).

26 In summary, conventional underground potash mining is currently taking place and is expected
27 to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future. The potential effects of HCN and
28 future conventional underground potash mining are accounted for in PA calculations as
29 prescribed by section 194.32(b), and as further described in the supplementary information to
30 Part 194 Subpart C, "Compliance Certification and Recertification" and in the Compliance
31 Application Guidance (CAG), Subpart C, § 194.32, Scope of Performance Assessments.

1 **SCR-5.1.2.2 FEP Number:** H14
2 **FEP Title:** *Other Resources (mining for)*

3 **SCR-5.1.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-R (Future)

5 HCN *Mining for Other Resources* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
6 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future *Mining for Other Resources* has
7 been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

8 **SCR-5.1.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

9 Since the CCA, no changes in the resources sought via mining have occurred.

10 **SCR-5.1.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

11 Potash is the only known economically viable resource in the vicinity of the WIPP that is
12 recovered by underground mining. Potash is mined extensively in the region east of Carlsbad
13 and up to 5 km (3.1 mi) from the boundaries of the controlled area. According to existing plans
14 and leases, potash mining is expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.
15 The DOE assumes that all economically recoverable potash in the vicinity of the disposal system
16 will be extracted in the near future. Excavation for resources other than potash and
17 archaeological excavations have taken place or are currently taking place in the Delaware Basin.
18 These activities have not altered the geology of the controlled area significantly, and have been
19 eliminated from PA calculations for the HCN timeframe on the basis of low consequence to the
20 performance of the disposal system.

21 Potash is the only resource that has been identified within the controlled area in a quality similar
22 to that currently mined elsewhere in the Delaware Basin. Future mining for other resources has
23 been eliminated from PA calculations on the regulatory basis of section 194.25(a).

24 **SCR-5.1.2.3 FEP Numbers:** H15 and H16
25 **FEP Titles:** *Tunneling* (H15)
26 *Construction of Underground Facilities* (H16)

27 **SCR-5.1.2.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
28 SO-R (Future)

29 Consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), near-future, human-induced EPs relating to *Tunneling* into
30 the WIPP excavation and *Construction of Underground Facilities* have been eliminated from PA
31 calculations on regulatory grounds. Furthermore, consistent with section 194.25(a), future
32 human-induced EPs relating to *Tunneling* into the WIPP excavation and *Construction of*
33 *Underground Facilities* have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

34 **SCR-5.1.2.3.2 Summary**

35 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

1 **SCR-5.1.2.3.3 Screening Argument**

2 No tunneling or construction of underground facilities (for example, storage, disposal,
 3 accommodation [i.e., dwellings]) has taken place in the Delaware Basin. Mining for potash
 4 occurs (a form of tunneling), but is addressed specifically in (Section SCR-5.1.2.1 (*Conventional*
 5 *Underground Potash Mining* [H13])). Gas storage does take place in the Delaware Basin, but it
 6 involves injection through boreholes into depleted reservoirs, and not excavation (see, for
 7 example, Burton et al. 1993, pp. 66–67).

8 On April 26, 2001, the DOE formally requested approval for the installation of the OMNISita
 9 astrophysics experiment in the core storage alcove of the WIPP underground repository. The
 10 purpose of the project is to develop a prototype neutrino detector to test proof-of-concept
 11 principles and measure background cosmic radiation levels within the WIPP underground
 12 repository. EPA approved the request on August 29, 2001. This project does not require
 13 additional tunneling or excavation beyond the current repository footprint, and therefore does not
 14 impact the screening argument for this FEP.

15 Because tunneling and construction of underground facilities (other than WIPP) have not taken
 16 place in the Delaware Basin, and consistent with the future-states assumptions in section
 17 194.25(a), such excavation activities have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
 18 grounds.

19 **SCR-5.1.2.4 FEP Number:** H17

20 **FEP Title:** *Archeological Excavations*

21 **SCR-5.1.2.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 22 SO-R (Future)

23 HCN *Archeological Excavations* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 24 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future *Archeological Excavations* into
 25 the disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

26 **SCR-5.1.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**

27 No new information related to this FEP has been identified.

28 **SCR-5.1.2.4.3 Screening Argument**

29 Archeological excavations have occurred at or near the WIPP, but involved only minor surface
 30 disturbances. These archaeological excavations may continue into the foreseeable future as other
 31 archeological sites are discovered. These activities have not altered the geology of the controlled
 32 area significantly, and have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 33 consequence to the performance of the disposal system for the HCN timeframe.

34 Also, consistent with section 194.32(a), which limits the scope of consideration of future human
 35 actions to mining and drilling, future archaeological excavations have been eliminated from PA
 36 calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.1.2.5 FEP Number:** H18
2 **FEP Title:** *Deliberate Mining Intrusion*

3 **SCR-5.1.2.5.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
4 SO-R (Future)

5 Consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), near-future, human-induced EPs relating to *Deliberate*
6 *Mining Intrusion* into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from PA calculations on
7 regulatory grounds. Furthermore, consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), future human-induced
8 EPs relating to *Deliberate Mining Intrusion* into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from
9 PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

10 **SCR-5.1.2.5.2 Summary of New Information**

11 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

12 **SCR-5.1.2.5.3 Screening Argument**

13 Consistent with section 194.33(b)(1), all future human-related EPs relating to deliberate mining
14 intrusion into the WIPP excavation have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
15 grounds.

16 **SCR-5.1.3 Subsurface Explosions**

17 **SCR-5.1.3.1 FEPs Number:** H19
18 **FEP Title:** *Explosions for Resource Recovery*

19 **SCR-5.1.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
20 SO-R (Future)

21 Historical underground *Explosions for Resource Recovery* have been eliminated from PA
22 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future
23 underground *Explosions for Resource Recovery* have been eliminated from PA calculations on
24 regulatory grounds.

25 **SCR-5.1.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

26 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

27 **SCR-5.1.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

28 This section discusses subsurface explosions associated with resource recovery that may result in
29 pathways for fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons. The potential effects of
30 explosions on the hydrological characteristics of the disposal system are discussed in Section
31 SCR-5.2.3.1 (*Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions* [H39]).

1 **SCR-5.1.3.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

2 Neither small-scale nor regional-scale explosive techniques to enhance the formation of
 3 hydraulic conductivity form a part of current mainstream oil- and gas-production technology.
 4 Instead, controlled perforating and hydrofracturing are used to improve the performance of oil
 5 and gas boreholes in the Delaware Basin. However, small-scale explosions have been used in
 6 the past to fracture oil- and natural-gas-bearing units to enhance resource recovery. The size of
 7 explosion used to fracture an oil- or gas-bearing unit is limited by the need to contain the damage
 8 within the unit being exploited. In the area surrounding the WIPP, the stratigraphic units with oil
 9 and gas resources are too deep for explosions to affect the performance of the disposal system.
 10 Thus the effects of explosions for resource recovery have been eliminated from PA calculations
 11 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

12 Potash mining is currently taking place and is expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in
 13 the near future. Potash is mined extensively in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 2.4 km
 14 (1.3 mi) from the boundaries of the controlled area. In earlier years conventional drill, blast, load,
 15 and rail-haulage methods were used. Today, continuous miners similar to those used in coal-
 16 mining have been adapted to fit the potash-salt formations. Hence, drilling and blasting
 17 technology is not used in the present day potash mines. Thus the effects of explosions for
 18 resource recovery have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to
 19 the performance of the disposal system.

20 Consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
 21 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole. Therefore, future underground
 22 explosions for resource recovery have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
 23 grounds.

24 **SCR-5.1.3.2 FEPs Number: H20**

25 **FEP Title:** *Underground Nuclear Device Testing*

26 **SCR-5.1.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 27 SO-R (Future)

28 Historical *Underground Nuclear Device Testing* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 29 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future *Underground*
 30 *Nuclear Device Testing* has been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

31 **SCR-5.1.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

32 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

33 **SCR-5.1.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

34 **SCR-5.1.3.2.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

35 The Delaware Basin has been used for an isolated nuclear test. This test, Project Gnome
 36 (Rawson et al. 1965), took place in 1961 at a location approximately 13 km (8 mi) southwest of
 37 the WIPP waste disposal region. Project Gnome was decommissioned in 1979.

1 The primary objective of Project Gnome was to study the effects of an underground nuclear
2 explosion in salt. The Gnome experiment involved the detonation of a 3.1 kiloton nuclear device
3 at a depth of 360 m (1,190 ft) in the bedded salt of the Salado. The explosion created an
4 approximately spherical cavity of about 27,000 cubic meters (m³) (950,000 cubic feet [ft³]) and
5 caused surface displacements in a radius of 360 m (1,180 ft). No earth tremors perceptible to
6 humans were reported at distances over 40 km (25 mi) from the explosion. A zone of increased
7 permeability was observed to extend at least 46 m (150 ft) laterally from and 105 m (344 ft)
8 above the point of the explosion. The test had no significant effects on the geological
9 characteristics of the WIPP disposal system. Thus historical underground nuclear device testing
10 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of
11 the disposal system. There are no existing plans for underground nuclear device testing in the
12 vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.

13 **SCR-5.1.3.2.3.2 Future Human EPs**

14 The criterion in section 194.32(a) relating to the scope of PAs limits the consideration of future
15 human actions to mining and drilling. Therefore, future underground nuclear device testing has
16 been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

17 **SCR-5.2 Subsurface Hydrological and Geochemical EPs**

18 **SCR-5.2.1 Borehole Fluid Flow**

19 **SCR-5.2.1.1 FEP Number:** H21

20 **FEP Title:** *Drilling Fluid Flow*

21 **SCR-5.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
22 DP (Future)

23 *Drilling Fluid Flow* associated with historical, current, near-future, and future boreholes that do
24 not intersect the waste disposal region has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
25 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The possibility of a future deep
26 borehole penetrating a waste panel, such that drilling-induced flow results in transport of
27 radionuclides to the land surface or to overlying hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for
28 in PA calculations. The possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both the waste disposal region
29 and a Castile brine reservoir is accounted for in PA calculations.

30 **SCR-5.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

31 The screening argument for this FEP has been revised slightly to remove confusion and
32 inconsistency as suggested by the EPA in "TSD for Section 194.25, 194.32, and 194.33" (U.S.
33 Environmental Protection Agency 2006).

34 **SCR-5.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

35 Borehole circulation fluid could be lost to thief zones encountered during drilling, or fluid could
36 flow from pressurized zones through the borehole to the land surface (blowout) or to a thief
37 zone. Such drilling-related EPs could influence groundwater flow and, potentially, radionuclide

1 transport in the affected units. Future drilling within the controlled area could result in direct
2 releases of radionuclides to the land surface or transport of radionuclides between hydraulically
3 conductive units.

4 Movement of brine from a pressurized zone through a borehole into potential thief zones such as
5 the Salado interbeds or the Culebra could result in geochemical changes and altered radionuclide
6 migration rates in these units.

7 **SCR-5.2.1.1.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

8 Drilling fluid flow is a short-term event that can result in the flow of pressurized fluid from one
9 geologic stratum to another. However, long-term flow through abandoned boreholes would have
10 a greater hydrological impact in the Culebra than a short-term event like drilling-induced flow
11 outside the controlled area. Wallace (1996a) analyzed the potential effects of flow through
12 abandoned boreholes in the future within the controlled area, and concluded that
13 interconnections between the Culebra and deep units could be eliminated from PA calculations
14 on the basis of low consequence. Thus the HCN of drilling fluid flow associated with boreholes
15 outside the controlled area has been screened out on the basis of low consequence to the
16 performance of the disposal system.

17 As discussed in FEPs H25 through H36 (Section SCR-5.2.1.5, Section SCR-5.2.1.6, Section
18 SCR-5.2.1.7, Section SCR-5.2.1.8, Section SCR-5.2.1.9, Section SCR-5.2.1.10, Section SCR-
19 5.2.1.11, Section SCR-5.2.1.12, and Section SCR-5.2.1.13), drilling associated with water
20 resources exploration, groundwater exploitation, potash exploration, oil and gas exploration, oil
21 and gas exploitation, enhanced oil and gas recovery, and drilling to explore other resources has
22 taken place or is currently taking place outside the controlled area in the Delaware Basin. These
23 drilling activities are expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.

24 **SCR-5.2.1.1.3.2 Future Human EPs**

25 For the future, drill holes may intersect the waste disposal region and their effects could be more
26 profound. Thus the possibility of a future borehole penetrating a waste panel, so that drilling
27 fluid flow and, potentially, blowout results in transport of radionuclides to the land surface or to
28 overlying hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for in PA calculations.

29 The units intersected by the borehole may provide sources for fluid flow (brine, oil, or gas) to the
30 waste panel during drilling. In the vicinity of the WIPP, the Castile that underlies the Salado
31 contains isolated volumes of brine at fluid pressures greater than hydrostatic. A future borehole
32 that penetrates a Castile brine reservoir could provide a connection for brine flow from the
33 reservoir to the waste panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the waste panel.
34 The possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both a waste panel and a brine reservoir is
35 accounted for in PA calculations.

36 Penetration of an underpressurized unit underlying the Salado could result in flow and
37 radionuclide transport from the waste panel to the underlying unit during drilling, although
38 drillers would minimize such fluid loss to a thief zone through the injection of materials to
39 reduce permeability or through the use of casing and cementing. Also, the permeabilities of
40 formations underlying the Salado are less than the permeability of the Culebra (Wallace 1996a).
41 Thus the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to an underpressurized unit below

1 the waste panels during drilling will be less significant, in terms of disposal system performance,
2 than the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to the land surface or to the Culebra
3 during drilling. Through this comparison, drilling events that result in penetration of
4 underpressurized units below the waste-disposal region have been eliminated from PA
5 calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-5.2.1.2 FEP Number:** H22
7 **FEP Title:** *Drilling Fluid Loss*

8 **SCR-5.2.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
9 DP (Future)

10 *Drilling Fluid Loss* associated with HCN and future boreholes that do not intersect the waste
11 disposal region has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
12 performance of the disposal system. The possibility of a future *Drilling Fluid Loss* into waste
13 panels is accounted for in PA calculations.

14 **SCR-5.2.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

15 The screening argument for this FEP has been revised slightly to remove confusion and
16 inconsistency as suggested by the EPA in “TSD for Section 194.25, 194.32, and 194.33” (U.S.
17 Environmental Protection Agency 2006).

18 **SCR-5.2.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

19 Drilling fluid loss is a short-term event that can result in the flow of pressurized fluid from one
20 geologic stratum to another. Large fluid losses would lead a driller to inject materials to reduce
21 permeability, or it would lead to the borehole being cased and cemented to limit the loss of
22 drilling fluid. Assuming such operations are successful, drilling fluid loss in the near future
23 outside the controlled area will not significantly affect the hydrology of the disposal system.
24 Thus drilling fluid loss associated with historical, current, and near-future boreholes has been
25 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
26 disposal system.

27 In evaluating the potential consequences of drilling fluid loss to a waste panel in the future, two
28 types of drilling events need to be considered – those that intercept pressurized fluid in
29 underlying formations such as the Castile (defined in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.2.2 as
30 E1 events), and those that do not (E2 events). A possible hydrological effect would be to make a
31 greater volume of brine available for gas generation processes and thereby increase gas volumes
32 at particular times in the future. For either type of drilling event, on the basis of current drilling
33 practices, the driller is assumed to pass through the repository rapidly. Relatively small amounts
34 of drilling fluid loss might not be noticed and might not give rise to concern. Larger fluid losses
35 would lead to the driller injecting materials to reduce permeability, or to the borehole being
36 cased and cemented, to limit the loss of drilling fluid.

37 For boreholes that intersect pressurized brine reservoirs, the volume of fluid available to flow up
38 a borehole will be significantly greater than the volume of any drilling fluid that could be lost.

1 This greater volume of brine is accounted for in PA calculations, and is allowed to enter the
2 disposal room (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7). Thus the effects of drilling fluid loss
3 will be small by comparison to the potential flow of brine from pressurized brine reservoirs.
4 Therefore, the effects of drilling fluid loss for E1 drilling events have been eliminated from PA
5 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 The consequences of drilling fluid loss into waste panels in the future are accounted for in PA
7 calculations for E2 events.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.2.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

9 Drilling fluid flow will not affect hydraulic conditions in the disposal system significantly unless
10 there is substantial drilling fluid loss to a thief zone, such as the Culebra. Typically, zones into
11 which significant borehole circulation fluid is lost are isolated through injection of materials to
12 reduce permeability or through casing and cementing programs. Assuming such operations are
13 successful, drilling fluid loss in the near future outside the controlled area will not affect the
14 hydrology of the disposal system significantly and be of no consequence.

15 **SCR-5.2.1.2.3.2 Future Human EPs**

16 The consequences of drilling within the controlled area in the future will primarily depend on the
17 location of the borehole. Potentially, future deep drilling could penetrate the waste disposal
18 region. Hydraulic and geochemical conditions in the waste panel could be affected as a result of
19 drilling fluid loss to the panel.

20 Penetration of an underpressurized unit underlying the Salado could result in flow and
21 radionuclide transport from the waste panel to the underlying unit during drilling, although
22 drillers would minimize such fluid loss to a thief zone through the injection of materials to
23 reduce permeability or through the use of casing and cementing. Also, the permeabilities of
24 formations underlying the Salado are less than the permeability of the Culebra (Wallace 1996a).
25 Thus the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to an underpressurized unit below
26 the waste panels during drilling will be less significant, in terms of disposal system performance,
27 than the consequences associated with radionuclide transport to the land surface or to the Culebra
28 during drilling. Through this comparison, drilling events that result in penetration of
29 underpressurized units below the waste-disposal region have been eliminated from PA
30 calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 For boreholes that do not intersect pressurized brine reservoirs (but do penetrate the waste-
32 disposal region), the treatment of the disposal room implicitly accounts for the potential for
33 greater gas generation resulting from drilling fluid loss. Thus the hydrological effects of drilling
34 fluid loss for E2 drilling events are accounted for in PA calculations within the conceptual model
35 of the disposal room for drilling intrusions.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.3 FEP Number:** H23
2 **FEP Title:** *Blowouts*

3 **SCR-5.2.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
4 DP (Future)

5 *Blowouts* associated with HCN and future boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal
6 region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
7 performance of the disposal system. The possibility of a future deep borehole penetrating a
8 waste panel such that drilling-induced flow results in transport of radionuclides to the land
9 surface or to overlying hydraulically conductive units is accounted for in PA calculations. The
10 possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both the waste disposal region and a Castile brine
11 reservoir is accounted for in PA calculations.

12 **SCR-5.2.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information is available for this FEP.

14 **SCR-5.2.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

15 *Blowouts* are short-term events that can result in the flow of pressurized fluid from one geologic
16 stratum to another. For the near future, a blowout may occur in the vicinity of the WIPP but is
17 not likely to affect the disposal system because of the distance from the well to the waste panels,
18 assuming that AICs are in place which restrict borehole installation to outside the WIPP
19 boundary. *Blowouts* associated with HCN and future boreholes that do not intersect the waste
20 disposal region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to
21 the performance of the disposal system. For the future, the drill holes may intersect the waste
22 disposal region and these effects could be more profound. Thus *blowouts* are included in the
23 assessment of future activities and their consequences are accounted for in PA calculations.

24 Fluid could flow from pressurized zones through the borehole to the land surface (*blowout*) or to
25 a thief zone. Such drilling-related EPs could influence groundwater flow and, potentially,
26 radionuclide transport in the affected units. Movement of brine from a pressurized zone through
27 a borehole into potential thief zones such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra could result in
28 geochemical changes and altered radionuclide migration rates in these units.

29 **SCR-5.2.1.3.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

30 Drilling associated with water resources exploration, groundwater exploitation, potash
31 exploration, oil and gas exploration, oil and gas exploitation, enhanced oil and gas recovery, and
32 drilling to explore other resources has taken place or is currently taking place outside the
33 controlled area in the Delaware Basin. These drilling activities are expected to continue in the
34 vicinity of the WIPP in the near future.

35 Naturally occurring brine and gas pockets have been encountered during drilling in the Delaware
36 Basin. Brine pockets have been intersected in the Castile (as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0,
37 Section 2.2.1.3) and in the Salado above the WIPP horizon (the CCA, Section 2.2.1.2.2). Gas
38 blowouts have occurred during drilling in the Salado. Usually, such events result in brief

1 interruptions in drilling while the intersected fluid pocket is allowed to depressurize through flow
2 to the surface (for a period lasting from a few hours to a few days). Drilling then restarts with an
3 increased drilling mud weight. Under these conditions, blowouts in the near future will cause
4 isolated hydraulic disturbances, but will not affect the hydrology of the disposal system
5 significantly.

6 Potentially, the most significant disturbance to the disposal system could occur if an uncontrolled
7 blowout during drilling resulted in substantial flow through the borehole from a pressurized zone
8 to a thief zone. For example, if a borehole penetrates a brine reservoir in the Castile, brine could
9 flow through the borehole to the Culebra over the long term, and, as a result, could affect
10 hydraulic conditions in the Culebra. The potential effects of such an event can be compared to
11 the effects of long-term fluid flow from deep overpressurized units to the Culebra through
12 abandoned boreholes. Wallace (1996a) analyzed the potential effects of flow through abandoned
13 boreholes in the future within the controlled area and concluded that interconnections between
14 the Culebra and deep units could be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
15 consequence. Long-term flow through abandoned boreholes would have a greater hydrological
16 impact in the Culebra than short-term, drilling-induced flow outside the controlled area. Thus
17 the effects of fluid flow during drilling in the near future have been eliminated from PA
18 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 In summary, blowouts associated with historical, current, and near-future boreholes have been
20 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
21 disposal system.

22 **SCR-5.2.1.3.3.2 Future Human EPs—Boreholes that Intersect the Waste Disposal Region**

23 The consequences of drilling within the controlled area in the future will depend primarily on the
24 location of the borehole. Potentially, future deep drilling could penetrate the waste disposal
25 region. If the borehole intersects the waste in the disposal rooms, radionuclides could be
26 transported as a result of drilling fluid flow: releases to the accessible environment may occur as
27 material entrained in the circulating drilling fluid is brought to the surface. Also, during drilling,
28 contaminated brine may flow up the borehole and reach the surface, depending on fluid pressure
29 within the waste disposal panels; blowout conditions could prevail if the waste panel were
30 sufficiently pressurized at the time of intrusion.

31 **SCR-5.2.1.3.3.3 Hydraulic Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow**

32 The possibility of a future borehole penetrating a waste panel, so that drilling fluid flow and,
33 potentially, blowout results in transport of radionuclides to the land surface or to overlying
34 hydraulically conductive units, is accounted for in PA calculations.

35 The units intersected by the borehole may provide sources for fluid flow (brine, oil, or gas) to the
36 waste panel during drilling. In the vicinity of the WIPP, the Castile that underlies the Salado
37 contains isolated volumes of brine at fluid pressures greater than hydrostatic. A future borehole
38 that penetrates a Castile brine reservoir could provide a connection for brine flow from the
39 reservoir to the waste panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the waste panel.
40 The possibility of a deep borehole penetrating both a waste panel and a brine reservoir is
41 accounted for in PA calculations.

1 Future boreholes could affect the hydraulic conditions in the disposal system. Intersection of
2 pockets of pressurized gas and brine would likely result in short-term, isolated hydraulic
3 disturbances, and will not affect the hydrology of the disposal system significantly. Potentially
4 the most significant hydraulic disturbance to the disposal system could occur if an uncontrolled
5 blowout during drilling resulted in substantial flow through the borehole from a pressurized zone
6 to a thief zone. For example, if a borehole penetrates a brine reservoir in the Castile, brine could
7 flow through the borehole to the Culebra, and, as a result, could affect hydraulic conditions in the
8 Culebra. The potential effects of such an event can be compared to the effects of long-term fluid
9 flow from deep overpressurized units to the Culebra through abandoned boreholes. Wallace
10 (1996a) analyzed the potential effects of such interconnections in the future within the controlled
11 area, concluding that flow through abandoned boreholes between the Culebra and deep units
12 could be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

13 **SCR-5.2.1.4 FEP Number:** H24

14 **FEP Title:** *Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes*

15 **SCR-5.2.1.4.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)

16 DP (Future)

17 *Drilling-Induced Geochemical Changes* that occur within the controlled area as a result of HCN
18 and future drilling-induced flow are accounted for in PA calculations.

19 **SCR-5.2.1.4.2 Summary of New Information**

20 No new information is available for this FEP.

21 **SCR-5.2.1.4.3 Screening Argument**

22 Borehole circulation fluid could be lost to thief zones encountered during drilling, or fluid could
23 flow from pressurized zones through the borehole to the land surface (blowout) or to a thief
24 zone. Such drilling-related EPs could influence groundwater flow and, potentially, radionuclide
25 transport in the affected units. Future drilling within the controlled area could result in direct
26 releases of radionuclides to the land surface or transport of radionuclides between hydraulically
27 conductive units.

28 Movement of brine from a pressurized zone through a borehole and into potential thief zones
29 such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could result in geochemical changes and altered
30 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

31 **SCR-5.2.1.4.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

32 Drilling associated with resource exploration, exploitation, and recovery has taken place or is
33 currently taking place outside the controlled area in the Delaware Basin. These drilling activities
34 are expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future. Chemical changes
35 induced by such drilling are discussed below.

SCR-5.2.1.4.3.2 Geochemical Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow–HCN

Radionuclide migration rates are governed by the coupled effects of hydrological and geochemical processes (see discussions in FEPs W77 through W100, Section SCR-6.6.1.1, Section SCR-6.6.1.2, Section SCR-6.6.2.1, Section SCR-6.6.3.1, Section SCR-6.6.3.2, Section SCR-6.6.4.1, Section SCR-6.7.1.1, Section SCR-6.7.2.1, Section SCR-6.7.3.1, Section SCR-6.7.4.1, Section SCR-6.7.4.2, Section SCR-6.7.4.3, Section SCR-6.7.5.1, Section SCR-6.7.5.2, Section SCR-6.7.5.3, and Section SCR-6.7.5.4). Human EPs outside the controlled area could affect the geochemistry of units within the controlled area if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area. Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile through a borehole into potential thief zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could cause drilling-induced geochemical changes resulting in altered radionuclide migration rates in these units through their effects on colloid transport and sorption (colloid transport may enhance radionuclide migration, while radionuclide migration may be retarded by sorption).

The treatment of colloids in PA calculations is described in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.6 and Section 6.4.6.2.2. The repository and its contents provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. By comparison, Castile brines have relatively low total colloid concentrations. Therefore, changes in colloid transport in units within the controlled area as a result of HCN drilling-induced flow have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

Sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2. The sorption model comprises an equilibrium, sorption isotherm approximation, employing K_{ds} applicable to dolomite in the Culebra (the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section MASS-15.2). The cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of K_{ds} used are derived from a suite of experimental studies that include measurements of K_{ds} for actinides in a range of chemical systems including Castile brines, Culebra brines, and Salado brines. Therefore, any changes in sorption geochemistry in the Culebra within the controlled area as a result of HCN drilling-induced flow are accounted for in PA calculations.

Sorption within the Dewey Lake is accounted for in PA calculations, as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.6. It is assumed that the sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake is sufficiently large to prevent any radionuclides that enter the Dewey Lake from being released over 10,000 years (Wallace et al. 1995). Sorption within other geological units of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey Lake and other units within the controlled area as a result of HCN drilling-induced flow have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-5.2.1.4.3.3 Future Human EPs — Boreholes that Intersect the Waste Disposal Region

The consequences of drilling within the controlled area in the future will primarily depend on the location of the borehole. Future deep drilling could potentially penetrate the waste disposal region. If the borehole intersects the waste in the disposal rooms, radionuclides could be transported as a result of drilling fluid flow and geochemical conditions in the waste panel could be affected as a result of drilling induced geochemical changes.

SCR-5.2.1.4.3.4 Geochemical Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow-Future

Drilling fluid loss to a waste panel could modify the chemistry of disposal room brines in a manner that would affect the solubility of radionuclides and the source term available for subsequent transport from the disposal room. The majority of drilling fluids used are likely to be locally derived, and their bulk chemistry will be similar to fluids currently present in the disposal system. In addition, the presence of the MgO chemical conditioner in the disposal rooms will buffer the chemistry across a range of fluid compositions, as discussed in detail in Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-2.3.2. Furthermore, for E1 drilling events, the volume of Castile brine that flows into the disposal room will be greater than that of any drilling fluids; Castile brine chemistry is accounted for in PA calculations. Thus the effects on radionuclide solubility of drilling fluid loss to the disposal room have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile through a borehole into thief zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could result in geochemical changes in the receiving units, and thus alter radionuclide migration rates in these units through their effects on colloid transport and sorption.

The repository and its contents provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Thus colloid transport in the Culebra within the controlled area as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region is accounted for in PA calculations, as described in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.6 and Section 6.4.6.2.1. The Culebra is the most transmissive unit in the disposal system, and it is the most likely unit through which significant radionuclide transport could occur. Therefore, colloid transport in units other than the Culebra, as a result of drilling fluid loss associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region, has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

As discussed in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-5.2.1.3), sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The sorption model used incorporates the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region.

Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-5.2.1.3), the effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey Lake inside the controlled area as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-5.2.1.4.3.5 Future Human EPs — Boreholes That Do Not Intersect the Waste Disposal Region

Future boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region could nevertheless encounter contaminated material by intersecting a region into which radionuclides have migrated from the disposal panels, or could affect hydrogeological conditions within the disposal system.

1 Consistent with the containment requirements in 40 CFR § 191.13(a), PAs need not evaluate the
2 effects of the intersection of contaminated material outside the controlled area.

3 Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile, through a borehole and into thief
4 zones such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra could result in drilling-induced geochemical
5 changes and altered radionuclide migration rates in these units.

6 **SCR-5.2.1.4.3.6 Geochemical Effects of Drilling-Induced Flow**

7 Movement of brine from a pressurized reservoir in the Castile through a borehole into thief
8 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra, could cause geochemical changes resulting in
9 altered radionuclide migration rates in these units through their effects on colloid transport and
10 sorption.

11 The contents of the waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal
12 system. Thus consistent with the discussion in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1,
13 Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-5.2.1.3), colloid transport as a result of drilling-induced flow
14 associated with future boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region has been
15 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
16 disposal system.

17 As discussed in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-
18 5.2.1.3), sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The sorption model
19 accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of drilling-induced flow
20 associated with boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region.

21 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21, H22, and H23 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1,
22 Section SCR-5.2.1.2, and SCR-5.2.1.3), the effects of changes in sorption in the Dewey Lake
23 within the controlled area as a result of drilling-induced flow associated with boreholes that do
24 not intersect the waste disposal region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
25 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological
26 units of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
27 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

28 In summary, the effects of drilling-induced geochemical changes that occur within the controlled
29 area as a result of HCN and future drilling-induced flow are accounted for in PA calculations.
30 Those that occur outside the controlled area have been eliminated from PA calculations.

31 **SCR-5.2.1.5 FEP Numbers:** H25 and H26

32 **FEP Titles:** *Oil and Gas Extraction*
33 *Groundwater Extraction*

34 **SCR-5.2.1.5.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
35 SO-R (Future)

36 HCN *Groundwater Extraction* and *Oil and Gas Extraction* outside the controlled area has been
37 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the

1 disposal system. *Groundwater Extraction and Oil and Gas Extraction* through future boreholes
2 has been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

3 **SCR-5.2.1.5.2 Summary of New Information**

4 The screening argument for this FEP has been updated with new information relating to a new
5 water well used for ranching purposes near WIPP. No change to the screening decisions is
6 merited.

7 **SCR-5.2.1.5.2.1 Screening Argument**

8 The extraction of fluid could alter fluid-flow patterns in the target horizons, or in overlying units
9 as a result of a failed borehole casing. Also, the removal of confined fluid from oil- or gas-
10 bearing units can cause compaction in some geologic settings, potentially resulting in subvertical
11 fracturing and surface subsidence.

12 **SCR-5.2.1.5.2.2 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

13 As discussed in FEPs H25 through H36, water, oil, and gas production are the only activities
14 involving fluid extraction through boreholes that have taken place or are currently taking place in
15 the vicinity of the WIPP. These activities are expected to continue in the vicinity of the WIPP in
16 the near future.

17 Groundwater extraction outside the controlled area from formations above the Salado could
18 affect groundwater flow. The Dewey Lake contains a productive zone of saturation south of the
19 WIPP site. Several wells operated by the J.C. Mills Ranch south of the WIPP produce water
20 from the Dewey Lake to supply livestock (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.1.4.2.1). Water
21 has also been extracted from the Culebra at the Engle Well approximately 9.66 km (6 mi) south
22 of the controlled area to provide water for livestock. In addition, a new water well was drilled in
23 2007 at the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)-14 wellpad to provide livestock water for the
24 Mills ranch. This well is approximately 3,000 ft (0.9 km) from the WIPP site boundary.

25 If contaminated water intersects a well while it is producing, then contaminants could be pumped
26 to the surface. Consistent with the containment requirements in section 191.13(a), PAs need not
27 evaluate radiation doses that might result from such an event. However, compliance assessments
28 must include any such events in dose calculations for evaluating compliance with the individual
29 protection requirements in section 191.15. As discussed in the CCA, Chapter 8.0, under
30 undisturbed conditions, there are no calculated radionuclide releases to units containing
31 producing wells.

32 Pumping from wells at the J.C. Mills Ranch may have resulted in reductions in hydraulic head in
33 the Dewey Lake within southern regions of the controlled area, leading to increased hydraulic
34 head gradients. However, these changes in the groundwater flow conditions in the Dewey Lake
35 will have no significant effects on the performance of the disposal system, primarily because of
36 the sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.6).
37 Retardation of any radionuclides that enter the Dewey Lake will be such that no radionuclides
38 will migrate through the Dewey Lake to the accessible environment within the 10,000-yr
39 regulatory period.

1 The effects of groundwater extraction from the Culebra from a well 9.66 km (6 mi) south of the
2 controlled area have been evaluated by Wallace (1996b), using an analytical solution for Darcian
3 fluid flow in a continuous porous medium. Wallace (1996b) showed that such a well pumping at
4 about 0.5 gallon (gal) (1.9 liters [L]) per minute for 10,000 years will induce a hydraulic head
5 gradient across the controlled area of about 4×10^{-5} . The hydraulic head gradient across the
6 controlled area currently ranges from between 0.001 to 0.007. Therefore, pumping from the
7 Engle Well will have only minor effects on the hydraulic head gradient within the controlled area
8 even if pumping were to continue for 10,000 years. Thus the effects of HCN groundwater
9 extraction outside the controlled area have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
10 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

11 Oil and gas extraction outside the controlled area could affect the hydrology of the disposal
12 system. However, the horizons that act as oil and gas reservoirs are sufficiently below the
13 repository for changes in fluid-flow patterns to be of low consequence, unless there is fluid
14 leakage through a failed borehole casing. Also, oil and gas extraction horizons in the Delaware
15 Basin are well-lithified rigid strata, so oil and gas extraction is not likely to result in compaction
16 and subsidence (Brausch et al. 1982, pp. 52, 61). Furthermore, the plasticity of the salt
17 formations in the Delaware Basin will limit the extent of any fracturing caused by compaction of
18 underlying units. Thus, neither the extraction of gas from reservoirs in the Morrow Formation
19 (some 4,200 m (14,000 ft) below the surface), nor extraction of oil from the shallower units
20 within the Delaware Mountain Group (about 1,250 to 2,450 m (about 4,000 to 8,000 ft) below
21 the surface) will lead to compaction and subsidence. In summary, historical, current, and near-
22 future oil and gas extraction outside the controlled area has been eliminated from PA calculations
23 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

24 **SCR-5.2.1.5.2.3 Future Human EPs**

25 Consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
26 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole. Therefore, groundwater
27 extraction and oil and gas extraction through future boreholes have been eliminated from PA
28 calculations on regulatory grounds.

29 **SCR-5.2.1.6 FEP Numbers:** H27, H28, and H29

30 **FEP Titles:** *Liquid Waste Disposal – OB (H27)*
31 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – OB (H28)*
32 *Hydrocarbon Storage – OB (H29)*

33 **SCR-5.2.1.6.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
34 SO-C (Future)

35 The hydrological effects of HCN fluid injection (*Liquid Waste Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas*
36 *Production, and Hydrocarbon Storage*) through boreholes outside the controlled area have been
37 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
38 disposal system. *Liquid Waste Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas Production, and Hydrocarbon*
39 *Storage* in the future have been eliminated from PA calculations based on low consequence.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.6.2 Summary of New Information**

2 These FEPs are specific to activities outside the WIPP boundary, although past descriptions have
3 sometimes confused these activities with possible events occurring inside the WIPP boundary, or
4 IB. Section 194.33(d) excludes activities subsequent to drilling the borehole from further
5 consideration in PA. It has historically been understood that this exclusion implicitly applies to
6 activities within the WIPP boundary, and not those outside the boundary, or OB. Therefore,
7 three new FEPs have been created to address analogous IB activities (see Section SCR-5.2.1.7,
8 FEPs H60, *Liquid Disposal-IB*; H61 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Production-IB*; and H62
9 *Hydrocarbon Storage-IB*).

10 Recent monitoring activities have identified a salt water disposal well that had hardware failure
11 resulting in migration of the injected fluid away from the wellbore in a shallow freshwater
12 producing zone. This leak may have persisted up to 22 months, based on inspection and test
13 records on file with the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division. Once the failure was identified,
14 the well was repaired and returned to service. Details of this event are discussed in Hall (2008).

15 Fluid injection modeling conducted since the CCA has demonstrated that injection of fluids will
16 not have a significant effect upon the WIPP's ability to contain radioactive materials (Stoelzel
17 and Swift 1997). Conservative assumptions used by Stoelzel and Swift include a leaking well
18 that persists for many years (150) with pressures above maximum allowable permitted pressures
19 in the area. Therefore, current modeling conservatively bounds the effects of the recent injection
20 well failure mentioned above. Neither liquid waste disposal nor waterflooding conducted in
21 wells outside the controlled area have the potential to affect the disposal system in any
22 significant way.

23 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3 Screening Argument**

24 The injection of fluids could alter fluid-flow patterns in the target horizons or, if there is
25 accidental leakage through a borehole casing, in any other intersected hydraulically conductive
26 zone. Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could also result in geochemical changes
27 and altered radionuclide migration rates in the thief units.

28 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

29 The only historical and current activities involving fluid injection through boreholes in the
30 Delaware Basin are enhanced oil and gas production (waterflooding or carbon dioxide (CO₂)
31 injection), hydrocarbon storage (gas reinjection), and liquid waste disposal (byproducts from oil
32 and gas production). These fluid injection activities are expected to continue in the vicinity of
33 the WIPP in the near future.

34 Hydraulic fracturing of oil- or gas-bearing units is currently used to improve the performance of
35 hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Delaware Basin. Fracturing is induced during a short period of
36 high-pressure fluid injection, resulting in increased hydraulic conductivity near the borehole.
37 Normally, this controlled fracturing is confined to the pay zone and is unlikely to affect
38 overlying strata.

1 Secondary production techniques, such as waterflooding, that are used to maintain reservoir
2 pressure and displace oil are currently employed in hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Delaware
3 Basin (Brausch et al. 1982, pp. 29-30). Tertiary recovery techniques, such as CO₂ miscible
4 flooding, have been implemented with limited success in the Delaware Basin, but CO₂ miscible
5 flooding is not an attractive recovery method for reservoirs near the WIPP (Melzer 2008). Even
6 if CO₂ flooding were to occur, the effects, if any, would be very similar to those associated with
7 waterflooding.

8 ReInjection of gas for storage currently takes place at one location in the Delaware Basin in a
9 depleted gas field in the Morrow Formation at the Washington Ranch near Carlsbad Caverns
10 (Burton et al. 1993, pp. 66-67; the CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment A). This field is
11 too far from the WIPP site to have any effect on WIPP groundwaters under any circumstances.
12 Disposal of liquid by-products from oil and gas production involves injection of fluid into
13 depleted reservoirs. Such fluid injection techniques result in repressurization of the depleted
14 target reservoir and mitigates any effects of fluid withdrawal.

15 The most significant effects of fluid injection would arise from substantial and uncontrolled fluid
16 leakage through a failed borehole casing. The highly saline environment of some units can
17 promote rapid corrosion of well casings and may result in fluid loss from boreholes.

18 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.2 Hydraulic Effects of Leakage through Injection Boreholes**

19 The Vacuum Field (located in the Capitan Reef, some 30 km [20 mi] northeast of the WIPP site)
20 and the Rhodes-Yates Field (located in the back reef of the Capitan, some 70 km (45 mi)
21 southeast of the WIPP site) have been waterflooded for 40 years with confirmed leaking wells,
22 which have resulted in brine entering the Salado and other formations above the Salado (see, for
23 example, Silva 1994, pp. 67-68). Currently, saltwater disposal takes place in the vicinity of the
24 WIPP into formations below the Castile. However, leakages from saltwater disposal wells or
25 waterflood wells in the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP are unlikely to occur because of
26 the following:

- 27 • There are significant differences between the geology and lithology in the vicinity of the
28 disposal system and that of the Vacuum and Rhodes-Yates Fields. The WIPP is located
29 in the Delaware Basin in a fore-reef environment, where a thick zone of anhydrite and
30 halite (the Castile) exists. In the vicinity of the WIPP, oil is produced from the Brushy
31 Canyon Formation at depths greater than 2,100 m (7,000 ft). By contrast, the Castile is
32 not present at either the Vacuum or the Rhodes-Yates Field, which lie outside the
33 Delaware Basin. Oil production at the Vacuum Field is from the San Andres and
34 Grayburg Formations at depths of approximately 1,400 m (4,500 ft), and oil production at
35 the Rhodes-Yates Field is from the Yates and Seven Rivers Formations at depths of
36 approximately 900 m (3,000 ft). Waterflooding at the Rhodes-Yates Field involves
37 injection into a zone only 60 m (200 ft) below the Salado. There are more potential thief
38 zones below the Salado near the WIPP than at the Rhodes-Yates or Vacuum Fields; the
39 Salado in the vicinity of the WIPP is therefore less likely to receive any fluid that leaks
40 from an injection borehole. Additionally, the oil pools in the vicinity of the WIPP are
41 characterized by channel sands with thin net pay zones, low permeabilities, high
42 irreducible water saturations, and high residual oil saturations. Therefore, waterflooding

1 of oil fields in the vicinity of the WIPP on the scale of that undertaken in the Vacuum or
2 the Rhodes-Yates Field is unlikely.

- 3 • New Mexico state regulations require the emplacement of a salt isolation casing string for
4 all wells drilled in the potash enclave, which includes the WIPP area, to reduce the
5 possibility of petroleum wells leaking into the Salado. Also, injection pressures are not
6 allowed to exceed the pressure at which the rocks fracture. The injection pressure
7 gradient must be kept below 4.5×10^3 pascals per meter above hydrostatic if fracture
8 pressures are unknown. Such controls on fluid injection pressures limit the potential
9 magnitude of any leakages from injection boreholes.
- 10 • Recent improvements in well completion practices and reservoir operations management
11 have reduced the occurrences of leakages from injection wells. For example, injection
12 pressures during waterflooding are typically kept below about 23×10^3 pascals per meter
13 to avoid fracture initiation. Also, wells are currently completed using cemented and
14 perforated casing, rather than the open-hole completions used in the early Rhodes-Yates
15 wells. A recent report (Hall et al. 2008) concludes that injection well operations near the
16 WIPP have a low failure rate, and that failures are remedied as soon as possible after
17 identification.

18 Any injection well leakages that do occur in the vicinity of the WIPP in the near future are more
19 likely to be associated with liquid waste disposal than waterflooding. Disposal typically involves
20 fluid injection through old and potentially corroded well casings and does not include monitoring
21 to the same extent as waterflooding. Such fluid injection could affect the performance of the
22 disposal system if sufficient fluid leaked into the Salado interbeds to affect the rate of brine flow
23 into the waste disposal panels.

24 Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996) evaluated the potential effects on the disposal system of leakage
25 from a hypothetical salt water disposal borehole near the WIPP. Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996)
26 used the two-dimensional BRAGFLO model (vertical north-south cross-section) to simulate
27 saltwater disposal to the north and to the south of the disposal system. The disposal system
28 model included the waste disposal region, the marker beds (MBs) and anhydrite intervals near
29 the excavation horizon, and the rock strata associated with local oil and gas developments. A
30 worst-case simulation was run using high values of borehole and anhydrite permeability and a
31 low value of halite permeability to encourage flow to the disposal panels via the anhydrite. The
32 boreholes were assumed to be plugged immediately above the Salado (consistent with the
33 plugging configurations described in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2). Saltwater disposal
34 into the Upper Bell Canyon was simulated, with annular leakage through the Salado. A total of
35 approximately $7 \times 10^5 \text{ m}^3$ ($2.47 \times 10^7 \text{ ft}^3$) of brine was injected through the boreholes during a
36 50-year simulated disposal period. In this time, approximately 50 m^3 ($1,765.5 \text{ ft}^3$) of brine
37 entered the anhydrite interval at the horizon of the waste disposal region. For the next 200 years,
38 the boreholes were assumed to be abandoned (with open-hole permeabilities of 1×10^{-9} square
39 meters (m^2) ($4 \times 10^{-8} \text{ in.}^2$)). Cement plugs (of permeability $1 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$ ($4 \times 10^{-16} \text{ in.}^2$)) were
40 assumed to be placed at the injection interval and at the top of the Salado. Subsequently, the
41 boreholes were prescribed the permeability of silty sand (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section
42 6.4.7.2), and the simulation was continued until the end of the 10,000-yr regulatory period.
43 During this period, approximately 400 m^3 ($14,124 \text{ ft}^3$) of brine entered the waste disposal region

1 from the anhydrite interval. This value of cumulative brine inflow is within the bounds of the
2 values generated by PA calculations for the UP scenario. During the disposal well simulation,
3 leakage from the injection boreholes would have had no significant effect on the inflow rate at
4 the waste panels.

5 Stoelzel and Swift (1997) expanded on Stoelzel and O'Brien's (1996) work by considering
6 injection for a longer period of time (up to 150 years) and into deeper horizons at higher
7 pressures. They developed two computational models (a modified cross-sectional model and an
8 axisymmetric radial model) that are alternatives to the cross-sectional model used by Stoelzel
9 and O'Brien (1996). Rather than repeat the conservative and bounding approach used by
10 Stoelzel and O'Brien (1996), Stoelzel and Swift (1997) focused on reasonable and realistic
11 conditions for most aspects of the modeling, including setting parameters that were sampled in
12 the CCA at their median values. Model results indicate that, for the cases considered, the largest
13 volume of brine entering MB 139 (the primary pathway to the WIPP) from the borehole is
14 approximately 1,500 m³ (52,974 ft³), which is a small enough volume that it would not affect
15 Stoelzel and O'Brien's (1996) conclusion even if it somehow all reached the WIPP. Other cases
16 showed from 0 to 600 m³ (21,190 ft³) of brine entering MB 139 from the injection well. In all
17 cases, high-permeability fractures created in the Castile and Salado anhydrite layers by the
18 modeled injection pressures were restricted to less than 400 m (1,312 ft) from the wellbore, and
19 did not extend more than 250 m in MB 138 and MB 139.

20 No flow entered MB 139, nor was fracturing of the unit calculated to occur away from the
21 borehole, in cases in which leaks in the cement sheath had permeabilities of 10^{-12.5} m²
22 (corresponding to the median value used to characterize fully degraded boreholes in the CCA) or
23 lower. The cases modeled in which flow entered MB 139 from the borehole and fracturing
24 occurred away from the borehole required injection pressures conservatively higher than any
25 currently in use near the WIPP and either 150 years of leakage through a fully degraded cement
26 sheath or 10 years of simultaneous tubing and casing leaks from a waterflood operation. These
27 conditions are not likely to occur in the future. If leaks like these do occur from brine injection
28 near the WIPP, however, results of the Stoelzel and Swift (1997) modeling study indicate that
29 they will not affect the performance of the repository.

30 Thus the hydraulic effects of leakage through HCN boreholes outside the controlled area have
31 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
32 disposal system.

33 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.3 Effects of Density Changes Resulting from Leakage Through Injection** 34 **Boreholes**

35 Leakage through a failed borehole casing during a fluid injection operation in the vicinity of the
36 WIPP could alter fluid density in the affected unit, which could result in changes in fluid flow
37 rates and directions within the disposal system. Disposal of oil and gas production byproducts
38 through boreholes could increase fluid densities in transmissive units affected by leakage in the
39 casing. Operations such as waterflooding use fluids derived from the target reservoir, or fluids
40 with a similar composition, to avoid scaling and other reactions. Therefore, the effects of
41 leakage from waterflood boreholes would be similar to leakage from disposal wells.

1 Denser fluids have a tendency to sink relative to less dense fluids, and, if the hydrogeological
 2 unit concerned has a dip, there will be a tendency for the dense fluid to travel in the downdip
 3 direction. If this direction is the same as the direction of the groundwater pressure gradient, there
 4 would be an increase in flow velocity, and conversely, if the downdip direction is opposed to the
 5 direction of the groundwater pressure gradient, there would be a decrease in flow velocity. In
 6 general terms, taking account of density-related flow will cause a rotation of the flow vector
 7 towards the downdip direction that is dependent on the density contrast and the dip.

8 Wilmot and Galson (1996) showed that brine density changes in the Culebra resulting from
 9 leakage through an injection borehole outside the controlled area will not affect fluid flow in the
 10 Culebra significantly. Potash mining activities assumed on the basis of regulatory criteria to
 11 occur in the near future outside the controlled area will have a more significant effect on
 12 modeled Culebra hydrology. The distribution of existing leases suggests that near-future mining
 13 will take place to the north, west, and south of the controlled area (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0,
 14 Section 2.3.1.1). The effects of such potash mining are accounted for in calculations of UP of
 15 the disposal system (through an increase in the transmissivity of the Culebra above the mined
 16 region, as discussed in FEPs H37, H38, and H39 [Section SCR-5.2.2.1, Section SCR-5.2.2.2, and
 17 Section SCR-5.2.3.1]). Groundwater modeling that accounts for potash mining shows a change
 18 in the fluid pressure distribution and a consequent shift of flow directions towards the west in the
 19 Culebra within the controlled area (Wallace 1996c). A localized increase in fluid density in the
 20 Culebra resulting from leakage from an injection borehole would rotate the flow vector towards
 21 the downdip direction (towards the east).

22 Wilmot and Galson (1996) compared the relative magnitudes of the freshwater head gradient and
 23 the gravitational gradient and showed that the density effect is of low consequence to the
 24 performance of the disposal system. According to Darcy's Law, flow in an isotropic porous
 25 medium is governed by the gradient of fluid pressure and a gravitational term

26
$$\bar{v} = -\frac{k}{\mu}[\nabla p - \rho \bar{g}] \quad (\text{SCR.7})$$

27 where

- 28 v = Darcy velocity vector (m s⁻¹)
 29 k = intrinsic permeability (m²)
 30 μ = fluid viscosity (Pa s)
 31 ∇p = gradient of fluid pressure (Pa m⁻¹)
 32 ρ = fluid density (kg m⁻³)
 33 g = gravitational acceleration vector (m s⁻²)

34 The relationship between the gravity-driven flow component and the pressure-driven component
 35 can be shown by expressing the velocity vector in terms of a freshwater head gradient and a
 36 density-related elevation gradient

37
$$\bar{v} = -K \left[\nabla H_f + \frac{\Delta \rho}{\rho_f} \nabla E \right] \quad (\text{SCR.8})$$

1 where

2 K = hydraulic conductivity (m s⁻¹)
 3 ∇H_f = gradient of freshwater head
 4 $\Delta\rho$ = difference between actual fluid
 5 density and reference fluid density (kg m⁻³)
 6 ρ_f = density of freshwater (kg m⁻³)
 7 ∇E = gradient of elevation

8 Davies (1989, p. 28) defined a driving force ratio (DFR) to assess the potential significance of
 9 the density gradient

$$10 \quad DFR = \frac{\Delta\rho |\nabla E|}{\rho_f |\nabla H_f|} \quad (\text{SCR.9})$$

11 and concluded that a DFR of 0.5 can be considered an approximate threshold at which density-
 12 related gravity effects may become significant (Davies 1989, p. 28).

13 The dip of the Culebra in the vicinity of the WIPP is about 0.44 degrees or 8 m/km (26 ft/mi) to
 14 the east (Davies 1989, p. 42). According to Davies (1989, pp. 47–48), freshwater head gradients
 15 in the Culebra between the waste panels and the southwestern and western boundaries of the
 16 accessible environment range from 4 m/km (13 ft/mi) to 7 m/km (23 ft/mi). Only small changes
 17 in gradient arise from the calculated effects of near-future mining. Culebra brines have densities
 18 ranging from 998 to 1,158 kilograms per cubic meter (kg/m³) (998 to 1,158 parts per million
 19 [ppm]) (Cauffman et al. 1990, Table E1.b). Assuming the density of fluid leaking from a
 20 waterflood borehole or a disposal well to be 1,215 kg/m³ (1,215 ppm) (a conservative high value
 21 similar to the density of Castile brine [Popielak et al. 1983, Table C-2]) leads to a DFR of
 22 between 0.07 and 0.43. These values of the DFR show that density-related effects caused by
 23 leakage of brine into the Culebra during fluid injection operations are not significant.

24 In summary, the effects of HCN fluid injection (liquid waste disposal, enhanced oil and gas
 25 production, and hydrocarbon storage) through boreholes outside the controlled area have been
 26 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 27 disposal system.

28 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.4 Geochemical Effects of Leakage through Injection Boreholes**

29 Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could affect the geochemical conditions in thief
 30 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra. Such fluid injection-induced geochemical
 31 changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
 32 if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area through their effects on colloid
 33 transport and sorption.

34 The majority of fluids injected (for example, during brine disposal) have been extracted locally
 35 during production activities. Because they have been derived locally, their compositions are
 36 similar to fluids currently present in the disposal system, and they will have low total colloid
 37 concentrations compared to those in the waste disposal panels (see FEPs discussion for H21

1 through H24, Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, Section SCR-5.2.1.3, and SCR-
 2 5.2.1.4). The repository will remain the main source of colloids in the disposal system.
 3 Therefore, colloid transport as a result of HCN fluid injection has been eliminated from PA
 4 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

5 As discussed in FEPs H21 through H24 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, Section
 6 SCR-5.2.1.3, and SCR-5.2.1.4), sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations.
 7 The sorption model used accounts for the effects of any changes in sorption in the Culebra as a
 8 result of leakage through HCN injection boreholes.

9 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21 through H24, the effects of changes in
 10 sorption in the Dewey Lake within the controlled area as a result of leakage through HCN
 11 injection boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
 12 to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal
 13 system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
 14 performance of the disposal system.

15 Nonlocally derived fluids could be used during hydraulic fracturing operations. However, such
 16 fluid-injection operations would be carefully controlled to minimize leakage to thief zones.
 17 Therefore, any potential geochemical effects of such leakages have been eliminated from PA
 18 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-5.2.1.6.3.5 Future Human EPs**

20 Consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
 21 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole within the site boundary.
 22 Liquid waste disposal (byproducts from oil and gas production), enhanced oil and gas
 23 production, and hydrocarbon storage are techniques associated with resource recovery and are
 24 expected to continue into the future outside the site boundary. Analyses have shown that these
 25 activities have little consequence on repository performance (Stoelzel and Swift 1997).
 26 Therefore, activities such as liquid waste disposal, enhanced oil and gas production, and
 27 hydrocarbon storage outside the site boundary have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 28 basis of low consequence.

29 **SCR-5.2.1.7 FEP Numbers:** H60, H61, and H62

30 **FEP Titles:** *Liquid Waste Disposal – IB (H60)*
 31 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Production – IB (H61)*
 32 *Hydrocarbon Storage – IB (H62)*

33 **SCR-5.2.1.7.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
 34 SO-R (Future)

35 The hydrological effects of HCN fluid injection (*Liquid Waste Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas*
 36 *Production, and Hydrocarbon Storage*) through boreholes inside the controlled area have been
 37 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds (section 194.25(a)). *Liquid Waste*
 38 *Disposal, Enhanced Oil and Gas Production, and Hydrocarbon Storage* (within the controlled
 39 area) in the future have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds (section
 40 194.33(d)).

1 **SCR-5.2.1.7.2 Summary of New Information**

2 These FEPs are specific to activities inside the WIPP boundary, or IB, although past discussions
3 have sometimes confused these activities with possible events occurring outside the WIPP
4 boundary or OB. Section 194.33(d) excludes activities subsequent to drilling the borehole from
5 further consideration in PA. It has historically been understood that this exclusion applies only
6 to IB activities, and not those OB. Therefore, these FEPs deal specifically with IB activities.
7 These three new FEPs have been created to address IB activities analogous to FEPs H27, *Liquid*
8 *Disposal-OB*; H28 *Enhanced Oil and Gas Production-OB*; and H29 *Hydrocarbon Storage-OB*.
9 The descriptions of the OB activities (H27 – H29, Section SCR-5.2.1.6) have been clarified to be
10 specifically related to activities OB.

11 **SCR-5.2.1.7.3 Screening Argument**

12 The injection of fluids in a borehole within the WIPP boundary could alter fluid-flow patterns in
13 the target horizons or, if there is accidental leakage through a borehole casing, in any other
14 intersected hydraulically conductive zone. Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole within
15 the WIPP boundary could also result in geochemical changes and altered radionuclide migration
16 rates in the thief units.

17 **SCR-5.2.1.7.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

18 Injection of fluids for the purposes of liquid disposal, enhanced oil and gas production, or
19 hydrocarbon storage has not occurred within the WIPP boundary. Therefore, based on the future
20 states assumption provided by section 194.25(a), it is assumed that such activities will not occur
21 within the near-future time frame, which includes the period of WIPP AICs. These activities are
22 excluded from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

23 **SCR-5.2.1.7.3.2 Future Human EPs**

24 The provisions of section 194.33(d) state, “that performance assessments need not analyze the
25 effects of techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of the borehole.”
26 Therefore, the future injection of fluids for the purposes of liquid disposal, enhanced oil and gas
27 production, and hydrocarbon storage within the WIPP boundary have been excluded from PA
28 calculations on regulatory grounds.

29 **SCR-5.2.1.8 FEP Number:** H30

30 **FEP Title:** *Fluid Injection-Induced Geochemical Changes*

31 **SCR-5.2.1.8.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)

32 SO-R (Future)

33 Geochemical changes that occur inside the controlled area as a result of fluid flow associated
34 with HCN fluid injection are accounted for in PA calculations. Geochemical changes resulting
35 from fluid injection in the future inside the controlled area have been eliminated from PA
36 calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.8.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information regarding this FEP has been identified.

3 **SCR-5.2.1.8.3 Screening Argument**

4 The injection of fluids could alter fluid-flow patterns in the target horizons or, if there is
5 accidental leakage through a borehole casing, in any other intersected hydraulically conductive
6 zone. Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could also result in geochemical changes
7 and altered radionuclide migration rates in the thief units.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.8.3.1 Geochemical Effects of Leakage through Injection Boreholes**

9 Injection of fluids through a leaking borehole could affect the geochemical conditions in thief
10 zones, such as the Salado interbeds or the Culebra. Such fluid injection-induced geochemical
11 changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
12 if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area through their effects on colloid
13 transport and sorption.

14 The majority of fluids injected (for example, during brine disposal) have been extracted locally
15 during production activities. Because they have been derived locally, their compositions are
16 similar to fluids currently present in the disposal system, and they will have low total colloid
17 concentrations compared to those in the waste disposal panels (see FEPs H21 through H24,
18 Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, Section SCR-5.2.1.3, and SCR-5.2.1.4). The
19 repository will remain the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Therefore, colloid
20 transport as a result of HCN fluid injection has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
21 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 As discussed in FEPs H21 through H24 (Section SCR-5.2.1.1, Section SCR-5.2.1.2, Section
23 SCR-5.2.1.3, and SCR-5.2.1.4), sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations.
24 The sorption model used accounts for the effects of any changes in sorption in the Culebra as a
25 result of leakage through HCN injection boreholes.

26 Consistent with the screening discussion in FEPs H21 through H24, the effects of changes in
27 sorption in the Dewey Lake within the controlled area as a result of leakage through HCN
28 injection boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
29 to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units of the disposal
30 system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
31 performance of the disposal system.

32 Nonlocally derived fluids could be used during hydraulic fracturing operations. However, such
33 fluid injection operations would be carefully controlled to minimize leakage to thief zones.
34 Therefore, any potential geochemical effects of such leakages have been eliminated from PA
35 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

36 **SCR-5.2.1.8.3.2 Future Human EPs**

37 Consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not analyze the effects of techniques used for
38 resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future borehole. Liquid waste disposal

1 (byproducts from oil and gas production), enhanced oil and gas production, and hydrocarbon
2 storage are techniques associated with resource recovery. Therefore, the use of future boreholes
3 for such activities and fluid injection-induced geochemical changes have been eliminated from
4 PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

5 **SCR-5.2.1.9 FEP Number:** H31

6 **FEP Title:** *Natural Borehole Fluid Flow* (H31)

7 **SCR-5.2.1.9.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)

8 SO-C (Future, holes not penetrating waste panels)

9 DP (Future, holes through waste panels)

10 The effects of *Natural Borehole Fluid Flow* through existing or near-future abandoned
11 boreholes, known or unknown, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
12 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. *Natural Borehole Fluid Flow* through a
13 future borehole that intersects a waste panel is accounted for in PA calculations. The effects of
14 *Natural Borehole Fluid Flow* through a future borehole that does not intersect the waste-disposal
15 region have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
16 performance of the disposal system.

17 **SCR-5.2.1.9.2 Summary of New Information**

18 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

19 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3 Screening Argument**

20 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
21 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
22 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
23 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

24 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
25 changes in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus alter
26 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

27 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
28 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
29 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
30 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
31 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
32 precipitation.

33 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

34 Abandoned water, potash, oil, and gas exploration and production boreholes exist within and
35 outside the controlled area. Most of these boreholes have been plugged in some way, but some
36 have simply been abandoned. Over time, even the boreholes that have been plugged may
37 provide hydraulic connections among the units they penetrate as the plugs degrade. The DOE

1 assumes that records of past and present drilling activities in New Mexico are largely accurate
2 and that evidence of most boreholes would be included in these records. However, the potential
3 effects of boreholes do not change depending on whether their existence is known, hence flow
4 through undetected boreholes and flow through detected boreholes can be evaluated together.

5 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.2 Hydraulic Effects of Flow through Abandoned Boreholes**

6 Fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the Culebra could be affected if deep boreholes
7 result in hydraulic connections between the Culebra and deep, overpressurized or
8 underpressurized units, or if boreholes provide interconnections for flow between shallow units.

9 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.3 Connections Between the Culebra and Deeper Units**

10 Fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the Culebra could be affected if deep boreholes
11 result in hydraulic connections between the Culebra and deep, overpressurized or
12 underpressurized units. Over the past 80 years, a large number of deep boreholes have been
13 drilled within and around the controlled area (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.2). The
14 effects on the performance of the disposal system of long-term hydraulic connections between
15 the Culebra and deep units depends on the locations of the boreholes. In some cases, changes in
16 the Culebra flow field caused by interconnections with deep units could decrease lateral
17 radionuclide travel times to the accessible environment.

18 As part of an analysis to determine the impact of such interconnections, Wallace (1996a)
19 gathered information on the pressures, permeabilities, and thicknesses of potential oil- or gas-
20 bearing sedimentary units; such units exist to a depth of about 5,500 m (18,044 ft) in the vicinity
21 of the WIPP. Of these units, the Atoka, some 4,000 m (13,123 ft) below the land surface, has the
22 highest documented pressure of about 64 megapascals (MPa) (9,600 pounds per square inch
23 [psi]), with permeability of about $2 \times 10^{-14} \text{ m}^2$ (2.1×10^{-13} square feet [ft^2]) and thickness of
24 about 210 m (689 ft). The Strawn, 3,900 m (12,795 ft) below the land surface, has the lowest
25 pressures (35 MPa [5,000 psi], which is lower than hydrostatic) and highest permeability (10^{-13}
26 m^2 [$1.1 \times 10^{-12} \text{ ft}^2$]) of the deep units, with a thickness of about 90 m (295 ft).

27 PA calculations indicate that the shortest radionuclide travel times to the accessible environment
28 through the Culebra occur when flow in the Culebra in the disposal system is from north to
29 south. Wallace (1996a) ran the steady-state SECOFL2D model with the PA data that generated
30 the shortest radionuclide travel times (with and without mining in the controlled area) but
31 perturbed the flow field by placing a borehole connecting the Atoka to the Culebra just north of
32 the waste disposal panels and a borehole connecting the Culebra to the Strawn just south of the
33 controlled area. The borehole locations were selected to coincide with the end points of the
34 fastest flow paths modeled, which represents an unlikely worst-case condition. Although the
35 Atoka is primarily a gas-bearing unit, Wallace (1996a) assumed that the unit is brine saturated.
36 This assumption is conservative because it prevents two-phase flow from occurring in the
37 Culebra, which would decrease the water permeability and thereby increase transport times. It
38 was conservatively assumed that the pressure in the Atoka would not have been depleted by
39 production before the well was plugged and abandoned. Furthermore, it was conservatively
40 assumed that all flow from the Atoka would enter the Culebra and not intermediate or shallower
41 units, and that flow from the Culebra could somehow enter the Strawn despite intermediate
42 zones having higher pressures than the Culebra. The fluid flux through each borehole was
43 determined using Darcy's Law, assuming a borehole hydraulic conductivity of 10^{-4} m/s (for a

1 permeability of about 10^{-11} m^2 [$1.1 \times 10^{-10} \text{ ft}^2$]) representing silty sand, a borehole radius of
2 0.25 m (.82 ft), and a fluid pressure in the Culebra of 0.88 MPa (132 psi) at a depth of about 200
3 m (650 ft). With these parameters, the Atoka was calculated to transmit water to the Culebra at
4 about $1.4 \times 10^{-5} \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ (0.22 gallons per minute [gpm]), and the Strawn was calculated to receive
5 water from the Culebra at about $1.5 \times 10^{-6} \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ (0.024 gpm).

6 Travel times through the Culebra to the accessible environment were calculated using the
7 SECOFL2D velocity fields for particles released to the Culebra above the waste panels,
8 assuming no retardation by sorption or diffusion into the rock matrix. Mean Darcy velocities
9 were then determined from the distance each radionuclide traveled, the time taken to reach the
10 accessible environment, and the effective Culebra porosity. The results show that, at worst,
11 interconnections between the Culebra and deep units under the unrealistically conservative
12 assumptions listed above could cause less than a twofold increase in the largest mean Darcy
13 velocity expected in the Culebra in the absence of such interconnections.

14 These effects can be compared to the potential effects of climate change on gradients and flow
15 velocities through the Culebra. As discussed in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.9 (and Corbet
16 and Knupp 1996), the maximum effect of a future, wetter climate would be to raise the water
17 table to the ground surface. This would raise heads and gradients in all units above the Salado.
18 For the Culebra, the maximum change in gradient was estimated to be about a factor of 2.1. The
19 effect of climate change is incorporated in compliance calculations through the Climate Index,
20 which is used as a multiplier for Culebra groundwater velocities. The Climate Index has a
21 bimodal distribution, with the range from 1.00 to 1.25 having a 75% probability, and the range
22 from 1.50 to 2.25 having a 25% probability. Because implementation of the Climate Index leads
23 to radionuclide releases through the Culebra that are orders of magnitude lower than the
24 regulatory limits, the effects of flow between the Culebra and deeper units through abandoned
25 boreholes can be screened out on the basis of low consequence.

26 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.4 Connections Between the Culebra and Shallower Units**

27 Abandoned boreholes could also provide interconnections for long-term fluid flow between
28 shallow units (overlying the Salado). Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for
29 downward flow of water from the Dewey Lake and/or Magenta to the Culebra because the
30 Culebra hydraulic head is lower than the hydraulic heads of these units. Magenta freshwater
31 heads are as much as 45 m (148 ft) higher than Culebra freshwater heads. Because the Culebra
32 is generally at least one order of magnitude more transmissive than the Magenta at any location,
33 a connection between the Magenta and Culebra would cause proportionally more drawdown in
34 the Magenta head than rise in the Culebra head. For example, for a one-order-of-magnitude
35 difference in transmissivity and a 45-m (148-ft) difference in head, the Magenta head would
36 decrease by approximately 40 m (131 ft) while the Culebra head increased by 5 m (16 ft). This
37 head increase in the Culebra would also be a localized effect, decreasing with radial distance
38 from the leaking borehole. The primary flow direction in the Culebra across the WIPP site is
39 from north to south, with the Culebra head decreasing by approximately 20 m (66 ft) across this
40 distance. A 5-m (16-ft) increase in Culebra head at the northern WIPP boundary would,
41 therefore, increase gradients by at most 25%.

42 The Dewey Lake freshwater head at the WQSP-6 pad is 55 m (180 ft) higher than the Culebra
43 freshwater head. Leakage from the Dewey Lake could have a greater effect on Culebra head

1 than leakage from the Magenta if the difference in transmissivity between the Dewey Lake and
2 Culebra observed at the WQSP-6 pad, where the Dewey Lake is two orders of magnitude more
3 transmissive than the Culebra (Beauheim and Ruskauff 1998), persists over a wide region.
4 However, the saturated, highly transmissive zone in the Dewey Lake has only been observed
5 south of the WIPP disposal panels. A connection between the Dewey Lake and the Culebra
6 south of the panels would tend to decrease the north-south gradient in the Culebra across the site,
7 not increase it.

8 In any case, leakage of water from overlying units into the Culebra could not increase Culebra
9 heads and gradients as much as might result from climate change, discussed above. Because
10 implementation of the Climate Index leads to radionuclide releases through the Culebra that are
11 orders of magnitude lower than the regulatory limits, the effects of flow between the Culebra and
12 shallower units through abandoned boreholes can be screened out on the basis of low
13 consequence.

14 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.5 Changes in Fluid Density Resulting from Flow Through Abandoned** 15 **Boreholes**

16 Leakage from historical, current, and near-future abandoned boreholes that penetrate pressurized
17 brine pockets in the Castile could give rise to fluid density changes in affected units. Wilmot and
18 Galson (1996) showed that brine density changes in the Culebra resulting from leakage through
19 an abandoned borehole would not have a significant effect on the Culebra flow field. A
20 localized increase in fluid density in the Culebra resulting from leakage from an abandoned
21 borehole would rotate the flow vector towards the downdip direction (towards the east). A
22 comparison of the relative magnitudes of the freshwater head gradient and the gravitational
23 gradient, based on an analysis similar to that presented in Section SCR-5.2.1.6 (FEPs H27, H28,
24 and H29), shows that the density effect is of low consequence to the performance of the disposal
25 system.

26 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.6 Future Human EPs**

27 The EPA provides criteria for analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in section
28 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete, the
29 borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see the CCA, Chapter
30 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for fluid
31 flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive zones.
32 The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will primarily
33 depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods used.

34 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.7 Hydraulic Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes**

35 A future borehole that penetrates a Castile brine reservoir could provide a connection for brine
36 flow from the reservoir to the waste panel, thus increasing fluid pressure and brine volume in the
37 waste panel. Long-term natural borehole fluid flow through such a borehole is accounted for in
38 PA calculations (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.8).

39 Deep, abandoned boreholes that intersect the Salado interbeds near the waste disposal panels
40 could provide pathways for long-term radionuclide transport from the waste panels to the land
41 surface or to overlying units. The potential significance of such events were assessed by the
42 WIPP PA Department (1991, B-26 to B-27), which examined single-phase flow and transport

1 between the waste panels and a borehole intersecting MB 139 outside the DRZ. The analysis
2 assumed an in situ pressure of 11 MPa in MB 139, a borehole pressure of 6.5 MPa (975 psi)
3 (hydrostatic) at MB 139, and a constant pressure of 18 MPa (2,700 psi) as a source term in the
4 waste panels representing gas generation. Also, MB 139 was assigned a permeability of
5 approximately $3 \times 10^{-20} \text{ m}^2$ ($3.2 \times 10^{-19} \text{ ft}^2$) and a porosity of 0.01%. The disturbed zone was
6 assumed to exist in MB 139 directly beneath the repository only and was assigned a permeability
7 of $1.0 \times 10^{-17} \text{ m}^2$ ($1.1 \times 10^{-16} \text{ ft}^2$) and a porosity of 0.055%. Results showed that the rate of flow
8 through a borehole located just 0.25 m (0.8 ft) outside the DRZ would be more than two orders
9 of magnitude less than the rate of flow through a borehole located within the DRZ because of the
10 contrast in permeability. Thus any releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment
11 through deep boreholes that do not intersect waste panels would be insignificant compared to the
12 releases that would result from transport through boreholes that intersect waste panels. Thus
13 radionuclide transport through deep boreholes that do not intersect waste panels has been
14 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
15 disposal system.

16 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.8 Fluid Flow and Radionuclide Transport in the Culebra**

17 Fluid flow and radionuclide transport within the Culebra could be affected if future boreholes
18 result in hydraulic connections between the Culebra and either deeper or shallower units. Over
19 the 10,000-yr regulatory period, a large number of deep boreholes could be drilled within and
20 around the controlled area (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.12.2). The effects on the
21 performance of the disposal system of long-term hydraulic connections between the Culebra and
22 deeper or shallower units would be the same as those discussed above for historic, current, and
23 near-future conditions. Thus the effects of flow between the Culebra and deeper or shallower
24 units through abandoned future boreholes can be screened out on the basis of low consequence.

25 **SCR-5.2.1.9.3.9 Changes in Fluid Density Resulting from Flow Through Abandoned** 26 **Boreholes**

27 A future borehole that intersects a pressurized brine reservoir in the Castile could also provide a
28 source for brine flow to the Culebra in the event of borehole casing leakage, with a consequent
29 localized increase in fluid density in the Culebra. The effect of such a change in fluid density
30 would be to increase any density-driven component of groundwater flow. If the downdip
31 direction, along which the density-driven component would be directed, is different from the
32 direction of the groundwater pressure gradient, there would be a slight rotation of the flow vector
33 towards the downdip direction. The groundwater modeling presented by Davies (1989, p. 50)
34 indicates that a borehole that intersects a pressurized brine pocket and causes a localized increase
35 in fluid density in the Culebra above the waste panels would result in a rotation of the flow
36 vector slightly towards the east. However, the magnitude of this effect would be small in
37 comparison to the magnitude of the pressure gradient (see screening argument for FEPs H27,
38 H28, and H29, Section SCR-5.2.1.6, where this effect is screened out on the basis of low
39 consequence).

1 **SCR-5.2.1.10 FEP Number:** H32
2 **FEP Title:** *Waste-Induced Borehole Flow*

3 **SCR-5.2.1.10.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
4 DP (Future)

5 Waste-induced flow through boreholes drilled in the near future has been eliminated from PA
6 calculations on regulatory grounds. *Waste-Induced Borehole Flow* through a future borehole
7 that intersects a waste panel are accounted for in PA calculations.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.10.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 **SCR-5.2.1.10.3 Screening Argument**

11 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
12 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
13 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
14 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

15 Continued resource exploration and production in the near future will result in the occurrence of
16 many more abandoned boreholes in the vicinity of the controlled area. Institutional controls will
17 prevent drilling (other than that associated with the WIPP development) from taking place within
18 the controlled area in the near future. Therefore, no boreholes will intersect the waste disposal
19 region in the near future, and waste-induced borehole flow in the near future has been eliminated
20 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

21 **SCR-5.2.1.10.3.1 Future Human EPs**

22 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in
23 section 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is
24 complete, the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see the
25 CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.7.2). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in
26 connections for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected
27 hydraulically conductive zones. The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and
28 abandoned in the future will primarily depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole
29 casing and plugging methods used.

30 **SCR-5.2.1.10.3.2 Hydraulic Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes**

31 An abandoned future borehole that intersects a waste panel could provide a connection for
32 contaminant transport away from the repository horizon. If the borehole has degraded casing
33 and/or plugs, and the fluid pressure within the waste panel is sufficient, radionuclides could be
34 transported to the land surface. Additionally, if brine flows through the borehole to overlying
35 units, such as the Culebra, it may carry dissolved and colloidal actinides that can be transported
36 laterally to the accessible environment by natural groundwater flow in the overlying units.
37 Long-term waste-induced borehole flow is accounted for in PA calculations (see Appendix
38 PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5).

1 **SCR-5.2.1.11 FEP Number:** H34
2 **FEP Title:** *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence*

3 **SCR-5.2.1.11.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-C (Future)

5 The effects of *Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence* associated with existing, near-future,
6 and future abandoned boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
7 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.11.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 **SCR-5.2.1.11.3 Screening Argument**

11 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
12 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
13 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
14 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
15 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
16 precipitation.

17 **SCR-5.2.1.11.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

18 **SCR-5.2.1.11.3.1.1 Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence**

19 During the period covered by HCN FEPs, drilling within the land withdrawn for the WIPP will
20 be controlled, and boreholes will be plugged according to existing regulations. Under these
21 circumstances and during this time period, borehole-induced solution and subsidence at WIPP is
22 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of no consequence to the disposal system.

23 Outside the area withdrawn for the WIPP, drilling has been regulated, but conditions of historical
24 and existing boreholes are highly variable. Borehole-induced solution and subsidence may occur
25 in these areas, although it is expected to be limited and should not affect the disposal system, as
26 discussed in the following paragraphs.

27 Three features are required for significant borehole-induced solution and subsidence to occur: a
28 borehole, an energy gradient to drive unsaturated (with respect to halite) water through the
29 evaporite-bearing formations, and a conduit to allow migration of brine away from the site of
30 dissolution. Without these features, minor amounts of halite might be dissolved in the immediate
31 vicinity of a borehole, but percolating water would become saturated with respect to halite and
32 stagnant in the bottom of the drillhole, preventing further dissolution.

33 At, and in the vicinity of, the WIPP site, drillholes penetrating into, but not through, the
34 evaporite-bearing formations have little potential for dissolution. Brines coming from the Salado
35 and Castile, for example, have high total dissolved solids and are likely to precipitate halite, not
36 dissolve more halite during passage through the borehole. Water infiltrating from the surface or
37 near-surface units may not be saturated with halite. For drillholes with a total depth in halite-

1 bearing formations, there is little potential for dissolution because the halite-bearing units have
2 very low permeability and provide little outlet for the brine created as the infiltrating water fills
3 the drillhole. ERDA-9 is the deepest drillhole in the immediate vicinity of the waste panels at the
4 WIPP; the bottom of the drillhole is in the uppermost Castile, with no known outlet for brine at
5 the bottom.

6 Drillholes penetrating through the evaporite-bearing formations provide possible pathways for
7 circulation of water. Underlying units in the vicinity of the WIPP site with sufficient
8 potentiometric levels or pressures to reach or move upward through the halite units generally
9 have one of two characteristics: (1) high-salinity brines, which limit or eliminate the potential
10 for dissolution of evaporites, or (2) are gas producers. Wood et al. (1982) analyzed natural
11 processes of dissolution of the evaporites by water from the underlying Bell Canyon. They
12 concluded that brine removal in the Bell Canyon is slow, limiting the movement of dissolution
13 fronts or the creation of natural collapse features. Existing drillholes that are within the
14 boundaries of the withdrawn land and also penetrate through the evaporites are not located in the
15 immediate vicinity of the waste panels or WIPP workings.

16 There are three examples in the region that appear to demonstrate the process for borehole-
17 induced solution and subsidence, but the geohydrologic setting and drillhole completions differ
18 from those at or near the WIPP.

19 An example of borehole-induced solution and subsidence occurred in 1980 about 160 km (100
20 mi) southeast of the WIPP site (outside the Delaware Basin) at the Wink Sink (Baumgardner
21 et al. 1982; Johnson 1989), where percolation of shallow groundwater through abandoned
22 boreholes, dissolution of the Salado, and subsidence of overlying units led to a surface collapse
23 feature 110 m (360 ft) in width and 34 m (110 ft) deep. At the Wink Sink, the Salado is
24 underlain by the Tansill, Yates, and Capitan Formations, which contain vugs and solution
25 cavities through which brine could migrate. Also, the hydraulic head of the Santa Rosa (the
26 uppermost aquifer) is greater than those of the deep aquifers (Tansill, Yates, and Capitan),
27 suggesting downward flow if a connection were established. A second sink (Wink Sink 2)
28 formed in May 2002, near the earlier sink (Johnson et al. 2003). Its origin is similar to the earlier
29 sink. By February 2003, Wink Sink 2 had enlarged by surface collapse to a length of about 305
30 m (1,000 ft) and a width of about 198 m (650 ft).

31 A similar, though smaller, surface collapse occurred in 1998 northwest of Jal, New Mexico
32 (Powers 2000). The most likely cause of collapse appears to be dissolution of Rustler, and
33 possibly Salado, halite as relatively low salinity water from the Capitan Reef circulated through
34 breaks in the casing of a deep water supply well. Much of the annulus behind the casing through
35 the evaporite section was uncemented, and work in the well at one time indicated bent and
36 ruptured casing. The surface collapse occurred quickly, and the sink was initially about 23 m
37 (75 ft) across and a little more than 30 m (100 ft) deep. By 2001, the surface diameter was about
38 37 m (120 ft), and the sink was filled with collapse debris to about 18 m (60 ft) below the ground
39 level (Powers, in press).

40 The sinkholes near Wink, Texas and Jal, New Mexico, occurred above the Capitan Reef (which
41 is by definition outside the Delaware Basin), and the low-salinity water and relatively high
42 potentiometric levels of the Capitan Reef appear to be integral parts of the process that formed

1 these sinkholes. They are reviewed as examples of the process of evaporite dissolution and
2 subsidence related to circulation in drillholes. Nevertheless, the factors of significant low salinity
3 water and high potentiometric levels in units below the evaporites do not appear to apply at the
4 WIPP site.

5 Beauheim (1986) considered the direction of natural fluid flow through boreholes in the vicinity
6 of the WIPP. Beauheim (1986, p. 72) examined hydraulic heads measured using drill stem tests
7 in the Bell Canyon and the Culebra at well DOE-2 and concluded that the direction of flow in a
8 cased borehole open only to the Bell Canyon and the Culebra would be upward. Bell Canyon
9 waters in the vicinity of the WIPP site are saline brines (e.g., Lambert 1978; Beauheim et al.
10 1983; Mercer et al. 1987), limiting the potential for dissolution of the overlying evaporites.
11 However, dissolution of halite in the Castile and the Salado would increase the relative density of
12 the fluid in an open borehole, causing a reduction in the rate of upward flow. The direction of
13 borehole fluid flow could potentially reverse, but such a flow could be sustained only if
14 sufficient driving pressure, porosity, and permeability exist for fluid to flow laterally within the
15 Bell Canyon. A further potential sink for Salado-derived brine is the Capitan Limestone.
16 However, the subsurface extent of the Capitan Reef is approximately 16 km (10 mi) from the
17 WIPP at its closest point, and this unit will not provide a sink for brine derived from boreholes in
18 the vicinity of the controlled area. A similar screening argument is made for natural deep
19 dissolution in the vicinity of the WIPP (see N16 and N18, Section SCR-4.1.5.1 and Section
20 SCR-4.1.5.2).

21 The effects of borehole-induced solution and subsidence through a waste panel are considered
22 below. The principal effects of borehole-induced solution and subsidence in the remaining parts
23 of the disposal system should be to change the hydraulic properties of the Culebra and other
24 rocks in the system. The features are local (limited lateral dimensions) and commonly nearly
25 circular. If subsidence occurs along the expected travel path and the transmissivity of the Culebra
26 is increased, as in the calculations conducted by Wallace (1996c), the travel times should
27 increase. If the transmissivity along the expected flow path decreased locally as a result of such a
28 feature, the flow path should be lengthened by travel around the feature. Thus the effects of
29 borehole-induced solution and subsidence around existing abandoned boreholes, and boreholes
30 drilled and abandoned in the near-future, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
31 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 **SCR-5.2.1.11.3.2 Future Human EPs**

33 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in
34 section 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
35 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Appendix PA-
36 2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for
37 fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive
38 zones. The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will
39 primarily depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods
40 used.

1 SCR-5.2.1.11.3.2.1 Borehole-Induced Solution and Subsidence

2 Future boreholes that do not intersect the WIPP excavation do not differ in long-term behavior or
3 consequences from existing boreholes, and can be eliminated from PA on the basis of low
4 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

5 The condition of more apparent concern is a future borehole that intersects the WIPP excavation.
6 Seals and casings are assumed to degrade, connecting the excavation to various units. For a
7 drillhole intersecting the excavation, but not connecting to a brine reservoir or to formations
8 below the evaporites, downward flow is limited by the open volume of the disposal room(s),
9 which is dependent with time, gas generation, or brine inflow to the disposal system from the
10 Salado.

11 Maximum dissolution, and maximum increase in borehole diameter, will occur at the top of the
12 Salado; dissolution will decrease with depth as the percolating water becomes salt saturated.
13 Eventually, degraded casing and concrete plug products, clays, and other materials will fill the
14 borehole. Long-term flow through a borehole that intersects a waste panel is accounted for in
15 DP calculations by assuming that the borehole is eventually filled by such materials, which have
16 the properties of a silty sand (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5). However, these
17 calculations assume that the borehole diameter does not increase with time. Under the conditions
18 assumed in the CCA for an E2 drilling event at 1,000 years, about 1,000 m³ (35,316 ft³) would
19 be dissolved from the lower Rustler and upper Salado. If the dissolved area is approximately
20 cylindrical or conical around the borehole, and the collapse/subsidence propagates upward as
21 occurred in breccia pipes (e.g., Snyder and Gard 1982), the diameter of the collapsed or subsided
22 area through the Culebra and other units would be a few tens of meters across. Changes in
23 hydraulic parameters for this small zone should slow travel times for any hypothesized
24 radionuclide release, as discussed for HCN occurrences. This does not change the argument for
25 low consequence due to borehole-induced solution and subsidence for these circumstances.

26 If a drillhole through a waste panel and into deeper evaporites intercepts a Castile brine reservoir,
27 the brine has little or no capability of dissolving additional halite. The Castile brine flow is
28 considered elsewhere as part of DP. There is, however, no *Borehole-Induced Solution and*
29 *Subsidence* under this circumstance, and therefore there is no effect on performance because of
30 this EP.

31 If a borehole intercepts a waste panel and also interconnects with formations below the evaporite
32 section, fluid flow up or down is determined by several conditions and may change over a period
33 of time (e.g., as dissolution increases the fluid density in the borehole). Fluid flow downward is
34 not a concern for performance, as fluid velocities in units such as the Bell Canyon are slow and
35 should not be of concern for performance (Wilson et al., 1996). As with boreholes considered
36 for HCN, the local change in hydraulic parameters, if it occurs along the expected flow path,
37 would be expected to cause little change in travel time and should increase the travel time.

38 In summary, the effects of borehole-induced solution and subsidence around future abandoned
39 boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
40 performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.12 FEP Number:** H35
2 **FEP Title:** *Borehole-Induced Mineralization*

3 **SCR-5.2.1.12.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
4 SO-C (Future)

5 The effects of *Borehole-Induced Mineralization*, associated with existing, near-future, and future
6 abandoned boreholes, have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
7 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 **SCR-5.2.1.12.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 **SCR-5.2.1.12.3 Screening Argument**

11 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
12 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
13 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
14 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

15 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
16 changes in the receiving units, such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus alter
17 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

18 Potentially, boreholes could provide pathways for surface-derived water or groundwater to
19 percolate through low-permeability strata and into formations containing soluble minerals.
20 Large-scale dissolution through this mechanism could lead to subsidence and to changes in
21 groundwater flow patterns. Also, fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through
22 a borehole may result in changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral
23 precipitation.

24 **SCR-5.2.1.12.3.1 Borehole-Induced Mineralization**

25 Fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through a borehole may result in changes
26 in permeability in the affected units through mineral precipitation. For example:

- 27
- 28 • Limited calcite precipitation may occur as the waters mix in the Culebra immediately
29 surrounding the borehole, and calcite dissolution may occur as the brines migrate away
from the borehole as a result of variations in water chemistry along the flow path.
 - 30 • Gypsum may be dissolved as the waters mix in the Culebra immediately surrounding the
31 borehole but may precipitate as the waters migrate through the Culebra.

32 The effects of these mass transfer processes on groundwater flow depend on the original
33 permeability structure of the Culebra rocks and the location of the mass transfer. The volumes of
34 minerals that may precipitate or dissolve in the Culebra as a result of the injection of Castile or

1 Salado brine through a borehole will not affect the existing spatial variability in the permeability
 2 field significantly.

3 Predicted radionuclide transport rates in the Culebra assume that the dolomite matrix is
 4 diffusively accessed by the contaminants. The possible inhibition of matrix diffusion by
 5 secondary mineral precipitation on fracture walls as a result of mixing between brines and
 6 Culebra porewater was addressed by Wang (1998). Wang showed that the volume of secondary
 7 minerals precipitated because of this mechanism was too small to significantly affect matrix
 8 porosity and accessibility.

9 Consequently, the effects of borehole-induced mineralization on permeability and groundwater
 10 flow within the Culebra, as a result of brines introduced via any existing abandoned boreholes
 11 and boreholes drilled and abandoned in the near future, have been eliminated from PA
 12 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

13 **SCR-5.2.1.12.4 Future Human EPs**

14 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in
 15 section 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
 16 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Appendix PA-
 17 2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for
 18 fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive
 19 zones. The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will
 20 primarily depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods
 21 used.

22 **SCR-5.2.1.12.4.1 Borehole-Induced Mineralization**

23 Fluid flow between hydraulically conductive horizons through a future borehole may result in
 24 changes in permeability in the affected units through mineral precipitation. However, the effects
 25 of mineral precipitation as a result of flow through a future borehole in the controlled area will
 26 be similar to the effects of mineral precipitation as a result of flow through an existing or near-
 27 future borehole (see FEP H32, Section SCR-5.2.1.10). Thus borehole-induced mineralization
 28 associated with flow through a future borehole has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 29 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

30 **SCR-5.2.1.13 FEP Number: H36**

31 **FEP Title:** *Borehole-Induced Geochemical Changes*

32 **SCR-5.2.1.13.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)

33 DP (Future)

34 SO-C for units other than the Culebra

35 Geochemical changes that occur inside the controlled area as a result of long-term flow
 36 associated with HCN and future abandoned boreholes are accounted for in PA calculations.

1 **SCR-5.2.1.13.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

3 **SCR-5.2.1.13.3 Screening Argument**

4 Abandoned boreholes could provide pathways for fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant
5 transport between any intersected zones. For example, such boreholes could provide pathways
6 for vertical flow between transmissive units in the Rustler, or between the Culebra and units
7 below the Salado, which could affect fluid densities, flow rates, and flow directions.

8 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
9 changes in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra, and thus alter
10 radionuclide migration rates in these units.

11 **SCR-5.2.1.13.3.1 Geochemical Effects of Borehole Flow**

12 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
13 changes in the receiving units such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra. Such geochemical
14 changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
15 if they occur sufficiently close to the edge of the controlled area, or if they occur as a result of
16 flow through existing boreholes within the controlled area through their effects on colloid
17 transport and sorption.

18 The contents of the waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal
19 system. Thus, consistent with the discussion in Section SCR-5.2.1.4 (*Borehole-Induced*
20 *Geochemical Changes* [H24]), colloid transport as a result of flow through existing and near-
21 future abandoned boreholes has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
22 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 As discussed in H24, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations. The
24 sorption model used accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra as a result of
25 flow through existing and near-future abandoned boreholes.

26 Consistent with the screening discussion in Section SCR-5.2.1.4, the effects of changes in
27 sorption in the Dewey Lake inside the controlled area as a result of flow through existing and
28 near-future abandoned boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
29 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units
30 of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
31 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 **SCR-5.2.1.13.4 Future Human EPs**

33 The EPA provides criteria concerning analysis of the consequences of future drilling events in
34 section 194.33(c). Consistent with these criteria, the DOE assumes that after drilling is complete
35 the borehole is plugged according to current practice in the Delaware Basin (see Appendix PA-
36 2009, Section PA-2.1.4.5). Degradation of casing and/or plugs may result in connections for
37 fluid flow and, potentially, contaminant transport between connected hydraulically conductive

1 zones. The long-term consequences of boreholes drilled and abandoned in the future will
 2 primarily depend on the location of the borehole and the borehole casing and plugging methods
 3 used.

4 **SCR-5.2.1.13.4.1 Geochemical Effects of Flow Through Abandoned Boreholes**

5 Movement of fluids through abandoned boreholes could result in borehole-induced geochemical
 6 changes in the receiving units, such as the Salado interbeds or Culebra. Such geochemical
 7 changes could alter radionuclide migration rates within the disposal system in the affected units
 8 through their effects on colloid transport and sorption.

9 The waste disposal panels provide the main source of colloids in the disposal system. Colloid
 10 transport within the Culebra as a result of long-term flow associated with future abandoned
 11 boreholes that intersect the waste disposal region are accounted for in PA calculations, as
 12 described in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.6 and Section 6.4.6.2.1. Consistent with the
 13 discussion in Section SCR-5.2.1.4, colloid transport as a result of flow through future abandoned
 14 boreholes that do not intersect the waste disposal region has been eliminated from PA
 15 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The
 16 Culebra is the most transmissive unit in the disposal system and it is the most likely unit through
 17 which significant radionuclide transport could occur. Therefore, colloid transport in units other
 18 than the Culebra, as a result of flow through future abandoned boreholes, has been eliminated
 19 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

20 As discussed in Section SCR-5.2.1.4, sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA
 21 calculations. The sorption model accounts for the effects of changes in sorption in the Culebra
 22 as a result of flow through future abandoned boreholes.

23 Consistent with the screening discussion in Section SCR-5.2.1.4, the effects of changes in
 24 sorption in the Dewey Lake within the controlled area as a result of flow through future
 25 abandoned boreholes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 26 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Sorption within other geological units
 27 of the disposal system has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
 28 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

29 **SCR-5.2.2 Excavation-Induced Flow**

30 **SCR-5.2.2.1 FEP Number:** H37

31 **FEP Title:** *Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Mining*

32 **SCR-5.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)
 33 DP (Future)

34 *Changes in Groundwater Flow due to Mining* (HCN and future) are accounted for in PA
 35 calculations.

36 **SCR-5.2.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

37 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

1 **SCR-5.2.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Excavation activities may result in hydrological disturbances of the disposal system. Subsidence
3 associated with excavations may affect groundwater flow patterns through increased hydraulic
4 conductivity within and between units. Fluid flow associated with excavation activities may also
5 result in changes in brine density and geochemistry in the disposal system.

6 **SCR-5.2.2.1.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

7 Currently, potash mining is the only excavation activity currently taking place in the vicinity of
8 the WIPP that could affect hydrogeological or geochemical conditions in the disposal system.
9 Potash is mined in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 5 km (3.1 mi) from the boundaries of the
10 controlled area. Mining of the McNutt Potash Zone in the Salado is expected to continue in the
11 vicinity of the WIPP (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1): the DOE assumes that all
12 economically recoverable potash in the vicinity of the WIPP (outside the controlled area) will be
13 extracted in the near future.

14 **SCR-5.2.2.1.3.2 Hydrogeological Effects of Mining**

15 Potash mining in the Delaware Basin typically involves constructing vertical shafts to the
16 elevation of the ore zone and then extracting the minerals in an excavation that follows the trend
17 of the ore body. Potash has been extracted using conventional room-and-pillar mining,
18 secondary mining where pillars are removed, and modified long-wall mining methods. Mining
19 techniques used include drilling and blasting (used for mining langbeinite) and continuous
20 mining (commonly used for mining sylvite). The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 2-17 to 2-19)
21 reported investigations of subsidence associated with potash mining operations located near the
22 WIPP. The reported maximum total subsidence at potash mines is about 1.5 m (5 ft),
23 representing up to 66% of initial excavation height, with an observed angle of draw from the
24 vertical at the edge of the excavation of 58 degrees. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994 pp. 2-22 to
25 2-23) found no evidence that subsidence over local potash mines had caused fracturing sufficient
26 to connect the mining horizon to water-bearing units or the surface. However, subsidence and
27 fracturing associated with mining in the McNutt in the vicinity of the WIPP may allow increased
28 recharge to the Rustler units and affect the lateral hydraulic conductivity of overlying units, such
29 as the Culebra, which could influence the direction and magnitude of fluid flow within the
30 disposal system. Such changes in groundwater flow due to mining are accounted for in
31 calculations of UP of the disposal system. The effects of any increased recharge that may be
32 occurring are, in effect, included by using heads measured in 2000 (which should reflect that
33 recharge) to calibrate Culebra transmissivity fields (T fields) and calculate transport through
34 those fields (Beauheim 2002). Changes (increases) in Culebra transmissivity are incorporated
35 directly in the modeling of flow and transport in the Culebra (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section
36 6.4.6.2.3).

37 Potash mining, and the associated processing outside the controlled area, have changed fluid
38 densities within the Culebra, as demonstrated by the areas of higher densities around boreholes
39 WIPP-27 and WIPP-29 (Davies 1989, p. 43). Transient groundwater flow calculations (Davies
40 1989, pp. 77–81) show that brine density variations to the west of the WIPP site caused by
41 historical and current potash processing operations will not persist because the rate of
42 groundwater flow in this area is fast enough to flush the high-density groundwaters to the Pecos
43 River. These calculations also show that accounting for the existing brine density variations in

1 the region east of the WIPP site, where hydraulic conductivities are low, would have little effect
 2 on the direction or rate of groundwater flow. Therefore, changes in fluid densities from
 3 historical and current human EPs have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 4 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

5 The distribution of existing leases and potash grades suggests that near-future mining will take
 6 place to the north, west, and south of the controlled area (see the CCA, Appendix DEL). A
 7 localized increase in fluid density in the Culebra, in the mined region or elsewhere outside the
 8 controlled area, would rotate the flow vector towards the downdip direction (towards the east).
 9 A comparison of the relative magnitudes of the pressure gradient and the density gradient (based
 10 on an analysis identical to that presented for fluid leakage to the Culebra through boreholes)
 11 shows that the density effect is of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

12 **SCR-5.2.2.1.4 Future Human EPs**

13 Consistent with section 194.32(b), consideration of future mining may be limited to potash
 14 mining within the disposal system. Within the controlled area, the McNutt provides the only
 15 potash of appropriate quality. The extent of possible future potash mining within the controlled
 16 area is discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1. Criteria concerning the consequence
 17 modeling of future mining are provided in section 194.32(b): the effects of future mining may be
 18 limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal
 19 system. Thus, consistent with section 194.32(b), changes in groundwater flow due to mining
 20 within the controlled area are accounted for in calculations of the DP of the disposal system (see
 21 the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.3).

22 **SCR-5.2.2.2 FEP Number:** H38

23 **FEP Title:** *Changes in Geochemistry Due to Mining*

24 **SCR-5.2.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 25 SO-R (Future)

26 *Changes in Geochemistry due to Mining* (HCN) have been eliminated from PA calculations on
 27 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Future *Changes in*
 28 *Geochemistry due to Mining* have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

29 **SCR-5.2.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

30 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

31 **SCR-5.2.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

32 **SCR-5.2.2.2.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

33 Potash mining is the only excavation activity currently taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP
 34 that could affect hydrogeological or geochemical conditions in the disposal system. Potash is
 35 mined in the region east of Carlsbad and up to 5 km (1.5 mi) from the boundaries of the
 36 controlled area. Mining of the McNutt in the Salado is expected to continue in the vicinity of the
 37 WIPP (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1): the DOE assumes that all economically

1 recoverable potash in the vicinity of the WIPP (outside the controlled area) will be extracted in
 2 the near future.

3 **SCR-5.2.2.2.3.2 Geochemical Effects of Mining**

4 Fluid flow associated with excavation activities may result in geochemical disturbances of the
 5 disposal system. Some waters from the Culebra reflect the influence of current potash mining,
 6 having elevated potassium to sodium ratios. However, potash mining has had no significant
 7 effect on the geochemical characteristics of the disposal system. Solution mining, which
 8 involves the injection of freshwater to dissolve the ore body, can be used for extracting sylvite.
 9 The impact on the WIPP of neighboring potash mines was examined in greater detail by
 10 D'Appolonia (1982). D'Appolonia noted that attempts to solution mine sylvite in the Delaware
 11 Basin failed because of low ore grade, thinness of the ore beds, and problems with heating and
 12 pumping injection water. See discussion in Section SCR-5.1.2.1 (*Conventional Underground*
 13 *Potash Mining* [H13]). Thus changes in geochemistry due to mining (HCN) have been
 14 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 15 disposal system.

16 **SCR-5.2.2.2.3.3 Future Human EPs**

17 Consistent with section 194.32(b), consideration of future mining may be limited to potash
 18 mining within the disposal system. Within the controlled area, the McNutt provides the only
 19 potash of appropriate quality. The extent of possible future potash mining within the controlled
 20 area is discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.1.1. Criteria concerning the consequence
 21 modeling of future mining are provided in section 194.32(b): the effects of future mining may be
 22 limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the hydrogeologic units of the disposal
 23 system. Thus, consistent with section 194.32(b), changes in groundwater flow as a result of
 24 mining within the controlled area are accounted for in calculations of the DP of the disposal
 25 system (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2.3). Other potential effects, such as changes in
 26 geochemistry due to mining, have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

27 **SCR-5.2.2.3 FEP Number** H58
 28 **FEP Title:** *Solution Mining for Potash*

29 **SCR-5.2.2.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
 30 SO-R (Future)

31 HCN and future *Solution Mining for Potash* has been eliminated from PA calculations on
 32 regulatory grounds. HCN and future solution mining for other resources has been eliminated
 33 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

34 **SCR-5.2.2.3.2 Summary of New Information**

35 Plans for the development of a potash solution mine in the region continue, although the solution
 36 process has not begun; the project remains in the permitting and planning stage. The project lies
 37 outside the Delaware Basin, but the DOE maintains communication with the leaseholder and the
 38 U.S. Bureau of Land Management to monitor project status.

1 **SCR-5.2.2.3.3 Screening Argument**

2 Currently, no solution mining for potash occurs in the CPD. The prospect of using solution-
3 mining techniques for extracting potash has been identified in the region, but has not been
4 implemented. A pilot plant for secondary solution mining of sylvite in the Clayton Basin, just
5 north of the Delaware Basin was permitted, and concept planning took place during the mid-
6 1990s and was noted by the EPA in their Response to Comments to the CCA (U.S.
7 Environmental Agency 1998c). Continued progress has been made towards initiating this
8 project, but as of the submittal of this recertification application, the project has not begun. The
9 project intends to solution mine sylvite from retired underground mine workings at the old
10 Potash Corporation of America lease. To date, discharge permits have been filed with the State
11 of New Mexico, but are pending. Therefore, it is premature to consider this an operational
12 solution mining activity. More importantly, the proposed site is outside the Delaware Basin.

13 The potash reserves evaluated by Griswold and Griswold (1999) and New Mexico Bureau of
14 Mines and Mineral Resources (1995) at the WIPP are of economic importance in only two ore
15 zones; the 4th and the 10th contain two minerals of economic importance, langbeinite and sylvite.
16 The ore in the 10th ore zone is primarily sylvite with some langbeinite and the ore in the 4th zone
17 is langbeinite with some sylvite. Langbeinite falls between gypsum and polyhalite in solubility
18 and dissolves at a rate 1000 times slower than sylvite (Heyn 1997). Halite, the predominate
19 gangue mineral present, is much more soluble than the langbeinite. Because of the insolubility of
20 langbeinite, sylvite is the only potash ore in the WIPP vicinity that could be mined using a
21 solution mining process. Mining for sylvite by solutioning would cause the langbeinite to be lost
22 because conventional mining could not be done in conjunction with a solution mining process.

23 Communiqués with IMC Global (Heyn 1997, Prichard 2003) indicate that rock temperature is
24 critical to the success of a solution-mining endeavor. IMC Global's solution mines in Michigan
25 and Saskatchewan are at depths of around 914 m (3,000 ft) or greater, at which rock
26 temperatures are higher. The ore zones at the WIPP are shallow, at depths of 457 to 549 m
27 (1,500 to 1,800 ft), with fairly cool rock temperatures. Prichard (2003) states that solution mining
28 is energy intensive and the cool temperature of the rock would add to the energy costs. In
29 addition, variable concentrations of confounding minerals (such as kainite and leonite) will cause
30 problems with the brine chemistry.

31 Typically, solution mining is used for potash

- 32 • When deposits are at depths in excess of 914 m (3,000 ft) and rock temperatures are high,
33 or are geologically too complex to mine profitably using conventional underground
34 mining techniques
- 35 • To recover the potash pillars at the end of a mine's life
- 36 • When a mine is unintentionally flooded with waters from underlying or overlying rock
37 strata and conventional mining is no longer feasible

38 Douglas W. Heyn (chief chemist of IMC Kalium) provided written testimony to the EPA related
39 to the Agency's rulemaking activities on the CCA. Heyn concluded that "the rational choice for

1 extracting WIPP potash ore reserves would be by conventional room and pillar mechanical
2 means” (Heyn 1997). It is the opinion of IMC Global that no company will ever attempt solution
3 mining of the ores in or near the WIPP (Heyn 1997, Prichard 2003).

4 The impact on the WIPP of neighboring potash mines and the possible effects of solution mining
5 for potash or other evaporite minerals were examined in detail by D’Appolonia (1982).
6 According to D’Appolonia (1982), and in agreement with Heyn (1997) of IMC Global, Inc.,
7 solution mining of langbeinite is not technically feasible because the ore is less soluble than the
8 surrounding evaporite minerals. Solution mining of sylvite was unsuccessfully attempted in the
9 past by the Potash Company of America and Continental Potash. Both ore bodies are currently
10 owned by Mississippi Chemical. Failure of solution mining was attributed to low ore grade,
11 thinness of the ore beds, and problems with heating and pumping injection water. Unavailability
12 of water in the area would also impede implementation of this technique. For these reasons,
13 solution mining is not currently used in the CPD.

14 Serious technical and economic obstacles exist that render solution mining for potash very
15 unlikely in the vicinity of the WIPP. Expectedly, no operational example of this technology
16 exists in the CPD; that is, solution mining for potash is not considered a current practice in the
17 area. For this reason, consideration of solution mining on the disposal system in the future may
18 be excluded on regulatory grounds. For example, the EPA stated in their Response to
19 Comments, Section 8, Issue GG (EPA 1998c):

20 ...However, the Agency emphasizes that, in accordance with the WIPP compliance criteria,
21 solution mining does not need to be included in the PA. As previously discussed, potash solution
22 mining is not an ongoing activity in the Delaware Basin. Section 194.32(b) of the rule limits
23 assessment of mining effects to excavation mining. Thus the solution mining scenarios proposed
24 are excluded on regulatory grounds after repository closure. Prior to or soon after disposal,
25 solution mining is an activity that could be considered under Section 194.32(c). However, DOE
26 found that potash solution mining is not an ongoing activity in the Delaware Basin; and one pilot
27 project examining solution mining in the Basin is not substantive evidence that such mining is
28 expected to occur in the near future. (Even if mining were assumed to occur in the near future, the
29 proposed scenarios would not be possible because, even though solution mining might occur, there
30 would be no intruding borehole to provide a pathway into the repository: active institutional
31 controls would preclude such drilling during the first 100 years after disposal.) Furthermore,
32 Section 194.33(d) states that PA need not analyze the effects of techniques used for resource
33 recovery (e.g. solution mining) after a borehole is drilled in the future.

34 No new data or information have become available that compromise, reduce, or invalidate the
35 project’s position on whether solution mining for potash should be included in the PA
36 calculations. Therefore, conventional mining activities will continue to be incorporated into the
37 WIPP PA as directed by the EPA CAG (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996b). It
38 remains to be seen if a viable potash solution mining project (or others like it) ever progress
39 beyond the planning phase. Construction of a facility for solution mining is an expensive
40 undertaking, and its use as a final recovery method implies that marginal (residual) ore quantities
41 are available. Because the CPD mines are in their mature (declining) stages of production, the
42 significant financing required for a solution mining facility may not become available.
43 Nonetheless, at the time of this FEP reassessment, this technology is not being employed.
44 Therefore, a screening based on the future states assumption at section 194.25(a) is appropriate

1 for this mining technique. Further, the proposed site is outside the Delaware Basin, making it
2 outside the scope of consideration.

3 **SCR-5.2.2.4 FEP Number:** H59

4 **FEP Title:** *Solution Mining for Other Resources*

5 **SCR-5.2.2.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
6 SO-C (Future)

7 HCN and future *Solution Mining for Other Resources* have been eliminated from PA
8 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-5.2.2.4.2 Summary of New Information**

10 Brine well information provided in Table SCR-3 has been updated based on new information
11 from the Delaware Basin Monitoring Program (U.S. Department of Energy 2007b). Since the
12 CRA-2004, active brine wells have increased from 11 to 12 wells.

13 **SCR-5.2.2.4.3 Screening Argument**

14 Brine wells (solution mining for brine) exist within the Delaware Basin, although none within
15 the vicinity of the WIPP. Sulfur extraction using the Frasch process began in 1969 and
16 continued for three decades at the Culberson County Rustler Springs mine near Orla, Texas.
17 Solution mining for the purposes of creating a storage cavity has not occurred within the New
18 Mexico portion of the Delaware Basin.

19 **SCR-5.2.2.4.4 Solution Mining for Brine**

20 Oil and gas reserves in the Delaware Basin are located in structures within the Delaware
21 Mountain Group and lower stratigraphic units. Boreholes drilled to reach these horizons pass
22 through the Salado and Castile that comprise thick halite and other evaporite units. To avoid
23 dissolution of the halite units during drilling and prior to casing of the borehole, the fluid used
24 for lubrication, rotating the drilling-bit cutters, and transporting cuttings (drilling mud) must be
25 saturated with respect to halite. Most oil- and gas-field drilling operations in the Delaware Basin
26 therefore use saturated brine (10 to 10.5 pounds per gallon [lb/gal]) as a drilling fluid until
27 reaching the Bell Canyon, where intermediate casing is set.

28 One method of providing saturated brine for drilling operations is solution mining, whereby fresh
29 water is pumped into the Salado, allowed to reach saturation with respect to halite, and then
30 recovered. This manufactured brine is then transported to the drilling site by water tanker.

31 Two principal techniques are used for solution mining: single-borehole operations and doublet or
32 two-borehole operations.

Table SCR-3. Delaware Basin Brine Well Status

County	Location	API No.	Well Name and No.	Operator	Status
Eddy	22S-26E-36	3001521842	City of Carlsbad #WS-1	Key Energy Services	Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-03	3001520331	Tracy #3	Ray Westall	Plugged Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-17	3001522574	Eugenie #WS-1	I & W Inc	Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-17	3001523031	Eugenie #WS-2	I & W Inc	Plugged Brine Well
Eddy	22S-27E-23	3001528083	Dunaway #1	Mesquite SWD, Inc.	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 29-03	4230110142	Lineberry Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 01-82	4230130680	Chapman Ford #BR1	Herricks & Son Co.	Plugged Brine Well
Loving	Blk 33-80	4230180318	Mentone Brine Station #1D	Basic Energy Services	Brine Well
Loving	Blk 29-28	4230180319	East Mentone Brine Station #1	Permian Brine Sales, Inc.	Plugged Brine Well
Loving	Blk 01-83	4230180320	North Mentone #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 56-30	4238900408	Orla Brine Station #1D	Mesquite SWD Inc.	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 04-08	4238920100	North Pecos Brine Station #WD-1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Reeves	Blk 07-21	4238980476	Coyanosa Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 17-20	4247531742	Pyote Brine Station #WD-1	Chance Properties	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 01-13	4247534514	Quito West Unit #207	Seaboard Oil Co.	Brine Well
Ward	Blk 34-174	4247582265	Barstow Brine Station #1	Chance Properties	Brine Well

1

2 In single-borehole operations, a borehole is drilled into the upper part of the halite unit. After
 3 casing and cementing this portion of the borehole, the borehole is extended, uncased, into the
 4 halite formation. An inner pipe is installed from the surface to the base of this uncased portion
 5 of the borehole. During operation, fresh water is pumped down the annulus of the borehole.
 6 This dissolves halite over the uncased portion of the borehole, and saturated brine is forced up
 7 the inner tube to the surface.

8 In doublet operations, a pair of boreholes are drilled, cased, and cemented into the upper part of
 9 the halite unit. The base of the production well is set some feet below the base of the injection
 10 well. In the absence of natural fractures or other connections between the boreholes,
 11 hydrofracturing is used to induce fractures around the injection well. During operation, fresh
 12 water is pumped down the injection well. This initially dissolves halite from the walls of the
 13 fractures and the resulting brine is then pumped from the production well. After a period of
 14 operation a cavity develops between the boreholes as the halite between fractures is removed.
 15 Because of its lower density, fresh water injected into this cavity will rise to the top and dissolve

1 halite from the roof of the cavity. As the brine density increases it sinks within the cavern and
2 saturated brine is extracted from the production well.

3 **SCR-5.2.2.4.4.1 Current Brine Wells within the Delaware Basin**

4 Brine wells are classified as Class II injection wells. In the Delaware Basin, the process includes
5 injecting fresh water into a salt formation to create a saturated brine solution which is then
6 extracted and utilized as a drilling agent. These wells are tracked by the DBDSP on a continuing
7 basis. Supplemental information provided to the EPA in 1997 showed 11 brine wells in the
8 Delaware Basin. Since that time, additional information has shown that there are 16 brine wells
9 within the Delaware basin, of which 4 are plugged and abandoned. This results in 12 currently
10 active brine wells. Table SCR-3 provides information on these wells.

11 While these wells are within the Delaware Basin, none are within the vicinity of the WIPP. The
12 nearest brine well to the WIPP is the Eugenie #WS-1, located within the city limits of Carlsbad,
13 New Mexico. This well is approximately 48 km (30 mi) from the WIPP site.

14 **SCR-5.2.2.4.5 Solution Mining for Other Minerals**

15 Currently, there are no ongoing solution mining activities within the vicinity of the WIPP. The
16 Rustler Springs sulfur mine located in Culberson County, Texas, began operations in 1969 and
17 continued until it was officially closed in 1999. This mine used the Frasch process (superheated
18 water injection) to extract molten sulfur (Cunningham 1999).

19 **SCR-5.2.2.4.6 Solution Mining for Gas Storage**

20 No gas storage cavities have been solution mined within the New Mexico portion of the
21 Delaware Basin. Five gas storage facilities exist within the general vicinity of the WIPP;
22 however, only one is within the Delaware basin. This one New Mexico Delaware Basin facility
23 uses a depleted gas reservoir for storage and containment; it was not solution mined (see the
24 CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment A, Section DATA-A-5.4).

25 **SCR-5.2.2.4.7 Solution Mining for Disposal**

26 Solution mining can be used to create a disposal cavity in bedded salt. Such disposal cavities can
27 be used for the disposal of naturally occurring radioactive material or other wastes. No such
28 cavities have been mined or operated within the vicinity of the WIPP.

29 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8 Effects of Solution Mining**

30 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8.1 Subsidence**

31 Regardless of whether the single-borehole or two-borehole technique is used for solution mining,
32 the result is a subsurface cavity which could collapse and lead to subsidence of overlying strata.
33 Gray (1991) quoted earlier analyses that show cavity stability is relatively high if the cavity has
34 at least 15 m (50 ft) of overburden per million cubic feet of cavity volume (26.9 m per
35 50,000 m³). There are two studies – discussed below – on the size of solution-mining cavities in
36 the Carlsbad, New Mexico region. These studies concern the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine Wells and

1 the Carlsbad Brine Well and show that neither of these cavities are currently close to this critical
2 ratio, but that subsidence in the future, given continued brine extraction, is a possibility.

3 Hickerson (1991) considered the potential for subsidence resulting from operation of the
4 Carlsbad Eugenie Brine wells, where fresh water is injected into a salt section at a depth of
5 178 m (583 ft) and brine is recovered through a borehole at a depth of 179 m (587 ft). The
6 boreholes are 100 m (327 ft) apart. Hickerson noted that the fresh water, being less dense than
7 brine, tends to move upwards, causing the dissolution cavern to grow preferentially upwards.
8 Thus the dissolution cavern at the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine wells is approximately triangular in
9 cross-section, being bounded by the top of the salt section and larger near the injection well.
10 Hickerson estimated that brine production from 1979 until 1991 had created a cavern of about
11 $9.6 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$ ($3.4 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3$). The size of this cavern was estimated as 107 m (350 ft) by 47 m
12 (153 ft) at the upper surface of the cavern with a depth of 39 m (127 ft).

13 Gray (1991) investigated the potential for collapse and subsidence at the Carlsbad Brine Well.
14 Based on estimated production rates between 1976 and 1991, approximately $9.6 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$ ($3.4 \times$
15 10^6 ft^3) of salt has been dissolved at this site. The well depth is 216 m (710 ft), and thus there are
16 about 64 m (210 ft) of overburden per million cubic feet of capacity (112 m of overburden per
17 $50,000 \text{ m}^3$ of capacity).

18 Gray (1991) also estimated the time required for the cavity at the Carlsbad Brine Well to reach
19 the critical ratio. At an average cavity growth rate of $6.4 \times 10^3 \text{ m}^3$ per year ($2.25 \times 10^5 \text{ ft}^3$ per
20 year), a further 50 years of operation would be required before cavity stability was reduced to
21 levels of concern. A similar calculation for the Carlsbad Eugenie Brine well, based on an
22 overburden of 140 m (460 ft) and an estimated average cavity growth rate of $7.9 \times 10^3 \text{ m}^3$ per
23 year ($2.8 \times 10^5 \text{ ft}^3$ per year), shows that a further 15 years of operation is required before the
24 cavity reaches the critical ratio.

25 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8.2 Hydrogeological Effects**

26 In regions where solution mining takes place, the hydrogeology could be affected in a number
27 ways:

- 28 • Subsidence above a large dissolution cavity could change the vertical and lateral
29 hydraulic conductivity of overlying units.
- 30 • Extraction of fresh water from aquifers for solution mining could cause local changes in
31 pressure gradients.
- 32 • Loss of injected fresh water or extracted brine to overlying units could cause local
33 changes in pressure gradients.

34 The potential for subsidence to take place above solution mining operations in the region of
35 Carlsbad, New Mexico is discussed above. Some subsidence could occur in the future if brine
36 operations continue at existing wells. Resulting fracturing may change permeabilities locally in
37 overlying formations. However, because of the restricted scale of the solution mining at a
38 particular site, and the distances between such wells, such fracturing will have no significant
39 effect on hydrogeology near the WIPP.

1 Solution mining operations in the Delaware Basin extract water from shallow aquifers so that,
 2 even if large drawdowns are permitted, the effects on the hydrogeology will be limited to a
 3 relatively small area around the operation. Since all the active operations are more than 32 km
 4 (20 mi) from the WIPP, there will be no significant effects on the hydrogeology near the WIPP.

5 Discharge plans for solution mining operations typically include provision for annual mechanical
 6 integrity tests at one and one-half the normal operating pressure for four hours (New Mexico Oil
 7 Conservation Division 1994). Thus the potential for loss of integrity and consequent leakage of
 8 freshwater or brine to overlying formations is low. If, despite these annual tests, large water
 9 losses did take place from either injection or production wells, the result would be low brine
 10 yields and remedial actions would most likely be taken by the operators.

11 **SCR-5.2.2.4.8.3 Geochemical Effects**

12 Solution mining operations could affect the geochemistry of surface or subsurface water near the
 13 operation if there were brine leakage from storage tanks or production wells. Discharge plans for
 14 solution mining operations specify the measures to be taken to prevent leakage and to mitigate
 15 the effects of any that do take place. These measures include berms around tanks and annual
 16 mechanical integrity testing of wells (New Mexico Oil Conservation Division 1994). The
 17 potential for changes in geochemistry is therefore low, and any brine losses that did take place
 18 would be limited by remedial actions taken by the operator. In the event of leakage from a
 19 production well, the effect on geochemistry of overlying formation waters would be localized
 20 and, given the distance of such wells from the WIPP site, such leakage would have no significant
 21 effect on geochemistry near the WIPP.

22 **SCR-5.2.2.4.9 Conclusion of Low Consequence**

23 Brine production through solution mining takes place in the Delaware Basin, and the DOE
 24 assumes it will continue in the near future. Because of the existence of these solution operations,
 25 it is not possible to screen this activity based on the provisions of section 194.25(a). However,
 26 despite oil and gas exploration and production taking place in the vicinity of the WIPP site, the
 27 nearest operating solution mine is more than 32 km (20 mi) from the WIPP site. These locations
 28 are too far from the WIPP site for any changes in hydrogeology or geochemistry, from
 29 subsidence or fresh water or brine leakage, to affect the performance of the disposal system.
 30 Thus the effects of HCN and future solution mining for other resources in the Delaware Basin
 31 can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of
 32 the disposal system.

33 **SCR-5.2.3 Explosion-Induced Flow**

34 **SCR-5.2.3.1 FEP Number:** H39

35 **FEPs Title:** Changes in Groundwater Flow Due to Explosions

36 **SCR-5.2.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 37 SO-R (Future)

38 *Changes in Groundwater Flow due to Explosions* (HCN) have been eliminated from PA
 39 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 Changes in groundwater flow that may be caused by future explosions have been eliminated
2 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

3 **SCR-5.2.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

4 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

5 **SCR-5.2.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

6 **SCR-5.2.3.1.3.1 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

7 The small-scale explosions that have been used in the Delaware Basin to fracture oil- and
8 natural-gas-bearing units to enhance resource recovery have been too deep to have disturbed the
9 hydrology of the disposal system (see FEP H19, Section SCR-5.1.3.1).

10 Also, as discussed in Section SCR-5.1.3.2 (*Underground Nuclear Device Testing* [H20]), the
11 Delaware Basin has been used for an isolated nuclear test (Project Gnome), approximately 13 km
12 (8 mi) southwest of the WIPP waste disposal region. An induced zone of increased permeability
13 was observed to extend 46 m (150 ft) laterally from the point of the explosion. The increase in
14 permeability was primarily associated with motions and separations along bedding planes, the
15 major preexisting weaknesses in the rock. This region of increased permeability is too far from
16 the WIPP site to have had a significant effect on the hydrological characteristics of the disposal
17 system. Thus changes in groundwater flow due to explosions in the past have been eliminated
18 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-5.2.3.1.3.2 Future Human EPs**

20 The criterion in section 194.32(a) relating to the scope of PAs limits the consideration of future
21 human actions to mining and drilling. Also, consistent with section 194.33(d), PAs need not
22 analyze the effects of techniques used for resource recovery subsequent to the drilling of a future
23 borehole. Therefore, changes in groundwater flow due to explosions in the future have been
24 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

25 **SCR-5.3 Geomorphological EPS**

26 **SCR-5.3.1 Land Use Changes**

27 **SCR-5.3.1.1 FEP Number:** H40

28 **FEP Title:** *Land Use Changes*

29 **SCR-5.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
30 SO-R (Future)

31 *Land Use Changes* have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

32 **SCR-5.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

33 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

1 **SCR-5.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 This section discusses surface activities that could affect the geomorphological characteristics of
3 the disposal system and result in changes in infiltration and recharge conditions. The potential
4 effects of water use and control on disposal system performance are discussed in FEPs H42
5 through H46 (Section SCR-5.4.1.1, Section SCR-5.4.1.2, and Section SCR-5.4.1.3).

6 **SCR-5.3.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

7 Surface activities that take place at present in the vicinity of the WIPP site include those
8 associated with potash mining, oil and gas reservoir development, water extraction, and grazing.
9 Additionally, a number of archeological investigations have taken place within the controlled
10 area that were aimed at protecting and preserving cultural resources. Elsewhere in the Delaware
11 Basin, sand, gravel, and caliche are produced through surface quarrying. The only surface
12 activity that has the potential to affect the disposal system is potash tailings, salt tailings (both
13 potash and WIPP), and effluent disposal. Potash tailings ponds may act as sources of focused
14 recharge to the Dewey Lake and Rustler units.

15 Three potash tailings piles/ponds are in operation that might be influencing groundwater flow at
16 the WIPP site. These are the Mississippi Potash Inc. (MPI) East tailings pile, approximately
17 10 km (6 mi) due north of the WIPP, the MPI West tailings pile in the northwest arm of Nash
18 Draw, and the IMC Kalium tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due west of the WIPP in
19 Nash Draw. These tailings piles have been in operation for decades—disposal at the MPI East
20 site, the youngest of the piles, began in 1965. Brine disposal at these locations affects Rustler
21 groundwaters in Nash Draw, as shown by the hydrochemical facies D waters described by Siegel
22 et al. (1991, p. 2-61). Brine disposal also affects heads in Nash Draw, and these head effects
23 likely propagate to the WIPP site as well. These effects, however, predate water-level
24 monitoring for the WIPP and have been implicitly included when defining boundary heads for
25 Culebra flow models. The Culebra T fields developed for the CRA used water levels measured
26 in 2000 to define model boundary conditions. Thus the effects of brine disposal at the tailings
27 piles can be considered to be included in PA calculations. These effects are expected to continue
28 in the near future.

29 The Delaware Basin monitoring program monitors land use activities in the WIPP vicinity. This
30 program has not identified new planned uses for land in the vicinity of the WIPP (U.S.
31 Department of Energy 2007b). Therefore, consistent with the criteria in section 194.32(c) and 40
32 CFR § 194.54(b) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a), land use changes in the near
33 future in the vicinity of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
34 grounds.

35 **SCR-5.3.1.1.5 Future Human EPs**

36 The criterion in section 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the future states of society,
37 requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the future
38 remain what they are at the time the compliance application is prepared, provided that such
39 characteristics are not related to hydrogeologic, geologic or climatic conditions.” Therefore, no

1 future land use changes need be considered in the vicinity of the WIPP, and they have been
2 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

3 **SCR-5.3.1.2 FEP Number:** H41
4 **FEP Title:** *Surface Disruptions*

5 **SCR-5.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP (HCN)
6 SO-C (Future)

7 The effects of HCN *Surface Disruptions* are accounted for in PA calculations. The effects of
8 future *Surface Disruptions* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
9 consequence.

10 **SCR-5.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

11 The screening decision has been changed from SO-R to SO-C. The EPA's TSD for Features,
12 Events, and Processes (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006) identified an inconsistency
13 between the screening decision and the screening rationale. After review, it has been determined
14 that SO-C is the correct screening decision and the previous classification of SO-R is not correct.

15 **SCR-5.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

16 This section discusses surface activities that could affect the geomorphological characteristics of
17 the disposal system and result in changes in infiltration and recharge conditions. The potential
18 effects of water use and control on disposal system performance are discussed in FEPs H42
19 through H46.

20 **SCR-5.3.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

21 Most surface activities have no potential to affect the disposal system and are, therefore,
22 screened out on the basis of low consequence (e.g., archaeological excavations and arable
23 farming). However, the effects of activities capable of altering the disposal system (disposal of
24 potash effluent) are included in the modeling of current conditions (i.e., heads) at and around the
25 site. Discussion regarding these anthropogenic effects is found in the CRA-2004, Chapter 2.0,
26 Section 2.2.1.4.2.2.

27 Surface activities that take place at present in the vicinity of the WIPP site include those
28 associated with potash mining, oil and gas reservoir development, water extraction, and grazing.
29 Additionally, a number of archeological investigations have taken place within the controlled
30 area that were aimed at protecting and preserving cultural resources. Elsewhere in the Delaware
31 Basin, sand, gravel, and caliche are produced through surface quarrying. The only surface
32 activity that has the potential to affect the disposal system is potash tailings, salt tailings (both
33 potash and WIPP), and effluent disposal. Potash tailings ponds may act as sources of focused
34 recharge to the Dewey Lake and Rustler units.

35 Three potash tailings piles/ponds are in operation that might be influencing groundwater flow at
36 the WIPP site. These are the MPI East tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due north of the

1 WIPP, the MPI West tailings pile in the northwest arm of Nash Draw, and the IMC Kalium
2 tailings pile, approximately 10 km (6 mi) due west of the WIPP in Nash Draw. These tailings
3 piles have been in operation for decades—disposal at the MPI East site, the youngest of the piles,
4 began in 1965. Brine disposal at these locations affects Rustler groundwaters in Nash Draw, as
5 shown by the hydrochemical facies D waters described by Siegel et al. (1991, p. 2-61). Brine
6 disposal also affects heads in Nash Draw, and these head effects likely propagate to the WIPP
7 site as well. These effects, however, predate water-level monitoring for the WIPP and have been
8 implicitly included when defining boundary heads for Culebra flow models. The Culebra T
9 fields developed for the CRA used water levels measured in 2000 to define model boundary
10 conditions. Thus the effects of brine disposal at the tailings piles can be considered to be
11 included in PA calculations. These effects are expected to continue in the near future.

12 **SCR-5.3.1.2.5 Future Human EPs**

13 Future tailings ponds, if situated in Nash Draw, are expected to change Culebra (and Magenta)
14 heads, similar to existing ones. Future tailings ponds outside of Nash Draw would not be
15 expected to alter Culebra heads because leakage from the ponds would not be able to propagate
16 through the low-permeability lower Dewey Lake clastics and Rustler anhydrites overlying the
17 Culebra during the 100 years or less that such a pond might be in operation. Because PA
18 calculations already include the present-day effects of tailings ponds in Nash Draw on heads, as
19 well as the effects of future potash mining on the permeability of the Culebra (which has much
20 greater potential to alter flow than changes in head), future surface disruptions affecting
21 hydrologic or geologic conditions (such as potash tailings ponds) may be screened out on the
22 basis of low consequence.

23 **SCR-5.4 Surface Hydrological EPs**

24 **SCR-5.4.1 Water Control and Use**

25 **SCR-5.4.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H42, H43, and H44

26 **FEP Titles:** *Damming of Streams and Rivers* (H42)
27 *Reservoirs* (H43)
28 *Irrigation* (H44)

29 **SCR-5.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN) 30 SO-R (Future)

31 The effects of HCN *Damming of Streams and Rivers*, *Reservoirs*, and *Irrigation* have been
32 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
33 disposal system. Future *Damming of Streams and Rivers*, *Reservoirs*, and *Irrigation* have been
34 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

35 **SCR-5.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

36 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs.

1 **SCR-5.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Irrigation and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
 3 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
 4 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake.

5 **SCR-5.4.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

6 In the WIPP area, two topographically low features, the Pecos River and Nash Draw, are
 7 sufficiently large to warrant consideration for damming. Dams and reservoirs already exist along
 8 the Pecos River. However, the Pecos River is far enough from the waste panels (19 km [12 mi])
 9 that the effects of damming of streams and rivers and reservoirs can be eliminated from PA
 10 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Nash
 11 Draw is not currently dammed, and based on current hydrological and climatic conditions, there
 12 is no reason to believe it will be dammed in the near future.

13 Irrigation uses water from rivers, lakes, impoundments, and wells to supplement the rainfall in an
 14 area to grow crops. Irrigation in arid environments needs to be efficient and involves the
 15 spreading of a relatively thin layer of water for uptake by plants, so little water would be
 16 expected to infiltrate beyond the root zone. However, some water added to the surface may
 17 infiltrate and reach the water table, affecting groundwater flow patterns. Irrigation currently
 18 takes place on a small scale within the Delaware Basin but not in the vicinity of the WIPP, and
 19 the extent of irrigation is not expected to change in the near future. Such irrigation has no
 20 significant effect on the characteristics of the disposal system. Thus the effects of irrigation have
 21 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 22 disposal system.

23 **SCR-5.4.1.1.5 Future Human EPs**

24 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
 25 the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling. Therefore, the
 26 effects of future damming of streams and rivers, reservoirs, and irrigation have been eliminated
 27 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

28 **SCR-5.4.1.2 FEP Number:** H45
 29 **FEP Title:** *Lake Usage*

30 **SCR-5.4.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
 31 SO-R (Future)

32 The effects of *Lake Usage* have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

33 **SCR-5.4.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

34 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

1 **SCR-5.4.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

2 Irrigation and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
 3 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow
 4 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake. Surface activities, such as those
 5 associated with potash mining, could also affect soil and surface water chemistry. Note that the
 6 potential effects of geomorphological changes through land use are discussed in Section SCR-
 7 5.3.1.1 and Section SCR-5.3.1.2.

8 **SCR-5.4.1.2.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

9 As discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.2.2, there are no major natural lakes or ponds
 10 within 8 km (5 mi) of the site. To the northwest, west, and southwest, Red Lake, Lindsey Lake,
 11 and Laguna Grande de la Sal are more than 8 km (5 mi) from the site, at elevations of 914 to
 12 1,006 m (3,000 to 3,300 ft). Laguna Gatuña, Laguna Tonto, Laguna Plata, and Laguna Toston
 13 are playas more than 16 km (10 mi) north and are at elevations of 1,050 m (3,450 ft) or higher.

14 Waters from these lakes are of limited use. Therefore human activities associated with lakes
 15 have been screened out of PA calculations based on regulatory grounds supported by section
 16 194.32(c) and section 194.54(b).

17 **SCR-5.4.1.2.5 Future Human EPs**

18 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
 19 the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling. Therefore, the
 20 effects of future lake usage have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

21 **SCR-5.4.1.3 FEP Number:** H46

22 **FEP Title:** *Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human*
 23 *Activities*

24 **SCR-5.4.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN)
 25 SO-R (Future)

26 The effects of HCN *Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities* have been
 27 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
 28 disposal system. Future *Altered Soil or Surface Water Chemistry by Human Activities* have been
 29 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

30 **SCR-5.4.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

31 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

32 **SCR-5.4.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

33 Irrigation and damming, as well as other forms of water control and use, could lead to localized
 34 changes in recharge, possibly leading to increased heads locally, thereby affecting flow

1 directions and velocities in the Rustler and Dewey Lake. Surface activities, such as those
2 associated with potash mining, could also affect soil and surface water chemistry.

3 **SCR-5.4.1.3.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

4 Potash mining effluent and runoff from oil fields have altered soil and surface water chemistry in
5 the vicinity of the WIPP. However, the performance of the disposal system will not be sensitive
6 to soil and surface water chemistry. Therefore, altered soil or surface water chemistry by human
7 activities has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
8 performance of the disposal system. The effects of effluent from potash processing on
9 groundwater flow are discussed in H37 (Section SCR-5.2.2.1).

10 **SCR-5.4.1.3.5 Future Human EPs**

11 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
12 the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling. Therefore, the
13 effects of future altered soil or surface water chemistry by human activities have been eliminated
14 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

15 **SCR-5.5 Climatic EPs**

16 **SCR-5.5.1 Anthropogenic Climate Change**

17 **SCR-5.5.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H47, H48, and H49

18 **FEP Titles:** *Greenhouse Gas Effects (H47)*
19 *Acid Rain (H48)*
20 *Damage to the Ozone Layer (N49)*

21 **SCR-5.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
22 SO-R (Future)

23 The effects of anthropogenic climate change (*Acid Rain, Greenhouse Gas Effects, and Damage*
24 *to the Ozone Layer*) have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

25 **SCR-5.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

26 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

27 **SCR-5.5.1.1.3 Anthropogenic Climate Change**

28 The effects of the current climate and natural climatic change are accounted for in PA
29 calculations, as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.9 and Appendix PA-2009,
30 Section PA-4.8. However, human activities may also affect the future climate and thereby
31 influence groundwater recharge in the WIPP region. The effects of anthropogenic climate
32 change may be on a local to regional scale (acid rain) or on a regional to global scale
33 (greenhouse gas effects and damage to the ozone layer). Of these anthropogenic effects, only the
34 greenhouse gas effect could influence groundwater recharge in the WIPP region. However,

1 consistent with the future states assumptions in section 194.25, compliance assessments and PAs
2 need not consider indirect anthropogenic effects on disposal system performance. Therefore, the
3 effects of anthropogenic climate change have been eliminated from PA calculations on
4 regulatory grounds.

5 **SCR-5.6 Marine EPs**

6 **SCR-5.6.1 Marine Activities**

7 **SCR-5.6.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H50, H51, and H52

8 **FEP Titles:** *Coastal Water Use (H50)*

9 *Seawater Use (H51)*

10 *Estuarine Water Use (H52)*

11 **SCR-5.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)

12 SO-R (Future)

13 HCN, and future *Coastal Water Use*, *Seawater Use*, and *Estuarine Water Use* have been
14 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

15 **SCR-5.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

17 **SCR-5.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 This section discusses the potential for human EPs related to marine activities to affect
19 infiltration and recharge conditions in the vicinity of the WIPP.

20 **SCR-5.6.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

21 The WIPP site is more than 800 km (480 mi) from the nearest seas, and hydrological conditions
22 in the vicinity of the WIPP have not been affected by marine activities. Furthermore, consistent
23 with the criteria in section 194.32(c) and section 194.54(b), consideration of HCN human
24 activities is limited to those activities that have occurred or are expected to occur in the vicinity
25 of the disposal system. Therefore, Human EPs related to marine activities (such as coastal water
26 use, seawater use, and estuarine water use) have been eliminated from PA calculations on
27 regulatory grounds.

28 **SCR-5.6.1.1.5 Future Human EPs**

29 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
30 the scope of consideration of future human actions in PAs to mining and drilling. Therefore, the
31 effects of future marine activities (such as coastal water use, seawater use, and estuarine water
32 use) have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 **SCR-5.7 Ecological EPs**

2 **SCR-5.7.1 Agricultural Activities**

3 **SCR-5.7.1.1 FEP Numbers:** H53, H54, and H55

4 **FEP Titles:** *Arable Farming* (H53)

5 *Ranching* (H54)

6 *Fish Farming* (H55)

7 **SCR-5.7.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C (HCN) (H53, H54)

8 SO-R (HCN) (H55)

9 SO-R (Future) (H53, H54, H55)

10 The effects of HCN *Ranching* and *Arable Farming* have been eliminated from PA calculations
11 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The effects of
12 changes in future *Ranching* and *Arable Farming* practices have been eliminated from PA
13 calculations on regulatory grounds. *Fish Farming* has been eliminated from PA calculations on
14 regulatory grounds.

15 **SCR-5.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs.

17 **SCR-5.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 Agricultural activities could affect infiltration and recharge conditions in the vicinity of the
19 WIPP. Also, application of acids, oxidants, and nitrates during agricultural practice could alter
20 groundwater geochemistry.

21 **SCR-5.7.1.1.4 Historical, Current, and Near-Future Human EPs**

22 Grazing leases exist for all land sections immediately surrounding the WIPP and grazing occurs
23 within the controlled area (see the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.2.2). Although grazing and
24 related crop production have had some control on the vegetation at the WIPP site, these activities
25 are unlikely to have affected subsurface hydrological or geochemical conditions. The climate,
26 soil quality, and lack of suitable water sources all mitigate against agricultural development of
27 the region in the near future. Therefore, the effects of HCN ranching and arable farming have
28 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
29 disposal system. Consistent with the criteria in section 194.32(c) and section 194.54(b),
30 agricultural activities, such as fish farming, that have not taken place and are not expected to take
31 place in the near future in the vicinity of the WIPP have been eliminated from PA calculations on
32 regulatory grounds.

33 **SCR-5.7.1.1.5 Future Human EPs**

34 The EPA has provided criteria relating to future human activities in section 194.32(a) that limit
35 the scope of consideration of future human activities in PAs to mining and drilling. Also, the

1 criterion in section 194.25(a) concerned with predictions of the future states of society requires
2 that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that characteristics of the future remain what
3 they are at the time the compliance application is prepared.” Therefore, the effects of changes in
4 future agricultural practices (such as ranching, arable farming, and fish farming) have been
5 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

6 **SCR-5.7.2 Social and Technological Development**

7 **SCR-5.7.2.1 FEP Number:** H56

8 **FEP Title:** *Demographic Change and Urban Development*

9 **SCR-5.7.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R (HCN)
10 SO-R (Future)

11 *Demographic Change and Urban Development* in the near future and in the future have been
12 eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory grounds.

13 **SCR-5.7.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

14 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

15 **SCR-5.7.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

16 Social and technological changes in the future could result in the development of new
17 communities and new activities in the vicinity of the WIPP that could have an impact on the
18 performance of the disposal system.

19 Demography in the WIPP vicinity is discussed in the CCA, Chapter 2.0, Section 2.3.2.1. The
20 community nearest to the WIPP site is the town of Loving, 29 km (18 mi) west-southwest of the
21 site center. There are no existing plans for urban developments in the vicinity of the WIPP in the
22 near future. Furthermore, the criterion in section 194.25(a), concerned with predictions of the
23 future states of society, requires that compliance assessments and PAs “shall assume that
24 characteristics of the future remain what they are at the time the compliance application is
25 prepared.” Therefore, demographic change and urban development in the vicinity of the WIPP
26 and technological developments have been eliminated from PA calculations on regulatory
27 grounds.

28 **SCR-5.7.2.2 FEP Number:** H57

29 **FEP Title:** *Loss of Records*

30 **SCR-5.7.2.2.1 Screening Decision:** **Not Applicable** (N/A) (HCN)
31 DP (Future)

32 *Loss of Records* in the future is accounted for in PA calculations.

1 **SCR-5.7.2.2.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

3 **SCR-5.7.2.2.3 Screening Argument**

4 Because the DOE will maintain control for the current period throughout the active institutional
5 period (100 years after closure), inadvertent drilling intrusion resulting from the loss of records is
6 not applicable during the HCN period. However, PAs must consider the potential effects of
7 human activities that might take place within the controlled area at a time when institutional
8 controls cannot be assumed to eliminate completely the possibility of human intrusion.
9 Consistent with 40 CFR § 194.41(b) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a), the DOE
10 assumes no credit for AICs for more than 100 years after disposal. Also, consistent with 40 CFR
11 § 194.43(c) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996a), the DOE originally assumed in the
12 CCA that passive institutional controls (PICs) do not eliminate the likelihood of future human
13 intrusion entirely. The provisions at section 194.43(c) allow credit for PICs by reducing the
14 likelihood of human intrusions for several hundred years. In U.S. Department of Energy 1996a,
15 the DOE took credit for these controls that include records retention by reducing the probability
16 of intrusion for the first 600 years after active controls cease. The EPA disallowed this credit
17 during the original certification (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998a). The DOE no
18 longer takes credit for PICs in PA, effectively assuming that all public records and archives
19 relating to the repository are lost 100 years after closure. Therefore, the DOE continues to
20 include the loss of records FEP within PA and does not include credit for PICs.

1 **SCR-6.0 Waste and Repository-Induced FEPs**

2 This section presents screening arguments and decisions for waste- and repository-induced FEPs.
3 There are 114 waste- and repository-induced FEPs used in the CRA-2009. Of these, 74 remain
4 unchanged since the CRA-2004 and 26 were updated with new information. Further, 7 FEPs
5 have been split into 14 similar, but more descriptive, FEPs since the CRA-2004.

6 **SCR-6.1 Waste and Repository Characteristics**

7 **SCR-6.1.1 Repository Characteristics**

8 **SCR-6.1.1.1 FEP Number:** W1
9 **FEP Title:** *Disposal Geometry*

10 **SCR-6.1.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

11 The WIPP repository *Disposal Geometry* is accounted for in PA calculations.

12 **SCR-6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

13 Representation of the repository within the PA has not changed since the CRA-2004; the
14 screening argument and decision remain unchanged. Disposal geometry is accounted for in PA
15 calculations.

16 **SCR-6.1.1.2 Screening Argument**

17 Disposal geometry is described in the CRA-2004, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.2 and is accounted for
18 in the setup of PA calculations (the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.2).

19 **SCR-6.1.2 Waste Characteristics**

20 **SCR-6.1.2.1 FEP Number:** W2 and W3
21 **FEP Title:** *Waste Inventory*
22 *Heterogeneity of Waste Forms*

23 **SCR-6.1.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP (W2)
24 DP (W3)

25 The *Waste Inventory* and *Heterogeneity of Waste Forms* are accounted for in PA calculations.

26 **SCR-6.1.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

27 The waste inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA calculations is the same as used for the
28 CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation (PABC) (see Clayton 2008 and Leigh
29 et al. 2005). Since these FEPs are accounted for (UP) in PA, the implementation may differ from
30 that used in the in previous PAs; however, the screening decision has not changed.

1 **SCR-6.1.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Waste characteristics, comprising the waste inventory and heterogeneity of waste forms, are
3 described in the CCA, Appendix BIR. The waste inventory is accounted for in PA calculations
4 in deriving the dissolved actinide source term (see the CRA-2004, Appendix SOTERM) and gas
5 generation rates (see Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005, Section 2.3). The distribution of contact-
6 handled (CH) transuranic (TRU) (CH-TRU) and remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) (RH-
7 TRU) waste within the repository leads to room-scale heterogeneity of the waste forms, which is
8 accounted for in PA calculations when considering the potential activity of waste material
9 encountered during inadvertent borehole intrusion (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-3.8).

10 **SCR-6.1.3 Container Characteristics**

11 **SCR-6.1.3.1 FEP Number:** W4

12 **FEP Title:** *Container Form*

13 **SCR-6.1.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C – Beneficial

14 The *Container Form* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
15 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

16 **SCR-6.1.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

17 The physical form of the containers is conservatively ignored in performance calculations. Some
18 inventory information has been updated since the CRA-2004. This inventory is slightly different
19 than that used for the CRA-2004, although no changes affect the container form. As such,
20 changes represented in the inventory used for this application do not affect this FEP or its
21 screening decision.

22 **SCR-6.1.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

23 The container form has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of its beneficial effect
24 on retarding radionuclide release. The PA assumes instantaneous container failure and waste
25 dissolution consistent with the source-term model, even though WIPP performance calculations
26 show that a significant fraction of steel and other Fe-base materials will remain undegraded over
27 10,000 years (see Helton et al. 1998). All these undegraded container materials will (1) prevent
28 contact between brine and radionuclides; (2) decrease the rate and extent of radionuclide
29 transport because of high tortuosity along the flow pathways and, as a result, increase
30 opportunities for metallic iron (Fe) and corrosion products to beneficially reduce radionuclides to
31 lower oxidation states. Therefore, the container form can be eliminated on the basis of its
32 beneficial effect on retarding radionuclide transport. In the CCA, Appendix WCL, a minimum
33 quantity of metallic Fe was specified to ensure sufficient reactants to reduce radionuclides to
34 lower and less soluble oxidation states. This requirement is met as long as there are no
35 substantial changes in container materials. The inventory used for the CRA-2009 indicates that
36 the density of steel in container materials currently reported by the sites has an average value of
37 170 kg/m^3 . This is the same value used for the CRA-2004, but represents an increase over what
38 was reported for the CCA (139 to 230 kg/m^3) (8.6 to 14.3 lb/ft^3). Therefore, the current

1 inventory estimates indicate that there is a sufficient quantity of metallic iron to ensure reduction
2 of radionuclides to lower and less soluble oxidation states.

3 **SCR-6.1.3.2 FEP Number:** W5
4 **FEP Title:** *Container Material Inventory*

5 **SCR-6.1.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

6 The *Container Material Inventory* is accounted for in PA calculations.

7 **SCR-6.1.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information has been identified that relates to this FEP.

9 **SCR-6.1.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

10 The container material inventory is described in Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005), and is accounted
11 for in PA calculations through the estimation of gas generation rates (see Appendix PA-2009,
12 Section PA-4.2.5).

13 **SCR-6.1.4 Seal Characteristics**

14 **SCR-6.1.4.1 FEP Numbers:** W6, W7, W109, and W110
15 **FEP Titles:** *Shaft Seal Geometry (W6)*
16 *Shaft Seal Physical Properties (W7)*
17 *Panel Closure Geometry (W109)*
18 *Panel Closure Physical Properties (W110)*

19 **SCR-6.1.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

20 The *Shaft Seal Geometry*, *Shaft Seal Physical Properties*, *Panel Closure Geometry*, and *Panel*
21 *Closure Properties* are accounted for in PA calculations.

22 **SCR-6.1.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

23 FEPs related to seals (generic) have been renamed to differentiate between panel closures and
24 shaft seals. While analyzing the impacts of redesigned panel closures on the FEPs baseline, it
25 was concluded that the current FEPs do not accurately represent these seal types (Kirkes 2006).
26 Because a redesigned panel closure system has not been approved or implemented, new
27 screening arguments are not appropriate at this time, but if the request for a redesigned panel
28 closure system is approved, revised screening arguments may be warranted to better describe the
29 panel closure physical properties (i.e., crushed salt versus concrete).

30 **SCR-6.1.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

31 Seal (shaft seals, panel closures, and drift closures) characteristics, including shaft seal geometry,
32 panel closure geometry, seal physical properties, and panel closure physical properties are

1 described in the CCA, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.3.2 and are accounted for in PA calculations
2 through the representation of the seal system and panel closures in BRAGFLO and the
3 permeabilities assigned to the shaft seal and panel closure materials (see Appendix PA-2009,
4 Section PA-4.2.7 and Section PA-4.2.8).

5 **SCR-6.1.4.2 FEP Numbers:** W8, W111

6 **FEP Titles:** *Shaft Seal Chemical Composition (W8)*

7 *Panel Closure Chemical Composition (W111)*

8 **SCR-6.1.4.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C Beneficial

9 The *Shaft Seal Chemical Composition* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
10 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

11 **SCR-6.1.4.2.2 Summary of New Information**

12 These FEPs have been retitled as a result of the FEPs analysis conducted for the Panel Closure
13 Redesign planned change request (Kirkes 2006).

14 **SCR-6.1.4.2.3 Screening Argument**

15 The effect of shaft seal chemical composition and panel closure chemical composition on
16 actinide speciation and mobility has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
17 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

18 **SCR-6.1.4.2.4 Repository Seals (Shaft and Panel Closures)**

19 Certain repository materials have the potential to interact with groundwater and significantly
20 alter the chemical speciation of any radionuclides present. In particular, extensive use of
21 cementitious materials in the seals may have the capacity to buffer groundwaters to extremely
22 high pH (for example, Bennett et al. 1992, pp. 315 – 325). At high pH values, the speciation and
23 adsorption behavior of many radionuclides is such that their dissolved concentrations are reduced
24 in comparison with near-neutral waters. This effect reduces the migration of radionuclides in
25 dissolved form.

26 Several publications describe strong actinide (or actinide analog) sorption by cement
27 (Altenheinhaese et al. 1994; Wierczinski et al. 1998; Pointeau et al. 2001), or sequestration by
28 incorporation into cement alteration phases (Gougar et al. 1996, Dickson and Glasser 2000).
29 These provide support for the screening argument that chemical interactions between the cement
30 seals and the brine will be of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 The effects of cementitious materials in shaft seals and panel closures on groundwater chemistry
32 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
33 performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.1.5 Backfill Characteristics**

2 **SCR-6.1.5.1 FEP Number:** W9

3 **FEP Title:** *Backfill Physical Properties*

4 **SCR-6.1.5.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

5 *Backfill Physical Properties* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
6 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-6.1.5.1.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information related to this FEP has been identified.

9 **SCR-6.1.5.1.3 Screening Argument**

10 A chemical backfill is being added to the disposal room to buffer the chemical environment. The
11 backfill characteristics were previously described in the CCA, Appendix BACK with additional
12 information contained in the CRA-2004, Appendix BARRIERS, Section BARRIERS-2.3.4.3.
13 The mechanical and thermal effects of backfill are discussed in W35 (Section SCR-6.3.5.4) and
14 W72 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1) respectively, where they have been eliminated from PA calculations
15 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Backfill will result
16 in an initial permeability for the disposal room lower than that of an empty cavity, so neglecting
17 the hydrological effects of backfill is a conservative assumption with regard to brine inflow and
18 radionuclide migration. Thus backfill physical properties have been eliminated from PA
19 calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

20 **SCR-6.1.5.2 FEP Number:** W10

21 **FEP Title:** *Backfill Chemical Composition*

22 **SCR-6.1.5.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

23 The *Backfill Chemical Composition* is accounted for in PA calculations.

24 **SCR-6.1.5.2.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information related to this FEP has been identified.

26 **SCR-6.1.5.2.3 Screening Argument**

27 A chemical backfill is added to the disposal room to buffer the chemical environment. The
28 backfill characteristics are described in Appendix MgO-2009, Section MgO-3.0. The
29 mechanical and thermal effects of backfill are discussed in W35 (Section SCR-6.3.5.4) and W72
30 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1), respectively, where they have been eliminated from PA calculations on
31 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Backfill chemical
32 composition is accounted for in PA calculations in deriving the dissolved and colloidal actinide

1 source terms (see Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-5.0 and Appendix MgO-2009,
2 Section MgO-5.0).

3 **SCR-6.1.6 Post-Closure Monitoring Characteristics**

4 **SCR-6.1.6.1 FEPs Number:** W11

5 **FEP Title:** *Post-Closure Monitoring*

6 **SCR-6.1.6.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

7 The potential effects of *Post-Closure Monitoring* have been eliminated from PA calculations on
8 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-6.1.6.1.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified that relates to this FEP.

11 **SCR-6.1.6.1.3 Screening Argument**

12 Post-closure monitoring is required by 40 CFR § 191.14(b) (U.S. Environmental Protection
13 Agency 1993) as an assurance requirement to “detect substantial and detrimental deviations from
14 expected performance.” The DOE has designed the monitoring program (see the CCA,
15 Appendix MON) so that the monitoring methods employed are not detrimental to the
16 performance of the disposal system (40 CFR § 194.42(d)) (U.S. Environmental Protection
17 Agency 1996a). Nonintrusive monitoring techniques are used so that post-closure monitoring
18 would not impact containment or require remedial activities. In summary, the effects of
19 monitoring have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
20 performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-6.2 Radiological FEPs**

22 **SCR-6.2.1 Radioactive Decay and Heat**

23 **SCR-6.2.1.1 FEP Number:** W12

24 **FEP Title:** *Radionuclide Decay and Ingrowth*

25 **SCR-6.2.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

26 Radionuclide decay and ingrowth are accounted for in PA calculations.

27 **SCR-6.2.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

28 No new information related to this FEP has been identified.

1 **SCR-6.2.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Radionuclide decay and ingrowth are accounted for in PA calculations (see Appendix PA-2009,
3 Section PA-4.3).

4 **SCR-6.2.1.2 FEP Number:** W13

5 **FEP Title:** *Heat From Radioactive Decay*

6 **SCR-6.2.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

7 The effects of temperature increases as a result of *Heat From Radioactive Decay* have been
8 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
9 disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.2.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

11 The radionuclide inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA calculations (Leigh, Trone, and Fox
12 2005a) is lower than previously estimated for the CCA. Thus all CRA-2009 radioactive decay
13 heat screening arguments are bounded by the previous CCA screening arguments.

14 **SCR-6.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

15 Radioactive decay of the waste emplaced in the repository will generate heat. The importance of
16 heat from radioactive decay depends on the effects that the induced temperature changes would
17 have on mechanics (W29 - W31, Section SCR-6.3.4.1), fluid flow (W40 and W41, Section SCR-
18 6.4.1.1), and geochemical processes (W44 through W75, Section SCR-6.5.1.1, Section SCR-
19 6.5.1.2, Section SCR-6.5.1.3, Section SCR-6.5.1.4, Section SCR-6.5.1.5, Section SCR-6.5.1.6,
20 Section SCR-6.5.1.7, Section SCR-6.5.1.8, Section SCR-6.5.1.9, Section SCR-6.5.2.1, Section
21 SCR-6.5.2.2, Section SCR-6.5.3.1, Section SCR-6.5.4.1, Section SCR-6.5.5.1, Section SCR-
22 6.5.5.2, Section SCR-6.5.5.3, Section SCR-6.5.6.1, Section SCR-6.5.7.1, Section SCR-6.5.7.1,
23 and Section SCR-6.5.7.2). For example, extreme temperature increases could result in thermally
24 induced fracturing, regional uplift, or thermally driven flow of gas and brine in the vicinity of the
25 repository.

26 The design basis for the WIPP requires that the thermal loading does not exceed 10 kilowatts
27 (kW) per acre. Transportation restrictions also require that the thermal power generated by
28 waste in an RH-TRU container shall not exceed 300 watts (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
29 Commission 2002).

30 The DOE has conducted numerous studies related to heat from radioactive decay. The following
31 presents a brief summary of these past analyses. First, a numerical study to calculate induced
32 temperature distributions and regional uplift is reported in DOE (1980, pp. 9-149 through 9-150).
33 This study involved estimation of the thermal power of CH-TRU waste containers. The DOE
34 (1980, p. 9-149) analysis assumed the following:

- 35
 - All CH-TRU waste drums and boxes contain the maximum permissible quantity of Pu.
36 The fissionable radionuclide content for CH-TRU waste containers was assumed to be no

1 greater than 200 grams (g) per 0.21 m³ (7 ounces [oz] per 7.4 ft³) drum and 350 g/1.8 m³
2 (12.3 oz/63.6 ft³) standard waste box (²³⁹Pu fissile gram equivalents).

- 3 • The Pu in CH-TRU waste containers is weapons grade material producing heat at 0.0024
4 watts per gram (W/g). Thus the thermal power of a drum is approximately 0.5 W, and
5 that of a box is approximately 0.8 W.
- 6 • Approximately 3.7×10^5 m³ (1.3×10^7 ft³) of CH-TRU waste are distributed within a
7 repository enclosing an area of 7.3×10^5 m² (7.9×10^6 ft²). This is a conservative
8 assumption in terms of quantity and density of waste within the repository, because the
9 maximum capacity of the WIPP is 1.756×10^5 m³ (6.2×10^6 ft³) for all waste (as
10 specified by the LWA) to be placed in an enclosed area of approximately 5.1×10^5 m²
11 (16 mi²).
- 12 • Half of the CH-TRU waste volume is placed in drums and half in boxes so that the
13 repository will contain approximately 900,000 drums and 900,000 boxes. Thus a
14 calculated thermal power of 0.7 W/m² (2.8 kW/acre) of heat is generated by the CH-TRU
15 waste.
- 16 • Insufficient RH-TRU waste would be emplaced in the repository to influence the total
17 thermal load.

18 Under these assumptions, Thorne and Rudeen (1981) estimated the long-term temperature
19 response of the disposal system to waste emplacement. Calculations assumed a uniform initial
20 power density of 2.8 kW/acre (0.7 W/m²) which decreases over time. Thorne and Rudeen (1981)
21 attributed this thermal load to RH-TRU waste, but the DOE (1980) more appropriately attributed
22 this thermal load to CH-TRU waste based on the assumptions listed above. Thorne and Rudeen
23 (1981) estimated the maximum rise in temperature at the center of a repository to be 1.6 °C
24 (2.9 °F) at 80 years after waste emplacement.

25 More recently, Sanchez and Trelue (1996) estimated the maximum thermal power of an RH-
26 TRU waste container. The Sanchez and Trelue (1996) analysis involved inverse shielding
27 calculations to evaluate the thermal power of an RH-TRU container corresponding to the
28 maximum permissible surface dose of 1,000 rem per hour (rem/hr). The following calculational
29 steps were taken in the Sanchez and Trelue (1996) analysis:

- 30 • Calculate the absorbed dose rate for gamma radiation corresponding to the maximum
31 surface dose equivalent rate of 1,000 rem/hr. Beta and alpha radiation are not included in
32 this calculation because such particles will not penetrate the waste matrix or the container
33 in significant quantities. Neutrons are not included in the analysis because the maximum
34 dose rate from neutrons is 270 millirems/hr, and the corresponding neutron heating rate
35 will be insignificant.
- 36 • Calculate the exposure rate for gamma radiation corresponding to the absorbed dose rate
37 for gamma radiation.

- 1 • Calculate the gamma flux density at the surface of a RH-TRU container corresponding to
2 the exposure rate for gamma radiation. Assuming the gamma energy is 1.0 megaelectron
3 volts, the maximum allowable gamma flux density at the surface of a RH-TRU container
4 is about 5.8×10^8 gamma rays/cm²/seconds (s).
- 5 • Determine the distributed gamma source strength, or gamma activity, in an RH-TRU
6 container from the surface gamma flux density. The source is assumed to be shielded
7 such that the gamma flux is attenuated by the container and by absorbing material in the
8 container. The level of shielding depends on the matrix density. Scattering of the
9 gamma flux, with loss of energy, is also accounted for in this calculation through
10 inclusion of a gamma buildup factor. The distributed gamma source strength is
11 determined assuming a uniform source in a right cylindrical container. The maximum
12 total gamma source (gamma curies [Ci]) is then calculated for a RH-TRU container
13 containing 0.89 m³ (31.4 ft³) of waste. For the waste of greatest expected density (about
14 6,000 kg/m³ (360 lb/ft³), the gamma source is about 2×10^4 Ci/m³ (566 Ci/ft³).
- 15 • Calculate the total Ci load of a RH-TRU container (including alpha and beta radiation)
16 from the gamma load. The ratio of the total Ci load to the gamma Ci load was estimated
17 through examination of the radionuclide inventory presented in the CCA, Appendix BIR.
18 The gamma Ci load and the total Ci load for each radionuclide listed in the WIPP BIR
19 were summed. Based on these summed loads the ratio of total Ci load to gamma Ci load
20 of RH-TRU waste was calculated to be 1.01.
- 21 • Calculate the thermal load of a RH-TRU container from the total Ci load. The ratio of
22 thermal load to Ci load was estimated through examination of the radionuclide inventory
23 presented in the CCA, Appendix BIR. The thermal load and the total Ci load for each
24 radionuclide listed in the WIPP inventory were summed. Based on these summed loads
25 the ratio of thermal load to Ci load of RH-TRU waste was calculated to be about 0.0037
26 watts per curie (W/Ci). For a gamma source of 2×10^4 Ci/m³ (566 Ci/ft³), the maximum
27 permissible thermal load of a RH-TRU container is about 70 W/m³ (2 W/ft³). Thus the
28 maximum thermal load of a RH-TRU container is about 60 W, and the transportation
29 limit of 300 W will not be achieved.

30 Note that Sanchez and Trelue (1996) calculated the average thermal load for a RH-TRU
31 container to be less than 1 W. Also, the total RH-TRU heat load is less than 10% of the total
32 heat load in the WIPP. Thus the total thermal load of the RH-TRU waste will not significantly
33 affect the average rise in temperature in the repository resulting from decay of CH-TRU waste.

34 Temperature increases will be greater at locations where the thermal power of an RH-TRU
35 container is 60 W, if any such containers are emplaced. Sanchez and Trelue (1996) estimated
36 the temperature increase at the surface of a 60 W RH-TRU waste container. Their analysis
37 involved solution of a steady-state thermal conduction problem with a constant heat source term
38 of 70 W/m³ (2 W/ft³). These conditions represent conservative assumptions because the thermal
39 load will decrease with time as the radioactive waste decays. The temperature increase at the
40 surface of the container was calculated to be about 3 °C (5.4 °F).

1 In summary, previous analyses have shown that the average temperature increase in the WIPP
2 repository caused by radioactive decay of the emplaced CH- and RH-TRU waste will be less
3 than 2 °C (3.6 °F). Temperature increases of about 3 °C (5.4 °F) may occur in the vicinity of
4 RH-TRU containers with the highest allowable thermal load of about 60 W (based on the
5 maximum allowable surface dose equivalent for RH-TRU containers). Potential heat generation
6 from nuclear criticality is discussed in Section SCR-6.2.1.4 and exothermic reactions and the
7 effects of repository temperature changes on mechanics are discussed in the set of FEPs grouped
8 as W29, W30, W31, W72, and W73 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1). These FEPs have been eliminated
9 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 Additionally, WIPP transportation restrictions and WIPP design basis loading configurations do
11 not allow the thermal load of the WIPP to exceed 10 kW/acre (NRC 2002). Transportation
12 requirements restrict the thermal load from RH-TRU waste containers to no more than 30 W per
13 container (NRC 2002). However, the limit on the surface dose equivalent rate of the RH-TRU
14 containers (1,000 rem/hr) is more restrictive and equates to a thermal load of only about 60 W
15 per container. Based on the thermal loads permitted, the maximum temperature rise in the
16 repository from radioactive decay heat should be less than 2 °C (3.6 °F).

17 The previous FEPs screening arguments for the CCA used a bounding radioactivity heat load of
18 0.5 W/drum for the CH-TRU waste containers. With a total CH-TRU volume of 168,500 m³
19 (~5,950,000 ft³) this corresponds to approximately 810,000 55-gal drum equivalents with a
20 corresponding heat load of > 400 kW used for the CCA FEPs screening arguments. From
21 Sanchez and Trellue (1996), it can be seen that a realistic assessment of the heat load, based on
22 radionuclide inventory data in the Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report (TWBIR) is less
23 than 100 kW. Thus the CCA FEPs incorporate a factor of safety of at least four, and heat loads
24 from the CRA-2009 inventory would be even less.

25 **SCR-6.2.1.4 FEPs Number:** W14

26 **FEPs Title:** Nuclear Criticality: Heat

27 **SCR-6.2.1.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

28 *Nuclear Criticality* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
29 occurrence over 10,000 years.

30 **SCR-6.2.1.4.2 Summary of New Information**

31 Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.2 states that the inventory used for the CRA-2009 PA is based
32 on Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005). This is the same inventory used for the CRA-2004 PABC.
33 Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005) show that the disposal inventory of fissile material continues to
34 decrease below that used for the CCA. Thus CRA-2009 criticality screening arguments are
35 conservatively bounded by the previous CCA screening arguments (Rechard et al. 1996, 2000,
36 and 2001).

1 **SCR-6.2.1.4.3 Screening Argument**

2 Nuclear criticality refers to a sustained fission reaction that may occur if fissile radionuclides
3 reach both a sufficiently high concentration and total mass (where the latter parameter includes
4 the influence of enrichment of the fissile radionuclides). In the subsurface, the primary effect of
5 a nuclear reaction is the production of heat.

6 Nuclear criticality (near and far field) was eliminated from PA calculations for the WIPP for
7 waste contaminated with TRU radionuclides. The probability for criticality within the repository
8 is low (there are no mechanisms for concentrating fissile radionuclides dispersed amongst the
9 waste). Possible mechanisms for concentration in the waste disposal region include high
10 solubility, compaction, sorption, and precipitation. First, the maximum solubility of ^{239}Pu in the
11 WIPP repository, the most abundant fissile radionuclide, is orders of magnitude lower than
12 necessary to create a critical solution. The same is true for ^{235}U , the other primary fissile
13 radionuclide. Second, the waste is assumed to be compacted by repository processes to one
14 fourth its original volume. This compaction is still an order of magnitude too disperse (many
15 orders of magnitude too disperse if neutron absorbers that prevent criticality (for example, ^{238}U)
16 are included). Third, any potential sorbents in the waste would be fairly uniformly distributed
17 throughout the waste disposal region; consequently, concentration of fissile radionuclides in
18 localized areas through sorption is improbable. Fourth, precipitation requires significant
19 localized changes in brine chemistry; small local variations are insufficient to separate
20 substantial amounts of ^{239}Pu from other actinides in the waste disposal region (for example, 11
21 times more ^{238}U is present than ^{239}Pu).

22 Criticality away from the repository (following an inadvertent human intrusion) has a low
23 probability because (1) the amount of fissile material transported from the repository is small; (2)
24 host rock media have small porosities (insufficient for the generation of a sizable precipitation
25 zone); and (3) no credible mechanism exists for concentrating fissile material during transport
26 (the natural tendency is for transported material to be dispersed). As discussed in the CRA-2004,
27 Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2 and the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment MASS, Section
28 MASS-15.0, the dolomite porosity consists of intergranular porosity, vugs, microscopic
29 fractures, and macroscopic fractures. As discussed in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0, Section
30 6.4.5.2, porosity in the MBs consists of partially healed fractures that may dilate as pressure
31 increases. Advective flow in both units occurs mostly through macroscopic fractures.
32 Consequently, any potential deposition through precipitation or sorption is constrained by the
33 depth to which precipitation and sorption occur away from fractures. This geometry is not
34 favorable for fission reactions and eliminates the possibility of criticality. Thus nuclear
35 criticality has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
36 occurrence.

37 Additionally, screening arguments made in Rechar et al. (1996) are represented in greater detail
38 in Rechar et al. (2000, 2001). A major finding among the analysis results in the screening
39 arguments is the determination that fissile material would need to be reconcentrated by three
40 orders of magnitude in order to be considered in a criticality scenario. Because inventory
41 estimates reported in Leigh, Trone and Fox (2005) are below that used in previous calculations,
42 screening analyses for nuclear criticality are conservatively bounded by the previous CCA
43 screening arguments (Rechar et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

1 **SCR-6.2.2 Radiological Effects on Material Properties**

2 **SCR-6.2.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W15, W16, W17, and W112

3 **FEP Titles:** *Radiological Effects on Waste (W15)*
4 *Radiological Effects on Containers (W16)*
5 *Radiological Effects on Shaft Seals (W17)*
6 *Radiological Effects on Panel Closures (W112)*

7 **SCR-6.2.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

8 *Radiological Effects* on the properties of the *Waste, Containers, Shaft Seals, and Panel Closures*
9 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
10 of the disposal system.

11 **SCR-6.2.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

12 These FEPs have been retitled as a result of the FEPs analysis conducted for the Panel Closure
13 Redesign planned change request (Kirkes 2006), and the screening arguments for these FEPs
14 have been updated to include references to the radionuclide inventory used for CRA-2009 PA
15 calculations.

16 **SCR-6.2.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

17 Ionizing radiation can change the physical properties of many materials. Strong radiation fields
18 could lead to damage of waste matrices, brittleness of the metal containers, and disruption of any
19 crystalline structure in the seals. The low level of activity of the waste in the WIPP is unlikely to
20 generate a strong radiation field. According to the inventory data presented in Leigh, Trone, and
21 Fox (2005), the overall activity for all TRU radionuclides has decreased from 3.44×10^6 Ci
22 reported in the CCA, to 2.48×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2004, to 2.32×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2009. This
23 decrease will not change the original screening argument. Furthermore, PA calculations assume
24 instantaneous container failure and waste dissolution according to the source-term model (see the
25 CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.4, Section 6.4.3.5, and Section 6.4.3.6). Therefore, radiological
26 effects on the properties of the waste, container, shaft seals, and panel closures have been
27 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
28 disposal system.

29 **SCR-6.3 Geological and Mechanical FEPs**

30 **SCR-6.3.1 Excavation-Induced Changes**

31 **SCR-6.3.1.1 FEP Numbers:** W18 and W19

32 **FEP Titles:** *Disturbed Rock Zone (W18)*
33 *Excavation-Induced Change in Stress (W19)*

1 **SCR-6.3.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

2 Excavation-induced host rock fracturing through formation of a *Disturbed Rock Zone* and
3 *Changes in Stress* are accounted for in PA calculations.

4 **SCR-6.3.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

5 No new information has been identified relating to the screening of these two FEPs.

6 **SCR-6.3.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

7 Construction of the repository has caused local excavation-induced changes in stress in the
8 surrounding rock as discussed in the CCA, Chapter 3.0, Section 3.3.1.5. Excavation-induced
9 changes in stress has led to failure of intact rock around the opening, creating a DRZ of fractures.
10 On completion of the WIPP excavation, the extent of the induced stress field perturbation will be
11 sufficient to have caused dilation and fracturing in the anhydrite layers “a” and “b,” MB 139,
12 and, possibly, MB 138. The creation of the DRZ around the excavation and the disturbance of
13 the anhydrite layers and MBs will alter the permeability and effective porosity of the rock around
14 the repository, providing enhanced pathways for flow of gas and brine between the waste-filled
15 rooms and the nearby interbeds. This excavation-induced, host-rock fracturing is accounted for
16 in PA calculations (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.3).

17 The DRZ around repository shafts and panel closures could provide pathways for flow from the
18 repository to hydraulically conductive units above the repository horizon. The effectiveness of
19 long-term shaft seals and panel closures are dependent upon providing sufficient backstress for
20 salt creep to heal the DRZ around them, so that connected flow paths out of the repository
21 horizon will cease to exist. These factors are considered in the current designs.

22 **SCR-6.3.1.2 FEP Numbers:** W20 and W21

23 **FEP Titles:** *Salt Creep (W20)*
24 *Change in the Stress Field (W21)*

25 **SCR-6.3.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

26 *Salt Creep* in the Salado and any resultant *Changes in the Stress Field* are accounted for in PA
27 calculations.

28 **SCR-6.3.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

29 No new information has been identified relating to these two FEPs.

30 **SCR-6.3.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

31 Salt creep will lead to changes in the stress field, compaction of the waste and containers, and
32 consolidation of the long-term components of the sealing system. It will also tend to close
33 fractures in the DRZ, leading to reductions in porosity and permeability, increases in pore fluid
34 pressure, and reductions in fluid flow rates in the repository. Salt creep in the Salado is

1 accounted for in PA calculations (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.1). The long-term
 2 repository seal system relies on the consolidation of the crushed-salt seal material and healing of
 3 the DRZ around the shaft seals and panel closures to achieve a low permeability under stresses
 4 induced by salt creep. Shaft seal and panel closure performance is discussed further in Section
 5 SCR-6.3.5.1 (FEPs W36, W37, W113, and W114).

6 **SCR-6.3.1.3 FEP Number:** W22
 7 **FEP Title:** *Roof Falls*

8 **SCR-6.3.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** UP

9 The potential effects of *Roof Falls* on flow paths are accounted for in PA calculations.

10 **SCR-6.3.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

11 No new information has been identified relating to this FEP.

12 **SCR-6.3.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

13 Instability of the DRZ could lead to localized roof falls in the first few hundred years. If
 14 instability of the DRZ causes roof falls, development of the DRZ may be sufficient to disrupt the
 15 anhydrite layers above the repository, which may create a zone of rock containing anhydrite
 16 extending from the interbeds toward a waste-filled room. Fracture development is most likely to
 17 be induced as the rock stress and strain distributions evolve because of creep. In the long term,
 18 the effects of roof falls in the repository are likely to be minor because salt creep will reduce the
 19 void space and the potential for roof falls as well as promote healing of any roof material that has
 20 fallen into the rooms. However, because of uncertainty in the process by which the disposal
 21 room DRZ heals, the flow model used in PA assumes that a higher permeability zone remains for
 22 the long term. Thus the potential effects of roof falls on flow paths are accounted for in PA
 23 calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.

24 **SCR-6.3.1.4 FEP Numbers:** W23 and W24
 25 **FEP Titles:** *Subsidence (W23)*
 26 *Large Scale Rock Fracturing (W24)*

27 **SCR-6.3.1.4.1 Screening Decision(s):** SO-C (W23)
 28 SO-P (W24)

29 Fracturing within units overlying the Salado and surface displacement caused by *Subsidence*
 30 associated with repository closure have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 31 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The potential for excavation- or
 32 repository-induced *Subsidence* to create *Large Scale Rock Fracturing* and fluid flow paths
 33 between the repository and units overlying the Salado has been eliminated from PA calculations
 34 on the basis of the low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-6.3.1.4.2 Summary of New Information**

2 Continuous survey data, reported annually, reaffirm that subsidence is minimal and near the
3 accuracy of the survey itself (see annual COMPs reports in Appendix DATA-2009).

4 **SCR-6.3.1.4.3 Screening Argument**

5 Instability of the DRZ could lead to localized roof falls in the first few hundred years. If
6 instability of the DRZ causes roof falls, development of the DRZ may be sufficient to disrupt the
7 anhydrite layers above the repository, which may create a zone of rock containing anhydrite
8 extending from the interbeds toward a waste-filled room. Fracture development is most likely to
9 be induced as the rock stress and strain distributions evolve because of creep and the local
10 lithologies. In the long term, the effects of roof falls in the repository are likely to be minor
11 because salt creep will reduce the void space and the potential for roof falls as well as promote
12 healing of any roof material that has fallen into the rooms. Because of uncertainty in the process
13 by which the disposal room DRZ heals, the flow model used in PA assumed that a higher-
14 permeability zone remained for the long term. The CCA PAVT modified the DRZ permeability
15 to a sampled range. Thus the potential effects of roof falls on flow paths are accounted for in PA
16 calculations through appropriate ranges of the parameters describing the DRZ.

17 The amount of subsidence that can occur as a result of salt creep closure or roof collapse in the
18 WIPP excavation depends primarily on the volume of excavated rock, the initial and compressed
19 porosities of the various emplaced materials (waste, backfill, panel and drift closures, and seals),
20 the amount of inward creep of the repository walls, and the gas and fluid pressures within the
21 repository. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994) has analyzed potential excavation-induced
22 subsidence with the primary objective of determining the geomechanical advantage of
23 backfilling the WIPP excavation. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 3-4 through 3-23) used
24 mass conservation calculations, the influence function method, the National Coal Board
25 empirical method, and the two-dimensional, finite-difference-code, Fast Lagrangian Analysis of
26 Continua (FLAC) to estimate subsidence for conditions ranging from no backfill to emplacement
27 of a highly compacted crushed-salt backfill. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 2-17 to 2-23)
28 also investigated subsidence at potash mines located near the WIPP site to gain insight into the
29 expected subsidence conditions at the WIPP and to calibrate the subsidence calculation methods.

30 Subsidence over potash mines will be much greater than subsidence over the WIPP because of
31 the significant differences in stratigraphic position, depth, extraction ratio, and layout. The
32 WIPP site is located stratigraphically lower than the lowest potash mine, which is near the base
33 of the McNutt. At the WIPP site, the base of the McNutt is about 150 m (490 ft) above the
34 repository horizon. The WIPP rock extraction ratio in the waste disposal region will be about
35 22%, as compared to 65% for the lowest extraction ratios within potash mines investigated by
36 the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-17).

37 The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-22) reported the maximum total subsidence at potash mines
38 to be about 1.5 m (5 ft). This level of subsidence has been observed to have caused surface
39 fractures. However, the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, p. 2-23) found no evidence that subsidence
40 over potash mines had caused fracturing sufficient to connect the mining horizon to water-
41 bearing units or the land surface. The level of disturbance caused by subsidence above the WIPP

1 repository will be less than that associated with potash mining and thus, by analogy, will not
2 create fluid flow paths between the repository and the overlying units.

3 The various subsidence calculation methods used by the DOE (Westinghouse 1994, pp. 3-4 to
4 3-23) provided similar and consistent results, which support the premise that subsidence over the
5 WIPP will be less than subsidence over potash mines. Estimates of maximum subsidence at the
6 land surface for the cases of no backfill and highly compacted backfill are 0.62 m (2 ft) and
7 0.52 m (1.7 ft), respectively. The mass conservation method gave the upper bound estimate of
8 subsidence in each case. The surface topography in the WIPP area varies by more than 3 m
9 (10 ft), so the expected amount of repository-induced subsidence will not create a basin, and will
10 not affect surface hydrology significantly. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, Table 3-13) also
11 estimated subsidence at the depth of the Culebra using the FLAC model for the case of an empty
12 repository (containing no waste or backfill). The FLAC analysis assumed the Salado to be halite
13 and the Culebra to have anhydrite material parameters.

14 Maximum subsidence at the Culebra was estimated to be 0.56 m (1.8 ft). The vertical strain was
15 concentrated in the Salado above the repository. Vertical strain was less than 0.01% in units
16 overlying the Salado and was close to zero in the Culebra (Westinghouse 1994, Figure 3-40).
17 The maximum horizontal displacement in the Culebra was estimated to be 0.02 m (0.08 ft), with
18 a maximum tensile horizontal strain of 0.007%. The DOE (Westinghouse 1994, 4-1 to 4-2)
19 concluded that the induced strains in the Culebra will be uniformly distributed because no large-
20 scale faults or discontinuities are present in the vicinity of the WIPP. Furthermore, strains of this
21 magnitude would not be expected to cause extensive fracturing.

22 At the WIPP site, the Culebra transmissivity varies spatially over approximately five orders of
23 magnitude (see Appendix TFIELD-2009, Figure TFIELD-64). Where transmissive horizontal
24 fractures exist, hydraulic conductivity in the Culebra is dominated by flow through the fractures.
25 An induced tensile vertical strain may result in an increase in fracture aperture and corresponding
26 increases in hydraulic conductivity. The magnitude of increase in hydraulic conductivity can be
27 estimated by approximating the hydrological behavior of the Culebra with a simple conceptual
28 model of fluid flow through a series of parallel fractures with uniform properties. A conservative
29 estimate of the change in hydraulic conductivity can be made by assuming that all the vertical
30 strain is translated to fracture opening (and none to rock expansion). This method for evaluating
31 changes in hydraulic conductivity is similar to that used by the EPA in estimating the effects of
32 subsidence caused by potash mining (Peake 1996, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
33 1996c).

34 The equivalent porous medium hydraulic conductivity, K (m/s), of a system of parallel fractures
35 can be calculated assuming the cubic law for fluid flow (Witherspoon et al. 1980):

$$36 \quad K = \frac{w^3 \rho g N}{12 \mu D} \quad (\text{SCR.10})$$

37 where w is the fracture aperture, ρ is the fluid density (taken to be 1,000 kg/m³), g is the
38 acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m/s² (32 ft) per second squared), μ is the fluid viscosity (taken
39 as 0.001 pascal seconds), D is the effective Culebra thickness (7.7 m (26.3 ft)), and N is the
40 number of fractures. For 10 fractures with a fracture aperture, w , of 6×10^{-5} m (2×10^{-4} ft), the

1 Culebra hydraulic conductivity, K , is approximately 7 m per year (2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per
2 second). The values of the parameters used in this calculation are within the range of those
3 expected for the Culebra at the WIPP site (Appendix TFIELD-2009).

4 The amount of opening of each fracture as a result of subsidence-induced tensile vertical strain,
5 ε , (assuming rigid rock), is $D\varepsilon/N$ meters. Thus, for a vertical strain of 0.0001, the fracture
6 aperture, w , becomes approximately 1.4×10^{-4} m. The Culebra hydraulic conductivity, K , then
7 increases to approximately 85 m (279 ft) per year (2.7×10^{-6} m (8.9×10^{-6} ft) per second). Thus,
8 on the basis of a conservative estimate of vertical strain, the hydraulic conductivity of the
9 Culebra may increase by an order of magnitude. In PA calculations, multiple realizations of the
10 Culebra T fields are generated as a means of accounting for spatial variability and uncertainty
11 (Appendix TFIELD-2009). A change in hydraulic conductivity of one order of magnitude
12 through vertical strain is within the range of uncertainty incorporated in the Culebra T fields
13 through these multiple realizations. Thus changes in the horizontal component of Culebra
14 hydraulic conductivity resulting from repository-induced subsidence have been eliminated from
15 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

16 A similar calculation can be performed to estimate the change in vertical hydraulic conductivity
17 in the Culebra as a result of a horizontal strain of 0.00007 m/m (Westinghouse 1994, p. 3-20).
18 Assuming this strain to be distributed over about 1,000 fractures (neglecting rock expansion),
19 with zero initial aperture, in a lateral extent of the Culebra of about 800 m (2,625 ft)
20 (Westinghouse 1994, Figure 3-39), then the subsidence-induced fracture aperture is
21 approximately 6×10^{-5} m (1.9×10^{-4} ft). Using the values for ρ , g , and μ , above, the vertical
22 hydraulic conductivity of the Culebra can then be calculated, through an equation similar to
23 above, to be 7 m (23 ft) per year (2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per second). Thus vertical hydraulic
24 conductivity in the Culebra may be created as a result of repository-induced subsidence, although
25 this is expected to be insignificant.

26 In summary, as a result of observations of subsidence associated with potash mines in the
27 vicinity of the WIPP, the potential for subsidence to create fluid flow paths between the
28 repository and units overlying the Salado has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
29 of low probability. The effects of repository-induced subsidence on hydraulic conductivity in the
30 Culebra have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
31 performance of the disposal system.

32 **SCR-6.3.2 Effects of Fluid Pressure Changes**

33 **SCR-6.3.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W25 and W26

34 **FEP Titles:** *Disruption Due to Gas Effects (W25)*
35 *Pressurization (W26)*

36 **SCR-6.3.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

37 The mechanical effects of gas generation through *Pressurization* and *Disruption Due to Gas*
38 *Effects* flow are accounted for in PA calculations.

1 **SCR-6.3.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified relating to these FEPs.

3 **SCR-6.3.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

4 The mechanical effects of gas generation, including the slowing creep closure of the repository
5 because of gas pressurization and the fracturing of interbeds in the Salado through disruption due
6 to gas effects are accounted for in PA calculations (the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.5.2 and
7 Section 6.4.3.1).

8 **SCR-6.3.3 Effects of Explosions**

9 **SCR-6.3.3.1 FEP Number:** W27

10 **FEP Title:** *Gas Explosions*

11 **SCR-6.3.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

12 The potential effects of *Gas Explosions* are accounted for in PA calculations.

13 **SCR-6.3.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

14 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

15 **SCR-6.3.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

16 Explosive gas mixtures could collect in the head space above the waste in a closed panel. The
17 most explosive gas mixture potentially generated will be a mixture of hydrogen, methane (CH₄),
18 and oxygen, which will convert to CO₂ and water on ignition. This means that there is little
19 likelihood of a gas explosion in the long term because the rooms and panels are expected to
20 become anoxic and oxygen depleted. Compaction through salt creep will also greatly reduce any
21 void space in which the gas can accumulate. Analysis (see the CRA-2004, Appendix
22 BARRIERS, Attachment PCS) indicates that the most explosive mixture of hydrogen, CH₄, and
23 oxygen will be present in the void space approximately 20 years after panel-closure
24 emplacement. This possibility of an explosion prior to the occurrence of anoxic conditions is
25 considered in the design of the operational panel closure. The effect of such an explosion on the
26 DRZ is expected to be no more severe than a roof fall, which is accounted for in the PA
27 calculations (FEP W22).

28 **SCR-6.3.3.2 FEP Number:** W28

29 **FEP Title:** *Nuclear Explosions*

30 **SCR-6.3.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

31 *Nuclear Explosions* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
32 occurrence over 10,000 years.

1 **SCR-6.3.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

2 This FEP has been updated to include the most recent inventory information as presented in
3 Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005).

4 **SCR-6.3.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

5 Nuclear explosions have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
6 occurrence over 10,000 years. For a nuclear explosion to occur, a critical mass of Pu would have
7 to undergo rapid compression to a high density. Even if a critical mass of Pu could form in the
8 system, there is no mechanism for rapid compression. Inventory information used for the CCA,
9 the CRA-2004, and the CRA-2009 are presented in Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005). The updated
10 inventory information for the CRA-2009 shows a reduction of TRU radionuclides from previous
11 estimates. Thus current criticality screening arguments are conservatively bounded by the
12 previous CCA screening arguments (Rechard et al. 1996, 2000, and 2001).

13 **SCR-6.3.4 Thermal Effects**

14 **SCR-6.3.4.1 FEP Numbers:** W29, W30, W31, W72, and W73

15 **FEP Titles:** *Thermal Effects on Material Properties (W29)*
16 *Thermally-Induced Stress Changes (W30)*
17 *Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository Components*
18 *(W31)*
19 *Exothermic Reactions (W72)*
20 *Concrete Hydration (W73)*

21 **SCR-6.3.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

22 The effects of *Thermally-Induced Stress, Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository*
23 *Components, and Thermal Effects on Material Properties* in the repository have been eliminated
24 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to performance of the disposal system.

25 The thermal effects of *Exothermic Reactions*, including *Concrete Hydration*, have been
26 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
27 disposal system.

28 **SCR-6.3.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

29 This FEP has been updated to include the most recent inventory information as presented in
30 Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005). Thermal calculations have been updated with the updated
31 quantities of reactants and provided below.

32 **SCR-6.3.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

33 Thermally induced stress could result in pathways for groundwater flow in the DRZ, in the
34 anhydrite layers and MBs, and through seals, or it could enhance existing pathways. Conversely,
35 elevated temperatures will accelerate the rate of salt creep and mitigate fracture development.

1 Thermal expansion could also result in uplift of the rock and ground surface overlying the
 2 repository, and thermal buoyancy forces could lift the waste upward in the salt rock.

3 The distributions of thermal stress and strain changes depend on the induced temperature field
 4 and the differing thermal expansion of components of the repository, which depends on the
 5 components' elastic properties. Thermal effects on material properties (such as permeability and
 6 porosity) could potentially affect the behavior of the repository.

7 Exothermic reactions in the WIPP repository include MgO hydration, MgO carbonation,
 8 aluminum (Al) corrosion, and cement hydration (Bennett et al. 1996). Wang (1996) has shown
 9 that the temperature rise by an individual reaction is proportional to \sqrt{VM} , where V is the
 10 maximum rate of brine inflow into a waste panel for a reaction limited by brine inflow (or a
 11 specified maximum reaction rate for a reaction limited by its own kinetics) and M is the quantity
 12 of the reactant. MgO hydration, cement hydration, and Al corrosion are assumed to be limited by
 13 brine inflow because they all consume water and have high reaction rates. The amounts of
 14 reactants are tabulated in Table SCR-4.

15 **Table SCR-4. Changes in Inventory Quantities from the CCA to the CRA-2009**

Inventory	CCA	CRA-2004	CRA-2009
MgO (tons)	85,600 ^a	72,760 (because of the elimination of mini-sacks) ^a	59,385 ^c
Cellulosics (tons)	5,940 ^b	8,120 ^c	8,907 ^f
Plastics (tons)	3,740 ^b	8,120 ^c	10,180 ^f
Rubber (tons)	1,100 ^b	1,960 ^c	1,885 ^f
Aluminum alloys (tons)	1,980 ^b	1,960 ^c	2,030 ^f
Cement (tons)	8,540 ^b	9,971 ^d	13,888 ^g

^a U.S. Department of Energy (2000a)

^b U.S. Department of Energy (1996b). Only CH-TRU wastes are considered. Total volume of CH-TRU wastes is 1.1×10^5 m³. This is not scaled to WIPP disposal volume.

^c CRA-2004 Appendix DATA, Attachment F. Only CH-TRU wastes are considered. Total volume of CH-TRU waste is 1.4×10^5 m³. This is not scaled to WIPP disposal volume.

^d This estimate is derived from data in Leigh (2003) includes both reacted and unreacted cement. $(1.2 \times 10^7 \text{ kg} \times 1.4 \times 10^5 / 168485 / 1000 \text{ kg/ton} = 9971 \text{ tons cement})$.

^e This estimate is derived by assuming that Panel 1 has an MgO excess factor of 1.95, three panel equivalents have a 1.67 excess factor, and the remaining 6 panel equivalents have a 1.2 excess factor, resulting in a 1.416 projected excess factor for a full repository. The projected excess factor is then multiplied by the equivalent cellulose value of $28,098 \times (40.3/27)$ (the MgO molar ratio).

^f This value is derived using material densities reported in Leigh et al., (2005a) and total CH-TRU waste volume (1.45×10^5 m³ reported in Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005)).

^g This value is derived from data in Leigh (2003) and Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005). $((1.2 \times 10^7 \text{ kg}) \times 39/29 \times (1.45 \times 10^5) / 168485 / 1000 \text{ kg/ton} = 13,888 \text{ tons cement})$.

16

17 Similarly, MgO carbonation, which consumes CO₂, is limited by CO₂ generation from microbial
 18 degradation. Given a biodegradation rate constant, the total CO₂ generated per year is
 19 proportional to the total quantity of biodegradable materials in the repository. Using the
 20 computational methods in Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996b), the inventory of biodegradable
 21 materials has been changed from 23,884 (8,120 + 1.7 × 8,120 + 1,960) tons for the CRA-2004¹

¹The 1.7 molar conversion rate for plastic is based on analyses presented in Wang and Brush (1996a and 1996b).

1 to 28,098 (8,907 + 1.7 × 10,180 + 1,885) tons of equivalent cellulose for the CRA-2009.¹ This
 2 increase in biodegradable materials corresponds to a proportional increase in CO₂ generation.
 3 For MgO carbonation and microbial degradation, the calculated temperature rises have been
 4 updated for the changes in both microbial gas generation and waste inventory and are presented
 5 in Table SCR-5.

6 Temperature rises (°C) by exothermic reactions are revised as follows:

7 CCA conditions following a drilling event show that Al corrosion could, at most, result in a
 8 short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6 °C (10.8 °F) above ambient room
 9 temperature (about 27 °C (80 °F)) (Bennett et al. 1996). A temperature rise of 6 °C (10.8 °F)
 10 represented the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of exothermic
 11 reactions occurring simultaneously. Revised maximum temperature rises by exothermic reactions
 12 for CRA-2009 are still less than 10 °C (18 °F) (as shown in Table SCR-5). Such small
 13 temperature changes cannot affect material properties. Thus thermal effects on material
 14 properties in the repository have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
 15 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

16 **Table SCR-5. CCA and CRA Exothermic Temperature Rises**

Reactant	CCA ^a	CRA-2004 ^a	CRA-2009 ^a
MgO hydration	< 4.5	< 4.7	< 4.2
MgO carbonation	< 0.6	< 0.7	< 0.6
Microbial degradation	< 0.8	< 1.4	< 1.5
Aluminum corrosion	< 6.0	< 6.8	< 6.9
Cement hydration	< 2.0	< 2.5	< 3.0

^a All values are in degrees Celsius.

17

18 All potential sources of heat and elevated temperature have been evaluated and found not to
 19 produce high enough temperature changes to affect the repository's performance. Sources of
 20 heat within the repository include radioactive decay and exothermic chemical reactions such as
 21 backfill hydration and metal corrosion. The rates of these exothermic reactions are limited by
 22 the availability of brine in the repository. Concrete hydration in the seals is a significant source
 23 of heat, but it is relatively short-lived (Loken 1994 and Loken and Chen 1994). Energy released
 24 by the hydration of the seal concrete could raise the temperature of the concrete to approximately
 25 53 °C (127 °F), and that of the surrounding salt to approximately 38 °C (100 °F), one week after
 26 seal emplacement. Elevated temperatures will persist for a short period of time, perhaps a few
 27 years or a few decades. The thermal stresses from these temperatures and the temperatures in the
 28 concrete itself have been calculated to be below the design compressive strength for the concrete.
 29 Thus thermal stresses should not degrade the long-term performance of the seals. In general, the
 30 various sources of heat do not appear to be great enough to jeopardize the performance of the
 31 disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.3.5 Mechanical Effects on Material Properties**

2 **SCR-6.3.5.1 FEP Numbers:** W32, W36, W37, W39, W113, and W114

3 **FEP Titles:** *Consolidation of Waste (W32)*
4 *Consolidation of Shaft Seals (W36)*
5 *Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals (W37)*
6 *Underground Boreholes (W39)*
7 *Consolidation of Panel Closures (W113)*
8 *Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures (W114)*

9 **SCR-6.3.5.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

10 *Consolidation of Waste* is accounted for in PA calculations. *Consolidation of Shaft Seals* and
11 *Panel Closures* and *Mechanical Degradation of Shaft Seals* and *Panel Closures* are accounted
12 for in PA calculations. Flow through isolated, unsealed *Underground Boreholes* is accounted for
13 in PA calculations.

14 **SCR-6.3.5.1.2 Summary of New Information**

15 The titles of W36 and W37 have been modified to specifically apply to shaft seals. New FEPs
16 W113, *Consolidation of Panel Closures*, and W114, *Mechanical Degradation of Panel Closures*,
17 have been added to comprehensively address these repository components. These changes were
18 made as a result of the FEPs analysis conducted for the Panel Closure Redesign planned change
19 request (Kirkes 2006).

20 **SCR-6.3.5.1.3 Screening Argument**

21 Consolidation of waste is accounted for in PA calculations in the modeling of creep closure of
22 the disposal room (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.3).

23 Consolidation of shaft seals, consolidation of panel closures, mechanical degradation of shaft
24 seals, and mechanical degradation of panel closures are accounted for in PA calculations through
25 the permeability ranges assumed for the seal and closure systems (Appendix PA-2009, Section
26 PA-4.2.7 and Section PA-4.2.8).

27 The site investigation program has also involved the drilling of boreholes from within the
28 excavated part of the repository. Following their use for monitoring or other purposes, these
29 underground boreholes will be sealed where practical, and salt creep will also serve to
30 consolidate the seals and to close the boreholes. Any boreholes that remain unsealed will
31 connect the repository to anhydrite interbeds within the Salado, and thus provide potential
32 pathways for radionuclide transport. PA calculations account for fluid flow to and from the
33 interbeds by assuming that the DRZ has a permanently enhanced permeability that allows flow
34 of repository brines into specific anhydrite layers and interbeds. This treatment is also
35 considered to account for the effects of any unsealed boreholes.

1 **SCR-6.3.5.2 FEP Number:** W33
2 **FEP Title:** *Movement of Containers*

3 **SCR-6.3.5.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 *Movement of Containers* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
5 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-6.3.5.2.2 Summary of New Information**

7 The FEP description has been updated to reflect new waste inventory data.

8 **SCR-6.3.5.2.3 Screening Argument**

9 Movement of waste containers placed in salt may occur as a result of two buoyancy mechanisms
10 (Dawson and Tillerson 1978): (1) the density contrast between the waste container and the
11 surrounding salt, and (2) the temperature contrast between a salt volume that includes a heat
12 source and the surrounding unheated salt. When the density of the waste container is greater
13 than the density of the surrounding salt, the container sinks relative to the salt, whereas when the
14 salt density is greater than the container density, the container rises relative to the salt. Similarly,
15 when a discrete volume of salt within a large salt mass is heated, the heat raises the temperature
16 of the discrete volume above that of the surrounding salt, thereby inducing density contrasts and
17 buoyant forces that initiate upward flow of the heated salt volume. In a repository setting, the
18 source of the heat may be radioactive decay of the waste itself or exothermic reactions of the
19 backfill materials and waste constituents, e.g., MgO hydration, MgO carbonation, Al corrosion,
20 cement hydration, and calcium oxide hydration.

21 For the CCA, the density of the compacted waste and the grain density of the halite in the Salado
22 were assumed to be 2,000 kg/m³ and 2,163 kg/m³, respectively. Because this density contrast is
23 small, the movement of containers relative to the salt was considered minimal, particularly when
24 drag forces on the waste containers were also considered. In addition, vertical movement
25 initiated in response to thermally induced density changes for high-level waste containers of a
26 similar density to those at the WIPP were calculated to be approximately 0.35 m (1.1 ft)
27 (Dawson and Tillerson 1978, p. 22). This calculated movement was considered conservative,
28 given that containers at the WIPP will generate much less heat and will, therefore, move less. As
29 a result, container movement was eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
30 consequences to the performance of the disposal system.

31 The calculations performed for the DOE (U.S. Department of Energy 1996a) were based on
32 estimates of the waste inventory. However, with the initiation of waste disposal, actual waste
33 inventory is tracked and future waste stream inventories have been refined. Based on an
34 evaluation of these data, two factors may affect the conclusions reached in DOE (U.S.
35 Department of Energy 1996a) concerning container movement.

36 The first factor is changes in density of the waste form. According to CRA-2009 inventory data
37 (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005), the waste density has changed only slightly since that anticipated
38 for the CCA (see Leigh et al. 2005a, Table 9). Some future waste streams may, however, be

1 more highly compacted, perhaps having a density roughly three times greater than that assumed
2 in the CCA, while others may be less dense. In calculations of container movement, Dawson
3 and Tillerson (1978, p. 22) varied container density by nearly a factor of 3 (from 2,000 kg/m³
4 (125 lb/ft³) to 5,800 kg/m³ (362 lb/ft³)) and found that an individual dense container could move
5 vertically as much as about 28 m (92 ft). Given the geologic environment of the WIPP, a
6 container would likely encounter a dense stiff unit (such as an anhydrite stringer) that would
7 arrest further movement far short of this upper bound; however, because of the massive thickness
8 of the Salado salt, even a movement of 28 m (92 ft) would have little impact on performance.

9 The second inventory factor that could affect container movement is the composition of the
10 waste (and chemical buffer) relative to its heat production. Radioactive decay, nuclear
11 criticality, and exothermic reactions are three possible sources of heat in the WIPP repository.
12 According to Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005), the TRU radionuclide inventory has decreased from
13 3.44×10^6 Ci reported in the CCA, to 2.48×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2004, to 2.32×10^6 Ci in the
14 CRA-2009. Such a small change will not result in a significant deviation from the possible
15 temperature rise predicted in the CCA. Additionally, and as shown in Section SCR-6.3.4.1
16 (FEPs W72 and W73), temperature rises from exothermic reactions are quite small (see Table
17 SCR-5). Note that the revised maximum temperature increases caused by exothermic reactions
18 are still less than 10 °C (18 °F).

19 Based on the small differences between the temperature and density assumed in the CCA and
20 those determined using new inventory data (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005), the conclusion about
21 the importance of container movement reported in the CCA will not be affected, even when more
22 highly compacted future waste streams are considered. The effects of the revised maximum
23 temperature rise and higher-density future waste streams on container movement are competing
24 factors (high-density waste will sink, whereas the higher-temperature waste-salt volume will
25 rise) that may result in even less movement. Therefore, movement of waste containers has been
26 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

27 **SCR-6.3.5.3 FEP Number:** W34
28 **FEP Title:** *Container Integrity*

29 **SCR-6.3.5.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C Beneficial

30 *Container Integrity* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
31 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

32 **SCR-6.3.5.3.2 Summary of New Information**

33 No new information has been identified relating to this FEP.

34 **SCR-6.3.5.3.3 Screening Argument**

35 Container integrity is required only for waste transportation. Past PA calculations show that a
36 significant fraction of steel and other Fe-base materials will remain undegraded over 10,000
37 years (see, for example, Helton et al. 1998). In addition, it is assumed in both CCA and
38 CRA-2004 calculations that there is no microbial degradation of plastic container materials in

1 75% of PA realizations (Wang and Brush 1996). All these undegraded container materials will
2 (1) prevent the contact between brine and radionuclides; and (2) decrease the rate and extent of
3 radionuclide transport because of high tortuosity along the flow pathways and, as a result,
4 increase opportunities for metallic iron and corrosion products to beneficially reduce
5 radionuclides to lower oxidation states. Therefore, container integrity can be eliminated on the
6 basis of its beneficial effect on retarding radionuclide transport. PA assumes instantaneous
7 container failure and waste dissolution according to the source-term model.

8 **SCR-6.3.5.4 FEP Number:** W35
9 **FEP Title:** *Mechanical Effects of Backfill*

10 **SCR-6.3.5.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

11 The *Mechanical Effects of Backfill* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
12 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

13 **SCR-6.3.5.4.2 Summary of New Information**

14 In February 2008, the EPA approved a reduction in the minimum amount of MgO to be placed in
15 the repository (Reyes 2008). This reduction is described fully in Appendix MgO-2009. While
16 this reduction is important to WIPP operations, it has no bearing on PA calculations and the
17 screening decisions and arguments for FEPs that are related to backfill, buffers, and barriers.

18 **SCR-6.3.5.4.3 Screening Argument**

19 The chemical conditioners or backfill added to the disposal room will act to resist creep closure.
20 However, calculations have shown that because of the high porosity and low stiffness of the
21 waste and the high waste to potential backfill volume, inclusion of backfill does not significantly
22 decrease the total subsidence in the waste emplacement area or disposal room (Westinghouse
23 1994). In 2001, the DOE eliminated MgO mini-sacks from the repository, reducing the total
24 inventory from 85,600 short tons to 74,000 short tons, which reduced the potential backfill
25 volume (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2001). More recently, the required amount of
26 MgO has been further reduced (see Appendix MgO-2009 and Reyes [2008]). Therefore, the
27 mechanical effects of backfill have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
28 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.4 Subsurface Hydrological and Fluid Dynamic FEPs**

2 **SCR-6.4.1 Repository-Induced Flow**

3 SCR-6.4.1.1 **FEP Numbers:** W40 and W41

4 **FEP Titles:** *Brine Inflow (W40)*

5 *Wicking (W41)*

6 **SCR-6.4.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

7 Two-phase brine and gas flow and capillary rise (wicking) in the repository and the Salado are
8 accounted for in PA calculations.

9 **SCR-6.4.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs.

11 **SCR-6.4.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

12 Brine inflow to the repository may occur through the DRZ, impure halite, anhydrite layers, or
13 clay layers. Pressurization of the repository through gas generation could limit the amount of
14 brine that flows into the rooms and drifts. Two-phase flow of brine and gas in the repository and
15 the Salado is accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2).

16 Capillary rise (or wicking) is a potential mechanism for liquid migration through unsaturated
17 zones in the repository. Capillary rise in the waste material could affect gas generation rates,
18 which are dependent on water availability. Potential releases caused by drilling intrusion are
19 also influenced by brine saturations and therefore by wicking. Capillary rise is therefore
20 accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2).

21 **SCR-6.4.2 Effects of Gas Generation**

22 **SCR-6.4.2.1 FEP Number:** W42

23 **FEP Title:** *Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production*

24 **SCR-6.4.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

25 *Fluid Flow Due to Gas Production* in the repository and the Salado is accounted for in PA
26 calculations.

27 **SCR-6.4.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

28 No new information has been identified related to this FEP.

1 **SCR-6.4.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Pressurization of the repository through gas generation could limit the amount of brine that flows
 3 into the rooms and drifts. Gas may flow from the repository through the DRZ, impure halite,
 4 anhydrite layers, or clay layers. The amount of water available for reactions and microbial
 5 activity will impact the amounts and types of gases produced (W44 through W55, Section SCR-
 6 6.5.1.1, Section SCR-6.5.1.2, Section SCR-6.5.1.3, Section SCR-6.5.1.4, Section SCR-6.5.1.5,
 7 Section SCR-6.5.1.6, Section SCR-6.5.1.7, Section SCR-6.5.1.8, and Section SCR-6.5.1.9). Gas
 8 generation rates, and therefore repository pressure, may change as the water content of the
 9 repository changes. Pressure changes and fluid flow due to gas production in the repository and
 10 the Salado are accounted for in PA calculations through modeling the two-phase flow (Appendix
 11 PA-2009, Section PA-4.2).

12 **SCR-6.4.3 Thermal Effects**

13 **SCR-6.4.3.1 FEP Number:** W43

14 **FEP Title:** *Convection*

15 **SCR-6.4.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

16 *Convection* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
 17 performance of the disposal system.

18 **SCR-6.4.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

19 No new information has been identified relative to the screening of this FEP.

20 **SCR-6.4.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

21 Temperature differentials in the repository could initiate convection. The resulting thermally
 22 induced brine flow or thermally-induced, two-phase flow could influence contaminant transport.
 23 Thermal gradients in the disposal rooms could potentially drive the movement of water vapor.
 24 For example, temperature increases around waste located at the edges of the rooms could cause
 25 evaporation of water entering from the DRZ. This water vapor could condense on cooler waste
 26 containers in the rooms and could contribute to brine formation, corrosion, and gas generation.

27 The characteristic velocity, V_i , for convective flow of fluid component I in an unsaturated porous
 28 medium is given by (from Hicks 1996)

29
$$V_i \approx -\frac{k_i}{\mu_i} (\alpha_i \rho_{i0} g \Delta T) \quad (\text{SCR.11})$$

30 where α_i (per degree Kelvin) is the coefficient of expansion of the i^{th} component, k_i is the
 31 intrinsic permeability (m^2), μ_i is the fluid viscosity (pascal second), ρ_{i0} (kg/m^3) is the fluid
 32 density at a reference point, g is the acceleration due to gravity, and ΔT is the change in
 33 temperature. This velocity may be evaluated for the brine and gas phases expected in the waste
 34 disposal region.

1 For a temperature increase of 10 °C (18 °F), the characteristic velocity for convective flow of
2 brine in the DRZ around the concrete shaft seals is approximately 7×10^{-4} m (2.3×10^{-3} ft) per
3 year (2×10^{-11} m (6.6×10^{-11} ft) per second), and the characteristic velocity for convective flow
4 of gas in the DRZ is approximately 1×10^{-3} m (3.2×10^{-3} ft) per year (3×10^{-11} m ($9.8 \times$
5 10^{-11} ft) per second) (Hicks 1996). For a temperature increase of 25 °C (45 °F), the
6 characteristic velocity for convective flow of brine in the concrete seals is approximately
7 2×10^{-7} m (6.5×10^{-7} ft) per year (6×10^{-15} m (1.9×10^{-14} ft) per second), and the characteristic
8 velocity for convective flow of gas in the concrete seals is approximately 3×10^{-7} m (9.8×10^{-7}
9 ft) per year (8×10^{-15} m (2.6×10^{-4} ft) per second) (Hicks 1996). These values of Darcy velocity
10 are much smaller than the expected values associated with brine inflow to the disposal rooms of
11 fluid flow resulting from gas generation. In addition, the buoyancy forces generated by smaller
12 temperature contrasts in the DRZ, resulting from backfill, concrete hydration, and radioactive
13 decay will be short-lived and insignificant compared to the other driving forces for fluid flow.
14 The short-term concrete seals will be designed to function as barriers to fluid flow for at least
15 100 years after emplacement, and seal permeability will be minimized (Wakeley et al. 1995).
16 Thus temperature increases associated with concrete hydration will not result in significant
17 buoyancy-driven fluid flow through the concrete seal system. In summary, temperature changes
18 in the disposal system will not cause significant thermal convection. Furthermore, the induced
19 temperature gradients will be insufficient to generate water vapor and drive significant moisture
20 migration.

21 Temperature effects on fluid viscosity would be most significant in the DRZ surrounding the
22 hydrating concrete seals (where temperatures of approximately 38 °C (100 °F) are expected).
23 The viscosity of pure water decreases by about 19% over a temperature range of between 27 °C
24 (80 °F) and 38 °C (100 °F) (Batchelor 1973, p. 596). Although at a temperature of 27 °C
25 (80 °F), the viscosity of Salado brine is about twice that of pure water (Rechard et al. 1990,
26 a-19), the magnitude of the variation in brine viscosity between 27 °C (80 °F) and 38 °C (100 °F)
27 will be similar to the magnitude of the variation in viscosity of pure water. The viscosity of air
28 over this temperature range varies by less than 7% (Batchelor 1973, p. 594) and the viscosity of
29 gas in the waste disposal region over this temperature range is also likely to vary by less than
30 7%. The Darcy fluid flow velocity for a porous medium is inversely proportional to the fluid
31 viscosity. Thus increases in brine and gas flow rates may occur as a result of viscosity variations
32 in the vicinity of the concrete seals. However, these viscosity variations will persist only for a
33 short period in which temperatures are elevated, and, thus, the expected variations in brine and
34 gas viscosity in the waste disposal region will not significantly affect the long-term performance
35 of the disposal system.

36 For the CCA conditions following a drilling event, Al corrosion could, at most, result in a short-
37 lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6 °C (10.8 °F). A temperature rise of 6 °C
38 (10.8 °F) represented the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of
39 exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously. Revised maximum temperature rises by
40 exothermic reactions for CRA-2009 are still less than 10 °C (18 °F) (as shown in Table SCR-5).
41 Such small temperature changes cannot affect material properties.

1 In summary, temperature changes in the disposal system will not cause significant thermally
2 induced two-phase flow. Thermal convection has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
3 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

4 **SCR-6.5 Geochemical and Chemical FEPs**

5 **SCR-6.5.1 Gas Generation**

6 **SCR-6.5.1.1 FEP Numbers:** W44, W45, and W48

7 **FEP Titles:** *Degradation of Organic Material (W44)*

8 *Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation*

9 (W45)

10 *Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation (W48)*

11 **SCR-6.5.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

12 Microbial gas generation from *Degradation of Organic Material* is accounted for in PA
13 calculations, and the *Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation* and the *Effects of*
14 *Biofilm Formation on Microbial Gas Generation* are incorporated in the gas generation rates
15 used.

16 **SCR-6.5.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

17 These FEPs have been updated to be consistent with the latest inventory information.

18 **SCR-6.5.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

19 Microbial breakdown of cellulosic material, and possibly plastics and other synthetic materials,
20 will produce mainly CO₂, but also nitrogen oxide, nitrogen, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen, and
21 CH₄. The rate of microbial gas production will depend upon the nature of the microbial
22 populations established, the prevailing conditions, and the substrates present. Microbial gas
23 generation from degradation of organic material is accounted for in PA calculations.

24 The following subsections discuss the effects of temperature, pressure, radiation, and biofilms on
25 gas production rates via their control of microbial gas generation processes.

26 **SCR-6.5.1.1.3.1 Effects of Temperature on Microbial Gas Generation**

27 Calculations and experimental studies of induced temperature distributions within the repository
28 have been undertaken and are described in FEPs W29, W30, and W31 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1).
29 Numerical analysis suggests that the average temperature increase in the WIPP repository caused
30 by radioactive decay of the emplaced CH-TRU and RH-TRU waste is likely to be less than 3 °C
31 (5.4 °F) (FEP W13).

32 Temperature increases resulting from exothermic reactions are discussed in FEPs W72 and W73
33 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1). Potentially the most significant exothermic reactions are concrete
34 hydration, backfill hydration, and aluminum corrosion. Hydration of the seal concrete could

1 raise the temperature of the concrete to approximately 53 °C (127 °F) and that of the surrounding
2 salt to approximately 38 °C (100 °F) one week after seal emplacement (W73).

3 As discussed in FEPs W72 and W73 (Section SCR-6.3.4.1), the maximum temperature rise in
4 the disposal panels as a consequence of backfill hydration will be less than 4.2 °C (7.6 °F),
5 resulting from brine inflow following a drilling intrusion into a waste disposal panel. Note that
6 AICs will prevent drilling within the controlled area for 100 years after disposal. By this time,
7 any heat generation by radioactive decay and concrete seal hydration will have decreased
8 substantially, and the temperatures in the disposal panels will have decreased to close to initial
9 values.

10 Under similar conditions following a drilling event, Al corrosion could, at most, result in a short-
11 lived (two years) temperature rise of about 6.9 °C (12.4 °F) (see W72). These calculated
12 maximum heat generation rates resulting from Al corrosion and backfill hydration could not
13 occur simultaneously because they are limited by brine availability; each calculation assumes
14 that all available brine is consumed by the reaction of concern. Thus the temperature rise of
15 10 °C (18 °F) represents the maximum that could occur as a result of any combination of
16 exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously.

17 Relatively few data exist on the effects of temperature on microbial gas generation under
18 expected WIPP conditions. Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized microbial gas generation rates
19 observed during a range of experiments. Increases in temperature from ambient up to 40 °C
20 (104 °F) or 50 °C (122 °F) were reported to increase gas production, mainly via the degradation
21 of cellulosic waste under either aerobic or anaerobic conditions (Molecke 1979, p. 7). Above
22 70 °C (158 °F), however, gas generation rates were generally observed to decrease. The
23 experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and chemical conditions and for
24 different substrates, representing likely states within the repository. Gas generation rates were
25 presented as ranges with upper and lower bounds as estimates of uncertainty (Molecke 1979, p.
26 7). Later experiments reported by Francis and Gillow (1994) support the gas generation rate data
27 reported by Molecke (1979). These experiments investigated microbial gas generation under a
28 wide range of possible conditions in the repository. These conditions included the presence of
29 microbial inoculum, humid or inundated conditions, cellulosic substrates, additional nutrients,
30 electron acceptors, bentonite, and initially oxic or anoxic conditions. These experiments were
31 carried out at a reference temperature of 30 °C (86 °F) based on the average temperature
32 expected in the repository. Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations are described in
33 Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.5. The effects of temperature on microbial gas generation
34 are implicitly incorporated in the gas generation rates used.

35 **SCR-6.5.1.1.3.2 Effects of Biofilms on Microbial Gas Generation**

36 The location of microbial activity within the repository is likely to be controlled by the
37 availability of substrates and nutrients. Biofilms may develop on surfaces where nutrients are
38 concentrated. They consist of one or more layers of cells with extracellular polymeric material,
39 and serve to maintain an optimum environment for growth. Within such a biofilm ecosystem,
40 nutrient retention and recycling maximize microbe numbers on the surface (see, for example,
41 Stroes-Gascoyne and West 1994, pp. 9–10).

1 Biofilms can form on almost any moist surface, but their development is likely to be restricted in
2 porous materials. Even so, their development is possible at locations throughout the disposal
3 system. The effects of biofilms on microbial gas generation may affect disposal system
4 performance through control of microbial population size and their effects on radionuclide
5 transport.

6 Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized microbial gas generation rates observed during a range of
7 experimental studies. The experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and
8 chemical conditions and for different substrates representing likely states within the repository.
9 However, the effect of biofilm formation in these experiments was uncertain. Molecke (1979,
10 p. 7), presented gas generation rates as ranges, with upper and lower bounds as estimates of
11 uncertainty. Later experiments reported by Francis and Gillow (1994) support the gas generation
12 rate data reported by Molecke (1979). Their experiments investigated microbial gas generation
13 under a wide range of possible conditions in the repository. These conditions included the
14 presence of microbial inoculum, humid or inundated conditions, cellulosic substrates, additional
15 nutrients, electron acceptors, bentonite, and initially oxic or anoxic conditions. Under the more
16 favorable conditions for microbial growth established during the experiments, the development
17 of populations of halophilic microbes and associated biofilms was evidenced by observation of
18 an extracellular, carotenoid pigment, bacterioruberin, in the culture bottles (Francis and Gillow
19 1994, p. 59). Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived from available
20 experimental data and are described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.5. The effects of
21 biofilms on microbial gas generation rates are implicitly incorporated in the gas generation rates.

22 Biofilms may also influence contaminant transport rates through their capacity to retain and thus
23 retard both the microbes themselves and radionuclides. This effect is not accounted for in PA
24 calculations, but is considered potentially beneficial to calculated disposal system performance.
25 Microbial transport is discussed in Section SCR-6.6.3.1.

26 **SCR-6.5.1.2 FEP Number:** W46

27 **FEP Title:** *Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation*

28 **SCR-6.5.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

29 The *Effects of Pressure on Microbial Gas Generation* has been eliminated from PA calculations
30 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

31 **SCR-6.5.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

32 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

33 **SCR-6.5.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

34 Directly relevant to WIPP conditions, the gas generation experiments with actual waste
35 components at Argonne National Laboratory provide no indication of any enhancement of
36 pressured nitrogen atmosphere (2,150 pounds per square inch absolute [psia]) on microbial gas
37 generation (Felicione et al. 2001). In addition, microbial breakdown of cellulosic material, and
38 possibly plastics and other synthetic materials in the repository, will produce mainly CO₂ and

1 CH₄ with minor amounts of nitrogen oxide, nitrogen, and hydrogen sulfide. The accumulation of
2 these gaseous species will contribute the total pressure in the repository. Increases in the partial
3 pressures of these reaction products could potentially limit gas generation reactions. However,
4 such an effect is not taken into account in WIPP PA calculations. The rate of microbial gas
5 production will depend upon the nature of the microbial populations established, the prevailing
6 conditions, and the substrates present. Microbial gas generation from degradation of organic
7 material is accounted for in PA calculations.

8 Chemical reactions may occur depending on, among other things, the concentrations of available
9 reactants, the presence of catalysts and the accumulation of reaction products, the biological
10 activity, and the prevailing conditions (for example, temperature and pressure). Reactions that
11 involve the production or consumption of gases are often particularly influenced by pressure
12 because of the high molar volume of gases. The effect of high total pressures on chemical
13 reactions is generally to reduce or limit further gas generation.

14 Few data exist from which the effects of pressure on microbial gas generation reactions that may
15 occur in the WIPP can be assessed and quantified. Studies of microbial activity in deep-sea
16 environments (for example, Kato et al. 1994, p. 94) suggest that microbial gas generation
17 reactions are less likely to be limited by increasing pressures in the disposal rooms than are
18 inorganic gas generation reactions (for example, corrosion). Consequently, the effects of
19 pressure on microbial gas generation have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
20 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-6.5.1.3 FEP Number:** W47

22 **FEP Title:** *Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation*

23 **SCR-6.5.1.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

24 The *Effects of Radiation on Microbial Gas Generation* has been eliminated from PA calculations
25 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

26 **SCR-6.5.1.3.2 Summary of New Information**

27 The FEP screening argument has been updated to reflect the radionuclide inventory used for
28 CRA-2009 calculations, although the screening decision has not changed.

29 **SCR-6.5.1.3.3 Screening Argument**

30 Radiation may slow down microbial gas generation rates, but such an effect is not taken into
31 account in WIPP PA calculations. According to the inventory data presented in Leigh, Trone,
32 and Fox (2005), the overall activity for all TRU radionuclides has decreased from 3.44×10^6 Ci
33 reported in the CCA, to 2.48×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2004, to 2.32×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2009. This
34 decrease will not affect the original screening argument.

35 Experiments investigating microbial gas generation rates suggest that the effects of alpha
36 radiation from TRU waste is not likely to have significant effects on microbial activity (Barnhart
37 et al. 1980; Francis 1985). Consequently, the effects of radiation on microbial gas generation

1 have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance
2 of the disposal system.

3 **SCR-6.5.1.4 FEP Numbers:** W49 and W51

4 **FEP Titles:** *Gasses from Metal Corrosion*
5 *Chemical Effects of Corrosion*

6 **SCR-6.5.1.4.1 Screening Decision:** UP

7 Gas generation from metal corrosion is accounted for in PA calculations, and the effects of
8 chemical changes from metal corrosion are incorporated in the gas generation rates used.

9 **SCR-6.5.1.4.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified related to these FEPs.

11 **SCR-6.5.1.4.3 Screening Argument**

12 Oxidic corrosion of waste drums and metallic waste will occur at early times following closure of
13 the repository and will deplete its oxygen content. Anoxic corrosion will follow the oxidic phase
14 and will produce hydrogen while consuming water. Gases from metal corrosion are accounted
15 for in PA calculations.

16 The predominant chemical effect of corrosion reactions on the environment of disposal rooms
17 will be to lower the oxidation state of the brines and maintain reducing conditions.

18 Molecke (1979, p. 4) summarized gas generation rates that were observed during a range of
19 experiments. The experiments were conducted over a range of temperatures and chemical
20 conditions representing likely states within the repository. Later experiments reported by
21 Telander and Westerman (1993) support the gas generation rate data reported by Molecke
22 (1979). Their experiments investigated gas generation from corrosion under a wide range of
23 possible conditions in the repository. The studies included corrosion of low-carbon steel waste
24 packaging materials in synthetic brines, representative of intergranular Salado brines at the
25 repository horizon, under anoxic (reducing) conditions.

26 Gas generation rates used in the PA calculations have been derived from available experimental
27 data and are described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.2.5. The effects of chemical changes
28 from metal corrosion are, therefore, accounted for in PA calculations.

29 **SCR-6.5.1.5 FEP Number:** W50

30 **FEP Title:** *Galvanic Coupling (within the repository)*

31 **SCR-6.5.1.5.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

32 The effects of *Galvanic Coupling* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
33 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.5.1.5.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

3 **SCR-6.5.1.5.3 Screening Argument**

4 Galvanic coupling (i.e. establishing an electrical current through chemical processes) could lead
5 to the propagation of electric potential gradients between metals in the waste form, canisters, and
6 other metals external to the waste form, potentially influencing corrosion processes, gas
7 generation rates, and chemical migration.

8 Metallic ore bodies external to the repository are nonexistent (see the CCA, Appendix GCR) and
9 therefore galvanic coupling between the waste and metals external to the repository would not
10 occur. However, a variety of metals will be present within the repository as waste metals and
11 containers, creating a potential for formation of galvanic cells over short distances. As an
12 example, the presence of copper could influence rates of hydrogen gas production resulting from
13 the corrosion of iron. The interactions between metals depend upon their physical disposition
14 and the prevailing solution conditions, including pH and salinity. Good physical and electrical
15 contact between the metals is critical to the establishment of galvanic cells.

16 Consequently, given the preponderance of iron over other metals within the repository and the
17 likely passivation of many nonferrous materials, the influence of these electrochemical
18 interactions on corrosion, and therefore on gas generation, is expected to be minimal. Therefore,
19 the effects of galvanic coupling have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
20 consequence.

21 **SCR-6.5.1.6 FEP Number:** W52

22 **FEP Title:** *Radiolysis of Brine*

23 **SCR-6.5.1.6.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

24 Gas generation from *Radiolysis of Brine* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
25 of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

26 **SCR-6.5.1.6.2 Summary of New Information**

27 No new information has been identified relative to this FEP.

28 **SCR-6.5.1.6.3 Screening Argument**

29 Radiolysis of brine in the WIPP disposal rooms, and of water in the waste, will lead to the
30 production of gases and may significantly affect the oxygen content of the rooms. This, in turn,
31 will affect the prevailing chemical conditions and potentially the concentrations of radionuclides
32 that may be mobilized in the brines.

33 The overall reaction for the radiolysis of water in the waste and brine is

34
$$\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightarrow \text{H}_2 + \frac{1}{2} \text{O}_2. \quad (\text{SCR.12})$$

1 However, the production of intermediate oxygen-bearing species that may subsequently undergo
 2 reduction will lead to reduced oxygen gas yields. The remainder of this section is concerned
 3 with the physical effects of gas generation by radiolysis of brine.

4 Reed et al. (1993) studied radiolytic gas generation during experiments lasting between 155 and
 5 182 days. These experiments involved both synthetic brines similar to those sampled from the
 6 Salado at the WIPP repository horizon, and brines occurring in reservoirs in the Castile, as well
 7 as real brines sampled from the Salado in the repository workings. The brines were spiked with
 8 ²³⁹Pu(VI) at concentrations between 6.9×10^{-9} and 3.4×10^{-4} molal. During these relatively
 9 short-term experiments, hydrogen gas was observed as the product of radiolysis. Oxygen gas
 10 was not observed; this was attributed to the formation of intermediate oxygen-bearing species.
 11 However, given sufficient exposure to alpha-emission, oxygen production may reach 50% that of
 12 hydrogen.

13 An estimate of the potential rate of gas generation caused by the radiolysis of brine, R_{RAD} , can be
 14 made by making the following assumptions:

- 15 • Gas production occurs following the reaction above, so that 1.5 moles of gas are
 16 generated for each mole of water consumed
- 17 • Gas production occurs as a result of the alpha decay of ²³⁹Pu
- 18 • ²³⁹Pu concentrations in the disposal room brines are controlled by solubility equilibria
- 19 • All of the dissolved Pu is ²³⁹Pu

20 R_{RAD} is then given by

$$21 \quad R_{RAD} = \frac{Y_g C_{Pu} SA_{Pu} \bar{E}_\alpha V_B}{N_D N_A} \quad (SCR.13)$$

$$22 \quad R_{RAD} = \frac{\left(\frac{1.5 \text{ molecule gas}}{\text{molecule H}_2\text{O}}\right) \left(3.15 \times 10^7 \frac{\text{s}}{\text{yr}}\right) \left(3 \times 10^{-4} \frac{\text{mol}}{\text{L}}\right) \left(5.42 \times 10^{11} \frac{\text{Bq}}{\text{mol}}\right) \left(5.15 \times 10^6 \frac{\text{eV}}{\text{dis}}\right) \left(\frac{1.5 \text{ H}_2\text{O}}{100 \text{ eV}}\right) (4.36 \times 10^8 \text{L})}{(8 \times 10^5 \text{ drums}) \left(6.022 \times 10^{23} \frac{\text{molecules}}{\text{mole}}\right)}$$

$$= 0.533 \text{ mol/drum/yr}$$

23 (SCR.14)

24 Y_g = radiolytic gas yield, in number of moles of gas produced per number of water
 25 molecules consumed

26 C_{Pu} = maximum dissolved concentration of plutonium (molar)

27 SA_{Pu} = specific activity of ²³⁹Pu (5.42×10^{11} becquerels (Bq) per mole)

28 \bar{E}_α = average energy of α -particles emitted during ²³⁹Pu decay (5.15×10^6 eV)

29 G = number of water molecules split per 100 eV of energy transferred from alpha-
 30 particles

31 V_B = volume of brine in the repository (L)

- 1 N_D = number of CH-TRU drums in the repository ($\sim 8 \times 10^5$)
2 N_A = Avogadro constant (6.022×10^{23} molecules per mole)

3 The value of G used in this calculation has been set at 0.015, the upper limit of the range of
4 values observed (0.011 to 0.015) during experimental studies of the effects of radiation on WIPP
5 brines (Reed et al. 1993). A maximum estimate of the volume of brine that could potentially be
6 present in the disposal region has been made from its excavated volume of 436,000 m³ (520,266
7 cubic yards [yd³]). This estimate, in particular, is considered to be highly conservative because it
8 makes no allowance for creep closure of the excavation, or for the volume of waste and backfill
9 that will be emplaced, and takes no account of factors that may limit brine inflow. These
10 parameter values lead to an estimate of the potential rate of gas production caused by the
11 radiolysis of brine of 0.6 moles per drum per year or less.

12 Assuming ideal gas behavior and repository conditions of 30 °C (86 °F) and 14.8 MPa
13 (lithostatic pressure), this is equivalent to approximately 6.8×10^4 L (1.8×10^4 gal) per year.

14 Potential gas production rates from other processes that will occur in the repository are
15 significantly greater than this. For example, under water-saturated conditions, microbial
16 degradation of cellulosic waste has the potential to yield between 1.3×10^6 and 3.8×10^7 L (3.4
17 $\times 10^5$ and 1.0×10^7 gal) per year; anoxic corrosion of steels has the potential to yield up to 6.3
18 $\times 10^5$ L (1.6×10^5 gal) per year.

19 In addition to the assessment of the potential rate of gas generation by radiolysis of brine given
20 above, a study of the likely consequences on disposal system performance has been undertaken
21 by Vaughn et al. (1995). A model was implemented in BRAGFLO to estimate radiolytic gas
22 generation in the disposal region according to the equation above.

23 A set of BRAGFLO simulations was performed to assess the magnitude of the influence of the
24 radiolysis of brine on contaminant migration to the accessible environment. The calculations
25 considered radiolysis of water by 15 isotopes of Th, Pu, U, and Am. Conditional CCDFs of
26 normalized contaminated brine releases to the Culebra via a human intrusion borehole and the
27 shaft system, as well as releases to the subsurface boundary of the accessible environment via the
28 Salado interbeds, were constructed and compared to the corresponding baseline CCDFs
29 calculated excluding radiolysis. The comparisons indicated that radiolysis of brine does not
30 significantly affect releases to the Culebra or the subsurface boundary of the accessible
31 environment under disturbed or undisturbed conditions (Vaughn et al. 1995). Although the
32 analysis of Vaughn et al. (1995) used data that are different than those used in the PA
33 calculations, estimates of total gas volumes in the repository are similar to those considered in
34 the analysis performed by Vaughn et al. (1995).

35 Therefore, gas generation by radiolysis of brine has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
36 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.5.1.7 FEP Number:** W53
2 **FEP Title:** *Radiolysis of Cellulose*

3 **SCR-6.5.1.7.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 Gas generation from *Radiolysis of Cellulose* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
5 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-6.5.1.7.2 Summary of New Information**

7 This FEP has been updated with new inventory data related to cellulose content.

8 **SCR-6.5.1.7.3 Screening Argument**

9 Molecke (1979) compared experimental data on gas production rates caused by radiolysis of
10 cellulose and other waste materials with gas generation rates by other processes, including
11 bacterial (microbial) waste degradation. The comparative gas generation rates reported by
12 Molecke (1979, p. 4) are given in terms of most probable ranges, using units of moles per year
13 per drum, for drums of 0.21 m³ (0.27 yd³) in volume. A most probable range of 0.005 to 0.011
14 moles per year per drum is reported for gas generation caused by radiolysis of cellulosic material
15 (Molecke 1979, p. 4). As a comparison, a most probable range of 0.0 to 5.5 moles per year per
16 drum is reported for gas generation by bacterial degradation of waste.

17 The data reported by Molecke (1979) are consistent with more recent gas generation
18 investigations made under the WIPP program, and indicate that radiolysis of cellulosic materials
19 will generate significantly less gas than other gas generation processes. Gas generation from
20 radiolysis of cellulose therefore can be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
21 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 Radiolytic gas generation is controlled by the radioactivity of wastes and the waste properties.
23 According to the new inventory presented in Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005), the overall activity
24 for all TRU radionuclides has decreased from 3.44×10^6 Ci reported in the CCA, to 2.48×10^6
25 Ci in the CRA-2004, to 2.32×10^6 Ci in the CRA-2009. Such decreasing activity levels imply
26 that the radiolytic effects will be decreased from those presented in the CCA.

27 Radiolytic gas generation is also limited by transportation requirements, which state that the
28 hydrogen generated in the innermost layer of confinement must be no more than 5% over 60
29 days (U.S. Department of Energy 2000b). Thus the maximum rate allowed for transportation is
30 $0.201 \text{ m}^3/\text{drum} \times 5\% \times 1,000 \text{ L/m}^3/60 \text{ days} \times 365 \text{ days/yr} = 61 \text{ L/drum/yr}$, smaller than the
31 maximum microbial gas generation rate. Note that this estimate is very conservative and the
32 actual rates are even smaller. It is a general consensus within the international research
33 community that the effect of radiolytic gas generation on the long-term performance of a
34 low/intermediate level waste repository is negligible (Rodwell et al. 1999).

1 **SCR-6.5.1.8 FEP Number:** W54
 2 **FEP Title:** *Helium Gas Production*

3 **SCR-6.5.1.8.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C


4 Gas generation from helium production has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
 5 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

6 **SCR-6.5.1.8.2 Summary of New Information**

7 The updated information for the WIPP disposal inventory indicates that the expected WIPP-scale
 8 radionuclide activity (2.32 million Ci of TRU isotopes) (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) is less than
 9 previously estimated in TWBIR Rev 3 (U.S. Department of Energy 1996b). Thus the helium gas
 10 production argument for CRA-2009 is conservatively bounded by the CCA screening argument.
 11 The FEP screening argument and screening decision remain unchanged except for editorial
 12 changes.

13 **SCR-6.5.1.8.3 Screening Argument**

14 Helium gas production will occur by the reduction of α -particles (helium nuclei) emitted from
 15 the waste. The maximum amount of helium that could be produced can be calculated from the
 16 number of α -particles generated during radioactive decay. The α -particles are converted to
 17 helium gas by the following reaction:



19 For the screening argument used in the CCA, the inventory (I) that may be emplaced in the
 20 repository is approximately 4.07 million Ci or 1.5×10^{17} Bq (see the CCA, Appendix BIR).
 21 Assuming that the inventory continues to yield α -particles at this rate throughout the 10,000-yr
 22 regulatory period, the maximum rate of helium gas produced (R_{He}) may be calculated from

23
$$R_{\text{He}} = \frac{I \left(\frac{1 \text{ He atom}}{\alpha - \text{decay}} \right)}{N_A} \quad (\text{SCR.16})$$

24 R_{He} is the rate of helium gas production in the repository (mole per second).

25 I is the waste inventory, 1.5×10^{17} Bq, assuming that 1 Bq is equal to 1 α -decay per second, and
 26 N_A is Avogadro's constant (6.022×10^{23} atoms per mole). These assumptions regarding the
 27 inventory lead to maximum estimates for helium production because some of the radionuclides
 28 will decay by beta and gamma emission.

29 R_{He} is approximately 5.5×10^{-7} moles per second based on an α -emitting inventory of 4.07
 30 million Ci (much greater than current inventory estimates) (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005).
 31 Assuming ideal gas behavior and repository conditions of 30 °C (86 °F) and 14.8 MPa or 146
 32 atmospheres (lithostatic pressure) yields approximately 1.3 L (0.34 gal) per year.

1 The effects of helium gas production have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
2 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

3 **SCR-6.5.1.9 FEP Number:** W55
4 **FEP Title:** *Radioactive Gases*

5 **SCR-6.5.1.9.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

6 The formation and transport of *Radioactive Gases* has been eliminated from PA calculations on
7 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

8 **SCR-6.5.1.9.2 Summary of New Information**

9 This FEP has been updated with references to the latest inventory information.

10 **SCR-6.5.1.9.3 Screening Argument**

11 Based on the composition of the anticipated waste inventory, as described in the CRA-2004,
12 Appendix DATA, Attachment F, the radioactive gases that will be generated in the repository are
13 radon (Rn) and ^{14}C -labeled CO_2 and CH_4 .

14 Leigh, Trone, and Fox (2005) indicates that a small amount of carbon-14 (2.41 Ci) will be
15 disposed in the WIPP. This amount is insignificant in comparison with the section 191.13
16 cumulative release limit for ^{14}C .

17 Notwithstanding this comparison, consideration of transport of radioactive gases could
18 potentially be necessary in respect of the section 191.15 individual protection requirements. ^{14}C
19 may partition into CO_2 and CH_4 formed during microbial degradation of cellulosic and other
20 organic wastes (for example, rubbers and plastics). However, total fugacities of CO_2 in the
21 repository are expected to be very low because of the action of the MgO backfill, which will lead
22 to incorporation of CO_2 in solid magnesite. Similarly, interaction of CO_2 with cementitious
23 wastes will limit CO_2 fugacities by the formation of solid calcium carbonate. Thus, because of
24 the formation of solid carbonate phases in the repository, significant transport of ^{14}C as carbon
25 dioxide-14 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
26 performance of the disposal system.

27 Potentially significant volumes of CH_4 may be produced during the microbial degradation of
28 cellulosic waste. However, volumes of methane-14 will be small given the low total inventory
29 of carbon-14 and the tendency of carbon-14 to be incorporated into solid carbonate phases in the
30 repository. Therefore, although transport of carbon-14 could occur as methane-14, this effect has
31 been eliminated from the current PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
32 performance of the disposal system.

33 Rn gas will contain proportions of the alpha emitters ^{219}Rn , ^{220}Rn , and ^{222}Rn . All of these have
34 short half-lives, but ^{222}Rn is potentially the most important because it is produced from the
35 abundant waste isotope, ^{238}Pu , and because it has the longest half-life of the radon isotopes (≈ 4
36 days). ^{222}Ra will exhibit secular equilibrium with its parent ^{226}Rn , which has a half-life of 1600

1 years. Consequently, ^{222}Rn will be produced throughout the 10,000-yr regulatory time period.
2 Conservative analysis of the potential ^{222}Rn inventory suggests activities of less than 716 Ci at
3 10,000 years (Bennett 1996).

4 Direct comparison of the estimated level of ^{222}Rn activity with the release limits specified in
5 section 191.13 cannot be made because the release limits do not cover radionuclides with half-
6 lives less than 20 years. For this reason, production of Rn gas can be eliminated from the PA
7 calculations on regulatory grounds. Notwithstanding this regulatory argument, the small
8 potential Rn inventory means that the formation and transport of Rn gas can also be eliminated
9 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.5.2 Speciation**

11 **SCR-6.5.2.1 FEP Number:** W56

12 **FEP Title:** *Speciation*

13 **SCR-6.5.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP – Disposal Room

14 UP – Culebra

15 SO-C – Beneficial – Shaft Seals

16 Chemical *Speciation* is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of radionuclide
17 solubility in the disposal rooms and the degree of chemical retardation estimated during
18 contaminant transport. The effects of cementitious seals on chemical *Speciation* have been
19 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
20 disposal system.

21 **SCR-6.5.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

22 No new information has been identified related to the screening of this FEP.

23 **SCR-6.5.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

24 Chemical speciation refers to the form in which elements occur under a particular set of chemical
25 or environmental conditions. Conditions affecting chemical speciation include the temperature,
26 pressure, and salinity (ionic strength) of the water in question. The importance of chemical
27 speciation lies in its control of the geochemical reactions likely to occur and the consequences
28 for actinide mobility.

29 **SCR-6.5.2.1.3.1 Disposal Room**

30 The concentrations of radionuclides that dissolve in any brines present in the disposal rooms
31 after repository closure will depend on the stability of the chemical species that form under the
32 prevailing conditions (for example, temperature, pressure, and ionic strength). The method used
33 to derive radionuclide solubilities in the disposal rooms (see Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section
34 SOTERM-4.0) considers the expected conditions. The MgO backfill will buffer pH values in the
35 disposal room to between 9 and 10. Thus chemical *Speciation* is accounted for in PA
36 calculations in the estimates of radionuclide solubility in the disposal rooms.

SCR-6.5.2.1.3.2 Repository Seals

Certain repository materials have the potential to interact with groundwater and significantly alter the chemical speciation of any radionuclides present. In particular, extensive use of cementitious materials in the seals may have the capacity to buffer groundwaters to extremely high pH (for example, Bennett et al. 1992, pp. 315–25). At high pH values, the speciation and adsorption behavior of many radionuclides is such that their dissolved concentrations are reduced in comparison with near-neutral waters. This effect reduces the migration of radionuclides in dissolved form. The effects of cementitious seals on groundwater chemistry have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-6.5.2.1.3.3 Culebra

Chemical speciation will affect actinide retardation in the Culebra. The dependence of An retardation on speciation in the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations by sampling over ranges of K_{ds} . The ranges of K_{ds} are based on the range of groundwater compositions and speciation in the Culebra, including consideration of nonradionuclide solutes. The methodology used to simulate sorption in the Culebra is described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.9.

SCR-6.5.2.2 FEP Number: W57

FEP Title: *Kinetics of Speciation*

SCR-6.5.2.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-C

The effects of reaction kinetics in chemical speciation reactions have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

SCR-6.5.2.2.2 Summary of New Information

No new information has been identified for this FEP.

SCR-6.5.2.2.3 Screening Argument

Chemical speciation of actinides describes the composition and relative distribution of dissolved species, such as the hydrated metal ion, or complexes, whether with organic or inorganic ligands. Conditions affecting chemical speciation include temperature, ionic strength, ligand concentration, and pH of the solution. Some ligands, such as hydroxide, may act to decrease An solubility, while others, such as citrate, frequently have the opposite influence, often increasing An solubility.

SCR-6.5.2.2.4 Disposal Room Equilibrium Conditions

The concentrations of radionuclides that can be dissolved in brines within the disposal rooms will depend on the thermodynamic stabilities and solubilities of the respective metal complexes. The Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT) calculations and database input used to determine the brine solubilities of radionuclides takes into account the expected conditions, including temperature, ionic strength, pH, and ligand concentration. The chemical speciation at

1 equilibrium is accounted for in PA calculations in the estimates of radionuclide solubility in the
2 disposal rooms.

3 **SCR-6.5.2.2.5 Kinetics of Complex Formation**

4 The waste that is emplaced within the WIPP contains radionuclides, including actinides or An-
5 bearing materials in solid phases, e.g. metal oxides, salts, coprecipitated solids, and contaminated
6 objects. In the event of contact with brine, the solution phase concentration of dissolved
7 radionuclides is controlled both by the solution composition and by the kinetics of dissolution of
8 the solid phases, effectively approaching equilibrium from undersaturation. Solution
9 complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as carbonate
10 and hydroxide, and with organic ligands such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and ethylene diamine
11 tetra-acetate (EDTA) are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in fractions of a second, an
12 inconsequential short time increment on the scale of the 10,000-yr regulatory period.
13 Reactions of these types are generally so fast that special techniques must be adopted to measure
14 the reaction rates; as a practical matter, the reaction rate is limited by the mixing rate when metal
15 solutions are combined with ligand solutions. As a result, the rate of approach to an equilibrium
16 distribution of solution species takes place much more rapidly than dissolution, making the
17 dissolution reaction the rate-limiting step. The effects of reaction kinetics in aqueous systems
18 are discussed by Lasaga et al. (1994), who suggest that in contrast to many heterogeneous
19 reactions, homogeneous aqueous geochemical speciation reactions involving relatively small
20 inorganic species occur rapidly and are accurately described by thermodynamic equilibrium
21 models that neglect explicit consideration of reaction kinetics.

22 For that reason, the rate at which solution species approach equilibrium distribution is of no
23 consequence to repository performance. Kinetics of chemical speciation may be eliminated from
24 PA calculations on the basis of no consequence.

25 **SCR-6.5.3 Precipitation and Dissolution**

26 **SCR-6.5.3.1 FEP Numbers:** W58, W59, and W60

27 **FEP Titles:** *Dissolution of Waste (W58)*
28 *Precipitation of Secondary Minerals (W59)*
29 *Kinetics of Precipitation and Dissolution (W60)*

30 **SCR-6.5.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP – W58
31 SO-C Beneficial – W59
32 SO-C – W60

33 Waste dissolution and the release of radionuclides in the disposal rooms are accounted for in PA
34 calculations. The formation of radionuclide-bearing precipitates from groundwaters and brines
35 and the associated retardation of contaminants have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
36 basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The effect of reaction
37 kinetics in controlling the rate of waste dissolution within the disposal rooms has been eliminated
38 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
39 system.

1 **SCR-6.5.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

2 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

3 **SCR-6.5.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

4 Dissolution of waste and precipitation of secondary minerals control the concentrations of
5 radionuclides in brines and can influence rates of contaminant transport. Waste dissolution is
6 accounted for in PA calculations. The formation of radionuclide-bearing precipitates from
7 groundwaters and brines and the associated retardation of contaminants have been eliminated
8 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
9 system.

10 At low temperatures, precipitation and dissolution reactions are caused by changes in fluid
11 chemistry that result in chemical undersaturation or oversaturation (Bruno and Sandino 1987).
12 Precipitation can be divided into two stages: nucleation and crystal growth. Following
13 nucleation, growth rates depend on the rates of surface processes and the transport of materials to
14 the growth site. Mineral dissolution often depends on whether a surface reaction or transport of
15 material away from the reaction site acts as the rate-controlling process. The former case may
16 cause selective dissolution along crystallographically controlled features, whereas the latter may
17 induce rapid bulk dissolution (Berner 1981). Thus a range of kinetic behaviors will be exhibited
18 by different mineral precipitation and dissolution reactions in geochemical systems.

19 **SCR-6.5.3.1.3.1 Disposal Room**

20 The waste that is emplaced within the WIPP contains radionuclides, including actinides or An-
21 bearing materials in solid phases, e.g. metal oxides, salts, coprecipitated solids, and contaminated
22 objects. In the event of contact with brine, the solution phase concentration of dissolved
23 radionuclides is controlled both by the solution composition and the kinetics of dissolution of the
24 solid phases, effectively approaching equilibrium from undersaturation. Solution complexation
25 reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as carbonated and hydroxide,
26 and with organic ligands such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA are kinetically very fast,
27 reaching equilibrium in less than 1 s, which is infinitesimally small on the time scale of the
28 10,000-yr regulatory period. The rate at which thermodynamic equilibrium is approached
29 between solution composition and the solubility-controlling solid phases will be limited by rate
30 of dissolution of the solid materials in the waste. As a result, until equilibrium is reached, the
31 solution concentration of the actinides will be lower than the concentration predicted based upon
32 equilibrium of the solution phase components with the solubility-limiting solid phases. The
33 WIPP An source term model, which describes interactions of the waste and brine, is described in
34 detail in the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.5. The assumption of instantaneous equilibrium in
35 waste dissolution reactions is a conservative approach, yielding maximum concentration
36 estimates for radionuclides in the disposal rooms because a time-weighted average resulting from
37 a kinetically accurate estimate of solution compositions would have lower concentrations at early
38 times. Waste dissolution at the thermodynamic equilibrium solubility limit is accounted for in
39 PA calculations. However, the kinetics of dissolution within the disposal rooms has been
40 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
41 disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.5.3.1.3.2 Geological Units**

2 During groundwater flow, radionuclide precipitation processes that occur will lead to reduced
 3 contaminant transport. No credit is given in PA calculations to the potentially beneficial
 4 occurrence of precipitation of secondary minerals. The formation of radionuclide-bearing
 5 precipitates from groundwaters and brines and the associated retardation of contaminants have
 6 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to disposal system
 7 performance. As a result, kinetics of precipitation has also been eliminated from PA calculations
 8 because no credit is taken for precipitation reactions.

9 **SCR-6.5.4 Sorption**

10 **SCR-6.5.4.1 FEP Numbers:** W61, W62, and W63

11 **FEP Titles:** *Actinide Sorption (W61)*
 12 *Kinetics of Sorption (W62)*
 13 *Changes in Sorptive Surfaces (W63)*

14 **SCR-6.5.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP – (W61, W62) In the Culebra and Dewey Lake
 15 SO-C – Beneficial – (W61, W62) In the Disposal
 16 Room, Shaft Seals, Panel Closures, Other Geologic
 17 Units
 18 UP – (W63)

19 Sorption within the disposal rooms, which would serve to reduce radionuclide concentrations,
 20 has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
 21 performance of the disposal system. The effects of sorption processes in shaft seals and panel
 22 closures have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the
 23 performance of the disposal system. Sorption within the Culebra and the Dewey Lake is
 24 accounted for in PA calculations. Sorption processes within other geological units of the
 25 disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial
 26 consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Mobile adsorbents (for example,
 27 microbes and humic acids), and the sorption of radionuclides at their surfaces, are accounted for
 28 in PA calculations in the estimates of the concentrations of actinides that may be carried. The
 29 potential effects of reaction kinetics in adsorption processes and of *Changes in Sorptive Surfaces*
 30 are accounted for in PA calculations.

31 **SCR-6.5.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

32 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

33 **SCR-6.5.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

34 Sorption may be defined as the accumulation of matter at the interface between a solid and an
 35 aqueous solution. Within PA calculations, including those made for the WIPP, the use of
 36 isotherm representations of An sorption prevails because of their computational simplicity in
 37 comparison with other models (Serne 1992, pp. 238–39).

1 The mechanisms that control the kinetics of sorption processes are, in general, poorly
2 understood. Often, sorption of inorganic ions on mineral surfaces is a two-step process
3 consisting of a short period (typically minutes) of diffusion-controlled, rapid uptake, followed by
4 slower processes (typically weeks to months) including surface rearrangement, aggregation and
5 precipitation, and solid solution formation (Davis and Kent 1990, p. 202). Available data
6 concerning rates of sorption reactions involving the important radionuclides indicate that, in
7 general, a range of kinetic behavior is to be expected.

8 The relevance to the WIPP of sorption reaction kinetics lies in their effects on chemical
9 transport. Sorption of waste contaminants to static surfaces of the disposal system, such as seals
10 and host rocks, acts to retard chemical transport. Sorption of waste contaminants to potentially
11 mobile surfaces, such as colloids, however, may act to enhance chemical transport, particularly if
12 the kinetics of contaminant desorption are slow or the process is irreversible (nonequilibrium).

13 The following subsections discuss sorption in the disposal rooms, shaft seals, panel closures, the
14 Culebra, and other geological units of the WIPP disposal system. Sorption on colloids,
15 microbes, and particulate material is also discussed.

16 **SCR-6.5.4.1.3.1 Disposal Room**

17 The concentrations of radionuclides that dissolve in waters entering the disposal room will be
18 controlled by a combination of sorption and dissolution reactions. However, because sorption
19 processes are surface phenomena, the amount of material likely to be involved in sorption mass
20 transfer processes will be small relative to that involved in the bulk dissolution of waste. WIPP
21 PA calculations therefore assume that dissolution reactions control radionuclide concentrations.
22 Sorption on waste, containers, and backfill within the disposal rooms, which would serve to
23 reduce radionuclide concentrations, has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
24 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

25 **SCR-6.5.4.1.4 Shaft Seals and Panel Closures**

26 The CCA, Chapter 3.0 and Appendix SEAL describe the seals that are to be placed at various
27 locations in the access shafts and waste panel access tunnels. The materials to be used include
28 crushed salt, bentonite clay, and cementitious grouts. Of these, the latter two in particular
29 possess significant sorption capacities. No credit is given for the influence of sorption processes
30 that may occur in seal materials and their likely beneficial effects on radionuclide migration
31 rates. The effects of sorption processes in shaft seals and panel closures have been eliminated
32 from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal
33 system.

34 **SCR-6.5.4.1.4.1 Culebra**

35 Sorption within the Culebra is accounted for in PA calculations as discussed in the CCA, Chapter
36 6.0, Section 6.4.6.2. The model used comprises an equilibrium, sorption isotherm
37 approximation, employing constructed CDFs of K_{ds} applicable to dolomite in the Culebra. The
38 potential effects of reaction kinetics in adsorption processes are encompassed in the ranges of
39 K_{ds} used. The geochemical speciation of the Culebra groundwaters and the effects of changes in
40 sorptive surfaces are implicitly accounted for in PA calculations for the WIPP in the ranges of
41 K_{ds} used.

1 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.2 Other Geological Units

2 During groundwater flow, any radionuclide sorption processes that occur between dissolved or
3 colloidal actinides and rock surfaces will lead to reduced rates of contaminant transport. The
4 sorptive capacity of the Dewey Lake is sufficiently large to prevent any radionuclides that enter
5 it from being released to the accessible environment over 10,000 years (Wallace et al. 1995).
6 Thus sorption within the Dewey Lake is accounted for in PA calculations, as discussed in the
7 CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.6.6. No credit is given to the potentially beneficial occurrence of
8 sorption in other geological units outside the Culebra. Sorption processes within other
9 geological units of the disposal system have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis
10 of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

11 SCR-6.5.4.1.4.3 Sorption on Colloids, Microbes, and Particulate Material

12 The interactions of sorption processes with colloidal, microbial, or particulate transport are
13 complex. Neglecting sorption of contaminants on immobile surfaces in the repository shafts and
14 Salado (for example, the clays of the Salado interbeds) is a conservative approach because it
15 leads to overestimated transport rates. However, neglecting sorption on potentially mobile
16 adsorbents (for example, microbes and humic acids) cannot be shown to be conservative with
17 respect to potential releases, because mobile adsorbents may act to transport radionuclides
18 sorbed to them. Consequently, the concentrations of actinides that may be carried by mobile
19 adsorbents are accounted for in PA calculations (see the CCA, Chapter 6.0, Section 6.4.3.6).

20 SCR-6.5.5 Reduction-Oxidation Chemistry**21 SCR-6.5.5.1 FEP Numbers:** W64 and W66

22 **FEP Titles:** *Effects of Metal Corrosion*
23 *Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics*

24 SCR-6.5.5.1.1 Screening Decision: UP

25 The effects of reduction-oxidation reactions related to metal corrosion on reduction-oxidation
26 conditions are accounted for in PA calculations. Reduction-oxidation reaction kinetics are
27 accounted for in PA calculations.

28 SCR-6.5.5.1.2 Summary of New Information

29 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

30 SCR-6.5.5.1.3 Screening Argument**31 SCR-6.5.5.1.3.1 Reduction-Oxidation Kinetics**

32 In general, investigation of the reduction-oxidation couples present in aqueous geochemical
33 systems suggests that most reduction-oxidation reactions are not in thermodynamic equilibrium
34 (Wolery 1992, p. 27). The lack of data characterizing the rates of reactions among trace element
35 reduction-oxidation couples leads to uncertainty in elemental speciation. This uncertainty in
36 reduction-oxidation kinetics is accounted for in PA calculations in the dissolved An source term
37 model (see Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-4.0), which estimates the probabilities
38 that particular actinides occur in certain oxidation states.

SCR-6.5.5.1.3.2 Corrosion

Other than gas generation, which is discussed in FEPs W44 through W55, the main effect of metal corrosion will be to influence the chemical conditions that prevail within the repository. Ferrous metals will be the most abundant metals in the WIPP, and these will corrode on contact with any brines entering the repository. Initially, corrosion will occur under oxic conditions owing to the atmospheric oxygen present in the repository at the time of closure. However, consumption of the available oxygen by corrosion reactions will rapidly lead to anoxic (reducing) conditions. These changes and controls on conditions within the repository will affect the chemical speciation of the brines and may affect the oxidation states of the actinides present. Changes to the oxidation states of the actinides will lead to changes in the concentrations that may be mobilized during brine flow. The oxidation states of the actinides are accounted for in PA calculations by the use of parameters that describe probabilities that the actinides exist in particular oxidation states and, as a result, the likely An concentrations. Therefore, the effects of metal corrosion are accounted for in PA calculations.

SCR-6.5.5.2 FEP Number: W65**FEP Title: *Reduction-Oxidation Fronts*****SCR-6.5.5.2.1 Screening Decision: SO-P**

The migration of *Reduction-Oxidation Fronts* through the repository has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

SCR-6.5.5.2.2 Summary of New Information

No new information has been identified for this FEP.

SCR-6.5.5.2.3 Screening Argument

The development of reduction-oxidation fronts in the disposal system may affect the chemistry and migration of radionuclides. Reduction-oxidation fronts separate regions that may be characterized, in broad terms, as having different oxidation potentials. On either side of a reduction-oxidation front, the behavior of reduction-oxidation-sensitive elements may be controlled by different geochemical reactions. Elements that exhibit the greatest range of oxidation states (for example, U, Np, and Pu) will be the most affected by reduction-oxidation front development and migration. The migration of reduction-oxidation fronts may occur as a result of diffusion processes, or in response to groundwater flow, but will be restricted by the occurrence of heterogeneous buffering reactions (for example, mineral dissolution and precipitation reactions). Indeed, these buffering reactions cause the typically sharp, distinct nature of reduction-oxidation fronts.

Of greater significance is the possibility that the flow of fluids having different oxidation potentials from those established within the repository might lead to the development and migration of a large-scale reduction-oxidation front. Reduction-oxidation fronts have been observed in natural systems to be the loci for both the mobilization and concentration of radionuclides, such as U. For example, during investigations at two U deposits at Poços de Caldas, Brazil, U was observed by Waber (1991) to be concentrated along reduction-oxidation

1 fronts at the onset of reducing conditions by its precipitation as U oxide. In contrast, studies of
 2 the Alligator Rivers U deposit in Australia by Snelling (1992) indicated that the movement of the
 3 relatively oxidized weathered zone downwards through the primary ore body as the deposit was
 4 eroded and gradually exhumed led to the formation of secondary uranyl-silicate minerals and the
 5 mobilization of U in its more soluble U(VI) form in near-surface waters. The geochemical
 6 evidence from these sites suggests that the reduction-oxidation fronts had migrated only slowly,
 7 at most on the order of a few tens of meters per million years. These rates of migration were
 8 controlled by a range of factors, including the rates of erosion, infiltration of oxidizing waters,
 9 geochemical reactions, and diffusion processes.

10 The migration of large-scale reduction-oxidation front through the repository as a result of
 11 regional fluid flow is considered unlikely over the regulatory period on the basis of comparison
 12 with the slow rates of reduction-oxidation front migration suggested by natural system studies.
 13 This comparison is considered conservative because the relatively impermeable nature of the
 14 Salado suggests that reduction-oxidation front migration rates at the WIPP are likely to be slower
 15 than those observed in the more permeable lithologies of the natural systems studied. Large-
 16 scale reduction-oxidation fronts have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 17 basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 yrs.

18 **SCR-6.5.5.3 FEP Number:** W67
 19 **FEP Title:** *Localized Reducing Zones*

20 **SCR-6.5.5.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

21 The formation of *Localized Reducing Zones* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the
 22 basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

23 **SCR-6.5.5.3.2 Summary of New Information**

24 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

25 **SCR-6.5.5.3.3 Screening Argument**

26 The dominant reduction reactions in the repository include steel corrosion and microbial
 27 degradation. The following bounding calculation shows that molecular diffusion alone will be
 28 sufficient to mix brine chemistry over a distance of meters and therefore the formation of
 29 localized reducing zones in the repository is of low consequence.

30 The diffusion of a chemical species in a porous medium can be described by Fick's equation
 31 (e.g., Richardson and McSween 1989, p.132):

$$32 \quad \frac{\partial C}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial X} \left(D_{eff} \frac{\partial C}{\partial X} \right) \quad (\text{SCR.17})$$

33 where C is the concentration of the diffusing chemical species, t is the time, X is the distance,
 34 and D_{eff} is the effective diffusivity of the chemical species in a given porous medium. D_{eff} is
 35 related to the porosity (ϕ) of the medium by (e.g., Oelkers 1996):


1
$$D_{eff} = \phi^2 D \tag{SCR.18}$$

2 where D is the diffusivity of the species in pure solution. The D values for most aqueous species
 3 at room temperatures fall into a narrow range, and 10^{-5} cm^2 ($1.5 \times 10^{-6} \text{ in.}^2$) per s is a good
 4 approximation (e.g., Richardson and McSween 1989, p.138). From the WIPP PA calculations
 5 (Bean et al. 1996, p.7-29; WIPP Performance Assessment, 1993, Equation B-8), the porosity in
 6 the WIPP waste panels after room closure is calculated to be 0.4 to 0.7. From Equation
 7 (SCR.19), the effective diffusivity D_{eff} in the waste is estimated to be $2 - 5 \times 10^{-6} \text{ cm}^2$ (7×10^{-7}
 8 in.^2) per second ($= 6 - 16 \times 10^{-3} \text{ m}^2/\text{year}$).

9 Given a time scale of T , the typical diffusion penetration distance (L) can be determined by
 10 scaling:

11
$$L = \sqrt{D_{eff} T} \tag{SCR.19}$$

12 Using Equation (SCR.20), the diffusion penetration distance in the WIPP can be calculated as a
 13 function of diffusion time, as shown in Figure SCR-1.



14
 15 **Figure SCR-1. Diffusion Penetration Distance in the WIPP as a Function of Diffusion**
 16 **Time**

17 Direct brine release requires the repository gas pressure to be at least 8 MPa (Stoelzel et al.
 18 1996). The CRA-2009 calculations show that it will take at least 100 years for the repository
 19 pressure to reach this critical value by gas generation processes (see Nemer and Clayton 2008,

1 Figure 6-24). Over this time scale, according to Equation (SCR.20) and Figure SCR-1, molecular
2 diffusion alone can mix brine composition effectively at least over a distance of ~ 1 m (3.3 ft).

3 The above calculation assumes diffusion only through liquid water. This assumption is
4 applicable to steel corrosion, the humid rate of which is zero. Note that microbial reactions can
5 also consume or release gaseous species. The diffusion of a gaseous species is much faster than
6 an aqueous one. Thus molecular diffusion can homogenize microbial reactions even at a much
7 larger scale.

8 The height of waste stacks in the repository after room closure (h) can be calculated by:

$$9 \quad h = \frac{h_0(1 - \phi_0)}{1 - \phi} \quad (\text{SCR.20})$$

10 where h_0 and ϕ_0 are the initial height of waste stacks and the initial porosity of wastes, which are
11 assumed to be 4 m and 0.88, respectively, in the WIPP PA. For $\phi = 0.4 - 0.7$, h is estimated to be
12 0.8 to 1.4 m. This means that molecular diffusion alone can homogenize redox reaction in the
13 vertical dimension of the repository. Therefore, the formation of localized reducing zones is
14 unlikely. The general repository environment will become reducing shortly after room closure
15 because of metal corrosion and microbial reactions. Therefore, localized reducing zones can be
16 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the disposal system.

17 **SCR-6.5.6 Organic Complexation**

18 **SCR-6.5.6.11** **FEP Numbers:** W68, W69, and W71

19 **FEP Titles:** *Organic Complexation (W68)*

20 *Organic Ligands (W69)*

21 *Kinetics of Organic Complexation (W71)*

22 **SCR-6.5.6.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP – W68 and W69

23 SO-C – W71

24 The effects of anthropogenic *Organic Complexation* reactions, including the effects of *Organic*
25 *Ligands*, humic, and fulvic acids, have been incorporated in the PA calculations. The kinetics of
26 organic ligand complexation is screened out because the rate at which organic ligands are
27 complexed to actinide is so fast that it has no consequence to repository performance.

28 **SCR-6.5.6.1.2 Summary of New Information**

29 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

30 **SCR-6.5.6.1.3 Screening Argument**

31 From a PA standpoint, the most important actinides are Th, U, Np, Pu, and Am. Dissolved Th,
32 U, Np, Pu, and Am will essentially speciate entirely as Th(IV), U(IV) or U(VI), Np(IV) or
33 Np(V), Pu(III) or Pu(IV), and Am(III) under the strongly reducing conditions expected as a

1 result of the presence of Fe(II) and microbes (see the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment
2 SOTERM, Section SOTERM-2.2.5).

3 Some organic ligands can increase the actinide solubilities. An estimate of the complexing
4 agents in the TRU solidified waste forms scheduled for disposal in the WIPP is presented in the
5 CRA-2004, Appendix DATA, Attachment F, Table DATA-F-33. Acetate, citrate, oxalate, and
6 EDTA were determined to be the only water-soluble and actinide-complexing organic ligands
7 present in significant quantities in the TWBIR. These ligands and their complexation with
8 actinides (Th(IV), U(VI), Np(V), and Am(III)) in a variety of ionic strength media were studied
9 at Florida State University (FSU) (Choppin et al. 2001). The FSU studies showed that acetate,
10 citrate, oxalate, and EDTA are capable of significantly enhancing dissolved An concentrations.
11 Lactate behavior was also studied at FSU because it appeared in the preliminary inventory of
12 nonradioactive constituents of the TRU waste to be emplaced in the WIPP (Brush 1990); lactate
13 did not appear in the CRA-2004 inventory, nor does it appear in the inventory used for the
14 CRA-2009.

15 The solubility of the actinides is calculated using FMT, a computer code for calculating actinide
16 concentration limits based on thermodynamic parameters. The parameters for FMT are derived
17 both from experimental investigations specifically designed to provide parameter values for this
18 model and from the published literature.

19 Although the FSU experimental work on organic ligands complexation showed that acetate,
20 citrate, oxalate, and EDTA are capable of significantly enhancing dissolved An concentrations,
21 SNL did not include the results in the FMT calculations for the CCA PA because (1) the
22 thermodynamic database for organic complexation of actinides was not considered adequate at
23 the time, and (2) side-calculations using thermodynamic data for low-ionic-strength NaCl
24 solutions showed that transition metals (in particular iron, nickel, chromium, vanadium, and
25 manganese present in waste drum steel) would compete effectively with the actinides for the
26 binding sites on the organic ligands, thus preventing significant complexation of actinides.

27 The CRA-2009 calculations include the effects of organic ligands (acetate, citrate, EDTA, and
28 oxalate) on actinide solubilities in the FMT calculations (Brush and Xiong 2003). The FMT
29 database includes all of the results of experimental studies (Choppin et al. 2001) required to
30 predict the complexation of dissolved An(III), An(IV), and An(V) species by acetate, citrate,
31 EDTA, and oxalate (Giambalvo 2002a, 2002b).

32 Solution complexation reactions of most metal ions with common inorganic ligands, such as
33 carbonate and hydroxide, and with organic ligands, such as acetate, citrate, oxalate, and EDTA,
34 are kinetically very fast, reaching equilibrium in fractions of a second, an inconsequentially short
35 time increment on the scale of the 10,000-yr regulatory period. Reactions of these types are
36 generally so fast that special techniques must be adopted to measure the reaction rates; as a
37 practical matter, the reaction rate is limited by the mixing rate when metal solutions are
38 combined with ligand solutions.

39 For that reason, the rate at which organic ligands are complexed to actinide is of no consequence
40 to repository performance. Kinetics of organic complexation may be eliminated from PA
41 calculations on the basis of no consequence.

1 **SCR-6.5.6.2 FEP Number:** W70
2 **FEP Title:** *Humic and Fulvic Acids*

3 **SCR-6.5.6.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

4 The presence of *Humic Acids* and *Fulvic Acids* is incorporated in PA calculations.

5 **SCR-6.5.6.2.2 Summary of New Information**

6 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

7 **SCR-6.5.6.2.3 Screening Argument**

8 The occurrence of humic acids and fulvic acids is incorporated in PA calculations in the models
9 for radionuclide transport by humic colloids (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.3.2).

10 **SCR-6.5.7 Chemical Effects on Material Properties**

11 **SCR-6.5.7.1 FEP Numbers:** W74, W76, and W115
12 **FEP Titles:** *Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals (W74)*
13 *Microbial Growth on Concrete (W76)*
14 *Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures (W115)*

15 **SCR-6.5.7.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

16 The effects of *Chemical Degradation of Shaft Seals*, *Chemical Degradation of Panel Closures*,
17 and *Microbial Growth on Concrete* are accounted for in PA calculations.

18 **SCR-6.5.7.1.2 Summary of New Information**

19 Changes to the titles of these FEPs are a result of the FEPs analysis conducted for the Panel
20 Closure Redesign planned change request (Kirkes 2006).

21 **SCR-6.5.7.1.3 Screening Argument**

22 The concrete used in the seal systems and panel closure systems will degrade as a result of
23 chemical reaction with the infiltrating groundwater. Degradation could lead to an increase in
24 permeability of the seal system. The main uncertainties with regard to cement degradation rates
25 at the WIPP are the effects of groundwater chemistry, the exact nature of the cementitious phases
26 present, and the rates of brine infiltration. The PA calculations take a conservative approach to
27 these uncertainties by assuming a large increase in permeability of the concrete seals only a few
28 hundred years after closure. These permeability values are based on seal design considerations
29 and consider the potential effects of degradation processes. Therefore, the effects of chemical
30 degradation of seals and chemical degradation of panel closures are accounted for in PA
31 calculations through the CDFs used for seal material permeabilities.

1 Concrete can be inhabited by alkalophilic bacteria, which could produce acids, thereby
2 accelerating the seal degradation process. Nitrification processes, which will produce nitric acid,
3 tend to be aerobic, and will be further limited at the WIPP by the low availability of ammonium
4 in the brines (Pedersen and Karlsson 1995, p. 75). Because of the limitations on growth caused
5 by the chemical conditions, it is likely that the effects of microbial growth on concrete will be
6 small. The effects of such microbial activity on seal properties are, therefore, implicitly
7 accounted for in PA calculations through the CDFs used for seal material permeabilities.

8 **SCR-6.5.7.2 FEP Number:** W75
9 **FEP Title:** *Chemical Degradation of Backfill*

10 **SCR-6.5.7.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

11 The effects on material properties of the *Chemical Degradation of Backfill* have been eliminated
12 from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence.

13 **SCR-6.5.7.2.2 Summary of New Information**

14 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

15 **SCR-6.5.7.2.3 Screening Argument**

16 Degradation of the chemical conditioners or backfill added to the disposal room is a prerequisite
17 of their function in buffering the chemical environment of the disposal room. However, the
18 chemical reactions (Snider 2001) and dissolution involved will change the physical properties of
19 the material. Because the mechanical and hydraulic characteristics of the backfill have been
20 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
21 disposal system, the effects of the chemical degradation of backfill on material properties have
22 been eliminated from PA calculations on the same basis.

23 **SCR-6.6 Contaminant Transport Mode FEPs**

24 **SCR-6.6.1 Solute and Colloid Transport**

25 **SCR-6.6.1.1 FEP Number:** W77
26 **FEP Title:** *Solute Transport*

27 **SCR-6.6.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

28 Transport of dissolved radionuclides is accounted for in PA calculations.

29 **SCR-6.6.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

30 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

1 **SCR-6.6.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

2 Solute transport may occur by advection, dispersion, and diffusion down chemical potential
3 gradients, and is accounted for in PA calculations (see Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.1.4.4).

4 **SCR-6.6.1.2 FEP Numbers:** W78, W79, W80, and W81

5 **FEP Titles:** *Colloidal Transport (W78)*
6 *Colloidal Formation and Stability (W79)*
7 *Colloidal Filtration (W80)*
8 *Colloidal Sorption (W81)*

9 **SCR-6.6.1.2.1 Screening Decision:** UP

10 Formation of colloids, transport of colloidal radionuclides, and colloid retardation through
11 filtration and sorption are accounted for in PA calculations.

12 **SCR-6.6.1.2.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

14 **SCR-6.6.1.2.3 Screening Argument**

15 Colloids typically have sizes of between 1 nm and 1 μm and may form stable dispersions in
16 groundwaters. Colloid formation and stability depends on their composition and the prevailing
17 chemical conditions (for example, salinity). Depending on their size, colloid transport may occur
18 at different rates than those of fully dissolved species. They may be physically excluded from
19 fine porous media, and their migration may be accelerated through fractured media in channels
20 where velocities are greatest. However, they can also interact with the host rocks during
21 transport and become retarded. These interactions may be of a chemical or physical nature and
22 include electrostatic effects leading to colloid sorption, and sieving leading to colloid filtration
23 and pore blocking. Colloidal formation and stability is accounted for in PA calculations through
24 estimates of colloid numbers in the disposal room based on the prevailing chemical conditions
25 (Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-3.8). Colloidal sorption, colloidal filtration, and
26 colloidal transport in the Culebra are accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix
27 SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-3.8).

1 **SCR-6.6.2 Particle Transport**

2 **SCR-6.6.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W82, W83, W84, W85, and W86

3 **FEP Titles:** *Suspension of Particles* (W82)
 4 *Rinse* (W83)
 5 *Cuttings* (W84)
 6 *Cavings* (W85)
 7 *Spallings* (W86)

8 **SCR-6.6.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** DP – W82, W84, W85, W86
 9 SO-C – W83

10 The formation of particulates through *Rinse* and subsequent transport of radionuclides in
 11 groundwater and brine has been eliminated from PA calculations for undisturbed conditions on
 12 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. The transport of
 13 radionuclides as particulates (cuttings, cavings, and spallings) during penetration of the
 14 repository by a borehole, is accounted for in PA calculations.

15 **SCR-6.6.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

17 **SCR-6.6.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 Suspensions of particles that have sizes larger than colloids are unstable because the particles
 19 undergo gravitational settling. It is unlikely that brine flow will be rapid enough within the
 20 WIPP disposal rooms to generate particulate suspensions through rinse and transport under
 21 undisturbed conditions. Mobilization of suspensions would effect a local and minor
 22 redistribution of radionuclides within the room and would not result in increased radionuclide
 23 transport from the repository. The formation of particulates through rinse and transport of
 24 radionuclides in groundwater and brine has been eliminated from PA calculations for
 25 undisturbed conditions on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal
 26 system.

27 Inadvertent human intrusion into the repository by a borehole could result in transport of waste
 28 material to the ground surface through drilling-induced flow and blowouts (FEPs H21 and H23,
 29 Section SCR-5.2.1.1 and Section SCR-5.2.1.3). This waste could include material intersected by
 30 the drill bit (cuttings), material eroded from the borehole wall by circulating drilling fluid
 31 (cavings), and material that enters the borehole as the repository depressurizes (spallings).
 32 Transport of radionuclides by these materials and in brine is accounted for in PA calculations
 33 and is discussed in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.5.

1 **SCR-6.6.3 Microbial Transport**

2 **SCR-6.6.3.1 FEP Number:** W87

3 **FEP Title:** *Microbial Transport*

4 **SCR-6.6.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

5 Transport of radionuclides bound to microbes is accounted for in PA calculations.

6 **SCR-6.6.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

7 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

8 **SCR-6.6.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

9 Microbes will be introduced into the disposal rooms during the operational phase of the
10 repository and will also occur naturally in geological units throughout the disposal system.
11 Because of their colloidal size, microbes, and any radionuclides bound to them, may be
12 transported at different rates than radionuclides in solution. Microbial transport of radionuclides
13 is accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix SOTERM-2009, Section SOTERM-5.0).

14 **SCR-6.6.3.2 FEP Number:** W88

15 **FEP Title:** *Biofilms*

16 **SCR-6.6.3.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C Beneficial

17 The effects of *Biofilms* on microbial transport have been eliminated from PA calculations on the
18 basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

19 **SCR-6.6.3.2.2 Summary of New Information**

20 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

21 **SCR-6.6.3.2.3 Screening Argument**

22 Microbes will be introduced into the disposal rooms during the operational phase of the
23 repository and will also occur naturally in geological units throughout the disposal system.

24 Biofilms may influence microbial and radionuclide transport rates through their capacity to
25 retain, and therefore retard, both the microbes themselves and radionuclides. The formation of
26 biofilms in deep subsurface environments such as in the WIPP is controversial. Since the
27 microbial degradation experiments at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) bracket expected
28 repository conditions, the potential effect of biofilms formation on microbial degradation and
29 transport, if any, has been captured in the PA parameters derived from those experiments
30 (Francis and Gillow 1994; Francis et. al 1997; Francis and Gillow 2000; Gillow and Francis
31 2001a; Gillow and Francis 2001b; Gillow and Francis 2002a; Gillow and Francis 2002b). As a
32 matter of fact, no apparent formation of stable biofilms was observed in the BNL experiments.

1 The formation of biofilms tends to reduce cell suspension and mobility. This effect has been
2 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to the performance of the
3 disposal system.

4 **SCR-6.6.4 Gas Transport**

5 **SCR-6.6.4.1 FEP Number:** W89

6 **FEP Title:** *Transport of Radioactive Gases*

7 **SCR-6.6.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

8 The *Transport of Radioactive Gases* has been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
9 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

10 **SCR-6.6.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

11 This FEP discussion has been updated to include recent inventory information.

12 **SCR-6.6.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

13 The production and potential transport of radioactive gases are eliminated from PA calculations
14 on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system. Transportable
15 radioactive gases are comprised mainly of isotopes of Rn and ¹⁴C. Rn gases are eliminated from
16 PA because their inventory is small (<7 Ci; (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005)) and their half-lives
17 are short (<4 days), resulting in insignificant potential for release from the repository.

18 **SCR-6.7 Contaminant Transport Processes**

19 **SCR-6.7.1 Advection**

20 **SCR-6.7.1.1 FEP Number:** W90

21 **FEP Title:** *Advection*

22 **SCR-6.7.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

23 *Advection* of contaminants is accounted for in PA calculations.

24 **SCR-6.7.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

25 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

26 **SCR-6.7.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

27 Advection (that is, the transport of dissolved and solid material by flowing fluid) is accounted for
28 in PA calculations (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.3.5).

1 **SCR-6.7.2 Diffusion**

2 **SCR-6.7.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W91 and W92

3 **FEP Titles:** *Diffusion* (W91)

4 *Matrix Diffusion* (W92)

5 **SCR-6.7.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** UP

6 *Diffusion* of contaminants and retardation by *Matrix Diffusion* are accounted for in PA
7 calculations.

8 **SCR-6.7.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

9 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

10 **SCR-6.7.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

11 Diffusion (that is, the movement of molecules or particles both parallel to and transverse to the
12 direction of advection in response to Brownian forces) and, more specifically matrix diffusion,
13 whereby movement is transverse to the direction of advection within a fracture and into the
14 surrounding rock matrix, are accounted for in PA calculations (Appendix PA-2009, Section
15 PA-4.9).

16 **SCR-6.7.3 Thermochemical Transport Phenomena**

17 **SCR-6.7.3.1 FEP Number:** W93

18 **FEP Title:** *Soret Effect*

19 **SCR-6.7.3.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

20 The effects of thermochemical transport phenomena (the *Soret Effect*) have been eliminated from
21 PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

22 **SCR-6.7.3.1.2 Summary of New Information**

23 This FEP has been updated with new thermal heat rise values for Al corrosion, based on the
24 latest inventory data.

25 **SCR-6.7.3.1.3 Screening Argument**

26 According to Fick's law, the diffusion flux of a solute is proportional to the solute concentration
27 gradient. In the presence of a temperature gradient there will also be a solute flux proportional to
28 the temperature gradient (the Soret Effect). Thus the total solute flux, J , in a liquid phase may be
29 expressed as

30
$$J = -D\bar{V}C - ND\bar{V}T \quad (\text{SCR.21})$$

1 where C is the solute concentration, T is the temperature of the liquid, D is the solute diffusion
2 coefficient, and

$$3 \quad N = S_T C (1 - C) \quad (\text{SCR.22})$$

4 in which S_T is the Soret coefficient. The mass conservation equation for solute diffusion in a
5 liquid is then

$$6 \quad \frac{\partial C}{\partial t} = \nabla \cdot (D \nabla C + N D \nabla T) \quad (\text{SCR.23})$$

7 When temperature gradients exist in solutions with both light and heavy solute molecules, the
8 heavier molecules tend to concentrate in the colder regions of the solution. Typically, large
9 temperature gradients are required for Soret diffusion to be significant compared to Fickian
10 diffusion.

11 Radioactive decay, nuclear criticality, and exothermic reactions are three possible sources of heat
12 in the WIPP repository. The U.S. Department of Energy (1980) estimated that radioactive decay
13 of CH-TRU waste will result in a maximum temperature rise at the center of the repository of
14 1.6 °C (2.9 °F) at 80 years after waste emplacement. Sanchez and Trelue (1996) have shown
15 that the total thermal load of RH-TRU waste will not significantly affect the average temperature
16 increase in the repository. Temperature increases of about 3 °C (5.4 °F) may occur at the
17 locations of RH-TRU containers with maximum thermal power (60 W). Such temperature
18 increases are likely to be short-lived on the time scale of the 10,000-yr regulatory period because
19 of the rapid decay of heat-producing nuclides in RH-TRU waste, such as ^{137}Cs (cesium), ^{90}Sr
20 (strontium), ^{241}Pu , and ^{147}Pm (promethium), whose half-lives are approximately 30, 29, 14, and 3
21 years, respectively. Soret diffusion generated by such temperature gradients will be negligible
22 compared to other radionuclide transport mechanisms.

23 Temperature increases resulting from exothermic reactions are discussed in Section SCR-6.3.4.1.
24 Potentially the most significant exothermic reactions are concrete hydration, backfill hydration,
25 and aluminum corrosion. Hydration of the seal concrete could raise the temperature of the
26 concrete to approximately 50 °C (122 °F) and that of the surrounding salt to approximately 38 °C
27 (100 °F) one week after seal emplacement.

28 However, the concrete seals will act as barriers to fluid flow for at least 100 years after
29 emplacement, and seal permeability will be minimized (Wakeley et al. 1995). As a result, short-
30 term temperature increases associated with concrete hydration will not result in significant Soret
31 diffusion through the seal system.

32 The maximum temperature rise in the disposal panels will be less than 5 °C (9 °F) as a
33 consequence of MgO hydration. Note that AICs will prevent drilling within the controlled area
34 for 100 years after disposal. Heat generation by radioactive decay and concrete seal hydration
35 will have decreased substantially after 100 years, and the temperatures in the disposal panels will
36 have decreased nearly to the temperature of the undisturbed host rock.

1 If the repository were to be inundated following a drilling intrusion, Al corrosion could, at most,
2 result in a short-lived (two years) temperature increase of about 6.9 °C (12.4 °F). These
3 calculated maximum heat generation rates resulting from Al corrosion and backfill hydration
4 could not occur simultaneously because they are limited by brine availability; each calculation
5 assumes that all available brine is consumed by the reaction of concern. Thus the temperature
6 rise of 6.9 °C (12.4 °F) represents the maximum that could occur as a result of a combination of
7 exothermic reactions occurring simultaneously. Temperature increases of this magnitude will
8 not result in significant Soret diffusion within the disposal system.

9 The limited magnitude and spatial scale of temperature gradients in the disposal system indicate
10 that Soret diffusion will be insignificant, allowing the effects of thermochemical transport (soret
11 effect) to be eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the
12 performance of the disposal system.

13 **SCR-6.7.4 Electrochemical Transport Phenomena**

14 **SCR-6.7.4.1 FEP Number:** W94

15 **FEP Title:** *Electrochemical Effects*

16 **SCR-6.7.4.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

17 The effects of electrochemical transport phenomena caused by electrochemical reactions have
18 been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
19 disposal system.

20 **SCR-6.7.4.1.2 Summary of New Information**

21 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

22 **SCR-6.7.4.1.3 Screening Argument**

23 The variety of waste metals and metal packaging in the repository may allow galvanic cells
24 spanning short distances to be established. The interactions among the metals depend upon their
25 physical characteristics and the chemical conditions in the repository. For example, good
26 physical and electrical contact, which is critical to the establishment of galvanic cells, may be
27 impeded by electrically nonconductive waste materials. Additionally, in order to establish a
28 galvanic cell, it is necessary that the metals have different values for standard reduction
29 potentials. For example, a galvanic cell is not expected to be formed by contact of two segments
30 of metals with identical compositions. As a result, galvanic cells can only be established by
31 contact of dissimilar metals, as might happen because of contact between a waste drum and the
32 contents, or between contents within a waste package. The localized nature of electrochemical
33 transport is restricted to the size scale over which galvanic cells can develop, i.e., on the order of
34 size of waste packages. Since the possible range of transport is restricted by the physical extent
35 of galvanic activity, electrochemical effects cannot act as long-range transport mechanisms for
36 radionuclides and therefore are of no consequence to the performance of the repository.

1 **SCR-6.7.4.2 FEP Number:** W95
2 **FEP Title:** *Galvanic Coupling* (outside the repository)

3 **SCR-6.7.4.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-P

4 The effects of *Galvanic Coupling* between the waste and metals external to the repository on
5 transport have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of
6 occurrence over 10,000 years.

7 **SCR-6.7.4.2.2 Summary of New Information**

8 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

9 **SCR-6.7.4.2.3 Screening Argument**

10 With regard to the WIPP, galvanic coupling refers to the establishment of galvanic cells between
11 metals in the waste form, canisters, and other metals external to the waste form.

12 Long-range electric potential gradients may exist in the subsurface as a result of groundwater
13 flow and electrochemical reactions. The development of electric potential gradients may be
14 associated with the weathering of sulfide ore bodies, variations in rock properties at geological
15 contacts, bioelectric activity associated with organic matter, natural corrosion reactions, and
16 temperature gradients in groundwater. With the exception of mineralization potentials associated
17 with metal sulfide ores, the magnitude of electric potentials is usually less than about 100
18 millivolts (mV) and the potentials tend to average to zero over distances of several thousand feet
19 (Telford et al. 1976). Metals external to the waste form can include natural metallic ore bodies
20 in the host rock. However, metallic ore bodies and metallic sulfide ores do not exist in the region
21 of the repository (the CCA, Appendix GCR). As a result, galvanic coupling between the waste
22 and metallic materials outside the repository cannot occur. Therefore, galvanic coupling is
23 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low probability of occurrence over 10,000 years.

24 **SCR-6.7.4.3 FEP Number:** W96
25 **FEP Title:** *Electrophoresis*

26 **SCR-6.7.4.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

27 The effects of electrochemical transport phenomena caused by *Electrophoresis* have been
28 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
29 disposal system.

30 **SCR-6.7.4.3.2 Summary of New Information**

31 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

1 **SCR-6.7.4.3.3 Screening Argument**

2 Long range (in terms of distance) electric potential gradients may exist in the subsurface as a
3 result of groundwater flow and electrochemical reactions. The development of potentials may be
4 associated with the weathering of sulfide ore bodies, variations in rock properties at geological
5 contacts, bioelectric activity associated with organic matter, natural corrosion reactions, and
6 temperature gradients in groundwater. With the exception of mineralization potentials associated
7 with metal sulfide ores, the magnitude of such potentials is usually less than about 100 mV and
8 the potentials tend to average to zero over distances of several thousand feet (Telford et al. 1976,
9 p. 458). Short range potential gradients caused by the corrosion of metals within the waste may
10 be set up over distances that are restricted to the size scale of the waste packages.

11 A variety of metals will be present within the repository as waste metals and metal packaging,
12 which may allow electrochemical cells to be established over short distances. The types of
13 interactions that will occur depend on the metals involved, their physical characteristics, and the
14 prevailing solution conditions. Electrochemical cells that may be established will be small
15 relative to the size of the repository, limiting the extent to which migration of contaminants by
16 electrophoresis can occur. The electric field gradients will be of small magnitude and confined
17 to regions of electrochemical activity in the area immediately surrounding the waste material.
18 As a result, electrophoretic effects on migration behavior caused by both long and short range
19 potential gradients have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence
20 to the performance of the disposal system.

21 **SCR-6.7.5 Physiochemical Transport Phenomena**

22 **SCR-6.7.5.1 FEP Number:** W97

23 **FEP Title:** *Chemical Gradients*

24 **SCR-6.7.5.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

25 The effects of enhanced diffusion across *Chemical Gradients* have been eliminated from PAs on
26 the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

27 **SCR-6.7.5.1.2 Summary of New Information**

28 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

29 **SCR-6.7.5.1.3 Screening Argument**

30 Chemical gradients within the disposal system, whether induced naturally or resulting from
31 repository material and waste emplacement, may influence the transport of contaminants.
32 Gradients will exist at interfaces between different repository materials and between repository
33 and geological materials. Distinct chemical regimes will be established within concrete seals and
34 adjoining host rocks. Similarly, chemical gradients will exist between the waste and the
35 surrounding rocks of the Salado. Other chemical gradients may exist because of the
36 juxtaposition of relatively dilute groundwaters and brines or between groundwaters with

1 different compositions. Natural gradients currently exist between different groundwaters in the
2 Culebra.

3 Enhanced diffusion is a possible consequence of chemical gradients that occur at material
4 boundaries. However, the distances over which enhanced diffusion could occur will be small in
5 comparison to the size of the disposal system. Processes that may be induced by chemical
6 gradients at material boundaries include the formation or destabilization of colloids. For
7 example, cementitious materials that will be emplaced in the WIPP as part of the waste and the
8 seals contain colloidal-sized materials, such as calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and alkaline pore
9 fluids. Chemical gradients will exist between the pore fluids in the cementitious materials and
10 the less alkaline surroundings. Chemical interactions at these interfaces may lead to the
11 generation of colloids of the inorganic, mineral fragment type. Colloidal compositions may
12 include calcium and magnesium oxides, calcium hydroxide, calcium-aluminum silicates,
13 calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and silica. Experimental investigations of the stability of
14 inorganic, mineral fragment colloidal dispersions have been carried out as part of the WIPP
15 colloid-facilitated actinide transport program (Papenguth and Behl 1996). Results of the
16 investigations indicate that the salinities of the WIPP brines are sufficient to cause destabilization
17 of mineral fragment colloidal dispersions. Therefore, concentrations of colloidal suspensions
18 originating from concrete within the repository are expected to be extremely low, and are
19 considered in PA calculations for completeness.

20 **SCR-6.7.5.2 FEP Number:** W98
21 **FEP Title:** *Osmotic Processes*

22 **SCR-6.7.5.2.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

23 The effects of *Osmotic Processes* have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of
24 beneficial consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

25 **SCR-6.7.5.2.2 Summary of New Information**

26 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

27 **SCR-6.7.5.2.3 Screening Argument**

28 Osmotic processes, i.e., diffusion of water through a semipermeable or differentially permeable
29 membrane in response to a concentration gradient, may occur at interfaces between waters of
30 different salinities. Osmotic processes can occur if waters of different salinities and/or
31 compositions exist on either side of a particular lithology such as clay, or a lithological boundary
32 that behaves as a semipermeable membrane. At the WIPP, clay layers within the Salado may act
33 as semipermeable membranes across which osmotic processes may occur.

34 In the absence of a semipermeable membrane, water will move from the more dilute water into
35 the more saline water. However, the migration of dissolved contaminants across an interface
36 may be restricted depending upon the nature of the membrane. A hydrological gradient across a
37 semipermeable membrane may either enhance or oppose water movement by osmosis depending
38 on the direction and magnitude of the gradient. Dissolved contaminants that cannot pass through

1 a semipermeable membrane may be moved towards the membrane and concentrated along the
2 interface when advection dominates over osmosis and reverse osmosis occurs. Thus both
3 osmosis and reverse osmosis can restrict the migration of dissolved contaminants and possibly
4 lead to concentration along interfaces between different water bodies. The effects of osmotic
5 processes have been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence to
6 the performance of the disposal system.

7 **SCR-6.7.5.3 FEP Number:** W99
8 **FEP Title:** *Alpha Recoil*

9 **SCR-6.7.5.3.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

10 The effects of *Alpha Recoil* processes on radionuclide transport have been eliminated from PA
11 calculations on the basis of low consequence to performance of the disposal system.

12 **SCR-6.7.5.3.2 Summary of New Information**

13 No new information relating to this FEP has been identified.

14 **SCR-6.7.5.3.3 Screening Argument**

15 Alpha particles are emitted with sufficiently high energies that daughter nuclides recoil
16 appreciably to conserve system momentum. For example, ^{238}U decays to ^{234}Th with emission of
17 a 4.1 megaelectron volt (MeV) alpha particle. The law of conservation of momentum requires
18 that the daughter nuclide, ^{234}Th , recoils in the opposite direction with an energy of approximately
19 0.07 MeV. The energy is great enough to break chemical bonds or cause ^{234}Th to move a short
20 distance through a crystal lattice. If the ^{234}Th is close enough to the surface of the crystal, it will
21 be ejected into the surroundings. ^{234}Th decays to ^{234}Pa which decays to ^{234}U with respective
22 half-lives of 24.1 days and 1.17 minutes. The recoil and decay processes can lead to the apparent
23 preferential dissolution or leaching of ^{234}U relative to ^{238}U from crystal structures and amorphous
24 or adsorbed phases. Preferential leaching may be enhanced because of radiation damage to the
25 host phase resulting from earlier radioactive decay events. Consequently, ^{234}U sometimes
26 exhibits enhanced transport behavior relative to ^{238}U .

27 The influence of alpha recoil processes on radionuclide transport through natural geologic media
28 is dependent on many site-specific factors, such as mineralogy, geometry, and microstructure of
29 the rocks, as well as geometrical constraints on the type of groundwater flow, e.g., porous or
30 fracture flow. Studies of natural radionuclide-bearing groundwater systems often fail to discern
31 a measurable effect of alpha-recoil processes on radionuclide transport above the background
32 uncertainty introduced by the spatial heterogeneity of the geological system. Consequently, the
33 effects of the alpha recoil processes that occur on radionuclide transport are thought to be minor.
34 These effects have therefore been eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low
35 consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.7.5.4 FEP Number:** W100
2 **FEP Title:** *Enhanced Diffusion*

3 **SCR-6.7.5.4.1 Screening Decision:** SO-C

4 Enhanced diffusion is a possible consequence of chemical gradients that occur at material
5 boundaries. However, the distances over which enhanced diffusion could occur will be small in
6 comparison to the size of the disposal system. Therefore, the effects of *Enhanced Diffusion*
7 across chemical gradients at material boundaries have been eliminated from PAs on the basis of
8 low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

9 **SCR-6.7.5.4.2 Summary of New Information**

10 No new information has been identified for this FEP.

11 **SCR-6.7.5.4.3 Screening Argument**

12 Enhanced diffusion only occurs where there are higher than average chemical gradients. The
13 spatial extent of chemical gradients should be quite limited and as enhanced diffusion occurs, it
14 will tend to reduce the chemical gradient. Thus the driving force for the enhanced diffusion will
15 be reduced and eventually eliminated as the system approaches steady state or equilibrium
16 conditions. Because of the limited spatial extent of enhanced diffusion, its effect on radionuclide
17 transport should be small.

18 Processes that may be induced by chemical gradients at material boundaries include the
19 formation or destabilization of colloids. For example, cementitious materials, emplaced in the
20 WIPP as part of the waste and the seals, contain colloidal-sized phases such as calcium-silicate-
21 hydrate gels and alkaline pore fluids. Chemical gradients will exist between the pore fluids in
22 the cementitious materials and the less-alkaline surroundings. Chemical interactions at these
23 interfaces may lead to the generation of colloids of the inorganic, mineral-fragment type.
24 Colloidal compositions may include calcium and MgO, calcium hydroxide, calcium-aluminum
25 silicates, calcium-silicate-hydrate gels, and silica. Concentrations of colloidal suspensions
26 originating from concrete within the repository are considered in PA calculations even though
27 expected to be extremely low.

28 Distinct interfaces between waters of different salinities and different densities may limit mixing
29 of the water bodies and affect flow and contaminant transport. Such effects have been
30 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the
31 disposal system.

32 The effects of enhanced diffusion across chemical gradients at material boundaries have been
33 eliminated from PAs on the basis of low consequence to the performance of the disposal system.

1 **SCR-6.8 Ecological FEPs**

2 **SCR-6.8.1 Plant, Animal, and Soil Uptake**

3 **SCR-6.8.1.1 FEP Numbers:** W101, W102, and W103

4 **FEP Titles:** *Plant Uptake* (W101)
5 *Animal Uptake* (W102)
6 *Accumulation in Soils* (W103)

7 **SCR-6.8.1.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R for section 191.13 – W101, W102
8 SO-C Beneficial for section 191.13 – W103
9 SO-C for section 191.15 – W101, W102, W103

10 *Plant Uptake, Animal Uptake, and Accumulation in Soils* have been eliminated from compliance
11 assessment calculations for section 191.15 on the basis of low consequence. *Plant Uptake* and
12 *Animal Uptake* in the accessible environment have been eliminated from PA calculations for
13 section 191.13 on regulatory grounds. *Accumulation in Soils* within the controlled area has been
14 eliminated from PA calculations for section 191.13 on the basis of beneficial consequences.

15 **SCR-6.8.1.1.2 Summary of New Information**

16 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

17 **SCR-6.8.1.1.3 Screening Argument**

18 The results of the calculations presented in Section 34, “Results of Performance Assessment,”
19 show that releases to the accessible environment under undisturbed conditions are restricted to
20 lateral releases through the DRZ at repository depth. Thus, for evaluating compliance with the
21 EPA’s individual protection requirements in section 191.15, FEPs that relate to plant uptake,
22 animal uptake, and accumulation in soils have been eliminated from compliance assessment
23 calculations on the basis of low consequence.

24 PAs for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s cumulative release requirements in section
25 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible environment. Therefore, FEPs
26 that relate to plant uptake and animal uptake in the accessible environment have been eliminated
27 from PA calculations on regulatory grounds. Accumulation in soils that may occur within the
28 controlled area would reduce releases to the accessible environment and can, therefore, be
29 eliminated from PA calculations on the basis of beneficial consequence.

1 **SCR-6.8.2 Human Uptake**

2 **SCR-6.8.2.1 FEP Numbers:** W104, W105, W106, W107, and W108

3 **FEP Titles:** *Ingestion* (W104)
4 *Inhalation* (W105)
5 *Irradiation* (W106)
6 *Dermal Sorption* (W107)
7 *Injection* (W108)

8 **SCR-6.8.2.1.1 Screening Decision:** SO-R
9 SO-C for section 191.15

10 *Ingestion, Inhalation, Irradiation, Dermal Sorption, and Injection* have been eliminated from
11 compliance assessment calculations for section 191.15 and Part 191 Subpart C on the basis of
12 low consequence. FEPs that relate to human uptake in the accessible environment have been
13 eliminated from PA calculations for section 191.13 on regulatory grounds.

14 **SCR-6.8.2.1.2 Summary of New Information**

15 No new information has been identified for these FEPs.

16 **SCR-6.8.2.1.3 Screening Argument**

17 As described in Section 54, “Scope of Compliance Assessments,” releases to the accessible
18 environment under undisturbed conditions are restricted to lateral migration through anhydrite
19 interbeds within the Salado. Because of the bounding approach taken for evaluating compliance
20 with the EPA’s individual protection requirements in section 191.15 and the groundwater
21 protection requirements in Part 191 Subpart C (see Section 54), FEPs that relate to human uptake
22 by ingestion, inhalation, irradiation, dermal sorption, and injection have been eliminated from
23 compliance assessment calculations on the basis of low consequence.

24 PAs for evaluating compliance with the EPA’s cumulative release requirements in section
25 191.13 need not consider radionuclide migration in the accessible environment. Therefore, FEPs
26 that relate to human uptake in the accessible environment have been eliminated from PA
27 calculations on regulatory grounds.

1 SCR-7.0 References

- 2 Altenheinhaese, C., H., H. Bischoff, L. Fu, J. Mao, and G. Marx. 1994. "Adsorption of
3 Actinides on Cement Compounds." *Journal of Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 213: 553–56.
- 4 Anderson, R.Y. 1978. *Deep Dissolution of Salt, Northern Delaware Basin, New Mexico*.
5 Report to Sandia National Laboratories. ERMS 229530. Albuquerque: Sandia National
6 Laboratories.
- 7 Anderson, R.Y., W.E. Dean, Jr., D.W. Kirkland, and H.I. Snider. 1972. "Permian Castile
8 Varved Evaporite Sequence, West Texas and New Mexico." *Geological Society of America*
9 *Bulletin*, vol. 83, no. 1: 59–85. ERMS 241261.
- 10 Anderson, R.Y., and D.W. Powers. 1978. "Salt Anticlines in Castile-Salado Evaporite
11 Sequence, Northern Delaware Basin." *Geology and Mineral Deposits of Ochoan Rocks in*
12 *Delaware Basin and Adjacent Areas: New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources* (pp.
13 79–84), Circular 159. G.S. Austin, ed. ERMS 241419.
- 14 Bachhuber, F.W. 1989. "The Occurrence and Paleolimnologic Significance of Cutthroat Trout
15 (*Oncorhynchus clarki*) in Pluvial Lakes of the Estancia Valley, Central New Mexico."
16 *Geological Society of America Bulletin*, vol. 101: 1543–51.
- 17 Bachman, G.O. 1974. *Geologic Processes and Cenozoic History Related to Salt Dissolution in*
18 *Southeastern New Mexico*. Open-File Report 74-194. Denver: U.S. Geological Survey. ERMS
19 243249.
- 20 Bachman, G.O. 1980. *Regional Geology and Cenozoic History of Pecos Region, Southeastern*
21 *New Mexico*. Open-File Report 80-1099. Denver: U.S. Geological Survey. ERMS 241268.
- 22 Bachman, G.O. 1981. *Geology of Nash Draw, Eddy County, New Mexico*. Open-File Report
23 81-31. U.S. Denver: Geological Survey. ERMS 241265.
- 24 Bachman, G.O. 1985. *Assessment of Near-Surface Dissolution at and Near the Waste Isolation*
25 *Pilot Plant (WIPP), Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND84-7178. ERMS 224609. Albuquerque:
26 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 Bachman, G.O. 1987a. "Stratigraphy and Dissolution of the Rustler Formation." *The Rustler*
28 *Formation at the WIPP Site: Report of a Workshop on the Geology and Hydrology of the*
29 *Rustler Formation as it Relates to the WIPP Project* (pp. 16–25). L. Chaturvedi, ed. Carlsbad,
30 NM, March 1985. ERMS 249769. Santa Fe: EEG-34, Environmental Evaluation Group.
- 31 Bachman, G.O. 1987b. *Karst in Evaporites in Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND86-7078.
32 ERMS 224006. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 33 Barnhart, B.J., R. Hallet, D.E. Caldwell, E. Martinez, and E.W. Campbell. 1980. *Potential*
34 *Microbial Impact on Transuranic Wastes under Conditions Expected in the Waste Isolation Pilot*
35 *Plant (WIPP): Annual Report, October 1, 1978–September 30, 1979*. LA-8297-PR. ERMS
36 241220. Los Alamos: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.

- 1 Batchelor, G.K. 1973. *An Introduction to Fluid Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
 2 London, UK. ERMS 243337.
- 3 Baumgardner, R.W., Jr., A.D. Hoadley, and A.G. Goldstein. 1982. *Formation of the Wink Sink,*
 4 *a Salt Dissolution and Collapse Feature, Winkler County, Texas*. Report of Investigations No.
 5 114. Austin, TX: Bureau of Economic Geology.
- 6 Bean, J.E., M.E., Lord, D.A. McArthur, R.J. MacKinnon, J.D. Miller, and J.D. Schreiber. 1996.
 7 *Analysis Package for the Salado Flow Calculations (Task 1) of the Performance Assessment*
 8 *Analysis Supporting the Compliance Certification Application*. ERMS 420238. Albuquerque:
 9 Sandia National Laboratories. (EPA Air Docket A-93-02, Item II-G-08).
- 10 Beauheim, R.L. 1986. *Hydraulic-Test Interpretations for Well DOE-2 at the Waste Isolation*
 11 *Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site*. SAND86-1364. ERMS 227656. Albuquerque: Sandia National
 12 Laboratories.
- 13 Beauheim, R.L. 2002. *Analysis Plan for Evaluation of the Effects of Head Changes on*
 14 *Calibration of Culebra Transmissivity Fields: Analysis Plan AP-088*. (Rev. 1). ERMS 522085.
 15 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 Beauheim, R.L., B.W. Hassinger, and J.A. Klaiber. 1983. *Basic Data Report for Borehole Cabin*
 17 *Baby-1 Deepening and Hydrologic Testing, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project,*
 18 *Southeastern New Mexico*. WTSD-TME-020. ERMS 241315. Carlsbad, NM: Westinghouse
 19 Electric Corporation.
- 20 Beauheim, R.L., and G.J. Ruskauff. 1998. *Analysis of Hydraulic Tests of the Culebra and*
 21 *Magenta Dolomites and Dewey Lake Redbeds Conducted at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site*.
 22 SAND98-0049. ERMS 251839. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 Bennett, D. 1996. *Formation and Transport of Radioactive Gases*. Summary Memorandum of
 24 Record for GG-8 and RNT-26. 16 May 1996. SWCF-A 1.2.07.3: PA: QA: TSK: GG-8, RNT-
 25 26. ERMS 415478. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque,
 26 NM.
- 27 Bennett, D.G., D. Read, M. Atkins, F.P. Glasser. 1992. "A Thermodynamic Model for Blended
 28 Cements II: Cement Hydrate Phases; Thermodynamic Values and Modeling Studies." *Journal*
 29 *of Nuclear Materials*, vol. 190: 315–15. ERMS 241221.
- 30 Bennett, D., Y. Wang, and T. Hicks. 1996. Memorandum to Distribution (Subject: An
 31 Evaluation of Heat Generation Processes for the WIPP). 20 August 1996. ERMS 240635. U.S.
 32 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 33 Berner, R.A. 1981. "Kinetics of Weathering and Diagenesis, in Kinetics of Geochemical
 34 Processes." *Reviews in Mineralogy*, vol. 8: 111–33. A.C. Lasaga, and R.J. Kirkpatrick, eds.
 35 Washington, DC: Mineralogical Society of America. ERMS 241361.
- 36 Blackwell, D.D., J.L. Steele, and L.S. Carter. 1991. "Heat-Flow Patterns of the North American
 37 Continent: A Discussion of the Geothermal Map of North America." *Neotectonics of North*

- 1 *America* (pp. 423-436). D.B. Slemmons, E.R. Engdahl, M.D. Zoback, and D.D. Blackwell, eds.
 2 Boulder, CO: Geological Society of America. ERMS 241460.
- 3 Borns, D.J. 1987. "Structural Development of Evaporites in the Northern Delaware Basin."
 4 Guidebook 18: *Geology of the Western Delaware Basin, West Texas and Southeastern New*
 5 *Mexico* (pp. 80-97). D.W Powers and W.C. James, eds. El Paso: El Paso Geological Society.
 6 ERMS 235759.
- 7 Borns, D.J., L.J. Barrows, D.W. Powers, and R.P. Snyder. 1983. *Deformation of Evaporites*
 8 *Near the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site*. SAND82-1069. ERMS 227532.
 9 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Borns, D.J., and S.E. Shaffer. 1985. *Regional Well-Log Correlation in the New Mexico Portion*
 11 *of the Delaware Basin*. SAND83-1798. ERMS 224511. Albuquerque: Sandia National
 12 Laboratories.
- 13 Brausch, L.M., Kuhn, A.K., Register, J.K. 1982. *Natural Resources Study, Waste Isolation Pilot*
 14 *Plant (WIPP) Project, Southeastern New Mexico*. WTSD-TME-3156. ERMS 239094.
 15 Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 16 Bredehoeft, J.D., F.S. Riley, and E.A. Roeloffs 1987. "Earthquakes and Groundwater."
 17 *Earthquakes and Volcanoes*, vol. 19, no. 4: 138-46. ERMS 241635.
- 18 Brokaw, A.L., C.L. Jones, M.E. Cooley, and W.H. Hays. 1972. *Geology and Hydrology of the*
 19 *Carlsbad Potash Area, Eddy and Lea Counties, New Mexico*. Open File Report 4339-1. Denver:
 20 U.S. Geological Survey. ERMS 243356.
- 21 Bruno, J., and A. Sandino. 1987. *Radionuclide Co-Precipitation*. SKB Technical Report, no.
 22 87-23. Stockholm: Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. ERMS 241222.
- 23 Brush, L.H. 1990. *Test Plan for Laboratory and Modeling Studies of Repository and*
 24 *Radionuclide Chemistry for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. SAND90-0266. ERMS 225053.
 25 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Brush, L.H. 1996. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Ranges and Probability
 27 Distributions of K_d s for Dissolved Pu, Am, U, Th, and Np in the Culebra for the PA Calculations
 28 to Support the CCA). 10 June 1996. ERMS 238801. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia
 29 National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 30 Brush, L.H., and L.J. Storz. 1996. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Revised Ranges and
 31 Probability Distributions of K_d s for Dissolved Pu, Am, U, Th, and Np in the Culebra for the PA
 32 Calculations to Support the CCA). July 24, 1996. ERMS 241561. U.S. Department of Energy,
 33 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 34 Brush, L.H. and Y. Xiong. 2003. *Calculation of Actinide Speciation and Solubilities for the*
 35 *Compliance Recertification Application*. AP-098. ERMS 527714. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
 36 National Laboratories.

- 1 Burton, P.L., J.W. Adams, and C. Engwall. 1993. "History of the Washington Ranch, Eddy
2 County, New Mexico." *New Mexico Geological Society Guidebook*. 44th Field Conference,
3 Carlsbad Region, New Mexico and West Texas. D.W. Love, J.W. Hawley, B.S. Kues, J.W.
4 Adams, G.W. Austin, and J.M. Barker, eds. Roswell, NM: New Mexico Geological Society.
5 ERMS 241273.
- 6 Bynum, V., C. Stockman, Y. Wang, A. Peterson, J. Krumhansl, J. Nowak, J. Cotton, S. Patchet,
7 and M. Chu. 1997. *Implementation of Chemical Controls Through a Backfill System for the*
8 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)*. SAND96-2656C. ERMS 247018. Albuquerque: Sandia
9 National Laboratories.
- 10 Cauffman, T.L., A.M. LaVenue, and J.P. McCord. 1990. *Ground-Water Flow Modeling of the*
11 *Culebra Dolomite, Volume II: Data Base*. SAND89-7068/2. ERMS 210551. Albuquerque:
12 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 13 Chapman, J.B. 1986. *Stable Isotopes in Southeastern New Mexico Groundwater: Implications*
14 *for Dating Recharge in the WIPP Area*, EEG-35, DOE/AL/10752-35. ERMS 241274. Santa Fe:
15 Environmental Evaluation Group.
- 16 Chapman, J.B. 1988. *Chemical and Radiochemical Characteristics of Groundwater in the*
17 *Culebra Dolomite, Southeastern New Mexico*. EEG-39. ERMS 241223. Santa Fe: New Mexico
18 Environmental Evaluation Group.
- 19 Chappell, J., and N.J. Shackleton. 1986. "Oxygen Isotopes and Sea Level." *Nature*, vol. 324, no.
20 6093: 137–40. ERMS 241275.
- 21 Choppin, G.R., A.H. Bond, M. Borkowski, M.G. Bronikowski, J.F. Chen, S. Lis, J. Mizera, O.
22 Pokrovsky, N.A. Wall, Y.X. Xia, and R.C. Moore. 2001. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Actinide*
23 *Source Term Test Program: Solubility Studies and Development of Modeling Parameters*.
24 SAND99-0943. ERMS 518556. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Claiborne, H.C., and F. Gera. 1974. *Potential Containment Failure Mechanisms and Their*
26 *Consequences at a Radioactive Waste Repository in Bedded Salt in New Mexico*. ORNL-TM-
27 4639. ERMS 241224. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
- 28 Clayton, D.J. 2008. *Analysis Plan for the Performance Assessment for the 2009 Compliance*
29 *Recertification Application (Revision 1)*. ERMS 547905. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
30 Laboratories.
- 31 Corbet, T.F., and P.M. Knupp. 1996. *The Role of Regional Groundwater Flow in the*
32 *Hydrogeology of the Culebra Member of the Rustler Formation at the Waste Isolation Pilot*
33 *Plant (WIPP), Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND96-2133. ERMS 243482. Albuquerque:
34 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 35 Cranwell, R.M., R.V. Guzowski, J.E. Campbell, and N.R. Ortiz.. 1990. *Risk Methodology for*
36 *Geologic Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Scenario Selection Procedure*. NUREG/CR-1667.
37 SAND80-1429. ERMS 226750. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Cunningham, C. 1999. "End of the Santa Fe Trail." *Sulfur*, no. 264. September-October 1999.
 2 ERMS 530223.
- 3 D'Appolonia Consulting Engineers, Inc. 1982. *Natural Resources Study - Waste Isolation Pilot*
 4 *Plant (WIPP) Project, Southeastern New Mexico* (January). NM78-648-813A. Albuquerque:
 5 D'Appolonia Consulting Engineers, Inc.
- 6 Davies, P.B. 1983. "Assessing the Potential for Deep-Seated Salt Dissolution and Subsidence at
 7 the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)." *State of New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group*
 8 *Conference, WIPP Site Suitability for Radioactive Waste Disposal, Carlsbad, NM, May 12-13,*
 9 *1983.* ERMS 229533. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Davies, P.B. 1989. *Variable Density Ground-Water Flow and Paleohydrology in the Waste*
 11 *Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Region, Southeastern New Mexico.* Open File Report 88-490.
 12 ERMS 238854. Denver: U.S. Geological Survey.
- 13 Davis, J.A. and D.B. Kent. 1990. "Surface Complexation Modeling in Aqueous Geochemistry."
 14 *Mineral-Water Interface Geochemistry.* M.F. Hochella and A.F. White, eds. Reviews in
 15 Mineralogy vol. 23: pp. 177–260. Washington, DC: Mineralogical Society of America. ERMS
 16 241473.
- 17 Dawson, P.R., and J.R. Tillerson. 1978. *Nuclear Waste Canister Thermally Induced Motion.*
 18 SAND78-0566. ERMS 227328. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Dence, M.R., R.A.F. Grieve, and P.B. Robertson. 1977. "Terrestrial Impact Structures:
 20 Principal Characteristics and Energy Considerations." *Impact and Explosion Cratering:*
 21 *Planetary and Terrestrial Implications* (pp. 247–75). D.J. Roddy, R.O. Pepin, and R.B. Merrill,
 22 eds. New York: Pergamon.
- 23 Dickson, C.L., and F.P. Glasser. 2000. "Cerium (III, IV) in Cement—Implications for Actinide
 24 (III, IV) Immobilization." *Cement and Concrete Research*, vol. 30: 1619–23.
- 25 Dietz, R.S. 1961. Astroblemes, *Scientific American*, vol. 205, no. 2: 50–58. ERMS 241226.
- 26 Dowding, C.H., and A. Rozen. 1978. "Damage to Rock Tunnels from Earthquake Shaking."
 27 *Journal of the Geotechnical Engineering Division, American Society of Civil Engineers*, vol.
 28 104, No. GT2: 175–91. ERMS 241350.
- 29 Francis, A.J. 1985. "Low-Level Radioactive Wastes in Subsurface Soils," in *Soil Reclamation*
 30 *Processes: Microbiological Analyses and Applications.* R.L. Tate, III and D.A. Klein, eds.
 31 New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc. (pp. 279–331). ERMS 241227.
- 32 Francis, A.J., and J.B. Gillow. 1994. *Effects of Microbial Gas Processes on Generation Under*
 33 *Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Repository Conditions, Progress Report through 1992.*
 34 SAND93-7036. ERMS 210673. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Francis, A.J., and J.B. Gillow. 2000. Memorandum to Y. Wang (Subject: Progress Report:
2 Microbial Gas Generation Program.) 6 January 2000. ERMS 509352. Brookhaven National
3 Laboratory, Upton, NY.
- 4 Francis A.J., J.B. Gillow, and M.R. Giles. 1997. *Microbial Gas Generation under Expected*
5 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Repository Conditions*. SAND96-2582. ERMS 244125.
6 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Giambalvo, E.R. 2002a. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Recommended Parameter
8 Values for Modeling Organic Ligands in WIPP Brines). 25 July 2002. ERMS 522981. U.S.
9 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 10 Giambalvo, E.R. 2002b. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Recommended μ^0/RT Values
11 for Modeling the Solubility of Oxalate Solids in WIPP Brines). 31 July 2002. ERMS 523057.
12 U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 13 Gillow, J.B., M. Dunn, A.J. Francis, D.A. Lucero, and H.W. Papenguth. 2000. "The Potential of
14 Subterranean Microbes in Facilitating Actinide Migration at the Grimsel Test Site and Waste
15 Isolation Pilot Plant," *Radiochemica Acta*, vol. 88: 769–774.
- 16 Gillow, J.B., and A.J. Francis. 2001a. "Re-Evaluation of Microbial Gas Generation under
17 Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Conditions: Data Summary Report, January 24, 2001."
18 *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline Reports, WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository*
19 *Investigations Milestone RI010, January 31, 2001* (pp. 19–46). ERMS 516749. Carlsbad, NM:
20 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 21 Gillow, J.B., and A.J. Francis. 2001b. "Re-Evaluation of Microbial Gas Generation under
22 Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Conditions: Data Summary and Progress Report (February
23 1 – July 13, 2001), July 16, 2001, Rev. 0." *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline*
24 *Reports, WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations Milestone RI020, July 31, 2001* (pp. 3-1 through
25 3-21). ERMS 518970. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Gillow, J.B., and A.J. Francis. 2002a. "Re-Evaluation of Microbial Gas Generation under
27 Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Conditions: Data Summary and Progress Report (July 14,
28 2001 - January 31, 2002), January 22, 2002." *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline*
29 *Reports, WBS 1.3.5.3, Compliance Monitoring; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations,*
30 *Milestone RI110, January 31, 2002* (pp. 2.1-1 through 2.1-26). ERMS 520467. Carlsbad, NM:
31 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 32 Gillow, J.B., and A.J. Francis. 2002b. "Re-Evaluation of Microbial Gas Generation under
33 Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Conditions: Data Summary and Progress Report (February
34 1 – July 15, 2002), July 18, 2002." *Sandia National Laboratories Technical Baseline Reports,*
35 *WBS 1.3.5.3, Compliance Monitoring; WBS 1.3.5.4, Repository Investigations, Milestone RI130,*
36 *July 31, 2002* (pp. 3.1-1 through 3.1-A10). ERMS 523189. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
37 Laboratories.
- 38 Gougar, M.L.D., B.E. Scheetz, and D.M. Roy. 1996. "Ettringite and C-S-H Portland Cement
39 Phases for Waste Ion Immobilization: A Review." *Waste Management*, vol. 16, no. 4: 295–303.

- 1 Gray, J.L. 1991. Letter to W. Price (Subject: Carlsbad Brine Well Collapse and Subsidence
2 Investigation, Simon Environmental Services Project No. 502-939-01). September 25, 1991.
3 ERMS 549576. Simon Environmental Services, Norman, OK.
- 4 Grieve, R.A.F. 1987. "Terrestrial Impact Structures." *Annual Review of Earth and Planetary*
5 *Sciences*, vol. 15: 245–70. ERMS 241228.
- 6 Griswold, G.B. and J.E. Griswold. 1999. "Method of Potash Reserve Evaluation" in *New*
7 *Mexico Bureau of Mines & Mineral Resources* (pp. 33–67), Circular 207 (1999).
- 8 Hall, R.K., D. R. Creamer, S.G. Hall, and L.S. Melzer. 2008. *Water Injection in WIPP Vicinity:*
9 *Current Practices, Failure Rates and Future Operations*. (August). Midland, TX. Russell K.
10 Hall and Associates, Inc. ERMS 549596.
- 11 Halliday, I. 1964. "The Variation in the Frequency of Meteorite Impact with Geographic
12 Latitude," *Meteoritics*, vol. 2, no. 3: 271–278. ERMS 241229.
- 13 Harris, A.H. 1987. "Reconstruction of Mid-Wisconsin Environments in Southern New Mexico,"
14 *National Geographic Research*, vol. 3, no. 2: 142–51.
- 15 Harris, A.H. 1988. "Late Pleistocene and Holocene *Microtus (pitymys)* (*Rodentia: cricetidae*)
16 in New Mexico." *Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology*, vol. 8, no. 3: 307–13.
- 17 Hartmann, W.K. 1965. "Terrestrial and Lunar Flux of Large Meteorites in the Last Two Billion
18 Years," *Icarus*, vol. 4, no. 2: 157–65. ERMS 241230.
- 19 Hartmann, W.K. 1979. *Long-Term Meteorite Hazards to Buried Nuclear Waste Report 2, in*
20 *Assessment of Effectiveness of Geologic Isolation Systems: A Summary of FY-1978 Consultant*
21 *Input for Scenario Methodology Development*. B.L. Scott, G.L. Benson, R.A. Craig, and M.A.
22 Harwell, eds. PNL-2851. Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest Laboratory. ERMS 241232.
- 23 Haug, A., V.A. Kelley, A.M. LaVenue, and J.F. Pickens. 1987. *Modeling of Ground-Water*
24 *Flow in the Culebra Dolomite at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site: Interim Report*,
25 SAND86-7167. ERMS 228486. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Hawley, J.W. 1993. "The Ogallala and Gatuña Formation in the Southeastern New Mexico and
27 West Texas." *New Mexico Geological Society, Forty-Fourth Annual Field Conference*,
28 *Carlsbad, NM, October 6-9, 1993* (pp. 261–69). D.W. Love et al., eds. Socorro, NM: New
29 Mexico Geological Society. ERMS 241431.
- 30 Helton, J.C., J.E. Bean, J.W. Berglund, F.J. Davis, K. Economy, J.W. Garner, J.D. Johnson, R.J.,
31 MacKinnon, J. Miller, D.G. O'Brien, J.L. Ramsey, J.D. Schreiber, A. Shinta, L.N. Smith, D.M.
32 Stoelzel, C. Stockman, and P. Vaughn. 1998. *Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Results*
33 *Obtained in the 1996 Performance Assessment for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. SAND98-
34 0365. ERMS 252619. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 35 Heyn, D.W. 1997. Letter from IMC Kalium to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency on
36 Potash Solution Mining at WIPP Site. 26 February 1997. ERMS 530221. Washington, DC.

- 1 Hickerson, A.L. 1991. Letter to V. Pierce (B&E Inc., Carlsbad, New Mexico). 12 April 1991.
2 Odessa, Texas.
- 3 Hicks, T.W. 1996. "Thermal Convection and Effects of Thermal Gradients," Summary
4 Memorandum of Record for GG-4 and S-10. Memorandum. 29 May 1996. SWCF-A 1.2.07.3:
5 PA: QA: TSK: S10,GG4. ERMS 411687. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 6 Hicks, T.W. 1997a. Memorandum from T. Hicks to P. Swift. 6 March 1997. "Solution Mining
7 for Potash."
- 8 Hicks, T.W. 1997b. Memorandum from T.W. Hicks to P.N. Swift. 7 March 1997. "Solution
9 Mining for Brine."
- 10 Holt, R.M., and D. W. Powers. 1984. *Geotechnical Activities in the Waste Handling Shaft,*
11 *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project, Southeastern New Mexico: WTSD-TME 038.*
12 Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy. ERMS 241347.
- 13 Holt, R.M., and D.W. Powers. 1986. *Geotechnical Activities in the Exhaust Shaft, Waste*
14 *Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project, Southeastern New Mexico: DOE-WIPP 86-008.* ERMS
15 241696. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 16 Holt, R.M., and D.W. Powers. 1988. *Facies Variability and Post-Depositional Alteration within*
17 *the Rustler Formation in the Vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Southeastern New*
18 *Mexico.* DOE/WIPP 88-004. ERMS 242145. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 19 Holt, R.M., and D.W. Powers. 1990. *Geotechnical Activities in the Air Intake Shaft, Waste*
20 *Isolation Pilot Plant.* WIPP-DOE 90-051. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 21 Holt, R.M., and D.W. Powers. 2002. "Impact of Salt Dissolution on the Transmissivity of the
22 Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation, Delaware Basin Southeastern New
23 Mexico." *Geological Society of America Abstracts with Programs*, vol. 34, no. 6: 215.
- 24 Holt, R.M., and L. Yarbrough. 2002. *Analysis Report: Task 2 of AP-088; Estimating Base*
25 *Transmissivity Fields* (July 8). ERMS 523889. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Imbrie, J., and J.Z. Imbrie. 1980. "Modeling the Climatic Response to Orbital Variations,"
27 *Science*, vol. 207, no. 4434: 943–953. ERMS 241338.
- 28 Johnson, K.S. 1989. "Development of the Wink Sink in West Texas, USA, Due to Salt
29 Dissolution and Collapse." *Environmental Geology and Water Science*, vol. 14: 81–92.
- 30 Johnson, K.S., E.W. Collins, and S. Seni. 2003. "Sinkholes and Land Subsidence due to Salt
31 Dissolution near Wink, West Texas, and Other Sites in West Texas and New Mexico."
32 *Evaporite Karst and Engineering/Environmental Problems in the United States* (pp. 183–96).
33 K.T. Johnson and J.T. Neal, eds. Norman, OK: Oklahoma Geological Survey.
- 34 Jones, C.L. 1981. *Geologic Data for Borehole ERDA-6, Eddy County, New Mexico.* Open-File
35 Report 81-468. Denver: U.S. Geological Society. ERMS 242321.

- 1 Kärnbränslesakerhet. 1978. *Handling of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Final Storage of Vitrified High*
2 *Level Reprocessing Waste*. Stockholm: Kärnbränslesakerhet. ERMS 242406.
- 3 Kato, C., T. Sato, M. Smorawinska, and K. Horikoshi. 1994. "High Pressure Conditions
4 Stimulate Expression of Chloramphenicol Acetyltransferase Regulated by the *lac* Promoter in
5 *Escherichia coli*." *FEMS Microbiology Letters*, vol. 122, nos. 1-2: 91–96. ERMS 241233.
- 6 King, P.B. 1948. *Geology of the Southern Guadalupe Mountains, Texas*. Professional Paper
7 215. Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey. ERMS 241749.
- 8 Kirkes, G.R. 2006. *Activity/Project Specific Procedure SP 9-4: Performing FEPs Baseline*
9 *Impact Assessments for Planned or Unplanned Changes* (Revision 1, June 6). ERMS 543625.
10 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 11 Kirkes, G.R. 2008. *Features, Events and Processes Assessment for the Compliance*
12 *Recertification Application—2009* (Revision 0). ERMS 550489. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
13 National Laboratories.
- 14 Lambert, S.J. 1978. "The Geochemistry of Delaware Basin Groundwaters." *Geology and*
15 *Mineral Deposits of Ochoan Rocks in Delaware Basin and Adjacent Areas*. G.S. Austin, ed.
16 Circular 159. Socorro, NM: New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources. ERMS
17 504429.
- 18 Lambert, S.J. 1983. *Dissolution of Evaporites in and Around the Delaware Basin, Southeastern*
19 *New Mexico and West Texas*. SAND82-0461. ERMS 227520. Albuquerque: Sandia National
20 Laboratories.
- 21 Lambert, S.J. 1986. *Stable-Isotope Studies of Groundwaters in Southeastern New Mexico, The*
22 *Rustler Formation at the WIPP Site, EEG-34*. SAND85-1978C. Santa Fe: New Mexico
23 Environmental Evaluation Group.
- 24 Lambert, S.J. 1987. Feasibility Study: *Applicability of Geochronologic Methods Involving*
25 *Radiocarbon and Other Nuclides to the Groundwater Hydrology of the Rustler Formation,*
26 *Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND86-1054. ERMS 228417. Albuquerque: Sandia National
27 Laboratories.
- 28 Lambert, S.J., and J.A. Carter. 1987. *Uranium-Isotope Systematics in Groundwaters of the*
29 *Rustler Formation, Northern Delaware Basin, Southeastern New Mexico. Principles and*
30 *Methods*. SAND87-0388. ERMS 245158. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 31 Lambert, S.J., and D.M. Harvey. 1987. *Stable-Isotope Geochemistry of Groundwaters in the*
32 *Delaware Basin of Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND87-0138. WPO 24150. ERMS 224150.
33 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 34 Lappin, A.R., R.L. Hunter, D.P. Garber, P.B. Davies, R.L. Beauheim, D.J. Borns, L.H. Brush,
35 B.M. Butcher, T. Cauffman, M.S.Y. Chu, L.S. Gomez, R.V. Guzowski, H.J. Iuzzolino, V.
36 Kelley, S.J. Lambert, M.G. Marietta, J.M. Mercer, E.J. Nowak, J. Pickens, R.P. Rechar, M.
37 Reeves, K.L. Robinson, and M.D. Siegel, (eds. 1989). *Systems Analysis, Long-Term*

- 1 *Radionuclide Transport, and Dose Assessments, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP),*
2 *Southeastern New Mexico.* SAND89-0462. ERMS 210281. Albuquerque: Sandia National
3 Laboratories.
- 4 Lasaga, A.C., J.M. Soler, J. Ganor, T.E. Burch, and K.L. Nagy, K.L. 1994. “Chemical
5 Weathering Rate Laws and Global Geochemical Cycles.” *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*,
6 vol. 58, no. 10: 2361–2386. ERMS 241234.
- 7 Lee, W.T. 1925. “Erosion by Solution and Fill.” *Contributions to Geography in the United*
8 *States: U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 760-C* (pp. 107–21). ERMS 252969.
- 9 Leigh, C.D. 2003. *Estimate of Portland Cement in TRU Waste for Disposal in WIPP for the*
10 *Compliance Recertification Application.* September 15, 2003. ERMS 531562. Carlsbad, NM:
11 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Leigh, C., and J. Trone. 2005. *Calculation of the Waste Unit Factor for the Performance*
13 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 539613. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
14 Laboratories.
- 15 Leigh, C., J. Trone, and B. Fox. 2005. *TRU Waste Inventory for the 2004 Compliance*
16 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 1). ERMS
17 541118. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 Leigh, C., J. Kanney, L. Brush, J. Garner, G. Kirkes, T. Lowry, M. Nemer, J. Stein, E. Vugrin, S.
19 Wagner and T. Kirchner. 2005. *2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance*
20 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 541521. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
21 Laboratories.
- 22 Lenhardt, W.A. 1988. “Damage Studies at a Deep Level African Gold Mine.” *Rockbursts &*
23 *Seismicity in Mines, Proceeding of the Second International Symposium, Minneapolis, MN, June*
24 *8-10, 1988* (pp. 391–93). C. Fairhurst, ed. Brookfield, VT: A.A. Balkema.
- 25 Loken, M.C. 1994. *SMC Thermal Calculations, RSI Calculation No. A141-GE-05*, prepared for
26 Parsons Brinckerhoff, San Francisco, CA. Rapid City, SD: RE/SPEC, Inc. ERMS 242834.
- 27 Loken, M.C., and R. Chen. 1994. *Rock Mechanics of SMC, RSI Calculation No. A141-GE-07*,
28 prepared for Parsons Brinckerhoff, San Francisco, CA. Rapid City, SD: RE/SPEC Inc. ERMS
29 242835.
- 30 Lowenstein, T.K. 1987. *Post Burial Alteration of the Permian Rustler Formation Evaporites,*
31 *WIPP Site, New Mexico: Textural, Stratigraphic and Chemical Evidence.* EEG-36,
32 DOE/AL/10752-36. Santa Fe, NM: Environmental Evaluation Group. ERMS 241237.
- 33 Melzer, L.S. 2008. *An Assessment of the CO₂-Enhanced Oil Recovery Potential in the Vicinity*
34 *of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (June). ERMS 550502. Midland, TX: Melzer Consulting.

- 1 Mercer, J.W., R.L. Beauheim, R.P. Snyder, and G.M. Fairer. 1987. *Basic Data Report for*
2 *Drilling and Hydrologic Testing of Drillhole DOE-2 at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)*
3 *Site*. SAND86-0611. ERMS 227646. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Mercer, J.W., D.L. Cole, and R.M. Holt. 1998. *Basic Data Report for Drillholes on the H-019*
5 *Hydropad (WIPP)*. SAND98-0071. ERMS 252240. Albuquerque: Sandia National
6 Laboratories.
- 7 Molecke, M.A. 1979. *Gas Generation from Transuranic Waste Degradation*. SAND79-0911C.
8 ERMS 228093. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Muehlberger, W.R., R.C. Belcher, and L.K. Goetz. 1978. "Quaternary Faulting on Trans-Pecos,
10 Texas." *Geology*, vol. 6, no. 6: 337–340. ERMS 241238.
- 11 Nemer, M. B., and D. J. Clayton. 2008. *Analysis Package for Salado flow Modeling, 2009*
12 *Compliance Recertification Application Calculation*. ERMS 548607. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
13 National Laboratories.
- 14 New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources (NMBMMR). 1995. *Final Report*
15 *Evaluation of Mineral Resources at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site*. March 31,
16 1995. 4 vols. ERMS 239149. Socorro, NM: New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral
17 Resources, Campus Station.
- 18 New Mexico Oil Conservation Division (OCD). 1994. "Attachment to Discharge Plan BW-26
19 Approval Salado Brine Sales No. 3 Brine Facility Discharge Plan Requirements." Attachment to
20 letter from W.J. LeMay, (Oil Conservation Division, Santa Fe, New Mexico) to W.H.
21 Brininstool (Salado Brine Sales, Jal, New Mexico). 12 January 1994.
- 22 Nicholson, A., Jr., and A. Clebsch, Jr. 1961. "Geology and Ground-Water Conditions in
23 Southern Lea County, New Mexico." Ground-Water Report 6. Socorro, NM: New Mexico
24 Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources. ERMS 241583.
- 25 Oelkers, E. H. 1996. "Physical and Chemical Properties of Rocks and Fluids for Chemical Mass
26 Transport Calculations." *Reviews in Mineralogy*, vol. 34: 131–191.
- 27 Papenguth, H.W., and Y.K. Behl. 1996. *Test Plan for Evaluation of Colloid-Facilitated*
28 *Actinide Transport at the WIPP*. TP 96-01. ERMS 231337. Albuquerque: Sandia National
29 Laboratories.
- 30 Peake, T. 1996. Memorandum to Public Rulemaking Docket A-92-56 (Subject: WIPP–
31 Examination of Mining and Hydraulic Conductivity. 31 January 1996. ERMS 241239. U.S.
32 Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC.
- 33 Pedersen, K. 1999. "Subterranean Microorganisms and Radioactive Waste Disposal in Sweden."
34 *Engineering Geology*, vol. 52: 163–176.

- 1 Pedersen, K., and F. Karlsson. 1995. *Investigations of Subterranean Microorganisms: Their*
2 *Importance for Performance Assessment of Radioactive Waste Disposal*. SKB Technical Report
3 95-10. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co.
- 4 Phillips, F.M., A.R. Campbell, C. Kruger, P.S. Johnson, R. Roberts, and E. Keyes. 1992. *A*
5 *Reconstruction of the Water Balance in Western United States Lake Basins in Response to*
6 *Climate Change*, New Mexico Water Resources Research Institute Report 269. Las Cruces,
7 NM: New Mexico Water Resources Research Institute.
- 8 Pointeau, I., B. Piriou, M. Fedoroff, M.G. Barthes, N. Marmier, and F. Fromage. 2001.
9 “Sorption Mechanisms of Eu³⁺ on CSH Phases of Hydrated Cements.” *Journal of Colloid and*
10 *Interface Science*, vol. 236, no. 2: 252–259.
- 11 Popielak, R.S., R.L. Beauheim, S.R. Black, W.E. Coons, C.T. Ellingson, and R.L. Olsen. 1983.
12 *Brine Reservoirs in the Castile Formation, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project,*
13 *Southeastern New Mexico*. TME-3153. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy. ERMS
14 242085.
- 15 Powers, D.W. 1996. *Tracing Early Breccia Pipe Studies, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,*
16 *Southeastern New Mexico: A Study of the Documentation Available and Decision-Making*
17 *During the Early Years of WIPP*. SAND94-0991. ERMS 230968. Albuquerque: Sandia
18 National Laboratories.
- 19 Powers, D.W., J.M. Sigda, and R.M. Holt. 1996. *Probability of Intercepting a Pressurized*
20 *Brine Reservoir under the WIPP*. ERMS 240199. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 21 Powers, D.W. 2000. *Evaporites, Casing Requirements, Water-Floods, and Out-of-Formation*
22 *Waters: Potential for Sinkhole Developments: Technical Class – Sinkholes And Unusual*
23 *Subsidence Over Solution-Mined Caverns And Salt And Potash Mines*. San Antonio, TX:
24 Solution Mining Research Institute.
- 25 Powers, D.W. 2003. *Analysis Report, Task 1 of AP-088: Construction of Geologic Contour*
26 *Maps* (January). ERMS 522086. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 Powers, D.W. *Evaporites, Casing Requirements, Water-Floods, and Out-of-Formation Waters:*
28 *Potential for Sinkhole Developments: Circular* (in press). Norman, OK: Oklahoma Geological
29 Survey.
- 30 Powers, D.W., and R.M. Holt. 1990. “Sedimentology of the Rustler Formation near the Waste
31 Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site.” *Geological and Hydrological Studies of Evaporites in the*
32 *Northern Delaware Basin for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), New Mexico* (pp. 79–106).
33 Geological Society of America Field Trip No. 14 Guidebook. Dallas: Dallas Geological
34 Society.
- 35 Powers, D.W., and R.M. Holt. 1995. *Regional Processes Affecting Rustler Hydrogeology*.
36 ERMS 244173. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Powers, D.W., and R.M. Holt. 1999. "The Los Medaños Member of the Permian (Ochoan)
2 Rustler Formation." *New Mexico Geology*, vol. 21, no. 4: 97–103. ERMS 532368.
- 3 Powers, D.W., and R.M. Holt. 2000. "The Salt that Wasn't There: Mudflat Facies Equivalents
4 to Halite of the Permian Rustler Formation, Southeastern New Mexico." *Journal of Sedimentary
5 Research*, vol. 70, 29–39. ERMS 532369.
- 6 Powers, D.W., S.J. Lambert, S.E. Shaffer, I.R. Hill, and W.D. Weart, eds. 1978. *Geological
7 Characterization Report, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site, Southeastern New Mexico*.
8 SAND78-1596. ERMS 205448 (vol. 1). ERMS 205448 (vol. 2). Albuquerque: Sandia
9 National Laboratories.
- 10 Powers, D.W., J.M. Sigda, and R.M. Holt. 1996. *Probability of Intercepting a Pressurized Brine
11 Reservoir under the WIPP*. ERMS 240199. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Prichard, D.A. 2003. E-mail to Mary-Alena Martell (Subject: Potash Solution Mining at
13 WIPP). 6 April 2003. ERMS 525161. IMC Global, Inc. Carlsbad, NM.
- 14 Rawson, D., C. Boardman, and N. Jaffe-Chazan. 1965. *Project Gnome, the Environment
15 Created by a Nuclear Explosion in Salt*. PNE-107F. Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University
16 of California, Livermore, CA. Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service.
17 ERMS 241242.
- 18 Rechard, R.P., H. Iuzzolino, and J.S. Sandha. 1990. *Data Used in Preliminary Performance
19 Assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (1990)*. SAND89-2408. ERMS 227724.
20 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 21 Rechard, R.P., C.T. Stockman, L.C. Sanchez, H.R. Trellue, J.S. Rath, and J. Liscum-Powell.
22 1996. *RNT-1: Nuclear Criticality in Near Field and Far Field. FEP Screening Argument*.
23 ERMS 240818. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 24 Rechard, R.P., L.C. Sanchez, C.T. Stockman, and H.R. Trellue. 2000. *Consideration of Nuclear
25 Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. SAND99-
26 2898. ERMS 514911. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 27 Rechard, R.P., L.C. Sanchez, H.R. Trellue, and C.T. Stockman. 2001. *Unfavorable Conditions
28 for Nuclear Criticality Following Disposal of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot
29 Plant*. *Nuclear Technology*, vol. 136, (October 2001): 99–129.
- 30 Reed, D.T., Okajima, S., Brush, L.H., and Molecke, M.A. 1993. "Radiolytically-Induced Gas
31 Production in Plutonium-Spiked WIPP Brine, Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management
32 XVI," *Materials Research Society Symposium Proceedings, Boston, MA, November 30 –
33 December 4, 1992*. C.G. Interrante and R.T. Pabalan, eds. SAND92-7283C. Materials
34 Research Society, Pittsburgh, PA. Vol. 294, pp. 431–438. ERMS 228637.
- 35 Reilinger, R., Brown, L, and Powers, D. 1980. "New Evidence for Tectonic Uplift in the Diablo
36 Plateau Region, West Texas." *Geophysical Research Letters*, vol. 7: 181-184.

- 1 Reiter, M., M.W. Barroll, and J. Minier. 1991. "An Overview of Heat Flow in Southwestern
2 United States and Northern Chihuahua, Mexico." *Neotectonics of North America* (pp. 457–66).
3 D.B. Slemmons, E.R. Engdahl, M.D. Zoback, and D.D. Blackwell, eds. Boulder, CO:
4 Geological Society of America. ERMS 241575.
- 5 Reyes, J. 2008. Letter to D.C. Moody (5 Enclosures). 11 February 2008. U.S. Environmental
6 Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 7 Richardson, S. M. and H.Y. McSween, Jr. 1989. *Geochemistry: Pathways and Processes*.
8 Prentice Hall.
- 9 Robinson, J.Q., and D.W. Powers 1987. "A Clastic Deposit Within the Lower Castile
10 Formation, Western Delaware Basin, New Mexico." *Geology of the Western Delaware Basin,*
11 *West Texas and Southeastern New Mexico* (pp. 69–79). D.W. Powers and W.C. James, eds. El
12 Paso, TX: El Paso Geological Society Guidebook 18, El Paso Geological Society. ERMS
13 241368.
- 14 Rodwell, W.R., A.W. Harris, S.T. Horseman, P. Lalieux, W. Muller, Amaya L. Ortiz, and K.
15 Pruess. 1999. *Gas Migration and Two-Phase Flow through Engineered and Geological*
16 *Barriers for a Deep Repository for Radioactive Waste*. A Joint EC/NEA Status Report. EC,
17 European Commission Report EUR 19122 EN.
- 18 Rosholt, J.N., and C.R. McKinney. 1980. "Uranium Series Disequilibrium Investigations
19 related to the WIPP Site, New Mexico, Part II, Uranium Trend Dating of Surficial Deposits and
20 Gypsum Spring Deposits near WIPP Site, New Mexico," Open-File Report 80-879. Denver:
21 U.S. Geological Survey.
- 22 Sanchez, L.C., and H.R. Trelle. 1996. "Estimation of Maximum RH-TRU Thermal Heat Load
23 for WIPP." Memorandum to T. Hicks (Galson Sciences Ltd.). 17 January 1996. ERMS
24 231165. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Sanford, A.R., L.H. Jakasha, and D.J. Cash. 1991. "Seismicity of the Rio Grand Rift in New
26 Mexico." *Neotectonics of North America* (pp. 229–44). D.B. Slemmons, E.R. Engdahl, M.D.
27 Zoback, and D.D. Blackwell, eds. Boulder, CO: Geological Society of America. ERMS
28 241571.
- 29 Schiel, K.A. 1994. "A New Look at the Age, Depositional Environment and Paleogeographic
30 Setting of the Dewey Lake Formation (Late Permian)." *West Texas Geological Society Bulletin*,
31 vol. 33, no. 9: 5–13. ERMS 220465.
- 32 Serne, R.J. 1992. "Current Adsorption Models and Open Issues Pertaining to Performance
33 Assessment." *In Proceedings of the DOE/Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project*
34 *Radionuclide Adsorption Workshop at Los Alamos National Laboratory, September 11-12, 1990*.
35 Comp. J.A. Canepa. LA-12325-C. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory. 43–74.
36 ERMS 241243.
- 37 Servant, J. 2001. "The 100 kyr Cycle of Deglaciation During the Last 450 kyr: A New
38 Interpretation of Oceanic and Ice Core Data." *Global and Planetary Change*, vol. 29: 121–133.

- 1 Siegel, M.D., S.J. Lambert, and K.L. Robinson, eds. 1991. *Hydrogeochemical Studies of the*
2 *Rustler Formation and Related Rocks in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Area, Southeastern New*
3 *Mexico*. SAND88-0196. ERMS 225624. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Silva, M.K. 1994. *Implications of the Presence of Petroleum Resources on the Integrity of the*
5 *WIPP*. EEG-55. Albuquerque: Environmental Evaluation Group. ERMS 241470.
- 6 Snelling, A.A. 1992. *Alligator Rivers Analogue Project Final Report, Volume 2, Geologic*
7 *Setting*. UK DOE Report DOE/HMIP/RR/92/072, SKI Report SKI TR, vol. 92:20-2. Her
8 Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution of the Department of the Environment, London. Stockholm,
9 Sweden: Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. ERMS 241471.
- 10 Snider, A.C. 2001. "The Hydration of Magnesium Oxide in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,
11 December 2001." *MRS Fall 2001 Conference*, Boston, MA.
- 12 Snyder, R.P. 1985. *Dissolution of Halite and Gypsum, and Hydration of Anhydrite to Gypsum,*
13 *Rustler Formation, in the Vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Southeastern New Mexico*.
14 Open-File Report 85-229. Denver, CO: U.S. Geological Survey.
- 15 Snyder, R.P., and L.M. Gard, Jr. 1982. Evaluation of Breccia Pipes in Southeastern New
16 Mexico and Their Relation to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site. Open-File Report 82-
17 968. Denver: U.S. Geological Society. ERMS 241244.
- 18 Stenhouse, M.J., N.A. Chapman, and T.J. Sumerling. 1993. *SITE-94 Scenario Development*
19 *FEP Audit List Preparation: Methodology and Presentation*. SKI Technical Report 93:27.
20 ERMS 241371. Stockholm: Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate.
- 21 Stoelzel, D.M., and D.G. O'Brien. 1996. *The Effects of Salt Water Disposal and Waterflooding*
22 *on WIPP*. Summary Memorandum of Record for NS-7a. ERMS 240837. Albuquerque: Sandia
23 National Laboratories.
- 24 Stoelzel, D.M., and P.N. Swift. 1997. *Supplementary Analyses of the Effect of Salt Water*
25 *Disposal and Waterflooding on the WIPP*. ERMS 244158. Albuquerque: Sandia National
26 Laboratories.
- 27 Stroes-Gascoyne, S., and J.M. West. 1994. *Microbial Issues Pertaining to the Canadian*
28 *Concept for the Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Waste*. AECL Report No. AECL-10808, COG-93-54.
29 Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Manitoba, Canada: Whiteshell Labs, Pinawa. ERMS 241639.
- 30 Swift, P.N., W.D. Weart, S. G. Bertram-Howrey, R.V. Guzowski, K.F. Brinster, and S.B.
31 Pasztor. 1991. *Long-Term Climate Variability at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Background*
32 *Information Presented to the Expert Panel on Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste*
33 *Isolation Pilot Plant*. R.V. Guzowski and M.M. Gruebel, eds. SAND91-0928. Albuquerque:
34 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 35 Swift, P.N. 1992. *Long-Term Climate Variability at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,*
36 *Southeastern New Mexico, USA*. SAND91-7055. ERMS 227093. Albuquerque: Sandia
37 National Laboratories.

- 1 Tedesco, E.F. 1992. "Ceres." *McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology*. 1992 ed.
2 Vol. 3. p. 443.
- 3 Telander, M.R., and R.E. Westerman. 1993. *Hydrogen Generation by Metal Corrosion in*
4 *Simulated Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environments: Progress Report for the Period November*
5 *1989 through 1992*. SAND92-7347. ERMS 223456. Albuquerque: Sandia National
6 Laboratories.
- 7 Telford, W.M., L.P. Geldart, R. E. Sheriff, and D.A. Keys. 1976. *Applied Geophysics*.
8 Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP.
- 9 Thompson, G.A., and M.L. Zoback. 1979. "Regional Geophysics of the Colorado Plateau."
10 *Tectonophysics*, vol. 61, nos. 1-3: 149–81. ERMS 241603.
- 11 Thorne, B.J., and D.K. Rudeen. 1981. *Regional Effects of TRU Repository Heat*. SAND80-
12 7161. WPO 10281. ERMS 210281. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 13 Thorne, M.C. 1992. *Dry Run 3 - A Trial Assessment of Underground Disposal of Radioactive*
14 *Wastes Based on Probabilistic Risk Analysis - Volume 8: Uncertainty and Bias Audit*.
15 DOE/HMIP/RR/92.040. London: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) of the
16 Department of the Environment. ERMS 241245.
- 17 U.S. Congress. 1992. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act*. Public Law 102-579,
18 October 1992. 102nd Congress, Washington, DC. ERMS 239105.
- 19 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1980. *Final Environmental Impact Statement, Waste*
20 *Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 2 vols. DOE/EIS-0026. ERMS 238835 and ERMS 238838.
21 Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 22 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996a. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
23 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
24 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 25 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996b. *Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report*
26 *(Revision 3)*. DOE/CAO-95-1121. U.S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad, NM. ERMS 243330.
- 27 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1999. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 1998 Site Environmental*
28 *Report*. DOE/WIPP 99-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 29 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2000a. *MgO Mini-Sack Elimination Proposal* (July 21).
30 ERMS 519362. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 31 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2000b. *TRUPACT-II Authorized Methods for Payload*
32 *Control* (Revision 19b). March 2000. Washington TRU Solutions, Carlsbad, NM.
- 33 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
34 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
35 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.

- 1 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2005. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site*
2 *Environmental Report for 2004* (September). DOE/WIPP-05-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad
3 Field Office.
- 4 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site*
5 *Environmental Report for 2005* (September). DOE/WIPP-06-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad
6 Field Office.
- 7 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007a. *Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Annual Site*
8 *Environmental Report for 2006* (September). DOE/WIPP-07-2225. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad
9 Field Office.
- 10 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2007b. *Delaware Basin Monitoring Annual Report*.
11 DOE/WIPP-07-2308. U.S. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 12 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
13 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
14 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
15 20, 1993): 66398–416
- 16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
17 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance With the 40
18 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
19 5224–45.
- 20 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996b. *Compliance Application Guidance for 40*
21 *CFR Part 194* (March 29). EPA 402-R-95-014. ERMS 239159. Washington, DC: Office of
22 Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 23 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996c. *Criteria for the Certification and Re-*
24 *Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191 Disposal*
25 *Regulations, Background Information Document for 40 CFR Part 194*. 402-R-96-002. U.S.
26 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Washington, DC.
- 27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1997. Request for Additional Information.
28 Letter from R. Travato to A. Alm. 19 March 1997. EPA Air Docket A-93-02. Docket Number
29 II-I-17. Washington, DC.
- 30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998a. “40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
31 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the
32 Disposal Regulations; Certification Decision; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 63 (May 18,
33 1998): 27353–406.
- 34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998b. *Technical Support Document for Section*
35 *193.32: Scope of Performance Assessments* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
36 Indoor Air.

- 1 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1998c. *Response to Comments: Criteria for the*
2 *Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40*
3 *CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations* (May). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor
4 Air.
- 5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2001. Approval for the elimination of
6 magnesium oxide mini-sacks from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Letter from Frank
7 Marciniowski, EPA to Dr. Ines Triay, DOE. Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Environmental
8 Protection Agency, Washington, DC. ERMS 519362.
- 9 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006. *Technical Support Document for Sections*
10 *194.25, 194.32, and 194.33: Compliance Recertification Application Review for Features,*
11 *Events, and Processes* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and Indoor Air.
- 12 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 2002. Model RH-TRU 72-B Package Certificate
13 of Compliance Number 9212, Revision 2. December 27, 2002. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
14 Commission, Washington, DC.
- 15 Vaughn, P., M. Lord, J. Garner, J. and R. MacKinnon. 1995. "Radiolysis of Brine." Errata to
16 Summary Memorandum of Record GG-1, SWCF-A:1.1.6.3:PA:QA:TSK:GG1,S7. 21 December
17 1995. ERMS 230786. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 18 Vine, J.D. 1963. *Surface Geology of the Nash Draw Quadrangle, Eddy County, New Mexico.*
19 Bulletin 1141-B. Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey. ERMS 239558.
- 20 Waber, N. 1991. *Mineralogy, Petrology and Geochemistry of the Poços de Caldas Analogue*
21 *Study Sites, Minas Gerais, Brazil, I.: Osamu Utsumi Uranium Mine.* Nagra Report NTB-90-20.
22 Baden, Switzerland: National Genossen Schaft für die Lagerung Radioaktiver Abfalle
23 (NAORA).
- 24 Wakeley, L.D., P.T. Harrington, and F.D. Hansen. 1995. *Variability in Properties of Salado*
25 *Mass Concrete.* SAND94-1495. ERMS 222744. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Wallace, M. 1996a. "Leakage from Abandoned Boreholes." Summary Memorandum of Record
27 for NS-7b, SWCF-A 1.1.6.3:PA:QA:TSK:NS-7b. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
28 ERMS 240819.
- 29 Wallace, M. 1996b. "Pumping from the Culebra Outside the Controlled Area." Summary
30 Memorandum of Record for NS-5. SWCF-A 1.1.6.3:PA:QA:TSK:NS-5. Albuquerque: Sandia
31 National Laboratories. ERMS 240831.
- 32 Wallace, M. 1996c. *Records Package for Screening Effort NS11: Subsidence Associated with*
33 *Mining Inside or Outside the Controlled Area* (November 21). ERMS 412918. Carlsbad, NM:
34 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 35 Wallace, M., R. Beauheim, C. Stockman, M. Alena Martell, K. Brinster, R. Wilmot, and T.
36 Corbert. 1995. "Dewey Lake Data Collection and Compilation." Summary Memorandum of

- 1 Record for NS-1, SWCF-A 1.1.6.3:PA:QA:TSK:NS-1. Albuquerque: Sandia National
2 Laboratories. ERMS 222508.
- 3 Wallner, M. 1981. “Critical Examination of Conditions for Ductile Fracture in Rock Salt.”
4 *Proceedings of the Workshop on Near-Field Phenomena in Geologic Repositories for*
5 *Radioactive Waste, Seattle, WA, August 31–September 3, 1981* (pp. 243–53). Paris:
6 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. ERMS 241372.
- 7 Wang, Y. 1996. Memorandum to Internal Distribution (Subject: Evaluation of the Thermal
8 Effect of MgO Hydration for the Long-Term WIPP Performance Assessment). 9 May 1996.
9 ERMS 237743. U.S. Department of Energy. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Wang, Y. 1998. Memorandum to Malcolm D. Siegel (Subject: On the Matrix Pore Plugging
11 Issue). 8 August 1998. ERMS 421858. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National
12 Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 13 Wang, Y. and L.H. Brush. 1996a. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Estimates of Gas-
14 Generation Parameters for the Long-Term WIPP Performance Assessment). 26 January 1996.
15 ERMS 231943. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 16 Wang, Y. and L.H. Brush. 1996b. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Modify the
17 Stoichiometric Factor γ in the BRAGFLO to Include the Effect of MgO Added to WIPP
18 Repository as a Backfill). 23 February 1996. ERMS 232286. U.S. Department of Energy,
19 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 20 Warrick, R., and J. Oerlemans. 1990. *Sea Level Rise, in Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific*
21 *Assessment* (pp. 257–81). J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins, and J.J. Ephraums, eds. Sweden:
22 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
- 23 Westinghouse Electric Corporation. 1994. *Backfill Engineering Analysis Report, Waste*
24 *Isolation Pilot Plant*. WPO 37909. ERMS 237909. Carlsbad, NM. Westinghouse Electric
25 Corporation.
- 26 Wierczinski, B., S. Helfer, M. Ochs, and G. Skarnemark. 1998. “Solubility Measurements and
27 Sorption Studies of Thorium in Cement Pore Water.” *Journal of Alloys and Compounds*, vol.
28 271: 272–76.
- 29 Wilmot, R.D., and D.A. Galson. 1996. Memorandum of Record for NS17 and NS18, SWCF-A
30 1.1.6.3:PA:QA:TSK; NS-17, NS-18 (Subject: Human-Initiated Brine Density Changes). ERMS
31 238748. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 32 Wilson, C., D. Porter, J. Gibbons, E. Oswald, G. Sjoblom, and F. Caporuscio. 1996. *Conceptual*
33 *Models Supplementary Peer Review Report* (December). ERMS 243153. Carlsbad, NM:
34 Department of Energy, Carlsbad Area Office.
- 35 WIPP Performance Assessment Department. 1991. *Preliminary Comparison with 40 CFR Part*
36 *191, Subpart B for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, December 1991, Volume 1: Methodology and*

- 1 *Results*. SAND91-0893/1, Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Performance Assessment
2 Department, Albuquerque, NM. ERMS 226404.
- 3 WIPP Performance Assessment Department. 1993. *Preliminary Performance Assessment for*
4 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, December 1992, Volume 4: Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses*
5 *for 40 CFR 191, Subpart B*. SAND92-0700/4.UC-721. ERMS 223599. Albuquerque: Sandia
6 National Laboratories.
- 7 Witherspoon, P.A., J.S.Y., Wang, K. Iwai, and J.E. Gale. 1980. "Validity of Cubic Law for
8 Fluid Flow in a Deformable Rock Fracture." *Water Resources Research*, vol. 16: 1016–24.
9 ERMS 238853.
- 10 Wolery, T.J. 1992. *EQ3NR—A Computer Program for Geochemical Aqueous Speciation*
11 *Solubility Calculations: Theoretical Manual, User's Guide, and Related Documentation*
12 (Version 7.0). UCRL-MA-110662 PT III. Berkeley: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
- 13 Wood, R.E. Snow, D.J. Cosler, and S. Haji-Djafari. 1982. *Delaware Mountain Group (DMG)*
14 *Hydrology – Salt Removal Potential, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project, Southeastern*
15 *New Mexico*. TME 3166. ERMS 241602. Albuquerque: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 16 Zoback, M.D., and M.L. Zoback. 1991. "Tectonic Stress Field of North America and Relative
17 Plate Motions." *Neotectonics of North America* (pp. 339–66). D.B. Slemmons, E.R. Engdahl,
18 M.D. Zoback, and D.D. Blackwell, eds. Boulder, CO: Geological Society of America. ERMS
19 241601.
- 20 Zoback, M.L., and Zoback, M.D. 1980. "State of Stress in the Conterminous United States."
21 *Journal of Geophysical Research*, vol. 85, no. B11: 6113–56. ERMS 241600.
- 22 Zoback, M.L., M.D. Zoback, J. Adams, S. Bell, M. Suter, G. Suarez, C. Estabrook, and M.
23 Magee. 1991. *Stress Map of North America*. Continent Scale Map CSM-5, Scale 1:5,000,000.
24 Boulder, CO: Geological Society of America.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix SOTERM-2009
Actinide Chemistry Source Term**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix SOTERM-2009
Actinide Chemistry Source Term

Table of Contents

SOTERM-1.0 Introduction	SOTERM-1
SOTERM-2.0 Expected WIPP Repository Conditions, Chemistry, and Processes	SOTERM-3
SOTERM-2.1 Ambient Geochemical Conditions	SOTERM-3
SOTERM-2.2 Repository Conditions	SOTERM-3
SOTERM-2.2.1 Repository Pressure	SOTERM-5
SOTERM-2.2.2 Repository Temperature	SOTERM-5
SOTERM-2.2.3 Water Content and Relative Humidity	SOTERM-5
SOTERM-2.2.4 Minimum Repository Brine Volume	SOTERM-6
SOTERM-2.2.5 DRZ	SOTERM-7
SOTERM-2.3 Repository Chemistry	SOTERM-7
SOTERM-2.3.1 WIPP Brine	SOTERM-7
SOTERM-2.3.2 Brine pH and pH Buffering	SOTERM-9
SOTERM-2.3.3 Selected MgO Chemistry and Reactions	SOTERM-13
SOTERM-2.3.4 Iron Chemistry and Corrosion	SOTERM-14
SOTERM-2.3.5 Chemistry of Lead in the WIPP	SOTERM-16
SOTERM-2.3.6 Organic Chelating Agents	SOTERM-17
SOTERM-2.3.7 CPR in WIPP Waste	SOTERM-19
SOTERM-2.4 Important Postemplacement Processes	SOTERM-19
SOTERM-2.4.1 Microbial Effects in the WIPP	SOTERM-19
SOTERM-2.4.2 Radiolysis Effects in the WIPP	SOTERM-23
SOTERM-2.5 Changes in WIPP Conditions since the CRA-2004 and the CRA- 2004 PABC	SOTERM-27
SOTERM-3.0 WIPP-Relevant Actinide Chemistry	SOTERM-29
SOTERM-3.1 Actinide Inventory in the WIPP	SOTERM-30
SOTERM-3.2 Thorium Chemistry	SOTERM-33
SOTERM-3.2.1 Thorium Environmental Chemistry	SOTERM-33
SOTERM-3.2.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA- 2004 PABC	SOTERM-35
SOTERM-3.3 Uranium Chemistry	SOTERM-37
SOTERM-3.3.1 Uranium Environmental Chemistry	SOTERM-38
SOTERM-3.3.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA- 2004 PABC	SOTERM-45
SOTERM-3.4 Neptunium Chemistry	SOTERM-47
SOTERM-3.4.1 Neptunium Environmental Chemistry	SOTERM-47
SOTERM-3.4.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA- 2004 PABC	SOTERM-48
SOTERM-3.5 Plutonium Chemistry	SOTERM-48
SOTERM-3.5.1 Plutonium Environmental Chemistry	SOTERM-49
SOTERM-3.5.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA- 2004 PABC	SOTERM-52
SOTERM-3.6 Americium and Curium Chemistry	SOTERM-54
SOTERM-3.6.1 Americium and Curium Environmental Chemistry	SOTERM-55
SOTERM-3.6.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA- 2004 PABC	SOTERM-58
SOTERM-3.7 Complexation of Actinides by WIPP Organic Chelating Agents	SOTERM-60

SOTERM-3.8 Actinide Colloids.....	SOTERM-60
SOTERM-3.8.1 Actinide Colloids in the Environment.....	SOTERM-61
SOTERM-3.8.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 PABC	SOTERM-63
SOTERM-3.9 Changes in Actinide Speciation Information since the CRA-2004 and the CRA-2004 PABC.....	SOTERM-63
SOTERM-4.0 Calculation of the WIPP Actinide Source Term	SOTERM-66
SOTERM-4.1 Overview of WIPP Approach to Calculate Actinide Solubilities	SOTERM-67
SOTERM-4.2 Use of Oxidation-State-Invariant Analogs.....	SOTERM-67
SOTERM-4.3 Actinide Inventory and Oxidation State Distribution in the WIPP ..	SOTERM-69
SOTERM-4.4 Actinide Speciation Reactions Used in the FMT Model.....	SOTERM-70
SOTERM-4.4.1 The III Actinides: Pu(III), Am(III), Cm(III)	SOTERM-71
SOTERM-4.4.2 The IV Actinides: Th(IV), U(IV), Pu(IV), Np(IV)	SOTERM-71
SOTERM-4.4.3 The V Actinides: Np(V).....	SOTERM-74
SOTERM-4.4.4 The VI Actinides: U(VI)	SOTERM-75
SOTERM-4.5 Calculations of Actinide Solubility Using the FMT Computer Code	SOTERM-76
SOTERM-4.5.1 Pitzer Approach for High-Ionic-Strength Brines	SOTERM-76
SOTERM-4.5.2 Calculated Actinide Solubilities.....	SOTERM-77
SOTERM-4.6 Calculation of the Effects of Organic Ligands on Actinide Solubility.....	SOTERM-79
SOTERM-4.7 Calculation of Colloidal Contribution to Actinide Solution Concentrations	SOTERM-80
SOTERM-5.0 Use of the Actinide Source Term in PA.....	SOTERM-83
SOTERM-5.1 Simplifications.....	SOTERM-83
SOTERM-5.1.1 Elements and Isotopes Modeled.....	SOTERM-83
SOTERM-5.1.2 Use of Brine End Members	SOTERM-84
SOTERM-5.1.3 Sampling of Uncertain Parameters.....	SOTERM-85
SOTERM-5.1.4 Combining the Transport of Dissolved and Colloidal Species in the Salado	SOTERM-88
SOTERM-5.2 Construction of the Source Term	SOTERM-88
SOTERM-5.3 Example Calculation of Actinide Solubility	SOTERM-91
SOTERM-5.4 Calculated Dissolved, Colloidal, and Total Actinide Solubilities....	SOTERM-91
SOTERM-6.0 References	SOTERM-94

List of Figures

Figure SOTERM-1. Molal H ⁺ Concentration Measured as a Function of Time During the Solubility Experiments in 2.67 and 5.15 m MgCl ₂ Solution	SOTERM-12
Figure SOTERM-2. Expected Dominant Actinide Oxidation States as a Function of the Standard Reduction Potential at pH = 7 in Water That is in Equilibrium With Atmospheric CO ₂	SOTERM-23
Figure SOTERM-3. NaCl Brine Radiolysis Species and Suggested Mechanism of Production.....	SOTERM-25
Figure SOTERM-4. Radiolytic Formation of Hypochlorite Ion in Solutions of Various NaCl Concentrations at a Constant Alpha Activity	

	of 37 GBq/L at pH~12 (Based on Data in Kelm, Pashalidis, and Kim 1999)	SOTERM-25
Figure SOTERM-5.	Solubility of Amorphous Th(IV) Oxyhydroxide as a Function of Carbonate Concentration in 5 M for pH = 2–8 (A) and pH = 8–13.5 (B)	SOTERM-36
Figure SOTERM-6.	Solubility of Th(OH) ₄ (am) Determined from Undersaturation in 0.5 NaCl, 5.0 M NaCl, and 2.5 M MgCl ₂	SOTERM-37
Figure SOTERM-7.	Reduction Potential Diagram for U at pH = 0, 8, and 14 (Based on Data in Morss, Edelstein, and Fuger 2006)	SOTERM-38
Figure SOTERM-8.	Predominance Diagrams for U as a Function of Log P _{O₂} and pH: (A) Predominant Solid Phases; (B) Predominant Aqueous Species	SOTERM-41
Figure SOTERM-9.	Solubility of UO ₂ (s) as a Function of pH at 20–25 °C (68–77 °F) in 1M NaCl (based on Neck and Kim 2001)	SOTERM-42
Figure SOTERM-10.	U(VI) Solubility in Carbonate-Free Brine Versus pC _{H+} for GWB (Top Curve) and ERDA-6 (Bottom Curve)	SOTERM-45
Figure SOTERM-11.	Speciation Diagram for Plutonium in Carbonated Low-Ionic-Strength Groundwater (Based on Data Presented in Runde et al. 2002)	SOTERM-50
Figure SOTERM-12.	Comparison of the Reactivity of Iron Powder and Iron Coupon Towards Pu(VI)	SOTERM-53
Figure SOTERM-13.	The Concentration of Pu as a Function of Time in the Presence of Iron Powder, Iron Coupon, Ferric Oxide, and Magnetite (Mixed Iron Oxide) (Reed et al. 2009)	SOTERM-54
Figure SOTERM-14.	Redox Potential for Some Am Redox Couples (Silva et al. 1995, p. 74)	SOTERM-55
Figure SOTERM-15.	Composite of Nd Solubility Trends Under All Conditions Investigated (Borkowski et al. 2008)	SOTERM-59
Figure SOTERM-16.	Predominant Am Species as a Function of pH and E _h Based on the Speciation Reactions (SOTERM.34) to (SOTERM.47) (Richmann 2008)	SOTERM-72
Figure SOTERM-17.	Predominant Species of Th as a Function of pH and Redox Conditions (Richmann 2008)	SOTERM-73
Figure SOTERM-18.	Predominant Species Diagram for Np as a Function of pH and E _h Based on the Np Speciation Data Reactions (SOTERM.60) to (SOTERM.70) (Richmann 2008)	SOTERM-75
Figure SOTERM-19.	Frequency Distribution of the Deviation of Experimental log Solubility from Model-Predicted Value for all An(III) Comparisons	SOTERM-86
Figure SOTERM-20.	Frequency Distribution of the Deviation of Experimental log Solubility from Model-Predicted Value for all An(IV) Comparisons	SOTERM-87
Figure SOTERM-21.	Cumulative Distribution Function for the Humic-Acid Proportionality Constant	SOTERM-88

List of Tables

Table SOTERM-1.	Summary of Current WIPP Chemistry Model Assumptions (Leigh et al. 2005).....	SOTERM-4
Table SOTERM-2.	Compositions of GWB and ERDA-6 Prior To and After Equilibration with MgO (Brush et al. 2006).....	SOTERM-8
Table SOTERM-3.	Redox Half-Reaction Potentials for Key Fe, Pb, Pu, and U Reactions at 25 °C and I<1 (Morss, Edelstein, and Fuger 2006, Chapter 23).....	SOTERM-15
Table SOTERM-4.	Concentrations of Organic Ligands in WIPP Brine Calculated for Use in the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush and Xiong 2005a)	SOTERM-18
Table SOTERM-5.	Apparent Stability Constants for Organic Ligands with Selected Metals (National Institute of Standards and Technology 2004).....	SOTERM-18
Table SOTERM-6.	Overview of the WIPP PA View/Role and Relevant Environmental Chemistry of the Key Actinide Species in the WIPP (References for Each Actinide are Provided in the Following Sections)	SOTERM-31
Table SOTERM-7.	WIPP Radionuclide Inventory (U.S. Department of Energy 2006) Decay-Corrected to 2002.....	SOTERM-32
Table SOTERM-8.	Total Amount (in Kilograms) of Key Waste Package Components and Actinides Present in WIPP Panels 1 and 2 (Based on Data in Lucchini et al. 2007)	SOTERM-33
Table SOTERM-9.	Thermodynamic Stability Constants for Key Th Hydrolytic Species	SOTERM-34
Table SOTERM-10.	Complexation Constants for Binary U(VI) Carbonate Complexes at I = 0 M and 25 °C (Guillaumont et al. 2003)....	SOTERM-43
Table SOTERM-11.	Solubility of U(VI) in High-Ionic-Strength Media.....	SOTERM-46
Table SOTERM-12.	Hydrolysis Constants of Am(III) (in Logarithmic Units) Corresponding to Equation (SOTERM.30)	SOTERM-57
Table SOTERM-13.	Apparent Stability Constants for the Complexation of Organic Ligands with Actinides in NaCl Media (Choppin et al. 1999)	SOTERM-60
Table SOTERM-14.	List of Documents and Reports that Support the CRA-2004 PABC	SOTERM-66
Table SOTERM-15.	WIPP Radionuclide Inventory at Closure (in 2033) Used in PABC-2005 Calculations (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005).....	SOTERM-69
Table SOTERM-16.	Oxidation States of the Actinides in the WIPP as Used in the CRA-2004 PABC.....	SOTERM-70
Table SOTERM-17.	Solubilities of the Oxidation-State Analogs (M) with MgO Backfill Calculated for the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush 2005)....	SOTERM-78
Table SOTERM-18.	Historical Actinide Solubilities (M) Calculated (III, IV, and V) or Estimated (VI) for the CRA-2004 PA, the CCA PAVT and the CCA PA (U.S. Department of Energy 2004)....	SOTERM-78
Table SOTERM-19.	Comparison of Actinide Solubility Calculations With and Without Organics.....	SOTERM-80

Table SOTERM-20.	Classification of Four Colloid Types Considered by WIPP PA	SOTERM-80
Table SOTERM-21.	Material and Property Names for Colloidal Parameters	SOTERM-81
Table SOTERM-22.	Colloid Concentration Factors (The CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM)	SOTERM-82
Table SOTERM-23.	Actinide Concentration or Maximum Concentration Due to Colloidal Enhanced Solution Concentrations (Garner and Leigh 2005).....	SOTERM-82
Table SOTERM-24.	WIPP PA Modeling Scenarios for the CRA-2004 PABC (Garner and Leigh 2005; Leigh et al. 2005)	SOTERM-84
Table SOTERM-25.	Concentrations (M) of Dissolved, Colloidal, and Total Mobile Actinides Obtained Using Median Parameter Values for the CCA PAVT and CRA-2004 PABC ^a	SOTERM-92

Acronyms and Abbreviations

%	percent
α	alpha particle
a_c	activity of a chemical species
μm	micrometer, micron
ACP	LANL-CO Actinide Chemistry Project
am	amorphous
AP	Analysis Plan
aq	aqueous
ASTP	Actinide Source Term Program
atm	atmosphere
β	(apparent) stability constant, or beta particle
Bq	becquerel
BRAGFLO	Brine and Gas Flow code
CAPHUM	maximum (cap) concentration of actinide associated with mobile humic colloids
CAPMIC	maximum concentrations of actinides that could be associated with microbes
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
Ci	Curie
cm^{-1}	per centimeter
CN	coordination number
coll	colloid
conc	concentration
CONCINT	concentration of actinide associated with mobile actinide intrinsic colloids
CONCMIN	concentration of actinide associated with mobile mineral fragment colloids
CPR	cellulosic, plastic, and rubber
C_{Pu}	maximum concentration of all combined isotopes of Pu
cr	crystalline phase
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DBR	direct brine release
D-H	Debye-Hückel theory
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DRZ	disturbed rock zone

EDTA	ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EQ3/6	software package for geochemical modeling of aqueous systems
eV	electron volt
EXAFS	Extended X-Ray Absorption Fine Structure
f_{CO_2}	fugacity of carbon dioxide
FMT	Fracture-Matrix Transport
ft	feet
γ	gamma radiation or activity coefficient
g	gaseous, or gram
g/mL	gram per milliliter
GBq	giga becquerel
GWB	Generic Weep Brine, a synthetic brine representative of fluids in Salado brine reservoirs
h	hours
I	ionic strength
K	degree Kelvin or stability constant
kg	kilogram
K_{sp}	solubility product
L	liter
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LET	Linear Energy Transfer
log	logarithm
\log_{10}	logarithm base 10
m	meter, molal
M	mole per liter
m^2	square meter
m^3	cubic meter
mg/L	milligram per liter
mL	milliliter
mM	millimole per liter
mol	mole
molec	molecule

MPa	megapascal
N	degree of polymerization number
N _A	Avogadro's number
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
nm	nanometer
NUTS	Nuclide Transport System code
orgs	organics
OXSTAT	oxidation state parameter
PA	Performance Assessment
PABC	Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
PAVT	Performance Assessment Verification Test
pC _{H⁺} or pCH	Negative logarithm of H ⁺ concentration in moles per liter
pCO ₂	Partial pressure of carbon dioxide
pH	negative logarithm of H ⁺ activity
pH _{obs}	negative logarithm of H ⁺ activity measured
PHUMCIM	Proportionality constant for concentration of actinides associated with mobile humic colloids, in Castile brine
PHUMOX _n	Proportionality constant for humic colloids and actinides in the +n oxidation state
PHUMSIM	Proportionality constant for concentration of actinides associated with mobile humic colloids, in Salado brine
pK _a	negative logarithm of the dissociation constant of an acid
pm	picometer
pmH	negative logarithm of H ⁺ concentration in molal
P _{O₂}	partial pressure of molecular oxygen
PROPMIC	proportionality constant describing the amount of actinide element bound to mobile microbes
RH	relative humidity
s	solid or second
SECOTP2D	computer program that simulates single or multiple component radionuclide transport in fractures or granular aquifers
SEM	scanning electron microscope
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SOTERM	WIPP Actinide Source Term
SPC	Salado Primary Constituents

t _½	half-life
TDS	total dissolved solid
TRU	transuranic
TWBIR	Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report
V	volt, or vanadium
w	with
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WWIS	WIPP Waste Information System
XANES	X-Ray Absorption Near Edge Structure
XRD	X-Ray Diffraction
yr	year

Elements and Chemical Compounds

Am	Americium
Am(III)	Americium in the +3 oxidation state
Am(IV)	Americium in the +4 oxidation state
Am(V)	Americium in the +5 oxidation state
Am(VI)	Americium in the +6 oxidation state
Am ²⁺	Americium cation - Aqueous form of the americium in the +2 oxidation state that only exists as a transient
Am ³⁺	Americium cation - Aqueous form of the americium in the +3 oxidation state
Am ⁴⁺	Americium cation - Aqueous form of the americium in the +4 oxidation state
Am(CO ₃) _n ⁽³⁻²ⁿ⁾	Americium (III) carbonate complex with n=1, 2, or 3
AmCO ₃ OH	Americium (III) carbonato hydroxide
AmO ₂ ⁺	Americium oxo-cation – Aqueous form of the americium in the +5 oxidation state
AmO ₂ ²⁺	Americium oxo-cation – Aqueous form of the americium in the +6 oxidation state
AmO ₂ OH	Americium (V) oxide hydroxide
AmOH ²⁺	Americium (III) hydroxide cation – (1:1) complex
Am(OH) ₂ ⁺	Americium (III) hydroxide cation – (1:2) complex
Am(OH) ₃	Americium hydroxide
AmPO ₄	Americium (III) phosphate
Am(SO ₄) _n ⁽³⁻²ⁿ⁾	Americium (III) sulfate complex with n = 1 or 2
[An] _p	Concentration of an adsorbed actinide element (mol/particle)
An	Actinide
An(III)	General actinide in the +3 oxidation state
An(IV)	General actinide in the +4 oxidation state
An(V)	General actinide in the +5 oxidation state
An(VI)	General actinide in the +6 oxidation state
An ³⁺	Aqueous form of the actinide in the +3 oxidation state
An ⁴⁺	Aqueous form of the actinide in the +4 oxidation state
An ⁿ⁺	Aqueous form of the actinide in the +n oxidation state
An ₂ (CO ₃) ₃	Actinide (III) carbonate – (2:3) complex

$An_2(CO_3)_2^{2+}$	Actinide (III) carbonate ion – (2:2) complex
$AnB_4O_7^+$	Actinide (III) tetraborate ion – (1:1) complex
$AnCl^{2+}$	Actinide (III) chloride ion – (1:1) complex
$An(CO_3)^+$	Actinide (III) carbonate ion – (1:1) complex
$An(CO_3)_2^-$	Actinide (III) carbonate ion – (1:2) complex
$An(CO_3)_3^{3-}$	Actinide (III) carbonate ion – (1:3) complex
$AnCO_3OH$	Actinide (III) carbonate hydroxide
$AnL^{(n+m)}$	Complex of an actinide with a charge n and an organic ligand L with a charge m
$An(V)O_2^+$ or AnO_2^+	Aqueous form of the actinide in the +5 oxidation state
$An(VI)O_2^{2+}$ or AnO_2^{2+}	Aqueous form of the actinide in the +6 oxidation state
$AnOH^{2+}$	Actinide (III) hydroxide cation – (1:1) complex
$An(OH)_3$	Hydroxide of the actinide (III)
$AnPO_4$	Actinide (III) phosphate
$AnSO_4^+$	Actinide (III) sulfate ion – (1:1) complex
$B_3O_3(OH)_4^-$	Hydroxy polynuclear form of boric acid
$B_4O_7^{2-}$	Tetraborate anion
$B(OH)_x^{3-x}$	Hydroxyborate ions
Ba^{2+}	Barium cation
Br^-	Bromide anion
[C]	Concentration of species C in solution
$[C_0]$	Concentration of a chosen standard state
C	Carbon or concentration
$C_6H_{10}O_5$	Cellulose
CH_4	Methane
$CH_3CO_2^-$	Acetate anion
$(CH_2CO_2)_2C(OH)(CO_2)^{3-}$	Citrate anion
$(CH_2CO_2)_2N(CH_2)_2N(CH_2CO_2)_2^{4-}$	Ethylenediaminetetraacetate (EDTA) anion
$C_2O_4^{2-}$	Oxalate anion
Ca^{2+}	Calcium cation
$CaCl_2$	Calcium chloride
$CaCO_3$	Calcium carbonate
$CaMg(CO_3)_2$	Dolomite, calcium magnesium carbonate

CaO	Calcium oxide
Ca ₄ [Pu(OH) ₈] ⁴⁺	Calcium plutonium (IV) hydroxide cation complex
CaSO ₄	Anhydrite, calcium sulfate
CaSO ₄ ·2H ₂ O	Gypsum, hydrated calcium sulfate
Ca ₄ [Th(OH) ₈] ⁴⁺	Calcium thorium (IV) hydroxide cation complex
CeO ₂	Cerium dioxide
Cl	Chlorine
Cl ⁻	Chloride ion
Cl ₂	Chlorine
Cl ₂ ⁻	Chlorine free radical
Cl ₃ ⁻	Chlorine anion
ClBr ⁻	Chloride bromide radical
ClO ⁻	Hypochlorite anion
ClO ₂ ⁻	Chlorite anion
ClO ₃ ⁻	Chlorate anion
ClO ₄ ⁻	Perchlorate anion
Cm	Curium
Cm(III)	Curium in the +3 oxidation state
Cm(IV)	Curium in the +4 oxidation state
Cm ³⁺	Curium cation – Aqueous form of the curium at the +3 oxidation state
CO ₂	Carbon dioxide
CO ₃ ²⁻	Carbonate anion
Cr	Chromium
Cs	Cesium
Cu	Copper
F ⁻	Fluoride
Fe	Iron
Fe(0)	Zero-valent iron
FeCl ₄ ²⁻	Iron (II) tetrachloride anion
FeCO ₃	Iron (II) carbonate, ferrous carbonate
Fe ₃ O ₄	Magnetite, iron (II,III) oxide
Fe ²⁺	Aqueous form of the iron in the +2 oxidation state, ferrous anion

Fe ³⁺	Aqueous form of the iron in the +3 oxidation state, ferric anion
Fe(II)	Iron in the +2 oxidation state
Fe(III)	Iron in the +3 oxidation state
Fe(OH) ₃	Ferric hydroxide
Fe(OH) ₂ ·(x-2)H ₂ O	Hydrated ferrous hydroxide
FeOOH	Goethite, iron oxide hydroxide
FeS	Iron (II) sulfide
H	Hydrogen
H ⁺	Hydrogen cation
H ₂	Hydrogen
HA	Humic acid
HAal-LBr	Aliphatic humic acid isolated from sediments collected from Lake Bradford, Florida, prepared by Florida State University
HAar-Gor	Aromatic humic acid isolated from groundwaters near Gorleben, Germany, obtained from Professor J.-I. Kim, Institut für Radiochemie, München
HClO ₄	Perchloric acid
hmag.	Hydromagnesite
HPO ₄ ²⁻	Hydrogenphosphate anion
HCO ₃ ⁻	Bicarbonate anion, hydrogen carbonate anion
H ₂ O	Water
H ₂ O ₂	Hydrogen peroxide
HOBr	Hypobromous acid
HOCl	Hypochlorous acid
H ₂ PO ₄ ⁻	Dihydrogen phosphate anion
H ₂ S	Hydrogen sulfide
K	Potassium
K ⁺	Potassium cation
K ₂ MgCa ₂ (SO ₄) ₄ ·2H ₂ O	Polyhalite
KNpO ₂ CO ₃ ·2H ₂ O	Hydrated potassium neptunium (V) carbonate – (1:1:1) complex
K ₃ NpO ₂ (CO ₃) ₂ ·0.5H ₂ O	Hydrated potassium neptunium (V) carbonate – (3:1:2) complex
K ₂ SO ₄	Potassium sulfate
K ₂ U ₂ O ₇	Potassium diuranate

mag.	Magnesite
Mg	Magnesium
Mg ²⁺	Magnesium cation
MgCl ₂	Magnesium chloride
Mg ₃ (OH) ₅ Cl·4H ₂ O	Magnesium chloride hydroxide hydrate
MgCO ₃	Magnesite, magnesium carbonate
Mg ₅ (CO ₃) ₄ (OH) ₂ ·4H ₂ O	Hydromagnesite
Mg ₂ (OH) ₃ Cl·4H ₂ O	Magnesium chloride hydroxide hydrate, magnesium oxychloride
MgO	Periclase, magnesium oxide
Mg(OH) ₂	Brucite, magnesium hydroxide
Mn	Manganese
N ₂	Nitrogen
Na	Sodium
Na ⁺	Sodium cation
Na ₂ SO ₄	Sodium sulfate
Na ₂ S ₂ O ₄	Sodium hydrosulfite
NaAm(CO ₃) ₂	Sodium americium (III) carbonate
NaCl	Halite, sodium chloride
NaNpO ₂ CO ₃ ·3.5H ₂ O	Hydrated sodium neptunium (V) carbonate – (1:1:1) complex
Na ₃ NpO ₂ (CO ₃) ₂	Sodium neptunium (V) carbonate – (3:1:2) complex
NaOH	Sodium hydroxide
NaUO ₂ O(OH) H ₂ O	Clarkeite, sodium uranate
Na ₂ U ₂ O ₇ ·xH ₂ O	Sodium diuranate hydrate
Nd	Neodymium
Nd(III)	Neodymium in the +3 oxidation state
Nd(OH) ₃	Neodymium (III) hydroxide
Ni	Nickel
Ni ²⁺	Nickel (II) cation
Np	Neptunium
Np(IV)	Neptunium in the +4 oxidation state
Np(V)	Neptunium in the +5 oxidation state
Np(VI)	Neptunium in the +6 oxidation state

Np^{4+}	Neptunium cation – Aqueous form of the neptunium at the +4 oxidation state
NpO_2^+ or Np(V)O_2^+	Neptunyl cation – Aqueous form of the neptunium at the +5 oxidation state
NpO_2^{2+} or Np(VI)O_2^{2+}	Neptunyl cation – Aqueous form of the neptunium at the +6 oxidation state
$\text{NpO}_2\text{CO}_3^-$	Neptunium (V) carbonate ion – (1:1) complex
$\text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{3-}$	Neptunium (V) carbonate ion – (1:2) complex
$\text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{5-}$	Neptunium (V) carbonate ion – (1:3) complex
NpO_2OH	Neptunium (V) hydroxide
$\text{NpO}_2(\text{OH})_2^-$	Neptunium (V) hydroxide ion – (1:2) complex
NO_3^-	Nitrate anion
N_S	Adsorption site density (sites/nm ²)
O	Oxygen
O_2	Molecular oxygen
OBr^-	Hypobromite anion
OCl^-	Hypochlorite anion
OH^-	Hydroxide anion
$\text{OH}\cdot$	Hydroxyl radical
Pb	Lead
Pb(0)	Zero-valent lead
Pb(II)	Lead in the +2 oxidation state
Pb^{2+}	Lead cation – Aqueous form of the lead at the +2 oxidation state
Pb^{4+}	Lead cation – Aqueous form of the lead at the +4 oxidation state
PbCl_2	Lead (II) chloride
PbCO_3	Lead (II) carbonate
$[\text{Pb}_6\text{O}(\text{OH})_6]^{4+}$	Lead (II) polyoxyhydroxide cation
PbO	Lead (II) oxide
PO_4^{3-}	Phosphate anion
$(\text{PbOH})_2\text{CO}_3$	Lead (II) hydroxide carbonate
PbS	Lead (II) sulfide
PbSO_4	Lead (II) sulfate
Pu	Plutonium

Pu(III)	Plutonium in the +3 oxidation state
Pu(IV)	Plutonium in the +4 oxidation state
Pu(V)	Plutonium in the +5 oxidation state
Pu(VI)	Plutonium in the +6 oxidation state
Pu(VII)	Plutonium in the +7 oxidation state
Pu^{3+}	Plutonium cation – Aqueous form of the plutonium at the +3 oxidation state
Pu^{4+}	Plutonium cation – Aqueous form of the plutonium at the +4 oxidation state
$\text{Pu}(\text{CO}_3)^+$	Plutonium (III) carbonate ion – (1:1) complex
$\text{Pu}(\text{CO}_3)_2^-$	Plutonium (III) carbonate ion – (1:2) complex
$\text{Pu}(\text{CO}_3)_3^{3-}$	Plutonium (III) carbonate ion – (1:3) complex
PuF_2^{2+}	Plutonium (IV) fluoride cation
PuO_2	Plutonium (IV) dioxide
PuO_{2+x}	Oxidized plutonium (IV) dioxide
PuO_2CO_3	Plutonium (VI) carbonate
$\text{PuO}_2\text{CO}_3^-$	Plutonium (V) carbonate ion – (1:1) complex
$\text{PuO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{3-}$	Plutonium (V) carbonate ion – (1:2) complex
$\text{PuO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{2-}$	Plutonium (VI) carbonate ion – (1:2) complex
$\text{PuO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{4-}$	Plutonium (VI) carbonate ion – (1:3) complex
PuO_2F^+	Plutonium (VI) oxofluoride cation
PuO_2^+ or Pu(V)O_2^+	Plutonyl cation – Aqueous form of the plutonium at the +5 oxidation state
PuO_2^{2+} or Pu(VI)O_2^{2+}	Plutonyl cation – Aqueous form of the plutonium at the +6 oxidation state
$\text{PuO}_3 \cdot x\text{H}_2\text{O}$	Plutonium (VI) trioxide-hydrate
PuOH^{3+}	Plutonium (IV) hydroxide cation – (1:1) complex
$\text{Pu}(\text{OH})_2^{2+}$	Plutonium (IV) hydroxide cation – (1:2) complex
$\text{Pu}(\text{OH})_3^+$	Plutonium (IV) hydroxide cation – (1:3) complex
$\text{Pu}(\text{OH})_4$	Plutonium (IV) hydroxide
$[\text{Pu}(\text{H}_2\text{O})_m]^{n+}$	Hydrolysis complex of plutonium
$[\text{Pu}(\text{O})\text{Pu}(\text{O})\text{Pu}(\text{O})\dots]_n$	Plutonium polymer
Ra	Radium
S^{2-}	Sulfide anion

SO_4^{2-}	Sulfate anion
Sr	Strontium
Tc(IV)	Technetium in the +4 oxidation state
Th	Thorium
Th(IV)	Thorium in the +4 oxidation state
Th^{3+}	Thorium cation – Aqueous form of the thorium at the +3 oxidation state
Th^{4+}	Thorium cation – Aqueous form of the thorium at the +4 oxidation state
$\text{Th}(\text{CO}_3)_5^{6-}$	Thorium (IV) pentacarbonyl ion complex
ThO_2	Thorium dioxide
$\text{Th}(\text{OH})_4$	Thorium hydroxide
$\text{Th}(\text{OH})(\text{CO}_3)_4^{5-}$	Thorium (IV) hydroxide carbonate ion – (1:1:4) complex
$\text{Th}(\text{OH})_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{2-}$	Thorium (IV) hydroxide carbonate ion – (1:2:2) complex
$\text{Th}(\text{OH})_3\text{CO}_3^-$	Thorium (IV) hydroxide carbonate ion – (1:3:1) complex
$\text{Th}(\text{OH})_2\text{SO}_4$	Thorium (IV) hydroxide sulfate ion – (1:2:1) complex
$\text{Th}(\text{SO}_4)_3^{2-}$	Thorium (IV) sulfate ion – (1:3) complex
$\text{Th}(\text{SO}_4)_2$	Thorium (IV) sulfate
U	Uranium
U(III)	Uranium in the +3 oxidation state
U(IV)	Uranium in the +4 oxidation state
U(V)	Uranium in the +5 oxidation state
U(VI)	Uranium in the +6 oxidation state
U^{3+}	Uranium cation – Aqueous form of the uranium at the +3 oxidation state
U^{4+}	Uranium cation – Aqueous form of the uranium at the +4 oxidation state
U_3O_7	Triuranium heptaoxide
U_4O_9	Tetrauranium nonaoxide
UO_2	Uraninite, uranium (IV) dioxide
UO_2^{2+} or $\text{U}(\text{VI})\text{O}_2^{2+}$	Uranyl cation – Aqueous form of the uranium at the +6 oxidation state
UO_2CO_3	Rutherfordine, uranium (VI) carbonate
$\text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{2-}$	Uranium (VI) carbonate ion – (1:2) complex
$\text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{4-}$	Uranium (VI) carbonate ion – (1:3) complex or triscarbonato complex
$(\text{UO}_2)_3(\text{CO}_3)_6^{6-}$	Uranium (VI) carbonate ion – (3:6) complex
$(\text{UO}_2)_2(\text{CO}_3)(\text{OH})_3^-$	Uranium (VI) carbonate hydroxide ion – (2:1:3) complex
$(\text{UO}_2)_{11}(\text{CO}_3)_6(\text{OH})_{12}^{2-}$	Uranium (VI) carbonate hydroxide ion – (11:6:12) complex

UO_2OH^+	Uranium (VI) hydroxide ion – (1:1) complex
$(\text{UO}_2)_3(\text{OH})_5^+$	Uranium (VI) hydroxide ion – (3:5) complex
$\text{UO}_2(\text{OH})_3^-$	Uranium (VI) hydroxide ion – (1:3) complex
$\text{UO}_2(\text{OH})_4^{2-}$	Uranium (VI) hydroxide ion – (1:4) complex
$\text{U}(\text{OH})_3^+$	Uranium (IV) hydroxide ion – (1:3) complex
$\text{U}(\text{OH})_4$	Uranium (IV) hydroxide
$\text{UO}_2 \cdot x\text{H}_2\text{O}$	Hydrous uranium (IV) dioxide
$(\text{UO}_2)(\text{OH})_2 \cdot x\text{H}_2\text{O}$ or $\text{UO}_3 \cdot x\text{H}_2\text{O}$	Schoepite, hydrated uranium trioxide
V	Vanadium
ZrO_2	Zirconium dioxide

1 **SOTERM-1.0 Introduction**

2 Appendix SOTERM-2009 (Actinide Chemistry Source Term) is a summary of the U. S.
3 Department of Energy's (DOE's) understanding of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
4 chemical conditions, assumptions, and processes; the underlying actinide chemistry; and the
5 resulting dissolved actinide concentrations that were calculated based on this repository
6 chemistry. This appendix supplements Appendix PA-2009 in the 2009 Compliance
7 Recertification Application (CRA-2009). The calculational results summarized here are based
8 on the 2004 Performance Assessment (PA) Baseline Calculations (PABC) (Leigh et al. 2005),
9 and hence on the various assumptions about chemical conditions in the repository that were
10 included in the formulation of that baseline. WIPP-related geochemical experimental results
11 obtained within and outside of the WIPP project since these calculations were performed are also
12 summarized.

13 Actinide release from the WIPP is a critical performance measure for the WIPP as a transuranic
14 (TRU) repository. There are a number of potential pathways for actinide release considered by
15 the WIPP PA, and these are discussed in detail in Appendix PA-2009. Quantifying the impact of
16 these releases contributes directly to assessing compliance with 40 CFR Part 191 (U.S.
17 Environmental Protection Agency 1993).

18 In the undisturbed scenario for PA, actinide releases up the shafts or laterally through the marker
19 beds are physically insignificant in all realizations and have no impact on compliance (Appendix
20 PA-2009, Section PA-7.2). The self-sealing of the salt and the reducing anoxic environment in
21 the repository provide the primary mechanisms for geologic isolation of the TRU waste in the
22 undisturbed scenario. For the disturbed scenarios, actinide releases can occur primarily as a
23 result of inadvertent human intrusions (i.e., boreholes drilled into or through the repository). For
24 example, direct brine release (DBR) to the accessible environment may occur during a drilling
25 intrusion, or actinides may be transported up a borehole to the Culebra Formation and then move
26 laterally through the Culebra to the land withdrawal boundary (LWB). The potential for human
27 intrusions makes it important to assess the range of possible repository conditions and associated
28 dissolved actinide concentrations associated with the disturbed scenarios.

29 This appendix focuses on the actinide source term used to calculate actinide release from the
30 WIPP for the DBR release and transport through the Salado and Culebra Formations. This
31 actinide source term is the sum of the soluble and colloidal species in brine. Direct release of
32 actinide particulates to the surface resulting from cuttings, cavings, and spillings is not
33 considered part of the actinide source term because these particulate releases do not depend on
34 the mobilized actinide concentrations in brine.

35 The relative importance of radioelements that significantly contribute to the actinide source term,
36 and consequently impact the long-term performance of the WIPP, as established in the 2004
37 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2004) (U.S. Department of Energy 2004),
38 Appendix SOTERM, and the CRA-2004 PABC is:

39
$$\text{Pu} \approx \text{Am} \gg \text{U} > \text{Th} \gg \text{Np, Cm, and fission products.} \quad (\text{SOTERM.1})$$

1 The TRU components for this list of radionuclides are the α -emitting isotopes of plutonium (Pu),
2 americium (Am), neptunium (Np), and curium (Cm) with half-lives greater than 20 years. These
3 TRU actinides make up the waste unit factor used to calculate the normalized release from the
4 WIPP in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) units, as required by Part 191. In
5 SOTERM, the chemistry of thorium (Th) and uranium (U) is also discussed, since these actinides
6 are present in the WIPP waste and their chemistry is analogous to the TRU components.

7 This appendix has the following overall organization:

- 8 • An overview of key near-field conditions and biogeochemical processes is presented in
9 Section SOTERM-2.0.
- 10 • An updated literature review and summary of WIPP-relevant results for the key actinides
11 is given in Section SOTERM-3.0.
- 12 • A summary of the WIPP actinide PA approach and assumptions, along with the
13 calculated actinide solution concentrations, are provided in Section SOTERM-4.0.
- 14 • The PA implementation of the dissolved and colloidal components of the source term is
15 described in Section SOTERM-5.0.

16 Each of these sections identifies important changes and/or new information since the CRA-2004
17 and the CRA-2004 PABC (Leigh et al. 2005).

1 **SOTERM-2.0 Expected WIPP Repository Conditions, Chemistry,** 2 **and Processes**

3 The preemplacement and postemplacement near-field processes and conditions that could affect
4 actinide concentrations in the WIPP are discussed in this section. An up-front summary of the
5 current WIPP chemistry model assumptions is given in Table SOTERM-1, with a more detailed
6 discussion of each assumption presented in the following sections. Emphasis is placed on how
7 these processes and conditions in the repository could affect the concentrations of dissolved and
8 colloidal actinide species in brine.

9 **SOTERM-2.1 Ambient Geochemical Conditions**

10 The ambient geochemical conditions are discussed in detail in the CRA-2004, Chapter 6.0. The
11 Salado, which is the repository horizon, is predominantly pure halite (NaCl), with interbeds
12 (marker beds) consisting mainly of anhydrite (CaSO_4). The nearly pure halite contains accessory
13 evaporite minerals such as anhydrite (CaSO_4), gypsum ($\text{CaSO}_4 \cdot 2\text{H}_2\text{O}$), polyhalite
14 ($\text{K}_2\text{MgCa}_2(\text{SO}_4)_4 \cdot 2\text{H}_2\text{O}$), magnesite (MgCO_3), and clays. Small quantities of intergranular
15 (grain-boundary) brines and intragranular brines (fluid inclusions) are associated with the salt at
16 the repository horizon. These brines are highly concentrated solutions (ionic strength up to 8
17 moles per liter [M]) of predominantly sodium (Na^+), magnesium (Mg^{2+}), potassium (K^+),
18 chloride (Cl^-), and sulfate (SO_4^{2-}), with smaller amounts of calcium (Ca^{2+}), carbonate (CO_3^{2-}),
19 and borate ($\text{B}(\text{OH})_4^-$ and/or $\text{B}_4\text{O}_7^{2-}$). These brines have been in contact with the Salado evaporite
20 minerals since their deposition (estimated to be 250 million years) and are saturated with respect
21 to these minerals.

22 Underlying the Salado Formation is the Castile, composed of alternating units of interlaminated
23 carbonate, anhydrite, and nearly pure halite. The Castile in the vicinity of the WIPP site is
24 known to contain localized brine reservoirs with sufficient pressure to force brine to the surface
25 if penetrated by a borehole. Castile brines are predominantly saturated NaCl solutions
26 containing Ca^{2+} and SO_4^{2-} , as well as small concentrations of other elements, and are about eight
27 times more concentrated than seawater. Overlying the Salado in the vicinity of the WIPP site is
28 the Culebra of the Rustler Formation, a fractured dolomite ($\text{CaMg}(\text{CO}_3)_2$) layer. It is significant
29 because it is expected to be the most transmissive geologic pathway to the accessible
30 environment. Culebra brines are generally more dilute than the Salado and Castile brines, and
31 are predominantly NaCl with K^+ , Mg^{2+} , Ca^{2+} , SO_4^{2-} , and CO_3^{2-} . More detailed information on
32 the distribution of Culebra brine salinity in the WIPP site and vicinity can be found in Appendix
33 HYDRO-2009.

34 **SOTERM-2.2 Repository Conditions**

35 Repository conditions that could potentially affect actinide solubility are briefly summarized in
36 this section. These include: repository pressure, repository temperature, water content and
37 relative humidity, the minimum free volume for actinide release (effective porosity), and the
38 extent of the disturbed rock zone (DRZ).

1 **Table SOTERM-1. Summary of Current WIPP Chemistry Model Assumptions**
 2 **(Leigh et al. 2005)**

Repository Condition or Parameter	CRA-2004/CRA-2004 PABC Assumptions	SOTERM-2009 Section Containing References
Ambient Geochemistry	Predominantly halite of the Salado Formation, with anhydrite interbeds and inclusions.	SOTERM-2.1
Temperature	Ambient temperature is 28 °C (82 °F). An increase of up to 3 °C (5.4 °F) is possible as a result of the emplacement of TRU waste.	SOTERM-2.2.2
Humidity	~70 percent (%) relative humidity (RH) at the repository temperature.	SOTERM-2.2.3
Water Content	Host rock is groundwater-saturated with inclusions in the salt that range from 0.057% to 3% by mass. Repository is unsaturated for up to 1000 years (yr) depending on pressure and intrusion scenarios.	SOTERM-2.2.3
Pressure	A lithostatic pressure of about 15 megapascals (MPa) (148 atmospheres [atm]) at repository depth; a hydrostatic pressure of about 8 MPa (79.0 atm) at the bottom of an intrusion borehole at repository depth.	SOTERM-2.2.1
Gas Phase	Initially air/oxic at repository closure, but rapidly transitions to an anoxic atmosphere dominated by hydrogen with smaller amounts of methane and nitrogen. Trace amounts of carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, and other microbially produced gases may be present.	SOTERM-2.2.3 SOTERM-2.4.1
DRZ	Upper bound of 12 meter (m) above the repository and 2 m below the repository horizon.	SOTERM-2.2.5
Minimum Brine Volume for DBR	The calculated minimum volume of brine from any source needed for DBR release is 10011 cubic meters (m ³).	SOTERM-2.2.4
WIPP Brine	High-ionic-strength brine bracketed by Generic Weep Brine (GWB) and ERDA-6 brine formulations	SOTERM-2.3.1
pH	pH of about 9 and controlled by MgO, borate, and carbonate.	SOTERM-2.3.2
MgO	Engineered barrier for the WIPP that will sequester carbon dioxide (CO ₂) and control increases and decreases in pH by the precipitation of brucite, hydromagnesite, and magnesite.	SOTERM-2.3.3
Microbial Effects	Gas generation, primarily carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide, resulting from the biodegradation of cellulosic, plastic, and rubber (CPR) materials and creation of reducing conditions, including bioreduction of actinide elements from higher oxidation states.	SOTERM-2.4.1
Corrosion	Container steel and metals in WIPP waste will react to remove oxygen and produce hydrogen.	SOTERM-2.3.4
Radiolysis	Localized oxidizing effects possible near high-activity actinides, but overall radiolytic processes are overwhelmed by the in-room chemistry.	SOTERM-2.4.2

3

1 **SOTERM-2.2.1 Repository Pressure**

2 The preexcavation lithostatic pressure (Stein 2005, CRA-2004 PABC, Section 4.1.1) in the
3 WIPP at repository depth is about 15 MPa (148 atm). This pressure can be reestablished after
4 repository closure due to salt creep and gas generation, but there are a number of PA vectors that
5 predict pressure may not be fully restored even by the end of the 10,000-yr period of WIPP
6 performance, and final pressures may range from 6 to 15 MPa (in the undisturbed scenario) and
7 from 0.1 to 15 MPa (in the disturbed scenarios) considered in the CRA-2004 PABC. In this
8 context, the pressure in the repository after closure cannot significantly exceed the far-field
9 confining stress of about 15 MPa.

10 DBR can occur when the pressure in the repository at the time of a drilling intrusion exceeds 8
11 MPa and a sufficient amount of brine has already flowed into the repository (see related
12 discussions in Section SOTERM-2.2.4 and Stein 2005). Eight MPa is the pressure exerted by a
13 column of brine-saturated drilling fluid at the depth of the repository (Stoelzel and OBrien 1996).
14 For repository pressures less than 8 MPa, no DBRs are assumed to occur because the fluid
15 pressure in the repository cannot eject the drilling fluid from the borehole. There is also no DBR
16 release until the brine volume exceeds the minimum brine volume (see Section SOTERM-2.2.4)
17 needed to fill the effective porosity present in the compacted TRU waste.

18 When discussing the possible range of brine pressure to the source term, it is important to assess
19 the possibility that the pressures experienced in the WIPP could impact actinide solubilities. In
20 this context, the maximum pressure possible (~15 MPa) is well below pressures needed to affect
21 the solution chemistry, and is not expected to have a significant effect on actinide solubilities or
22 processes that lead to the association of actinides with colloidal particles. For these reasons, the
23 effect of pressure on actinide solubility is not considered in the WIPP PA.

24 **SOTERM-2.2.2 Repository Temperature**

25 The ambient preemplacement temperature at the WIPP repository horizon was established to be
26 28 °C (82 °F) (Munson et al., 1987). The emplacement of TRU waste in the WIPP is expected to
27 increase the ambient temperature by only a few degrees Celsius at most (Sanchez and Trelue
28 1996, Wang and Brush 1996a). For the purposes of PA, the temperature of the WIPP
29 underground repository is assumed to be constant with time at 300 Kelvin (K) (27 °C [80 °F])
30 (Appendix PA-2009).

31 Actinide solubilities were calculated in WIPP PA using thermodynamic and laboratory data
32 measured at 25 °C [77 °F]. The expected effect of the slightly elevated temperature in the WIPP
33 on actinide concentrations is relatively small, especially when compared to other uncertainties
34 inherent in the measurement and calculation of the actinide solubilities and colloidal
35 concentrations. For this reason, the very small effect of temperature on actinide solubility was
36 not considered in WIPP PA calculations.

37 **SOTERM-2.2.3 Water Content and Relative Humidity**

38 A key argument for the WIPP as a TRU waste repository is that the self-sealing of the salt will
39 limit the availability and transport of water into and through the repository, and correspondingly

1 minimize the potential release of TRU from the repository. In all the undisturbed repository
2 scenarios considered by PA, no actinide release from the WIPP is predicted (Leigh et al. 2005).
3 There is, however, groundwater in the WIPP, even in undisturbed scenarios, that is potentially
4 available to interact with the TRU waste. The salt surrounding waste is groundwater-saturated
5 with both intergranular and intragranular water. The amount of water present as inclusions in the
6 salt was used as a random variable in PA calculations (Leigh et al. 2005) with a range of 0.057 to
7 3 mass % based on what was measured in preexcavation salt (Skokan et al. 1987 and Powers et
8 al. 1978). This brine can seep into the repository horizon and fill the excavated areas (TRU
9 waste). Brine saturation of the repository is estimated to occur in less than 1000 years after
10 repository closure.

11 The presence of some brine in the WIPP prior to brine saturation leads to an environment that
12 will contain an atmosphere of up to about 70% RH, defined by the vapor pressure of saturated
13 brine at the repository temperature. This water vapor pressure will be present, at least in part,
14 until brine saturation occurs as a result of some human intrusions or brine seepage into the
15 excavated area.

16 The presence of a humid environment in the WIPP prior to brine saturation may have a transitory
17 effect on actinide solubilities. These transitory/temporary phases are not considered in WIPP PA
18 because they will be rapidly overwhelmed by the in-room chemistry and higher reactivity of the
19 waste components should brine inundation or saturation occur.

20 **SOTERM-2.2.4 Minimum Repository Brine Volume**

21 The minimum brine volume is the volume of brine needed for a DBR to occur during an
22 intrusion scenario. There have been two calculational efforts to estimate this volume in the
23 compacted TRU waste for the WIPP. Prior to the 1996 Compliance Certification Application
24 (CCA) (U.S. Department of Energy 1996), Larson (1996) estimated this volume, calculated at
25 2000 years after repository closure with an assumption of no gas generation, to be 343 m³ per
26 room and a minimum brine saturation of 0.75 for 116 equivalent rooms. This led to a repository-
27 scale volume of 29,841 m³. Under these assumptions, this was the minimum brine volume
28 needed for DBR.

29 Since this initial calculation, new information has led to a reassessment of this minimum volume
30 (Stein 2005). The most important changes in this new calculation were: (1) it was based on the
31 structural results used in the most current PA, (2) the time of the calculation was extended from
32 2000 to 10,000 years after repository closure, (3) a corrected waste-filled repository volume was
33 used, and (4) the calculation was made to be more in line with the DBR conceptual model that
34 requires a hydrostatic pressure of about 8 MPa. These changes led to a calculated per-room
35 volume of 301.5 m³, a reduction in the minimum brine saturation value to 0.276, and 120.3
36 equivalent rooms. This led to an overall repository-scale volume of 10,011 m³.

37 The minimum repository brine volume has two important potential impacts on calculating
38 actinide concentrations in the WIPP. The first is that the predicted inventory of some actinides,
39 when fully dissolved in this brine volume, lead to concentrations that are below their predicted
40 solubility, most importantly Np and Cm. In this context, they are assumed to be fully dissolved
41 in the brine and may have an insignificant impact on the calculated actinide release in WIPP PA

1 based on inventory arguments alone. The second impact is on the predicted concentration of key
2 organic and inorganic complexants that coexist with the TRU species in WIPP waste. The
3 maximum concentrations of acetate, citrate, and ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA) (see
4 Section SOTERM-2.3.6) are defined by their fully dissolved concentration in the minimum brine
5 volume.

6 **SOTERM-2.2.5 DRZ**

7 More detailed discussions of the DRZ can be found in Appendix PA-2009. The DRZ is a zone
8 immediately surrounding the excavated repository that has been altered by the construction of
9 the repository. In the Brine and Gas Flow (BRAGFLO) code, the Upper DRZ has a height of
10 about 12 m (39 feet [ft]) and the Lower DRZ has a depth of about 2.2 m (7.2 ft) (Leigh et al.
11 2005, Figure 4-1). The creation of this DRZ disturbs the anhydrite layers and marker beds and
12 alters the permeability and effective porosity of the rock around the excavated areas, providing
13 enhanced pathways for the flow of gas and brine between the waste-filled rooms and the nearby
14 interbeds.

15 The DRZ is important to the calculation of dissolved actinide concentrations because it
16 potentially makes the minerals in the interbeds “available” for reaction with the TRU and
17 emplaced waste components. The most important of these minerals is the calcium sulfate
18 (anhydrite) that could function as a source of sulfate for processes in the repository subsequent to
19 brine inundation. Currently, sulfate is assumed to be available from the DRZ into the waste area,
20 which prolongs microbial sulfate reduction processes in the WIPP.

21 **SOTERM-2.3 Repository Chemistry**

22 Brine present in the WIPP will react with emplaced TRU waste, waste components, and
23 engineered barrier materials to establish the brine chemistry that will define actinide solubilities
24 and colloid formation. In this context, the composition of the brine in the repository horizon will
25 be defined by a combination of factors, including the initial composition of the in-flow brine;
26 reactions that control pH; and the extent to which this brine is altered by equilibration with the
27 waste components, emplaced container materials, and the waste-derived organic chelating agents
28 that can dissolve in the brine. An overview of this repository chemistry is given in this section.

29 **SOTERM-2.3.1 WIPP Brine**

30 The composition of brine in and around the WIPP site prior to waste emplacement was
31 established by sampling the groundwater and intergranular inclusions in the Salado and Castile
32 (Popielak et al. 1983, Snider 2003a). Synthetic brines that simulate these compositions were
33 developed and have been used for WIPP laboratory studies. The two simulated brines that best
34 represent these repository-relevant, end-member brines are: (1) GWB, which simulates
35 intergranular (grain-boundary) brines from the Salado at or near the stratigraphic horizon of the
36 repository (Snider 2003a); and (2) ERDA-6, which simulates brine from the ERDA-6 well,
37 typical of fluids in Castile brine reservoirs (Popielak et al. 1983). The concentrations of key
38 inorganic species in these two brines, along with some brine properties, are listed in Table
39 SOTERM-2.

1 **Table SOTERM-2. Compositions of GWB and ERDA-6 Prior To and After Equilibration**
 2 **with MgO (Brush et al. 2006)**

Ion or Property^a	GWB^b Before Reaction with MgO, Halite, and Anhydrite	GWB After Reaction with MgO, Halite, and Anhydrite^c	ERDA-6^d Before Reaction with MgO, Halite, and Anhydrite	ERDA-6 After Reaction with MgO, Halite, and Anhydrite^c
B(OH) _x ^{3-x} (see Footnote e)	158 mM	166 mM	63 mM	62.4 mM
Na ⁺	3.53 M	4.35 M	4.87 M	5.24 M
Mg ²⁺	1.02 M	0.578 M	19 mM	157 mM
K ⁺	0.467 M	0.490 M	97 mM	96.1 mM
Ca ²⁺	14 mM	8.95 mM	12 mM	10.7 mM
SO ₄ ²⁻	177 mM	228 mM	170 mM	179 mM
Cl ⁻	5.86 M	5.38 M	4.8 M	5.24 M
Br ⁻	26.6 mM	27.8 mM	11 mM	10.9 mM
Total Inorganic C (as HCO ₃ ⁻)	Not reported	0.35 mM	16 mM	0.428 mM
pH	Not reported	8.69	6.17	8.94
Relative Density	1.2	1.23	1.22	1.22
Ionic Strength (m)	7.56	7.66	6.05	6.80

^a Ions listed represent the total of all species with this ion.

^b From Snider (2003a)

^c From Brush et al. (2006)

^d From Popielak et al. (1983)

^e Boron species will be present in brine as boric acid, hydroxy polynuclear forms (B₃O₃(OH)₄⁻, and/or borate forms (e.g., B₄O₇²⁻)

3
 4 At the time of the CCA, Brine A (Molecke 1983) and Salado Primary Constituents (SPC) Brine,
 5 a version of Brine A from which trace elements had been removed, were used to simulate Salado
 6 brines for laboratory and modeling studies. Since the CCA, however, GWB has been shown to
 7 be more representative of intergranular Salado brines than either Brine A or SPC Brine (Brush
 8 and Xiong 2003a, Snider 2003a). This brine formulation is currently used to represent Salado
 9 brines in PA. In particular, the magnesium concentration of GWB (1.0 M) simulates the average
 10 concentration of this element in Salado brines more closely than Brine A (1.44 M).

11 The reaction with MgO, based on the modeling calculations performed, leads to some potentially
 12 significant changes in the composition of the brine (see Table SOTERM-2). The most important
 13 of these changes for GWB brine is the lowering of the magnesium concentration from 1.02 to
 14 0.578 M, a decrease in calcium concentration from 14 to 8.95 mM, and a pH of 8.69. For
 15 ERDA-6, there is a significant increase in the magnesium concentration from 19 to 157 mM, a
 16 decrease in total inorganic carbon from 16 to 0.428 mM, and an increase of the pH to 8.94 from
 17 6.17. The pH associated with these MgO-reacted brines established the range of expected pH
 18 values in the WIPP for the calculation of actinide solubilities, and the composition of these
 19 reacted brines were used in PA to calculate actinide solubility in brine (Brush 2005).

1 Salado brine will enter the repository after closure, and can be supplemented by Castile brine in
2 some human intrusion scenarios. It is also possible that groundwater from the Rustler and
3 Dewey Lake Formation could flow down the borehole into the repository, mix with the waste,
4 and then be forced back up a borehole. The majority of WIPP-specific solubility studies since
5 the CRA-2004 were performed using GWB or ERDA-6 brines, since these brines bracket the
6 expected range in brine composition. Including brine mixing in PA has been considered and
7 rejected because using the end member brines (i.e., GWB or ERDA-6 brines) brackets the
8 median values and uncertainties for the solubility calculations.

9 In addition to using these end-member brines in PA, other simplifying assumptions were also
10 made:

- 11 1. Any brine present in the repository is well mixed with waste.
- 12 2. Equilibria with halite and anhydrite, the most abundant Salado minerals at or near the
13 stratigraphic horizon of the repository, are rapidly established.
- 14 3. Oxidation-reduction (redox) equilibria with waste materials were not assumed.
- 15 4. Brine compositions attained after equilibration of GWB or ERDA-6 with the MgO
16 engineered barrier exist for the entire 10,000-year regulatory period.

17 Brine composition is important to the calculation of actinide concentrations. The inorganic
18 complexants, ionic strength, and pH are direct inputs needed to calculate actinide solubilities for
19 a given brine composition. These species and properties are also important in defining the
20 potential for colloid formation in the WIPP.

21 **SOTERM-2.3.2 Brine pH and pH Buffering**

22 The brine pH is a very critical parameter in defining the solubility of actinides under conditions
23 where brine-mediated releases (DBR and transport through the Culebra) would be important in
24 the WIPP. The brine pH is established by a number of highly coupled processes that will occur
25 when the emplaced WIPP waste is inundated with brine. The most important of these are the
26 potential buffering capacity of the brine coming into the WIPP, the reactions of this brine with
27 emplaced waste components (most notably reduced metals and MgO), and microbial processes.
28 The reactions of the emplaced MgO barrier material are expected to sufficiently control and
29 define the pH when the repository is saturated with brine.


30 The range of brine composition that is likely to be present in the WIPP repository was discussed
31 in Section SOTERM-2.3.1 (see also Table SOTERM-2). These brines have an intrinsic
32 buffering capacity that is highest at pH 8.5-9. ERDA-6 brine, although it has an ambient pH of
33 6.2, contains a number of constituents that, in the pH range of 8-10, add buffer capacity to the
34 reacted brine: Carbonate/bicarbonate (16 mM), borate (63 mM), and divalent cations that tend to
35 react with hydroxide or carbonate to influence pH (Ca^{2+} at 12 mM, and Mg^{2+} at 19 mM). The
36 pK_a for boric acid and dissolved carbonate/bicarbonate species are 9.0 and 9.67, respectively,
37 which explains the tendency of this brine to maintain the pH in the range of 8-10. Operationally,
38 the simulated ERDA-6 brines prepared in the laboratory have relatively high buffering capacity,

1 and significant changes in brine concentrations and pH are not routinely observed once the pH is
 2 experimentally defined (Borkowski et al. 2008, Lucchini et al. 2009). An operational pH range
 3 for ERDA-6 has been defined as having an upper limit of pH ~10, which is the pH at which a
 4 cloud point (indicating Mg precipitation) is observed. The preexcavation ambient ERDA-6-like
 5 brine will naturally add to the buffering capacity of WIPP brine due to its acid-base components
 6 and will establish a relatively high buffer capacity at the mildly alkaline conditions expected in
 7 the WIPP.

8 The expected pH in the WIPP in the event of brine saturation, however, will be defined by the
 9 reaction of the Castile ERDA-6-like brine with the waste components and barrier material. This
 10 was evaluated as part of the documentation for the CRA-2004 PABC (Leigh et al. 2005, Brush et
 11 al. 2006, and Table SOTERM-2).

12 Under these repository-relevant conditions, the expected pH, when little or no carbonate is
 13 present, is 8.69 in GWB brine and 8.94 for ERDA-6 brine. In both cases, this pH is
 14 established/buffered by the brucite dissolution reaction. The presence of microbial activity will
 15 potentially contribute significant amounts of carbon dioxide and leads to a model-predicted pH
 16 of 8.69 and 9.02 for GWB and ERDA-6 brine, respectively.

17 The key role MgO has in the buffering of pH at 8 to 9 under WIPP-relevant conditions is the
 18 basis of current WIPP actinide solubility calculations. In the absence of significant amounts of
 19 CO₂, the following carbonation reaction will buffer the fugacity of carbon dioxide (f_{CO₂}) at a
 20 value of 10^{-5.48} atm in GWB and 10^{-6.15} atm in ERDA-6:



22 Under these conditions, the following brucite dissolution/precipitation reaction will buffer pH in
 23 the WIPP at a value of 8.69 in GWB and 8.94 in ERDA-6 (Brush et al. 2006).



25 The potential for significant CO₂ formation as the result of microbial activity changes the
 26 mechanism by which pH is buffered, but causes a relatively small change in the calculated pH
 27 for ERDA-6-like brines. Microbial consumption of CPR materials could produce significant
 28 quantities of CO₂, which could in turn acidify any brine present in the repository and increase the
 29 solubility of the actinides relative to that predicted for near-neutral and mildly basic conditions.
 30 Under these conditions, both laboratory and modeling studies predict that the following
 31 carbonation reaction:




33 will buffer f_{CO₂} at a value of 10^{-5.50} atm in both GWB and ERDA-6. In this reaction, Mg(OH)₂ is
 34 the brucite, which is the main hydration product of the periclase (MgO) expected in the WIPP;
 35 Mg₅(CO₃)₄(OH)₂·4H₂O is the form of the hydromagnesite expected in the repository.
 36 Consideration of the possibility of high CO₂ levels leads to a calculated pH of 8.69 and 9.02 for
 37 GWB and ERDA-6 brine, respectively. This is a relatively small change in the predicted pH
 38 with no change predicted in GWB brine and only a 0.08 pH shift in ERDA-6 brine. These values

1 of f_{CO_2} and pH were used in the actinide speciation and solubility calculations for all CRA-2004
2 PABC vectors (Brush 2005).


3 Experiments that are relevant to the chemistry and pH buffering capacity of MgO, but not
4 reflected in the CRA-2004 PABC, were performed by investigators at Karlsruhe (Schuessler et
5 al. 2001 and Altmaier et al. 2003). This research was done to support the development of the
6 German salt-based repository where MgO, calcium oxide (CaO), and clays are being evaluated
7 as potential backfill material. Equilibration experiments with 2.67 and 5.15 molal magnesium
8 chloride with excess magnesium hydroxide present were conducted for durations of over 400
9 days and show the establishment of a stable magnesium solution concentration with a pH of 8.7
10 to 8.8, which is in excellent agreement with current WIPP model predictions (see Figure
11 SOTERM-1). This equilibration was also modeled using the Pitzer formulation in the software
12 package for geochemical modeling of aqueous systems (EQ3/6), and excellent agreement was
13 obtained. In this study, a change in magnesium (Mg) concentration was not noted during the
14 equilibration with MgO, even though cement was dissolved in brine.

15 Based on Figure SOTERM-1, the dissolution of MgO in brine, when high chloride
16 concentrations are present ($> 2 \text{ m}$), demonstrates the self-buffering property of the brine-MgO
17 system. The pH does not increase when MgO is dissolved. Moreover, with time, the system
18 counteracts the potential decrease in pH that could result from solid phase transformations. To
19 illustrate this better, the dissolution of 1 mole of MgO introduces 1 mol of Mg^{2+} and 2 moles of
20 OH^- to the brine, which should increase the pH. To counter this and maintain pH, the
21 magnesium chloride hydroxide hydrate ($\text{Mg}_2(\text{OH})_3\text{Cl}\cdot 4\text{H}_2\text{O}$) phase precipitates to reduce the pH.
22 For the data shown in Figure SOTERM-1, the pH is reduced slowly as a consequence of
23 equilibration with MgO. In this context, more hydroxide ions are precipitated than are
24 introduced to the brine during the MgO dissolution step. There will also be more magnesium
25 precipitated from the brine, resulting in a lower magnesium concentration in the brine.

26 There are no new WIPP-specific results to report that explicitly address the MgO buffering of
27 WIPP brine since the CRA-2004. Some WIPP-specific experiments using simulated GWB and
28 ERDA-6 brine, however, indirectly provide some information on this subject (Xiong and Lord
29 2008, Lucchini et al. 2009, Borkowski et al. 2008, Reed et al. 2009). A considerable number of
30 the solubility experiments were performed in the pH range of 8-10 (below the cloud point of
31 either ERDA-6 or GWB brine) and reflect strong buffering with no pH drift over the greater
32 than 2-year duration of the experiments. Additionally, no significant Mg precipitation was noted
33 in this pH range. The brines in these solubility studies were not equilibrated with MgO, but in
34 some cases had excess iron in the system. Several experiments were performed outside of this
35 pH range; in the presence of high carbonate (10 mM), a slow, downward pH drift was observed
36 that was as much as 2 pH units over the duration of the experiments, even through
37 preequilibration at the desired higher experimental pH was initially performed. In Xiong and
38 Lord (2008), where the MgO and brucite reaction paths in GWB, ERDA-6 brine, and simplified
39 brines were investigated, the equilibrium pH values measured were pH about 9 and were
40 established by the reaction/dissolution of the MgO or $\text{Mg}(\text{OH})_2$. Slightly higher pH was noted
41 (up to pH 9.7) in some simplified brines when no carbonate or other brine components were
42



1



2

3 **Figure SOTERM-1. Molal H⁺ Concentration Measured as a Function of Time During the**
 4 **Solubility Experiments in 2.67 and 5.15 m MgCl₂ Solution. The Filled**
 5 **Circles and Triangles Show the Two Experiment Runs (Based on**
 6 **Data in Altmaier et al. 2003, Figure 3).**

1 present. All of these data, although indirect, suggest that the MgO controls the pH to a $\text{pH} = 9 \pm$
2 1. In this context, it is predicted that brine pH will remain in the range of 8-10 under a wide
3 range of expected conditions. These experimental observations are also consistent with the
4 experimental results and model predictions reported by Altmaier et al. (2003).

5 **SOTERM-2.3.3 Selected MgO Chemistry and Reactions**

6 MgO is the bulk, granular material emplaced in the WIPP as an engineered barrier. The MgO
7 currently being placed in the WIPP contains 96 ± 2 mol % reactive constituents (i.e., periclase
8 and lime) (Deng et al. 2006). The amount of MgO emplaced in the WIPP is currently calculated
9 based on the estimated CPR content with an excess factor of 1.2, and it is estimated that in
10 excess of 75,000 metric tons will be emplaced in the WIPP by the time of repository closure.

11 The chemistry of MgO is critical to the overall performance of the WIPP and is discussed in
12 detail in Appendix MgO-2009 and in Xiong and Lord (2008). The MgO, as an engineered
13 barrier in the WIPP repository design, has two important functions that directly support the PA
14 calculation of actinide concentrations in brine. These are:


- 15 1. Sequester the excess CO_2 produced by the microbial consumption of CPR material and
16 establish/maintain a low f_{CO_2} in the repository. This is currently estimated to be $10^{-5.5}$ atm for
17 GWB and ERDA-6 brine.
- 18 2. Establish and buffer the brine pH by maintaining a magnesium solution concentration that
19 reacts with CO_2 and hydroxide (see reaction SOTERM.2 and SOTERM.3) to buffer the pH at
20 about 9. This was part of the pH discussion in Section SOTERM-2.3.2. This buffering
21 removes uncertainty from the actinide concentration calculations.

22 Initially, MgO will undergo hydration to generate brucite ($\text{Mg}(\text{OH})_2$). In time, brucite will react
23 further to form magnesium chloride hydroxide hydrate ($\text{Mg}_3(\text{OH})_5\text{Cl}\cdot 4\text{H}_2\text{O}$) in Salado brine
24 (Appendix MgO-2009, Section MgO-4.1). These phases combine to control the concentration of
25 magnesium in high-magnesium brine (for example, GWB). The existence of magnesium as an
26 aqueous cation in equilibrium with excess magnesium minerals helps to establish the solution pH.


27 For the reaction of MgO with GWB brine, PA uses a magnesium concentration of ~ 0.6 M (see
28 Table SOTERM-2), which is supported by experimental results showing a magnesium
29 concentration ~ 0.7 M (Snider 2003b). This reaction was also investigated by Altmaier et al.
30 (2003) and Harvie, Møller, Weare (1984). Snider noted that the rate of MgO hydration is most
31 likely linked to mineral phase changes between hydrated magnesium oxychloride and brucite.
32 The existence of the hydrated magnesium oxychloride phase was inferred from scanning electron
33 microscope (SEM) images, coupled with an energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy system (EDS),
34 to identify Mg-Cl phases. The Altmaier and Harvie studies showed that the hydration reaction
35 was a solid-phase transformation between brucite and hydrated magnesium oxychloride that
36 depends not on magnesium concentration, but on chloride concentration, with an invariant point
37 predicted at 1.8 m MgCl concentration and a $-\log m_{\text{H}^+} = 8.95$.

38 The most important role of the MgO engineered barrier is to sequester carbon dioxide to
39 maintain a low f_{CO_2} in the repository. Microbial consumption of CPR materials could produce

1 significant quantities of CO₂. Under these conditions, brucite and magnesium chloride hydroxide
 2 hydrate will react with the CO₂ generated. Both laboratory and modeling studies predict that the
 3 following carbonation reaction will buffer f_{CO₂} at a value of 10^{-5.50} atm in both GWB and
 4 ERDA-6:



6 This reaction effectively removes excess CO₂ from the repository and bicarbonate/carbonate
 7 from the brine. The initial product of MgO carbonation reaction is Mg₅(CO₃)₄(OH)₂·4H₂O. This
 8 is converted into MgCO₃, which is the expected stable mineral form of magnesium carbonate in
 9 the WIPP, according to Reaction (SOTERM.6).



11 Reaction (SOTERM.6) is slow and it is estimated that hundreds to thousands of years (Appendix
 12 MgO-2009) are needed for the conversion of hydromagnesite to magnesite. Consumption of CO₂
 13 will prevent the brine acidification, and magnesium carbonate precipitation will maintain low
 14 carbonate concentration in the WIPP brine to avoid the formation of highly soluble actinide
 15 species with carbonate complexes. Although MgO will consume essentially all CO₂, residual
 16 quantities in equilibrium with magnesite under the WIPP conditions will persist in the aqueous and
 17 gaseous phases.





18 The importance of magnesium chemistry, and correspondingly the chemistry associated with the
 19 emplaced MgO on the calculation of actinide concentrations in brine is clear. MgO sequesters
 20 CO₂ and minimizes the buildup of carbonate in brine. At the expected pH, carbonate forms
 21 strong complexes with the An(III), An(IV), and An(VI) oxidation states. An increased carbonate
 22 concentration in brine would significantly increase actinide solubilities. Additionally, MgO
 23 helps establish the pH in brine. The removal of CO₂ prevents a decrease in the pH that could
 24 also significantly increase actinide solubility. An additional beneficial effect of MgO is to
 25 maintain a solution concentration of Mg²⁺ that will precipitate as brucite to keep the pH in the 8-
 26 10 range. The presence of MgO leads to a more predictable chemistry that lowers the
 27 uncertainty when calculating actinide concentrations in WIPP brine (see Borkowski et al. 2008
 28 for data on An(III) and Altmaier et al. 2005 for data on An(IV)).

29 **SOTERM-2.3.4 Iron Chemistry and Corrosion**

30 The WIPP repository will contain a large quantity of reduced iron due to the use of iron-based
 31 containers for much of the emplaced TRU waste. Currently, it is estimated that the WIPP will
 32 contain upwards of 51,000 metric tons of iron (U.S. Department of Energy 2006) when all the
 33 waste is emplaced. The presence of this reduced metal will have an important role in the
 34 establishment of reducing conditions in the WIPP by removing oxygen. Reduced iron species
 35 (aqueous Fe(II) and Fe(0, II)-valent minerals) are important because they will reduce higher-valent
 36 actinides in the WIPP, leading to lower actinide solubilities (Reed et al. 2009, Reed et al. 2006).

37 It is expected that oxic corrosion of steels and aerobic microbial consumption of CPR materials
 38 will quickly consume the limited amount of oxygen (O₂) trapped within the repository at the time
 39 of closure. After O₂ is consumed, anoxic corrosion of metals will occur (Brush 1990, Brush

1 1995, Wang and Brush 1996a). In all of the vectors for the 2004 PA, the EPA's CCA 1997
 2 Performance Assessment Verification Test (PAVT), the CCA PA, and the CRA-2004 PABC,
 3 there were significant amounts of uncorroded steels and other Fe-base alloys in the repository
 4 throughout the 10,000-yr regulatory period. WIPP-specific experiments (Telander and
 5 Westerman 1993 and 1997) showed that steels and other Fe-based alloys will corrode by the
 6 following reactions:



11 In reducing environments, reduced iron phases (Fe(II) oxides and zero valent iron) and aqueous
 12 ferrous iron will be present. These are all reducing agents towards key actinide species (see
 13 Table SOTERM-3) and will help establish the predominance of lower-valent actinides in the
 14 WIPP. The concentration of ferrous iron could be relatively high in the WIPP brine, although its
 15 solubility has not yet been explicitly determined. There are also many potential reactions that
 16 could control and/or define the iron chemistry. The expectation is that ferrous hydroxide will
 17 control the solubility of iron, leading to a predicted solubility in the range of 10^{-6} M to 10^{-4} M for
 18 pH between 8.5 and 10.5 (Refait and Génin 1994).

19 **Table SOTERM-3. Redox Half-Reaction Potentials for Key Fe, Pb, Pu, and U Reactions at**
 20 **25 °C and I<1 (Morss, Edelstein, and Fuger 2006, Chapter 23)**

Metal Species Reduced	E _o (Acidic) in V	E _o at pH = 8 in V
Pb ⁴⁺ → Pb ²⁺	1.69	2.47
PuO ₂ ⁺ → Pu ⁴⁺	1.170	0.70
PuO ₂ ²⁺ → PuO ₂ ⁺	0.916	0.60
Fe(OH) ₃ (s) → Fe ²⁺	Not Applicable	0.1
FeOOH (s) → FeCO ₃ (s)	Not Applicable	-0.05
UO ₂ ²⁺ → U ⁴⁺	0.338	-0.07
Pu ⁴⁺ → Pu ³⁺	0.982	-0.39
Pb ²⁺ → Pb	-0.1251	-0.54
Fe ³⁺ → Fe ²⁺	0.77	-0.86
Fe(II)(OH) ₂ → Fe(0)	-0.44	-0.89
U ⁴⁺ → U ³⁺	-0.607	-1.95

21
 22 Three important reactions of iron are considered for the WIPP PA. The first is the reaction of
 23 metallic iron with carbon dioxide to form strongly insoluble ferrous carbonate. The solubility
 24 product of this salt is log K = -10.8 at I = 0 (National Institute of Standards and Technology
 25 [NIST] 2004), and it is much smaller than magnesium carbonate. This suggests that the presence

1 of iron will likely remove CO₂ from the repository more effectively than MgO due to its lower
2 solubility product. This reaction is not included in the WIPP PA because the CO₂ reacts with
3 MgO before the iron.




4 The second is the reaction of iron and ferrous ions with the hydrogen sulfide that could be
5 generated in the repository by sulfate-reducing microbes. This will lead to a very insoluble
6 ferrous sulfide precipitate with a solubility product of log K_s = -17.2 (NIST 2004). This helps
7 remove sulfide, which can complex actinides, from brine. This reaction is assumed to occur
8 instantaneously in the PA.

9 Finally, iron species form strong complexes with organic ligands. The strongest of these
10 complexes is EDTA. The net effect is that dissolved iron species will compete with actinides for
11 organic ligands, and in many cases out-compete the actinides to counteract the potential
12 enhancement of actinide solubility that would otherwise occur. This reaction is not currently
13 included in the PA.

14 The chemistry of iron will have a pronounced effect on WIPP-relevant actinide chemistry in
15 many ways. The linkages of iron chemistry to the redox chemistry are well-established in the
16 literature (Farrell et al. 1999, Fredrickson et al. 2000, Qui et al. 2001, Nakata et al. 2004, and
17 Behrends and Van Cappellen 2005). Iron will establish reducing conditions conducive to the
18 overall reduction of higher-valent actinide species and precipitate an iron sulfide phase that
19 removes sulfide from solution. Additionally, iron species could sequester carbon dioxide and
20 compete with actinides for organic and inorganic complexants, although there is no explicit
21 credit taken for this in the WIPP PA.

22 **SOTERM-2.3.5 Chemistry of Lead in the WIPP**

23 Lead is present in the repository in the metallic form as part of the waste. The reactivity of zero-
24 valent lead is greatly mitigated by the formation of a thin, coherent, protective oxide,
25 oxycarbonate, chloride, or sulfate protective layer. Metallic lead also reacts slowly with water at
26 room temperature and undergoes corrosion to form oxides and oxyhydroxides. Under slightly
27 alkaline conditions, the hydrolysis of lead leads to formation of a poly-oxyhydroxide cation,
28 [Pb₆O(OH)₆]⁴⁺. The following reactions are possible under WIPP-relevant conditions:



1 The solubility of lead in WIPP brine is expected to be low, due in part to the passivation process,
2 but also because of insoluble solids formation. Strong oxidants, e.g., radiolysis products, may
3 locally enhance the dissolution of lead, but alkaline brine, which contains chlorides and
4 carbonate/bicarbonate species, will overwhelm radiolytic effects to maintain a low concentration
5 of lead in the brine. In solution, lead will exist as Pb^{2+} species that are redox-active toward high-
6 valent actinides (see Table SOTERM-3) and will help establish and maintain reducing conditions
7 in the brine.

8 Lead, as was the case with iron, can influence the redox chemistry (see Table SOTERM-3) and
9 precipitate carbonate and sulfide from the WIPP brine. This leads to a redox chemistry that will
10 help maintain reducing conditions and effectively lower carbonate concentration. Both of these
11 will potentially lower actinide solubility in the WIPP. These impacts are not considered in the
12 WIPP PA.

13 **SOTERM-2.3.6 Organic Chelating Agents**

14 Organic chelating agents are used in the processing and cleanup/decontamination of actinides
15 throughout the DOE complex. For this reason, they are often present as cocontaminants with the
16 TRU component in the WIPP waste. Some of these chelating agents strongly complex actinides
17 and could have a significant effect on their solubility in brine. In this context, four organic
18 chelating agents—oxalate, acetate, citrate, and EDTA—are tracked as part of the WIPP inventory
19 process, and the potential effects of these complexants on the calculated actinide solubilities are
20 evaluated as part of the WIPP PA (Leigh et al. 2005, Brush and Xiong 2005a).

21 The potential concentrations of the key organic ligands in the WIPP were calculated a number of
22 times (Brush and Xiong 2003b, Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005) and are based on the inventory
23 provided by Crawford and Leigh (2003). The potential concentrations of these organics used in
24 the CRA-2004 PABC were calculated by Brush and Xiong (2005a) and are based on the best
25 understanding of the WIPP inventory data available at that time. These concentrations are
26 summarized in Table SOTERM-4, where the potential maximum organic concentration in the
27 WIPP is defined as the inventory of the organic ligand divided by the minimum free volume of
28 brine needed for brine release (see Section SOTERM-2.2.4).

29 Dissolved metals will compete with the actinides to form organic complexes. As the metals in
30 the repository corrode, additional transition metal ions will dissolve into the brine. These ionic
31 species include iron (Fe) and lead (Pb). Other steel constituents, such as nickel (Ni), chromium
32 (Cr), vanadium (V), and manganese (Mn), may also be present. Additionally, divalent cations in
33 the brine, most importantly Mg^{2+} and Ca^{2+} , will also form complexes with these chelating agents
34 and compete with the actinide species. The stability constants for Mg^{2+} , Ca^{2+} , Fe^{2+} , Pb^{2+} , and
35 Ni^{2+} and deprotonation constants for the organic acids are shown in Table SOTERM-5 (National
36 Institute of Standards and Technology 2004). These formation constants, in many respects,
37 follow the same trends as the actinide species and, when present in high enough concentrations,
38 will compete with the actinide to form complexes and effectively lower the effect of organic
39 complexation on actinide solubility. However, this is not included in the PA.

1 **Table SOTERM-4. Concentrations of Organic Ligands in WIPP Brine Calculated for Use**
 2 **in the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush and Xiong 2005a)**

Organic Ligand	Compound	Inventory Amount (g)	Molecular Weight ^a (g/mol)	Potential Concentration ^c (M)	Total Potential Concentration ^c (M)
Acetate	Acetic acid	1.42×10^5	60.05	2.36×10^{-4}	1.06×10^{-2}
	Sodium acetate	8.51×10^6	82.03	1.04×10^{-2}	
Oxalate	Oxalic acid	1.38×10^7	90.03	1.53×10^{-2}	4.55×10^{-2b}
	Sodium oxalate	3.39×10^7	112.0	3.02×10^{-2}	
Citrate	Citric acid	1.19×10^6	192.1	6.19×10^{-4}	8.06×10^{-4}
	Sodium citrate	4.00×10^5	214.1	1.87×10^{-4}	
EDTA	Sodium salt	2.56×10^4	314.2	8.14×10^{-6}	8.14×10^{-6}

^a Molecular weight was calculated for monosodium salts to be conservative.

^b Inventory, in moles, of the organic chelating agent divided by 10,011 m³

^c Concentration of oxalate will be limited by solubility, not inventory, in ERDA-6-like brine

3
 4 **Table SOTERM-5. Apparent Stability Constants for Organic Ligands with Selected**
 5 **Metals (National Institute of Standards and Technology 2004)**

Organic Ligand	pK _a	Metal	Ionic Strength (m)	log ₁₀ β ₁
EDTA	k ₁ 8.86-9.05	Fe ²⁺	0.1	14.3
	k ₂ 6.10-7.02	Ni ²⁺	0.1	18.4
	k ₃ 2.79-2.54	Pb ²⁺	0.1	18
	k ₄ 2.05-2.20	Mg ²⁺	1	8.61
		Ca ²⁺	1	9.68
Citrate	k ₁ 5.58-5.30	Fe ²⁺	0.1	4.4
	k ₂ 4.25-4.38	Ni ²⁺	0.1	5.18
	k ₃ 2.85-3.06	Pb ²⁺	1.0	4.44
		Mg ²⁺	0.1	3.43
		Ca ²⁺	0.1	3.48
Oxalate	k ₁ 3.74-4.23	Fe ²⁺	1.0	3.05
	k ₂ 1.15-1.43	Ni ²⁺	0.1	4.16
		Pb ²⁺	1.0	4.20
		Mg ²⁺	0.1	2.75
		Ca ²⁺	0.1	2.46
Acetate	k ₁ 4.52-4.99	Fe ²⁺	3.0	0.54
		Ni ²⁺	0.1	0.88
		Pb ²⁺	0.1	2.15
		Mg ²⁺	0.1	0.51
		Ca ²⁺	0.1	0.55

1 There are two final, but important, observations about the organic chelating agents present in the
2 WIPP. First, they are expected to have very different tendencies toward biodegradation, based
3 on extensive experience with soil bacteria in the literature (Banaszak, Rittmann, and Reed 1999).
4 Microbial activity, based on many general observations with soil bacteria, will likely readily
5 degrade citrate, oxalate, and acetate to very low (submicromolar) steady-state concentrations.
6 This important degradation pathway is not as certain for EDTA, which tends to resist
7 biodegradation in most groundwaters. These degradation pathways have, however, not been
8 demonstrated for the halophiles typically present in the WIPP, and it is currently assumed in the
9 WIPP PA that no degradation pathways for these organic complexants, microbiological or
10 chemical, exist.

11 The second important observation is that these chelating agents, under WIPP-relevant conditions,
12 are expected to help establish reducing conditions in the WIPP because they tend to reduce
13 higher-valent actinides. This has been demonstrated in WIPP brine for Np(V) and Pu(V/VI), but
14 was not observed for U(VI) (Reed et al. 1998). These chelating agents also tend to oxidize III
15 actinides to IV, which would have a beneficial effect on actinide solubility in the WIPP because
16 the actinides in the IV oxidation state are approximately 10 times less soluble than actinides in
17 the III oxidation state. These potentially beneficial effects of organic chelating agents on
18 actinide speciation are also currently not included in the WIPP PA.

19 **SOTERM-2.3.7 CPR in WIPP Waste**

20 The WIPP waste contains a relatively high amount of organic material, since much of the waste
21 is residue from laboratory operations where CPR materials were widely used. Current estimates
22 project over 10,000 metric tons of plastic and cellulosic materials with a much lower amount of
23 rubber material in the WIPP. This organic material is important from the perspective of
24 repository performance in that it provides an organic “feedstock” for microbial activity that
25 could lead to gas generation (carbon dioxide, hydrogen, hydrogen sulfide, and possibly
26 methane), as well as degradation products that can complex actinides or form pseudocolloids.
27 CPR degradation is represented in the PA to evaluate these potential impacts on the actinide
28 concentrations and release.

29 **SOTERM-2.4 Important Postemplacement Processes**

30 There are three important postemplacement processes that take place in the WIPP after
31 repository closure. These are metal corrosion, microbiological effects, and radiolysis. Metal
32 corrosion was already discussed as part of the iron chemistry section (Section SOTERM-2.3.4).
33 Microbiological effects and radiolysis are briefly discussed in this section.

34 **SOTERM-2.4.1 Microbial Effects in the WIPP**

35 Microbiological processes can have a significant effect on many aspects of subsurface chemical
36 and geochemical processes. This, particularly as it relates to contaminant transport and
37 remediation, has been well established for soil bacteria in low-ionic-strength and near-surface
38 groundwaters (Banaszak, Rittmann, and Reed 1998). In the WIPP, as a result of the high-ionic-
39 strength brines present, halophiles (rather than soil bacteria) will predominate. What is
40 understood about halophiles under WIPP-relevant conditions was established through a series of

1 long-term studies conducted as part of the Actinide Source Term Program (ASTP) project by
2 researchers at Brookhaven (Brush 1990; Francis and Gillow 1994; Brush 1995; Wang and Brush
3 1996a). The important and potential effects of microbial activity on the WIPP PA are also
4 discussed extensively (Leigh et al. 2005, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006).

5 In the WIPP repository, many of the co-contaminants present (e.g., sulfates, phosphates,
6 organics, nitrate) are important nutrients that drive microbial activity and, in part, select the
7 primary degradation and growth pathways taken. There are WIPP-specific data which
8 demonstrate that microbial processes can occur under humid and saturated conditions in the
9 laboratory (Francis 1998). In the CRA-2004 PABC, a longer-term rate for microbial gas
10 generation was implemented based on new laboratory data obtained by the project (Leigh et al.
11 2005; Nemer and Stein 2005; Nemer, Stein, and Zelinski 2005).

12 Under repository-relevant conditions, there are primarily two important potential effects on
13 repository performance linked to the presence of microbial activity. The first is gas generation
14 due to the biodegradation of the organics present as WIPP waste (see Section SOTERM-2.3.6
15 and SOTERM-2.3.7). This is currently addressed by the WIPP PA (Nemer and Stein 2005;
16 Nemer, Stein, and Zelinski 2005). The second is the growing recognition of the linkages
17 between microbial activity and actinide speciation under microbiologically active anaerobic and
18 reducing conditions. This is not currently addressed in the WIPP PA, but adds an additional
19 argument for the sustained predominance of lower-valent actinides under WIPP-relevant
20 conditions (III and IV oxidation states).

21 **SOTERM-2.4.1.1 Gas Generation and Microbial Degradation of CPR Materials**

22 Microorganisms utilize organic compounds as the carbon source for their growth. This
23 biodegradation also provides energy to the organism because the organic compound also
24 functions as an electron donor that, when coupled with inorganic electron acceptors (oxidized
25 metals, sulfate, nitrate, and or oxygen), will provide energy to the organism. Under anaerobic
26 conditions, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, and/or methane are typically produced as gases.

27 The large quantity of CPR materials emplaced in the WIPP is the main carbon source that could
28 lead to substantial gas generation from degradation by microorganisms. As with most subsurface
29 microbial processes, there are large uncertainties surrounding the extent to which microbial
30 consumption of CPR materials can occur during the 10,000-yr WIPP regulatory period. In this
31 context, it is assumed that significant microbial consumption of CPR materials is possible, but
32 this is by no means certain.




33 To incorporate these uncertainties in the PA, the conceptual model for biodegradation used in
34 CRA-2004 (Wang and Brush 1996a and 1996b) used a probability of 0.50 for significant
35 microbial activity. This was changed in the CRA-2004 PABC calculation to be a probability of
36 1.0, meaning that microbial activity was considered in all PA vectors. The presence of this
37 microbial activity means it is assumed that microbes may consume 100% of the cellulosic
38 materials in the repository, and that there is a probability of 0.25 that microbes may consume the
39 plastic and rubber materials. Thus, there is microbial consumption of cellulosic materials, but
40 not of plastic or rubber materials, in 75% of the PA realizations (vectors), and microbial
41 consumption of all CPR materials in 25% of the vectors.

1 Microbial consumption of CPR materials could affect the actinide source term in four ways:

- 2 1. Production of significant quantities of CO₂, which could acidify the brine in the absence of
- 3 an MgO buffer or increase the solubility of actinides by carbonate complexation at the
- 4 expected mildly alkaline pH
- 5 2. Bioreduction of higher-valent actinide species leading to lower-valent, less-soluble actinide
- 6 species
- 7 3. Degradation of solubilizing organic ligands, leading to lower actinide solubility
- 8 4. Production of humic and microbial colloids that could increase the amount of actinide
- 9 pseudocolloids in the brine

10 The effect of CO₂ production is discussed in this section. The remaining three effects are
 11 implicitly considered in the analyses that address the oxidation-state distributions (Section
 12 SOTERM-4.2), the effects of organic ligands (Section SOTERM-2.3.6), and the effects of
 13 colloids (Section SOTERM-3.8). The simplifications used in the PA calculations for all four of
 14 these effects are discussed at the end of this section.

15 Microbial activity, if it occurs to a significant extent in the WIPP, would consume CPR materials
 16 by the following sequential reactions (Brush 1990, Francis and Gillow 1994, Brush 1995, Wang
 17 and Brush 1996a, and Francis 1998):



21 Methanogenesis, described by Reaction (SOTERM.20), is not included as a degradation pathway
 22 in CRA-2004 PABC (Leigh et al. 2005) due to uncertainty about the availability of sulfate (see
 23 Section SOTERM-2.2.5) in the DRZ and its exclusion is a conservative assumption relative to
 24 the amount of carbon dioxide that could be produced. In effect, the CRA-2004 PABC and this
 25 PA assume that an excess of sulfate is always available to sustain sulfate-reduction
 26 biodegradation pathways. When unlimited sulfate is available from natural sources in the host
 27 rock, which is the assumption for the CRA-2004 PABC and for this PA, 4% of the gas
 28 generation occurs through denitrification and 96% occurs by way of sulfate reduction (Leigh et
 29 al. 2005, Section 2.4).

30 Microbial consumption of CPR materials, therefore, could produce significant quantities of CO₂,
 31 which could in turn acidify any brine present in the repository and increase the solubilities of the
 32 actinides relative to those predicted for neutral and mildly basic conditions. Therefore, the DOE
 33 is emplacing MgO in the repository to decrease actinide solubilities by consuming essentially all
 34 of the CO₂ that could be produced by microbial consumption of CPR materials, and by buffering
 35 (controlling) the f_{CO₂} and pH within ranges that are favorable from the standpoint of actinide
 36 speciation and solubility (see Section SOTERM-2.3.2).

1 Three effects of microbial consumption of CPR materials are recognized in the system
2 performance modeling. A simplification has been made so the effects will be time-independent
3 after 100 years. These effects are

4 1. CO₂ production. With the addition of excess MgO, the effects of CO₂ production are
5 minimized, and it is assumed that the system may be modeled using the brucite-
6 hydromagnesite (Mg₅(CO₃)₄(OH)₂·4H₂O) buffer.

7 2. Redox effects. After 100 years, the repository will have a reducing environment. This is, in
8 part, established by the postclosure microbial consumption of oxygen, but is also due to the
9 corrosion of steel. This combined effect leads to the formation of an anoxic reducing
10 environment in the WIPP.


11 3. Production of humic and microbial colloids is possible/probable and likely to be the main
12 colloidal contributor to actinide concentrations in DBR release.

13 **SOTERM-2.4.1.2 Bioreduction of Multivalent Actinides**

14 The bioreduction of higher-valent actinides is an important potential effect of microbial activity
15 in the WIPP. This potential effect is beneficial to the WIPP licensing case since it strengthens
16 the current PA assumption that lower-valent, and therefore less-soluble, actinide species will
17 predominate in the WIPP. The bioreduction of actinides has recently been the focus of much
18 research due to its expected role in microbially-mediated remediation and containment of
19 subsurface contaminants (Banaszak, Rittman, and Reed 1998; Banaszak et al. 1999; Lloyd,
20 Young, and Macaskie 2000; Reed et al. 2007; Icopini, Boukhalfa, and Neu 2007; and Francis,
21 Dodge, and Gillow 2008). The extent that this applies to the halophiles typically present in the
22 WIPP is, however, uncertain, although it is expected that similar trends in bioreduction will be
23 observed.

24 The linkage between actinide oxidation state and microbiological processes for soil bacteria is
25 shown in Figure SOTERM-2. Under anaerobic conditions, U(VI), Pu(V/VI), and Np(V) are
26 reduced for a wide range of microbes and electron donors. U(VI) and Np(V) species are
27 primarily reduced enzymatically by reductases formed. The end product in both of these cases is
28 the actinide in the IV oxidation state. The Pu system, however, is more complex in that there are
29 strongly coupled abiotic and biotic pathways (see Table SOTERM-3) and the formation of
30 Pu(III), rather than Pu(IV), is sometimes observed when Pu(IV) solubilization mechanisms
31 coexist.

32 Although there is a reasonable expectation that bioreduction of higher-valent actinides will occur
33 for microbiologically active anaerobic systems in the WIPP, WIPP-specific data that support this
34 expectation have not been obtained. For this reason, the potential effects of bioreduction on
35 multivalent actinide systems are not considered in the WIPP PA.



1
2 **Figure SOTERM-2. Expected Dominant Actinide Oxidation States as a Function of the**
3 **Standard Reduction Potential at pH = 7 in Water That is in**
4 **Equilibrium With Atmospheric CO_2 . The Linkages Between the**
5 **Redox Potentials, Associated Specific Oxidation States, and Microbial**
6 **Electron Acceptor Couples are Also Shown (Banaszak, Rittmann, and**
7 **Reed 1998).**

8 SOTERM-2.4.2 Radiolysis Effects in the WIPP

9 Radiolysis effects in the WIPP are caused by the interaction of ionizing radiation and particles
10 (neutrons, α , β , and γ) with the gases, brines, and materials present in the repository. These
11 effects have not been extensively studied under WIPP-related conditions, but there is a fairly
12 good general understanding of their extent and nature. The strongly reducing and oxidizing
13 transients generated radiolytically in aqueous systems can affect the oxidation state distribution
14 of multivalent metals and actinides. In high-ionic-strength sodium chloride brines, this is
15 primarily exhibited in the oxidation of Am(III) and Pu(III/IV) species to Am(V) and Pu(V/VI).
16 Additionally, the radiolytic breakdown of water leads to the formation of molecular hydrogen,
17 which adds to gas generation in the WIPP after brine inundation. Lastly, radiolytic effects can
18 affect the stability and/or enhance the degradation of waste components (e.g., CPR degradation,
19 iron/metal corrosion, and initial actinide oxidation state distribution) during the unsaturated and
20 saturated phases in repository history.

21 The effects of radiolysis for most conditions expected in the WIPP are predicted to be transient
22 and insignificant. In this context, there is a recognition that although radiolysis can lead to
23 localized conditions and effects that could oxidize multivalent actinides, the brine chemistry,
24 metal corrosion, and microbiological activity will combine to very rapidly overwhelm these
25 effects. For this reason, radiolysis effects on actinide solubility are not explicitly included in the
26 WIPP PA to calculate actinide concentrations. More specifics on the overall mechanisms, brine

1 radiation chemistry, and potential radiolytic effects on actinide speciation are given in this
2 section.

3 **SOTERM-2.4.2.1 Radiation Chemistry of Brine Systems**


4 The radiolysis of high-ionic-strength brine systems has not been extensively studied, but some
5 studies exist (Büppelman, Kim, and Lierse 1988; Kim et al. 1994; Kelm, Pashalidis, and Kim
6 1999; Ershov et al. 2002). The many components in the brine systems of interest to the WIPP
7 will lead to a relatively complex radiation chemistry and the formation of numerous transients
8 and free radicals.

9 In contrast to this, the radiation chemistry of pure and dilute aqueous systems has been
10 extensively investigated, and detailed reviews of this research have been published (Draganic
11 and Draganic 1971, Spinks and Woods 1990). The irradiation of pure water leads to the
12 formation of molecular hydrogen peroxide (H_2O_2) and hydrogen (H_2). These molecular yields
13 are relatively insensitive to a wide range of conditions in dilute systems for a given type of
14 ionizing radiation. Molecular yields are $G_{\text{H}_2} = 0.45$ molecule (molec)/100 electron-volt (eV) and
15 $G_{\text{H}_2\text{O}_2} = 0.7$ molec/100 eV for low Linear Energy Transfer (LET) ionizing radiation (β , and γ)
16 and $G_{\text{H}_2} = 1.6$ molec/100 eV and $G_{\text{H}_2\text{O}_2} = 1.5$ molec/100 eV for high LET radiation (α and
17 neutrons). The radiolytic formation of hydrogen in the WIPP brine due to self-irradiation effects
18 of ^{239}Pu was established and a molecular yield of $G_{\text{H}_2} = 1.4$ molec/100 eV was measured (Reed
19 et al. 1993). This yield is consistent with the high LET literature, even though the irradiations
20 were performed in brine.


21 The high concentrations of electron and free radical scavengers present in the WIPP brine have a
22 pronounced effect on the radiation chemistry. Most importantly, halides react with the hydroxyl
23 radical ($\text{OH}\cdot$) or act as scavengers (such as Cl^- or Br^-) to gradually lower the molecular yield of
24 H_2O_2 as the concentration of the scavengers is increasing (Kelm, Pashalidis, and Kim 1999). In
25 this context, oxidizing transient species are “chemically” stored as oxychlorides and
26 oxybromides, leading to a shift towards more oxidizing conditions. Figure SOTERM-3 gives an
27 overview of the radiolytic pathways and mechanisms that are likely (Buppelmann, Kim, and
28 Lierse 1988). In NaCl brine, the formation of chloride species (ClO^- , HOCl , Cl_2 , and Cl_3^-) is
29 favored, instead of H_2O_2 (Büppelmann, Kim, and Lierse 1988).

30 Kelm, Pashalidis, and Kim (1999) showed that the formation of hypochlorite ion increases with
31 the chloride concentration and the dose (Figure SOTERM-4) in NaCl brine. The authors found
32 that in solutions containing 37 gigabecquerel (GBq)/liter (L) of ^{238}Pu , the hypochlorite
33 concentration increases with time (dose) and appears to approach a steady state (see Figure
34 SOTERM-4). At a constant dose rate, the maximum hypochlorite concentration depends on the
35 chloride concentration. It was also observed that hypochlorite ion generation was negligible
36 when chloride concentrations were smaller than 2 M.

37 In the WIPP brine, however, some solutes other than chloride may play a role. Ershov et al.
38 (2002) showed that small amounts of bromide in natural brines under radiolysis can give Cl_2^- ,
39 ClBr^- , and Br^- radical anions at the radical step, and then mixed halogen molecules and trihalide
40 ions by radical recombination at the molecular step (Ershov et al. 2002). The hydrolysis of
41



1
2 **Figure SOTERM-3. NaCl Brine Radiolysis Species and Suggested Mechanism of**
3 **Production. The Formation of Chloride Species (ClO^- , $HOCl$, Cl_2 , and**
4 **Cl_3^-) is Favored Instead of H_2O_2 (Based on Data in Büppelmann, Kim,**
5 **and Lierse 1988).**



6
7 **Figure SOTERM-4. Radiolytic Formation of Hypochlorite Ion in Solutions of Various**
8 **NaCl Concentrations at a Constant Alpha Activity of 37 GBq/L at**
9 **pH~12 (Based on Data in Kelm, Pashalidis, and Kim 1999)**

1 mixed halogen molecules can then result in the formation of hypobromite (OBr^-) (acidic form:
2 hypobromous acid [HOBr]), a starting substance to more stable bromates of higher oxidation
3 state (Ershov et al. 2002).

4 Some WIPP-specific experiments were performed to establish the key radiolytic product in
5 GWB and ERDA-6 brine (Lucchini et al. 2009). This study confirms that hydrogen peroxide
6 (H_2O_2) and hypochlorite ion (OCl^-) are unstable in these WIPP brines, due in part to metallic
7 impurities in the brine. There was, however, an accelerated decomposition of these species when
8 bromide (Br^-) was present, which is the case for both ERDA-6 and GWB brines. Here, OCl^-
9 readily and stoichiometricly reacted with Br^- to form hypobromite ion (OBr^-), which appeared to
10 be the most important radiolytic transient observed under these conditions. OBr^- , like OCl^- , is
11 also an oxidizing species ($E^\circ=0.76\text{V}$), that will likely lead to the oxidation of multivalent
12 actinides in the WIPP, but this reactivity has not been established experimentally under
13 representative WIPP conditions (Lucchini et al. 2009).

14 In the WIPP, most of the brine radiolysis is caused by the deposition of alpha particles from the
15 TRU isotopes present in the WIPP waste. The range (distance traveled until the alpha particle's
16 energy is lost) of these alpha particles is very short (<40 microns) and radiolysis of the brine
17 solution will take place at the solid-liquid interface. Locally, the concentration of oxidative
18 radiolytic products of brine, such as hypochlorite, chlorite, chlorate, and products of their
19 reaction with brine components (e.g., hypobromite) may be high, and they may directly interact
20 with the radioactive surface. These "very-near" radiolytic effects, however, are expected to be
21 quickly mitigated by the bulk brine chemistry and the reaction of reducing agents (e.g., reduced
22 iron) with the oxidizing molecular products formed.


23 **SOTERM-2.4.2.2 Potential Radiolytic Effects on Actinide Speciation and Solubility**

24 A buildup of oxidizing radiolytic products in brine may increase the redox potential of the brine
25 (Büppelmann, Kim, and Lierse 1988), and consequently directly generate higher-valent actinide
26 species. Alternatively, these radiolytic products could be inserted into some solid actinide
27 phases. For example, Kim et al. (1994) studied the solubility of schoepite, $(\text{UO}_2)(\text{OH})_2 \cdot x\text{H}_2\text{O}$,
28 with hypochlorite ion in 0.1M NaCl at 25 °C (77 °F), in CO_2 -free atmosphere (Kim et al. 1994).
29 Their X-Ray Diffraction (XRD) patterns of the residual precipitates showed the introduction of
30 hypochlorite ion in precipitates. Kim et al. (1994) observed that the presence of hypochlorite ion
31 in the initial schoepite structure enhanced the solubility of the solid 10 to 100 times in the range
32 of pH 6.0-9.8, compared with its solubility in the absence of hypochlorite ion (Kim et al. 1994).
33 However, this effect was reduced when the molar ratio $[\text{ClO}^-]/[\text{UO}_2^{2+}]$ increased. This scenario
34 is unlikely to occur in the WIPP because the potential buildup of oxidizing radiolytic products
35 generated in brine is readily overwhelmed by the overall reducing capacity of the site (reduced
36 metals and microbial processes).

37 The buildup of oxidizing radiolytic products due to brine radiolysis has also been shown to
38 significantly affect the solution chemistry of Am. For example, Am(III) was oxidized to the
39 more soluble forms of Am, namely AmO_2^+ and AmO_2^{2+} (Magirius, Carnall, and Kim 1985; Katz,
40 Seaborg, and Morss 1986; Stadler and Kim 1988; and Meyer et al. 2002). Magirius, Carnall, and
41 Kim (1985) reported on the radiation effects exerted upon a 5 M NaCl solution at the pH 8 to 9
42 range using precipitated $\text{Am}(\text{OH})_3$ at a concentration of 1.03×10^{-3} M (1.07 curie [Ci]/L). They

1 observed that the precipitate began to show discoloration, changing from pink Am^{3+} to brown
2 AmO_2^+ , within 24 hours (h), with quantitative oxidation of all the Am to AmO_2^+ within 1 week.
3 Because Pu is more readily oxidized than Am, the expectation is that Pu could also be oxidized
4 in irradiated brine. The metastability of Pu(VI) in the WIPP brine when no reducing agents were
5 present was established and attributed to self-radiolysis effects of the ^{239}Pu isotope used (Reed,
6 Okajima, and Richmann 1994; Reed et al. 2006).

7 Stadler and Kim (1988) also report the existence of higher oxidation states of Am, due to self
8 radiolysis. Solubility experiments on $\text{Am}(\text{OH})_3(\text{solid}[s])$ in 3 M NaCl resulted in much higher
9 Am concentrations than was calculated from the solubility product. This difference was assigned
10 to the radiolytic oxidation of Am^{3+} to AmO_2^+ . Spectrophotometric evidence of AmO_2^+ species in
11 solution was reported. The authors report the value of $\log_{10}K_{S,0} = -9.3 \pm 0.5$ for the reaction



13 The solubility product of $\text{AmO}_2\text{OH}(s)$ is in general agreement with other solubility studies on
14 different pentavalent actinides.

15 These results show there is clearly a potential for oxidized, higher-valent actinides to form in
16 brine when no reducing agents are present. This, however, needs to be interpreted in the context
17 of the strong reducing agents and processes that will predominate in the WIPP, such as
18 bioreduction (Section SOTERM-2.4.1.2), iron reduction (Section SOTERM-3.4.2), and
19 reduction by organic complexants (Section SOTERM-2.3.4). WIPP-specific data show that the
20 presence of reduced iron (Fe(II/0)) leads to a rapid reduction of Pu(VI) to Pu(IV) species under a
21 wide range of anoxic conditions (Reed et al. 2006, Reed et al. 2009). These results are expected
22 to extend to the Am(V) system, since this species is more readily reduced than Pu(V/VI).
23 Reduced iron will also react with radiolytically generated oxidizing species, such as hypochlorite
24 or hypobromite, to prevent their buildup in the brine solution with time. In summary, these
25 WIPP-specific results show that the reductants present in WIPP waste (reduced metals and
26 organics) will overwhelm potential radiolytic effects under the expected conditions in the WIPP,
27 and a significant and sustained radiolytic enhancement of actinide solubilities is not predicted.

28 **SOTERM-2.5 Changes in WIPP Conditions since the CRA-2004 and the** 29 **CRA-2004 PABC**

30 There are no significant changes in the WIPP repository conditions, chemistry, and processes
31 since the CRA-2004 and the last PA performed (Leigh et al. 2005). Specifically, the
32 assumptions and parameters given in Table SOTERM-1 are the same as those used for the CRA-
33 2004 PABC. This applies to all the discussions in Section SOTERM-2.1, Section SOTERM-2.2,
34 Section SOTERM-2.3, and Section SOTERM-2.4.

35 Three WIPP-relevant processes were reviewed and updated. First, actinide reduction is a direct
36 consequence of microbial activity under anoxic conditions (see Section SOTERM-2.4.1). This,
37 in fact, strengthens the current PA position that reducing conditions will be maintained in the
38 WIPP, although this is not accounted for in PA. Second, there is an increased understanding of
39 the effects of ionizing radiation on actinide speciation in sodium chloride brine systems (Section
40 SOTERM-2.4.2). This leads to recognition of the role of hypobromite in WIPP-specific brines.

1 Additionally, WIPP-specific data show that the effects of radiolysis, which can create locally
2 more oxidizing zones in the repository, are readily overwhelmed by the effects of reduced iron.
3 Third, further progress was made in understanding the reaction sequence and interactions of
4 MgO in WIPP-relevant brine systems (see Section SOTERM-2.3.3).

5 The TRU inventory was updated. This update impacted the concentration of organic chelating
6 agents (see Section SOTERM-2.3.6), the volume of the TRU waste inventory, and the amount of
7 emplaced materials which increased the CPR inventory (see Section SOTERM-2.3.7).

8 It is important to note that the CRA-2004 PABC included changes to the CRA-2004 PA in
9 response to comments received from the EPA (Cotsworth 2005). These are discussed in detail as
10 part of the CRA-2004 PABC documentation (Leigh et al. 2005). The specific changes for CRA-
11 2004 PABC that revised or clarified the microbial assumptions and input are as follows:

- 12 1. Gas generation rates were revised to account for slower, longer-term processes based on new
13 WIPP-specific data (Nemer and Stein 2005; Nemer, Stein, and Zelinski 2005a).
- 14 2. All PA vectors are now assumed to be microbial (this was changed from a probability of 0.5
15 in CRA-2004 PA).
- 16 3. Gas generation is assumed to occur only through denitrification (~4%) and sulfate reduction
17 (~96%). It is assumed that methanogenesis does not occur because sulfate is assumed to be
18 always available for microbial processes.

1 **SOTERM-3.0 WIPP-Relevant Actinide Chemistry**

2 The speciation of actinides under WIPP-relevant conditions defines the source term for actinide
3 release from the WIPP in release scenarios where dissolved actinide concentrations are important
4 (e.g., DBR and transport through the Salado or Culebra). The key factors that establish the
5 concentrations of dissolved actinides under subsurface conditions are known. The most
6 important of these factors for the WIPP repository are listed below.

- 7 1. Actinide redox chemistry is a critical factor in establishing the concentration of actinides in
8 brine. The solubility of reduced actinides (III and IV oxidation states) is significantly lower
9 than oxidized forms (V and/or VI). In this context, maintaining reducing conditions in the
10 WIPP and the strong coupling of the chemistry for reduced metals and microbiological
11 processes with actinides are important.
- 12 2. The complexation of each actinide species is a critical factor in defining its solubility. For a
13 given oxidation state, the inorganic and organic complexes present will define the solubility
14 of the actinide. These complexants are in the preemplacement environment, are part of the
15 TRU waste that is emplaced, or are produced as a result of subsurface processes, most
16 notably microbial and corrosion processes.
- 17 3. Intrinsic and pseudoactinide colloid formation is a critical factor in defining the overall
18 solution concentration of each actinide. The contribution of actinide colloids to the
19 concentration of actinides in the WIPP is predicted to be significant. Many of the key TRU
20 species in their expected oxidation states tend to form colloids or strongly associate with
21 nonactinide colloids present (e.g., microbial, humic and organic).

22 The WIPP PA approach as established in the initial WIPP license application (U.S. Department
23 of Energy 1996) and continued through the most recent PA calculations (Leigh et al. 2005)
24 accounts for all three of these key factors.

25 The PA concept of actinide speciation in the WIPP is well grounded in what has been observed
26 for actinide contaminants in near-surface groundwater. In natural systems, the following
27 inorganic ligands are potentially important complexants of radionuclides in solution:
28 $\text{CO}_3^{2-}/\text{HCO}_3^-$, OH^- , Cl^- , $\text{SO}_4^{2-}/\text{S}^{2-}$, fluoride (F^-), and phosphate. Additionally, anthropogenic and
29 bioderived chelating agents can strongly bind actinide species and will compete with the
30 inorganic complexants present. Lastly, the tendencies of actinides to form intrinsic colloids and
31 strongly associate or bind with colloidal particles are also well established. The relative
32 importance of these complexants and processes depends on the pH, radionuclide oxidation state
33 present, the presence of other metals, and the relative ligand concentrations. There are a number
34 of general reviews on various aspects of actinide environmental chemistry (Allard 1982;
35 Choppin, Liljenzin, and Rydberg 2004 [pp. 94–112]; Clark, Hobart, and Neu 1995; Banaszak,
36 Rittmann, and Reed 1998; Runde 2000; Nitsche et al. 1992).

37 For the anoxic, reducing, and mildly basic brine systems expected in the WIPP (see Table
38 SOTERM-1), the most important inorganic complexants are expected to be
39 carbonate/bicarbonate and hydroxide. There are also important organic complexants that coexist
40 in TRU waste with the potential to strongly influence actinide solubility. In this context, the

1 relative importance of actinides and overall oxidation state, based on the CRA-2004 PABC TRU
2 waste inventory, with respect to the potential release of actinides from the WIPP, is:

3 **Actinides:** Pu \approx Am \gg U $>$ Th \gg Np \approx Cm (SOTERM.22)

4
5 **Actinide Oxidation State:** An(III) $>$ An(IV) \gg An(VI) \gg An(V) (SOTERM.23)

6
7 In the CRA-2004 PABC (Leigh et al. 2005), the contribution of Pu, Am, U, Th, Cm, and Np is
8 expressly considered, although only Pu and Am contribute significantly to TRU release from the
9 WIPP. The III oxidation state is the most important oxidation state based on current WIPP PA
10 assumptions because Am always exists in the III state, Pu exists in the III state in 50% of the
11 vectors, and the III oxidation state is more soluble than the IV (see Section SOTERM-4.0 for a
12 more detailed discussion).

13 In this section, an update of the literature and a summary of new WIPP-specific data is provided
14 (when available) for all the actinides that contribute in one way or another to the PA. Section
15 SOTERM-3.1 gives an overview of the projected and current inventory of actinides in the WIPP;
16 Section SOTERM-3.2, Section SOTERM-3.3, Section SOTERM-3.4, Section SOTERM-3.5, and
17 Section SOTERM-3.6 contain an overview of the relevant environmental chemistry and WIPP-
18 specific results for Th, U, Np, Pu, and Am/Cm, respectively; Section SOTERM-3.7 pertains to
19 the complexation of actinides by organic chelating agents in the WIPP; Section SOTERM-3.8
20 provides an overview of the potential for the formation of actinide colloids in the WIPP; and
21 Section SOTERM-3.9 is a summary of changes since the CRA-2004 and CRA-2004 PABC. An
22 up-front overview of these sections appears in Table SOTERM-6. The PA implementation of
23 this actinide environmental chemistry is discussed in Section SOTERM-4.0 and Section
24 SOTERM-5.0.

25 **SOTERM-3.1 Actinide Inventory in the WIPP**

26 The actinide inventory for the WIPP, based on the Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report-
27 2004 inventory (U.S. Department of Energy 2006), is given in Table SOTERM-7. This is also
28 the inventory used to calculate the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush and Xiong 2005b) actinide
29 solubilities. Also included in this table are the calculated inventory limits of the various
30 actinides and radionuclides considered by the WIPP PA.

31 Over long time frames, only Pu and Am are expected to make a significant contribution to
32 releases from the WIPP. Curium (Cm), which is predominantly present as ^{244}Cm , is a factor of
33 10 below the calculated solubility for III actinides when fully dissolved and, with its very short
34 half-life (18.11 years), will not be important beyond the 100-year period of institutional control.
35 Although relatively large inventories of cesium (Cs) and strontium (Sr) are projected, these can
36 only contribute significantly to the overall release from the WIPP for the first 100 years of
37 repository history, so are not significant beyond the period of institutional control.

38 Table SOTERM-8 gives the panel-specific inventory of the actinides for Panels 1 and 2 in the
39 WIPP. These data are based on characterization of containers in Panels 1 and 2 WIPP Waste
40 Information System (WWIS). Also included in this inventory is the amount of key waste
41

1 **Table SOTERM-6. Overview of the WIPP PA View/Role and Relevant Environmental**
 2 **Chemistry of the Key Actinide Species in the WIPP (References for**
 3 **Each Actinide are Provided in the Following Sections)**

Actinide	WIPP PA View/Role	Environmental Chemistry
Thorium	Not a TRU component. Currently included in PA calculations, but not a significant contributor to actinide release. Used as an oxidation-state invariant analog for the IV actinides. Th data are used in Fracture-Matrix Transport (FMT) to calculate the solubility of Pu(IV), Np(IV), and U(IV).	Exists as Th ⁴⁺ complexes and is sparingly soluble under a wide range of environmental conditions.
Uranium	Not a TRU component. Potentially useful as a VI analog for Pu(VI) species. Currently, U is conservatively assumed to be U(VI) in 50% of the PA vectors (set at a 1 mM solubility) and U(IV) in 50% of the PA vectors.	Exists as UO ₂ ²⁺ and U ⁴⁺ species that are strongly correlated with redox conditions. Can form highly insoluble U(VI) and U(IV) phases. Can persist up to mM concentrations in near-surface groundwater.
Neptunium	TRU component. Currently included in PABC calculations, but not a significant contributor to actinide release. Assumed to be IV in 50% of the PA vectors and V in 50% of the PA vectors. Expected to be in the IV oxidation state under the conditions expected in the WIPP.	Mobile and relatively soluble as the NpO ₂ ⁺ species under oxidizing conditions. Is fairly insoluble and immobile as Np ⁴⁺ under reducing conditions.
Plutonium	TRU component. Major contributor to actinide release calculations. Assumed to be IV in 50% of PA vectors and III in the other 50% of PA vectors.	Relatively immobile and insoluble as a subsurface contaminant. Persists as Pu ⁴⁺ except under biomediated, strongly reducing conditions where transitory Pu ³⁺ species may be formed. Expected to be transported primarily through colloidal mechanisms.
Americium	TRU component. Major contributor to actinide release calculations. Exists in the III oxidation state in all vectors and its thermodynamic data is used by FMT for all III oxidation state calculations. Significant colloidal contribution due to strong association as a pseudocolloid.	Relatively immobile and insoluble as a subsurface contaminant. Persists as Am ³⁺ complexes under a wide range of environmental conditions.
Curium	Small quantities of ²⁴³ Cm, ²⁴⁵ Cm, and ²⁴⁸ Cm are present in the WIPP. ²⁴⁴ Cm, although present, is not a TRU waste component due to its <20 year half-life. These are very minor contributors to actinide release. Chemistry is analogous to Am(III).	Not a very significant concern as a subsurface contaminant. Has the same chemistry as Am, so it will persist as a Cm ³⁺ species.
Organic Chelating Agents	The effects of EDTA, citrate, oxalate, and acetate on actinide solubility are considered in WIPP PA. These are present in WIPP waste and it is assumed that they are neither destroyed nor created by WIPP-relevant subsurface processes.	EDTA can persist under a wide range of environmental conditions and strongly chelates actinides. Citrate, oxalate, and acetate will likely be degraded due to microbial activity.
Actinide Colloids	Pseudocolloids with actinides are formed. These are accounted for in WIPP PA and add to the conservatism of the actinide concentrations calculated.	Importance and role of An colloid-facilitated transport are the subject of much ongoing debate. Although colloids are formed, it is not clear that they lead to increased actinide migration.

1 **Table SOTERM-7. WIPP Radionuclide Inventory (U.S. Department of Energy 2006)**
 2 **Decay-Corrected to 2002. This Inventory was the Basis of CRA-2004**
 3 **PABC Calculations.**

Radionuclide	Activity (Ci)	Amount (kg)	Element-Specific Inventory	Inventory-Defined Potential Solubility ^a (M)
Actinides				
²²⁹ Th	1.55E+00	7.82E-03	5.07 Ci 3.11E+04 kg	>> Solubility
²³⁰ Th	9.72E-02	4.71E-03		
²³² Th	3.42E+00	3.11E+04		
²³³ U	1.23E+03	1.27E+02	1.68E+03 Ci 6.47E+05 kg	>> Solubility
²³⁴ U	2.27E+02	3.65E+01		
²³⁵ U	4.99E+00	2.31E+03		
²³⁶ U	2.78E+00	4.29E+01		
²³⁸ U	2.17E+02	6.45E+05		
²³⁷ Np	6.89E+00	9.77E+00	6.89 Ci 9.77 kg	4×10^{-6} M (\geq projected solubility)
²³⁸ Pu	1.45E+06	8.49E+01	4.22E+06 Ci 9.93E+03 kg	>> Solubility
²³⁹ Pu	5.83E+05	9.40E+03		
²⁴⁰ Pu	9.57E+04	4.20E+02		
²⁴¹ Pu	2.09E+06	2.03E+01		
²⁴² Pu	1.27E+01	3.23E+00		
²⁴⁴ Pu	5.53E-03	3.10E-01		
²⁴¹ Am	4.89E+05	1.42E+02	4.89E+05 Ci 143 kg	6×10^{-5} M (\geq projected solubility)
²⁴³ Am	7.88E+01	3.95E-01		
²⁴⁴ Cm	7.26E+03	8.97E-02	7.26E+03 Ci 0.0897 kg	4×10^{-8} M
Fission Products^b				
¹³⁷ Cs	4.33E+05	5.02E+00	4.33E+05 Ci 5.02 kg	4×10^{-6} M
⁹⁰ Sr	3.78E+05	2.77E+00	3.78E+05 Ci 2.77 kg	3×10^{-6} M

^a Moles in the inventory divided by the minimum brine volume (10011 m³)

^b Fission products are not TRU, but are considered in the PA to calculate overall release

4

1 **Table SOTERM-8. Total Amount (in Kilograms) of Key Waste Package Components and**
 2 **Actinides Present in WIPP Panels 1 and 2 (Based on Data in Lucchini**
 3 **et al. 2007)**

Panel 1			
Radionuclides	Amount in kg (Ci)	Materials	Amount (kg)
²⁴¹ Am	34.6 (1.19 × 10 ⁵)	Iron-based metal alloys	3,327,871
Pu (total)	2,571	Aluminum-based metal alloys	5,459
²³⁹ Pu	2,416 (1.5 × 10 ⁵)	Other metal alloys	46,793
U (total)	22,232	MgO	4,482,355
²³⁸ U	22,170 (7.5)	Cellulosics	706,141
²³⁷ Np	0.6 (0.42)	Plastic	522,688
Panel 2			
Radionuclides	Amount in kg (Ci)	Materials	Amount (kg)
²⁴¹ Am	9.2 (3.2 × 10 ⁴)	Iron-based metal alloys	4,922,035
Pu (total)	1,405	Aluminum-based metal alloys	17,730
²³⁹ Pu	1,306 (8.1 × 10 ⁴)	Other metal alloys	121,526
U (total)	6,850	MgO	6,667,625
²³⁸ U	6,808 (2.3)	Cellulosics	477,213
²³⁷ Np	1.2 (0.85)	Plastic	876,399

4
 5 components emplaced. From the perspective of actinide solubility and PA, the most important of
 6 these are MgO and iron. Over 8,000 metric tons of iron is already emplaced, contrasting with the
 7 much smaller amounts of TRU present (1.8 kg of Np, 43.6 kg of Am, and 3.8 metric tons of Pu).
 8 Approximately 11,000 metric tons of MgO are present. These data support and are consistent
 9 with current WIPP PA assumptions that sufficient MgO and an overwhelming amount of iron
 10 will be present in the WIPP to establish strongly reducing conditions and favorable carbonate
 11 levels.

12 **SOTERM-3.2 Thorium Chemistry**

13 Th is not a TRU component. An estimated 31 metric tons of Th will be in the WIPP. The
 14 release of Th as the ²³⁰Th isotope was calculated in the CRA-2004 PABC and does not
 15 significantly contribute to the overall release of activity from the WIPP. Th is, however,
 16 important for the WIPP in that it is used as a redox-invariant analog for the IV actinides (Pu(IV),
 17 Np(IV), and U(IV)), and Th complexation data is used in the FMT code for the An(IV) solubility
 18 calculations (see Section SOTERM-4.4.3).

19 **SOTERM-3.2.1 Thorium Environmental Chemistry**

20 Th, under a wide range of conditions, has one stable oxidation state in aqueous solutions: the
 21 Th⁴⁺ tetravalent ion. For this reason, the environmental chemistry of Th is understood from the

1 perspective of the solubility and complexation of this species, which is also the species expected
2 to be present in the WIPP environment when DBR and transport release scenarios are important.

3 Other oxidation states for Th in aqueous systems have been reported. Recent data by Klapötke
4 and Schulz (1997) that suggests a Th^{3+} species as a somewhat stable species in slightly acidic
5 solution is not correct; it has been discounted because the proposed reaction for the species'
6 formation is shown to be thermodynamically impossible, and the azido-chloro Th^{4+} complex is
7 incorrectly assigned to the Th^{3+} species (Ionova, Madic, and Guillaumont 1998).



8 The hydrolysis of Th^{4+} , as is true for all An(IV) species in the WIPP, is complex and a critically
9 important interaction in defining the overall solubility of Th. This was recently investigated by
10 Ekberg et al. (2000), Rai et al. (2000), Moulin et al. (2001), and Okamoto, Mochizuki, and
11 Tsushim (2003) and critically reviewed by Neck and Kim (2001) and Moriyama et al. (2005).
12 The authors have proposed a comprehensive set of thermodynamic constants that extends to all
13 tetravalent actinides. The solubility products were determined for amorphous (am) $\text{Th}(\text{OH})_4$
14 (Neck et al. 2002, Altmaier et al. 2005; Altmaier et al. 2006) and for crystalline ThO_2 (Neck et
15 al. 2003), as well as for specific ion interaction theory parameters (Neck, Altmaier, and
16 Fanghänel 2006). The thermodynamic stability constants are listed in Table SOTERM-9.

17 **Table SOTERM-9. Thermodynamic Stability Constants for Key Th Hydrolytic Species**

Hydrolytic Reaction/Species	Stability Constant
Mononuclear Species	
$\text{Th}(\text{OH})_{4, \text{am}} \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}^{4+} + 4\text{OH}^-$	$\log K_{s, \text{am}} = -47.8 \pm 0.3$
$\text{Th}(\text{OH})_{4, \text{cr}} \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}^{4+} + 4\text{OH}^-$	$\log K_{s, \text{cr}} = -53.2 \pm 0.4$
$\text{Th}^{4+} + \text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{OH})^{3+}$	$\log \beta^0_1 = 11.8 \pm 0.2$
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 2\text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{OH})_2^{2+}$	$\log \beta^0_2 = 22.0 \pm 0.6$
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 3\text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{OH})_3^+$	$\log \beta^0_3 = 31 \pm 1$
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 4\text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{OH})_{4, \text{aq}}$	$\log \beta^0_4 = 38.5 \pm 1$
Polynuclear Species	
$4\text{Th}^{4+} + 12\text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}_4(\text{OH})_{12}^{4+}$	$\log \beta^0_{4,12} = 141$
$6\text{Th}^{4+} + 15\text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}_6(\text{OH})_{15}^{9+}$	$\log \beta^0_{6,15} = 176$

18

19 The presence of carbonate in solution greatly increases the solubility of thorium dioxide (ThO_2).
20 An increase by one order of magnitude of the carbonate concentration in the range of 0.1 – 2 M
21 leads to a five-order-of-magnitude increase in the Th(IV) solubility due to the formation of
22 mono- and penta-carbonate complexes. Östhols, Bruno, and Grenthe (1994) proposed the
23 following equilibrium reactions and the corresponding stability constants:



26 This speciation scheme, however, has been criticized in recent work (Altmaier et al. 2005)
27 because it overpredicts the dependency of Th solubility on carbonate and underpredicts the effect

1 of hydrolysis at higher pH. That hydrolysis prevails at $\text{pH} > 10$ is supported by relatively detailed
2 experimental results (see Figure SOTERM-5). These data are explained by the predominance in
3 this system of $\text{Th}(\text{OH})(\text{CO}_3)_4^{5-}$ complex rather than $\text{Th}(\text{CO}_3)_5^{6-}$. A greater role for other ternary
4 complexes of thorium (e.g. $\text{Th}(\text{OH})_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{2-}$), which are also likely to be present in the WIPP
5 conditions, is also proposed, and formation constants for these complexation reactions are
6 reported. The use of the pentacarbonyl complex for the IV actinides in the WIPP PA, for these
7 reasons, is a conservative assumption that overpredicts the solubility of the IV oxidation state at
8 $\text{pH} > 10$. A correction in the FMT database to the value of the $\text{Th}(\text{OH})_4(\text{aqueous [aq]})$ to be
9 consistent with Neck et al. (2002) was incorporated into the CRA-2004 PABC.


10 Oxyanions such as phosphate and, to a lesser extent, sulfate, also form Th^{4+} complexes that can
11 precipitate at $\text{pH} < 5$. The effect of phosphate on solubility of microcrystalline ThO_2 is very
12 limited. The stability constants for $\text{Th}^{4+}/\text{H}_2\text{PO}_4^-$ and $\text{Th}^{4+}/\text{HPO}_4^{2-}$ were reported (Langmuir and
13 Herman 1980). Overall, the role of these oxyanions is expected to be unimportant for the mildly
14 basic brines ($\text{pH} \sim 8-10$) present in the WIPP.

15 A new perturbation to the understanding of Th speciation, as well as other actinides in the IV
16 oxidation state, is the recent observation that Ca, and to a lesser extent, magnesium (Mg),
17 enhances Th solubility at $\text{pH} > 10$ when carbonate is present. In recent publications, the
18 formation of $\text{Ca}_4[\text{Th}(\text{OH})_8]^{4+}$ and $\text{Ca}_4[\text{Pu}(\text{OH})_8]^{4+}$ ion pairs in alkaline CaCl_2 solution is reported
19 (Brendebach et al. 2007; Altmaier, Neck, and Fanghänel 2007). These species cause a rapid
20 increase in the solubility of all tetravalent actinides at pH greater than 11. This increased
21 solubility is only observed at CaCl_2 concentrations above 0.5 M for Th(IV), and correspondingly
22 above 2 M for Pu(IV) species. This effect can be discounted for the WIPP PA because Ca
23 concentrations in the WIPP are predicted to be approximately 14 mM or less with a pH of
24 approximately 8.7. These are both well below the levels needed to see a significant effect for
25 both Th and Pu.


26 Actinides in the IV oxidation state, because of the complexity of their solution chemistry and
27 very high tendency towards hydrolysis, form colloidal species in groundwater. The potential
28 effect of colloid formation on solubility of Th(IV) in concentrated NaCl and MgCl_2 solution was
29 recently published by Altmaier, Neck, and Fanghänel (2004) and is shown in Figure SOTERM-
30 6. In neutral-to-alkaline solutions, colloids could be formed as Th oxyhydroxide with \log
31 $[\text{Th}]_{(\text{colloid [coll]})} = -6.3 \pm 0.5$, independent of ionic strength. In Mg solutions, the formation of
32 pseudocolloids (i.e., Th(IV)) sorbed onto $\text{Mg}_2(\text{OH})_3\text{Cl} \cdot 4\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{coll})$ led to an apparent increase of
33 the total Th concentration up to 10^{-5} M (Walther 2003, Degueldre and Kline 2007, Bundschuh et
34 al. 2000). For these reasons, colloid formation is addressed in the WIPP PA.

35 **SOTERM-3.2.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA-** 36 **2004 PABC**

37 There were no new WIPP-specific data on Th solubility and speciation obtained since CRA-
38 2004. There were, however, a number of WIPP-relevant experiments reported in simplified
39 brine systems, mainly by researchers at Karlsruhe. These results were summarized above in the
40 context of their relationship to the environmental chemistry of Th in high-ionic-strength systems.
41 These solubility data support the current WIPP PA assumptions on An(IV) solubility and extend
42




1



2

3 **Figure SOTERM-5. Solubility of Amorphous Th(IV) Oxyhydroxide as a Function of**
 4 **Carbonate Concentration in 5 M for pH = 2–8 (A) and pH = 8–13.5**
 5 **(B). The Solid Lines are the Calculated Solubilities (Based on Data in**
 6 **Altmaier et al. 2005).**



1
2 **Figure SOTERM-6. Solubility of Th(OH)₄(am) Determined from Undersaturation in 0.5**
3 **NaCl, 5.0 M NaCl, and 2.5 M MgCl₂. Filled Points: Total Th**
4 **Concentrations (Including Colloids); Open Points: Th Concentrations**
5 **Measured after Ultracentrifugation at 90,000 Revolutions Per Minute**
6 **(5 × 10⁵ g) (Based on Data in Altmaier, Neck, and Fanghänel 2004).**

7 past project data to a broader range of pH and carbonate levels. These results also note that Ca-
8 enhanced carbonate complexation, something that has only been understood in the last couple of
9 years, can greatly increase the solubility of IV actinides. This complexation, however, requires
10 relatively high pH in combination with very high Ca levels, something that is not expected in the
11 WIPP. The expected pH and dissolved Ca levels predict little or no effect due to this complex.

12 **SOTERM-3.3 Uranium Chemistry**

13 U is not a TRU component, but is, by mass, expected to be the most prevalent actinide
14 component in the WIPP. Current estimates predict that ~647 metric tons will be placed in the
15 repository (see Table SOTERM-8). By mass, greater than 99% of this U will be the ²³⁸U isotope,
16 with minor amounts of ²³³U, ²³⁴U, ²³⁵U, and ²³⁶U. U does not contribute significantly to the
17 calculation of actinide release through cuttings/cavings and spillings because of its low specific
18 activity. U release can occur through the Culebra in very small amounts because of its
19 potentially high solubility in the VI oxidation state.


1 U release, as the ^{234}U isotope, was calculated in the CRA-2004 PABC. In the WIPP PA, the
 2 oxidation state distribution assumption is that U speciates as U(IV) in 50% of the PA vectors and
 3 as U(VI) in the other 50% of the vectors. The U concentration for this oxidation state is
 4 currently set at 1 mM (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2005), since there is no An(VI)
 5 model in the WIPP. U(IV) solubility is calculated using the Th(IV) speciation data reported in
 6 the FMT model. For the current WIPP PA assumptions, uranium does not contribute
 7 significantly to the overall release of actinides from the WIPP.

8 **SOTERM-3.3.1 Uranium Environmental Chemistry**

9 U is by far the most studied of the actinides under environmentally relevant conditions. An
 10 extensive review of this chemistry, as it relates to the WIPP case, was completed (Lucchini et al
 11 2009) and more general reviews can be found (Morss, Edelstein, and Fuger 2006, Guillaumont et
 12 al. 2003). An overview of U environmental chemistry is presented in this section.

13 **SOTERM-3.3.1.1 Uranium Subsurface Redox Chemistry**

14 U can theoretically exist in aqueous solution in the III, IV, V, and VI oxidation states (Hobart
 15 1990; Keller 1971 [pp. 195–215]; Clark, Hobart, and Neu 1995). In the environment, however,
 16 only the IV and VI oxidation states, which exist as U^{4+} and UO_2^{2+} species, are present. U^{3+} ,
 17 should it be formed, is metastable and readily oxidized in aqueous solution, and U(V) only exists
 18 as a very short-lived transient that instantaneously disproportionates to form U(IV) and U(VI)
 19 species. The corresponding reduction potential diagram for U at pH = 0, 8, and 14 is given in
 20 Figure SOTERM-7 (Morss, Edelstein, and Fuger 2006).



22 **Figure SOTERM-7. Reduction Potential Diagram for U at pH = 0, 8, and 14 (Based on**
 23 **Data in Morss, Edelstein, and Fuger 2006). For the Expected**
 24 **Reducing and Mildly Basic pH Conditions in the WIPP, U(IV) is**
 25 **Predicted to be the Predominant Oxidation State.**

26 Under oxidizing subsurface conditions typical of most near-surface groundwaters, U(VI) as
 27 UO_2^{2+} uranyl complexes, is the predominant oxidation state and is not easily reduced
 28 geochemically. Thermodynamically, uranyl species are stable even under mildly reducing

1 conditions and are not reduced by some Fe(II) phases (see Table SOTERM-3). In anoxic WIPP
2 brine experiments with a hydrogen overpressure, uranyl persists as a stable hydrolytic or
3 carbonate complex for over two years (Reed and Wygmans 1997).

4 In the anoxic and strongly reducing environment expected in the WIPP, however, potential
5 reduction pathways exist. The two most important of these reduction pathways are reaction of
6 uranyl with reduced iron phases (Fe[0/II]), and bioreduction through enzymatic pathways by
7 anaerobic microbes, such as metal reducers, sulfate reducers, and methanogens (see Figure
8 SOTERM-2). For these reasons, U(IV) is the oxidation state expected to predominate in the
9 WIPP when brine inundation occurs.

10 The use of iron barriers in the removal of uranyl from groundwater is well established and has
11 been reported for the removal of U(VI) from groundwater using zero-valent iron barriers (Gu et
12 al. 1998, Fiedor et al. 1998, Farrell et al. 1999) and iron corrosion products formed in saline
13 solution (Grambow et al. 1996). However, in those studies, it was unclear whether the removal
14 of uranyl (UO_2^{2+}) resulted from reductive precipitation or from adsorption onto the iron
15 corrosion products (Gu et al. 1998). In their experiments under saline conditions, Grambow et
16 al. (1996) found that a large percentage of U was rapidly adsorbed onto the iron corrosion
17 products consisting of over 97% hydrous Fe(II) oxide, and very little U(IV) was found. The
18 complexity of the U-Fe-H₂O-CO₂ system explains the scarcity of the experimental data and the
19 lack of a predominant mechanism (reduction-precipitation or adsorption) for the removal of
20 U(VI) in the presence of iron.

21 Under anoxic conditions, Trolard et al. (1997) establishes that the corrosion of steel and iron
22 generates Fe(II)/Fe(III) hydroxide species known as green rusts. Green rusts contain a certain
23 amount of nonhydroxyl anions (carbonate, halides, or sulfate); they have a high specific surface
24 area (Cui and Spahiu 2002) and a high cation sequestration capacity (O'Loughlin et al. 2003).
25 They are considered metastable oxidation products of Fe(II) to magnetite Fe₃O₄ and Fe(III)
26 oxyhydroxides (e.g., goethite α -FeOOH) (O'Loughlin et al. 2003). A few experimental studies
27 demonstrate that U(VI) is reduced to U(IV) by green rusts (Dodge et al. 2002, O'Loughlin et al.
28 2003). The formation of a UO₂ phase was measured by Extended X-Ray Absorption Fine
29 Structure (EXAFS) analysis (O'Loughlin et al. 2003) or by X-Ray Absorption Near Edge
30 Structure (XANES) analysis and confirmed by X-ray Photoelectron Spectroscopy and Fourier
31 Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) (Dodge et al. 2002).


32 Banaszak, Rittman, and Reed (1998) have reviewed the important role of microbial processes in
33 the reduction of multivalent metals under anaerobic/reducing conditions. For uranyl in particular,
34 several studies exist that show that U(VI) is reduced to U(IV) species under a wide range of
35 conditions (Lovley et al. 1991, Lovley et al. 1993, Barton et al. 1996, Huang et al. 1998,
36 Abdelouas et al. 2000, Bender et al. 2000, Fredrickson et al. 2000). Most of this work pertains to
37 groundwater bacteria, and is not directly applicable to the WIPP.

38 There are relatively few studies that investigate the interaction of U with the halophiles that are
39 more typically present in WIPP brine. Some WIPP-relevant research was done (Francis et al.
40 2000), but this work was mostly focused on gas generation, not actinide interactions. It remains
41 to be demonstrated that the mechanisms leading to the bioreduction of U(VI) also extend to the
42 microbes present in the WIPP, although it is fully expected that this will be the case.

1 SOTERM-3.3.1.2 Solubility of U(IV)

2 Tetravalent U is expected to be the dominant oxidation state in the WIPP as a result of the
3 reducing conditions that will prevail. The solubility of U(IV) under these conditions is
4 analogous to that observed for Th (see Section SOTERM-3.2 and discussion in Section
5 SOTERM-4.1) and is, in fact, calculated in the WIPP PA with the Th(IV) database.


6 Under strictly reducing conditions, such as those expected in the WIPP, the most common and
7 stable U solid is U dioxide (UO₂, uraninite) and associated hydrates. The aqueous species that
8 predominates between pH 5-10, at low carbonate concentration, is the neutral tetra-hydroxide
9 complex. This is described by the following equation:




12 The solubilities reported in the literature for hydrous UO₂·xH₂O(s), amorphous (am) UO₂, or
13 microcrystalline UO₂ are very scattered (Neck and Kim 2001). The explanation in the NEA
14 review on U speciation (Guillaumont et al. 2003) is that the solubility data reported do not
15 correspond to a unique material, but rather to a range of U oxide solids that have different
16 thermodynamic stabilities. The species predominance diagrams for U are shown in Figure
17 SOTERM-8 for aqueous and solid phases (Casas et al. 1998), based on the thermodynamic
18 constants given for U at 25 °C by Guillaumont et al. (2003).

19 Experimentally, U⁴⁺ is readily oxidized to UO₂²⁺. This occurs even when only trace levels of
20 oxygen, which are often below the limit of detection by most laboratory instrumentation, exist.
21 This explains why there are relatively few studies of U⁴⁺. It is also problematic because there are
22 very large discrepancies in the literature as a result of experimental artifact. In particular, there
23 are a number of published results (Rai, Felmy, and Ryan 1990, Gayer and Leider 1957, Ryan and
24 Rai 1983, Tremain et al. 1981, Casas et al. 1998) that suggest amphotericity for U⁴⁺ at pH >10.
25 This, however, likely resulted from combined effects of two experimental artifacts: (1) oxidation
26 to UO₂²⁺, which is much more soluble, and (2) the presence of carbonate, which is a strong
27 complexant of U⁴⁺.

28 The solubility of U(IV) phases were also determined in simplified brines under conditions that
29 relate to the WIPP (Rai et al. 1997, Rai et al. 1998; Yajima, Kawamura, and Ueta 1995, Torro
30 et al. 1994). These data are shown in Figure SOTERM-9. Rai et al. (1997) determine the
31 solubility of freshly precipitated UO₂·xH₂O(am) in NaCl and MgCl₂ solutions of various ionic
32 strengths. They estimate the concentration of U(OH)₄(aq) in equilibrium with UO₂·xH₂O(am) to
33 be about 10^{-8.0} M, and a number of data with greater concentrations in the neutral and alkaline
34 range are ascribed to the presence of U(VI) in solution. This is in fair agreement with the value
35 of 10^{-(8.7±0.4)} M proposed by Yajima, Kawamura, and Ueta (1995). It is important to note that
36 U(IV) concentrations at pH >5 show no significant dependence on the initial solid phase (Figure
37 SOTERM-9); both fresh precipitates in oversaturation experiments or electrodeposited
38 microcrystalline UO₂(s) in undersaturation experiments gave the same results (Torrero et al.
39 1994).




1



2

3 **Figure SOTERM-8. Predominance Diagrams for U as a Function of Log P_{O2} and pH: (A)**
 4 **Predominant Solid Phases; (B) Predominant Aqueous Species.**
 5 **Experimental Log P_{O2} – pH Measurements of the Experiments from**
 6 **Casas et al. Open Dots: 0.008 M Perchlorate; Filled Dots: 1 M**
 7 **Chloride; Open Squares: Cigar Lake; Filled Squares: Jachymov;**
 8 **Stars: Oklo (Based on Data in Casas et al. 1998).**



1
2 **Figure SOTERM-9. Solubility of $\text{UO}_2(\text{s})$ as a Function of pH at 20–25 °C (68–77 °F) in 1M**
3 **NaCl (based on Neck and Kim 2001). The Experimental Data are**
4 **from Ryan and Rai (1983), Rai et al. (1997), and Neck and Kim**
5 **(2001). The Solid Line is Calculated by Neck with $\text{Log } K_{\text{sp}} = (-54.5 \pm$**
6 **1.0) and the Hydrolysis Constants Selected in Neck and Kim (2001).**
7 **The Dotted Lines Show the Range of Uncertainty. The Dashed Line**
8 **is Calculated With the Model Proposed by Rai et al. (1997).**

9 SOTERM-3.3.1.3 Solubility and Speciation of U(VI)

10 U(VI) phases and aqueous species, although not expected to predominate in the WIPP, could be
11 present due to the localized effects of radiolysis (see Section SOTERM-2.4.2). The WIPP PA
12 currently makes the conservative assumption that U(VI) species predominate in 50% of the PA
13 vectors. The solubility of U(VI) is, however, not explicitly calculated in WIPP PA, since there is
14 no model for actinides in the VI oxidation state. The potential contribution of U(VI) species to
15 the overall solubility of U in the WIPP is implicitly considered in the WIPP PA in the 1 mM
16 value for U solubility (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2005). Prior to this, the solubility
17 of U was defined as 1.2×10^{-5} M based on an assessment of the literature and existing WIPP-
18 relevant experimental data by Hobart and Moore (1996).

19 The role of carbonate (CO_3^{2-}) in the U(VI) solubility is indeed important (Clark, Hobart, and Neu
20 1995, Guillaumont et al. 2003). In the absence of competing complexing ligands, carbonate
21 complexation will dominate the speciation of the uranyl ion under near-neutral pH conditions as
22 long as there is ample carbonate-bicarbonate available. Complexation constants for binary
23 U(VI) carbonate complexes at $I = 0$ M and 25 °C (77 °F) are listed in Table SOTERM-10

1 **Table SOTERM-10. Complexation Constants for Binary U(VI) Carbonate Complexes at**
 2 **I = 0 M and 25 °C (Guillaumont et al. 2003)**

Reaction and Solubility Product for $\text{UO}_2\text{CO}_3(\text{crystalline [cr]})$	
$\text{UO}_2\text{CO}_3(\text{cr}) \rightleftharpoons \text{UO}_2^{2+} + \text{CO}_3^{2-}$	$\text{Log } K_{\text{SP}(\text{cr})}^0 = -14.76 \pm 0.02$
Reactions and Formation Constants β_{nq}^0 for $(\text{UO}_2)_n(\text{CO}_3)_q^{2n-2q}$	
$\text{UO}_2^{2+} + \text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{UO}_2\text{CO}_3(\text{aq})$	$\text{Log } \beta_{11}^0 = 9.94 \pm 0.03$
$\text{UO}_2^{2+} + 2 \text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{2-}$	$\text{Log } \beta_{12}^0 = 16.61 \pm 0.09$
$\text{UO}_2^{2+} + 3 \text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{4-}$	$\text{Log } \beta_{13}^0 = 21.84 \pm 0.04$
$3 \text{UO}_2^{2+} + 6 \text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons (\text{UO}_2)_3(\text{CO}_3)_6^{6-}$	$\text{Log } \beta_{36}^0 = 55.6 \pm 0.5$

3
 4 (Guillaumont et al. 2003). The three monomeric complexes of general formula $\text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)$,
 5 $\text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{2-}$, and $\text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{4-}$ are present under the appropriate conditions. There is also
 6 evidence from electrochemical, solubility, and spectroscopy data that support the existence of
 7 $(\text{UO}_2)_3(\text{CO}_3)_6^{6-}$, $(\text{UO}_2)_2(\text{CO}_3)(\text{OH})_3^-$, and $(\text{UO}_2)_{11}(\text{CO}_3)_6(\text{OH})_{12}^{2-}$ polynuclear species, which can
 8 only form under the conditions of high-metal-ion concentration or high ionic strength (Clark,
 9 Hobart, and Neu 1995). At uranyl concentrations above 10^{-3} M, the trimeric cluster
 10 $(\text{UO}_2)_3(\text{CO}_3)_6^{6-}$ can also be present in significant concentrations. When the uranyl ion
 11 concentration begins to exceed the carbonate concentration, hydrolysis will play an increasingly
 12 important role (Clark, Hobart, and Neu 1995).

13 It is generally accepted that the major complex in solution at high carbonate concentrations is
 14 $\text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{4-}$ (Kramer-Schnabel et al. 1992, Peper et al. 2004). However, at $I = 0.5$ M and $I = 3$
 15 M, the polynuclear $(\text{UO}_2)_3(\text{CO}_3)_6^{6-}$ species becomes an important competitor of $\text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{4-}$.
 16 Grenthe et al. (1984) indicated that the formation of $(\text{UO}_2)_3(\text{CO}_3)_6^{6-}$ is favored at high ionic
 17 strengths as a result of possible stabilization of the complex by ions of the background
 18 electrolyte.

19 The solubility of U(VI) in the WIPP is defined by the combined contribution of two processes:
 20 hydrolysis with oxyhydroxide phase formation, and carbonate complexation with U carbonate
 21 phase formation. These are both very complex systems, and there are many proposed speciation
 22 schemes. In carbonate-free or low-carbonate solutions, the speciation of U(VI) is dominated by
 23 hydrolysis.

24 The solubility of uranyl carbonate UO_2CO_3 and the formation constants for the associated
 25 complexes were determined at 25 °C (77 °F) in 0.1M NaClO_4 by Kramer-Schnabel et al. (1992).
 26 The authors noticed a change in the composition of the solid when the pH increased above 6.5.
 27 Using ^{14}C -labeled carbonate and X-ray analysis, they observed that UO_2CO_3 changed to a mixed
 28 uranyl-hydroxy-carbonate at $\text{pH} > 6.5$ and to uranyl hydroxide or sodium diuranate at $\text{pH} > 8$.
 29 The different transition states were not characterized in detail. In an earlier investigation, the
 30 existence of hydroxycarbonato uranyl species in the neutral pH range at 25 °C was also
 31 determined. An important observation from these studies is that the U concentration in solutions
 32 decreases with increasing ionic strength when UO_2CO_3 is the major aqueous U species.

1 At high pH, Yamamura et al. (1998) demonstrate that hydrolysis overwhelms carbonate
2 complexation. The solubility of U(VI) was measured in highly basic solutions ($11 \leq \text{pH} \leq 14$) at
3 an ionic strength of $I = 0.5 - 2 \text{ M}$ over a wide range of carbonate concentrations ($10^{-3} - 0.5 \text{ M}$)
4 using both oversaturation and undersaturation approaches. In the oversaturation experiments, the
5 solubility of U(VI) decreased with increasing equilibration time from one week to one year and
6 was explained as an increase in the crystallinity of the solid phase with aging. The solid phase
7 was identified as $\text{Na}_2\text{U}_2\text{O}_7 \cdot x\text{H}_2\text{O}$ by XRD. The undersaturation experiments conducted for one
8 month with the solid phase indicated a rapid equilibrium. These data were interpreted by
9 considering the formation of $\text{UO}_2(\text{OH})_3^-$, $\text{UO}_2(\text{OH})_4^{2-}$, and $\text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{4-}$ (Yamamura et al. 1998).


10 The influence of carbonate on U(VI) solubility in highly saline solutions was investigated by Lin
11 et al. (1998) and Fanghänel and Neck (2002). Lin et al. (1998) evaluated U(VI) solubilities with
12 up to 5M NaCl in a range of carbonate concentrations. At carbonate-ion concentrations greater
13 than 10^{-7} M , $\text{UO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{4-}$ was the dominant U(VI) complex in solution. At higher CO_2 partial
14 pressures, the solubility-controlling solid phase was found to be $\text{UO}_2\text{CO}_3(\text{s})$, whereas at lower
15 partial pressures, sodium uranate was identified as the solid phase in NaCl-saturated solutions.
16 This study, although interesting, is of questionable use to the WIPP because the details were not
17 fully published.

18 The solubility-controlling U(VI) solid phases are schoepite-type phases $\text{UO}_3 \cdot x\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s})$. This was
19 reported by Sandino and Grambow (1994) as corrosion products of spent fuel in long-term
20 leaching experiments under oxidizing conditions. However, in complex systems where many
21 other elements are present, the uranyl hydroxides are not predicted to predominate in the long
22 term. Specifically, they undergo a transformation into different phases that can include divalent
23 cations (e.g., Ca^{2+} , Pb^{2+} , Ba^{2+}) and monovalent cations, such as K^+ or Na^+ (Sandino and
24 Grambow 1994). The transformation reaction is generally dependent on pH and groundwater
25 composition. As an example, Fanghänel and Neck (2002) observed the formation of a sodium
26 (Na) uranate phase [clarkeite, $\text{NaUO}_2\text{O}(\text{OH}) \cdot \text{H}_2\text{O}$] in 5M NaCl experiments at pH 8. The extent
27 to which these alkali uranate salts contribute to U solubility in the higher-complexity brines
28 expected in the WIPP is not clear.

29 The U solid phases formed in the presence of carbonate were also investigated. Meinrath and
30 Kimura studied solid-liquid equilibria of U(VI) at 100, 0.98 and 0.03% CO_2 partial pressures in
31 the pH range 2.8-4.6 in 0.1M NaClO_4 solution at $(24 \pm 2)^\circ\text{C}$ (Meinrath and Kimura 1993). The
32 solid phase formed under 100% CO_2 partial pressure was found as a faint, yellow-greenish
33 powder. It was identified by XRD as rutherfordine (UO_2CO_3). At 0.98 and 0.03% CO_2 partial
34 pressures, the solids generated were bright yellow, and identified by XRD as schoepite
35 ($\text{UO}_3 \cdot 2\text{H}_2\text{O}$). The authors established that the phase transition between these two phases
36 (rutherfordine and schoepite) occurs at a CO_2 partial pressure of 2.8% (Meinrath and Kimura
37 1993). This estimated value is in agreement with the experimental results of Grenthe et al.
38 (1984) who report rutherfordine as a solubility-limiting solid phase at partial pressures $\geq 4.8\%$
39 CO_2 .

1 **SOTERM-3.3.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA-**
 2 **2004 PABC**

3 The solubility of U(VI) in the absence of carbonate was extensively studied since CRA-2004 in
 4 simulated GWB and ERDA-6 brine (Lucchini et al. 2009). An overview of these results is
 5 shown in Figure SOTERM-10, and a comparison of these results with other solubility data in the
 6 literature is given in Table SOTERM-11. The measured U(VI) solubilities were about 10^{-6} M in
 7 GWB brine at $pC_{H^+} \geq 7$ and about 10^{-8} - 10^{-7} M in ERDA-6 at $pC_{H^+} \geq 8$. These results put an
 8 upper bound of $\sim 10^{-5}$ M for the solubility of uranyl in the carbonate-free WIPP brines for the
 9 investigated range of experimental conditions. At the expected pC_{H^+} in the WIPP (~ 8.7), the
 10 measured uranium solubility was between 10^{-7} M and 10^{-6} M.



11
 12 **Figure SOTERM-10. U(VI) Solubility in Carbonate-Free Brine Versus pC_{H^+} for GWB**
 13 **(Top Curve) and ERDA-6 (Bottom Curve). These Correspond to**
 14 **Data Obtained After 705-day Equilibration Using an**
 15 **Oversaturation Approach (Lucchini et al. 2009).**

1

Table SOTERM-11. Solubility of U(VI) in High-Ionic-Strength Media

U(VI) Concentration (M)	pC _{H+}	Solution	Time (days)	Solid	Reference
$(2.8 \pm 1.8) \times 10^{-5}$	8.9	5M NaCl	≈ 50	Na _{0.68} UO _{3.34} ·(2.15±0.10)H ₂ O	Diaz-Arocas and Grambow 1998
$(8.2 \pm 4.6) \times 10^{-5}$	7.6	5M NaCl	≈ 110	Na _{0.45} UO _{3.23} ·(4.5±0.1)H ₂ O	Diaz-Arocas and Grambow 1998
$(4.2 \pm 1.9) \times 10^{-4}$	7.1	5M NaCl	≈ 170	Na _{0.29} UO _{3.15} ·(2.9±0.2)H ₂ O	Diaz-Arocas and Grambow 1998
$(2.8 \pm 0.9) \times 10^{-6}$	6.5	5M NaCl	≈ 170	Na _{0.14} UO _{3.07} ·(2.5±0.1)H ₂ O	Diaz-Arocas and Grambow 1998
$(1.82 \pm 0.01) \times 10^{-3}$	8.4	Brine (air atmosphere)	100	α-schoepite (oversaturation)	Yamazaki et al. 1992
$(1.81 \pm 0.01) \times 10^{-3}$	8.4	Brine (air atmosphere)	100	α-schoepite (oversaturation)	Yamazaki et al. 1992
$(1.40 \pm 0.05) \times 10^{-3}$	8.4	Brine (air atmosphere)	244	α-schoepite (undersaturation)	Yamazaki et al. 1992
$(1.80 \pm 0.05) \times 10^{-3}$	8.4	Brine (air atmosphere)	244	α-schoepite (undersaturation)	Yamazaki et al. 1992
$(3.8 \pm 0.4) \times 10^{-7}$	10.4	Brine (initial 0.11mM HCO ₃ ⁻)	150	Mg(OH) ₂ and K ₂ U ₂ O ₇ (oversaturation)	Yamazaki et al. 1992
$(3.1 \pm 0.3) \times 10^{-7}$	10.4	Brine (initial 0.11mM HCO ₃ ⁻)	150	Mg(OH) ₂ and K ₂ U ₂ O ₇ (oversaturation)	Yamazaki et al. 1992
$(1.7 \pm 1.4) \times 10^{-7}$	8.1	ERDA-6	705	To be determined (oversaturation)	Lucchini et al. 2009
$(9.9 \pm 3.0) \times 10^{-8}$	9.6	ERDA-6	705	To be determined (oversaturation)	Lucchini et al. 2009
$(3.1 \pm 1.3) \times 10^{-8}$	10.5	ERDA-6	705	To be determined (oversaturation)	Lucchini et al. 2009

2

3 The most important observations from these U(VI) solubility studies were

- 4 • The measured solubility of U(VI) in the absence of carbonate was ~10 – 100 times lower than
5 those reported by others in the literature and well below the current 1 mM limit used in the
6 WIPP PA (which applies to all conditions, including carbonate). These lower solubilities
7 reflect the lack of oxygen and carbonate in the brine systems investigated.
- 8 • U(VI) solubility does not exhibit amphoteric behavior.

- 1 • A difference in U(VI) solubility between the two brines investigated was noted, with U
2 concentrations in GWB ~10 times higher at pH > 8. This is caused by the complexation of
3 U(VI) with the higher borate and sulfate concentrations in GWB.

4 The new WIPP-specific data do not address the more important issue of the effects of carbonate
5 complexation on U(VI) solubility, but they do establish a baseline to determine this effect.


6 **SOTERM-3.4 Neptunium Chemistry**

7 The WIPP repository is projected to contain ~10 kg of Np, primarily as the ^{237}Np isotope (see
8 Table SOTERM-8). Its inventory increases with time from the decay of ^{241}Am and the
9 possibility of ^{238}U (n, 2n) reactions, but this increase is projected to be less than a factor of two
10 during the regulatory period of the WIPP. In the WIPP PA, Np speciates as Np(IV) in 50% of
11 the PA vectors and as Np(V) in the other 50% of the PA vectors. The contribution of Np to
12 actinide release from the WIPP was included in the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush and Xiong 2005a;
13 Leigh et al. 2005) calculation, but its effect on release was negligible. Arguments have also been
14 made that it should be excluded from consideration in the WIPP PA based on its low inventory
15 (Brush and Garner 2005).

16 **SOTERM-3.4.1 Neptunium Environmental Chemistry**

17 The environmental chemistry of Np is somewhat unique in the actinide series as a result of the
18 relatively high stability of the NpO_2^+ species, which is in the V oxidation state, under a wide
19 range of conditions typically found in the subsurface. This oxidation state is prevalent when
20 oxidizing conditions predominate (Hobart 1990). It is mobile because it has a relatively high
21 solubility and it is not strongly sorbed or complexed. It does not hydrolyze strongly, with little
22 or no measurable hydrolysis until pH >7 (Neck, Kim, and Kanellakopoulos 1992; Itagaki et al.
23 1992). Much of the complexation data for inorganic and organic complexes for Np pertains to
24 the V oxidation state for this reason (Lemire et al. 2001). The log K_{sp} for NpO_2OH (s) is $4.5 \pm$
25 0.06 (Neck, Kim, and Kanellakopoulos 1992).

26 Np can, however, actually exist in up to five oxidation states in aqueous media. The redox
27 potentials under basic conditions are (Marinot and Fuger 1985):



31 Only the Np(IV) and Np(VI) oxidation states, in addition to Np(V), can exist under the right
32 conditions in reducing or oxidizing groundwater (Hobart 1990; Keller 1971 [pp. 195–215];
33 Clark, Hobart, and Neu 1995). These exist as Np^{4+} complexes and NpO_2^{2+} complexes. Np(VI),
34 unlike Np(V), is strongly hydrolyzed at near-neutral pH and is readily reduced by many
35 constituents typically found in groundwater (e.g., organics and most reduced metals). For these
36 reasons, it does not tend to persist in groundwater under most conditions.

37 Under reducing anoxic conditions, Np^{4+} species can predominate. These Np^{4+} species readily
38 undergo hydrolysis and are comparable to Pu^{4+} in this regard. This system is highly irreversible

1 and probably polymeric in nature, as is observed for Pu⁴⁺. The measured solubility of Np⁴⁺ is
2 10^{-8.5} to 10^{-8.1} M with Np(OH)₄, not Np(OH)₅⁻, as the predominant aqueous species (Rai and
3 Ryan 1985, and Eriksen et al. 1993). The importance and predominance of the Np(IV) oxidation
4 state in reducing conditions is even more pronounced when anaerobic bacteria are present.
5 Np(V) was readily reduced by sulfate-reducing bacteria (Banaszak, Reed, and Rittmann 1998)
6 and methanogenic consortia (Banaszak et al. 1999), and precipitated as Np(IV) solids.

7 In WIPP-specific experiments, Reed and Wygmans (1997) found spectroscopic evidence for
8 reduction of Np(VI) to Np(V) in ERDA-6 (Castile) brine at pH 10, and have observed complete
9 reduction of Np(VI) to Np(V) in G-Seep (Salado) brine at pH 7 when no iron or microbial
10 activity were present. In the presence of oxalate, citrate, and EDTA, Reed and Wygmans (1997)
11 have observed rapid and complete reduction of Np(VI) to Np(V) coupled with a slower
12 formation of Np(IV) species. The stability of Np(V) under these conditions is further confirmed
13 by Neck, Runde, and Kim (1995), who showed that Np(V) carbonate complexes are stable in 5M
14 NaCl.

15 In the expected WIPP environment, however, where anoxic and reducing conditions with
16 microbial activity and reduced iron are expected to be present, Np(IV) is expected to be the
17 predominant oxidation state (Rai and Ryan 1985, Rai, Strickert, and McVay 1982a, Kim et al.
18 1985, Pryke and Rees 1986). This is based on studies of the solubility of NpO₂OH in 1 M and
19 5 M NaCl solutions at pH 6.5 where the reduction of Np(V) to Np(IV) was observed (Kim et al.
20 1985, Neck, Kim, and Kanellakopoulos 1992).

21 **SOTERM-3.4.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA-** 22 **2004 PABC**

23 There are no new WIPP-relevant results on the chemistry and speciation of Np since CRA-2004
24 and the CRA-2004 PABC.

25 **SOTERM-3.5 Plutonium Chemistry**

26 Pu is a key TRU component that contributes significantly to the potential for TRU release from
27 the WIPP under all release mechanisms considered by PA. Pu isotopes, estimated to be ~10
28 metric tons at the time of closure, represent approximately 89% of the Ci content for actinides in
29 TRU waste (see Table SOTERM-7). There are five isotopes of Pu that make a significant
30 contribution to the Pu inventory, but ²³⁹Pu, ²³⁸Pu, and ²⁴¹Pu are the major contributors to the Ci
31 content. Under the conditions expected in the WIPP, Pu(IV) is expected to be the predominant
32 oxidation state (Weiner 1996). A more extensive review of Pu subsurface speciation issues as
33 they pertain to the WIPP case was completed (Reed et al. 2009).


34 In the WIPP PA, all of the Pu is assumed to be reduced and present in the III or IV oxidation
35 state. Half of the PA vectors contain 100% Pu(III), with the other half of the vectors containing
36 100% Pu(IV) species. Because the solubility of Pu(III) is roughly 10 times higher, the
37 assumption that it is present is a conservatism built into the WIPP PA. The two higher-valent Pu
38 oxidation states, Pu(V) and Pu(VI), are not considered in the PA because they cannot persist
39 under the expected reducing and anoxic conditions in the WIPP.

1 SOTERM-3.5.1 Plutonium Environmental Chemistry

2 Generally, Pu can exist in oxidation states III, IV, V, VI, and VII (Katz, Seaborg, and Morss
3 1986, p. 781). Of these, only Pu(V), Pu(IV), and Pu(III) are expected to be important under
4 environmentally relevant oxidizing and reducing conditions. Pu(VII) is very unstable and exists
5 only in extremely basic solutions (for example, 7 M NaOH) that are not expected in the WIPP.
6 Pu(VI) can persist in the WIPP in the absence of reductants, but is readily reduced in the
7 presence of Fe(II/0) species, reduced by many organic chelators (Reed et al. 1998), and reduced
8 in anaerobic, biologically active systems (Reed et al. 2007; Icopini, Boukhalfa, and Neu 2007).
9 The reduction of Pu(VI), under WIPP-relevant conditions, was shown by Clark and Tait (1996),
10 Reed and Wygmans (1997), and Reed et al. (2007).

11 SOTERM-3.5.1.1 Importance of Redox for Plutonium Speciation

12 The role and importance of redox reactions in determining actinide mobility and solubility are
13 beyond question (Van Luik et al. 1987; Allard 1982; Choppin and Rao 1992). The redox
14 potentials for the various oxidation states at pH 7 are (Cleveland 1979, pp. 11–46)




19 A typical phase diagram for Pu in groundwater that illustrates the importance of redox is shown
20 in Figure SOTERM-11.

21 Higher-valent Pu, specifically Pu(V) and Pu(VI), can be present in near-surface oxidizing
22 groundwaters (Orlandini, Penrose, and Nelson 1986). The association of Pu(V) with organic
23 colloidal material was proposed as the mechanism by which subsurface migration occurred.
24 Pu(VI), in near-neutral systems, is strongly and irreversibly hydrolyzed (Okajima and Reed
25 1993). It is also readily reduced by organics and reduced metal species even when oxygen is
26 present to form Pu(V), and is not generally stable under most groundwater-relevant conditions.

27 Pu(V), by analogy with Np(V), does not undergo hydrolysis until $\text{pH} > 7$ and tends to form weak
28 complexes. It readily disproportionates to form Pu(IV) and Pu(VI) at high concentrations and is
29 relatively easy to reduce in the environment under anoxic conditions. $\text{Fe}^{2+}(\text{aq})$, Fe(II) minerals,
30 and metallic iron reduce Pu(V) to Pu(IV).

31 In geochemical systems, redox control is often interpreted in terms of the iron, and in a broader
32 sense, reduced metal, mineralogy, and associated aqueous chemistry (Sanchez, Murray, and
33 Sibley 1985, White, Yee, and Flexser 1985). In the WIPP case, iron will undergo anoxic
34 corrosion, producing Fe^{2+} . Both metallic iron (Fe^0) and Fe^{2+} have been shown to quantitatively
35 reduce Pu(VI) in the WIPP brines to either Pu(IV) or Pu(III). Clark and Tait (1996) and Felmy
36 et al. (1996) have experimentally observed the reduction of Pu(VI) carbonates by either Fe^0 or
37 Fe^{2+} to Pu(IV). In the absence of carbonates, a quantitative reduction of Pu(VI) is also observed,
38 but the oxidation state of the resulting species cannot be definitively determined because its
39



1
2 **Figure SOTERM-11. Speciation Diagram for Plutonium in Carbonated Low-Ionic-**
3 **Strength Groundwater (Based on Data Presented in Runde et al.**
4 **2002). This Illustrates the Expected Lower Solubility of Reduced**
5 **Pu, Shows Pu(IV) Rather Than Pu(III) Species at Near-Neutral pH,**
6 **and Suggests That the Dominant Pu Species in the pH 8-9 Range are**
7 **Hydrolytic Species with Lesser Contributions From Carbonate.**

8 concentration is below the lower detection limit of the oxidation state analytical process (about
9 10^{-9} M). However, since this concentration is well below the expected solubility of Pu(V)
10 species, it was reasonably assumed that the Pu must have been reduced to either the IV or III
11 oxidation state. Neretnieks (1982) has shown that when dissolved actinides in moving
12 groundwater came in contact with Fe(II), the actinides were reduced to a much-less-soluble
13 oxidation state and precipitated.

14 Pu(III) is not predicted to be stable under the expected WIPP conditions. There are some
15 mechanisms, however, identified in which Pu(III) species can be formed. Felmy et al. (1989)
16 observed some Pu(III) in the WIPP brines at neutral and slightly basic conditions. PA
17 conservatively takes account of these minor mechanisms by assuming that Pu is speciated as
18 Pu(III) in 50% of the PA vectors.

19 **SOTERM-3.5.1.2 Bioreduction of Higher-Valent Plutonium**

20 Comprehensive and critical reviews of how actinide species and microorganisms interact have
21 been published (Banaszak, Rittmann, and Reed 1998; Neu, Ruggiero, and Francis 2002).
22 General aspects of this were discussed in Section SOTERM-2.4.1.2. Additionally, the important
23 role of microbial activity through biotic transformations (Francis 1990; Zitomer and Speece
24 1993; Banaszak, Rittmann, and Reed 1998; Rittmann, Banaszak, and Reed 2002; Reed et al.

1 2007) in defining oxidation state distribution of multivalent metals and actinides has been
2 recognized.

3 Although the bioreduction of uranyl and neptunyl species is well established, there are relatively
4 few studies of the bioreduction of plutonyl species. Reed et al. (2007) demonstrate that
5 *Shewanella alga*, a ubiquitous metal-reducing soil bacteria, reduces Pu(V) to Pu(III/IV) species.
6 Icopini, Boukhalfa, and Neu (2007) have shown that *Geobacter* and *Shewanella odeinensis* also
7 reduce higher-valent Pu to Pu(III/IV) species.


8 These Pu data are consistent with the oxidation state predictions in microbially active systems
9 shown in Figure SOTERM-2. It is particularly important to note that Pu(IV) is the expected
10 oxidation state under a wide range of anoxic subsurface conditions, with no Pu(V) or Pu(VI)
11 species expected. The recent Pu bioreduction results confirm that highly reducing conditions are
12 being generated by metal-reducing bacteria under anaerobic growth conditions and support the
13 current WIPP PA assumption that higher-valent actinides cannot persist when the concentration
14 of dissolved actinides is important and microbial activity is prevalent.

15 There are no studies on the bioreduction of Pu(V/VI) under WIPP-relevant conditions.
16 Halophiles (Gillow et al. 2000) typically found and expected to predominate in the WIPP
17 environment have not been studied in the context of their tendency and ability to reduce higher-
18 valent actinides. Since there is a high expectation that geochemical reactions alone will produce
19 an anoxic, strongly reducing environment in the WIPP, halophiles, by analogy, are also expected
20 to cause the bioreduction of multivalent actinides in the WIPP by both indirect cometabolic and
21 direct enzymatic pathways.

22 **SOTERM-3.5.1.3 Thermodynamic Stability of Higher-Valent Plutonium: PuO_{2+x}**

23 It has long been held that Pu oxide, as PuO₂, is the thermodynamically favored form of Pu oxide.
24 This oxide is likely the predominant form of Pu in TRU waste and is believed to be the most
25 important phase under WIPP-related conditions. In the last few years, however, there have been
26 a number of studies that question this key and fundamental assumption.

27 Haschke, Allen, and Morales (2000) report that near-stoichiometric plutonium dioxide reacts
28 with water vapor at temperatures between 25 °C and 350 °C (77 °F and 662 °F) according to the
29 following reaction:



31 Here, water vapor is reduced by polycrystalline PuO₂ to produce hydrogen (H) and a previously
32 unknown higher-oxide PuO_{2+x} with x as large as 0.27. If only Pu(IV) and Pu(V) are present in
33 PuO_{2.27}, this oxide has 46% Pu(IV) and 54% Pu(V). Once formed, the PuO_{2+x} may dissolve in
34 contact with groundwater to form aqueous PuO₂⁺ or PuO₂²⁺ species (Haschke and Ricketts
35 1995).

36 There remains some controversy about the mechanisms that led to the observation of higher-
37 valent Pu in the PuO_{2+x}. This process only occurs under unsaturated conditions at high relative
38 humidities. Haschke, Allen, and Morales (2000) argue that this conversion is due to a chemical

1 reaction (that is, the above reaction has a Gibbs energy less than zero) rather than a radiolysis-
2 induced reaction because the reaction rate is temperature dependent. However, there seems to be
3 some contribution from radiolysis in this process and this may be the dominant mechanism
4 (LaVerne and Tandon 2002). Neither of these mechanisms are expected to impact WIPP
5 repository performance.

6 The behavior of PuO_2 in contact with water was studied as a function of time by means of the
7 short-lived isotope ^{238}Pu , as well as the longer-lived ^{239}Pu (Rai and Ryan 1982b). This study
8 concluded that crystalline PuO_2 , amorphous PuO_2 , and amorphous $\text{PuO}_3 \cdot x\text{H}_2\text{O}$ all convert to a
9 material intermediate between crystalline PuO_2 and a hydrated amorphous material that contains
10 both Pu(IV) and Pu(VI). These authors hypothesized that alpha particles generated by ^{238}Pu or
11 ^{239}Pu irradiated water to generate OH radicals that reacted to form Pu(V) and/or Pu(VI) on the
12 oxide surface. These observations are why the formation of localized oxidizing zones, where
13 some higher-valent Pu can persist, is recognized in the WIPP PA. Reduction of these species,
14 however, leads to a reformation of Pu(IV) hydrous oxide precipitates.

15 The overall issue of a thermodynamic driver for higher-valent Pu oxides, although it has received
16 much recent attention in the literature, is not yet resolved, but has a relatively insignificant
17 impact on the WIPP regardless of the mechanisms at work. A prolonged unsaturated phase in
18 the WIPP could lead to the formation of some PuO_{2+x} , but this will be quickly overwhelmed in
19 an aqueous environment and the higher-valent Pu will be reduced to Pu(III/IV) species, as
20 described in Section SOTERM-3.5.1.1 and Section SOTERM-3.5.1.2. Both DBR and transport-
21 release scenarios assume brine inundation and, correspondingly, the rapid introduction of
22 reducing conditions.

23 **SOTERM-3.5.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA-** 24 **2004 PABC**

25 General studies of Pu in brine have been done by a number of investigators (Büppelmann et al.
26 1986; Büppelmann, Kim, and Lierse 1988; Clark, Hobart, and Neu 1995; Nitsche et al. 1992;
27 Nitsche et al. 1994; Pashalidis et al. 1993; Villareal, Bergquist, and Leonard 2001; Reed et al.
28 1993; Reed, Okajima, and Richmann 1994; Reed and Wygmans 1997). There has also been an
29 assessment of the actinide chemistry in the WIPP CCA (Oversby 2000; Brush, Moore, and Wall
30 2001; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006). These studies confirm reduction of higher-
31 valent Pu under the expected WIPP conditions and establish the key speciation trends for Pu in
32 the WIPP. These trends, however, are captured in the WIPP PA through analogy with Am(III)
33 for Pu(III) and with Th(IV) for Pu(IV).


34 WIPP-specific experiments and progress were made in two important areas since CRA-2004 and
35 CRA-2004 PABC. The first is that a series of experiments to determine the solubility of
36 neodymium (Nd) in the WIPP brine were completed (Borkowski et al. 2008). Nd is an
37 oxidation-state-invariant analog for the III actinides and, in this context, is an analog for the
38 solubility of Pu(III). These results are summarized in Section SOTERM-3.6.2 and support the
39 current WIPP PA solubilities in the CRA-2004 PABC.

40 The second area of progress was in the completion and publication of WIPP-specific
41 experiments that establish the reduction of higher-valent Pu(V/VI) species by reduced iron in the

1 brine. A series of WIPP-specific experiments performed by researchers at Argonne were
 2 confirmed and published (Reed et al. 2006). Additionally, experiments were performed to
 3 further confirm the reduction of higher-valent Pu and establish its reactivity with iron oxides
 4 (Reed et al. 2009).


5 Iron and lead (Pb) have an important role as reducing agents for Pu in the V and VI oxidation
 6 state. Under the conditions expected in the WIPP, iron can exist as Fe(0), Fe(II), and small
 7 amounts of Fe(III) species, and lead can exist as Pb(0) and Pb(II) species. The expected
 8 importance of these two metals is based on the redox-half-reaction potentials for the reduced
 9 metal oxidation states Fe(0/II) and Pb(0/II) relative to Pu(V/VI), and the significant amount of
 10 these two metals present in the WIPP. Whereas, for U, the existence of favorable redox
 11 potentials are somewhat dependent on the speciation of Fe and Pb, the existence of reduced iron
 12 and Pb always lead to favorable redox conditions for the reduction of both Pu(V) and Pu(VI)
 13 species under a wide range of conditions.

14 Two key figures from Reed et al. (2009) that demonstrate the reduction of Pu(V/VI) are shown
 15 (Figure SOTERM-12 and Figure SOTERM-13). In Figure SOTERM-12, both powder and
 16 coupon forms of zero-valent iron led to the rapid (few days) reduction of Pu(V/VI). XANES
 17 analysis confirmed that Pu(IV) was produced.



18
 19 **Figure SOTERM-12. Comparison of the Reactivity of Iron Powder and Iron Coupon**
 20 **Towards Pu(VI). Rapid Reduction/Removal from Solution was**
 21 **Observed at pH 7 (GWB brine) and pH 8 (ERDA-6 brine). This was**
 22 **Somewhat Slower at pH 10 in ERDA-6 Brine (Reed et al. 2009).**

1 In Figure SOTERM-13, the effect of Fe(II) in the iron phases is shown. Overall, the reduction of
 2 Pu(V/VI) is observed over a wide range of conditions in the WIPP brine when either zero-valent
 3 iron, aqueous Fe^{2+} , or Fe(II) phases are present in the WIPP brine. When Fe(III) phases are
 4 present, only sorption, not reduction, is observed. These data provide strong and WIPP-specific
 5 evidence that reduced iron phases will reduce higher-valent Pu to Pu(IV) and support the current
 6 WIPP PA assumptions on oxidation state distribution.



7
 8 **Figure SOTERM-13. The Concentration of Pu as a Function of Time in the Presence of**
 9 **Iron Powder, Iron Coupon, Ferric Oxide, and Magnetite (Mixed**
 10 **Iron Oxide) (Reed et al. 2009)**

11 SOTERM-3.6 Americium and Curium Chemistry

12 There are relatively small quantities of Am in TRU waste (see Table SOTERM-8), but the high
 13 activity of ^{241}Am ($t_{1/2} = 432$ years, 3.443 Ci/g) make Am a key contributor to potential actinide
 14 release from the WIPP. In the WIPP PA, Am is in the trivalent state in all vectors and the
 15 aqueous concentration consists of Am^{3+} complexes and colloidal species.


16 Cm is also present in very small quantities in the WIPP (Table SOTERM-8) and exists primarily
 17 as the ^{244}Cm isotope. The high activity of this isotope ($t_{1/2} = 18.11$ years) makes Cm an important
 18 species in the WIPP at only the very early stages of repository history. It is essentially
 19 unimportant for the PA because it has decayed away by the end of the 100-year period for active
 20 institutional controls. However, other Cm isotopes with longer half-lives are present in the
 21 inventory and are considered by the WIPP PA. The environmental chemistry of Am and Cm are

1 very similar, and most of what is said in this section about the environmental chemistry of Am
2 also applies to Cm.

3 A more detailed review of the literature for Am can be found as part of a recent WIPP report
4 (Borkowski et al. 2008). The solubility of An(III) was measured in the WIPP brine over a wide
5 range of conditions using Nd(III) as a redox-invariant analog. These data support current WIPP
6 PA calculations for the solubility of Pu(III) and Am(III) in the WIPP brine and are also
7 summarized in Borkowski et al. (2008).

8 **SOTERM-3.6.1 Americium and Curium Environmental Chemistry**

9 Am is a 5f electron element and, like other elements of the actinide group, can exist in aqueous
10 solution in several oxidation states. The electrode potentials for some Am couples are presented
11 in Figure SOTERM-14. The trivalent state of Am is the most stable aqueous oxidation state
12



13
14 **Figure SOTERM-14. Redox Potential for Some Am Redox Couples (Silva et al. 1995, p. 74)**

15 (Katz, Seaborg, and Morss 1986, p. 912), and it is quite difficult to oxidize in aqueous solution
16 (Hobart, Samhoun, and Peterson 1982). The trivalent Am ion has an ionic radius of 97.5
17 picometers (pm) (coordination number [CN]=6) and its chemical properties can be used as an
18 analog for Pu(III), which has a similar ionic radius (100 pm at CN=6) and charge density, as well
19 as for Cm(III) (97 pm at CN=6).


20 The *Am(II)* species is italicized to stress that it is only a transient species. As discussed by
21 Marinot and Fuger (1985), there is evidence for the formation of *Am(II)* in aqueous perchlorate
22 solution in the pulse radiolysis experiment. The half-life of this species was estimated to be
23 approximately 5 μ s. This species is not observed during the electroreduction of Am(III) to the
24 metal in noncomplexing media (David, Maslennikov, and Peretrukhin 1990).

25 Cm is also distinguished by the relatively great stability of the III oxidation state with respect to
26 oxidation or reduction (Katz, Seaborg, and Morss 1986, p. 970). The stability of Cm(III) may be
27 attributed to the half-filled f-shell electronic configuration ($5f^7$). The oxidation of Cm(III) is
28 achieved only with the strongest oxidizing agents, and only one report claims evidence for an
29 oxidation state higher than IV (Korpusov, Patrusheva, and Dolidze 1975). The Cm(III) to
30 Cm(IV) transition has not been successfully induced by ozone or electrochemically, and the
31 Cm(IV) phosphotungstate produced by oxidizing with peroxysulfate is considerably less stable
32 than the Am(IV) analog (Katz, Seaborg, and Morss 1986, p. 971). In the reducing environment
33 of the WIPP repository, any higher-valent Cm produced radiolytically would be unstable. For all
34 these reasons, the predominant oxidation state for Cm in the WIPP environment is Cm(III).

1 Higher-valent Am species have also been noted. Am(IV) species, with an ionic radius estimated
 2 by Shannon (1976) to be 85 pm, is only stable in the presence of strongly complexing anions
 3 such as carbonate, fluoride, phosphate, or phosphotungstate, and was never found in any
 4 appreciable amount in trivalent Am solutions.

5 The pentavalent and hexavalent dioxoamericium ions AmO_2^+ and AmO_2^{2+} can be generated
 6 under strongly oxidizing conditions. Free radicals produced from α particles in water readily
 7 reduce these dioxoamericium ions back to Am^{3+} . In concentrated NaCl solution, in which the
 8 radiolysis products are strong oxidants, pentavalent and hexavalent Am are the predominant
 9 species (Büppelmann et al. 1986). Without an oxidant, the pentavalent dioxoamericium ion
 10 slowly disproportionates to AmO_2^{2+} and Am^{3+} . These higher oxidation states are not stable in
 11 natural waters and can be readily reduced by action of reductants naturally present in those
 12 waters.

13 The speciation of Am in groundwater under mildly alkaline conditions is primarily defined by
 14 hydrolysis and carbonate complexation. Hydrolysis is generally represented by the following
 15 reaction:



17 Silva measured the $^{243}\text{Am}(\text{OH})_3(\text{crystalline [cr]})$ and $\text{Nd}(\text{OH})_3(\text{cr})$ solubilities in 0.1 M NaClO_4
 18 solution at 25 ± 1 °C within the pH range 6 to 10 (Silva et al. 1995, p. 79-97). This is the only
 19 study with Am hydroxide using an x-ray-characterized crystalline solid. The solid phase was
 20 prepared by rigorously controlled, high-temperature transformation of $\text{Am}(\text{OH})_3(\text{am})$. Optical
 21 viewing by SEM of the solid samples at the end of the solubility experiments showed no changes
 22 in the crystal. The use of the ^{243}Am isotope diminished α -particle damage of the crystal as a
 23 result of the 17-times-lower specific activity compared to ^{241}Am . The weakness of this
 24 experiment was the relatively short equilibration time of only 48 days. A log (K_{sp}) of 16.6 ± 0.4
 25 was obtained for the $\text{Am}(\text{OH})_3$ phase. The corresponding hydrolysis constants are listed in Table
 26 SOTERM-12. Similar values for Nd(III) hydrolysis were derived from the $\text{Nd}(\text{OH})_3(\text{cr})$
 27 solubility measurements.

28 Stadler and Kim (1988) investigate the pH dependence of $\text{Am}(\text{OH})_3(\text{s})$ solubility in 0.1 M
 29 NaClO_4 and more concentrated Na chloride and perchlorate solutions at 25 ± 0.5 °C. The effect
 30 of α -induced radiolysis on solubility was also studied using different total concentrations of
 31 ^{241}Am . The solid phase was not characterized in this work. Although the solid used in this work
 32 was different than that used by Silva et al. (1995, pp. 275–76), the reported solubility products
 33 are in agreement. It is unclear, however, if the same phase controls the Am solubility in these
 34 two cases, because of markedly different preparation conditions of the starting solids.

35 Kim et al. (1984) measured the solubility of $\text{Am}(\text{OH})_3(\text{s})$ at $I = 0.1$ and 0.3 M NaClO_4 , in the
 36 absence of CO_2 and at $p\text{CO}_2 = 10^{-3.5}$ atm, and attributed the solubility measured in terms of
 37 contributions from the hydroxy, carbonato- and mixed Am hydroxy-carbonato complexes. No
 38 characterization of the solid was reported in this work, so it was assumed to be $\text{AmCO}_3\text{OH}(\text{s})$.
 39 Several investigators found that changes in the solid phase in aqueous suspensions of Am(III)
 40 hydroxide due to aging conditions become evident in hours and continue for weeks. Similar
 41

1 **Table SOTERM-12. Hydrolysis Constants of Am(III) (in Logarithmic Units)**
 2 **Corresponding to Equation (SOTERM.30)**

AmOH ²⁺	Am(OH) ₂ ⁺	Am(OH) ₃ (aq)	Medium	Reference
-7.93 ± 0.35	-14.77 ± 0.25	-24.71 ± 0.11	0.1 M NaClO ₄	Kim et al. 1984
-7.5 ± 0.3	-15.4 ± 0.4	-26.9 ± 0.5	0.1 M NaClO ₄	Stadler and Kim 1988
-7.8 ± 0.4	-15.4 ± 0.5	-26.9 ± 0.5	0.1 M NaCl	Stadler and Kim 1988
-8.1 ± 0.3	-15.8 ± 0.4	-27.0 ± 0.5	0.6 M NaCl	Stadler and Kim 1988
-7.7 ± 0.3	-16.7 ± 0.7	-25.0 ± 0.3	0.1 M NaClO ₄	Silva et al. 1995, p. 81
-6.9 ± 0.2		-23.8 ± 0.9	0.1 M NaClO ₄	Rösch et al. 1989
<-8.2	-17.1 ± 0.7	<-27.0	I → 0	Rai et al. 1983
-6.40 ± 0.11	-13.40 ± 0.16	-20.31 ± 0.17	3 M NaClO ₄	Pazukhin and Kochergin 1989
Recalculated from literature data				
-7.0 ± 0.4	-15.1 ± 0.4	-26.4 ± 0.5	0.1 M NaClO ₄	Silva et al. 1995, p. 294

3
 4 results were reported by Felmy, Rai, and Fulton (1990). These authors measured the solubility of
 5 AmCO₃OH(cr) at pCO₂ = 10⁻³ atm. The change in total Am concentration measured in this work
 6 as a function of pH was similar to that reported by Kim et al. (1984). Similar plots for the
 7 solubility of Nd in 5 M NaCl were measured by Borkowski et al. (2008); however, the Nd
 8 concentrations obtained for the comparable pC_{H+} values were two to three orders of magnitude
 9 greater as a result of the higher ionic strength present.

10 Am complexation by carbonate was extensively investigated by solvent extraction,
 11 spectrophotometry, electromigration, and solubility (Kim et al. 1984; Rösch et al. 1989; Felmy,
 12 Rai, and Fulton 1990; Meinrath and Kim 1991; Nitsche et al. 1995; Torretto et al. 1995). Many
 13 different soluble species have been proposed for the Am-water-carbonate system: pure
 14 carbonate, bicarbonate, and/or mixed hydroxy-carbonate complexes. Silva et al. (1995) carefully
 15 studied and reinterpreted the literature data. It is the consensus in these studies that Am(CO₃)_n⁽³⁻
 16 ²ⁿ⁾, with n = 1, 2 and 3, are the predominant carbonate complexes. According to Silva et al.
 17 (1995), there is no experimental evidence for the existence of a complex with n = 4 even at the
 18 highest carbonate concentrations. The report also suggests that there is no evidence for the
 19 formation of Am(III)-bicarbonate or hydroxy-carbonate complexes in solution. These data are,
 20 however, in disagreement with the more recent work done by Fanghänel and Kim (1998), which
 21 reports spectroscopic evidence for the formation of the n = 4 species.

22 Data reported by Kim et al. (1984) indicate that up to pC_{H+} = ~8.0, the carbonate complexation
 23 does not affect the solubility of Am(III). For the higher pC_{H+}, the presence of carbonate in 0.1-
 24 0.3 M NaClO₄ increases solubility of Am(III) in relation to carbonate-free systems, and at pC_{H+} =
 25 10 this difference is almost 4 orders of magnitude. The predominance of carbonate

1 complexation is observed in the pC_{H^+} range from 7.5 to 10. At higher pC_{H^+} , hydrolysis
2 predominates over carbonate complexation.


3 **SOTERM-3.6.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 and the CRA-** 4 **2004 PABC**

5 An extensive series of experiments were performed to determine the solubility of Nd(III) as an
6 analog for Pu(III) and Am(III) solubility in the brine (Borkowski et al. 2008). In this study, the
7 solubility was determined in GWB and ERDA-6 brine, over a pH range of 6-12, and as a
8 function of carbonate concentration. These solubility data extend earlier studies in simplified
9 brines to simulated WIPP brine compositions and cover a broader range of experimental
10 conditions.

11 There are a number of key results and observations from this Nd(III) solubility experimental
12 study. The most important of these are

- 13 1. The solubility data reported for Nd(III) in WIPP-relevant brine systems support current WIPP
14 PA calculations of An(III) solubility, in that the calculated values remain conservative for the
15 reference WIPP conditions. This observation is, however, qualified somewhat by the
16 observations summarized below.
- 17 2. Specific observations and results related to the Nd(III) solubility data include the following:
 - 18 A. Excellent agreement with comparable literature values for Nd(III) solubility in carbonate-
19 free, simplified 5 M NaCl brine study was obtained. This provided an external
20 corroboration of the experimental approach for the only system investigated that can be
21 directly compared to other non-WIPP studies.
 - 22 B. Excellent agreement was obtained between the oversaturation and undersaturation
23 experiments performed. This is a strong indicator that the solubility, rather than steady-
24 state metastable concentrations, was being measured.
 - 25 C. The solubility of Nd(III) in simulated WIPP brine was not strongly influenced by the
26 range of carbonate concentrations considered (as high as a total concentration of 0.01 M).
27 This is largely due to the complexation of Nd^{3+} by borate, already present in the WIPP
28 brine at much higher concentrations, which masks the effects of carbonate.
 - 29 D. The solubility of Nd, in the simplified and simulated brine systems considered, does not
30 exhibit amphoteric behavior. In this context, the solubility of Nd at $pC_{H^+} > 10$ is mostly
31 controlled by hydroxide concentration and decreases with increasing pC_{H^+} . A shoulder to
32 a varying degree, however, is noted in the Nd solubility graphs for $7.5 < pC_{H^+} < 10.5$ as a
33 result of complexation in all three brines investigated.
 - 34 E. The shoulder in the Nd solubility data for ERDA-6 and GWB brine is caused by borate
35 complexation. This establishes borate as the predominant complexant in brine in the
36 pC_{H^+} range of 7.5 to 10 (this includes the current reference pC_{H^+}). The formation
37 constant for this complex was established to be $\log K$ of approximately 3 to 4.

1 It is important to emphasize that the measurement of Nd(III) solubility in GWB and ERDA-6
 2 brines with carbonate showed that there was little effect of carbonate on Nd solubilities in these
 3 brines. This was due to the competition between borate and carbonate in these systems. Borate
 4 is, in fact, the key complexant in the WIPP brine, with its current GWB and ERDA-6
 5 formulations, for An(III). These solubility data, however, support the current calculated III
 6 solubilities in the WIPP PA. It is the competition between borate and carbonate that makes
 7 carbonate a relatively unimportant complexant for the conditions expected in the WIPP. A
 8 composite of all literature values, including our WIPP-specific data, is shown in Figure
 9 SOTERM-15.



10
 11 **Figure SOTERM-15. Composite of Nd Solubility Trends Under All Conditions**
 12 **Investigated (Borkowski et al. 2008). Open Symbols Correspond to**
 13 **Undersaturation Experiments and Closed Symbols Correspond to**
 14 **Oversaturation Experiments.**

15 Based on these results, there should be no significant change to the solubility of An(III)
 16 concentrations used in the WIPP PA for the reference case. In effect, although borate
 17 complexation is not currently in the model, the concentrations of III actinides calculated are
 18 conservatively high when compared to the experimental results. The WIPP-relevant data
 19 summarized in this report support current PA calculations performed with the use of the Pitzer
 20 model (U.S. Department of Energy 2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM) for the values of
 21 3×10^{-7} M and 1.7×10^{-7} M in GWB and ERDA-6, respectively, at $pC_{H^+} \sim 8.5$. The data show

1 that this solubility is at or near the maximum solubility over a wide range of pH, brine
2 composition, and carbonate concentrations.

3 **SOTERM-3.7 Complexation of Actinides by WIPP Organic Chelating Agents**

4 The stability constants for organic ligand-actinide complexation were determined as part of the
5 WIPP ASTP at Florida State University (Choppin et al. 1999). These data are summarized in
6 Table SOTERM-13 and demonstrate some key trends in actinide complexation. For acetate,
7

8 **Table SOTERM-13. Apparent Stability Constants for the Complexation of Organic**
9 **Ligands with Actinides in NaCl Media (Choppin et al. 1999)**

Organic Ligand	Actinide Ion	NaCl (molality)	$\log_{10} \beta_1$
Acetate	Am ³⁺	0.3 to 5	1.44 - 2.2
	Th ⁴⁺	0.3 to 5	3.68 - 4.18
	NpO ₂ ⁺	0.3 to 5	1.05 - 1.8
	UO ₂ ²⁺	0.3 to 4	2.23 - 3.09
Oxalate	Am ³⁺	0.3 to 5	4.17 - 4.63
	Th ⁴⁺	0.3 to 5	7.04 - 7.47
	NpO ₂ ⁺	1.0 to 5.0	3.62 - 4.63
	UO ₂ ²⁺	0.3 to 5	5.82 - 6.7
Citrate	Am ³⁺	0.3 to 5	4.84 - 5.9
	Th ⁴⁺	0.1 to 5	9.31 - 10.18
	NpO ₂ ⁺	0.1 to 5	2.39 - 2.56
	UO ₂ ²⁺	0.3 to 5	7.07 - 7.32
EDTA	Am ³⁺	0.3 to 5	13.76 - 15.1
	Th ⁴⁺	0.3 to 5	15.56 - 16.94
	NpO ₂ ⁺	0.3 to 5	5.45 - 6.7
	UO ₂ ²⁺	0.3 to 4	10.75 - 12.16

10

11 oxalate, and citrate, the strength of the complex formed is in the same order: IV > VI > III > V.
12 For EDTA, the VI and III are switched. For the most part, the III and IV actinides, which are the
13 two most important oxidation states in the WIPP, are strongly affected by organic complexation
14 and thus can out-compete carbonate and hydrolysis if the organic concentrations are high
15 enough. Of the four organic chelating agents considered, only citrate and EDTA are expected to
16 form strong enough complexes to influence the speciation of actinides and potentially increase
17 actinide concentrations under the expected conditions in the WIPP.

18 **SOTERM-3.8 Actinide Colloids**

19 Actinide colloids in the WIPP are potentially important since the actinide source term is defined
20 by the WIPP PA as the sum of contributions from dissolved actinide species and mobile colloidal
21 actinide species (see U.S. Department of Energy 2004, SOTERM 2004) for a more detailed

1 discussion of WIPP-relevant colloids). The importance of colloids in the migration and transport
2 of actinide contaminants, although it continues to receive attention in the literature, remains
3 somewhat controversial and difficult to prove. In this context, the consideration of colloidal
4 enhancement of actinide concentrations by the WIPP PA is, at least in part, a conservatism that is
5 built into the overall PA approach. In this context, the sorption of colloidal actinides onto fixed
6 substrates and their filtration in low-porosity media will also reduce the mobile colloidal actinide
7 source term, but no credit is currently being taken for this potentially significant reduction in
8 colloidal concentrations.

9 Actinide colloids or pseudocolloids may be generated in the WIPP repository as a result of

- 10 1. Hydrolysis (intrinsic chemistry).
- 11 2. The interactions of dissolved actinide species with microbially derived colloids or colloids
12 formed due to the corrosion of steel and waste constituents.
- 13 3. The hydrodynamic entrainment of colloidal-sized mineral fragments, as well as several other
14 mechanisms. The formation of colloids could enhance actinide release in two ways. First,
15 increased actinide concentration will increase the magnitude of DBR release and the effective
16 actinide source term concentration for transport through the Culebra. Second, colloids have
17 very different transport properties than dissolved species, and are predicted to migrate more
18 rapidly in the subsurface. This transport mechanism could enhance the overall actinide
19 release in the WIPP through migration pathways in the Culebra member and the Salado.

20 In this section, the general environmental aspects of colloid-enhanced transport in the subsurface
21 are discussed, along with an update of relevant WIPP-specific results since the CRA-2004
22 PABC.

23 **SOTERM-3.8.1 Actinide Colloids in the Environment**


24 The potential for colloidally-enhanced transport of actinides in the subsurface continues to
25 receive much attention in the literature. A key role of colloids in actinide transport has been
26 proposed to explain actinide migration at Rocky Flats (LoPresti, Conradson, and Clark 2007), the
27 Nevada Test Site (Kersting et al. 1999; Zavarin et al. 2003), Hanford (Dai, Buesseler, and Pike
28 2005), the Savannah River Site (Dai, Kelly, and Buesseler 2002), and the Mayak site (Novikov
29 et al. 2006). Colloidal transport at these sites provides an explanation for subsurface actinide
30 migration that exceeds the rates predicted for dissolved actinide species. There continues to be
31 very weak evidence for significant transport of colloids, once formed, in natural systems.

32 An important theme to recent field observations of actinide colloids is the tendency of Pu, as
33 Pu(IV), to form iron and manganese (Mn) oxide pseudocolloids. The colloidal transport of Pu in
34 the far-field was investigated by Novikov et al. (2006) at the Mayak site in Russia. They found
35 that the mobility of Pu in groundwater was facilitated by submicron-sized colloids. Pu(IV)
36 hydroxides or carbonates adsorbed on amorphous iron oxide colloids were most transported.
37 These Pu colloids were essentially removed from groundwater, leading to a drop in the Pu
38 concentration from 1000 becquerel (Bq)/L to 0.16 Bq/L over a distance of 3 km.

1 The field observations are supported by laboratory studies that show a high tendency of lower-
 2 valent actinides to form iron and Mn pseudocolloids in environmentally relevant systems.
 3 Zavarin et al. (2003) shows that, at pH 8, there is a strong sorption of Pu(IV) in groundwater to
 4 birnessite (Mn-oxide) and goethite (Fe-oxide) rather than clinoptilolite (a zeolite) and calcite.
 5 Sorption was rapid and equilibrium was reached after 24 hours. Complexation with carbonate
 6 reduced Pu(IV) sorption to clinoptilolite about 15%. For iron and Mn oxides, Pu(V) sorption
 7 was also rapid, but led to the reduction of Pu(V) to Pu(IV). Khasanova et al. (Khasanova et al.
 8 2007) also studied iron and Mn oxide interactions with actinides and saw a strong association
 9 between the dissolved actinide species and the oxides.


10 The potential formation of actinide pseudocolloids by association of dissolved actinides with
 11 biogenic and humic (natural) organics has also been established in the laboratory and the field.
 12 Santschi et al. (Santschi, Roberts, and Guo 2002), Asbury et al. (Asbury et al. 2001), and
 13 Orlandini, Penrose, and Nelson (1986) all show that actinides associate strongly with natural
 14 organics. These have been implicated as a potential explanation for actinide migration at Rocky
 15 Flats and in near-surface groundwater transport as a result of fallout.

16 Lastly, the formation of intrinsic colloids (colloids that are polymers of actinides) are important
 17 because they potentially add to the concentration of actinides in groundwater, but also because
 18 they potentially contribute to measured solubilities if care is not taken to properly account for
 19 their formation. The tendency of actinides to hydrolyze and to polymerize to form intrinsic
 20 colloids follows the order (Cleveland 1979, pp. 11–46; Choppin 1983; Kim 1991; Lieser et al.
 21 1991)




23 The most well known and well studied actinide intrinsic colloid is the Pu(IV) intrinsic colloid,
 24 which has been used as a basis of comparison for investigating intrinsic colloids of other
 25 actinides. A discussion of colloidal Th, also in the IV oxidation state, was presented in Section
 26 SOTERM-3.2.

27 The most convincing and consistent explanation for the chemistry of these Pu(IV) intrinsic
 28 colloid is presented by Johnson and Toth (1978). Pu polymerization occurs nearly immediately
 29 after the first hydrolysis occurs. The following reaction involving polymerization of two
 30 hydrolyzed species by loss of H₂O (olation) is proposed:



33 Aging or maturation of the polymer then occurs by loss of H₂O (olation) as follows:



36 An important insight into the important role of Pu polymer formation was reported by Neck et al.
 37 (2003), which investigated the solubility of Pu hydroxides/hydrous oxides under reducing
 38 conditions and in the presence of oxygen. The experimental data and thermodynamic
 39 calculations show that, under reducing conditions in the stability field of water, Pu(OH)₃(s) is not

1 stable and it converts to $\text{PuO}_2(\text{s,hyd})$. It also found that small Pu(IV) colloids/polymers, present
2 in neutral to alkaline solutions at the constant level of $\log[\text{Pu(IV)}]_{\text{coll}} = -8.3 \pm 1.0$, play an
3 important role in defining the redox potentials in these systems. The experimental results in
4 these systems including colloid species can be described in terms of equilibrium
5 thermodynamics. These data argue for a thermodynamically stable Pu(IV) oxidation state in the
6 WIPP.

7 Lastly, there is a growing debate about the care needed in solubility studies to account for
8 colloids in the solubilities measured—which is not a trivial problem, as the colloids are often
9 very small (< 20 nm) and difficult to detect experimentally. The role of colloid formation,
10 especially for An(IV) solubilities, was discussed by Fanghänel and Neck, who state, “The
11 formation of amorphous and crystalline solids and the discrepancies between the corresponding
12 experimental solubility data may be explained as an effort of particle size. ... the predicted
13 solubilities are often significantly lower than experimental data indicating that that solubility is
14 controlled by the surface properties” (Fanghänel and Neck 2002). In this context, existing
15 solubility data in the literature may include significant colloidal enhancement and overestimate
16 the corresponding solubility.

17 In conclusion, there is ample evidence that colloids can form and are readily generated in the
18 laboratory. Intrinsic colloids tend to be very low in concentration and comparable to the
19 solubilities observed. Significant enhancement can be observed when actinides associate with
20 oxide mineral colloids and natural and biogenic organic species. However, there remains high
21 uncertainty in the ability of these colloidal species to migrate in the subsurface. This key issue
22 was raised by Kersting et al. (1999) for the Nevada Test site, Dai et al. for the Hanford and
23 Savannah River site (Dai, Kelly, and Buessler 2002; Dai, Buessler, and Pike 2005), and strong
24 attenuation was noted at the Mayak site (Novikov et al. 2006). In the WIPP, with its very low
25 porosity, it is reasonable to predict that the transport of colloids is likely to be negligible; the
26 only significant concern would be the colloidal contribution to dissolved concentrations for
27 DBR-type release.

28 **SOTERM-3.8.2 WIPP-Specific Results since the CRA-2004 PABC**

29 There are no new experiments since the CRA-2004 PABC that investigate the formation and
30 transport of actinide colloids under WIPP-relevant conditions. Recently published results (Wall
31 and Mathews 2005) demonstrate that the presence of MgO in the WIPP brine will significantly
32 reduce the concentration of humic acids (HA); this occurs after a relatively short period of time
33 (12 to 60 days) when a negligible concentration of HA was observed in the system. This
34 important observation was attributed to MgO-facilitated HA precipitation and/or sorption of the
35 HA onto the MgO surface. Treatment of colloids in the PA are the same as in CRA-2004 and
36 CRA-2004 PABC.

37 **SOTERM-3.9 Changes in Actinide Speciation Information since the CRA-** 38 **2004 and the CRA-2004 PABC**

39 There are no significant changes in the general approach and assumptions used to understand and
40 predict actinide behavior in the WIPP from a PA perspective. Specifically,

- 1 • Oxidation state distributions for the TRU actinides, and correspondingly, assumptions
2 regarding their solubility calculations using redox-invariant analogs, have not changed.
- 3 • Predicted and calculated solubilities for Pu and Am oxidation states, which are the key
4 actinides from the perspective of PA, have not changed.
- 5 • Inventory assumptions regarding the amounts of organic chelating agents and actinides in
6 TRU waste are being updated annually.
- 7 • The recognition that microbial colloids are the most likely to be generated in the WIPP has
8 not changed. Treatment of colloids in PA are the same as in CRA-2004 and CRA-2004-
9 PABC.

10 There are new data, within and outside the WIPP project, that continue to support and/or expand
11 the robustness of the current PA assumptions. The most important of these are

- 12 • Extensive data from the Karlsruhe (German) program for III and IV actinides in simplified
13 brine systems. These data support existing PA assumptions and show that they extend
14 beyond the relatively narrow pH range considered in the WIPP PA. This is especially
15 important for higher-pH environments, where it was previously thought that solubilities
16 increase greatly.
- 17 • WIPP-specific results are reported in three key areas:
 - 18 – An(III) solubility in simulated WIPP brines over a wide range of conditions using Nd(III)
19 as an analog for Pu(III) and Am(III). These data support current PA solubilities for the
20 III actinides, but show that complexation with borate explains the observed trends with
21 pH and little or no effect of carbonate.
 - 22 – The reduction of Pu(V/VI) in WIPP brine by reaction with reduced iron species. These
23 results provide additional support to past observations that higher-valent actinides cannot
24 persist in the WIPP in the presence of reduced iron. This strongly supports current PA
25 assumptions on oxidation state distribution for both Am and Pu.
 - 26 – The solubility of U(VI) in simulated WIPP brine over a wide range of conditions in the
27 absence of carbonate. These data support the current WIPP PA assumptions about the
28 solubility of U(VI).

29 Lastly, there are some new developments reported in the literature that, although not directly
30 relevant to the WIPP, indirectly affect how the actinide chemistry in the WIPP is viewed. The
31 most important of these are

- 32 • The potential role of Ca^{2+} and Mg^{2+} to form soluble species in the presence of carbonate at
33 high pH. This has been evaluated in the WIPP case and is not likely to affect actinide
34 solubility in the range of conditions expected in the WIPP.
- 35 • Growing recognition that microbes, under most anaerobic conditions, reduce higher-valent
36 actinides in the subsurface.

- 1 • Additional results on the potential effects of radiolysis on brine systems. It is clear that
2 mechanisms exist that can lead to the oxidation of actinides when no reducing agents are
3 present in the brine. This could create localized oxidation in the WIPP, but WIPP-specific
4 experiments show this to be easily overwhelmed by the expected microbial and reduced-iron
5 effect on actinide redox.

1 **SOTERM-4.0 Calculation of the WIPP Actinide Source Term**

2 The calculation of the WIPP actinide source term was performed for the CRA-2004 PABC
 3 (Brush and Xiong 2005a) using the computer code FMT. This is the baseline PA currently being
 4 used for CRA-2009. A general description of the modeling approach to establish the actinide
 5 source term for the WIPP PA is described in this section. The approach used in the CRA-2004
 6 PABC calculations and the results obtained were published in a series of reports and documents.
 7 These are listed below with supporting letters and documentation.

8 **Table SOTERM-14. List of Documents and Reports that Support the CRA-2004 PABC**

PABC Analysis	Title/Subject of Report
CRA-2004 PABC (Leigh et al. 2005)	2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation
Analysis Plan (AP)-120, Rev. 0 (Brush and Xiong 2005b)	Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP Performance-Assessment Baseline Calculations
Letter Report: Organic ligand concentrations Task 1, AP-120, Rev. 0 (Brush and Xiong 2005a)	Calculation of Organic-Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP PABC
FMT_050405.CHEMDAT Task 2, AP-120, Rev. 0 (Xiong 2005)	CRA-2004 PABC version of FMT thermodynamic data base
Letter Report: Uncertainty Analysis Task 3, AP-120, Rev. 0 (Xiong, Nowak, and Brush 2005)	Updated Uncertainty Analysis of Actinide Solubilities for the Response to EPA Comment C-23-16, Rev. 1
Letter Report: Actinide Solubilities Task 4, AP-120, Rev. 0 (Brush 2005)	Results of Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP PABC
CRA-2004 PABC Inventory Document (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005)	TRU Waste Inventory for the 2004 CRA PABC
Actinide Concentration input to PANEL (Garner and Leigh 2005)	Analysis Package for PANEL: CRA-2004 PABC
Supporting Letter or Document	Title/Subject of Report
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Report (Brush et al. 2006)	Consumption of Carbon Dioxide by Precipitation of Carbonate Minerals Resulting for Dissolution of Sulfate Minerals in the Salado Formation In Response to Microbial Sulfate Reduction in the WIPP
Letter Report: Stein to Brush, 4/13/2005 (Stein 2005)	Estimate of Volume of Brine in Repository that Leads to a Brine Release
Letter Report: Brush to Kessel, 2/1/2005 (Brush and Garner 2005)	Additional Justification for the Insignificant Effect of Np on the Long-Term Performance of the WIPP
Telecon: EPA with DOE/SNL/Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), 3/2/2005 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2005)	Change in U(VI) Solubility Assumption to a Concentration of 1 mM
Letter: Cotsworth to Triay, 3/4/2005 (Cotsworth 2005)	Untitled: EPA documentation of requested changes to the CRA-2004 PA
EPA Response and Comments on CRA-2004 PABC (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006)	Evaluation of the Compliance Recertification Actinide Source Term and Culebra Dolomite Distribution Coefficient Values

1 **SOTERM-4.1 Overview of WIPP Approach to Calculate Actinide Solubilities**

2 The overall approach used to establish the actinides important in WIPP releases and calculate
3 their solubilities for use in the WIPP PA is summarized in this section. This approach consists of
4 the following:

- 5 • Assessing the WIPP inventory and regulations that govern the application of the WIPP
6 certification to determine the likely actinides of interest and, correspondingly, the key waste
7 components that may affect their solubility.
- 8 • Establishing a conceptual model for the key subsurface interactions and release mechanisms
9 and using a combination of literature review and WIPP-specific experimental results to
10 establish the likely oxidation state distribution, the species that affect actinide solubility, and
11 the parameters required to model the system at high ionic strength. This approach featured
12 the following:
 - 13 – Conservative assumptions, within the bounds of the conditions expected, for the
14 oxidation state distribution.
 - 15 – Use of redox-invariant analogs for multivalent actinides to determine formation constants
16 and establish oxidation-specific solubilities.
 - 17 – Use of the Pitzer formalism and associated parameters to model solubilities at the high
18 ionic strengths present. The Pitzer approach is recognized as the best approach for $I > 0.3$
19 M in brine systems.
- 20 • Calculating the solubility of the key actinides in the WIPP using the FMT code. The
21 solubilities are modeled in reacted GWB and ERDA-6 brines, which are expected to bracket
22 the range in the composition of the brine expected. This code assigns the actinides to the key
23 species by minimizing the total free energy of the system while satisfying charge-balance and
24 mass-balance constraints based on the standard chemical potentials assigned to each species.
- 25 • Establishing the effects of colloids and organic complexation, separately and simultaneously,
26 on the solubilities calculated.
- 27 • Tabulating and assigning uncertainty distributions in the range of expected conditions and
28 brine compositions to these solubility data.

29 This range of possible solubilities for a wide range of possible conditions defines the actinide
30 source term provided to the WIPP PA for the calculation of TRU release from the WIPP.

31 **SOTERM-4.2 Use of Oxidation-State-Invariant Analogs**

32 The solubility and speciation of multivalent actinides are often investigated with lanthanide and
33 actinide analogs that mimic the property of interest but, for varying reasons, provide an
34 advantage to the experimenter. The best example of this, used extensively in the WIPP modeling
35 approach, is the use of redox-invariant analogs for the multivalent actinides, most notably Pu, to

1 determine oxidation-state-specific properties (e.g., solubility or complexation). The advantage of
2 these types of analogs is that they remove the uncertainty of oxidation-state change from the
3 experiment, which is a complexity that can often lead to uncertain or incorrect interpretations of
4 the results obtained.

5 For the TRU actinides, the redox-invariant analogs used are lanthanides or other actinides.
6 Lanthanides, as 4f-electron elements, possess physical and chemical characteristics that make
7 them good analogs for the actinides when they are redox-invariant under the conditions of the
8 experiment. Correspondingly, actinides with their 5f-electron character also have good physical
9 and chemical properties to be analogs for other actinides if they also have redox stability under
10 WIPP-relevant conditions. This analog approach, although sometimes criticized in the literature,
11 considerably simplifies experimental design and consequently improves the reliability of the
12 experimental data (Choppin 1999).

13 A key argument for the use of analogs in WIPP-related experiments is that key complexants that
14 define actinide solubility in the WIPP are hard-donor complexants (e.g., hydroxide, carbonate,
15 borate, chloride, and/or sulfate). The use of lanthanides as analogs for actinides is based on
16 observations in many extraction systems, along with the associated crystallographic data
17 (Siekierski 1988) that show they are good analogs for compounds containing hard donor ligands
18 (oxygen) where the cation-anion interactions are primarily electrostatic in nature. In this context,
19 Nd(III) is a good analog for the chemical behavior of Am(III) and Pu(III) under most
20 circumstances in the WIPP. Not only do these species have the same 3+ charge, they also have
21 similar ionic radii for coordination number 6 (CN=6): 97.5 pm for Am³⁺, 98.3 pm for Nd³⁺, and
22 100 pm for Pu³⁺ (Shannon 1976). In this context, the magnitudes of electrostatic attractions
23 between these metal ions and corresponding ligands will be similar, yielding comparable
24 thermodynamic stabilities.

25 Th is used by the WIPP as a redox-invariant analog for Pu(IV), U(IV), and Np(IV). The use of
26 the Th⁴⁺ stability constants to represent the other An(IV) species is conservative. Th⁴⁺ is the
27 largest of the tetravalent actinide ions. It therefore has the lowest charge density and,
28 correspondingly, relatively weaker ionic interactions when compared to the other tetravalent
29 actinides. This is best exhibited by its lower tendency towards hydrolysis and intrinsic polymer
30 formation relative to the other actinides (see Section SOTERM-3.2). For these reasons, the use
31 of Th⁴⁺ as an analog is conservative, as Th will likely be the most soluble of the actinides in the
32 tetravalent state under comparable WIPP-relevant conditions.

33 To a lesser extent, actinides are analogs for each other, depending on the oxidation state. Np(V),
34 which has much greater redox stability than Pu(V) and much more favorable spectroscopy, is
35 often used as an analog for Pu(V). U(VI), which is much more redox stable than Pu(VI) and
36 Np(VI), is also used as an analog for these TRU actinides, although this breaks down somewhat
37 quickly. Am(III) and Cm(III) are also excellent analogs for Pu(III) as a result of their much
38 greater redox stability and comparable ionic radii.

1 **SOTERM-4.3 Actinide Inventory and Oxidation State Distribution in the** 2 **WIPP**

3 The actinide inventory used in CRA-2004 PABC is given in Table SOTERM-15 (Leigh, Trone
4 and Fox 2005). This is based on the inventory given in Table SOTERM-7 projected to the year
5 2033, which is the projected year for the closure of the WIPP.

6 **Table SOTERM-15. WIPP Radionuclide Inventory at Closure (in 2033) Used in PABC-**
7 **2005 Calculations (Leigh, Trone, and Fox 2005)**

Radionuclide	Activity (Ci)	Amount (kg)	Element-Specific Inventory
²²⁹ Th	5.21E+00	2.64E-02	8.81 Ci 3.11E+04 kg
²³⁰ Th	1.80E-01	8.73E-03	
²³² Th	3.42E+00	3.11E+04	
²³³ U	1.23E+03	1.27E+02	1.80E+03 Ci 6.47E+05 kg
²³⁴ U	3.44E+02	5.52E+01	
²³⁵ U	5.01E+00	2.32E+03	
²³⁶ U	2.87E+00	4.43E+01	
²³⁸ U	2.17E+02	6.44E+05	
²³⁷ Np	1.22E+01	1.73E+01	12.1 Ci 17.3 kg
²³⁸ Pu	1.13E+06	6.60E+01	2.26E+06 Ci 9.87E+03 kg
²³⁹ Pu	5.82E+05	9.38E+03	
²⁴⁰ Pu	9.54E+04	4.19E+02	
²⁴¹ Pu	4.48E+05	4.35E+00	
²⁴² Pu	1.27E+01	3.23E+00	
²⁴⁴ Pu	5.53E-03	3.09E-01	
²⁴¹ Am	5.17E+05	1.51E+02	5.179E+05 Ci
²⁴³ Am	7.87E+01	3.94E-01	151 kg
²⁴⁴ Cm	2.13E+03	2.63E-02	2.13E+03 Ci (0.0263 kg)
¹³⁷ Cs (see Note ^a)	2.07E+05	2.40E+00	2.07E+05 Ci (2.40 kg)
⁹⁰ Sr (see Note ^a)	1.76E+05	1.29E+00	1.76E+05 Ci (1.29 kg)

^a Fission products are not TRU, but are considered in the PA to calculate overall release

8
9 The oxidation states used by the WIPP PA to model actinide solubility are tabulated in Table
10 SOTERM-16. Also included are the assumed abundance percent of each oxidation state and the
11 speciation data set used in FMT for each oxidation state. This table is based on a general
12 understanding of the corresponding actinide chemistry summarized in Section SOTERM-3.0.

13 A number of conservative assumptions are reflected in this table. The most important
14 assumptions are

1 **Table SOTERM-16. Oxidation States of the Actinides in the WIPP as Used in the CRA-**
 2 **2004 PABC**

Actinide Element	Oxidation States, Abundance (%), and Analog Used (If Any)				
	Oxidation State ^{a,b}				FMT Speciation Data Used
	III	IV	V	VI	
Thorium	—	100 %	—	—	Thorium
Uranium	—	50 %	—	50 %	1 mM assumed for VI, Th for IV
Neptunium	—	50%	50 %	—	Np for V Th for IV
Plutonium	50 %	50 %	—	—	Am for III Th for IV
Americium	100 %	—	—	—	Americium
Curium	100 %	—	—	—	Americium

^a Oxidation state distributions (percentages) refer to the percent of PA vectors that have 100% of the specified oxidation state.

^b In PA calculations the distribution of oxidation states is correlated for U, Np, and Pu such that the states for all three elements are simultaneously either in the lower oxidation state (U(IV), Np(IV), and Pu(III)) or in the higher oxidation state (U(VI), Np(V), and Pu(IV)).

- 3
- 4 1. Use of 1 mM concentration for the solubility of U(VI). The actual solubility of U(VI) in the
 5 WIPP under the expected range of conditions is estimated to be <0.1 mM.
- 6 2. Use of Th as an analog for the IV actinides (see Section SOTERM-4.1 and Section
 7 SOTERM-3.2).
- 8 3. The assumption that 50% of the vectors have Pu(III) and 50% of the vectors have Pu(IV).
 9 The predominant Pu species expected is Pu(IV), although some Pu(III) is possible as a
 10 transient (see discussions in Section SOTERM-3.3). This is conservative because Pu(III) is
 11 approximately 6 to 10 times more soluble than corresponding Pu(IV) phases.
- 12 4. The assumption is that 50% of the vectors have U(IV) and 50% of the vectors have U(VI).
 13 The predominant uranium species expected is U(IV), which is approximately four 4 orders of
 14 magnitude less soluble than U(VI), based on current assumptions.

15 **SOTERM-4.4 Actinide Speciation Reactions Used in the FMT Model**

16 The version of the FMT code used in the CRA-2004 PABC was FMT_050405.CHEMDAT
 17 (Xiong 2005). The data in FMT was previously described in a series of memoranda by
 18 Giambavlo (Giambavlo 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e, 2003). The most recent database
 19 iteration included some minor changes from previous versions that go beyond those described in
 20 these memoranda:

- 21 • The chemical potential for the solubility of Th(OH)₄ (s) was changed.
- 22 • The effects of hydromagnesite and calcite precipitation were added.

1 SOTERM-4.4.1 The III Actinides: Pu(III), Am(III), Cm(III)

2 The thermodynamic database for the III actinides currently used in FMT was described by
 3 Giambalvo (2002a). Nd, Am, and Cm are generally used to establish solubility of An(III)
 4 because, unlike plutonium, they have redox-stable trivalent oxidation states. Speciation and
 5 solubility data for the III actinides were parameterized for use in the Pitzer activity-coefficient
 6 model by Felmy et al. (1989) for the Na^+ - Pu^{3+} - Cl^- - H_2O system; by Felmy, Rai, and Fulton
 7 (1990) for the Na^+ - Am^{3+} - OH^- - HCO_3^- - H_2O system; by Rai, Felmy, and Fulton (1995) for the Na^+ -
 8 Am^{3+} - PO_4^{3-} - SO_4^{2-} - H_2O system; and by Rao et al. (1996) for the Na^+ - Nd^{3+} - CO_3^{2-} - HCO_3^- - H_2O
 9 system. For this reason, FMT uses the Am(III) data to calculate the solubility for all the III
 10 actinides. A diagram of the predominant species for Am is shown in Figure SOTERM-16.


11 The inorganic aqueous and solubility-limiting species featured in the model for Am(III) are

Am(III) Reactions	log K	
$\text{Am}^{3+} + \text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{AmCO}_3^+$	8.1	(SOTERM.34)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + 2\text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Am}(\text{CO}_3)_2^-$	13.0	(SOTERM.35)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + 3\text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Am}(\text{CO}_3)_3^{3-}$	15.2	(SOTERM.36)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + 4\text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Am}(\text{CO}_3)_4^{5-}$	13.0	(SOTERM.37)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + \text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{AmOH}^{2+}$	6.4	(SOTERM.38)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + 2\text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{Am}(\text{OH})_2^+$	12.3	(SOTERM.39)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + 3\text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{Am}(\text{OH})_3(\text{aq})$	16.3	(SOTERM.40)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + \text{Cl}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{AmCl}^{2+}$	0.24	(SOTERM.41)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + 2\text{Cl}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{AmCl}_2^+$	-0.74	(SOTERM.42)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + \text{SO}_4^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Am}(\text{SO}_4)^+$	3.25	(SOTERM.43)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + 2\text{SO}_4^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Am}(\text{SO}_4)_2^-$	3.7	(SOTERM.44)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + \text{OH}^- + \text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{AmOHCO}_3(\text{s})$	22.7	(SOTERM.45)
$\text{Na}^+ + \text{Am}^{3+} + 2\text{CO}_3^{2-} + 6\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{NaAm}(\text{CO}_3)_2 \cdot 6\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s})$	21.4	(SOTERM.46)
$\text{Am}^{3+} + \text{PO}_4^{3-} \rightleftharpoons \text{AmPO}_4(\text{cr})$	24.8	(SOTERM.47)

12
 13 In these reactions, “aq,” “cr,” and “s” are the abbreviations for aqueous, crystalline, and solid,
 14 respectively. The An(III) database was extended to mixed Na^+ - CO_3^{2-} - Cl^- media, and was shown
 15 to reproduce the independently measured solubility of $\text{NaAm}(\text{CO}_3)_2(\text{s})$ in 5.6 M NaCl (Runde
 16 and Kim 1994) and the measured Nd(III) solubility in the WIPP brine (Borkowski et al. 2008).


17 SOTERM-4.4.2 The IV Actinides: Th(IV), U(IV), Pu(IV), Np(IV)

18 The IV actinides addressed by the WIPP PA are Th(IV), U(IV), Pu(IV), and Np(IV). The
 19 variation in charge-to-radius ratio for the tetravalent actinides is greater than for actinides in
 20 other oxidation states (Cotton and Wilkinson 1988, pp. 11–46), and larger differences in the
 21 chemical behavior among the IV actinides is expected. The application of the Th(IV) model to
 22 the other IV species is more uncertain, yet still conservative because Th(IV) is the most soluble
 23 of these elements under WIPP conditions. The model was evaluated against data for Pu(IV) and
 24 Np(IV) solubility and demonstrated to predict the chemical behavior of these actinides
 25 conservatively.



1
 2 **Figure SOTERM-16. Predominant Am Species as a Function of pH and Eh Based on the**
 3 **Speciation Reactions (SOTERM.34) to (SOTERM.47) (Richmann**
 4 **2008)**


5 The thermodynamic database for the IV actinides currently used in FMT was described by
 6 Giambalvo (2002c). Speciation and solubility data for Th(IV) were parameterized for the Pitzer
 7 activity-coefficient model for the Na⁺-K⁺-Mg²⁺-Cl⁻-SO₄²⁻-CO₃²⁻-HCO₃⁻-OH⁻-H₂O system. This
 8 model requires the species Th⁴⁺, Th(OH)₂SO₄ (s), Th(SO₄)₃²⁻, Th(SO₄)₂ (aq), ThO₂,
 9 Th(OH)₄(aq), Th(OH)₃CO₃⁻, and Th(CO₃)₅⁶⁻ to describe the data pertinent to the WIPP (Felmy,
 10 Mason, and Rai 1991; Rabindra et al. 1992; Felmy et al. 1996). A diagram of the predominant
 11 Th speciation, based on Reactions (SOTERM.48) to (SOTERM.59), is shown in Figure
 12 SOTERM-17.



1
 2 **Figure SOTERM-17. Predominant Species of Th as a Function of pH and Redox**
 3 **Conditions (Richmann 2008). Thorianite is Predicted to**
 4 **Predominate at the Conditions Expected in the WIPP Repository.**

5 The inorganic aqueous and solubility-limiting species featured in the IV model are:

Th(IV) Reactions	log K	
$\text{ThO}_2(\text{am}) + 2\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{OH})_4(\text{aq})$	-7.0	(SOTERM.48)
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 4\text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{OH})_4(\text{aq})$	38.5	(SOTERM.49)
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 3\text{OH}^- + \text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{OH})_3\text{CO}_3^-$	38.3	(SOTERM.50)
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 5\text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{CO}_3)_5^{6-}$	27.1	(SOTERM.51)
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 2\text{SO}_4^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{SO}_4)_2(\text{aq});$	11.6	(SOTERM.52)
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 3\text{SO}_4^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{SO}_4)_3^{2-};$	12.4	(SOTERM.53)
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 2\text{SO}_4^{2-} + 9\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{SO}_4)_2 \cdot 9\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s});$	13.0	(SOTERM.54)
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 2\text{SO}_4^{2-} + 8\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{Th}(\text{SO}_4)_2 \cdot 8\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s})$	12.9	(SOTERM.55)
$\text{Th}^{4+} + 2\text{Na}^+ + 3\text{SO}_4^{2-} + 6\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons$ $\text{Th}(\text{SO}_4)_2 \cdot \text{Na}_2\text{SO}_4 \cdot 6\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s})$	17.6	(SOTERM.56)




1
2 **SOTERM-4.4.3 The V Actinides: Np(V)**
3 The only V actinide of interest to the WIPP is Np(V), which exists as the neptunyl ion, NpO_2^+ .
4 Pu(V), which can be formed under some conditions, is transitory and not expected to persist in
5 significant quantities in the WIPP. The base model for Np(V) comes from Fanghänel, Neck, and
6 Kim (1995), constructed for the German repository program.

7 The thermodynamic database for the V actinides currently used in FMT is described by
8 Giambalvo (2002d). Np(V) speciation and solubility were parameterized in the Pitzer activity-
9 coefficient model for the Na^+ - K^+ - Mg^{2+} - Cl^- - SO_4^{2-} - CO_3^{2-} - HCO_3^- - OH^- - H_2O system. The model
10 requires the aqueous species NpO_2^+ , $\text{NpO}_2\text{OH}(\text{aq})$, $\text{NpO}_2(\text{OH})_2^-$, $\text{NpO}_2\text{CO}_3^-$, $\text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{3-}$, and
11 $\text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{5-}$, and the solid species $\text{NpO}_2\text{OH}(\text{am})$, $\text{NpO}_2\text{OH}(\text{aged})$, $\text{Na}_3\text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2(\text{s})$,
12 $\text{KNpO}_2\text{CO}_3 \cdot 2\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s})$, $\text{K}_3\text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2 \cdot 0.5\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s})$, and $\text{NaNpO}_2\text{CO}_3 \cdot 3.5\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s})$ to explain the
13 available data. The predominant species for Np(V) are shown in Figure SOTERM-18.

14 The inorganic aqueous and solubility-limiting species used are:

Np(V) Reactions	log K	
$\text{NpO}_2^+ + \text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{NpO}_2\text{OH}(\text{aq})$	2.7	(SOTERM.60)
$\text{NpO}_2^+ + \text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{NpO}_2\text{OH}(\text{s, am})$	8.8	(SOTERM.61)
$\text{NpO}_2^+ + \text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{NpO}_2\text{OH}(\text{s, aged})$	9.5	(SOTERM.62)
$\text{NpO}_2^+ + 2\text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{NpO}_2(\text{OH})_2^-$	4.5	(SOTERM.63)
$\text{NpO}_2^+ + \text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{NpO}_2\text{CO}_3^-$	5.0	(SOTERM.64)
$\text{NpO}_2^+ + 2\text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2^{3-}$	6.4	(SOTERM.65)
$\text{NpO}_2^+ + 3\text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_3^{5-}$	5.3	(SOTERM.66)
$\text{Na}^+ + \text{NpO}_2^+ + \text{CO}_3^{2-} + 3.5\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons$ $\quad \text{NaNpO}_2(\text{CO}_3) \cdot 3.5\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s})$	11.1	(SOTERM.67)
$3\text{Na}^+ + \text{NpO}_2^+ + 2\text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{Na}_3\text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2(\text{s})$	14.2	(SOTERM.68)
$\text{K}^+ + \text{NpO}_2^+ + \text{CO}_3^{2-} \rightleftharpoons \text{KNpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)(\text{s})$	13.6	(SOTERM.69)
$3\text{K}^+ + \text{NpO}_2^+ + 2\text{CO}_3^{2-} + 0.5\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons$ $\quad \text{K}_3\text{NpO}_2(\text{CO}_3)_2 \cdot 0.5\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{s})$	-4.8	(SOTERM.70)

15



1
 2 **Figure SOTERM-18. Predominant Species Diagram for Np as a Function of pH and Eh**
 3 **Based on the Np Speciation Data Reactions (SOTERM.60) to**
 4 **((SOTERM.70) (Richmann 2008)**

5 **SOTERM-4.4.4 The VI Actinides: U(VI)**

6 The An(VI) FMT model has not been developed sufficiently for reliable use in predicting
 7 concentrations of this oxidation state in the WIPP brines under various solution conditions.
 8 Although uranyl carbonate can be successfully modeled, the hydrolysis behavior of U(VI) is
 9 quite complicated and no satisfactory predictive models applicable to WIPP-like conditions are
 10 yet available. Because the implementation of an MgO backfill limits the pmH and f_{CO_2} to
 11 discrete values, empirical measurement of the solubility of U(VI) in WIPP and/or WIPP-like
 12 brines became practical. As documented in Hobart and Moore (1996) and used in prior PA
 13 calculations, the solubility of U(VI) at pH 10, in the absence of carbonate, was determined to be
 14 8.8×10^{-6} m. This is augmented by additional data from U(VI) solubility studies in WIPP-
 15 relevant carbonate-free brines reported in Section SOTERM-3.3.2 (Lucchini et al. 2009). Here,
 16 the measured U(VI) solubility was 10^{-7} M to 10^{-6} M for GWB and ERDA-6 brine, respectively.

1 The solubility of U(VI) currently used in WIPP PA was established through discussions with the
2 EPA to be 1 mM (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2005) to account for the potential and
3 expected effects of carbonate.

4 **SOTERM-4.5 Calculations of Actinide Solubility Using the FMT Computer** 5 **Code**

6 Details of the implementation of FMT and an early version of the CHEMDAT database are
7 given in Novak (1995, Appendix D) and in the FMT User's Manual (Babb and Novak 1995 and
8 1997). FMT calculates chemical equilibrium for user-specified total element amounts in
9 aqueous or aqueous/mineral geochemical systems. The FMT calculations of actinide solubility
10 in the WIPP system performed for WIPP PA included preequilibration with halite, anhydrite,
11 brucite, and magnesite (Novak, Moore, and Bynum 1996; Novak and Moore 1996), which are
12 the minerals present in large quantities in the repository. The effects of the MgO backfill are
13 realized by equilibrating brine with brucite, magnesite, and hydromagnesite.

14 **SOTERM-4.5.1 Pitzer Approach for High-Ionic-Strength Brines**

15 The Pitzer formalism is substantially different in approach from the classic Debye-Hückel (D-H)
16 theory of the behavior of ionic solutions. The latter is a theoretical approach to describing the
17 behavior of dilute solutions; more importantly, because many ionic solutes do not behave ideally
18 even at very low concentrations, it provides a means to calculate the activity, a_i , of a desired
19 species. This is of great importance, as the Gibbs free energies of the various species in solution
20 can be used to calculate solution equilibria if one knows the effective concentration of those
21 species, i.e. their "activity" in solution. The activity of a given species i is tied to the molality of
22 that species as $a_i = \gamma_i m_i$. Since the molality of species i is known, the unknown that must be
23 calculated to determine a_i is, therefore, γ_i . The simplest form relating activity to molality from
24 the D-H law is

$$25 \log \gamma_i = -A_\gamma z_i^2 \left(\frac{\sqrt{I}}{1 + \sqrt{I}} \right) \quad (\text{SOTERM.71})$$

26 where A_γ is the Debye-Hückel parameter, z_i is the charge of the i th species and I is the overall
27 solution ionic strength. The fundamental difficulty with the D-H formalism is that even with
28 extensions (Davies equation, B-dot equation), the D-H law begins to deviate significantly from
29 real solution behavior somewhere in the general region of $I = 0.3$ molal. As the WIPP brines
30 (and many other highly concentrated ionic species of interest) are well above this level of ionic
31 strength, many times with $I > 5$, another description is required to properly describe the activities
32 of the ionic species.

33 In 1973, Pitzer proposed a set of semiempirical equations to describe a_i . Pitzer (1973) wrote the
34 Gibbs excess energy of a solution as a virial expansion, where a portion of the overall expansion
35 can be tied down to a formalism similar to the D-H law and the majority of the remaining
36 constants are empirically determined from measurements of the desired ions. The most general
37 form of the equation is

$$\ln \gamma_i = \left(\frac{z_i^2}{2} \right) f'(I) + 2 \sum_j \lambda_{ij}(I) m_j + \sum_{jk} \left(\left(\frac{z_i^2}{2} \right) \lambda'_{ijk}(I) + 3 \mu_{ijk} \right) m_j m_k, \quad (\text{SOTERM.72})$$

2 where $f(I)$ is a Debye-Hückel function, $f'(I)$ is its derivative df/dI , the λ_{ij} are second-order
 3 interaction coefficients, $\lambda'_{ij}(I)$ is the derivative $d\lambda_{ij}/dI$, and the μ_{ijk} are third-order interaction
 4 coefficients. The experimentally observable values $\beta^{(0)}$, $\beta^{(1)}$, $\beta^{(2)}$, α_1 , α_2 , C^ϕ , and so forth are used
 5 to calculate the λ_{ij} and μ_{ijk} values needed to calculate γ_i (for more detail, see Wolery and Daveler
 6 1992).

7 This approach has proven highly effective and has successfully described the behavior of
 8 solutions at high ionic strength. The disadvantage of this technique is that binary and ternary
 9 coefficients for the expansion are normally needed to completely describe all the activities of the
 10 different species; in addition, if the number of species in solution grows, the number of
 11 calculations grows that much faster, i.e., on the order of the cube of the number of species. This
 12 problem would be even worse, except that many of the terms describing neutral species can be
 13 legitimately neglected in geochemical systems.

14 This parameter-determination problem is of particular interest in the description of actinide
 15 behavior in the WIPP, since the GWB and ERDA-6 brines of interest contain a wide variety of
 16 ions in and of themselves, in addition to the actinides introduced into the repository. As a result
 17 of this, it was necessary to constrain the total number of possible species in solution, aqueous,
 18 solid or gas, and in addition, to determine Pitzer parameters for many species by analogy to
 19 others rather than by experimental measurement. This is the basis of the parameter and species
 20 selection in the current database, FMT_050405.CHEMDAT, which contains the parameters (free
 21 energies, Pitzer parameters, etc.) for those species incorporated into the limited species set
 22 description. In practice, this has worked well to describe solution behavior in the WIPP within a
 23 limited set of pH values at 25 °C, but does not describe the WIPP system in all regions of
 24 interest.

25 **SOTERM-4.5.2 Calculated Actinide Solubilities**

26 The oxidation-state-specific actinide solubilities calculated with the FMT thermodynamic model
 27 are summarized in Table SOTERM-17 for the CRA-2004 PABC. For historical perspective, the
 28 calculated solubilities from prior PA analyses are tabulated in Table SOTERM-18. In the CRA-
 29 2004 PABC, the data are shown for two brines in the presence of organics, and as a function of
 30 equilibration with hydromagnesite or magnesite. The hydromagnesite case is recognized by the
 31 project as the most relevant to WIPP. It is important to note that, overall, the calculated
 32 solubilities have not changed much over time (generally within a factor of two) when organics
 33 are not considered.

1 **Table SOTERM-17. Solubilities of the Oxidation-State Analogs (M) with MgO Backfill**
 2 **Calculated for the CRA-2004 PABC (Brush 2005)**

Brine	FMT Name	Solubilities of the Actinide Oxidation States from the FMT Calculations for PABC			
		(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI) ^a
GWB	Run 7 (hydromagnesite with organics [hmag. w orgs.])	3.87×10^{-7}	5.64×10^{-8}	3.55×10^{-7}	1×10^{-3}
ERDA-6	Run 11 (hmag. w orgs)	2.88×10^{-7}	6.79×10^{-8}	8.24×10^{-7}	1×10^{-3}
GWB	Run 5 (mag. w orgs)	3.87×10^{-7}	4.57×10^{-8}	6.59×10^{-6}	1×10^{-3}
ERDA-6	Run 9 (mag. w orgs)	2.87×10^{-7}	4.84×10^{-8}	1.08×10^{-5}	1×10^{-3}

hmag. – hydromagnesite

mag. – magnesite

^a Not calculated with the FMT model

3

4 **Table SOTERM-18. Historical Actinide Solubilities (M) Calculated (III, IV, and V) or**
 5 **Estimated (VI) for the CRA-2004 PA, the CCA PAVT and the CCA**
 6 **PA (U.S. Department of Energy 2004)**

Actinide Oxidation State, and Brine	CRA Solubilities, Microbial Vectors	CRA Solubilities, Nonmicrobial Vectors	PAVT Solubilities	CCA Solubilities
III, Salado brine	3.07×10^{-7}	3.07×10^{-7}	1.2×10^{-7}	5.82×10^{-7}
III, Castile brine	1.69×10^{-7}	1.77×10^{-7}	1.3×10^{-8}	1.3×10^{-8}
IV, Salado brine	1.19×10^{-8}	1.24×10^{-8}	1.3×10^{-8}	4.4×10^{-6}
IV, Castile brine	2.47×10^{-8}	5.84×10^{-9}	4.1×10^{-9}	6.0×10^{-9}
V, Salado brine	1.02×10^{-6}	9.72×10^{-7}	2.4×10^{-7}	2.3×10^{-6}
V, Castile brine	5.08×10^{-6}	2.13×10^{-5}	4.8×10^{-5}	2.2×10^{-6}
VI, Salado brine	8.7×10^{-6}	8.7×10^{-6}	8.7×10^{-6}	8.7×10^{-6}
VI, Castile brine	8.8×10^{-6}	8.8×10^{-6}	8.8×10^{-6}	8.8×10^{-6}

7

8 The calculated solubility of the III actinides was 2.87×10^{-7} M to 3.87×10^{-7} M in the CRA-2004
 9 PABC (Brush and Xiong 2005b). These data are also fairly consistent with recently measured
 10 results for Nd(III) solubility in brine (Borkowski et al. 2008). A somewhat broader range was
 11 noted historically: 1.3×10^{-8} M to 5.82×10^{-7} M. The expected solubility of the IV actinides
 12 ranges between 4.57×10^{-8} M and 6.79×10^{-8} M. This is also somewhat consistent with prior
 13 calculations (Table SOTERM-18) and has increased slightly. Overall the solubility of the IV
 14 actinides is four to eight times lower than that predicted for the III actinides. The main reason
 15 for increases noted in CRA-2004 PABC was the presence of organics in the brines.

1 Uncertainties in the solubility data and uncertainty in the NONLIN least-squares refinement, for
2 Pitzer parameter determination, result in uncertainty in the model predictions. This distribution
3 was sampled and used in PA as discussed in Section SOTERM-5.0 (Xiong, Nowak, and Brush
4 2005).

5 **SOTERM-4.6 Calculation of the Effects of Organic Ligands on Actinide** 6 **Solubility**

7 Four organic ligands are included in FMT calculations of actinide solubilities. These are acetate
8 (CH_3CO_2^-), citrate [$(\text{CH}_2\text{CO}_2)_2\text{C}(\text{OH})(\text{CO}_2)^{3-}$], EDTA [$(\text{CH}_2\text{CO}_2)_2\text{N}(\text{CH}_2)_2\text{N}(\text{CH}_2\text{CO}_2)_2^{4-}$], and
9 oxalate ($\text{C}_2\text{O}_4^{2-}$). The current projected inventory of these complexing agents, with their
10 inventory-limited solubilities in the WIPP, were summarized in Table SOTERM-5. These
11 ligands are included in the solubility calculations because (1) approximately 60 organic
12 compounds were identified among the nonradioactive constituents of the TRU waste to be
13 emplaced in the WIPP (Brush 1990; Drez 1991; U.S. Department of Energy 1996); (2) 10 of
14 these 60 organic compounds could, if present in the WIPP, increase actinide solubilities because
15 they are soluble in aqueous solutions such as WIPP brines, and because they form complexes
16 with dissolved actinides (Choppin 1988); and (3) of these 10 water-soluble organic ligands that
17 form complexes with actinides, 4 (acetate, citrate, EDTA, and oxalate) were identified in the
18 WIPP inventory (See the CCA, Appendix SOTERM, p. 96).

19 The effects of all four ligands (acetate, citrate, EDTA, and oxalate), as well as the Mg^{2+} and Ca^{2+}
20 species present in brine, were addressed in the calculations of actinide solubility for GWB and
21 ERDA-6 brine in the PABC calculations (Brush 2005). The stability constants for the complexes
22 formed by the listed ligands with Ca^{2+} were assigned the same values as the stability complexes
23 formed by these ligands with Mg^{2+} (Giambalvo 2003). Because of insufficient data these
24 calculations did not include competition from the other dissolved metals such as Fe, V, Cr, Ni,
25 copper (Cu), and Pb, all of which could be present at significant concentrations due to
26 dissolution of steels and other metallic constituents of TRU waste (see Table SOTERM-19 and
27 U.S. Department of Energy 2006). The FMT calculations (Brush 2005) demonstrate that the
28 solubility of the III and IV actinides was not significantly enhanced by complexation with
29 acetate, citrate, EDTA, and oxalate at their maximum potential concentrations (Table SOTERM-
30 19). EDTA does, however, exert a strong influence on the speciation of the III actinides, in that
31 it essentially forms a 1:1 complex with the actinide. In this context, higher levels of EDTA in
32 the repository, should they exist, could overwhelm carbonate complexation and hydrolysis to
33 dominate the speciation of the III actinides.

34 In the FMT calculations, all four ligands (acetate, citrate, EDTA, and oxalate) were present
35 simultaneously in Salado or Castile brine at the concentrations calculated by Brush and Xiong
36 (2005a). The results of the FMT calculations for the CRA-2004 PABC demonstrate that acetate,
37 citrate, EDTA, and oxalate will not form complexes with the III and IV actinides to a significant
38 extent under expected WIPP conditions, and thus will not significantly affect the III and IV
39 actinide solubilities (Brush and Xiong 2003c; Downes 2003a and 2003b).

40 The importance and role of colloids in defining the concentration of actinide in the WIPP was
41 discussed in Section SOTERM-3.8, and more extensive discussions of WIPP-related results were
42

1 **Table SOTERM-19. Comparison of Actinide Solubility Calculations With and Without**
 2 **Organics**

Property or Actinide Oxidation State	FMT Run 7 (GWB, hmag, with orgs)	FMT Run 8 (GWB, hmag, without orgs)	FMT Run 11 (ERDA-6, hmag, with orgs)	FMT Run 12 (ERDA-6, hmag, without orgs)
An(III), M	3.87×10^{-7}	2.26×10^{-7}	2.88×10^{-7}	8.67×10^{-8}
An(IV), M	5.64×10^{-8}	5.66×10^{-8}	6.79×10^{-8}	7.20×10^{-8}
An(V), M	3.55×10^{-7}	2.36×10^{-7}	8.24×10^{-7}	5.38×10^{-7}
I, m	7.66	7.54	6.80	6.72
log f _{CO2}	-5.50	-5.50	-5.50	-5.50
ρ, kg/m ³	1230	1230	1220	1220
pH	8.69	8.69	8.94	9.02
RH, %	73.2	73.3	74.8	74.8

3
 4 presented in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM. Results of the colloidal
 5 actinide investigation were used in the CRA-2004 PABC, the CRA-2004 PA, the CCA PA, and
 6 the 1997 PAVT to define the PA approach to accounting for colloidal enhancement of actinide
 7 concentrations. The four types of colloids identified as relevant to the WIPP are listed and
 8 described in Table SOTERM-20.

9 **Table SOTERM-20. Classification of Four Colloid Types Considered by WIPP PA**

Mineral Fragment Colloids	Hydrophobic, hard-sphere particles that are kinetically stabilized or destabilized by electrostatic forces and may consist of crystalline or amorphous solids. Mineral fragments may be made kinetically stable by coatings with steric stabilizers that prevent close contact. Mineral fragments may act as substrates for sorption of actinides, or they may consist of precipitated or coprecipitated actinide solids.
Intrinsic Actinide Colloids	Intrinsic actinide colloids (also known as true colloids, real colloids, Type I colloids, and Eigenkolloide) are macromolecules of actinides that, at least in some cases, may mature into a mineral-fragment type of colloidal particle. When immature, they are hydrophilic; when mature, they become hydrophobic.
Humic Colloids	Humic substances are hydrophilic, soft-sphere particles that are stabilized by solvation forces. They are often powerful substrates for uptake of metal cations and are relatively small (less than 100,000 atomic mass units).
Microbial Colloids	Microbes are relatively large colloidal particles stabilized by hydrophilic coatings on their surfaces, which behave as steric stabilizing compounds. They may act as substrates for extracellular actinide sorption or actively bioaccumulate actinides intracellularly.

10
 11 **SOTERM-4.7 Calculation of Colloidal Contribution to Actinide Solution**
 12 **Concentrations**

13 Three types of parameter values were determined: (1) constant concentration values, (2)
 14 concentration values proportional to the dissolved actinide concentration, and (3) maximum
 15 concentration values. The parameter types are summarized below and were initially described in
 16 parameter record packages (Papenguth and Behl 1996a; Papenguth 1996a, 1996b, and 1996c)

1 and resummarized for the CRA-2004 PABC (Garner and Leigh 2005). For intrinsic actinide
 2 colloids and mineral-fragment colloids, associated actinide concentrations were described as
 3 constant values. Table SOTERM-21 summarizes the material and parameter names and
 4 descriptions.

5 **Table SOTERM-21. Material and Property Names for Colloidal Parameters**

Material	Property	Brief Description of Parameter
Th, U, Np, Pu, Am	CONCMIN	Concentration of actinide associated with mobile mineral fragment colloids
Th, U, Np, Pu, Am	CONCINT	Concentration of actinide associated with mobile intrinsic actinide colloids
Th, U, Np, Pu, Am	PROPMIC	Proportionality constant for concentration of actinides associated with mobile microbes
PHUMOX3 ^a PHUMOX4 PHUMOX5 PHUMOX6	PHUMCIM	Proportionality constant for concentration of actinides associated with mobile humic colloids; in Castile brine; actinide solubilities are inorganic only (complexes with man-made organic ligands are not important); solubilities were calculated assuming equilibrium with Mg-bearing minerals (brucite and magnesite)
PHUMOX3 ^a PHUMOX4 PHUMOX5 PHUMOX6	PHUMSIM	Proportionality constant for concentration of actinides associated with mobile humic colloids; in Salado brine; actinide solubilities are inorganic only (complexes with man-made organic ligands are not important); solubilities were calculated assuming equilibrium with Mg-bearing minerals (brucite and magnesite)
Th, U, Np, Pu, Am	CAPMIC	Maximum (cap) concentration of actinide associated with mobile microbes
Th, U, Np, Pu, Am	CAPHUM	Maximum (cap) concentration of actinide associated with mobile humic colloids

^a Proportionality constant for actinide concentrations associated with mobile humic substances for PHUMOX3, for actinide elements with oxidation state *III* (that is, Pu(III) and Am(III)); PHUMOX4, oxidation state *IV* (Th(IV), U(IV), Np(IV), and Pu(IV)); PHUMOX5, oxidation state *V* (Np(V)); and PHUMOX6, oxidation state *VI* (U(VI)).

6
 7 Experiments conducted to quantify actinide concentrations associated with humic substances and
 8 microbes provided the basis for a more sophisticated representation, in which colloidal actinide
 9 concentrations were related to the dissolved actinide concentration by proportionality constants.
 10 For microbes, the proportionality relationship was made by element. For humic actinides,
 11 however, the relationship was made by oxidation state, rather than by element. For microbes and
 12 humic substances, the experiments also provided a basis to define upper limits of the actinide
 13 concentration that could be associated with each of those colloid types. For both humic and
 14 microbial actinides, the upper limit parameter was defined by element, rather than oxidation
 15 state, and is in units of molality. The use of the two upper limit parameters is slightly different,
 16 and is described in the sections below discussing humic substances and microbes.

17 The colloid concentration factors used in the CRA-2004 PABC are summarized in Table
 18 SOTERM-22. The general approach used to account for colloidal enhancement of actinide
 19 solubilities is described in detail by Garner and Leigh (2005). There were essentially no changes
 20 in the approach used from the CRA-2004 PA. The maximum concentrations of actinides
 21 predicted for the four types of WIPP colloids are tabulated in Table SOTERM-23. These data
 22

1 **Table SOTERM-22. Colloid Concentration Factors (The CRA-2004, Appendix PA,**
 2 **Attachment SOTERM)**

Actinide	CONCMIN (Concentration on Mineral Fragments ^a)	CONCINT (Concentration as Intrinsic Colloid ^a)	PROPMIC (Proportion Sorbed on Microbes ^{b,c})	CAPMIC (Maximum Sorbed on Microbes ^d)	Proportion Sorbed on Humics ^b		CAPHUM (Maximum Sorbed on Humics ^a)
					PHUMSIM (Salado)	PHUMCIM (Castile)	
Th(IV)	2.6×10^{-8}	0.0	3.1	0.0019	6.3	6.3	1.1×10^{-5}
U(IV)	2.6×10^{-8}	0.0	0.0021	0.0021	6.3	6.3	1.1×10^{-5}
U(VI)	2.6×10^{-8}	0.0	0.0021	0.0021	0.12	0.51	1.1×10^{-5}
Np(IV)	2.6×10^{-8}	0.0	12.0	0.0027	6.3	6.3	1.1×10^{-5}
Np(V)	2.6×10^{-8}	0.0	12.0	0.0027	9.1×10^{-4}	7.4×10^{-3}	1.1×10^{-5}
Pu(III)	2.6×10^{-8}	1.0×10^{-9}	0.3	6.8×10^{-5}	0.19	1.37 ^e	1.1×10^{-5}
Pu(IV)	2.6×10^{-8}	1.0×10^{-9}	0.3	6.8×10^{-5}	6.3	6.3	1.1×10^{-5}
Am(III)	2.6×10^{-8}	0.0	3.6	1.0	0.19	1.37 ^e	1.1×10^{-5}

^a In units of moles colloidal actinide per liter

^b In units of moles colloidal actinide per mole dissolved actinide

^c For the CRA-2004 PABC, all vectors were microbial

^d In units of moles total mobile actinide per liter

^e A cumulative distribution from 0.065 to 1.60 with a median value of 1.37 was used

NOTE: The colloidal source term is added to the dissolved source term to arrive at a total source term. Mineral fragments were provided with distributions, but the maximum was used as described in the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Attachment SOTERM. Humic proportionality constants for the III, IV, and V states were provided with distributions, but only the Castile Am(III) and Pu(III) were sampled.

3
 4 **Table SOTERM-23. Actinide Concentration or Maximum Concentration Due to Colloidal**
 5 **Enhanced Solution Concentrations (Garner and Leigh 2005)**

Actinide	CAPHUM Humic colloids	CAPMIC Microbial Colloids	CONCMIN Mineral Colloids	CONCINT Intrinsic Colloids	PROPMIC Microbial Colloids ^a
Am	1.1×10^{-5} M	1.0 M	2.6×10^{-8} M	0.0	1.0
Np	1.1×10^{-5} M	0.0027 M	2.6×10^{-8} M	0.0	2.7×10^{-3}
Pu	1.1×10^{-5} M	6.8×10^{-5} M	2.6×10^{-8} M	1.00×10^{-9} M	6.8×10^{-5}
Th	1.1×10^{-5} M	0.0019 M	2.6×10^{-8} M	0.0	1.9×10^{-3}
U	1.1×10^{-5} M	0.0021 M	2.6×10^{-8} M	0.0	2.1×10^{-3}

^a In units of moles colloidal actinide per mole dissolved actinide

6
 7 show that microbial colloids are likely to have the most significant effect on actinide
 8 concentrations, with a smaller but significant contribution from the humic colloidal fraction.
 9 Section SOTERM-5.0 provides more details on the PA implementation of these data.

1 **SOTERM-5.0 Use of the Actinide Source Term in PA**

2 The WIPP ASTP provided the parameters to construct the maximum dissolved and suspended
3 colloidal actinide concentrations for use in modeling the mobilization and transport of actinides
4 in the disposal system. In the WIPP PA, mobilization of radionuclides is represented by the
5 PANEL code and transport of radionuclides within the repository and the Salado is represented
6 by the Nuclide Transport System (NUTS) code (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.4 and Section
7 PA-4.3, respectively). A description of the simplifications, manipulations, and approach used in
8 the PA to perform this modeling is discussed in this section.

9 **SOTERM-5.1 Simplifications**

10 The DOE has concentrated on those processes most likely to have a significant impact on system
11 performance. Therefore, several simplifications were used in the modeling of radionuclide
12 mobilization and transport in the CCA PA, the CCA PAVT, the CRA-2004 PA, the CRA-2004
13 PABC, and the CRA-2009 PA calculations. These include

- 14 • Using constant solubility parameters and constant colloidal parameters throughout the
15 repository and regulatory period for a given realization
- 16 • Modeling only the isotopes most important to compliance
- 17 • Using the compositions of Castile and Salado brines (the end-member brines) to bracket the
18 behavior of mixtures of these brines within the repository
- 19 • Sampling only the uncertain parameters with the most significant effect on repository
20 performance
- 21 • Combining dissolved and colloidal species for transport within the disposal system, as
22 modeled by NUTS and PANEL

23 **SOTERM-5.1.1 Elements and Isotopes Modeled**

24 Selection of isotopes for modeling mobilization and transport in the disposal system with NUTS
25 and PANEL is described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.3.3. Runs of PANEL, the PA
26 code that computes total mobilized radionuclide concentrations, include 29 radionuclides in the
27 decay calculations (Garner and Leigh 2005, Table 7 and Table 12). Runs of NUTS, the PA code
28 that computes radionuclide transport within the Salado, are based on five radionuclides: (²³⁰Th,
29 ²³⁴U, ²³⁸Pu, ²³⁹Pu, and ²⁴¹Am) that represent groupings of radionuclides with similar decay and
30 transport properties (Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.3.3). The number of radionuclides for
31 transport calculations in NUTS has been reduced because calculations for the full WIPP
32 inventory and decay chains would be very time consuming and because accurate results can be
33 achieved with this limited set of radionuclides.

34 Transport calculations in the Culebra use a reduced set of four radionuclides: (²³⁰Th, ²³⁴U, ²³⁹Pu,
35 and ²⁴¹Am) for computational efficiency (Garner 1996). ²³⁸Pu has been omitted from transport in

1 the Culebra because its short half-life (87.7 years) means that little ²³⁸Pu will enter the Culebra
 2 via brine flows up a borehole.

3 **SOTERM-5.1.2 Use of Brine End Members**

4 The general scenarios described in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-2.3.2 and Section PA-3.10
 5 and considered in the source term calculations may be categorized into three groups: (1)
 6 undisturbed performance (BRAGFLO S1 scenario); (2) intrusion through the repository and into
 7 the Castile, intersecting a pressurized brine reservoir (BRAGFLO S2, S3, and S6 scenarios); and
 8 (3) intrusion through the repository, but not into a pressurized brine reservoir (BRAGFLO S4
 9 and S5 scenarios). The specific scenarios and the associated type of borehole intrusion
 10 considered by the WIPP PA are listed in Table SOTERM-24.

11 **Table SOTERM-24. WIPP PA Modeling Scenarios for the CRA-2004 PABC (Garner and**
 12 **Leigh 2005; Leigh et al. 2005)**

BRAGFLO Scenario	Description	Brine Used in PA
S1	E0 (Undisturbed Repository)	Salado (GWB)
S2	E1 intrusion at 350 years penetrates the repository and a brine pocket	Castile (ERDA-6)
S3	E1 intrusion at 1000 years penetrates the repository and a brine pocket	Castile (ERDA-6)
S4	E2 intrusion at 350 years penetrates the repository (only)	Salado (GWB)
S5	E2 intrusion at 1000 years penetrates the repository (only)	Salado (GWB)
S6	E2 intrusion at 1000 years penetrates the repository (only); E1 intrusion at 2000 years penetrates the repository and a brine pocket	Castile (ERDA-6)

13
 14 Brine may enter the repository from three sources, depending on the nature of the borehole
 15 intrusion. Under all scenarios, brine may flow from the surrounding Salado through the DRZ
 16 and into the repository in response to the difference between the hydraulic head in the repository
 17 and in the surrounding formation. For the BRAGFLO S2 through S6 scenarios, in which a
 18 borehole is drilled into the repository, brine may flow down the borehole from the Rustler and/or
 19 the Dewey Lake. For the BRAGFLO S2, S3, and S6 scenarios, in which a pressurized Castile
 20 brine reservoir is intercepted, brine from the Castile may flow up the borehole into the
 21 repository.

22 As mentioned in Section SOTERM-2.3.1, the brines in the Salado and Castile have different
 23 compositions and the actinides solubilities are somewhat different in each of these end-member
 24 compositions.


1 The composition of the more dilute groundwaters from the Rustler and Dewey Lake are expected
2 to change rapidly upon entering the repository as a result of fast dissolution of host Salado
3 minerals from the walls and floor of the repository. These minerals comprise about 90-95%
4 halite and about 1-2% each of polyhalite, gypsum, anhydrite, and magnesite (Brush 1990).
5 Calculations titrating Salado rock into dilute brines using EQ3/6 (Wolery 1992; Wolery and
6 Daveler 1992) show that gypsum, anhydrite, and magnesite saturate before halite. When halite
7 saturates, the brine composition is very similar to that of Castile brine. One hundred times as
8 much polyhalite must be added to the system before the resulting brine has a composition similar
9 to Salado brines. These calculations indicate that if dilute brines dissolve away only the surfaces
10 of the repository, they will obtain Castile-like compositions, but if they circulate through the
11 Salado after saturating with halite, they may obtain compositions similar to Salado brine.
12 Similarly, if Castile brine circulates through enough host rock, it may also approach Salado brine
13 composition. In either case, the actual brine within the repository may be described as a mixture
14 of the two concentrated-brine end members: Salado and Castile. This mixture, however, is very
15 hard to quantify, because it is both temporally and spatially variable. Only in the undisturbed
16 scenario is the mixture well defined as 100% Salado brine over the 10,000-year regulatory
17 period. In this context, the Salado (GWB) and Castile (ERDA-6) brines bracket the range of
18 expected brine compositions.

19 For a panel intersected by a borehole, the BRAGFLO calculations show that in the 10% of the
20 repository represented by the BRAGFLO panel computational cells, the ratio of brine inflow that
21 enters through the borehole versus through inflow from the host rock varies in time and depends
22 on the sampled parameter values and scenario considered. This ratio was the only measure of
23 brine mixing available to the source term runs in the CCA PA, the CCA PAVT, the CRA-2004
24 PA, and the CRA-2004-PABC calculations. As an estimate, this ratio (1) does not account for
25 compositional changes that occur when H₂O is consumed by corrosion reactions; (2) does not
26 resolve the details of flow, diffusion, and brine interaction with internal pillars and the DRZ; and
27 (3) is an average over one-tenth of the repository. It is expected that the fraction of Salado brine
28 will be quite high in areas of the repository distant from the borehole and much lower near the
29 borehole. Because radionuclide travel up the borehole can lead to significant release, the
30 solubility of radionuclides near the borehole is important. Given these uncertainties, the DOE
31 decided to use the Castile end-member composition to calculate radionuclide solubilities for
32 scenarios where a borehole penetrates a brine reservoir, and to use the Salado end-member
33 composition for scenarios where it does not (see Table SOTERM-24).

34 **SOTERM-5.1.3 Sampling of Uncertain Parameters**

35 The parameters to be sampled for the PA were selected based on the expected significance of
36 their effect on repository performance. The following four parameters are sampled
37 independently (Garner and Leigh 2005, Table 3 and Table 8):

- 38 • The solubility uncertainty for oxidation state III (see discussion below and Figure SOTERM-
39 19).
- 40 • The solubility uncertainty for oxidation state IV (see discussion below and Figure SOTERM-
41 20).




1
2 **Figure SOTERM-19. Frequency Distribution of the Deviation of Experimental log**
3 **Solubility from Model-Predicted Value for all An(III) Comparisons.**
4 **A Total of 243 Measured and Predicted Solubilities were Compared**
5 **(Xiong 2005).**

- 6 • The oxidation state for Pu, Np, and U. The sampled value is a flag that is “low” 50% of the
7 time and “high” 50% of the time. If the flag is set to “high,” Pu is assumed to be in the IV
8 oxidation state, Np is assumed to be in the V oxidation state, and U is assumed to be in the
9 VI oxidation state. If the flag is set to “low,” Pu is assumed to be in the III oxidation state
10 and Np and U are assumed to be in the IV oxidation state.
- 11 • The humic-acid proportionality constant for the III oxidation state in Castile brine (see Table
12 SOTERM-22 and Figure SOTERM-21).

13 As discussed by Garner and Leigh (2005, Section 2.3), the solubility uncertainty for oxidation
14 state V is zero. The solubility uncertainty for oxidation state VI is zero because the EPA
15 specified a fixed, maximum solubility of 1×10^{-3} mol/L for U(VI).

16 Actinide solubilities for a single realization in the PA depend on (1) the oxidation state; (2) the
17 brine for that realization (see Table SOTERM-24); and (3) the solution concentration
18 uncertainty, as shown in Equation (SOTERM.73).




1
 2 **Figure SOTERM-20. Frequency Distribution of the Deviation of Experimental log**
 3 **Solubility from Model-Predicted Value for all An(IV) Comparisons.**
 4 **A Total of 45 Measured and Predicted Solubilities were Compared**
 5 **(Xiong 2005).**

$$6 \quad C_{i,b} = (S_{i,b}) \times (10^{SU_i}) \quad (\text{SOTERM.73})$$

7 $C_{i,b}$, used for every element in oxidation state i , is the concentration of oxidation state i and brine
 8 b . $S_{i,b}$ is the solubility calculated for oxidation state i in brine b with FMT (see Table SOTERM-
 9 17). SU_i is the solubility uncertainty sampled from a distribution unique to each oxidation state.
 10 Figure SOTERM-19 shows the distribution of SU values for oxidation state III. Figure
 11 SOTERM-20 shows the distribution of SU values for oxidation state IV. These distributions are
 12 calculated and documented in Xiong (2005).

13 Figure SOTERM-21 shows the cumulative distribution function for the humic-acid
 14 proportionality constant.



1

2 **Figure SOTERM-21. Cumulative Distribution Function for the Humic-Acid**
 3 **Proportionality Constant**

4 **SOTERM-5.1.4 Combining the Transport of Dissolved and Colloidal Species**
 5 **in the Salado**

6 Dissolved and colloidal species may transport differently because of different diffusion rates,
 7 sorption onto stationary materials, and size-exclusion effects (filtration and hydrodynamic
 8 chromatography). With maximum molecular diffusion coefficients of about $4 \times 10^{-10} \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$,
 9 actinides are estimated to diffuse about 10 m in 10,000 years, a negligible distance. Sorption and
 10 filtration have beneficial but unquantified effects on performance. Hydrodynamic
 11 chromatography may increase colloidal transport over dissolved transport by, at most, a factor of
 12 two for theoretically perfect colloidal-transport conditions. In the WIPP, the expected increase is
 13 much lower. Given the small or beneficial nature of these effects, they were not included in the
 14 CCA PA, the CCA PAVT, the CRA-2004 PA, or the CRA-2004 PABC calculations of
 15 radionuclide transport in the repository.

16 **SOTERM-5.2 Construction of the Source Term**

17 Because there was no modeled mechanism in PA to differentiate dissolved from colloidal
 18 species, the DOE combined them for transport within the Salado. To model transport within the
 19 Culebra, however, this simplification was replaced by separating the mobilized actinides
 20 delivered to the Culebra by Salado transport codes into five components (dissolved, humic,

1 microbial, mineral-fragment, and intrinsic colloids) to account for differences in their transport
2 behavior. This is important because transport within the repository occurs through, at most,
3 hundreds of meters of poorly defined waste undergoing decomposition, whereas transport
4 through the Culebra occurs over kilometers in a relatively homogeneous (compared to waste)
5 fractured dolomite.

6 The parameters required to construct the source term were as follows:

- 7 1. Solubilities for four oxidation states in Salado and Castile brines, the two brine end members.
- 8 2. Uncertainty distributions to be applied to the median solubilities for oxidation states III and
9 IV.
- 10 3. A scheme for assigning sampled oxidation states (“low” or “high”).
- 11 4. Colloidal concentrations or proportionality constants for each actinide (Th, U, Np, Pu, and
12 Am) and an associated oxidation state for each of four colloid types.
- 13 5. Caps on the actinide concentrations that may be applied to two types of colloids (microbial
14 and humic).
- 15 6. Cm is assigned the source term calculated for Am.

16 Cm and Np are not explicitly transported in NUTS (see Section SOTERM-5.1.1) although they
17 are implicitly lumped with other modeled isotopes. They are, however, included in the PANEL
18 calculations for use with the DBR calculations in PA.

19 These parameters are combined into a single maximum concentration for each modeled actinide
20 in the PA calculations. The term “total mobilized concentration” is used for the combined
21 concentrations of dissolved and colloidal species. The combined concentrations are not
22 necessarily the actual concentrations, because the concentration may be lower as a result of
23 inventory limits. Both NUTS and PANEL assume that the actinide concentrations specified by
24 the total mobilized concentrations are attained instantaneously as long as sufficient inventory is
25 available. When the inventory is insufficient, the actual mobilized concentration will be lower
26 and is said to be inventory limited. The calculation of the total mobilized concentration is
27 performed by PANEL for each of 100 sampled vectors in a replicate. A similar methodology to
28 generate the combined maximum concentrations was also used for the CCA PA, the CCA
29 PAVT, the CRA-2004 PA, and the CRA-2004 PABC.

30 All of the source term parameters and their associated distributions are entered into the PA
31 parameter database. For each sampled parameter, the Latin Hypercube Sampling code uses the
32 distribution from the PA parameter database to create 100 sampled values. These values are
33 combined with the parameters that have constant values and stored in computational databases
34 for each of the 100 vectors (i.e., 100 realizations), which constitute one replicate. For each
35 realization, PANEL uses both the constant and sampled values for all of the source term
36 parameters, and constructs the source term for NUTS and PANEL, as shown below. This
37 process is repeated for scenarios using the Salado end-member total mobilized concentration and
38 for scenarios using the Castile end-member total mobilized concentration.

1 Dissolved = Base Solubility $\times 10^{\text{Sampled from Solubility Distribution}}$ (SOTERM.74)

2 IF (Dissolved \times Proportionality Constant $<$ Humic Cap),
 3 THEN Humic = Dissolved \times Proportionality Constant, (SOTERM.75)
 4 ELSE Humic = Humic Cap

5 IF (Total Mobile $<$ Microbial Cap),
 6 THEN Microbial = Dissolved \times Proportionality Constant, (SOTERM.76)
 7 ELSE Microbial = Microbial Cap

8 Mineral = Database Concentration (a constant value) (SOTERM.77)

9 Intrinsic = Database Concentration (a constant value) (SOTERM.78)

10 Total Mobile = Dissolved + Humic + Microbial + Mineral + Intrinsic (SOTERM.79)

11 For actinides with more than one oxidation state, the oxidation state is specified by the oxidation-
 12 state parameter

13 IF (OXSTAT ≤ 0.5); THEN Lower Oxidation State,
 14 ELSE Higher Oxidation State (SOTERM.80)

15 where OXSTAT is the oxidation-state parameter sampled from a uniform distribution between 0
 16 and 1.

17 Similar solubility calculations are performed for Am, U, Th, and Np. The total mobilized
 18 concentration and mobile fractions for Cm are set equal to the values for Am. In addition, the
 19 PA groups radioisotopes with similar decay and transport properties for the NUTS and
 20 SECOTP2D (component radionuclide transport in fractures or granular aquifers) transport
 21 calculations, as explained in Section SOTERM-5.1.1. For example, the U solubility is decreased
 22 to account for the shared solubility with the low-activity ^{238}U , which is not explicitly modeled,
 23 enabling NUTS to properly represent the effect of the U isotopes on compliance using the single
 24 lumped isotope ^{234}U (the CRA-2004, Appendix PA, Section PA-4.3.3).

25 PANEL also calculates the fraction of each actinide mobilized by the five different mechanisms,
 26 as follows:

27 Fraction dissolved = Dissolved/Total Mobilized Concentration (Conc.) (SOTERM.81)

28 Fraction on humics = Humic/Total Mobilized Conc. (SOTERM.82)

29 Fraction in/on microbes = Microbe/Total Mobilized Conc. (SOTERM.83)

30 Fraction on mineral fragments = Mineral/Total Mobilized Conc. (SOTERM. 84)

31 Fraction as intrinsic colloid = Intrinsic/Total Mobilized Conc. (SOTERM.85)

1 **SOTERM-5.3 Example Calculation of Actinide Solubility**

2 For example, for one realization in Salado brine, the sampled value for OXSTAT was 0.9, so Pu
3 would be present in the IV state. The sampled value of the solubility uncertainty distribution
4 was 1.8 for the IV state, which has a median brine solubility of 5.64×10^{-8} M. The humic
5 proportionality constant for the IV oxidation state in Salado brine is 6.3, the microbial
6 proportionality constant for Pu is 0.3, the humic cap is 1.1×10^{-5} M, the microbe cap for Pu is
7 6.8×10^{-5} M, the concentration of the actinide on mineral fragments is 2.6×10^{-8} M, and the Pu
8 intrinsic-colloid concentration is 1×10^{-9} M.

9 For this realization, the maximum dissolved concentration of Pu(IV) used by the PA would be

$$10 \quad C_{Pu} = (5.64 \times 10^{-8}) \times (10^{1.8}) = 3.6 \times 10^{-6} \text{ M.} \quad (\text{SOTERM.86})$$

11 (The calculations for this example have been rounded to two significant figures, although the PA
12 would not round the intermediate or final values.) C_{Pu} is the maximum dissolved concentration
13 of all combined isotopes of Pu.

14 The maximum humic-complexed Pu would be

$$15 \quad (3.6 \times 10^{-6} \text{ M})(6.3 \text{ mol adsorbed per mol}) = 2.3 \times 10^{-5} \text{ M.} \quad (\text{SOTERM.87})$$

16 This value, however, exceeds the cap for humic-mobilized Pu, 1.1×10^{-5} M. Therefore, in this
17 case, the cap would be used for the maximum humic-mobilized actinide concentration. Note that
18 the humic-mobilized concentration of Pu exceeds the maximum dissolved concentration of Pu,
19 which is usually the case.

20 The maximum microbial-mobilized Pu would be

$$21 \quad (3.6 \times 10^{-6} \text{ M})(0.3 \text{ mol bioaccumulated per mol}) = 1.1 \times 10^{-6} \text{ M.} \quad (\text{SOTERM.88})$$

22 This value is less than the cap, 6.8×10^{-5} M, so the cap does not affect microbial-mobilized Pu
23 for this realization.

24 The total mobilized concentration of Pu(IV) for this realization would then be the sum of the
25 dissolved and colloidal contributions (see Equation [SOTERM.79]):

$$26 \quad \text{Total Mobile} = \text{Dissolved} + \text{Humic} + \text{Microbial} + \text{Mineral} + \text{Intrinsic}, \quad (\text{SOTERM.89})$$

$$27 \quad = 3.6 \times 10^{-6} + 1.1 \times 10^{-5} + 1.1 \times 10^{-6} + 2.6 \times 10^{-8} + 1.0 \times 10^{-9},$$

$$28 \quad = 1.6 \times 10^{-5} \text{ M.}$$

29 **SOTERM-5.4 Calculated Dissolved, Colloidal, and Total Actinide Solubilities**

30 The output of the PANEL calculations is a computational database containing the source term
31 and effective inventories. NUTS and PANEL both assume instantaneous dissolution and
32 colloidal mobilization up to the solubility limits when sufficient inventory is present, as
33 discussed in Appendix PA-2009, Section PA-4.3. Table SOTERM-25 shows the dissolved and
34

1 **Table SOTERM-25. Concentrations (M) of Dissolved, Colloidal, and Total Mobile**
 2 **Actinides Obtained Using Median Parameter Values for the CCA**
 3 **PAVT and CRA-2004 PABC^a**

Actinide Oxidation State and Brine	PAVT	CRA-2004 PABC
Pu(III), dissolved, Salado brine	9.75×10^{-8}	3.61×10^{-7}
Pu(III), colloidal, Salado brine	7.48×10^{-8}	2.04×10^{-7}
Pu(III), total mobile, Salado brine	1.72×10^{-7}	5.64×10^{-7}
Pu(III), dissolved, Castile brine	1.06×10^{-8}	2.68×10^{-7}
Pu(III), colloidal, Castile brine	4.46×10^{-8}	4.75×10^{-7}
Pu(III), total mobile, Castile brine	5.52×10^{-8}	7.44×10^{-7}
Am(III), dissolved, Salado brine	9.75×10^{-8}	3.61×10^{-7}
Am(III), colloidal, Salado brine	3.96×10^{-7}	1.39×10^{-6}
Am(III), total mobile, Salado brine	4.93×10^{-7}	1.75×10^{-6}
Am(III), dissolved, Castile brine	1.06×10^{-8}	2.68×10^{-7}
Am(III), colloidal, Castile brine	7.78×10^{-8}	1.34×10^{-6}
Am(III), total mobile, Castile brine	8.83×10^{-8}	1.61×10^{-6}
Th(IV), dissolved, Salado brine	1.06×10^{-8}	6.70×10^{-8}
Th(IV), colloidal, Salado brine	1.25×10^{-7}	6.56×10^{-7}
Th(IV), total mobile, Salado brine	1.36×10^{-7}	7.23×10^{-7}
Th(IV), dissolved, Castile brine	3.33×10^{-8}	8.07×10^{-8}
Th(IV), colloidal, Castile brine	3.39×10^{-7}	7.85×10^{-7}
Th(IV), total mobile, Castile brine	3.73×10^{-7}	8.65×10^{-7}
U(IV), dissolved, Salado brine	1.06×10^{-8}	6.70×10^{-8}
U(IV), colloidal, Salado brine	9.26×10^{-8}	4.48×10^{-7}
U(IV), total mobile, Salado brine	1.03×10^{-7}	5.15×10^{-7}
U(IV), dissolved, Castile brine	3.33×10^{-8}	8.07×10^{-8}
U(IV), colloidal, Castile brine	2.36×10^{-7}	5.35×10^{-7}
U(IV), total mobile, Castile brine	2.69×10^{-7}	6.15×10^{-7}
Pu(IV), dissolved, Salado brine	1.06×10^{-8}	6.70×10^{-8}
Pu(IV), colloidal, Salado brine	9.67×10^{-8}	4.69×10^{-7}
Pu(IV), total mobile, Salado brine	1.07×10^{-7}	5.36×10^{-7}
Pu(IV), dissolved, Castile brine	3.33×10^{-8}	8.07×10^{-8}
Pu(IV), colloidal, Castile brine	2.47×10^{-7}	5.60×10^{-7}
Pu(IV), total mobile, Castile brine	2.80×10^{-7}	6.40×10^{-7}
U(VI), dissolved, Salado brine	7.07×10^{-6}	1.00×10^{-3}
U(VI), colloidal, Salado brine	8.89×10^{-7}	1.31×10^{-5}

^a Values are calculated using data retrieved from the WIPP PA Database <http://yardbirds.sandia.gov/pview/> and equations SOTERM.75 through SOTERM.79.

4

1 **Table SOTERM-25. Concentrations (M) of Dissolved, Colloidal, and Total Mobile**
 2 **Actinides Obtained Using Median Parameter Values for the CCA**
 3 **PAVT and CRA-2004 PABC^a (Continued)**

Actinide Oxidation State and Brine	PAVT	CRA-2004 PABC
U(VI), total mobile, Salado brine	7.96×10^{-6}	1.01×10^{-3}
U(VI), dissolved, Castile brine	7.15×10^{-6}	1.00×10^{-3}
U(VI), colloidal, Castile brine	3.69×10^{-6}	1.31×10^{-5}
U(VI), total mobile, Castile brine	1.08×10^{-5}	1.01×10^{-3}

^a Values are calculated using data retrieved from the WIPP PA Database <http://yardbirds.sandia.gov/pview/> and equations SOTERM.75 through SOTERM.79.

4
 5 colloidal components of the source term and the total mobile actinide concentrations obtained
 6 when median parameter values are used. The values from CRA-2004 PABC have been used as
 7 the source term in the PA for CRA-2009.

1 SOTERM-6.0 References

- 2 Abdelouas, A., W. Lutze, W. Gong, E.H. Nuttall, B.A. Strietelmeier, and B.J. Travis. 2000.
3 “Biological Reduction of Uranium in Groundwater and Subsurface Soil.” *The Science of the*
4 *Total Environment*, vol. 250: 21.
- 5 Allard, B. 1982. “Solubilities of Actinides in Neutral or Basic Solutions.” *Actinides in*
6 *Perspective* (pp. 553–80). N. Edelstein, ed. New York: Pergamon.
- 7 Altmaier, M., V. Metz, V. Neck, R. Muller, and T. Fanghänel. 2003. “Solid-Liquid Equilibria
8 of $Mg(OH)_2(cr)$ and $Mg_2(OH)_3Cl_4H_2O(cr)$ in the System Mg-Na-H-OH-Cl- H_2O at 25°C.”
9 *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 67: 3595–3601.
- 10 Altmaier, M., V. Neck, and Th. Fanghänel. 2004. “Solubility and Colloid formation of Th(IV)
11 in concentrated NaCl and $MgCl_2$ Solutions.” *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 92: 537–43.
- 12 Altmaier, M., V. Neck, R. Müller, and Th. Fanghänel. 2005. “Solubility of $ThO_2 \cdot xH_2O(am)$ in
13 Carbonate Solution and the Formation of Ternary Th(IV) Hydroxide-carbonate Complexes.”
14 *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 93: 83–92.
- 15 Altmaier, M., V. Neck, M.A. Denecke, R. Yin, and Th. Fanghänel. 2006. “Solubility of ThO_2
16 $\cdot xH_2O(am)$ and the Formation of Ternary Th(IV) Hydroxide-Carbonate Complexes in $NaHCO_3$ -
17 Na_2CO_3 Solutions Containing 0–4M NaCl.” *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 94: 495–500.
- 18 Altmaier, M., V. Neck, and Th. Fanghänel. 2007. *Solubility of Zr(IV), Th(IV) and Pu(IV)*
19 *Hydrous Oxides in $CaCl_2$ Solutions and the Formation of Ternary Ca-M(IV)-OH Complexes.*
20 Manuscript presented at Migration 2007 Conference. 26-31 August 2007. Munich: Germany.
- 21 Asbury, S.M., S.P. Lamont, and S.B. Clark. 2001. “Plutonium Partitioning to Colloidal and
22 Particulate Matter in an Acidic, Sandy Sediment: Implications for Remediation Alternatives and
23 Plutonium Migration.” *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 35: 2295–2300.
- 24 Babb, S.C., and C.F. Novak. 1995. *Users Manual for FMT, Version 2.0*. ERMS 228119.
25 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Performance Assessment.
- 26 Babb, S.C., and C.F. Novak. 1997. *User's Manual for FMT Version 2.3: A Computer Code*
27 *Employing the Pitzer Activity Coefficient Formalism for Calculating Thermodynamic*
28 *Equilibrium in Geochemical Systems to High Electrolyte Concentrations*. ERMS 243037.
29 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Performance Assessment.
- 30 Banaszak, J.E., D.T. Reed, and B.E. Rittmann. 1998. “Speciation-Dependent Toxicity of
31 Neptunium(V) Towards *Chelatobacter heintzii*.” *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol.
32 32: 1085–91.
- 33 Banaszak, J.E., B.E. Rittmann, and D.T. Reed. 1998. *Subsurface Interactions of Actinide*
34 *Species and Microorganisms: Implications for the Bioremediation of Actinide-Organic*
35 *Mixtures*. ANL-98/26. Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory.

- 1 Banaszak, J.E., S.M. Webb, B.E. Rittmann, J.-F. Gaillard, and D.T. Reed. 1999. "Fate of
2 Neptunium in Anaerobic, Methanogenic Microcosm." *Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste*
3 *Management XXII*, vol. 556: 1141–49.
- 4 Barton, L.L., K. Choudhury, B.M. Thomson, K. Steenhoudt, and A.R. Groffman. 1996.
5 "Bacterial Reduction of Soluble Uranium: The First Step of In Situ Immobilization of Uranium."
6 *Radioactive Waste Management and Environmental Restoration*, vol. 20: 141–51.
- 7 Behrends, T., and P. Van Cappellen. 2005. Competition Between Enzymatic and Abiotic
8 Reduction of Uranium(VI) under Iron Reducing Conditions. *Chemical Geology*, vol. 220: 315–
9 27.
- 10 Bender, J., M.C. Duff, P. Phillips, and M. Hill. 2000. "Bioremediation and Bioreduction of
11 Dissolved U(VI) by Microbial Mat Consortium Supported on Silica Gel Particles."
12 *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 34: 3235–41.
- 13 Borkowski, M., J.-F. Lucchini, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2008. *Actinide (III) Solubility*
14 *in WIPP Brine: Data Summary and Recommendations*. LCO-ACP-08, LANL/ACRSP Report.
15 Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 16 Brendebach, B., M. Altmaier, J. Rothe, V. Neck, and M.A. Denecke. 2007. "EXAFS Study of
17 Aqueous Zr(IV) and Th(IV) Complexes in Alkaline CaCl₂ Solutions: Ca₃[Zr(OH)₆]⁴⁺ and
18 Ca₄[Th(OH)₈]⁴⁺." *Inorganic Chemistry*, vol. 46: 6804–10.
- 19 Brush, L.H. 1990. *Test Plan for Laboratory and Modeling Studies of Repository and*
20 *Radionuclide Chemistry for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. SAND90-0266. ERMS 226015.
21 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 22 Brush, L.H. 1995. *Systems Prioritization Method—Iteration 2 Baseline Position Paper: Gas*
23 *Generation in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March 17). ERMS 228740. Albuquerque:
24 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 Brush, L.H., 2005. *Results of Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP Performance*
26 *Assessment Baseline Calculations* (May 18). ERMS 539800. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
27 Laboratories.
- 28 Brush, L. H., R.C. Moore, and N.A. Wall. 2001. *Response to EEG-77, Plutonium Chemistry*
29 *under Conditions Relevant for WIPP Performance Assessment: Review of Experimental Results*
30 *and Recommendations for Future Work, by V. Oversby*. ERMS 517373. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
31 National Laboratories.
- 32 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003a. *Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
33 *Compliance Recertification Application, Rev. 1* (Revision 1). AP-098. ERMS 527714.
34 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 35 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003b. *Calculation of Organic Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP*
36 *Compliance Recertification Application*. ERMS 527567. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
37 Laboratories.

- 1 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2003c. *Calculation of Organic Ligand Concentrations for the WIPP*
2 *Compliance Recertification Application and for Evaluating Assumptions of Homogeneity in*
3 *WIPP PA*. ERMS 531488. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2005a. *Calculation of Organic-Ligand Concentrations for the*
5 *WIPP Performance Assessment Baseline Calculations (May 4)*. ERMS 539635. Carlsbad, NM:
6 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 7 Brush, L.H., and Y. Xiong. 2005b. *Calculation of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
8 *Performance Assessment Baseline Calculations, Analysis AP-120, Rev. 0 (Rev. 0)*. AP-120.
9 ERMS 539255. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Brush, L.H., and J. Garner. 2005. Letter to D. Kessel (Subject: Additional Justification for the
11 Insignificant Effect of Np on the Long-Term Performance of the WIPP). 21 February 2005.
12 ERMS 538533. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 13 Brush, L.H., Y. Xiong, J.W. Garner, A. Ismail, and G.T. Roselle. 2006. *Consumption of Carbon*
14 *Dioxide by Precipitation of Carbonate Minerals Resulting from Dissolution of Sulfate Minerals*
15 *in the Salado Formation in Response to Microbial Sulfate Reduction in the WIPP*. ERMS
16 544785. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 17 Bundschuh, T., R. Knopp, R. Müller, J.I. Kim, V. Neck, and Th. Fanghänel. 2000. "Application
18 of LIBD to the Determination of the Solubility Product of Thorium(IV)-Colloids."
19 *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 88: 625–629.
- 20 Büppelmann, K., S. Magirius, Ch. Lierse, and J.I. Kim. 1986. "Radiolytic Oxidation of Am (III)
21 to Am (V) and Pu(IV) to Pu (VI) in Saline Solution." *Journal of Less- Common Metals*, vol.
22 122: 329–36.
- 23 Büppelmann, K., J.I. Kim, and Ch. Lierse. 1988. "The Redox Behavior of Pu in Saline
24 Solutions under Radiolysis Effects." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 44/45: 65–70.
- 25 Casas, I., J. De Pablo, J. Gimenez, M.E. Torrero, J. Bruno, E. Cera, R.J. Finch, and R.C. Ewing.
26 1998. "The Role of pe, pH, and Carbonate on the Solubility of UO₂ and Uraninite under
27 Nominally Reducing Conditions." *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 62: 2223–31.
- 28 Choppin, G.R. 1983. "Solution Chemistry of the Actinides," *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 32: 43–
29 53.
- 30 Choppin, G.R. 1988. Letter to L.H. Brush. 29 December 1988. WIPP Central Files,
31 Tallahassee, FL.
- 32 Choppin, G.R., and L.F. Rao. 1992. "Reduction of Neptunium(VI) by Organic Compounds."
33 *Transuranium Elements: A Half Century* (pp. 262–75). L.R. Morss and J. Fuger, eds.
34 Washington, DC: American Chemical Society.
- 35 Choppin, G.R. 1999. "Utility of Oxidation State Analogs in the Study of Plutonium Behavior."
36 *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 85: 89–95.

- 1 Choppin, G.R., A.H. Bond, M. Borkowski, M.G. Bronikowski, J.G. Chen, S. Lis, J. Mizera, O.
2 Pokrovski, N.A. Wall, Y.X. Xia, and R.C. Moore. 1999. *WIPP Actinide Source Term Test*
3 *Program: Solubility Studies and Development of Modeling Parameters*. SAND 99-0943.
4 Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 5 Choppin, G.R., J. Liljenzin, and J.O. Rydberg. 2004. *Radiochemistry and Nuclear Chemistry*.
6 3rd ed. Woburn, MA: Butterworth-Heinenmann.
- 7 Clark, D.L., D.E. Hobart, and M.P. Neu. 1995. "Actinide Carbonate Complexes and Their
8 Importance in Actinide Environmental Chemistry." *Chemical Reviews*, vol. 95: 25.
- 9 Clark, D.L., and C.D. Tait. 1996. Monthly reports under Sandia National Laboratories Contract
10 AP2274. Sandia WIPP Central File A: WBS 1.1.10.1.1. WPO 31106.
- 11 Cleveland, J.M. 1979a. *The Chemistry of Plutonium*. La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear
12 Society.
- 13 Cotsworth, E. 2005. Letter to I. Triay (1 Enclosure). 4 March 2005. ERMS 538858. U.S.
14 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Washington, DC.
- 15 Cotton, F.A., and G. Wilkinson. 1988. *Advanced Inorganic Chemistry*. 5th ed. New York:
16 Wiley.
- 17 Crawford, B.A., and C.D. Leigh. 2003. *Estimate of Complexing Agents in TRU Waste for*
18 *the Compliance Recertification Application* (August 28). ERMS 531107. Carlsbad, NM: Los
19 Alamos National Laboratory.
- 20 Cui, D., and K. Spahiu. 2002. "The Reduction of U(VI) on Corroded Iron under Anoxic
21 Conditions." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 90: 623–28.
- 22 Dai, M., J.M. Kelly, and K.O. Buesseler. 2002. "Sources and Migration of Plutonium in
23 Groundwater at Savannah River Site." *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol 36: 3690–
24 99.
- 25 Dai, M., K.O. Buesseler, and S.M. Pike. 2005. "Plutonium in Groundwater at the 100K-Area of
26 the U.S. DOE Hanford Site." *Journal of Contaminant Hydrology*, vol. 76: 167–89.
- 27 David, F., A.G. Maslennikov, and V.P. Peretruxhin. 1990. "Electrochemical Reduction of
28 Actinides ions in Aqueous solution: Application to Separations and Some Intermetallic
29 Compound Synthesis." *Journal of Radioanalytical Nuclear Chemistry*, vol. 143: 415–26.
- 30 Degueldre, C., and A. Kline. 2007. "Study of Thorium Association and Surface Precipitation on
31 Colloids." *Earth and Planetary Science Letters*, vol. 264: 104–13.
- 32 Deng, H., S. Johnson, Y. Xiong, G.T. Roselle, and M. Nemer. 2006. *Analysis of Martin*
33 *Marietta MagChem 10 WTS-60 MgO*. ERMS 544712. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
34 Laboratories.

- 1 Diaz Arocas, P., and B. Grambow. 1998. "Solid-liquid Phase Equilibria of U(VI) in NaCl
2 Solutions." *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 62: 245–63.
- 3 Dodge, C.J., A.J. Francis, J.B. Gillow, G.P. Halada, C. Eng, and C.R. Clayton. 2002.
4 "Association of Uranium with Iron Oxides Typically Formed on Corroding Steel Surfaces."
5 *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 36: 3504–11.
- 6 Downes, P.S. 2003a. Memorandum to L.H. Brush. Subject: Spreadsheet Calculations of
7 Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP Compliance Recertification Application. 21 April 2003.
8 ERMS 528395. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 9 Downes, P.S. 2003b. *Spreadsheet Calculations of Actinide Solubilities for the WIPP*
10 *Compliance Recertification Application in Support of AP-098*, Calculation of Actinide
11 Solubilities for the WIPP Compliance Recertification Application, Analysis Plan AP-098,
12 Rev. 1. ERMS 530441. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 13 Draganic, I.G., and Z.D. Draganic. 1971. "Primary Products of Water Radiolysis: Oxidizing
14 Species—the Hydroxyl Radical and Hydrogen Peroxide." *The Radiation Chemistry of Water* (pp.
15 91–121). New York: Academic.
- 16 Drez, P.E. 1991. "Preliminary Nonradionuclide Inventory of CH-TRU Waste," *Preliminary*
17 *Comparison with 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart B for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, December*
18 *1991. Volume 3: Reference Data* (pp. A-43 through A-53). Eds. R.P. Rechard, A.C. Peterson,
19 J.D. Schreiber, H.J. Iuzzolino, M.S. Tierney, and J.S. Sandha. SAND91-0893/3. Albuquerque:
20 Sandia National Laboratories, WIPP Performance Assessment Division.
- 21 Ekberg, C., Y. Albinsson, M.J. Comarmond, and P.L. Brown. 2000. "Studies on the Behavior
22 of Thorium(IV)." *Journal of Solution Chemistry*, vol. 29, no. 1: 63–86.
- 23 Eriksen, T.E., P. Ndamamba, D. Cui, J. Bruno, M. Caceci, and K. Spahiu. 1993. *SKB Technical*
24 *Report 93-18*. Stockholm: Svensk Kärnbränsleforsörjning AB.
- 25 Ershov, B.G., M. Kelm, E. Janata, A.V. Gordeev, and E. Bohnert. 2002. "Radiation-Chemical
26 Effects in the Near-Field of a Final Disposal Site: Role of Bromine on the Radiolytic Processes
27 in NaCl-Solutions." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 90: 617.
- 28 Fanghänel, Th., V. Neck, and J.I. Kim. 1995. "Thermodynamics of Neptunium(V) in
29 Concentrated Salt Solutions: II. Ion Interaction (Pitzer) Parameters for Np(V) Hydrolysis
30 Species and Carbonate Complexes." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 69: 169–76.
- 31 Fanghänel, Th., and I.J. Kim. 1998. "Spectoscopic Evaluation of Thermodynamics of Trivalent
32 Actinides in Brines." *Journal of Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 271–273: 728–737.
- 33 Fanghänel, T., and V. Neck. 2002. "Aquatic Chemistry and Solubility Phenomena of Actinide
34 Oxides/hydroxides." *Pure Applied Chemistry*, vol. 74: 1895–1907.
- 35 Farrell, J., W.D. Bostick, R.J. Jarabeck, and J.N. Fiedor. 1999. "Uranium Removal from
36 Ground Water Using Zero Valent Iron Media." *Ground Water*, vol. 37: 618–24.

- 1 Felmy, A.R., D. Rai, J.A.S. Schramke, and J.L. Ryan. 1989. "The Solubility of Plutonium
2 Hydroxide in Dilute Solution and in High-Ionic Strength Chloride Brines." *Radiochimica Acta*,
3 vol. 48: 29–35.
- 4 Felmy, A.R., D. Rai, and R.W. Fulton. 1990. "The Solubility of AmOHCO₃(cr) and the
5 Aqueous Thermodynamics of the System Na⁺-Am³⁺-HCO₃⁻-CO₃²⁻-OH⁻-H₂O." *Radiochim. Acta*,
6 vol. 50: 193–204.
- 7 Felmy, A.R., M.J. Mason, and D. Rai, 1991. "The Solubility of Hydrous Thorium(IV) Oxide in
8 Chloride Media: Development of an Aqueous Ion-Interaction Model." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol.
9 55: 177–85.
- 10 Felmy, A.R., D. Rai, S.M. Sterner, M.J. Mason, N.J. Hess, and S.D. Conradson. 1996.
11 *Thermodynamic Models for Highly Charged Aqueous Species: The Solubility of Th(IV) Hydrous*
12 *Oxide in Concentrated NaHCO₃ and Na₂CO₃ Solutions* (August 14). ERMS 240226. Carlsbad,
13 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Fiedor, J.N., W.D. Bostick, R.J. Jarabek, and J. Farrell. 1998. "Understanding the Mechanism
15 of Uranium Removal from Groundwater by Zero-Valent Iron Using X-Ray Photoelectron
16 Spectroscopy." *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 32: 1466–73.
- 17 Francis, A.J. 1990. "Microbial Dissolution and Stabilization of Toxic Metals and Radionuclides
18 in Mixed Wastes." *Experientia*, vol. 46: 840–51.
- 19 Francis, A.J. 1998. "Biotransformation of Uranium and Other Actinides in Radioactive
20 Wastes." *Journal of Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 271–273: 78–84.
- 21 Francis, A.J., and J.B. Gillow. 1994. *Effects of Microbial Processes on Gas Generation Under*
22 *Expected Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Repository Conditions. Progress Report through 1992.*
23 SAND93-7036. WPO 26555. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 24 Francis, A.J., C.J. Dodge, J.B. Gillow, and H.W. Papenguth. 2000. "Biotransformation of
25 Uranium Compounds in High Ionic Strength Brine by a Halophilic Bacterium under Denitrifying
26 Conditions." *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 34: 2311.
- 27 Francis, A.J., C.J. Dodge, and J. B. Gillow. 2008. "Reductive Dissolution of Pu(IV) by
28 *Costridium* sp. under Anaerobic Conditions." *Environmental Science and Technology*., vol. 42:
29 2355–60.
- 30 Fredrickson, J.K., J.M. Zachara, D.W. Kennedy, M.C. Duff, Y.A. Gorby, S.W. Li, and K.M.
31 Krupka. 2000. "Reduction of U(VI) in Goethite (α -FeOOH) Suspensions by a Dissimilatory
32 Metal-Reducing Bacteria." *Geochimica et. Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 64: 3085–98.
- 33 Garner, J.W. 1996. *Radioisotopes to be Used in the 1996 CCA Calculations*. ERMS 540572.
34 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Garner, J., and C. Leigh. 2005. *Analysis Package for PANEL: CRA-2004 Performance*
2 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 540572 Albuquerque: Sandia National
3 Laboratories.
- 4 Gayer, K.H., and H. Leider. 1957. "The Solubility of Uranium (IV) Hydroxide in Solutions of
5 Sodium Hydroxide and Perchloric Acid at 25°C." *Canadian Journal of Chemistry*, vol. 35: 5–
6 7.
- 7 Giambalvo, E.R. 2002a. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Recommended Parameter
8 Values for Modeling An(III) Solubility in WIPP Brines). 25 July 2002. ERMS 522982. U.S.
9 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 10 Giambalvo, E.R. 2002b. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Recommended Parameter
11 Values for Modeling Organic Ligands in WIPP Brines). 25 July 2002. ERMS 522981. U.S.
12 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 13 Giambalvo, E.R. 2002c. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Recommended Parameter
14 Values for Modeling An(IV) Solubility in WIPP Brines). 26 July 2002. ERMS 522986. U.S.
15 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 16 Giambalvo, E.R. 2002d. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Recommended Parameter
17 Values for Modeling An(V) Solubility in WIPP Brines). 26 July 2002. ERMS 522990. U.S.
18 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 19 Giambalvo, E.R. 2002e. Memorandum to L.H. Brush. (Subject: Recommended μ^0/RT Values
20 for Modeling the Solubility of Oxalate Solids in WIPP Brines). 31 July 2002. ERMS 523057.
21 U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 22 Giambalvo, E.R., 2003. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Release of FMT Database
23 FMT_021120.CHEMDAT). 10 March 2003. ERMS 526372. U.S. Department of Energy,
24 Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 25 Gillow, J.B., M. Dunn, A.J. Francis, D. A. Lucero, and H.W. Papenguth. 2000. "The Potential
26 of Subterranean Microbes in Facilitating Actinide Migration at the Grimsel Test Site and Waste
27 Isolation Pilot Plant." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 88: 769–74.
- 28 Grambow, B., E. Smailos, H. Geckeis, R. Muller, and H. Hentschel. 1996. "Sorption and
29 Reduction of Uranium (VI) on Iron Corrosion Products under Reducing Saline Conditions."
30 *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 74: 149–54.
- 31 Grenthe, I., D. Ferri, F. Salvatore, and G. Riccio. 1984. "Studies on Metal Carbonate Equilibria.
32 Part 10. A Solubility Study of the Complex Formation in the Uranium (VI)-Water-Carbon
33 Dioxide (g) System at 25°C" *Journal of Chemical Society*, Dalton Trans.: 2439–43.
- 34 Gu, B., L. Liang, M.J. Dickey, X. Yin, and S. Dai. 1998. "Reductive Precipitation of Uranium
35 (VI) by Zero-Valent Iron." *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 32: 3366–73.

- 1 Guillaumont, R., T. Fanghänel, J. Fuger, I. Grenthe, V. Neck, D.A. Palmer, and M.H. Rand.
2 2003. "Update on the Chemical Thermodynamics of Uranium, Neptunium, Plutonium,
3 Americium and Technetium." F.I. Mompean, M. Illemassene, C. Domenech-Orti, and K. Ben
4 Said, eds. *Chemical Thermodynamics*. Vol. 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- 5 Harvie, C.E., N. Møller, and J.H. Weare. 1984. "The Prediction of Mineral Solubilities in
6 Natural Waters, The Na-K-Mg-Ca-H-Cl-SO₄-OH-HCO₃-CO₂-H₂O System to High Ionic
7 Strengths at 25°C." *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 48: 723–51.
- 8 Haschke, J.M., and T.E. Ricketts. 1995. *Plutonium Dioxide Storage: Conditions for Preparing
9 and Handling*. LA-12999. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 10 Haschke, J.M., T.H. Allen, and L.A. Morales. 2000. "Reaction of Plutonium Dioxide with
11 Water: Formation and Properties of PuO_{2+x}." *Science*, vol. 287: 285–87.
- 12 Hobart, D.E., K. Samhoun, and J. R. Peterson. 1982. "Spectroelectrochemical Studies of the
13 Actinides: Stabilization of Americium (IV) in Aqueous Carbonate Solution." *Radiochimica
14 Acta*, vol. 31: 139–45.
- 15 Hobart, D.E., 1990. "Actinides in the Environment." *Proceedings of the Robert A. Welch
16 Foundation Conference on Chemical Research, No. XXXIV: 50 Years With Transuranium
17 Elements* (pp. 378–436). Houston, TX: Robert A. Welch Foundation.
- 18 Hobart, D.E., and R.C. Moore. 1996. *Analysis of Uranium (VI) Solubility Data for WIPP
19 Performance Assessment*. (May 28, 1996). AP-028. Unpublished report. Albuquerque: Sandia
20 National Laboratories.
- 21 Huang, F.Y C., P.V. Brady, E.R. Lindgren, and P. Guerra. 1998. "Biodegradation of Uranium-
22 Citrate Complexes: Implications for Extraction of Uranium from Soils." *Environmental Science
23 and Technology*, vol. 32: 379.
- 24 Icopini, G.A., J. Boukhalfa, and M.P. Neu. 2007. "Biological Reduction of Np(V) and Np(V)
25 Citrate by Metal-Reducing Bacteria." *Environmental, Science, & Technology*, vol. 41: 2764–69.
- 26 Ionova, G., C. Madic, and R. Guillaumont. 1998. "About the Existence of Th(III) in Aqueous
27 Solution." *Polyhedron*, vol. 17: 1991–95.
- 28 Itagaki, H., S. Nakayama, S. Tanaka, and M. Yamawaki. 1992. "Effect of Ionic Strength on the
29 Solubility of Neptunium(V) Hydroxide." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 58/59: 61–66.
- 30 Johnson, G.L., and L.M. Toth. 1978. *Plutonium(IV) and Thorium(IV) Hydrous Polymer
31 Chemistry*. ORNL/TM-6365. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Chemistry
32 Division.
- 33 Katz, J.J., G.T. Seaborg, and L.R. Morss. 1986. *The Chemistry of the Actinide Elements*. 2nd
34 ed. New York: Chapman and Hall.

- 1 Keller, C. 1971. *The Chemistry of Transuranium Elements*. Weinheim, Germany: Verlag
2 Chemie.
- 3 Kelm, M., I. Pashalidis, and J.I. Kim. 1999. "Spectroscopic Investigation on the Formation of
4 Hypochlorite by Alpha Radiolysis in Concentrated NaCl Solutions." *Applied Radiation and*
5 *Isotopes*, vol. 51: 637–42.
- 6 Kersting, A.B., D.W. Efurud, D.L. Finnegan, D.J. Rokop, D.K. Smith, and J.L. Thompson. 1999.
7 "Migration of Plutonium in Grand Water at the Nevada Test Site." *Nature*, vol. 397: 56–59.
- 8 Khasanova, A.B., N.S. Shcherbina, S.N. Kalmykov, Yu.A. Teterin, and A.P. Novikov. 2007.
9 "Sorption of Np(V), Pu(V), and Pu(VI) on Colloids of Fe(III) Oxides and Hydrous Oxides and
10 MnO₂." *Radiochemistry*, vol. 49: 419–25.
- 11 Kim, J.I., M. Bernkopf, Ch. Lierse, and F. Koppold. 1984. "Hydrolysis Reactions of Am(III)
12 and Pu(VI) Ions in Near-Neutral Solutions." *Geochemical Behavior of Disposed Radioactive*
13 *Waste* (pp. 115–34). G.S. Barney, J.D. Navratill, and W.W. Schultz, eds. ACS Symposium
14 Series No. 246. Washington, DC: American Chemical Society.
- 15 Kim, J.I., Ch. Apostolidis, G. Buckau, K. Buppelmann, B. Kanellakopulos, Ch. Lierse, S.
16 Magirus, R. Stumpe, I. Hedler, Ch. Rahner, and W. Stoewer. 1985. *Chemisches Verhalten von*
17 *Np, Pu und Am in verschiedenen konzentrierten Salzoesunger = Chemical Behaviour of Np, Pu,*
18 *and Am in Various Brine Solutions*. RCM 01085. Munich, Germany: Institut für Radiochemie
19 der Technische Universitaet Muenchen. (Available from National Technical Information
20 Service, 555 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161, 703/487-4650 as DE857 2334.)
- 21 Kim, J.I. 1991. "Actinide Colloid Generation in Groundwater." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 52/53:
22 71–81.
- 23 Kim, W.H., K.C. Choi, K.K. Park, and T.Y. Eom. 1994. "Effects of Hypochlorite Ion on the
24 Solubility of Amorphous Schoepite at 25°C in Neutral to Alkaline Aqueous Solutions."
25 *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 66/67: 45–49.
- 26 Klapötke, T.M., and A. Schulz. 1997. "The First Observation of a Th³⁺ ion in Aqueous
27 Solution." *Polyhedron*, vol. 16: 989–91.
- 28 Korpusov, G.V., E.N. Patrusheva, and M.S. Dolidze. 1975. "The Study of Extraction Systems
29 and the Method of Separation of Trivalent Transuranium Elements Cm, Bk, and Cf." *Soviet*
30 *Radiochemistry*, vol. 17: 230–36.
- 31 Kramer-Schnabel, U., H. Bischoff, R.H. Xi, and G. Marx. 1992. "Solubility Products and
32 Complex Formation Equilibria in the Systems Uranyl Hydroxide and Uranyl Carbonate at 25°C
33 and I=0.1M." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 56: 183–88.
- 34 Langmuir, D., and J.S. Herman. 1980. "Mobility of Thorium in Natural Waters at Low
35 Temperatures." *Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 44: 1753–66.

- 1 Larson, K.L.. 1996. Memorandum to R. V. Bynum. Subject: Brine Waste Contact Volumes for
2 Scoping Analysis of Organic Ligand Concentration. 13 March 1996. ERMS 236044.
- 3 LaVerne, J.A., and L. Tandon. 2002. "H₂ Production in the Radiolysis of Water on CeO₂ and
4 ZrO₂." *Journal of Physical Chemistry B*, vol. 106: 380–86.
- 5 Leigh, C., J. Trone, and B. Fox. 2005. *TRU Waste Inventory for the 2004 Compliance*
6 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS
7 541118. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 8 Leigh, C., J. Kanney, L. Brush, J. Garner, R. Kirkes, T. Lowry, M. Nemer, J. Stein, E. Vugrin, S.
9 Wagner, and T. Kirchner. 2005. *2004 Compliance Recertification Application Performance*
10 *Assessment Baseline Calculation* (Revision 0). ERMS 541521. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
11 Laboratories.
- 12 Lemire, R.J., J. Fuger, H. Nitsche, P. Potter, M.H. Rand, J. Rydberg, K. Spahiu, J.C. Sullivan,
13 W.J. Ullman, P. Vitorge, and H. Wanner. 2001. *Chemical Thermodynamics of Neptunium and*
14 *Plutonium*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- 15 Lieser, K.H., R. Hill, U. Mühlenweg, R.N. Singh, T. Shu-De, and Th. Steinkopff. 1991.
16 "Actinides in the Environment." *Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry*, vol. 147:
17 117–31.
- 18 Lin, M.R., P. Paviet-Hartmann, Y. Xu, and W.H. Runde. 1998. "Uranyl Compounds in NaCl
19 Solutions: Structure, Solubility and Thermodynamics." *216th ACS National Meeting: Preprints*
20 *of Extended Abstracts*, vol. 38: 208. Abstract for the National Meeting of the American
21 Chemical Society, Division of Environmental Chemistry, Boston: 23-27 August.
- 22 Lloyd, J.R., P. Yong, and L.E. Macaskie. 2000. "Biological Reduction and Removal of Np(V)
23 by Two Microorganisms." *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 34: 1297–1301.
- 24 LoPresti, V., S.D. Conradson, and D.L. Clark. 2007. "XANES Identification of Plutonium
25 Speciation in RFETSI Samples." *Journal of Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 444–445: 540–43.
- 26 Lovley, D.R., E.J.P. Phillips, Y.A. Gorbi, and E.R. Landa. 1991. "Microbial Reduction of
27 Uranium." *Nature*, vol. 350: 413.
- 28 Lovley, D.R., E.E. Roden, E.J.P. Phillips, and J.C. Woodward. 1993. "Enzymatic Iron and
29 Uranium Reduction by Sulfate-Reducing Bacteria." *Marine Geology*, vol. 113: 41.
- 30 Lucchini, J.-F., M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, S. Ballard, and D.T. Reed. 2007. "Solubility of
31 Nd³⁺ and UO₂²⁺ in WIPP Brine as Oxidation-State Invariant Analogs for Plutonium." *Journal of*
32 *Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 444/445: 506–11.
- 33 Lucchini, J.-F., H. Khaing, M. Borkowski, M.K. Richmann, and D.T. Reed. 2009. *Actinide (VI)*
34 *Solubility in Carbonate-free WIPP Brine: Data Summary and Recommendations*. LCO-ACP-10,
35 LANL\ACRSP Report. Los Alamos: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

- 1 Magirus, S., W.T. Carnall, and J.I. Kim. 1985. "Radiolytic Oxidation of Am(III) to Am(V) in
2 NaCl Solution." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 38: 29–32.
- 3 Marinot, L., and J. Fuger. 1985. "The Actinides." *Standard Potentials in Aqueous Solution* (pp.
4 631–674). A.J. Bard, R. Parsons, and J. Jordan, eds. New York: Dekker.
- 5 Meinrath, G., and J.I. Kim. 1991. "The Carbonate Complexation of the Am(III) Ion."
6 *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 52/53: 29–34.
- 7 Meinrath, G., and T. Kimura. 1993. "Carbonate Complexation of the Uranyl (VI) Ion." *Journal*
8 *of Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 202: 89–93.
- 9 Meyer, D., S. Fouchard, E. Simoni, and C. DenAuwer. 2002. "Selective Dissolution of Am in
10 Basic Media in the Presence of Ferricyanide Ions: a Mechanistic and Structural Study on Am(V)
11 and Am(VI) Compounds." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 90: 253–58.
- 12 Molecke, M.A. 1983. *A Comparison of Brines Relevant to Nuclear Waste Experimentation*.
13 SAND83-0516. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Moriyama, H., T. Sasaki, T. Kobayashi, and I. Takagi. 2005. "Systemics of Hydrolysis
15 Constants of Tetravalent Actinide Ions." *Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology*, vol. 42-7:
16 626–35.
- 17 Morss, L.R., N. Edelstein, and J. Fuger, 2006. *The Chemistry of the Actinide and Transactinide*
18 *Elements*. 3rd ed. New York: Springer.
- 19 Moulin, C., B. Amekraza, S. Hubert, and V. Moulin. 2001. "Study of Thorium Hydrolysis
20 Species by Electrospray-Ionization Mass Spectrometry." *Analytica Chimica Acta*, vol. 441:
21 269–79.
- 22 Munson, D.E., R.L. Jones, D.L. Hoag, and J.R. Ball. 1987. *Heated Axisymmetric Pillar Test*
23 *(Room H): In Situ Data Report (February 1985–April 1987); Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*
24 *(WIPP) Thermal/Structural Interactions Program*. SAND87-2488. Albuquerque: Sandia
25 National Laboratories.
- 26 Nakata, K., S. Nagasaki, S. Tanaka, Y. Sakamoto, T. Tanaka, and H. Ogawa. 2004. "Reduction
27 Rate of Neptunium(V) in Heterogeneous Solution with Magnetite." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 92:
28 145–49.
- 29 Neck, V., J.I. Kim, and B. Kanellakopoulos. 1992. "Solubility and Hydrolysis Behavior of
30 Neptunium (V)." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 56:, 25–30.
- 31 Neck, V., W. Runde, and J.I. Kim. 1995. "Solid-Liquid Equilibria of Np(V) in Carbonate
32 Solutions at Different Ionic Strengths: II." *Journal of Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 225: 295–
33 302.
- 34 Neck, V., and J.I. Kim. 2001. "Solubility and Hydrolysis of Tetravalent Actinides."
35 *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 89: 1–16.

- 1 Neck, V., R. Müller., M. Bouby, M. Altmaier, J. Rothe, M.A. Denecke, and J.I. Kim. 2002.
2 “Solubility of Amorphous Th(IV) Hydroxide: Application of LIBD to Determine the Solubility
3 Product and EXAFS for Aqueous Speciation.” *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 90: 485–94.
- 4 Neck, V., M. Altmaier, R. Müller, A. Bauer, Th. Fanghänel, and J.I. Kim. 2003. “Solubility of
5 Crystalline Thorium Dioxide.” *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 91: 253–62.
- 6 Neck, V., M. Altmaier, and Th. Fanghänel. 2006. “Ion Interaction (SIT) Coefficients for the
7 Th⁴⁺ Ion and Trace Activity Coefficients in NaClO₄, NaNO₃ and NaCl Solution Determined by
8 Solvent Extraction with TBP.” *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 94: 501–07.
- 9 Nemer, M.B., and J.S. Stein. 2005. *Analysis Package for BRAGFLO: 2004 Compliance*
10 *Recertification Application Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation*. ERMS 540527.
11 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Nemer, M.B., J.S. Stein, and W.P. Zelinski. 2005. *Analysis Report of BRAGFLO Preliminary*
13 *Modeling Results with New Gas Generation Rates Based on Recent Experimental Results*.
14 ERMS 539437. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 Neretnieks, I. 1982. *The Movement of a Redox Front Downstream From a Repository for*
16 *Nuclear Waste*. KBS Report TR 82-16. Stockholm: Svensk Kärnbränsleforsörjning AB.
- 17 Neu, M.P., C.E. Ruggiero, and A.J. Francis. 2002. “Bioinorganic Chemistry of Plutonium and
18 Interactions of Plutonium with Microorganisms in Plants.” *Advances in Plutonium Chemistry*
19 (pp. 1967-2000). La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society.
- 20 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 2004. “Critical Stability Constants.”
21 *Standard Reference Database 46* (Version 8.0).
- 22 Nitsche, H., K. Roberts, R.C. Gatti, T. Prussin, K. Becraft, S.C. Leung, S.A. Carpenter, and C.F.
23 Novak. 1992. *Plutonium Solubility and Speciation Studies in a Simulant of Air Intake Shaft*
24 *Water from the Culebra Dolomite at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*. SAND92-0659. WPO
25 23480. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Nitsche, H., K. Roberts, R. Xi, T. Prussin, K. Becraft, I. Al Mahamid, H.B. Silber, S.A.
27 Carpenter, R.C. Gatti, and C.F. Novak. 1994. “Long-Term Plutonium Solubility and Speciation
28 Studies in a Synthetic Brine.” *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 66/67: 3.
- 29 Nitsche, H., K. Roberts, K. Becraft, T. Prussin, D. Keeney, S. Carpenter, and D. Hobart. 1995.
30 *Solubility and Speciation Results from Over- and Under-saturation Experiments on Neptunium,*
31 *Plutonium and Americium in water from Yucca Mountain Region Well UE-25p#1*. Report LA-
32 13017-MS. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 33 Novak, C.F. 1995. *The WIPP Actinide Source Term: Test Plan for the Conceptual Model and*
34 *the Dissolved Concentration Submodel*. SAND95-1985. WPO 27860. Albuquerque: Sandia
35 National Laboratories.

- 1 Novak, C.F., R.C. Moore, and R.V. Bynum. 1996. "Prediction of Dissolved Actinide
2 Concentrations in Concentrated Electrolyte Solutions: A Conceptual Model and Model Results
3 for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)." *Proceedings of the International Conference on*
4 *Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste*. Winnipeg, Manitoba, 16–19 September 1996.
- 5 Novak, C.F., and R.C. Moore. 1996. Sandia National Laboratories Technical Memo. Subject:
6 Estimates of Dissolved Concentrations for III, IV, V, and VI Actinides in Salado and Castile
7 Brine Under Anticipated Repository Conditions. 28 March 1996. WIPP Central File A: WBS
8 1.2.0.7.1; WBS 1.1.10.1.1: WPO 36207.
- 9 Novikov, A.P., S.N. Kalmykov, S. Utsunomiya, C. Ewing, F. Horreard, A. Merkulov, S.E. Clark,
10 V.V. Tkachev, and B.F. Myasoedov. 2006. "Colloid Transport of Plutonium in the Far-Field of
11 the Mayak Production Association, Russia." *Science*, vol. 314: 638–41.
- 12 O'Loughlin, E.J., S.D. Kelly, R.E. Cook, R. Csencsits, and K.M. Kemner. 2003. "Reduction of
13 Uranium (VI) by Mixed Iron (II)/ Iron (III) Hydroxide (Green Rust): Formation of UO₂
14 Nanoparticles." *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 37: 721–27.
- 15 Okajima, S., and D.T. Reed. 1993. "Initial Hydrolysis of Pu(VI)." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 60:
16 173–84.
- 17 Okamoto, Y., Y. Mochizuki, and S. Tsushim. 2003. "Theoretical Study of Hydrolysis Reactions
18 of Tetravalent Thorium Ion." *Chemical Physics Letters*, vol. 373: 213–17.
- 19 Orlandini, J.A., W.R. Penrose, and D.M. Nelson. 1986. "Pu(V) as the Stable form of Oxidized
20 Plutonium in Natural Waters." *Marine Chemistry*, vol. 18: 49–57.
- 21 Östhols, E., J. Bruno, and I. Grenthe. 1994. "On the Influence of Carbonate on Mineral
22 Dissolution: III: The Solubility of Microcrystalline ThO₂ in CO₂-H₂O Media." *Geochimica et*
23 *Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 58: 613–623.
- 24 Oversby, V.M. 2000. *Plutonium Chemistry under Conditions Relevant for WIPP Performance*
25 *Assessment: Review of Experimental Results and Recommendations for Future Work*
26 (September). EEG-77. Albuquerque, NM: Environmental Evaluation Group.
- 27 Papenguth, H.W., and Y.K. Behl. 1996. *Test Plan for Evaluation of Colloid-Facilitated*
28 *Actinide Transport at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (16 January). TP 96-01. ERMS 417319.
29 Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Papenguth, H.W. 1996a. Letter to Christine T. Stockman (Subject: Parameter Record Package
31 for Colloidal Actinide Source Term Parameters, Attachment A: Rationale for Definition of
32 Parameter Values for Microbes). 7 May 1996. ERMS 235856. U.S. Department of Energy,
33 Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 34 Papenguth, H.W. 1996b. Letter to Christine T. Stockman (Subject: Parameter Record Package
35 for Colloidal Actinide Source Term Parameters, Attachment A: Rationale for Definition of
36 Parameter Values for Humic Substances). 7 May 1996. ERMS 235855. U.S. Department of
37 Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.

- 1 Papenguth, H.W. 1996c. Letter to Christine T. Stockman (Subject: Parameter Record Package
2 for Colloidal Actinide Source Term Parameters, Attachment A: Rationale for Definition of
3 Parameter Values for Mineral Fragment Type Colloids). 7 May 1996. ERMS 235850. U.S.
4 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 5 Pashalidis, I., J.I. Kim, Ch. Liese, and J. Sullivan. 1993. "The Chemistry of Pu in Concentrated
6 Aqueous NaCl Solution: Effects of Alpha Self-Radiolysis and the Interaction Between
7 Hypochlorite and Dioxoplutonium (VI)." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 60: 99.
- 8 Pazukhin, E.M., and S.M. Kochergin. 1989. "Stability Constants of Hydrolyzed Forms of
9 Americium(III) and Solubility Product of its Hydroxide." *Soviet Radiochemistry* vol. 31: 430–
10 36.
- 11 Peper, S.M., L.F. Brodnax, S.E. Field, R.A. Zehnder, and S.N. Valdez, and W.H. Runde. 2004.
12 "Kinetic Study of the Oxidative Dissolution of UO₂ in Aqueous Carbonate Media." *Industrial*
13 *Engineering Chemical Research*, vol. 43: 8188–93.
- 14 Popielak, R.S., R.L. Beauheim, S.R. Black, W.E. Coons, C.T. Ellingson, and R.L. Olsen. 1983.
15 *Brine Reservoirs in the Castile Formation, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Project, Southeastern*
16 *New Mexico*. TME 3153. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 17 Powers, D.W., S.J. Lambert, S.E. Shaffer, I.R. Hill, and W.D. Weart, eds. 1978. *Geological*
18 *Characterization Report, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site, Southeastern New Mexico*.
19 SAND78-1596. 2 vols. ERMS 205448. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 20 Pryke, D.C., and J.H. Rees. 1986. "Understanding the Behaviour of the Actinides Under
21 Disposal Conditions: A Comparison between Calculated and Experimental Solubilities."
22 *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 40: 27–32.
- 23 Qui, S. R., C. Amrhein, M.L. Hunt, R. Pfeffer, B. Yakshinskiy, L. Zhang, T.E. Madey, and J.A.
24 Yarmoff. 2001. "Characterization of Uranium Oxide Thin Films Grown from Solution onto Fe
25 Surfaces." *Applied Surface Science*, vol. 181: 211–34.
- 26 Rabindra, N.R., K.M. Vogel, C.E. Good, W.B. Davis, L.N. Roy, D.A. Johnson, A.R. Felmy, and
27 K.S. Pitzer. 1992. "Activity Coefficients in Electrolyte Mixtures: HCl + ThCl₄ + H₂O for 5–55
28 °C." *Journal of Physical Chemistry*, vol. 96: 11,065–072.
- 29 Rai, D., R.G. Strickert, and G.L. McVay. 1982. "Neptunium Concentrations in Solutions
30 Contacting Actinide-Doped Glass." *Nuclear Technology*, vol. 58: 69–76.
- 31 Rai, D., and J.L. Ryan. 1982. "Crystallinity and Solubility of Pu(IV) Oxide and Hydrated Oxide
32 in Aged Aqueous Suspensions." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 30: 213–16.
- 33 Rai, D., J.L. Ryan, D.A. Moore, and R.G. Strickert. 1983. "Am(III) Hydrolysis Constants and
34 Solubility of Am(III) Hydroxide." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 33: 201–06.
- 35 Rai, D., and J.L. Ryan. 1985. "Neptunium (IV) Hydrated Oxide Solubility under Reducing and
36 Carbonate Conditions." *Inorganic Chemistry*, vol. 24: 247–51.

- 1 Rai, D., A.R. Felmy, and J.L. Ryan. 1990. "Uranium (VI) Hydrolysis Constants and Solubility
2 Products of $\text{UO}_2 \cdot x\text{H}_2\text{O}$ (am)." *Inorganic Chemistry*, vol. 29: 260–64.
- 3 Rai, D., A.R. Felmy, and R.W. Fulton. 1995. " Nd^{3+} and Am^{3+} Ion Interaction with Sulfate Ion
4 and Their Influence on $\text{NdPO}_4(\text{c})$ Solubility." *Journal of Solution Chemistry*, vol. 24: 879–95.
- 5 Rai, D., A.R. Felmy, S.M. Sterner, D.A. Moore, M.J. Mason, and C.F. Novak. 1997. "The
6 Solubility of Th(IV) and U(IV) Hydrous Oxides in Concentrated NaCl and MgCl_2 Solutions."
7 *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 79: 239–47.
- 8 Rai, D., A.R. Felmy, N.J. Hess, and D.A. Moore. 1998. "A Thermodynamic Model for the
9 Solubility of $\text{UO}_2(\text{am})$ in the Aqueous $\text{K}^+ \text{-Na}^+ \text{-HCO}_3^- \text{-CO}_3^{2-} \text{-OH}^- \text{-H}_2\text{O}$ System." *Radiochimica*
10 *Acta*, vol. 82: 17–25.
- 11 Rai, D., D.A. Moore, C.S. Oakes, and M. Yui. 2000. "Thermodynamic Model for the Solubility
12 of Thorium Dioxide in the $\text{Na}^+ \text{-Cl}^- \text{-OH}^- \text{-H}_2\text{O}$ System at 23 °C and 90°C." *Radiochimica Acta*,
13 vol. 88: 297–306.
- 14 Rao, L., D. Rai, A.R. Felmy, R.W. Fulton, and C.F. Novak. 1996. "Solubility of
15 $\text{NaNd}(\text{CO}_3)_2 \cdot 6\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{c})$ in Concentrated NaCO_3 and NaHCO_3 Solutions." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol.
16 75: 141–47.
- 17 Reed, D.T., S. Okajima, L.H. Brush, and M.A. Molecke. 1993. "Radiolytically Induced Gas
18 Production in Plutonium-Spiked WIPP Brine." *Materials Research Society Symposium*
19 *Proceedings* (pp. 431–38). Vol. 294. Warrendale, PA: Materials Research Society.
- 20 Reed, D.T., S. Okajima, and M.K. Richmann. 1994. "Stability and Speciation of Plutonium(VI)
21 in WIPP Brine." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 66/67: 95–101.
- 22 Reed, D.T., and D.R. Wygmans. 1997. *Actinide Stability/Solubility in Simulated WIPP Brines*
23 (March 21). WPO44625. Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory, Actinide Speciation and
24 Chemistry Group, Chemical Technology Group.
- 25 Reed, D.T., S.B. Aase, D. Wygmans, and J. E. Banaszak. 1998. "The Reduction of Np(VI) and
26 Pu(VI) by Organic Chelating Agents." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 82: 109-14.
- 27 Reed, D.T., J.-F. Lucchini, S.B. Aase, and A.J. Kropf. 2006. "Reduction of Plutonium (VI) in
28 Brine under Subsurface Conditions." *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 94: 591–97.
- 29 Reed, D.T., S.E. Pepper, M.K. Richmann, G. Smith, R. Deo, and B.E. Rittmann. 2007.
30 "Subsurface Bio-Mediated Reduction of Higher-Valent Uranium and Plutonium." *Journal of*
31 *Alloys and Compounds*, vol. 444/445: 376–82.
- 32 Reed, D.T., J.-F. Lucchini, M. Borkowski, and M.K. Richmann. 2009. *Pu(VI) Reduction by*
33 *Iron under WIPP-Relevant Conditions: Data Summary and Recommendations*. LCO-ACP-09,
34 LANL\ACRSP Report. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.

- 1 Refait, Ph., and J.-M.R. Génin. 1994. "The Transformation of Chloride-Containing Green Rust
2 One into Sulphated Green Rust Two by Oxidation in Mixed Cl^- and SO_4^{2-} Aqueous Media."
3 *Corrosion Science*, vol. 36, no. 1: 55–65.
- 4 Richmann, M.K. 2008. Letter report to D. Reed (Subject: Eh/pH Diagrams for Am(III), Th(IV)
5 and Np(V) Based on the FMT Database and Current PA Assumptions). 21 November 2008. Los
6 Alamos National Laboratory, Carlsbad Operations, Carlsbad, NM.
- 7 Rittmann, B.E., J.E. Banaszak, and D.T. Reed. 2002. "Reduction of Np(V) and Precipitation of
8 Np(IV) by an Anaerobic Microbial Consortium." *Biodegradation*, vol. 13: 329–42.
- 9 Rösch, F., T. Reimann, G.V. Buklanov, M. Milanov, V.A. Khalin, and R. Dryer. 1989.
10 "Electromigration of Carrier-Free Radionuclides. 13. Ion Mobilities and Hydrolysis of
11 ^{241}Am (III) in Aqueous Inert Electrolytes." *Journal of Radioanalytical Nuclear Chemistry*, vol.
12 134: 109–28.
- 13 Runde, W., and J.I. Kim. 1994. *Untersuchungen der Übertragbarkeit von Laboraten
14 natürliche Verhältnisse. Chemisches Verhalten von drei- und fünfwertigem Americium in
15 salinen NaCl-Lösungen*. Report RCM-01094, Munich: Institut für Radiochemie, Technische
16 Universität München. (Available from National Technical Information Service, 555 Port Royal
17 Road, Springfield, VA, 22161, 703/487-4650 as DE 95752244.)
- 18 Runde, W. 2000: "The Chemical Interactions of Actinides in the Environment." *Los Alamos
19 Science*, vol. 26: 330.
- 20 Runde, W., S.D. Conradson, D.W. Efurud, N. Lu, D.E. VanPelt, and C.D. Tait. 2002. "Solubility
21 and Sorption of Redox-Sensitive Radionuclides (Np,Pu) in j-13 Water from the Yucca Mountain
22 Site: Comparison Between Experiment and Theory." *Applied Geochemistry*, vol. 17: 837–53.
- 23 Ryan, J.L., and D. Rai. 1983. "The Solubility of Uranium (IV) Hydrated Oxide in Sodium
24 Hydroxide Solutions under Reducing Conditions." *Polyhedron*, vol. 2: 947–52.
- 25 Sanchez, A.L., J.W. Murray, and T.H. Sibley. 1985. "The Adsorption of Plutonium IV and V
26 on Geothite." *Geochimica Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 49: 2297.
- 27 Sanchez, L.C., and H.R. Trelue. 1996. Memorandum to T. Hicks (Subject: Estimation of
28 Maximum RH-TRU Thermal Heat Load for WIPP). 17 January 1996. WPO 31165. U.S.
29 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 30 Sandino, M.C.A., and B. Grambow. 1994. "Solubility Equilibria in the U(VI)-Ca-K-Cl-H₂O
31 System: Transformation of Schoepite into Becquerelite and Compreignacite." *Radiochim. Acta*,
32 vol. 66/67: 37-43.
- 33 Santschi, P.H., K.A. Roberts, and L. Guo. 2002. "Organic Nature of Colloidal Actinides
34 Transported in Surface Water Environments." *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 36:
35 3711–19.

- 1 Schuessler, W., B. Kienzler, S. Wilhelm, V. Neck, and J.I. Kim. 2001. Modeling of Near Field
2 Actinide Concentrations in Radioactive Waste Repositories in Salt Formations: Effect of Buffer
3 Materials. *Materials Research Society Symposium Proceedings*, vol. 663: 791-98.
- 4 Shannon, R.D. 1976. "Revised Effective Ionic Radii and Systematic Studies of Interatomic
5 Distances in Halides and Chalcogenides." *Acta Cryst*, vol. A32: 751-67.
- 6 Siekierski, S. "Comparison of Yttrium, Lanthanides and Actinides in Respect to Unit Cell
7 Volumes of Isostructural Compounds and Thermodynamic Functions of Complex Formation."
8 *Journal of Radioanalytical Nuclear Chemistry*, vol. 122: 279-84.
- 9 Silva, R.J., G. Bidoglio, M.H. Rand, P.B. Robouch, H. Wanner, and I. Puigdomenech. 1995.
10 *Chemical Thermodynamics of Americium*. Chemical Thermodynamics Series 2. New York
11 Elsevier.
- 12 Skokan, C.K., M.C. Pfeifer, G.V. Keller, and H.T. Anderses. 1987. *Studies of Electrical and*
13 *Electromagnetic Methods for Characterizing Salt Properties at the WIPP Site, New Mexico*.
14 SAND87-7174. Carlsbad NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 Snider, A.C. 2003a. *Verification of the Definition of Generic Weep Brine and the Development*
16 *of a Recipe for This Brine*. ERMS 527505. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 17 Snider A.C. 2003b. "Hydration of Magnesium Oxide in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant."
18 *Materials Research Society Symposium Proceedings* (pp. 665-70). Vol. 757. Warrendale, PA:
19 Materials Research Society.
- 20 Spinks, J.W.T., and R.J. Woods. 1990. "Radiation Sources: The Interaction of Radiation with
21 Matter." *Introduction to Radiation Chemistry* (pp. 243-313). New York: Wiley 1990.
- 22 Stadler, S., and J.I. Kim. 1988. "Hydrolysis reactions of Am(III) and Am(V)." *Radiochim.*
23 *Acta*, 44/45: 39-44.
- 24 Stein, J.S. 2005. Memorandum to L.H. Brush (Subject: Estimate of Volume of Brine in
25 Repository that Leads to a Brine Release). 13 April 2005. ERMS 539372. U.S. Department of
26 Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 27 Stoelzel, D.M., and D.G. O'Brien. 1996. *Analysis Package for the BRAGFLO Direct Release*
28 *Calculations (Task 4) of the Performance Assessment Analyses Supporting the Compliance*
29 *Certification Application*. AP-029. ERMS 240520. Albuquerque: Sandia National
30 Laboratories.
- 31 Telander, M.R., and R.E. Westerman. 1993. *Hydrogen Generation by Metal Corrosion in*
32 *Simulated Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environments: Progress Report for the Period November*
33 *1989 Through December 1992*. SAND92-7347. ERMS 223456. Albuquerque: Sandia National
34 Laboratories.

- 1 Telander, M.R., and R.E. Westerman. 1997. *Hydrogen Generation by Metal Corrosion in*
2 *Simulated Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Environments*. SAND96-2538. Albuquerque: Sandia
3 National Laboratories.
- 4 Torrero, M.E., I. Casas, J. de Pablo, M.C.A. Sandino, and B.A. Grambow. 1994. “Comparison
5 Between Unirradiated UO₂(s) and Schoepite Solubilities in 1 M NaCl Medium.” *Radiochimica*
6 *Acta*, vol. 66/67: 29–35.
- 7 Torretto, P., K. Becraft, T. Prussin, K. Roberts, S. Carpenter, D. Hobart, and H. Nitsche. 1995.
8 *Solubility and Speciation Results from Oversaturation Experiments on Neptunium, Plutonium*
9 *and Americium in a Neutral Electrolyte with a Total Carbonate Similar to Water from Yucca*
10 *Mountain Region Well UE-25p#1*. Report LA-13018-MS. Los Alamos: Los Alamos National
11 Laboratory.
- 12 Tremaine, P.R., J.D. Chen, G.J. Wallace, and W.A. Boivin. 1981. “Solubility of Uranium (IV)
13 Oxide in Alkaline Aqueous Solutions to 300°C.” *Journal of Solution Chemistry*, vol. 10: 221–
14 30.
- 15 Trolard, F., J.M.R. Genin, M. Abdelmoula, G. Bourrie, B. Humbert, and A. Herbillon. 1997.
16 “Identification of a Green Rust mineral in a Reductomorphic Soil by Mossbauer and Raman
17 Spectroscopies.” *Geochimica Cosmochimica Acta*, vol. 63: 1107–11.
- 18 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
19 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO-1996-2184.
20 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 21 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
22 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
23 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 24 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2006. *Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report—2004*
25 *(Revision 0)*. DOE/TRU-2006-3344. Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1993. “40 CFR Part 191: Environmental
27 Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
28 Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes; Final Rule.” *Federal Register*, vol. 58 (December
29 20, 1993): 66398–416.
- 30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2005. Teleconference with U.S. Department of
31 Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory
32 (LANL) (Subject: Change in U(VI) Solubility Assumption to a Concentration to 1 M). 2 March
33 2005.
- 34 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2006. *Technical Support Document for Section*
35 *194.24: Evaluation of the Compliance Recertification Actinide Source Term and Culebra*
36 *Dolomite Distribution Coefficient Values* (March). Washington, DC: Office of Radiation and
37 Indoor Air.

- 1 Van Luik, A.E., M.J. Apted, W.J. Bailey, J.H. Haberman, J.S. Shade, R.E. Guenther, R.J. Serne,
2 E.R. Gilbert, R. Peters, and R.E. Williford. 1987. *Spent Nuclear Fuel as a Waste Form for*
3 *Geologic Disposal: Assessment and Recommendations on Data and Modeling Needs*. PNL-
4 6329. Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest Laboratories.
- 5 Villareal, R., J.M. Bergquist, and S.L. Leonard. 2001. *The Actinide Source-Term Waste Test*
6 *Program (STTP): Final Report*. 3 vols. LA-UR-01-6822, LA-UR-01-6912, and LA-UR-01-
7 6913. Los Alamos: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
- 8 Wall, N.A., and S.A. Mathews. 2005. "Sustainability of Humic Acids in the Presence of
9 Magnesium Oxide." *Applied Geochemistry*, vol. 20: 1704–13.
- 10 Walther, C. 2003. "Comparison of Colloid Investigations by Single Particle Analytical
11 Techniques: A Case Study on Thorium-Oxyhydroxides." *Colloids and Surfaces A:*
12 *Physicochemical Engineering Aspects*, vol. 217: 81–92.
- 13 Wang, Y., and L. Brush. 1996a. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Estimates of Gas-
14 Generation Parameters for the Long-Term WIPP Performance Assessment). 26 January 1996.
15 ERMS 231943. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.
- 16 Wang, Y., and L.H. Brush. 1996b. Memorandum to M.S. Tierney (Subject: Modify the
17 Stoichiometric Factor γ in the BRAGFLO to Include the Effect of MgO Added to WIPP
18 Repository as a Backfill). 23 February 1996. ERMS 232286. U.S. Department of Energy,
19 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
- 20 Weiner, R. 1996. Technical memorandum to SWCF-A: Records Center (Subject:
21 Documentation Package For: Oxidation State Distribution of Actinides in the Repository). 27
22 March 1996. ERMS 235194. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories,
23 Albuquerque, NM.
- 24 White, A.F., A. Yee, and S. Flexser. 1985. "Surface Oxidation-Reduction Kinetics Associated
25 with Experimental Basalt-Water Reactions at 25 °C." *Chemical Geology*, vol. 49: 73.
- 26 Wolery, T.J. 1992. *EQ3/6, A Software Package for Geochemical Modeling of Aqueous Systems:*
27 *Package Overview and Installation Guide* (Version 7.0). UCRL-MA-110662 PT 1. Livermore,
28 CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
- 29 Wolery, T.J., and S.A. Daveler. 1992. *EQ3/6, A Computer Program for Reaction Path*
30 *Modeling of Aqueous Geochemical Systems: Theoretical Manual, User's Guide, and Related*
31 *Documentation* (Version 7.0). UCRL-MA-110662-Pt. 4. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore
32 National Laboratory.
- 33 Xiong, Y. 2005. E-mail to J.F. Kanney and J.J. Long (Subject: Release of
34 FMT_050405.CHEMDAT). 5 April 2005. ERMS 539304. U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia
35 National Laboratories, Carlsbad, NM.

- 1 Xiong, Y., E.J. Nowak, and L.H. Brush. 2005. *Updated Uncertainty Analysis of Actinide*
2 *Solubilities for the Response to EPA Comment C-23-16, Rev. 1*. ERMS 539595 (supersedes
3 ERMS 538219). Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 4 Xiong, Y., and A.S. Lord. 2008. “Experimental Investigations of the Reaction Path in the MgO-
5 CO₂-H₂O System in Solution with Various Ionic Strengths, and Their Applications to Nuclear
6 Waste Isolation.” *Applied Geochemistry*, vol. 23: 1634–59.
- 7 Yajima, T., Y. Kawamura, and S. Ueta. 1995. “Uranium(IV) Solubility and Hydrolysis
8 Constants Under Reduced Conditions.” *Materials Research Society Symposium Proceedings*,
9 (pp. 1137–42). Vol. 353. Warrendale, PA: Materials Research Society.
- 10 Yamamura, T., A. Kitamura, A. Fukui, S. Nishikawa, T. Yamamoto, and H. Moriyama. 1998.
11 “Solubility of U(VI) in Highly Basic Solutions.” *Radiochimica Acta*, vol. 83: 139–146.
- 12 Yamazaki, H., B. Lagerman, V. Symeopoulos, and G.R. Choppin. 1992. “Solubility of Uranyl
13 in Brine.” *Radioactive Waste Management*, vol. 1992: 1607–11.
- 14 Zavarin, M., A.B. Kersting, P. Zhao, E.R. Sylwester, P.G. Allen, and R.W. Williams. 2003.
15 “Plutonium Colloid-Facilitated Transport in the Environment-Experimental and Transport
16 Modeling: Evidence for Plutonium Migration Mechanisms.” *Plutonium Futures—The Science*
17 *Conference Proceedings* (pp. 102–04.), G.D. Jarvinen, ed.
- 18 Zitomer, D.H., and R.E. Speece. 1993. “Sequential Environments for Enhanced
19 Biotransformation of Aqueous Contaminants.” *Environmental Science and Technology*, vol. 27:
20 227.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Appendix TFIELD-2009
Transmissivity Fields**



**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Appendix TFIELD-2009

Transmissivity Fields

Table of Contents

TFIELD-1.0 Overview of Transmissivity Field Development, Calibration, and Modification Process TFIELD-1

TFIELD-2.0 Development of Maps of Geologic Factors..... TFIELD-3

TFIELD-3.0 Development of Model Relating Culebra Transmissivity to Geologic Factors..... TFIELD-9

 TFIELD-3.1 Fracture Interconnection TFIELD-9

 TFIELD-3.2 Overburden Thickness TFIELD-11

 TFIELD-3.3 Salado Dissolution TFIELD-11

 TFIELD-3.4 Halite Overlying the Culebra..... TFIELD-12

 TFIELD-3.5 Halite Bounding the Culebra TFIELD-12

 TFIELD-3.6 High-Transmissivity Zones..... TFIELD-12

 TFIELD-3.7 Linear Transmissivity Model..... TFIELD-12

 TFIELD-3.8 Linear-Regression Analysis..... TFIELD-14

TFIELD-4.0 Calculation of Base T Fields..... TFIELD-16

 TFIELD-4.1 Definition of Model Domain TFIELD-16

 TFIELD-4.2 Reduction of Geologic Map Data TFIELD-17

 TFIELD-4.3 Indicator Variography..... TFIELD-17

 TFIELD-4.4 Conditional Indicator Simulation..... TFIELD-18

 TFIELD-4.5 Construction of Base Transmissivity Fields TFIELD-19

TFIELD-5.0 Construction of Seed Realizations..... TFIELD-22

TFIELD-6.0 T-Field Calibration to Steady-State and Transient Heads TFIELD-28

 TFIELD-6.1 Modeling Assumptions TFIELD-28

 TFIELD-6.2 Initial Heads..... TFIELD-29

 TFIELD-6.3 Boundary Conditions TFIELD-34

 TFIELD-6.4 Observed Steady-State and Transient Head Data Used in Model Calibration..... TFIELD-37

 TFIELD-6.5 Spatial Discretization..... TFIELD-39

 TFIELD-6.6 Temporal Discretization TFIELD-39

 TFIELD-6.7 Weighting of Observation Data TFIELD-45

 TFIELD-6.8 Assignment of Pilot Point Geometry TFIELD-49

 TFIELD-6.9 Stochastic Inverse Calibration TFIELD-51

TFIELD-7.0 T-Field Acceptance Criteria..... TFIELD-63

 TFIELD-7.1 Candidate Acceptance Criteria TFIELD-64

 TFIELD-7.1.1 RMSE Values TFIELD-64

 TFIELD-7.1.2 Fit to Steady-State Heads..... TFIELD-64

 TFIELD-7.1.3 Phi Values..... TFIELD-65

 TFIELD-7.1.4 Fit to Transient Heads..... TFIELD-65

 TFIELD-7.2 Application of Criteria to T Fields..... TFIELD-67

 TFIELD-7.2.1 RMSE Values TFIELD-67

TFIELD-7.2.2 Fit to Steady-State Heads.....	TFIELD-67
TFIELD-7.2.3 Phi Values	TFIELD-71
TFIELD-7.2.4 Fit to Transient Heads.....	TFIELD-71
TFIELD-7.3 Final Acceptance Criteria	TFIELD-79
TFIELD-8.0 Inverse Modeling Results	TFIELD-81
TFIELD-8.1 Particle Tracking.....	TFIELD-81
TFIELD-8.2 Fit to Steady-State Heads.....	TFIELD-81
TFIELD-8.3 Pilot-Point Sensitivity	TFIELD-82
TFIELD-8.4 Ensemble Average T Field	TFIELD-87
TFIELD-9.0 Modification of T Fields For Mining Scenarios.....	TFIELD-90
TFIELD-9.1 Determination of Potential Mining Areas.....	TFIELD-91
TFIELD-9.2 Scaling of Transmissivity	TFIELD-91
TFIELD-9.3 Forward Runs.....	TFIELD-92
TFIELD-9.4 Results.....	TFIELD-94
TFIELD-9.4.1 Travel Times.....	TFIELD-94
TFIELD-9.4.2 Travel Directions	TFIELD-98
TFIELD-9.4.3 Extreme Values.....	TFIELD-104
TFIELD-10.0 Summary.....	TFIELD-112
TFIELD-11.0 References.....	TFIELD-114

List of Figures

Figure TFIELD-1. Structure Contour Map for the Top of the Culebra.....	TFIELD-4
Figure TFIELD-2. Salado Dissolution Margin	TFIELD-5
Figure TFIELD-3. Rustler Halite Margins. See Figure TFIELD-4 for Key to Stratigraphic Column.	TFIELD-6
Figure TFIELD-4. Stratigraphic Subdivisions of the Rustler	TFIELD-10
Figure TFIELD-5. Histogram of log ₁₀ Culebra Transmissivity.....	TFIELD-11
Figure TFIELD-6. Well Locations and log ₁₀ Culebra Transmissivities.....	TFIELD-13
Figure TFIELD-7. Regression Fit to Observed Culebra log ₁₀ T Data	TFIELD-15
Figure TFIELD-8. Zones for Indicator Grids.....	TFIELD-18
Figure TFIELD-9. High-T Indicator Model and Experimental Variograms.....	TFIELD-19
Figure TFIELD-10. Soft Data Around Wells.....	TFIELD-19
Figure TFIELD-11. Example Base T Field.....	TFIELD-21
Figure TFIELD-12. Conceptual Cross Section Showing the Updating of the Residual Field and the Base T Field into the Seed T Field.....	TFIELD-23
Figure TFIELD-13. Omnidirectional Variogram Model Fit to the Experimental Variogram of the Transmissivity Residuals.....	TFIELD-26
Figure TFIELD-14. An Example of the Creation of a Seed T Field.....	TFIELD-26
Figure TFIELD-15. Experimental and Model Variograms for the Raw-Space (Not Normal-Score Transformed) Transmissivity Residual Data.....	TFIELD-27

Figure TFIELD-16. Locations and Values of the 2000 Head Measurements Considered in the Steady-State Calibrations.....	TFIELD-30
Figure TFIELD-17. Gaussian Trend Surface Fit to the 2000 Observed Heads	TFIELD-32
Figure TFIELD-18. Locations and Values of the Residuals Between the Gaussian Trend Surface Model and the Observed Head Data	TFIELD-33
Figure TFIELD-19. Omnidirectional Experimental (Straight-Line Segments) and Model Variograms of the Head Residuals (Curves) for the 2000 Heads.....	TFIELD-34
Figure TFIELD-20. Map of Initial Heads Created Through Kriging and Used to Assign Fixed-Head Boundary Conditions	TFIELD-35
Figure TFIELD-21. Values of Fixed Heads Along the Eastern Boundary of the Model Domain.....	TFIELD-36
Figure TFIELD-22. Values of Fixed Heads Along the Northern and Southern Boundaries of the Model Domain.....	TFIELD-36
Figure TFIELD-23. Locations of the H-3b2 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells	TFIELD-40
Figure TFIELD-24. Observed Drawdowns for the H-3b2 Hydraulic Test.....	TFIELD-41
Figure TFIELD-25. Locations of the WIPP-13 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells	TFIELD-42
Figure TFIELD-26. Observed Drawdowns for the WIPP-13 Hydraulic Test.....	TFIELD-43
Figure TFIELD-27. Locations of the P-14 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells	TFIELD-44
Figure TFIELD-28. Observed Drawdowns for the P-14 Hydraulic Test.....	TFIELD-45
Figure TFIELD-29. Locations of the WQSP-1 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells	TFIELD-46
Figure TFIELD-30. Observed Drawdowns for the WQSP-1 Hydraulic Test.....	TFIELD-47
Figure TFIELD-31. Locations of the WQSP-2 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells	TFIELD-48
Figure TFIELD-32. Observed Drawdowns from the WQSP-2 Hydraulic Test.....	TFIELD-49
Figure TFIELD-33. Locations of the H-11 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells	TFIELD-50
Figure TFIELD-34. Observed Drawdowns for the H-11 Hydraulic Test	TFIELD-51
Figure TFIELD-35. Locations of the H-19 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells	TFIELD-52
Figure TFIELD-36. Observed Drawdowns From the H-19 Hydraulic Test	TFIELD-53
Figure TFIELD-37. Temporal Discretization and Pumping Rates for the Fifth Call to MODFLOW-2000. A Total of 17 Stress Periods (SPs) are Used to Discretize this Model Call.	TFIELD-55
Figure TFIELD-38. Locations of the Adjustable and Fixed Pilot Points Within the Model Domain	TFIELD-57
Figure TFIELD-39. Close-Up View of the Pilot-Point Locations in the Area of the WIPP Site.....	TFIELD-58
Figure TFIELD-40. Conceptual Cross-Section Showing the Addition of Pilot Points to the Optimization Process	TFIELD-59
Figure TFIELD-41. Flow Chart of the Stochastic Inverse Calibration Process Used to Create the Final Calibrated T Fields	TFIELD-60

Figure TFIELD-42. Flow Chart of the Core of the Inversion Process Highlighting the Connection Between PEST and MODFLOW-2000 TFIELD-61

Figure TFIELD-43. Example Final Steps in the Creation of a Calibrated T Field TFIELD-62

Figure TFIELD-44. Steady-State RMSE Values for 146 T Fields TFIELD-68

Figure TFIELD-45. Steady-State RMSE Values and Associated Travel Times..... TFIELD-68

Figure TFIELD-46. Travel Times for Fields with Steady-State RMSE <6 m (20 ft)... TFIELD-69

Figure TFIELD-47. Measured Versus Modeled Steady-State Heads for T Field d21r10 TFIELD-69

Figure TFIELD-48. Steady-State-Fit Slope Versus Travel Time for All Fields..... TFIELD-70

Figure TFIELD-49. Steady-State-Fit Slope Versus Travel Time for Slopes >0.5 TFIELD-70

Figure TFIELD-50. Transient Phi Versus Travel Time for All Fields..... TFIELD-71

Figure TFIELD-51. Transient Phi Versus Travel Time for Phi <8,000 m² TFIELD-72

Figure TFIELD-52. Example of Passing Well Response from T Field d21r10..... TFIELD-72

Figure TFIELD-53. Example of Failing Well Response from T Field d21r10..... TFIELD-73

Figure TFIELD-54. Transient Phi Versus Number of Failed Well Responses..... TFIELD-78

Figure TFIELD-55. Number of Failed Well Responses Versus Travel Time TFIELD-78

Figure TFIELD-56. Travel-Time CDFs for Different Sets of T Fields TFIELD-79

Figure TFIELD-57. Travel-Time CDFs for CCA and CRA-2004 T Fields..... TFIELD-80

Figure TFIELD-58. All Particle Tracks Within the WIPP LWB..... TFIELD-82

Figure TFIELD-59. All Particle Tracks Within the Model Domain TFIELD-83

Figure TFIELD-60. Scatterplot of Measured Versus Modeled Steady-State Heads..... TFIELD-84

Figure TFIELD-61. Histogram of Differences Between Measured and Modeled Steady-State Heads TFIELD-84

Figure TFIELD-62. Percentage of T Fields in which Pilot Points Hit Maximum Allowable Values..... TFIELD-85

Figure TFIELD-63. Percentage of T Fields in which Pilot Points Hit Minimum Allowable Values..... TFIELD-86

Figure TFIELD-64. Ensemble Average of 121 Calibrated T Fields TFIELD-88

Figure TFIELD-65. Close-Up View of the Ensemble Average T Field Near the WIPP Site TFIELD-89

Figure TFIELD-66. Potash Resources Near the WIPP Site..... TFIELD-92

Figure TFIELD-67. Potential Potash Distribution Within the WIPP LWB. The Repository Excavations are Shown in the Center..... TFIELD-93

Figure TFIELD-68. Comparison of CRA-2004 and CCA Areas Affected by Mining. TFIELD-94

Figure TFIELD-69. CDFs of Travel Times for the Full-, Partial-, and No-Mining Scenarios TFIELD-97

Figure TFIELD-70. CDFs of Partial-Mining Travel Times for Three CRA-2004 Replicates and One CCA Replicate TFIELD-97

Figure TFIELD-71. CDFs of Full-Mining Travel Times for Three CRA-2004 Replicates and One CCA Replicate TFIELD-98

Figure TFIELD-72. Normalized Pore Velocities for the Full-Mining Case TFIELD-99

Figure TFIELD-73. Particle Tracks for Replicate 1 for the Partial-Mining Scenario. TFIELD-100

Figure TFIELD-74. Particle Tracks for Replicate 2 for the Partial-Mining Scenario. TFIELD-101

Figure TFIELD-75. Particle Tracks for Replicate 3 for the Partial-Mining Scenario. TFIELD-101

Figure TFIELD-76. Particle Tracks for Replicate 1 for the Full-Mining Scenario..... TFIELD-102

Figure TFIELD-77. Particle Tracks for Replicate 2 for the Full-Mining Scenario..... TFIELD-102

Figure TFIELD-78. Particle Tracks for Replicate 3 for the Full-Mining Scenario..... TFIELD-103

Figure TFIELD-79. Correlation Between the Random Mining Factor and \log_{10} of
Travel Time..... TFIELD-105

Figure TFIELD-80. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Maximum-Travel-
Time T Field (d03r01-R3) for the Partial-Mining Case..... TFIELD-106

Figure TFIELD-81. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Minimum-Travel-Time
T Field (d09r06-R2) for the Partial-Mining Case..... TFIELD-107

Figure TFIELD-82. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Median-Travel-Time
T Field (d13r07-R2) for the Partial-Mining Case..... TFIELD-108

Figure TFIELD-83. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Maximum-Travel-
Time T Field (d22r06-R2) for the Full-Mining Case..... TFIELD-109

Figure TFIELD-84. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Minimum-Travel-Time
T Field (d03r03-R3) for the Full-Mining Case..... TFIELD-110

Figure TFIELD-85. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Median-Travel-Time
T Field (d12r08-R3) for the Full-Mining Case..... TFIELD-111

List of Tables

Table TFIELD-1. Regression Coefficients for Equations (TFIELD.2) and
(TFIELD.3)..... TFIELD-14

Table TFIELD-2. Coordinates of the Numerical Model Domain Corners..... TFIELD-17

Table TFIELD-3. \log_{10} Transmissivity Data Used in Inverse Calibrations..... TFIELD-24

Table TFIELD-4. Statistical Parameters Describing the Distributions of the Raw
and Normal-Score Transformed Residual Data..... TFIELD-25

Table TFIELD-5. Well Names and Locations of the 37 Head Measurements
Obtained in Late 2000 Used to Define Boundary and Initial
Heads..... TFIELD-31

Table TFIELD-6. Parameters for the Gaussian Trend Surface Model Fit to the 2000
Heads..... TFIELD-32

Table TFIELD-7. Model Variogram Parameters for the Head Residuals..... TFIELD-34

Table TFIELD-8. Transient Hydraulic Test and Observation Wells for the
Drawdown Data..... TFIELD-38

Table TFIELD-9. Discretization of Time into 29 Stress Periods and 127 Time Steps
with Pumping Well Names and Pumping Rates..... TFIELD-54

Table TFIELD-10. Observation Weights for Each of the Observation Wells..... TFIELD-56

Table TFIELD-11. Summary Information on T Fields..... TFIELD-73

Table TFIELD-12. T-Field Transmissivity Multipliers for Mining Scenarios..... TFIELD-95

Table TFIELD-13. Travel Time Statistics for the Full- and Partial-Mining Scenarios
as Compared to the No-Mining Scenario..... TFIELD-100

Preface

Appendix TFIELD-2009 and the associated transmissivity fields for Compliance Recertification Application (CRA)-2009 were originally prepared for the CRA-2004 Performance Assessment Baseline Calculation. The only changes that have been made to the text are minor and editorial in nature, such as corrections of referencing errors and the addition of a missing reference. Although additional hydrogeologic investigations, described in Appendix HYDRO-2009, were performed after these transmissivity fields (T fields) were constructed, T fields incorporating the new data have not been completed.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

%	percent
AP	Analysis Plan
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
CCA	Compliance Certification Application
CDF	cumulative distribution function
CRA	Compliance Recertification Application
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ft	feet
ft ²	square feet
GHz	gigahertz
GSLIB	Geostatistical Software Library
high-T	high-transmissivity
km	kilometer
LHS	Latin hypercube sampling
low-T	low-transmissivity
LWB	Land Withdrawal Boundary
m	meter
m ²	square meters
M/H	mudstone/halite
m ² /s	square meters per second
m ³ /s	cubic meters per second
mi	mile
PA	performance assessment
PEST	Parameter ESTimation software
RMSE	root mean squared error
s	second
S	storativity
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SP	stress period
SSE	sum of squared errors

T field	transmissivity field
USGS	United States Geological Survey
UTM	Universal Transverse Mercator
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
WQSP	Water Quality Sampling Program

TFIELD-1.0 Overview of Transmissivity Field Development, Calibration, and Modification Process

Modeling the transport of radionuclides through the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation (hereafter referred to as the Culebra) is one component of the Performance Assessment (PA) performed for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Compliance Recertification Application (CRA). This transport modeling requires a model of groundwater flow through the Culebra. This Appendix describes the process used to develop and calibrate the transmissivity fields (T fields) for the Culebra, and then modify them for the possible effects of potash mining for use in flow modeling for the CRA-2004 (U.S. Department of Energy 2004).

The work described in this appendix was performed under two Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Analysis Plans (APs): AP-088 (Beauheim 2002a) and AP-100 (Leigh, Beauheim, and Kanney 2003). AP-088 (Analysis Plan for the Evaluation of the Effects of Head Changes on Calibration of Culebra T Fields) dealt with the development, calibration, and modification for potash mining of the T fields. AP-100 (Analysis Plan for Calculations of Culebra Flow and Transport: Compliance Recertification Application) included the development of T-field acceptance criteria, as well as radionuclide-transport calculations not described herein.

The starting point in the T-field development process was to assemble information on geologic factors that might affect Culebra transmissivity (Section TFIELD-2.0). These factors include dissolution of the upper Salado Formation, the thickness of overburden above the Culebra, and the spatial distribution of halite in the Rustler Formation above and below the Culebra. Geologic information is available from hundreds of oil and gas wells and potash exploration holes in the vicinity of the WIPP site, while transmissivity values are available from only 46 well locations. Details of the geologic data compilation are given in Powers (2002a, 2002b, 2003) and summarized below in Section TFIELD-2.0.

A two-part “geologically based” approach was then used to generate Culebra base T fields. In the first part (Section TFIELD-3.0), a conceptual model for geologic controls on Culebra transmissivity was formalized, and the hypothesized geologic controls were regressed against Culebra transmissivity data to determine linear regression coefficients. The regression includes one continuously varying function, Culebra overburden thickness, and three indicator functions that assume values of 0 or 1 depending on the occurrence of open, interconnected fractures, Salado dissolution, and the presence or absence of halite in units bounding the Culebra.

In the second part (Section TFIELD-4.0), a method was developed for applying the linear regression model to predict Culebra transmissivity across the WIPP area. The regression model was combined with the maps of geologic factors to create 500 stochastically varying Culebra base T fields. Details about the development of the regression model and the creation of the base T fields are given in Holt and Yarbrough (2002, 2003a, 2003b).

By the nature of regression models, the base T fields do not honor the measured transmissivity values at the measurement locations. Therefore, before these base T fields could be used in a flow model, they had to be conditioned to the measured transmissivity values. This conditioning is described in McKenna and Hart (2003a, 2003b) and summarized in Section TFIELD-5.0. Section TFIELD-6.0 presents details on the modeling approach used to calibrate the T fields to

1 both steady-state heads and transient drawdown measurements. Heads measured in late 2000
2 were used to represent steady-state conditions in the Culebra, and drawdown responses in 40
3 wells to pumping in 7 wells were used to provide transient calibration data. Details on the heads
4 and drawdown data used are described in Beauheim (2002b) and Beauheim and Fox (2003).
5 Assumptions made in modeling, the definition of an initial head distribution, assignment of
6 boundary conditions, discretization of the spatial and temporal domain, weighting of the
7 observations, and the use of Parameter ESTimation software (PEST) (Doherty 2002) in
8 combination with MODFLOW-2000 (Harbaugh et al. 2000) to calibrate the T fields using a
9 pilot-point method are described in McKenna and Hart (2003a, 2003b) and summarized in
10 Section TFIELD-6.0.

11 Section TFIELD-7.0 addresses the development and application of acceptance criteria for the T
12 fields. Acceptance was based on a combination of objective fit to the calibration data and
13 providing travel time results consistent with the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of travel
14 times from the 23 best-calibrated T fields (Beauheim 2003). Of the 146 T fields that went
15 through the calibration process, 121 T fields were judged adequate for further use, with the 100
16 best T fields selected for use in the CRA-2004 transport calculations.

17 Section TFIELD-8.0 provides summary statistics and other information for the 121 T fields that
18 were judged to be acceptably calibrated. Particle tracks from a point above the center of the
19 WIPP disposal panels to the Land Withdrawal Boundary (LWB) are shown, along with
20 information on the model fits to steady-state heads, identification of the most sensitive pilot point
21 locations, and characteristics of an ensemble average T field. This information is summarized
22 from McKenna and Hart (2003b).

23 Section TFIELD-9.0 discusses the modification of the T fields to account for the effects of
24 potash mining both within and outside the WIPP LWB. Mining-affected areas were delineated,
25 random transmissivity multipliers were applied to transmissivities in those areas, and particle
26 tracks and travel times were determined (Lowry 2003). The flow fields produced by these
27 mining-affected T fields are input to SECOTP2D for the CRA-2004 radionuclide-transport
28 calculations.

29 Section TFIELD-10.0 provides a brief summary of this appendix.

1 **TFIELD-2.0 Development of Maps of Geologic Factors**

2 Beauheim and Holt (1990), among others, suggested three geologic factors that might be related
3 to the transmissivity of the Culebra in the vicinity of the WIPP site:


- 4 1. Thickness (or erosion) of overburden above the Culebra
- 5 2. Dissolution of the upper Salado
- 6 3. Spatial distribution of halite in the Rustler below and above the Culebra

7 Culebra transmissivity is inversely related to thickness of overburden because stress relief
8 associated with erosion of overburden leads to fracturing and opening of preexisting fractures.
9 Culebra transmissivity is high where dissolution of the upper Salado has occurred and the
10 Culebra has subsided and fractured. Culebra transmissivity is observed to be low where halite is
11 present in overlying and/or underlying mudstones. Presumably, high Culebra transmissivity
12 leads to dissolution of nearby halite (if any). Hence, the presence of halite in mudstones above
13 and/or below the Culebra can be taken as an indicator for low Culebra transmissivity.

14 Maps were developed for each of these factors using drillhole data of different types. The
15 general area for the geologic study comprised 12 townships, located in townships T21S to T24S,
16 ranges R30 to 32E (the WIPP site lies in T22S, R31E). The original sources of geologic data for
17 this analysis are mainly Powers and Holt (1995) and Holt and Powers (1988) and new
18 information derived by log interpretation by Powers (2002a, 2002b, 2003). All of the data are
19 either included or summarized in the references cited above, and can be independently checked;
20 basic data reports are available for WIPP drillholes, geophysical logs for oil and gas wells are
21 available commercially or at offices of the Oil Conservation Division (New Mexico) in Artesia
22 and Hobbs, and potash drillhole information is in files that can be accessed for stratigraphic
23 information at the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Carlsbad, NM. No proprietary data are
24 included.


25 Factor 1 is represented by a structure contour map of the elevation of the top of the Culebra
26 (Figure TFIELD-1) that can be digitized and then subtracted from a digital elevation model of
27 the land surface to obtain the thickness of overburden. Factor 2 is represented on a map as an
28 approximate margin of the area beginning to be affected by dissolution of the upper Salado
29 (Figure TFIELD-2). Factor 3 is delineated on a map by lines that represent as nearly as possible
30 the boundaries of the occurrence of halite in the Los Medaños, Tamarisk, and Forty-niner
31 Members of the Rustler in the study domain (Figure TFIELD-3).

32 With respect to Factor 2, the upper Salado has been dissolved, and presumably is still dissolving,
33 along the eastern margin of Nash Draw. On the basis of limited core information, Holt and
34 Powers (1988) suggested that formations overlying the dissolving upper Salado in Nash Draw
35 are affected in proportion to the amount of Salado dissolution. The most direct way to estimate
36 the spatial distribution of dissolution is to have cores of the upper Salado and basal Rustler and
37 knowledge of the thickness to marker beds in the upper Salado. The upper Salado has not been
38 cored frequently, but geophysical logs from oil and gas wells, and descriptive logs of cores or
39 cuttings from potash drillholes, provide a considerable amount of evidence of the thickness of
40 the lower Rustler and upper Salado, even though cores and cuttings are no longer available from
41 potash industry drillholes.




1
2

Figure TFIELD-1. Structure Contour Map for the Top of the Culebra



1
2

Figure TFIELD-2. Salado Dissolution Margin



Explanation

M#, H# indicate mudstone and halitic facies on each side of estimated halite margin (numbered line on map) for stratigraphic intervals as indicated in the column to the right (key on Figure TFIELD-4).

UTM coordinates (m) for Zone 13 (NAD27) are provided for easting and northing.

Two zones within the WIPP site boundary ("H3 once present?") indicate where halite may have been present west of the current boundary of H3 (marked by - - - - -).

1
2 **Figure TFIELD-3. Rustler Halite Margins. See Figure TFIELD-4 for Key to Stratigraphic**
3 **Column.**

1 Potash industry geological logs examined at the BLM in Carlsbad, NM, are quite variable in the
2 quality of description and the stratigraphic interval described. Drillhole logs from the 1930s and
3 1950s typically are the most descriptive; recent drillhole logs are commonly useless for this
4 project because no strata are described above portions of the McNutt potash zone of the Salado,
5 near the middle of the formation.

6 The top of the Culebra and the base of the Vaca Triste Sandstone Member in the upper Salado
7 are the most consistent stratigraphic markers spanning the upper Salado that are recognizable
8 across various types of records. As a guide to the limits or bounds of upper Salado dissolution, a
9 map of the thickness from the top of Culebra to the base of Vaca Triste was prepared (Powers
10 2003). In conjunction with previous work by Powers and Holt (1995) and the evidence of the
11 structure of the top of Culebra (see Figure TFIELD-1), an approximate boundary of dissolution
12 was drawn as shown in Figure TFIELD-2.

13 With respect to Factor 3, the boundaries of where halite is found in the three non-carbonate
14 members of the Rustler have been drawn several times on the basis of different borehole data
15 sets and different data types (e.g., core data and geophysical logs). For the most part, the
16 different versions of the boundaries do not vary significantly. In the map shown in Figure
17 TFIELD-3, the margins are based principally on the work of Powers and Holt (1995), which is a
18 continuation of work reported by Holt and Powers (1988). As discussed in Powers and Holt
19 (1995), the boundaries drawn here vary slightly from those drawn by Snyder (1985) based on
20 core data for two reasons: (1) the Los Medaños Member (Powers and Holt 1999; formerly called
21 the unnamed lower member) is here divided into two separate halite-bearing units (Powers and
22 Holt 2000), and (2) geophysical log signatures are now used to identify halite in areas where
23 cores are not available. Figure TFIELD-3 includes a stratigraphic sketch showing the
24 relationship of halite-bearing strata to other strata in the Rustler. Following the convention
25 established by Holt and Powers (1988), the mudstone/halite (M/H) strata are numbered
26 consecutively starting at the base of the Rustler.

27 The margins for halite have now been drawn in the area north of the WIPP site around the
28 northeastern arm of Nash Draw based on the descriptions of halite encounters in the Rustler
29 Formation in potash drillholes. In addition, a few areas have been modified (from Powers and
30 Holt 1995) to the south and west of the WIPP based on the records from potash drillholes as well
31 as the records of drilling H-12 and H-17 for the WIPP.

32 In 12 potash drillholes, halite was reported above the upper contacts of the Culebra or Magenta
33 Dolomite Members. The boundaries for M3/H3 and M4/H4 margins (i.e., the spatial limits of
34 where halite is found in the mudstone intervals) have been drawn north of the WIPP based on
35 these data. The depth below the Culebra at which halite was reported has also been used to draw
36 the boundaries of the lower (M1/H1) or the upper (M2/H2) halite-bearing units of the Los
37 Medaños in this area. Anhydrite A1 divides the M1/H1 (below) and M2/H2 (above) intervals.
38 M2 (no halite) is about 3 meters (m) (10 feet [ft]) thick. If halite is reported within about 3 m
39 (10 ft) of the base of Culebra or is clearly above A1, H2 is considered to be present. The M1/H1
40 interval is about 33–37 m (110–120 ft) thick at the WIPP site. In potash drillholes north of the
41 WIPP site, where halite was reported less than 33 m (110 ft) below the Culebra, H1 is present.
42 Within the zone for H1, other drillholes frequently reveal halite less than 33 m (110 ft) below the
43 Culebra.

1 It should be noted that the report of “top of salt” or first salt in records for potash drillholes does
2 not consistently mean the same thing and is frequently not the uppermost halite. It may instead
3 mean the first halite that is encountered after coring begins or the first unit that is dominantly
4 halite. Detailed inspection of logs sometimes shows halite described from cuttings, with a
5 summary report of “top of salt” much deeper. In some cases, it appears “top of salt” is an
6 estimate of where the Salado-Rustler contact should be.

7 Halite margins in the Rustler are interpreted as mainly due to depositional limits of saltpan
8 environments and syndepositional removal of some halite exposed in saline mud flat deposits
9 (Holt and Powers 1988). The halite margins are expected to be the locus of halite dissolution, if
10 any, since the Rustler was deposited. Facies including halite beds or halite cements are expected
11 to be less permeable than the equivalent mudstone facies. As a consequence, the margin is more
12 likely to be attacked by advection and diffusion at the margin, from the mudstone facies side of
13 the margin. In addition, removing halite along the margin as the saltpan margin fluctuates is
14 likely to introduce some vertical and horizontal discontinuities that persist after lithification and
15 are not created where the saltpan persisted. Water in adjacent units or in the mudstone unit likely
16 has more pathways along these margins, increasing the likelihood that the margins will be the
17 locus of dissolution. Recent findings of a narrow margin along which halite is dissolved from
18 the upper Salado (Powers et al. 2003) are consistent with the expectation that halite margins in
19 the Rustler would be the locus of dissolution.

20 Two areas have been identified where halite appears to have been dissolved from the M3/H3
21 interval after deposition of the Rustler. These areas are shown with the annotation “H3 once
22 present?” on Figure TFIELD-3. In the vicinity of drillhole H-19b0 and south (the southern area
23 shown), cores of several WIPP drillholes show brecciation of the upper Tamarisk Member
24 anhydrite in response to dissolution. Another area of dissolution, previously discussed in Holt
25 and Powers (1988), Powers and Holt (1995), and Beauheim and Holt (1990), is around WIPP-13
26 (the northern area shown), and may represent an outlier of salt left behind during syndepositional
27 removal of halite from the M3 areas west of the WIPP site (Powers and Holt 2000). These areas
28 have not been extended interpretively on Figure TFIELD-3 as was done in Beauheim and Holt
29 (1990), but are limited to the vicinities of the locations at which evidence of dissolution has been
30 directly observed.

31 Because of the position of M2/H2 directly beneath the Culebra, dissolution of H2 might be
32 expected to have a strong influence on Culebra transmissivity. However, the H2 depositional
33 margin is largely east of the WIPP site, barely crossing the southern portion of the eastern WIPP
34 site boundary (Figure TFIELD-3). H2 dissolution does not appear to be a factor affecting
35 Culebra transmissivity in any hydrology test well for WIPP, but there are no direct observations
36 along the H2 margin.

TFIELD-3.0 Development of Model Relating Culebra Transmissivity to Geologic Factors

Holt and Powers (1988), Powers and Holt (1990), Beauheim and Holt (1990), and Holt (1997) have described the geology and geologic history of the Culebra. The following model is developed from their work and is consistent with their interpretations. It is important to note that this work follows Holt (1997) and assumes that variability in Culebra transmissivity is due strictly to post-depositional processes. Throughout the following discussion, the informal stratigraphic subdivisions of Holt and Powers (1988) are used to identify geologic units within the Rustler (Figure TFIELD-4).

The spatial distribution of Culebra transmissivity on a regional scale is a function of a series of deterministic geologic controls, including Culebra overburden thickness, dissolution of the upper Salado, and the occurrence of halite in units above or below the Culebra. Each of these geologic controls can be determined at any location using geological map data. In the region between the margin of upper Salado dissolution and the margin of halite occurrence above the Culebra, which includes the WIPP site, however, high-transmissivity (high-T) regions occur that cannot be predicted using geologic data. These high-T zones are treated stochastically, using what is termed a fracture-interconnectivity indicator.

In the following paragraphs, the fracture-interconnectivity indicator is defined, and then the specifics of each hypothesized control on Culebra transmissivity are outlined. Finally, a linear model relating these controls to Culebra transmissivity is presented that provides an excellent fit to the available data, is testable, and is consistent with our understanding of Culebra geology.

TFIELD-3.1 Fracture Interconnection


Culebra transmissivity data show a bimodal distribution (Figure TFIELD-5). Interpretations of hydraulic tests (e.g., Beauheim and Ruskauff 1998) and observations of the presence or absence of open fractures in core show the bimodal transmissivity distribution to be the result of hydraulically significant fractures. Some degree of fracturing is evident in all Culebra cores, but the fractures tend to be filled with gypsum at locations where the transmissivity inferred from hydraulic tests is less than approximately 4×10^{-6} square meters per second (m^2/s) ($\log_{10} = -5.4$). Where \log_{10} transmissivity (m^2/s) is greater than -5.4 , hydraulic tests show double-porosity responses and open fractures are observed in core. Therefore, a fracture-interconnectivity indicator is defined based on a cutoff of \log_{10} transmissivity (m^2/s) = -5.4 :

$$I_f = \begin{cases} 1, & \log_{10} T(\text{m}^2/\text{s}) > -5.4 \\ 0, & \log_{10} T(\text{m}^2/\text{s}) \leq -5.4 \end{cases} \quad (\text{TFIELD.1})$$

Open, interconnected fractures and high transmissivities occur in regions affected by Salado dissolution (e.g., Nash Draw) and in areas west of the M3/H3 margin where gypsum fracture fillings are absent.


**Formal Stratigraphy
After
Lang (1935) and
Powers and Holt (1999)**

**Informal Stratigraphy
of
Holt and Powers (1988)**



1
2

Figure TFIELD-4. Stratigraphic Subdivisions of the Rustler



1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-5. Histogram of log₁₀ Culebra Transmissivity. Data from U.S.**
 3 **Department of Energy (1996), Beauheim and Ruskauff (1998), and**
 4 **Beauheim (2002c).**

5 **TFIELD-3.2 Overburden Thickness**

6 An inverse relationship exists between Culebra overburden thickness and transmissivity. At the
 7 WIPP wells for which transmissivity data are available, the Culebra overburden thickness ranges
 8 from 3.7 m (at WIPP-29) to 414.5 m (at H-10) (Mercer 1983), increasing from west to east.
 9 Overburden thickness is a metric for two different controls on Culebra transmissivity. First,
 10 fracture apertures are limited by overburden thickness (e.g., Currie and Nwachukwu 1974),
 11 which should lead to lower transmissivity where Culebra depths are great (Beauheim and Holt
 12 1990, Holt 1997). Second, erosion of overburden leads to changes in stress fractures, and the
 13 amount of Culebra fracturing increases as the overburden thickness decreases (Holt 1997). Holt
 14 (1997) estimates that at least 350 m of overburden has been eroded at the center of the WIPP site
 15 (where the Culebra is at a depth of approximately 214 m) since the end of the Triassic, with more
 16 erosion occurring west of the site center where overburden (chiefly the Dewey Lake) is thinner
 17 and less erosion occurring to the east where Triassic deposits are thicker.

18 **TFIELD-3.3 Salado Dissolution**

19 In regions north, south, and west of the WIPP site, Cenozoic dissolution has affected the upper
 20 Salado Formation (Figure TFIELD-2). Where this dissolution has occurred, the rocks overlying
 21 the Salado, including the Culebra, are strained (leading to larger apertures in existing fractures),
 22 fractured, collapsed, and brecciated (e.g., Beauheim and Holt 1990, Holt 1997). All WIPP wells

1 within the upper-Salado-dissolution zone fall within the high-T population, and all regions
2 affected by Salado dissolution are expected to have well-interconnected fractures and high-T.

3 **TFIELD-3.4 Halite Overlying the Culebra**

4 All wells (e.g., H-12 and H-17) located where halite occurs in the M3/H3 interval of the
5 Tamarisk (Figure TFIELD-3) show low-transmissivity (low-T). Transmissivity data are limited
6 in this region, but it is unlikely that halite would survive in M3/H3, only several meters from the
7 Culebra, in regions of high-T where Culebra flow rates are relatively high. High-T zones,
8 therefore, are assumed to not occur in regions where halite is present in the M3/H3 interval.

9 **TFIELD-3.5 Halite Bounding the Culebra**

10 In regions where halite is present in the M2/H2 interval directly below the Culebra, no reliable
11 quantitative estimates of Culebra transmissivity are available. Beauheim (1987) estimates
12 transmissivity at P-18, the only tested well at which halite is present in the M2/H2 interval, to be
13 less (probably much less) than $4 \times 10^{-9} \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$ ($\log_{10} = -8.4$). In much of the area where halite is
14 present in the M2/H2 interval (including the P-18 location), halite is also present in the M3/H3
15 interval. Based upon geologic observations of halite-bound units elsewhere within the WIPP
16 area, Holt (1997) suggests that porosity within the Culebra may contain abundant halite cements
17 in these areas. Beauheim and Holt (1990) and Holt (1997) indicate that Culebra porosity shows
18 increasing amounts of pore-filling cement east of the WIPP site. Consequently, Culebra
19 transmissivity is assumed to be much lower in the region where halite occurs both above (M3/H3
20 interval) and below (M2/H2 interval) the Culebra. Much lower-T is also assumed in the area
21 northeast of the WIPP site where halite is present in the M2/H2 interval but absent in the M3/H3
22 interval (see Figure TFIELD-3).


23 **TFIELD-3.6 High-Transmissivity Zones**

24 In addition to the high-T that occurs everywhere dissolution of the upper Salado has occurred,
25 high-T zones also occur in the Culebra in the region bounded by the limit of upper Salado
26 dissolution to the west and by the margin of where halite is present in the M2/H2 and M3/H3
27 intervals to the east (see Figure TFIELD-2 and Figure TFIELD-3). Fracture openness and
28 interconnectivity in these high-T zones are controlled by a complicated history of fracturing with
29 several episodes of cement precipitation and dissolution (Beauheim and Holt 1990; Holt 1997).
30 No geologic metric has yet been defined that allows prediction of where fractures are filled or
31 open, hence our knowledge of this indicator east of the Salado dissolution margin is limited to
32 the test well locations shown in Figure TFIELD-6. Consequently, the spatial location of high-T
33 zones between the Salado dissolution margin and the M2/H2 and M3/H3 margins is treated
34 stochastically.

35 **TFIELD-3.7 Linear Transmissivity Model**

36 Using the hypothesized geologic controls on Culebra transmissivity, the following linear model
37 for $Y(x) = \log_{10} T(x)$ was constructed:

$$38 \quad Y(x) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 d(x) + \beta_3 I_f(x) + \beta_4 I_D(x) \quad (\text{TFIELD.2})$$



TR-6115-192-1

1
2

Figure TFIELD-6. Well Locations and \log_{10} Culebra Transmissivities

1 where β_i ($i = 1, 2, 3, 4$) are regression coefficients, x is a two-dimensional location vector
 2 consisting of Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) X and UTM Y coordinates, $d(x)$ is the
 3 overburden thickness, $I_f(x)$ is the fracture-interconnectivity indicator given in Equation
 4 (TFIELD.1) that assumes the value of 1 if fracturing and high-T have been observed at point x
 5 and 0 otherwise, and $I_D(x)$ is a dissolution indicator function that assumes the value of 1 if Salado
 6 dissolution has occurred at point x and 0 otherwise. In this model, regression coefficient β_1 is the
 7 intercept value for the linear model. Coefficient β_2 is the slope of $Y(x)/d(x)$. Coefficients β_3 and
 8 β_4 represent adjustments to the intercept for the occurrence of interconnected fractures and
 9 Salado dissolution, respectively. Although other types of linear models could be developed, this
 10 model is consistent with the conceptual model relating transmissivity to geologic controls and
 11 can be tested using published WIPP geologic and transmissivity data. Note that the regression
 12 model does not explicitly contain terms relating Culebra transmissivity to zones where the
 13 Culebra is bounded by halite in both the M2/H2 and M3/H3 intervals because of lack of data
 14 from these areas. Therefore, it cannot be used to predict transmissivity east of the M2/H2
 15 margin.

16 **TFIELD-3.8 Linear-Regression Analysis**

17 A linear-regression model was written using the Windows[®]-based program MATHCAD[™] 7
 18 Professional specifically for this application. Although other variables are input, this model
 19 requires only \log_{10} transmissivity data from tested wells, the depth of the Culebra at those wells,
 20 and an estimate of whether dissolution of the upper Salado has or has not occurred at each
 21 location. The fracture interconnectivity indicator is defined from the \log_{10} transmissivity data,
 22 and a Salado dissolution indicator is defined using the Salado dissolution data. These data are
 23 then used in a standard linear regression algorithm to determine the regression coefficients for
 24 Equation (TFIELD.2).

25 The regression coefficients for Equation (TFIELD.2) derived from this analysis are presented in
 26 Table TFIELD-1. The regression has a multiple correlation coefficient (R^2) of 0.941 and a
 27 regression ANOVA F statistic of 222. The number of degrees of freedom about the regression
 28 (n) equals the number of observations (46) minus the number of parameters (4). The number of
 29 degrees of freedom due to the regression (m) equals the number of parameters (4) minus 1. With
 30 $n = 42$ and $m = 3$, the regression is significant above the 0.999 level. Residuals show no
 31 anomalous behavior. Accordingly, the regression model provides an accurate and reasonable
 32 description of the data. The fit of the regression to the \log_{10} transmissivity data is shown in
 33 Figure TFIELD-7.

34 **Table TFIELD-1. Regression Coefficients for Equations (TFIELD.2) and (TFIELD.3)**

β_1	β_2	β_3	β_4
-5.441	-4.636×10^{-3}	1.926	0.678

35
 36 The regression model does not predict transmissivity in the regions where the Culebra is
 37 underlain by halite in the M2/H2 interval because no quantitative data were available from these
 38 regions to be used in deriving the regression. In these regions, the following modified version of
 39 the regression model of Equation (TFIELD.2) is applied:




Figure TFIELD-7. Regression Fit to Observed Culebra $\log_{10} T$ Data

$$Y(x) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 d(x) + \beta_3 I_f(x) + \beta_4 I_D(x) + \beta_5 I_H(x) \quad (\text{TFIELD.3})$$

where $I_H(x)$ is a halite indicator function. This indicator is assigned a value of 1 in locations where halite occurs in the M2/H2 interval and 0 otherwise. The coefficient β_5 is set equal to -1 so that Equation (TFIELD.3) reduces the predicted transmissivity values by one order of magnitude where halite occurs in the M2/H2 interval, to accord qualitatively with the expected transmissivity reduction discussed in Section TFIELD-3.5 of this appendix. With knowledge (or stochastic estimations) of the values of the geologic controls (e.g., Culebra depth, fracture-interconnectivity indicator, dissolution indicator, and halite indicator), Culebra transmissivity values can be predicted at unobserved locations in the WIPP Culebra model domain using Equation (TFIELD.3).

1 **TFIELD-4.0 Calculation of Base T Fields**

2 In this section, a method is developed for applying the linear regression model from Section
3 TFIELD-3.0 of this appendix to predict Culebra transmissivity across a model domain
4 encompassing the WIPP area. Culebra overburden thickness, Salado dissolution, and the
5 presence or absence of halite in units bounding the Culebra can be deterministically evaluated
6 across the WIPP region using maps constructed from subsurface data (Section TFIELD-2.0).
7 The presence of open, interconnected fractures, however, cannot be deterministically assessed
8 across the WIPP area using maps. A geostatistical approach, conditional indicator simulation, is
9 used to generate 500 equiprobable realizations of zones with hydraulically significant fractures in
10 the WIPP region. These simulations are parameterized using the frequency of occurrence of
11 WIPP wells with hydraulically significant fractures and a fit to a variogram constructed using
12 data from those same wells. The regression model is then applied to the entire WIPP area by:

- 13 1. Overlaying the geologic map data for Culebra overburden thickness, Salado dissolution, and
14 the presence or absence of halite in units bounding the Culebra with each of the 500
15 equiprobable realizations of zones containing open, interconnected fractures
- 16 2. Sampling each grid point within the model domain to determine the overburden thickness
17 and the indicator values for Salado dissolution, overlying or underlying halite, and fracture
18 interconnectivity
- 19 3. Using the sampled data at each grid point with the regression model coefficients to estimate
20 Culebra transmissivity

21 When applied to the 500 equiprobable realizations of zones containing open, interconnected
22 fractures, this procedure generates 500 stochastically varying Culebra base T fields. Details
23 about the creation of the base T fields are given in Holt and Yarbrough (2002, 2003a, 2003b).

24 **TFIELD-4.1 Definition of Model Domain**

25 Two principal factors were considered in selecting the boundaries for the Culebra model domain.
26 First, model boundaries should coincide with natural groundwater divides where feasible, or be
27 far enough from the southern portion of the WIPP site, where transport will be modeled, to have
28 minimal influence in that area. Second, the model domain should encompass known features
29 with the potential to affect Culebra water levels at the WIPP site (e.g., potash tailings ponds).
30 The modeling domain selected is 22.4 kilometers (km) (13.9 miles [mi]) east-west by 30.7 km
31 (19.1 mi) north-south, aligned with the compass directions (Figure TFIELD-6). This is the same
32 as the domain used by LaVenue, Cauffman, and Pickens (1990) except that the current domain
33 extends 1 km (0.62 mi) farther to the west than the 1990 domain. The modeling domain is
34 discretized into 68,768 uniform 100 m (328 ft) by 100 m (328 ft) cells. The northern model
35 boundary is slightly north of the northern end of Nash Draw, 12 km (7.5 mi) north of the
36 northern WIPP site boundary and about 1 km (0.62 mi) north of Mississippi Potash
37 Incorporated's east tailings pile. The eastern boundary lies in a low-T region that contributes
38 little flow to the modeling domain. The southern boundary lies 12.2 km (7.6 mi) south of the
39 southern WIPP site boundary, 1.7 km (1.5 mi) south of our southernmost well (H-9) and far
40 enough from the WIPP site to have little effect on transport rates on the site. The western model
41 boundary passes through the IMC tailings pond (Laguna Uno of Hunter [1985]) due west of the
42 WIPP site in Nash Draw. Boundary conditions assigned for the model are discussed in Section

1 TFIELD-6.2. The coordinates of each corner of the domain are given in Table TFIELD-2, in
 2 North American Datum 27 UTM coordinates.

3 **Table TFIELD-2. Coordinates of the Numerical Model Domain Corners**

Domain Corner	UTM X Coordinate (m)	UTM Y Coordinate (m)
Northeast	624,050	3,597,150
Northwest	601,650	3,597,150
Southeast	624,050	3,566,450
Southwest	601,650	3,566,450

4

5 **TFIELD-4.2 Reduction of Geologic Map Data**

6 To create useable data sets for conditional simulation of high-T zones and prediction of Culebra
 7 transmissivity, the geological maps described above in Section TFIELD-2.0 were imported into a
 8 geographic information systems environment and digitized. A uniform 100-m (328-ft) grid was
 9 then created over the Culebra model domain. Using the Culebra structure contour map data
 10 (Figure TFIELD-1) and surface elevation data obtained from the United States Geological
 11 Survey (USGS) National Elevation Dataset (U.S. Geological Survey 2002), an isopach map of
 12 the Culebra overburden on the 100-m (328-ft) model grid was created.

13 Using maps showing occurrence of halite in the units above and below the Culebra and well
 14 locations, soft data files were created for conditional indicator simulations. Transmissivity
 15 within 120 m (374 ft) of each well is assumed to be from the same population (e.g., high- or
 16 low-T reflecting open, interconnected fractures or filled (poorly interconnected) fractures,
 17 respectively), and regions where the Culebra is overlain by halite in M3/H3 or underlain by
 18 halite in M2/H2 are assumed to be low-T regions.

19 Using maps of Salado dissolution and the occurrence of halite in the units above and below the
 20 Culebra, 100-m (328-ft) indicator grids were created over the model domain. These indicator
 21 grids were created for regions affected by Salado dissolution, regions where the Culebra is
 22 underlain by halite in the M2/H2 interval, and a middle zone in which the Culebra is neither
 23 overlain nor underlain by halite where high-T zones occur stochastically (Figure TFIELD-8).

24 **TFIELD-4.3 Indicator Variography**

25 Excluding data where Salado dissolution occurs, Culebra transmissivity data are indicator
 26 transformed (1 for \log_{10} transmissivity (m^2/s) > -5.4 , 0 otherwise). A high-T indicator
 27 variogram is then constructed for the indicator data in the region not affected by Salado
 28 dissolution using the Geostatistical Software Library (GSLIB) program GAMV (Deutsch and
 29 Journel 1998). The lag spacing for this variogram is selected to maximize variogram resolution.
 30 The resulting indicator variogram is then fit with an isotropic spherical variogram model:




Figure TFIELD-8. Zones for Indicator Grids

$$\gamma(h) = \begin{cases} s[1.5(h/\lambda) - 0.5(h/\lambda)^3] & \text{if } h \leq \lambda \\ s & \text{if } h \geq \lambda \end{cases} \quad (\text{TFIELD.4})$$

where $\gamma(h)$ is the variogram as a function of lag spacing h , s is the sill value of the indicator variogram, and λ is the correlation length. This variogram model minimizes the mean squared error between the experimental and modeled variogram. The sill value was determined using:


$$s = P[\log_{10} T (m^2/s) > -5.4] - \{P[\log_{10} T (m^2/s) > -5.4]\}^2 \quad (\text{TFIELD.5})$$

where $P[\cdot]$ is a cumulative distribution function. For the Culebra data set, excluding wells where dissolution has occurred, $s = 0.201$. The correlation length λ was estimated to be 1,790 m (5,873 ft). No nugget effect was included in the variogram model (Figure TFIELD-9). Variogram model parameters were then used in conditional indicator simulations of Culebra high-T zones.

TFIELD-4.4 Conditional Indicator Simulation


“Soft” indicator data were created for the indicator simulations. To ensure that no high-T regions develop in areas where halite occurs in M2/H2 or M3/H3, soft data points, indicating low-T, were placed on a 200-m (656-ft) grid east of the M2/H2 and M3/H3 salt margins. This 200-m (656-ft) grid used the original 100-m (328-ft) grid excluding every other node to assure the 200-m (656-ft) soft data grid spatially overlay the 100-m (328-ft) grid. Soft data were also specified for every 100-m (328-ft) node along the combined lines of the M2/H2 and M3/H3 salt margins.

Additional soft data were created near well locations establishing a 120-m (394-ft) buffer around each well (Figure TFIELD-10). All 100-m (328-ft) grid nodes lying within the 120-m (394-ft) buffer were selected and assigned the transmissivity attribute of the well. Because all the nodes within 120 m (394 ft) of the well and the node corresponding to the block containing the well were selected as soft data, there was duplication in the input files. Only one data point can occupy a 100-m (328-ft) grid space during a realization. Therefore, the node closest to the well was eliminated from the soft data file.



1
2

Figure TFIELD-9. High-T Indicator Model and Experimental Variograms



3
4

Figure TFIELD-10. Soft Data Around Wells

5 Five hundred conditional indicator simulations were generated on the 100-m (328-ft) model grid
 6 using the GSLIB program SISIM (Deutsch and Journel 1998) with Culebra high-T indicator
 7 data, soft data for regions around wells and regions where halite underlies and overlies the
 8 Culebra, and the variogram parameters. The resulting indicator simulations were used in the
 9 construction of base T fields.


10 **TFIELD-4.5 Construction of Base Transmissivity Fields**

11 The linear predictor (Equation (TFIELD.3)) was used to generate 500 equally probable
 12 realizations of the transmissivity distribution in the Culebra model domain. This calculation

1 required the regression coefficients discussed in Section TFIELD-3.8, Culebra depth data
2 (Section TFIELD-3.2), a Salado dissolution indicator function, an indicator for where halite
3 occurs in M2/H2, and the 500 realizations of high-T indicators discussed in Section TFIELD-4.4.

4 The 500 base T fields were created in five sets. Each set consists of 10 groups of 10 realizations
5 given d##r## designations. The “d” counter ranges from 01 to 50, while the “r” counter ranges
6 from 01 to 10. An example base T field is shown in Figure TFIELD-11. Stochastically located
7 patches of relatively high-T (yellowish-green) can be clearly seen in the middle zone of the
8 model domain. (Note: On black and white copy, these patches appear as the lightest shade of
9 gray.)

D21R10 -- Uncalibrated



Explanation

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Well (transmissivity) | --- Nash Draw |
| ○ Low | — Salado Dissolution |
| ○ High | □ WIPP Site |
| --- Salt Margin m3/h3 | |
| --- Salt Margin m2/h2 | |



1
2

Figure TFIELD-11. Example Base T Field

1 **TFIELD-5.0 Construction of Seed Realizations**


2 The base T fields described in Section TFIELD-4.5 rely on a regression model to estimate
3 transmissivity at every location. By the nature of regression models, the estimated transmissivity
4 values will not honor the measured transmissivity values at the measurement locations.
5 Therefore, before using these base T fields in a flow model, they must be conditioned to the
6 measured transmissivity values. This conditioning is performed with a Gaussian geostatistical
7 simulation algorithm to generate a series of 500 spatially correlated residual fields where each
8 field has a mean value of zero. These fields are conditional such that the residual value at each
9 measurement location, when added to the value provided by the regression model (which is the
10 same for all 500 fields), provides the known transmissivity value at that location. The result of
11 adding the simulated residual field to the base T field is the “seed” realization.

12 This process is shown conceptually along a west-to-east cross section of the Culebra in Figure
13 TFIELD-12. The upper image shows the value of the residuals at five transmissivity
14 measurement locations across the cross section. These residuals are calculated as the observed
15 (measured) transmissivity value minus the base field transmissivity value at the same locations.
16 Positive residuals are where the measured transmissivity value is greater than that of the base T
17 field. To create a T field from these residuals, there needs to be a way to tie the base field to the
18 measured transmissivity values. This tie is accomplished by creating a spatial simulation of the
19 residual values, a “residual field.” The middle image of Figure TFIELD-12 is an example
20 residual field as a (red) dashed line along the cross section. This residual field is constructed
21 through geostatistical simulation using a variogram model fit to the residual data. The residual
22 field honors the measured residuals at their measurement locations and returns to a mean value
23 of zero at distances far away from the measurement locations. Finally, this residual field is
24 added to the base T field to create the seed T field. The base T field is represented by the solid
25 (blue) line in the bottom image of Figure TFIELD-12 and the seed T field is shown by the dotted
26 line. The seed T field corresponds to the base T field except at those locations where it must
27 deviate to match the measured transmissivity data. The large discontinuity shown in the base T
28 field at the bottom of Figure TFIELD-12 is due to the stochastic simulation of high-T zones
29 within the Culebra.

30 A total of 46 measured transmissivity values and corresponding residual data, both in units of
31 \log_{10} (m^2/s), are available (Table TFIELD-3). For each pair of \log_{10} transmissivity and residual
32 data, the well name and the easting (X) and northing (Y) UTM coordinates are also given (for
33 multiwell hydropads, a single well’s coordinates were used).

34 The process of creating the residual fields is to use the residual data to generate variograms in the
35 VarioWin software package and to then create conditional stochastic Gaussian geostatistical
36 simulations of the residual field within the GSLIB program SGSIM (Deutsch and Journel 1998).

37 To use the data in a Gaussian simulation algorithm, it is first necessary to transform the
38 distribution of the raw residual data to a standard normal distribution. This is accomplished
39 through a process called the “normal-score transform,” where each transformed residual value is
40 the normal score of each original datum. The normal-score transform is a relatively simple two-
41 step process. First the cumulative frequency of each original residual value, $\text{cdf}(i)$, is determined
42 as:



1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-12. Conceptual Cross Section Showing the Updating of the Residual Field**
 3 **and the Base T Field into the Seed T Field**

4

$$cdf(i) = \frac{R(i) - 0.5}{N} \tag{TFIELD.6}$$

5 where $R(i)$ is the rank (smallest to largest) of the i th residual value and N is the total number of
 6 data (46 in this case). Then for each cumulative frequency value, the corresponding normal-
 7 score value is calculated from the inverse of the standard normal distribution. By definition, the
 8 standard normal distribution has a mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation of 1.0. Further details of
 9 the normal-score transform process can be found in Deutsch and Journel (1998).

10 The two-step normal-score transformation process is conducted in Microsoft[®] Excel[®] (see details
 11 in McKenna and Hart 2003b). The resulting normal-score values are the distance from the mean
 12 as measured in standard deviations. The parameters describing the residual and normal-score
 13 transformed distributions are presented in Table TFIELD-4.

Table TFIELD-3. \log_{10} Transmissivity Data Used in Inverse Calibrations

Well ID	Easting (UTM, m)	Northing (UTM, m)	\log_{10} T (m^2/s)	\log_{10} T Residual (m^2/s)
AEC-7	621126	3589381	-6.8	-0.11078
CB-1	613191	3578049	-6.5	-0.32943
D-268	608702	3578877	-5.7	0.27914
DOE-1	615203	3580333	-4.9	-0.21004
DOE-2	613683	3585294	-4.0	0.69492
Engle	614953	3567454	-4.3	-0.51632
ERDA-9	613696	3581958	-6.3	0.15250
H-1	613423	3581684	-6.0	0.41295
H-2c	612666	3581668	-6.2	0.13594
H-3b1	613729	3580895	-4.7	-0.22131
H-4c	612406	3578499	-6.1	0.05221
H-5c	616903	3584802	-6.7	0.02946
H-6c	610610	3584983	-4.4	-0.01524
H-7c	608095	3574640	-2.8	0.39794
H-9c	613974	3568234	-4.0	-0.22763
H-10b	622975	3572473	-7.4	-0.01484
H-11b4	615301	3579131	-4.3	0.25314
H-12	617023	3575452	-6.7	-0.07647
H-14	612341	3580354	-6.5	-0.26934
H-15	615315	3581859	-6.8	-0.12631
H-16	613369	3582212	-6.1	0.34962
H-17	615718	3577513	-6.6	-0.14310
H-18	612264	3583166	-5.7	0.73159
H-19b0	614514	3580716	-5.2	-0.62242
P-14	609084	3581976	-3.5	0.16212
P-15	610624	3578747	-7.0	-0.95938
P-17	613926	3577466	-6.0	0.24762
USGS-1	606462	3569459	-3.3	0.28998
WIPP-12	613710	3583524	-7.0	-0.39627
WIPP-13	612644	3584247	-4.1	0.42180
WIPP-18	613735	3583179	-6.5	0.06840
WIPP-19	613739	3582782	-6.2	0.32598
WIPP-21	613743	3582319	-6.6	-0.11148
WIPP-22	613739	3582653	-6.4	0.10549

Table TFIELD-3. \log_{10} Transmissivity Data Used in Inverse Calibrations (Continued)

Well ID	Easting (UTM, m)	Northing (UTM, m)	\log_{10} T (m^2/s)	\log_{10} T Residual (m^2/s)
WIPP-25	606385	3584028	-3.5	-0.01378
WIPP-26	604014	3581162	-2.9	0.21598
WIPP-27	604426	3593079	-3.3	-0.03209
WIPP-28	611266	3594680	-3.6	-0.15124
WIPP-29	596981	3578694	-3.0	-0.12497
WIPP-30	613721	3589701	-6.7	-0.35131
WQSP-1	612561	3583427	-4.5	0.01540
WQSP-2	613776	3583973	-4.7	-0.02729
WQSP-3	614686	3583518	-6.8	-0.15139
WQSP-4	614728	3580766	-4.9	-0.28895
WQSP-5	613668	3580353	-5.9	0.47178
WQSP-6	612605	3580736	-6.6	-0.32261

1


2 **Table TFIELD-4. Statistical Parameters Describing the Distributions of the Raw and**
3 **Normal-Score Transformed Residual Data**

Parameter	Raw Residual	Normal-Score Transformed Residual Data
Mean	0.000	0.000
Median	-0.015	0.000
Standard Deviation	0.330	0.997
Minimum	-0.959	-2.295
Maximum	0.732	2.295

4


5 The omnidirectional variogram is calculated with a 250-m (820-ft) lag spacing. The
6 experimental variogram is shown in Figure TFIELD-13. The model fit to this experimental
7 variogram is Gaussian with a nugget of 0.2, a sill of 0.8, and a range of 1,050 m (3,445 ft). The
8 sum of the nugget and sill values is constrained to equal the theoretical variance of 1.0 by the
9 sgsim software that is used to create the spatially correlated residual fields.

10 The variogram parameters for the normal-score transformed residuals are used directly in the
11 sgsim program to create 500 conditional realizations of the residual field. Each of these 500
12 residual fields is used as an initial residual field and each one is assigned to an individual base T
13 field. An example of a realization of the residual field and its combination with a base T field is
14 shown in Figure TFIELD-14. From Figure TFIELD-14, the effect of the residual field on the
15 base T field can be seen. The residual field perturbs the transmissivities to match the measured
16 transmissivities at the well locations. The discrete features that are part of the original base



1
2
3

Figure TFIELD-13. Omnidirectional Variogram Model Fit to the Experimental Variogram of the Transmissivity Residuals



4

Figure TFIELD-14. An Example of the Creation of a Seed T Field.

The Base T Field (Left Image) is Combined with the Initial Residual Field Created Through Geostatistical Simulation (Center Image) to Produce the Seed T Field (Right Image). That Field is Then Used as the Initial Field for the First Iteration of the Inverse Calibration Procedure. All Three Color Scales Denote the \log_{10} Transmissivity (m^2/s) Value.


T field (e.g., high-T zones in the middle of the domain) are retained when the residual field is added to the base field, although transmissivity values within those features may be altered to a degree.

12
13
14

1 A number of distributed locations within the modeling domain are selected and designated as
 2 “pilot points.” PEST adjusts the transmissivity value at each of these pilot points to achieve a
 3 better match between the groundwater flow model results and the observed steady-state and
 4 transient head data. The adjustments in transmissivity at each pilot point cannot be made
 5 independently of surrounding transmissivity values and, therefore, these surrounding
 6 transmissivity values must be updated in a manner consistent with the change made at the pilot
 7 point. This updating is done by applying a change at each of the surrounding points that is a
 8 weighted fraction of the change made at the pilot point. The weights are calculated from the
 9 residual variogram.

10 These updates are necessary to create a final T field that honors all observed transmissivity
 11 measurements and matches the observed heads when used as input to a groundwater flow model.
 12 Therefore, it is also necessary to calculate and model a variogram on the raw, not normal-score
 13 transformed residuals for use in this kriging process.

14 This variogram was also calculated with a 250-m (820-ft) lag and is omnidirectional. A doubly
 15 nested spherical variogram model was fit to the experimental variogram. The variogram
 16 parameters are a nugget of 0.008, a first sill and range of 0.033 and 500 m (1,640 ft),
 17 respectively, and a second sill and range of 0.067 and 1,500 m (4,921 ft), respectively (Figure
 18 TFIELD-15).



19
 20 **Figure TFIELD-15. Experimental and Model Variograms for the Raw-Space (Not**
 21 **Normal-Score Transformed) Transmissivity Residual Data**

TFIELD-6.0 T-Field Calibration to Steady-State and Transient Heads

This section presents details on the modeling approach used to calibrate the T fields to both the 2000 steady-state heads and 1,332 transient drawdown measurements. This section is divided into the following subsections:

1. Assumptions made in the modeling and the implications of these assumptions are provided. (Section TFIELD-6.1)
2. The initial heads used for each calibration are estimated at each location in the domain using the heads measured in 2000 using kriging and accounting for the regional trend in the head values. (Section TFIELD-6.2)
3. The initial heads are used to assign fixed-head boundaries to three sides of the model. The fourth side, the western edge, is set as a no-flow boundary for the model. (Section TFIELD-6.3)
4. The transient head observations for each hydraulic test and each observation well are selected from the database. These heads are shown as a function of time for each hydraulic test. (Section TFIELD-6.4)
5. The spatial and temporal discretization of the model domain are presented. (Section TFIELD-6.5 and Section TFIELD-6.6)
6. The transient head observations are given relative weights based on the inverse of the maximum observed drawdown in each hydraulic test. The relative weights assigned to the steady-state observations are also discussed. (Section TFIELD-6.7)
7. The locations of the adjustable pilot points are determined using a combination of approaches. (Section TFIELD-6.8)

All of these steps can be considered as preprocessing aspects of the stochastic inverse calibration procedure. The actual calibrations are done using an iterative coupling of the MODFLOW-2000 and PEST codes. The details of this process are covered in McKenna and Hart (2003a, 2003b), and are briefly summarized in Section TFIELD-6.9.

TFIELD-6.1 Modeling Assumptions

The major assumptions that apply to this set of model calculations are as follows.

1. The boundary conditions along the model domain boundary are known and do not change over the time frame of the model. This assumption applies to both the no-flow boundary along the western edge of the domain as well as to the fixed-head boundaries that were created to be consistent with the 2000 head measurements in the model domain. Implicit in this assumption is that the fixed-head boundary conditions do not have a significant impact on the transient tests that were simulated in the interior of the model at times other than the 2000 period.
2. The fracture permeability of the Culebra can be adequately modeled as a continuum at the 100-m (328-ft) × 100-m (328-ft) grid block scale and the measured transmissivity values used to condition the model are representative of the transmissivity in the 100-m (328-ft) × 100-m (328-ft) grid block in which the well test was performed. Implicit in this assumption


1 is the prior assumption that the hydraulic test interpretations were done correctly and used the
2 correct conceptual model.

- 3 3. Variable fluid densities in the Culebra can be adequately represented by casting the
4 numerical solution in terms of freshwater head. Davies (1989) investigated the effects of
5 variable fluid density on the directions of flow calculated in the Culebra using a freshwater-
6 head approach. As the Culebra flow system was conceptualized and modeled by Davies,
7 most of the water flowing in the Culebra in the vicinity of the WIPP site ultimately
8 discharged to the Pecos River southwest of WIPP. When variable fluid density was taken
9 into account, the only locations within the model domain where the flow direction changed
10 by more than 10 degrees were regions 1.1 to 14.3 km (0.7 to 8.9 mi) south of the WIPP site,
11 where the flow direction shifted as much as 70 degrees to the east toward a more downdip
12 direction (but still primarily to the south) (Davies, 1989, Figure 35 and Figure 36). As
13 currently conceptualized, flow in the Culebra in the vicinity of WIPP does not discharge to
14 the Pecos to the southwest, but instead goes to the southsoutheast toward the Paduca oilfield
15 where extensive dissolution of the Salado and collapse of the Culebra has occurred (see
16 Figure TFIELD-1). Hence, taking variable fluid density into account would have little effect
17 on the flow direction.

18 **TFIELD-6.2 Initial Heads**

19 A set of initial head values was estimated across the flow model domain based on water-level
20 measurements made in late 2000 (Beauheim 2002b). The water-level measurements were
21 converted to freshwater heads using fluid-density data collected from pressure-density surveys
22 performed in the wells and/or from water-quality sampling. The head values estimated at the
23 cells in the interior of the domain were used as initial values of the heads and were subsequently
24 updated by the groundwater flow model until the final solution was achieved. The head values
25 estimated for the fixed-head cells along the north, east, and south boundaries of the model
26 domain remained constant for the groundwater flow calculation. The estimation of the initial
27 and boundary heads was done by kriging. Observed heads both within and outside of the flow
28 model domain (Figure TFIELD-16) were used in the kriging process.

29 Kriging is a geostatistical estimation technique that uses a variogram model to estimate values of
30 a sampled property at unsampled locations. Kriging is designed for the estimation of stationary
31 fields (see Goovaerts 1997); however, the available head data show a significant trend
32 (nonstationary behavior) from high head in the northern part of the domain to low head in the
33 southern part of the domain. This behavior is typical of groundwater head values measured
34 across a large area with a head gradient. To use kriging with this type of nonstationary data, a
35 Gaussian polynomial function is fit to the data, and the differences between the polynomial and
36 the measured data (the “residuals”) are calculated and a variogram of the residuals is constructed.
37 This variogram and a kriging algorithm are then used to estimate the value of the residual at all
38 locations within a domain. The final step in the process is to add the trend from the previously
39 defined polynomial to the estimated residuals to get the final head estimates. This head
40 estimation process is similar to that used in the Culebra calculations done for the Compliance
41 Certification Application (CCA, U.S. Department of Energy 1996) (Lavenue 1996).



1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-16. Locations and Values of the 2000 Head Measurements Considered in**
 3 **the Steady-State Calibrations. The Approximate Extent of the**
 4 **Numerical Model Domain is Shown by the Black Rectangle in the**
 5 **Image.**

6 The available head data from late 2000, comprising 37 measurements, are listed in Table
 7 TFIELD-5. In general, these head measurements show a trend from high head in the north to
 8 low head in the south. The trend was modeled with a bivariate Gaussian function. The use of
 9 this Gaussian function with five estimated parameters allows considerable flexibility in the shape
 10 of the trend that can be fit through the observed data. The value of the Gaussian function, Z , is:

$$Z = a \exp \left[-\frac{1}{2} \left(\left(\frac{X - X_0}{b} \right)^2 + \left(\frac{Y - Y_0}{c} \right)^2 \right) \right] \quad \text{(TFIELD.7)}$$

12 where X_0 and Y_0 are the coordinates of the center of the function and b and c are the standard
 13 deviations of the function in the X (east-west) and Y (north-south) directions, respectively. The
 14 parameter a controls the height of the function. The Gaussian function was fit to the data using
 15 the regression wizard tool in the SigmaPlot® 2001 graphing software. The parameters estimated
 16 for the Gaussian function are presented in Table TFIELD-6. The fit of the Gaussian trend
 17 surface to the 2000 heads is shown in Figure TFIELD-17. The locations and values of the
 18 residuals (observed value–trend surface estimate) are shown in Figure TFIELD-18.

1 **Table TFIELD-5. Well Names and Locations of the 37 Head Measurements Obtained in**
 2 **Late 2000 Used to Define Boundary and Initial Heads**


Well	UTM X (Easting) (m)	UTM Y (Northing) (m)	2000 Freshwater Head (m amsl)
AEC-7	621126	3589381	933.19
DOE-1	615203	3580333	916.55
DOE-2	613683	3585294	940.03
ERDA-9	613696	3581958	921.59
H-1	613423	3581684	927.19
H-2b2	612661	3581649	926.62
H-3b2	613701	3580906	917.16
H-4b	612380	3578483	915.55
H-5b	616872	3584801	936.26
H-6b	610594	3585008	934.20
H-7b1	608124	3574648	913.86
H-9b	613989	3568261	911.57
H-11b4	615301	3579131	915.47
H-12	617023	3575452	914.66
H-14	612341	3580354	920.24
H-15	615315	3581859	919.87
H-17	615718	3577513	915.37
H-18	612264	3583166	937.22
H-19b0	614514	3580716	917.13
P-17	613926	3577466	915.20
WIPP-12	613710	3583524	935.30
WIPP-13	612644	3584247	935.17
WIPP-18	613735	3583179	936.08
WIPP-19	613739	3582782	932.66
WIPP-21	613743	3582319	927.00
WIPP-22	613739	3582653	930.96
WIPP-25	606385	3584028	932.70
WIPP-26	604014	3581162	921.06
WIPP-27	604426	3593079	941.01
WIPP-29	596981	3578701	905.36
WIPP-30	613721	3589701	936.88
WQSP-1	612561	3583427	935.64
WQSP-2	613776	3583973	938.82
WQSP-3	614686	3583518	935.89
WQSP-4	614728	3580766	917.49
WQSP-5	613668	3580353	917.22
WQSP-6	612605	3580736	920.02

3

1 **Table TFIELD-6. Parameters for the Gaussian Trend Surface Model Fit to the 2000 Heads**

Trend Surface Parameters	Value
X_0	611011.89
Y_0	3780891.50
a	1134.61
b	73559.35
c	313474.40

2



3

4

Figure TFIELD-17. Gaussian Trend Surface Fit to the 2000 Observed Heads

5


6

7

8

9

The next step in estimating the initial head values is to calculate an experimental variogram for each set of residuals and then fit a variogram model to each experimental variogram. Due to the rather limited number of data points, anisotropy in the spatial correlation of the residuals was not examined and an omnidirectional variogram was calculated. These calculations were done using the VARIOWIN (version 2.21) software (Pannatier 1996). The Gaussian variogram model is:




1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-18. Locations and Values of the Residuals Between the Gaussian Trend**
 3 **Surface Model and the Observed Head Data. The Approximate**
 4 **Boundary of the Flow Model is Shown as a Black Rectangle in the**
 5 **Image.**

6

$$\gamma(h) = C \left[1 - e^{-\left(\frac{3h^2}{a^2}\right)} \right] \text{ for } h > 0 \quad \text{(TFIELD.8)}$$

7 where C is the sill of the variogram, h is the distance between any two samples, or the lag
 8 spacing, and a is the practical range of the variogram, or the distance at which the model reaches
 9 95 percent (%) of the value of C . In addition to the sill and range, the variogram model may also
 10 have a nonzero intercept with the gamma (γ) axis of the variogram plot known as the nugget.
 11 Due to numerical instabilities in the kriging process associated with the Gaussian model without
 12 a nugget value, a small nugget was used in fitting each of the variogram models. The model
 13 variogram was fit to the experimental data (Figure TFIELD-19) and the parameters of this model
 14 are given in Table TFIELD-7.

15 The experimental variogram calculated on the 2000 data in Figure TFIELD-19 shows a number
 16 of points between lags 2,000 and 7,000 m (1.25 and 4.25 mi) that are above the variance of the
 17 data set (the horizontal dashed line). This behavior indicates that the Gaussian trend surface
 18 model used to calculate the residuals from the measured data did not remove the entire trend
 19 inherent in the observed data. A higher order trend surface model could be applied to these data
 20 to remove more of the trend, but the Gaussian trend surface model provides a reasonable
 21 estimate of the trend in the data.



1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-19. Omnidirectional Experimental (Straight-Line Segments) and Model**
 3 **Variograms of the Head Residuals (Curves) for the 2000 Heads. The**
 4 **Numbers Indicate the Number of Pairs of Values That Were Used to**
 5 **Calculate Each Point and the Horizontal Dashed Line Denotes the**
 6 **Variance of the Residual Data Set.**

7 **Table TFIELD-7. Model Variogram Parameters for the Head Residuals**


Parameter	Value
Sill	22
Range (meters)	3000
Nugget	4.5
Number of Data	37

8
 9 The GSLIB kriging program KT3D (Deutsch and Journel 1998) was used to estimate the residual
 10 values at all points on the grid within the model domain. The Gaussian trend surface was then
 11 added to the estimated residual values to produce the final estimates of the initial head field.


12 **TFIELD-6.3 Boundary Conditions**

13 Two types of boundary conditions were specified in MODFLOW-2000: constant-head and no-
 14 flow. Constant-head conditions were assigned along the eastern boundary of the model domain,
 15 and along the central and eastern portions of the northern and southern boundaries. Values of
 16 these heads were obtained from the kriged initial head field. The western model boundary passes
 17 through the Mosaic Potash Carlsbad tailings pond (Laguna Uno) due west of the WIPP site in
 18 Nash Draw. A no-flow boundary (a flow line) is specified in the model from this tailings pond


1 up the axis of Nash Draw to the northeast, reflecting the concept that groundwater flows down
 2 the axis of Nash Draw, forming a groundwater divide. Similarly, another no-flow boundary is
 3 specified from the tailings pond down the axis of the southeastern arm of Nash Draw to the
 4 southern model boundary, coinciding with a flow line in the regional modeling of Corbet and
 5 Knupp (1996). Thus, the northwestern and southwestern corners of the modeling domain
 6 are specified as inactive cells in MODFLOW-2000. The initial (starting) head field is shown in
 7 Figure TFIELD-20 and the head values along each boundary of the model domain are shown in
 8 Figure TFIELD-21 and Figure TFIELD-22.



9
 10 **Figure TFIELD-20. Map of Initial Heads Created Through Kriging and Used to Assign**
 11 **Fixed-Head Boundary Conditions**



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-21. Values of Fixed Heads Along the Eastern Boundary of the Model**
3 **Domain**



4
5 **Figure TFIELD-22. Values of Fixed Heads Along the Northern and Southern Boundaries**
6 **of the Model Domain. Note That Not All Locations Along the**
7 **Boundaries are Active Cells.**

TFIELD-6.4 Observed Steady-State and Transient Head Data Used in Model Calibration

In addition to being used to generate an initial head distribution, the water-level measurements made in 35 wells within the model domain during late 2000 were also used in steady-state model calibration. (Note that Table TFIELD-5 includes data from two wells—WIPP-27 and WIPP-29—that were used to define model boundary conditions but are outside the area of calibration).

The transient observation data used for the transient calibrations were taken from a number of different sources listed in Beauheim and Fox (2003). Responses to seven different hydraulic tests were employed in the transient portion of the calibration (Table TFIELD-8). Hydraulic responses for each of the 7 tests were monitored in 3 to 10 different observation wells depending on the hydraulic test.

A major change in the calibration data set from the CCA calculations is the exclusion of the hydraulic responses to the excavation of the exploratory (now salt) and ventilation (now waste) shafts in the current calibration. The responses to the shaft excavations were excluded because:

1. Only two wells (H-1 and H-3) responded directly to the shaft excavations and the areas between the shafts and these wells are stressed by other hydraulic tests that are included in the calibration data set (H-3b2, WIPP-13, and H-19b0).
2. It was difficult to model both the flux and pressure changes accurately during the excavation of the shafts with MODFLOW-2000. This difficulty is due to both the finite-difference discretization of MODFLOW-2000 that requires each shaft to be modeled as a complete model cell and some limitations of the data set.
3. The long-term effects of the shafts on site-wide water levels were important for the CCA modeling because that modeling sought to replicate heads over time. In the current CRA 2004 calibration effort, shaft effects are not important because drawdowns resulting from specific hydraulic tests are used as the calibration targets and shaft effects can be considered as second-order compared to the effects of the hydraulic tests that are simulated.

A small amount of processing of the observed data was necessary prior to using it in the calibration process. This processing included selecting the data values that would be used in the calibration procedure from the often voluminous measurements of head. These data were chosen to provide an adequate description of the transient observations at each observation well across the response time without making the modeling too computationally burdensome in terms of the temporal discretization necessary to model responses to these observations. Scientific judgment was used in selecting these data points. This selection process resulted in a total of 1,332 observations for use in the transient calibration.

Additionally, the modeling of the pressure data is done here in terms of drawdown. Therefore, the value of drawdown at the start of any transient test must be zero. A separate Perl script was written to normalize each set of observed heads to a zero value reference at the start of the test with the exception of the H-3 test that is only preceded by the steady-state simulation. The calculations are such that the resulting drawdown values are positive.

1 **Table TFIELD-8. Transient Hydraulic Test and Observation Wells for the Drawdown**
 2 **Data**

Stress Point	Observation Well	Observation Start	Observation End	Observation Type
H-3b2	DOE-1	10/15/1985	3/18/1986	Drawdown
	H-1	10/15/1985	4/14/1986	Drawdown
	H-2b2	10/15/1985	4/2/1986	Drawdown
	H-11b1	10/15/1985	4/21/1986	Drawdown
WIPP-13	DOE-2	1/12/1987	5/15/1987	Drawdown
	H-2b2	1/12/1987	5/15/1987	Drawdown
	H-6b	1/12/1987	5/15/1987	Drawdown
	P-14	1/12/1987	5/15/1987	Drawdown
	WIPP-12	1/12/1987	5/15/1987	Drawdown
	WIPP-18	1/12/1987	5/15/1987	Drawdown
	WIPP-19	1/12/1987	5/15/1987	Drawdown
	WIPP-25	1/12/1987	4/2/1987	Drawdown
	WIPP-30	1/12/1987	5/15/1987	Drawdown
P-14	D-268	2/14/1989	3/7/1989	Drawdown
	H-6b	2/14/1989	3/10/1989	Drawdown
	H-18	2/14/1989	3/10/1989	Drawdown
	WIPP-25	2/14/1989	3/7/1989	Drawdown
	WIPP-26	2/14/1989	3/7/1989	Drawdown
H-11b1	H-4b	2/7/1996	12/11/1996	Drawdown
	H-12	2/6/1996	12/10/1996	Drawdown
	H-17	2/6/1996	12/10/1996	Drawdown
	P-17	2/7/1996	12/10/1996	Drawdown
H-19b0	DOE-1	12/15/1995	12/10/1996	Drawdown
	ERDA-9	12/15/1995	12/10/1996	Drawdown
	H-1	12/15/1995	12/10/1996	Drawdown
	H-14	2/7/1995	12/10/1996	Drawdown
	H-15	12/12/1995	12/10/1996	Drawdown
	H-2b2	2/7/1996	12/10/1996	Drawdown
	H-3b2	12/15/1995	12/10/1996	Drawdown
	WIPP-21	1/18/1996	12/9/1996	Drawdown
	WQSP-4	1/1/1996	12/10/1996	Drawdown
WQSP-5	1/18/1995	12/10/1996	Drawdown	
WQSP-1	H-18	1/25/1996	2/20/1996	Drawdown
	WIPP-13	1/25/1996	2/20/1996	Drawdown
	WQSP-3	1/15/1996	2/20/1996	Zero Response
WQSP-2	DOE-2	2/20/1996	3/28/1996	Drawdown
	H-18	2/20/1996	3/28/1996	Drawdown
	WIPP-13	2/20/1996	3/28/1996	Drawdown
	WQSP-1	2/20/1996	3/24/1996	Drawdown
	WQSP-3	2/20/1996	3/24/1996	Zero Response

3
 4 In addition to normalizing the measured head data, some of the tests produced negative
 5 drawdown values when normalized. These negative results are due to some of the observations
 6 having heads greater than the reference value. This occurs due to some hydraulic tests that were
 7 conducted at earlier times in the Culebra but were not included in the numerical model. If the
 8 drawdowns from one of these previous tests are still recovering to zero at the start of a

1 simulation, they can cause negative drawdowns in the simulation as the recovery continues.
2 Most of these effects were addressed through trend removal in initial data processing (Beauheim
3 and Fox 2003) but some residual effects remain.

4 The resultant transient calibration points are shown in Figure TFIELD-23 through Figure
5 TFIELD-36. These sets of figures show the location of each hydraulic test and the locations of
6 the observation wells for that test within the model domain and the time series of drawdown
7 values for each observation well. The values of drawdown are in meters where a positive
8 drawdown indicates a decrease in the pressure within the well relative to the pressure before the
9 start of the pumping (negative drawdown values indicate rises in the water level). For the Water
10 Quality Sampling Program (WQSP)-1 and WQSP-2 tests, well WQSP-3 showed no response.
11 These results are used in the calibration process by setting the observed drawdown values to zero
12 for WQSP-3. The maps in Figure TFIELD-23 through Figure TFIELD-35 also show the
13 locations of the pilot points used in the calibration (these are discussed later).


14 **TFIELD-6.5 Spatial Discretization**

15 The flow model was discretized into 68,768 regular, orthogonal cells each of which represents
16 100 m (328 ft) × 100 m (328 ft). A constant Culebra thickness of 7.75 m (25.4 ft) was used (the
17 CCA, Appendix TFIELD). The 100-m (328-ft) grid discretization was selected to make the
18 finite-difference grid cell sizes considerably finer, on average, than those used in the CCA
19 calculations, but still computationally tractable. In the CCA calculations, a telescoping finite-
20 difference grid was used with the smallest cell being 100 m (328 ft) × 100 m (328 ft) near the
21 center of the domain. The largest cells in the CCA flow model grid were 800 m (2,625 ft) ×
22 800 m (2,625 ft) near the edges of the domain (Lavenue 1996).


23 The cells in the model domain were assigned elevations based on the digitized version of Figure
24 TFIELD-1. Of the 68,768 cells (224 east-west by 307 north-south), 14,999 (21.8%) lie to the
25 west of the no-flow boundary, so the total number of active cells in the model is 53,769. This
26 number is nearly a factor of five larger than the 10,800 (108 × 100) cells used in the CCA
27 calculations.

28 **TFIELD-6.6 Temporal Discretization**

29 The time period of nearly 11 years and 2 months covered by the transient modeling began
30 October 15, 1985, and ended December 11, 1996. Additionally, a single steady-state calculation
31 was run prior to the transient modeling. The length of this steady-state time period and the date
32 at which it occurs were arbitrarily set to one day (86,400 s) occurring from October 14, 1985, to
33 October 15, 1985. These steady-state heads were measured in the year 2000 and were only set to
34 these October dates to provide a steady-state solution prior to the start of any transient hydraulic
35 events. The responses to the transient events were defined by the amount of drawdown relative
36 to the initial steady-state solution. The discretization of this time interval was dictated by the
37 pumping history of the different wells used in the hydraulic testing and consideration of the
38 additional computational burden required for increasingly fine time discretization.




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-23. Locations of the H-3b2 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells**



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-24. Observed Drawdowns for the H-3b2 Hydraulic Test**


3 The groundwater flow model, MODFLOW-2000, allows for the discretization of time into both
 4 “stress periods” and “time steps.” A stress period is a length of time over which the boundary
 5 conditions and internal stresses on the system are constant. Even though these stresses are
 6 constant, this does not mean that the flow system is necessarily at steady state during the stress
 7 period. A time step is a subdivision of a stress period. System information such as the head or
 8 drawdown values is only calculated at the specified time steps. Each stress period must contain at
 9 least one time step. MODFLOW-2000 allows for the specification of the stress period length, the
 10 number of time steps in the stress period, and a time step multiplier. The time step multiplier
 11 increases the time between successive time steps geometrically. This geometric progression
 12 provides a nearly ideal time discretization for the start of a pumping or recovery period. To save
 13 on computational costs associated with calculating head/drawdown at each time step and with
 14 writing out the heads/drawdowns, the number of time steps in the model was kept to the minimum
 15 number possible that still adequately simulated the hydraulic tests. The time discretization in
 16 MODFLOW-2000 resulted in modeled heads calculated at times that sometimes differed from the
 17 observation times. For this situation, the PEST utility *mod2obs* was used to interpolate the head, or
 18 drawdown, values in time from the simulation times to the observation times.

19 A summary of the time discretization is given in Table TFIELD-9. There are five separate
 20 MODFLOW-2000 simulations for each complete forward simulation of the transient events. Each
 21 separate call to MODFLOW-2000 has its own set of input and output files. In Table TFIELD-9,
 22 each call to MODFLOW-2000 is separated by a horizontal black line. The first call is the steady-
 23 state simulation. The second, third, and fourth calls to MODFLOW-2000 (H-3, WIPP-13, and P-
 24 14) are all similar in that a single well was pumped. For the H-3 and WIPP-13 calls, there were a
 25 total of three stress periods. In the first stress period, the well was pumping at a constant rate; in
 26 the second stress period, the pumped well was inactive and heads were recovering after the
 27 cessation of pumping; and the final stress period was simply a long time of no pumping activity
 28 used to advance the simulation time to be consistent with the calendar time. The first two stress
 29 periods were discretized using eight time steps and the final stress period with no pumping activity
 30 was discretized using the minimum possible number of time steps—one.




1

2 **Figure TFIELD-25. Locations of the WIPP-13 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells**



1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-26. Observed Drawdowns for the WIPP-13 Hydraulic Test.**
 3 **Note the Change in the Scale of the Y-Axis from the Upper to the**
 4 **Lower Image.**


5 The final MODFLOW-2000 call, the H-19 call, was considerably more complicated than the
 6 earlier calls to MODFLOW-2000 and simulated the hydraulic conditions during the H-11, H-19,
 7 WQSP-1, and WQSP-2 hydraulic tests. This final call contained 17 stress periods with as many
 8 as 3 different wells pumping during any single stress period. The pumping rates of the different
 9 wells in this call to MODFLOW-2000 and the stress periods are shown as a function of time in
 10 Figure TFIELD-37. The first six stress periods in this call simulated pumping in the H-19 and
 11 H-11 wells without any observations (Table TFIELD-9). These pumping periods were added to
 12 the model solely to account for the effects of these tests in observations of later hydraulic tests
 13 and, therefore, these tests could be modeled with a single time step. The pumping rates shown in
 14 Figure TFIELD-37 are given as negative values to indicate the removal of water from the
 15 Culebra following the convention used in MODFLOW-2000.



1

2

Figure TFIELD-27. Locations of the P-14 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells



1

2

Figure TFIELD-28. Observed Drawdowns for the P-14 Hydraulic Test

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

The MODFLOW-2000 simulations could be done using a single call to MODFLOW-2000, but five separate calls were used here. Each of the five calls created separate binary output files of drawdown and head that were much smaller and easier to manage than a single output file would have been. Additionally, the simulated drawdowns at the start of each transient test must be zero (no drawdown prior to pumping). Because MODFLOW-2000 uses the resulting drawdowns and heads from the previous stress period as input to the next stress period, a single simulation would not necessarily start each transient test with zero drawdowns. Calling MODFLOW-2000 five times allowed the initial drawdowns to be reset to zero each time using shell scripts. The heads simulated at the end of the final time step in each MODFLOW-2000 call were used as the initial heads for the next call. The results of all five calls were combined to produce the 1332 model predictions prior to comparing them to the 1332 selected observation data, thus ensuring that all steady-state and transient data were used simultaneously in the inverse calibration procedure.

15

TFIELD-6.7 Weighting of Observation Data

16

17

18

19

20

21

22


23

24


25

26

The observed data for each response to each transient hydraulic test are weighted to take into account the differences in the responses across the different tests. The weights are calculated as the inverse of the maximum observed drawdown for each hydraulic test. This weighting scheme applies relatively less weight to tests with large drawdowns and relatively more weight to tests with smaller responses. This weighting scheme was used so that the overall calibration was not dominated by trying to reduce the very large residuals that may occur at a few of the observation locations with very large drawdowns. Under this weighting scheme, two tests that are both fit by the model to within 50% of the observed drawdown values would be given equal consideration in the calculation of the overall objective function even though one test may have an observed maximum drawdown of 10 m (33 ft) and the other a maximum observed drawdown of 0.10 m (0.33 ft).



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-29. Locations of the WQSP-1 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells**




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-30. Observed Drawdowns for the WQSP-1 Hydraulic Test**

3 The weights assigned in this manner ranged from 0.052 to 20.19. The observed absence of a
4 hydraulic response at WQSP-3 to pumping at WQSP-1 and WQSP-2 was also included in the
5 calibration process by inserting measurements of zero drawdown that were given an arbitrarily
6 high weight of 20. Through trial and error using the root mean squared error (RMSE) criterion
7 of how well the modeled steady-state heads fit the observed steady-state heads, a weight of 2.273
8 was assigned to the 35 steady-state observations. This weight is near that of the average of all
9 the weights assigned to the transient events and was found to be adequate to provide acceptable
10 steady-state matches. It is noted that the steady-state data provide measurements of head while
11 all of the transient events provide measurements of drawdown. However, the weights were
12 applied to the residuals between the observed and modeled aquifer responses and because both
13 heads and drawdowns are measured in meters, there was no need to adjust the weights to account
14 for different measurement units.

15 The number of measurements used for calibrations that were made at individual wells during
16 individual tests ranged from 6 to 104, and the number of measurements used for calibration that
17 were made at all wells during a single test ranged from 64 to 410. This means that different well
18 responses and different tests carried different cumulative weights. The spatially broadest
19 sampling of transient data possible was used in an effort to get transient coverage of as much of
20 the modeling domain as possible. In those areas where no transient data are available, the
21 calibration is dominated by fitting the model to the steady-state measurements. The greatest
22 coverage of transient data is within the boundaries of the WIPP site, which is also the area of
23 most significance for radionuclide transport.

24 The maximum observed drawdown, the weight assigned to all the observed test values for each
25 test, and the total number of observations for each observation well are given in Table TFIELD-
26 10. In a few cases, weights were increased to obtain better fits, or decreased due to high degrees
27 of noise in the data.



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-31. Locations of the WQSP-2 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells**





Figure TFIELD-32. Observed Drawdowns from the WQSP-2 Hydraulic Test

TFIELD-6.8 Assignment of Pilot Point Geometry

A major development in the field of stochastic inverse modeling that has occurred since the T fields were constructed for the CCA in 1996 is that inverse techniques are now capable of simultaneously determining optimal transmissivity values at a large number of pilot points. In the T fields constructed for the CCA, pilot points were added one at a time and each point was calibrated prior to the addition of the next pilot point. Furthermore, the total number of pilot points was limited to less than or equal to the total number of transmissivity observations to avoid numerical instabilities in the solution of the inverse problem. With the techniques now available and implemented in PEST, it is possible to use many more pilot points than there are transmissivity observations and to calibrate these pilot points simultaneously.


The pilot-point locations were chosen using a combination of a regular grid approach and deviations from that grid to accommodate specific pumping- and observation-well locations (Figure TFIELD-38). The goal in these deviations from the regular grid was to put at least one pilot point between each pumping well and each of its observation wells. Details of the pilot-point locations relative to the pumping and observation wells in the WIPP site area are shown in Figure TFIELD-39. This combined approach of a regular grid with specific deviations from that grid follows the guidelines for pilot-point placement put forth by John Doherty (the author of PEST 2003) (Doherty 2002) as Appendix 1 in the work of McKenna and Hart (2003a). Pilot points located at the transmissivity measurement locations were held as fixed values during the optimization (fixed pilot points shown as magenta squares in Figure TFIELD-38). The variable pilot points (dark blue diamonds in Figure TFIELD-38) are those where the transmissivity value was adjusted during the calibration procedure. A total of 43 fixed and 100 variable pilot points was used in the T-field calibration process. The zone option in PEST was employed to limit the influence of pilot points in any one zone (e.g., high-T or low-T) to adjusting only locations that are in the same zone.



1

2

Figure TFIELD-33. Locations of the H-11 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-34. Observed Drawdowns for the H-11 Hydraulic Test**

3 The variogram model for the residuals between the transmissivity measurements and the base
4 field has a range of 1,050 m (3,445 ft). Because the pilot-point approach to calibration uses this
5 range as a radius of influence, locations of the adjustable pilot points were as much as possible
6 set to be at least 1,050 m (3,445 ft) away from other pilot points (adjustable or fixed). For
7 maximum impact, all pilot points should be at least 2,100 m (6,890 ft) away from any other pilot
8 point but, given the existing well geometry, this distance was not always achievable.

9 **TFIELD-6.9 Stochastic Inverse Calibration**

10 The seed realizations are input to the inverse model using the pilot-point method. The seed
11 realizations are calibrated to the steady-state and transient head measurements. The residuals
12 and the T-field calculations are done in log₁₀ space so that a unit change in the residual equates to
13 a one order of magnitude change in the value of transmissivity. The initial values of the pilot
14 points are equal to the value of the initial residual field at each pilot-point location. The pilot
15 points are constrained to have a maximum perturbation of ±3.0 from the initial value except for
16 those pilot points within the high-T zone in Nash Draw (Figure TFIELD-11) and the low-T zone
17 on the eastern side of the model domain that are limited to perturbations of ±1.0. These limits
18 are employed to maintain the influence of the geologic conceptual model on the calibrated T
19 fields.

20 Figure TFIELD-11 is updated as Figure TFIELD-40 to show, conceptually, how the addition of
21 two pilot points along the cross section can modify the residual field and then update the T field.
22 The pilot points are shown as the open circles in Figure TFIELD-40 and are used to modify the
23 residual field before it is added to the base T field. Compare the shape of the dashed red and
24 blue lines in Figure TFIELD-40 to the same lines in Figure TFIELD-11. The values of the
25 residuals at the observation points are held fixed so any adjacent pilot points cannot modify
26 them.



1
2

Figure TFIELD-35. Locations of the H-19 Hydraulic Test Well and Observation Wells




Figure TFIELD-36. Observed Drawdowns From the H-19 Hydraulic Test

1
2
3 At the heart of the calibration process is the iterative adjustment of the residual field at the pilot
4 points by PEST and the subsequent updates of the residual field at the locations surrounding the
5 pilot points based on the shape of the variogram modeled on the raw residuals. The updated
6 residual field is then combined with the base T field (see Figure TFIELD-18) and then used in
7 MODFLOW-2000 to calculate the current set of modeled heads. These modeled heads are then
8 input to PEST for the next iteration.

9 The objective function minimized by PEST (ϕ) is a combination of the weighted sum of the
10 squared residuals between the measured and observed steady-state head data, the weighted sum
11 of the squared residuals between the measured and observed transient drawdown data, and the
12 weighted sum of the squared differences in the estimated transmissivity value between pairs of
13 pilot points.


Table TFIELD-9. Discretization of Time into 29 Stress Periods and 127 Time Steps with Pumping Well Names and Pumping Rates

Event Name	Global Stress Period No.	Internal Stress Period No.	Stress Period Length (s)	No. of Time Steps	Start Date	Stop Date	Pumping Well(s)	Pumping Rate(s) (m ³ /s)
Steady	1	1	86400	1	10/14/859:00	10/15/859:00	0	0
H-3	2	1	5356800	8	10/15/859:00	12/16/859:00	H-3	3.03E-04
	3	2	10892700	8	12/16/859:00	4/21/8610:45	None	0.00E+00
	4	3	22976100	1	4/21/8610:45	1/12/879:00	None	0.00E+00
WIPP-13	5	1	3110400	8	1/12/879:00	2/17/879:00	WIPP-13	1.89E-03
	6	2	7539900	8	2/17/879:00	5/15/8715:25	None	0.00E+00
	7	3	55359360	1	5/15/8715:25	2/14/899:01	None	0.00E+00
P-14	8	1	44928	3	2/14/899:01	2/14/8921:29	P-14	3.92E-03
	9	2	174612	8	2/14/8921:29	2/16/8922:00	P-14	3.64E-03
	10	3	50400	3	2/16/8922:00	2/17/8912:00	P-14	3.37E-03
	11	4	1820396	8	2/17/8912:00	3/10/8913:39	None	0.00E+00
	12	5	193212124	1	3/10/8913:39	4/24/95 19:42	None	0.00E+00
H-19	13	1	148860	1	4/24/9519:42	4/26/95 13:03	H-19b0	2.26E-04
	14	2	4399020	1	4/26/9513:03	6/16/9511:00	None	0.00E+00
	15	3	3614400	1	6/16/9511:00	7/28/95 7:00	H-19b0	2.36E-04
	16	4	1168200	1	7/28/95 7:00	8/10/95 19:30	None	0.00E+00
	17	5	1292700	1	8/10/9519:30	8/25/9518:35	H11	2.44E-04
	18	6	9651300	1	8/25/9518:35	12/15/9511:30	None	0.00E+00
	19	7	2878200	8	12/15/9511:30	1/17/9619:00	H-19b0	2.71 E-04
	20	8	670680	3	1/17/9619:00	1/25/9613:18	H-19b0	2.52E-04
	21	9	238980	3	1/25/9613:18	1/28/96 7:41	H-19b0, WQSP-1	2.52E-04, 4.30E-04
	22	10	872340	3	1/28/96 7:41	2/7/9610:00	H-19b0	2.52E-04
	23	11	1047000	8	2/7/9610:00	2/19/9612:50	H-19b0, H-11	2.52E-04, 2.23E-04
	24	12	81600	3	2/19/9612:50	2/20/9611:30	H-19b0, H-11	1.55E-04, 2.23E-04
	25	13	345600	3	2/20/96 11:30	2/24/9611:30	H-19b0, H-11, WQSP-2	1.55E-04, 2.23E-04, 4.5E-04
	26	14	1395000	8	2/24/96 11:30	3/11/9615:00	H-19b0, H-11	1.55E-04, 2.23E-04
	27	15	1445100	8	3/11/9615:00	3/28/96 8:25	H-19b0, H-11	1.55E-04, 3.76E-04
	28	16	1220700	8	3/28/96 8:25	4/11/9611:30	H-19b0	1.55E-04
	29	17	21074400	8	4/11/9611:30	12/11/969:30	None	0.00E+00

1

2

3




**Figure TFIELD-37. Temporal Discretization and Pumping Rates for the Fifth Call to MODFLOW-2000.
A Total of 17 Stress Periods (SPs) are Used to Discretize this Model Call.**

1 **Table TFIELD-10. Observation Weights for Each of the Observation Wells**

Test Well Observation Well	Maximum Drawdown (m)	Weight	Number of Observations
Steady	NA	2.273	35
H3-DOE1	5.426	0.184	57
H3-H1	10.396	0.096	26
H3-H11b1	3.622	0.276	19
H3-H2b2	3.781	0.265	20
W13-DOE2	12.138	0.082	104
W13-H2b2	0.781	1.281	23
W13-H6	5.545	0.180	93
W13-P14	0.570	1.755	38
W13-W12	1.553	0.644	27
W13-W18	6.481	0.154	26
W13-W19	5.048	0.198	22
W13-W25	0.246	4.062	11
W13-W30	3.391	0.295	24
P14-D268	0.432	2.317	38
P14-H18	0.113	8.850	21
P14-H6b	0.701	1.427	21
P14-W25	0.432	2.315	22
P14-W26	0.137	7.310	20
WQSP1-H18	1.431	0.699	47
WQSP1-W13	1.260	0.794	47
WQSP1-WQSP3	0.000	20.000	25
WQSP2-DOE2	1.178	0.849	34
WQSP2-H18	0.529	1.892	35
WQSP2-W13	1.053	0.949	34
WQSP2-WQSP1	1.132	0.884	6
WQSP2-WQSP3	0.000	20.000	18
H11-H17	1.030	0.971	23
H11-H4b	0.232	4.317	11
H11-H12	0.021	20.190	11
H11-P17	1.628	3.304	19
H19-DOE1	13.463	0.074	70
H19-ERDA9	10.571	0.095	80
H19-H1	10.618	0.094	80
H19-H15	11.110	0.090	22
H19-H3b2	19.283	0.052	69
H19-W21	7.153	0.140	19
H19-WQSP5	16.623	0.060	24
H19-H14	3.759	0.602	11
H19-H2b2	3.794	0.608	11
H19-WQSP4	25.721	0.462	24

2




1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-38. Locations of the Adjustable and Fixed Pilot Points Within the Model**
 3 **Domain**

4 Phi is defined as:

$$\phi = \sum_{i=1}^{n_{obs}^{SS}} (W^{SS} (H_i^{obs-SS} - H_i^{calc-SS}))^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{n_{wells}^{Tr}} \sum_{j=1}^{n_{obs}^{Tr}} (W_i^{Tr} (D_j^{obs-Tr} - D_j^{calc-Tr}))^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{n_{PP}} \sum_{j=j}^{n_{PP}} W_{ij}^R (PP_i - PP_j)$$

(TFIELD.9)

7 where n_{obs} is the number of head observations, n_{wells} is the number of wells, n_{PP} is the number of
 8 pilot points, W is the weight assigned to a group of measurements, H^{obs} and H^{calc} are the values
 9 of the observed and calculated heads, respectively, D^{obs} and D^{calc} are the values of the observed
 10 and calculated drawdowns, respectively, PP refers to the \log_{10} transmissivity value at a pilot
 11 point, and superscripts SS, Tr, and R refer to steady-state measurements, transient measurements,
 12 and pilot-point regularization, respectively. For this work, the weights on the head and
 13



1
2
3
4
5


Figure TFIELD-39. Close-Up View of the Pilot-Point Locations in the Area of the WIPP Site. The Colored (Solid) Lines Connect the Pumping and Observation Wells. The Legend for this Figure is the Same as That for Figure TFIELD-38.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

drawdown observations are as given in Table TFIELD-10. The third weighted sum of squares in the objective function is the regularization portion of the objective function. This weighted sum of squares involves the difference in transmissivity values between each pair of pilot points ($PP_i - PP_j$) and is designed to keep the T field as homogeneous as possible and to provide numerical stability when estimating more parameters than there are data. The pilot-point regularization weights, W_{ij}^R , are defined by the kriging factors and are a function of the distance between any two pilot points.

13
14
15
16
17
18

The stochastic inverse calibration process uses multiple pre- and post-processor codes in addition to PEST and MODFLOW-2000. The overall numerical approach to the T-field calibration is shown in Figure TFIELD-41 and Figure TFIELD-42 and the details on this approach are documented in McKenna and Hart (2003a, 2003b). The top of Figure TFIELD-41 shows the preprocessing steps. The large oval in the middle of the figure contains the link between MODFLOW-2000 and PEST. The “model process” portion of the figure is expanded and the




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-40. Conceptual Cross-Section Showing the Addition of Pilot Points to the**
3 **Optimization Process**

4 details are shown in Figure TFIELD-42. The output files and the connection to the particle-
5 tracking code are shown in the bottom of Figure TFIELD-41.


6 The calibration process is run iteratively until at least one of three conditions are met: (1) the
7 number of iterations reaches the maximum allowable number of 15; (2) the objective function
8 reaches a predefined minimum value of 1,000 square meters (m^2); or (3) the value of the
9 objective function changes by less than 1% across three consecutive iterations.

10 At the end of the calibration process, a residual field is created that when added to the base T
11 field reproduces the measured transmissivity values at the 43 measurement locations and
12 provides a minimum sum of squared errors (SSE) between the observed and model-predicted
13 heads/drawdowns. An example of the final step in the creation of a calibrated T field is shown in
14 Figure TFIELD-43. The computational cost of calibrating to the multiple transient events is
15 significant. For comparison, a single forward run of MODFLOW-2000 in steady-state takes on
16 the order of 10–15 s on a 1.9-Gigahertz (GHz) AMD Athlon™ processor, whereas the run time
17 for the combined steady-state and transient events is approximately 3 minutes (a factor of 12–18
18 times longer).

19 Due to these longer run times, two separate parallel PC clusters were employed. Each of these
20 clusters consists of 16 computational nodes running 1.9-GHz Athlon processors with 1 gigabyte
21 of random access memory. One cluster is located in Albuquerque, NM, and the other is in the
22




1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-41. Flow Chart of the Stochastic Inverse Calibration Process Used to**
 3 **Create the Final Calibrated T Fields**



1

2 **Figure TFIELD-42. Flow Chart of the Core of the Inversion Process Highlighting the**
 3 **Connection Between PEST and MODFLOW-2000**



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-43. Example Final Steps in the Creation of a Calibrated T Field. The**
3 **Calibrated Residual Field (Left Image) is Added to the Base T Field**
4 **(Middle Image) to Get the Final Calibrated T Field (Right Image).**
5 **All Color Scales are in Units of \log_{10} Transmissivity (m^2/s).**

6 Sandia office in Carlsbad, NM. Both clusters use the Linux[®] operating system. The total
7 number of forward runs necessary to complete the calibration process can be estimated as:

8 Total Runs \cong (# of parameters) \times (# of PEST iterations) \times (average runs per iteration) \times (# of
9 base T fields).

10 The maximum number of iterations used in these runs was set to 15, although not all fields went
11 to the maximum number of iterations. Additionally, on average for the first four iterations,
12 PEST used forward derivatives to calculate the entries of the Jacobian matrix and each entry only
13 required a single forward model evaluation. For the remaining 11 iterations, PEST used central
14 derivatives to calculate the Jacobian entries and each calculation required 2 forward evaluations
15 of the model (22 total). The average number of model evaluations is $1.733 = [(4 + 22)/15]$.
16 Therefore an estimate of the maximum possible total number of forward runs is equal to: 100
17 pilot points \times 15 iterations/field \times 1.73 runs/iteration \times 150 T fields = 390,000 runs. The total
18 time necessary to complete these calculations in serial mode on a single processor would be 813
19 days, or 2.22 years. PEST allows for parallel calculation of the Jacobian matrix, and this option
20 was used to decrease the total run time significantly relative to the time needed for serial
21 computation.

22 The model run times, as well as the time necessary to read and write input/output files across the
23 cluster network, were examined to determine the optimal number of client, or slave, nodes for
24 each server, or master, node. The optimal number of clients per server was determined to be
25 eight. More clients per server degraded overall performance due to increased communication
26 between machines and fewer clients per server resulted in underutilization of the system. By
27 combining the client and server activities on a single machine using a virtual server setup, 4
28 different base T fields could be calibrated simultaneously on the 32 machines.

1 **TFIELD-7.0 T-Field Acceptance Criteria**

2 The calibration procedure described in Section TFIELD-6.0 was applied to 150 of the base T
3 fields (the remaining 350 base fields were held in reserve, to be used only if necessary). Not all
4 base T fields yielded a resulting calibrated T field. Four base T fields (d01r03, d01r09, d02r09,
5 and d08r10) encountered numerical difficulties during the first iteration and did not calibrate at
6 all. For each of the remaining 146 T fields, the calibration procedure stopped for 1 of 3 reasons:

- 7 1. PEST completed the maximum allowed number of iterations (15).
- 8 2. PEST was unable to improve the objective function (SSE of weighted residuals) for three
9 successive iterations.
- 10 3. The optimization became numerically unstable.

11 Some of the T fields probably could have been calibrated better with more effort and adjustment
12 of some of the PEST input parameters; however, these parameters were set to work across the
13 largest number of fields possible and no calibration process will necessarily be able to make
14 progress on every base field given the same set of parameters.

15 Because the T-field calibration procedure did not stop when some objective goodness-of-fit
16 target was achieved, criteria had to be established to define what constitutes an acceptable
17 calibration for use in the WIPP CRA calculations. Because the T fields were to be used for
18 calculation of radionuclide transport, the travel times calculated in the T fields for a conservative
19 particle released above the center of the WIPP waste panels (UTM X = 613,597.5 m and Y =
20 3,581,385.2 m [Ramsey, Wallace, and Jow 1996, p. 9]) to reach the WIPP LWB were used in
21 developing acceptance criteria. That is, the sensitivity of the calculated travel-time distribution
22 to potential acceptance criteria was used to identify those criteria that are important. Once the
23 distribution of travel times showed no (remaining) sensitivity to continued refinement of the
24 criteria applied (e.g., a reduction in some metric below a threshold value), all T fields meeting
25 those criteria were considered to be acceptably calibrated.

26 The travel times discussed herein were obtained using the streamline particle-tracking algorithm
27 implemented in DTRKMF v. 1.0 (Rudeen 2003) assuming a single-porosity medium with a
28 porosity of 0.16. DTRKMF calculates particle tracks in two or three dimensions for steady-state
29 and time-dependent, variably saturated flow fields. The particles are tracked cell-by-cell using a
30 semi-analytical solution. DTRKMF assumes that the velocities vary linearly between the cell
31 faces as a function of the space coordinate and, for time-dependent cases, that the velocities at
32 the faces vary linearly between time planes. It directly reads the cell-by-cell flow budget file
33 from MODFLOW-2000 and uses those values to calculate the velocity field. For each calibrated
34 T field, a final forward run of MODFLOW-2000 was done and the cell-by-cell fluxes from this
35 run were used as input to DTRKMF to calculate the travel time. For each calibrated T field, only
36 a single particle was tracked, providing a single travel time. The MODFLOW-2000 modeling
37 was performed using a 7.75-m (25.4-ft) thickness for the Culebra, whereas transport calculations
38 assume that all flow is concentrated in the lower 4.0 m (13 ft) of Culebra (Meigs and McCord,
39 1996). Therefore, the travel times obtained from DTRKMF were scaled by multiplying by the
40 factor 0.516 (4/7.75). These scaled travel times were then consistent with the travel times
41 calculated and reported by Wallace (1996) for the T fields used in the WIPP CCA. These travel
42 times do not, however, represent the actual predicted travel times of solutes, conservative or

1 nonconservative, through the Culebra. Culebra transport modeling treats the Culebra as a
 2 double-porosity medium with transport through advective porosity (e.g., fractures) retarded by
 3 diffusion into diffusive porosity (e.g., matrix porosity) and by sorption. The travel times
 4 presented herein are intended only to allow comparison among T fields.

5 **TFIELD-7.1 Candidate Acceptance Criteria**

6 Four factors were evaluated for their potential to provide T-field acceptance criteria: RMSE of
 7 the modeled fit to the measured steady-state heads, the agreement between the measured and
 8 modeled steady-state gradient/heads, the sum of squared weighted residuals (ϕ) for the
 9 transient data, and the agreement between the measured and modeled transient heads. These
 10 factors are not totally independent of one another, but are related in ways discussed below.

11 **TFIELD-7.1.1 RMSE Values**

12 The RMSE is a measure of how close MODFLOW-2000/PEST came to matching the measured
 13 steady-state heads for each T field. The RMSE is defined as:

$$14 \quad RMSE = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_{obs}} (H_i^{obs} - H_i^{calc})^2}{n_{obs}}} \quad (TFIELD.10)$$

15 where n_{obs} is the number of head observations and H^{obs} and H^{calc} are the values of the observed
 16 and calculated heads, respectively. Previous Culebra T-field calibration exercises (e.g., LaVenue
 17 and RamaRao 1992) achieved RMSEs less than 3 m (9.5 ft) in most cases when calibration was
 18 being performed only to steady-state heads. This level of calibration was also achieved by
 19 McKenna and Hart (2003a) for four different sets of steady-state head measurements. RMSEs
 20 have not previously been reported for steady-state heads in Culebra T fields calibrated to
 21 transient heads.

22 **TFIELD-7.1.2 Fit to Steady-State Heads**

23 One measure of how well a T field has matched the steady-state heads can be obtained by simply
 24 plotting the measured heads versus the modeled heads. If the measured and modeled heads
 25 match exactly, the best-fit straight line through the data will have a slope of one. Exact
 26 agreement between measured and modeled heads is not to be expected, so an acceptance
 27 criterion on the slope of the best-fit line must be established.

28 The steady-state heads are important because the transport calculations performed in
 29 SECOTP2D rely on the steady-state velocity field provided by MODFLOW-2000. If
 30 MODFLOW-2000 has not accurately captured the steady-state heads, steady-state gradients and
 31 the associated steady-state velocities will be in error. With measured head plotted as the
 32 independent variable (x) and calculated head plotted as the dependent variable (y), a slope of the
 33 best-fit line less than unity implies that the calculated gradient is less than the measured gradient.
 34 Low gradients should lead to excessively long travel times. Therefore, it was important to

1 determine if a threshold value of the steady-state-fit slope exists above which the distribution of
2 travel times is insensitive.

3 **TFIELD-7.1.3 Phi Values**

4 As shown in Equation (TFIELD.9), phi values have three components:

- 5 • A weighted sum of squared residuals for the steady-state heads
- 6 • A weighted sum of squared residuals for the transient drawdowns
- 7 • A weighted sum of squared differences between transmissivity values for each pair of pilot
8 points

9 The steady-state component of phi is a weighted, squared, and summed expression of the RMSE
10 given in Equation (TFIELD.10), above, and is not, therefore, meaningful to consider when
11 RMSE is already being considered. The pilot-point-regularization component of phi relates to
12 the smoothness of the T field, not to the goodness of fit of the measured and modeled responses.
13 Hence, only the transient component of phi is considered in the discussion that follows.

14 For reasons discussed in Section TFIELD-6.7, transient phi values do not provide a completely
15 unbiased measure of how well a calibrated T field represents the actual T field. “Measurements”
16 of zero drawdown were given arbitrarily high weights in the calibration process, the number of
17 measurements used from individual wells during individual tests and the number of
18 measurements used from all wells during a single test varied, and some parts of the modeling
19 domain are covered by multiple wells’ responses, while other parts of the domain have no
20 transient response data. Therefore, no simple numerical value can be established that represents
21 an average residual of some meaningful value for each transient measurement, such as the
22 RMSE used to evaluate T-field calibration to steady-state heads alone. Nevertheless, the
23 transient phi values do provide an indication of how well a T field met the calibration targets as
24 defined and could be used qualitatively to define acceptable T fields.

25 **TFIELD-7.1.4 Fit to Transient Heads**

26 Evaluating the model match to transient heads is not as straightforward as for the steady-state
27 heads because the transient match involves both the magnitude and the timing of head changes.
28 The magnitude and timing of a transient response are governed by both the transmissivity and
29 storativity (S) of a system, but S was not included as a calibration parameter during the
30 calibration process. A single S value of 1×10^{-5} ($\log_{10} = -5$) was used during T-field calibration.
31 As reported by Beauheim and Fox (2003), the apparent storativities obtained from independent
32 analyses of the test responses used for the calibration range from 5.1×10^{-6} ($\log_{10} = -5.29$) to 7.3
33 $\times 10^{-5}$ ($\log_{10} = -4.14$). Because the calibration method only allowed PEST to adjust
34 transmissivity to try to match the measured heads, it might actually shift transmissivity away
35 from the correct value in trying to compensate for an inappropriate value of S. Thus, some
36 allowance needed to be made for how close PEST could actually come to matching the measured
37 responses.

1 To establish the bounds of what might be considered acceptable matches to the transient heads, a
2 series of well-test simulations using the code nSIGHTS (Roberts 2002) was performed. For
3 base-case parameter values, a transmissivity of 1×10^{-5} m²/s and an S of 1×10^{-5} were used.
4 Pumping in a well was simulated for 5, 25, and/or 50 days, and the responses that would be
5 observed in observations wells 1, 2, and/or 3 km away were calculated. Transmissivity and/or S
6 were also varied by approximately a half order of magnitude upward and downward (3×10^{-5}
7 and 3×10^{-6}). The results of these simulations are shown in Appendix A of Beauheim (2003).

8 Based on the simulations, a set of guidelines was developed to determine if a modeled response
9 matched a measured response within a half order of magnitude uncertainty in transmissivity
10 and/or S. The guidelines were structured around the position of the modeled maximum
11 drawdown relative to the measured maximum drawdown on a linear-linear plot of elapsed time
12 on the x-axis and drawdown (increasing upward) on the y-axis. The guidelines are as follows:

- 13 • If the modeled peak occurs early and high (relative to the measured peak), S is too low and
14 the maximum modeled drawdown can be up to three times greater than the maximum
15 measured drawdown.
- 16 • If the modeled peak occurs early and low, transmissivity is too high and the maximum
17 modeled drawdown can be up to two times lower than the maximum measured drawdown.
- 18 • If the modeled peak occurs late and high, transmissivity is too low and the maximum
19 modeled drawdown can be up to two times higher than the maximum measured drawdown.
- 20 • If the modeled peak occurs late and low, S is too high and the maximum modeled drawdown
21 can be up to three times lower than the maximum measured drawdown.
- 22 • If the modeled peak occurs at the same time as the measured peak but is high, the diffusivity
23 (transmissivity/S) is correct, but both values are too low and the maximum modeled
24 drawdown can be up to three times greater than the maximum measured drawdown.
- 25 • If the modeled peak occurs at the same time as the measured peak but is low, the diffusivity
26 (transmissivity/S) is correct, but both values are too high and the maximum modeled
27 drawdown can be up to three times lower than the maximum measured drawdown.

28 No quantitative criteria were established for how much earlier or later modeled peaks could
29 occur relative to measured peaks because of the wide range observed in the simple scoping
30 calculations (calculated peaks occurring a factor of 5 sooner to a factor of 10 later than the
31 observed peaks) and because of the variability in pumping durations and distances to observation
32 wells associated with the measured responses.

33 Using these guidelines, plots of each of the 40 transient well responses of each calibrated T field
34 were evaluated visually to determine if the T field represented that response within a half order
35 of magnitude uncertainty in transmissivity and/or S. A threshold number of well responses that
36 failed this test was then considered as a possible acceptance criterion for the T fields.

1 **TFIELD-7.2 Application of Criteria to T Fields**

2 The four criteria described above were applied to the calibrated Culebra T fields to determine if
3 they allowed meaningful discrimination among the fields. Given that travel time is the
4 performance measure of most concern, the four criteria were evaluated in terms of their effects
5 on the calculated distribution of travel times from the T fields.

6 **TFIELD-7.2.1 RMSE Values**


7 Steady-state RMSE values for the 146 completed T fields are plotted in Figure TFIELD-44. The
8 data for H-9b, the southernmost well, were excluded from the RMSE calculation because the
9 southern model boundary condition consistently caused the modeled H-9b head to be
10 significantly lower than the measured head, disproportionately affecting the calculation of the
11 RMSE. The exclusion of the H-9b data should provide a better measure of the accuracy of the
12 model in the rest of the model domain.

13 All nine RMSE values greater than 20 m (66 ft) correspond to T fields that were not considered
14 to have been successfully calibrated by McKenna and Hart (2003b). Figure TFIELD-45 shows
15 the RMSE values plotted against travel time, and shows that the high RMSE values tend to be
16 associated with long travel times. For RMSE values less than approximately 6 m (20 ft), travel
17 times tend to cluster below approximately 50,000 years. Applying an RMSE cutoff value of 6 m
18 (20 ft) would leave 117 T fields, with all but one having travel times less than 102,000 years
19 (Figure TFIELD-46; the outlier with a travel time of ~241,000 years, d01r06, is not shown).

20 **TFIELD-7.2.2 Fit to Steady-State Heads**


21 Figure TFIELD-47 provides an example plot of measured steady-state heads versus modeled
22 steady-state heads for one T field, with a unit-slope line shown as a reference. For each plot of
23 steady-state heads, the slope of the best-fit line through all of the data except for the data for
24 H-9b was calculated using the Excel[®] SLOPE function. The data for H-9b, the southernmost
25 well, were excluded from this calculation because the southern model boundary condition
26 consistently caused the modeled H-9b head to be significantly lower than the measured head.
27 Inasmuch as the gradient in the extreme southern portion of the modeling domain is unimportant
28 with respect to transport across the southern half of the WIPP site, the exclusion of the H-9b data
29 should improve the accuracy of the slope calculation in the area of interest.

30 The slopes of the best-fit lines through the measured vs. modeled steady-state heads are shown
31 plotted against travel time in Figure TFIELD-48. Steady-state-fit slopes less than 0.5 appear to
32 lead to significantly longer travel times, consistent with the low hydraulic gradients the low
33 slopes imply. Of the 116 T fields with steady-state-fit slopes greater than 0.5, all but 9 have
34 travel times less than 50,000 years. Figure TFIELD-49 shows the slopes and travel times for
35 these 116 fields (the outlier with a travel time of ~241,000 years, d01r06, is not shown), and
36 indicates that travel time is not sensitive to steady-state-fit slopes above 0.5.




1
2

Figure TFIELD-44. Steady-State RMSE Values for 146 T Fields




3
4

Figure TFIELD-45. Steady-State RMSE Values and Associated Travel Times




1
2

Figure TFIELD-46. Travel Times for Fields with Steady-State RMSE <6 m (20 ft)




3
4

Figure TFIELD-47. Measured Versus Modeled Steady-State Heads for T Field d21r10



1
2

Figure TFIELD-48. Steady-State-Fit Slope Versus Travel Time for All Fields



3
4


Figure TFIELD-49. Steady-State-Fit Slope Versus Travel Time for Slopes >0.5

1 **TFIELD-7.2.3 Phi Values**

2 Transient phi values for all the completed T fields are plotted against travel time in Figure
 3 TFIELD-50. As phi values decrease, particularly as they get below approximately 5,000 m²
 4 (53,800 square feet [ft²]), travel times tend to cluster below approximately 50,000 years, but little
 5 correlation is seen between transient phi and travel time. Figure TFIELD-51 shows transient phi
 6 versus travel time for the 123 fields with transient phi values less than 8,000 m² (86,000 ft²),
 7 excluding the 5 outliers that have travel times greater than 168,000 years. This plot suggests that
 8 despite the clustering of travel times below 50,000 years, the overall range of travel times does
 9 not decrease significantly as phi decreases. Thus, transient phi does not appear to provide an
 10 effective tool for distinguishing among T fields.

11 **TFIELD-7.2.4 Fit to Transient Heads**


12 In applying the tests described in Section TFIELD-7.1.4 to the well responses simulated for each
 13 T field, it was found that insufficient data (only six measurements) had been included for the
 14 WQSP-1 response to pumping at WQSP-2 to allow any determination of model adequacy. Thus,
 15 this response was eliminated from consideration for all T fields. Figure TFIELD-52 and Figure
 16 TFIELD-53 provide examples from T field d21r10 of well responses that were judged to pass
 17 and fail, respectively, the criteria outlined in Section TFIELD-7.1.4. The number of responses
 18 that failed for each T field is given in Table TFIELD-11. For the WQSP-3 responses to pumping
 19 at WQSP-1 and WQSP-2 (for which no clear drawdown was observed and “measured” values of
 20 zero were entered), the modeled response was accepted if it showed no more than 0.25 m
 21 (0.82 ft) of drawdown.



22


23

Figure TFIELD-50. Transient Phi Versus Travel Time for All Fields




1
2

Figure TFIELD-51. Transient Phi Versus Travel Time for Phi < 8,000 m²



3
4

Figure TFIELD-52. Example of Passing Well Response from T Field d21r10



1
2

Figure TFIELD-53. Example of Failing Well Response from T Field d21r10

Table TFIELD-11. Summary Information on T Fields

T Field	SS RMSE (m)	SS Phi (m ²)	Transient Phi (m ²)	Steady-State-Fit Slope	# of Failed Well Responses	Time to WIPP boundary (yr)
d01r01	7.427	10498	5486	0.411	13	67578
<i>d01r02</i>	3.915	3621	5110	0.862	20	12045
<i>d01r04</i>	2.812	2140	2563	1.204	11	13821
d01r05	7.313	10245	12643	0.245	16	18886
d01r06	4.856	5006	11426	0.759	15	241211
<i>d01r07</i>	3.377	2851	3187	0.889	9	42123
d01r08	5.484	6122	4091	1.407	14	4399
<i>d01r10</i>	1.646	1094	1476	0.943	9	20685
d02r01	26.966	128711	12359	0.075	19	141516
<i>d02r02</i>	3.507	2772	2889	0.748	11	17217
d02r03	10.070	18606	8173	0.165	15	279242
d02r04	8.104	12482	5305	0.158	12	92235
d02r05	5.184	5577	7224	0.614	17	17255
d02r06	25.325	113652	7810	0.071	16	169677
d02r07	3.648	3223	10047	0.963	15	32231
d02r08	5.001	5125	7713	0.643	17	23571
d02r10	6.066	6849	5312	0.785	13	6433
<i>d03r01</i>	4.506	4022	6053	0.625	17	18435

Reverse type signifies T fields not meeting final acceptance criteria.

Bold italics type signifies 100 final T fields as discussed in Section TFIELD-7.3.

3

Table TFIELD-11. Summary Information on T Fields (Continued)

T Field	SS RMSE (m)	SS Phi (m ²)	Transient Phi (m ²)	Steady-State-Fit Slope	# of Failed Well Responses	Time to WIPP boundary (yr)
d03r02	28.346	142152	15357	0.056	16	398937
<i>d03r03</i>	4.146	3899	7102	1.016	17	7171
d03r04	25.367	114006	11991	0.114	14	132833
d03r05	5.836	6873	4585	0.605	13	6638
<i>d03r06</i>	1.729	1208	1899	0.959	13	27006
<i>d03r07</i>	4.655	4740	4399	1.138	13	22599
<i>d03r08</i>	4.550	4250	5593	0.638	17	13942
<i>d03r09</i>	2.352	1574	1580	0.877	7	25757
d03r10	8.584	13811	2766	1.060	13	15054
<i>d04r01</i>	3.447	2370	4736	0.673	17	80690
<i>d04r02</i>	3.818	3175	2647	0.736	12	40593
<i>d04r03</i>	2.352	1659	3317	0.979	12	13888
<i>d04r04</i>	4.298	3692	2697	0.602	13	36245
<i>d04r05</i>	1.507	1059	1980	0.984	9	48168
<i>d04r06</i>	3.705	3146	5618	0.961	16	26199
<i>d04r07</i>	2.183	1397	2226	0.860	10	23105
<i>d04r08</i>	2.444	1759	1560	0.890	11	30470
d04r09	27.256	131491	18356	0.064	16	114087
<i>d04r10</i>	3.060	2401	2593	0.853	9	25316
d05r01	6.427	8119	2015	0.886	13	86924
d05r02	5.298	5831	6755	0.872	16	25610
<i>d05r03</i>	3.444	2580	2655	0.799	11	10880
d05r04	5.862	6984	10518	0.497	17	14856
d05r05	4.346	4226	18478	0.952	16	5668
d05r06	6.518	8198	3609	0.360	13	96589
<i>d05r07</i>	3.188	2682	5216	0.899	9	13766
d05r08	7.686	11242	11194	0.147	16	70896
d05r09	26.644	125685	10840	0.081	17	152818
d05r10	5.623	6497	7110	0.497	16	30955
d06r01	6.828	9057	6592	0.338	17	103442
<i>d06r02</i>	1.957	1266	2639	0.993	9	10353
<i>d06r03</i>	1.637	1051	1703	0.974	10	81258
<i>d06r04</i>	3.214	2246	2805	0.727	13	18294
<i>d06r05</i>	3.886	3516	5164	0.718	18	36644
<i>d06r06</i>	2.149	1254	2954	1.013	10	14935

Reverse type signifies T fields not meeting final acceptance criteria.

Bold italics type signifies 100 final T fields as discussed in Section TFIELD-7.3.

Table TFIELD-11. Summary Information on T Fields (Continued)

T Field	SS RMSE (m)	SS Phi (m ²)	Transient Phi (m ²)	Steady-State-Fit Slope	# of Failed Well Responses	Time to WIPP boundary (yr)
<i>d06r07</i>	1.518	784	965	0.951	7	12035
d06r08	7.440	10397	4518	0.343	18	74565
d06r09	28.309	141764	7864	0.046	18	168281
<i>d06r10</i>	2.196	1455	1801	0.876	11	21990
<i>d07r01</i>	3.101	2326	2905	0.811	14	5082
<i>d07r02</i>	2.010	1327	3271	0.934	15	45647
d07r03	15.470	42986	12795	0.320	19	12919
d07r04	5.579	6230	7033	0.699	18	5638
<i>d07r05</i>	2.727	1705	5942	0.958	10	15097
<i>d07r06</i>	4.334	3927	6345	0.540	12	24641
<i>d07r07</i>	2.477	1737	2225	0.908	9	17038
<i>d07r08</i>	2.232	1097	2836	0.843	9	4355
<i>d07r09</i>	2.207	1239	1628	0.909	8	68629
<i>d07r10</i>	1.782	839	1150	0.940	9	15680
<i>d08r01</i>	2.361	1736	2458	0.913	11	4388
<i>d08r02</i>	2.418	1168	1326	0.904	6	26115
<i>d08r03</i>	2.137	1489	1499	0.938	9	28570
<i>d08r04</i>	3.683	2674	2966	0.779	9	24773
<i>d08r05</i>	2.115	1384	2769	0.899	13	15358
<i>d08r06</i>	1.916	1388	1225	0.931	11	13917
<i>d08r07</i>	1.857	815	1333	1.029	10	15027
d08r08	12.534	28547	6267	0.244	12	13885
d08r09	5.785	6674	7437	0.809	17	9691
d09r01	8.621	13909	7050	0.074	11	291623
<i>d09r02</i>	3.243	2418	4482	0.817	12	20048
<i>d09r03</i>	2.252	1337	989	0.937	8	40948
<i>d09r04</i>	1.892	710	1123	0.952	8	12857
<i>d09r05</i>	2.061	954	1088	0.919	8	10726
<i>d09r06</i>	2.794	2313	2253	0.879	16	10509
<i>d09r07</i>	2.629	1676	4591	0.981	10	9472
<i>d09r08</i>	1.895	1030	1406	0.946	9	17741
<i>d09r09</i>	4.826	4945	4453	0.660	14	4359
<i>d09r10</i>	3.273	2790	3976	0.941	19	50791
d10r01	26.867	127794	6006	0.031	14	297840
<i>d10r02</i>	1.554	589	1330	0.967	8	3111
<i>d10r03</i>	2.201	1474	1626	0.955	9	12533

Reverse type signifies T fields not meeting final acceptance criteria.

Bold italics type signifies 100 final T fields as discussed in Section TFIELD-7.3.

Table TFIELD-11. Summary Information on T Fields (Continued)

T Field	SS RMSE (m)	SS Phi (m ²)	Transient Phi (m ²)	Steady-State-Fit Slope	# of Failed Well Responses	Time to WIPP boundary (yr)
<i>d10r04</i>	2.527	1788	2334	1.097	9	3799
d10r05	5.722	6646	6463	0.460	18	28390
<i>d10r06</i>	4.702	4644	4412	0.702	13	9210
<i>d10r07</i>	1.870	810	1937	0.935	10	10068
<i>d10r08</i>	2.334	1613	2083	0.925	8	19093
<i>d10r09</i>	4.128	3643	3466	0.628	11	68052
<i>d10r10</i>	1.789	982	1915	1.033	13	28367
<i>d11r01</i>	2.970	2297	1655	0.859	9	17015
<i>d11r02</i>	2.308	1799	1801	0.865	12	14677
d11r03	5.700	6093	6376	0.473	9	16014
d11r04	6.514	8401	6922	0.336	23	61862
d11r05	5.952	7166	3921	0.455	17	18998
<i>d11r06</i>	2.607	1949	1503	0.886	9	38399
<i>d11r07</i>	1.639	602	1727	0.925	9	73634
<i>d11r08</i>	1.801	1206	723	0.957	6	4520
<i>d11r09</i>	2.073	858	1712	0.901	7	7199
<i>d11r10</i>	3.135	2363	1767	0.827	5	14358
<i>d12r01</i>	3.378	2921	3432	0.827	14	23936
<i>d12r02</i>	2.459	1795	1426	0.880	10	26919
<i>d12r03</i>	1.618	558	1530	0.971	11	16780
d12r04	6.182	7395	12605	0.449	20	15619
<i>d12r05</i>	1.522	918	1463	0.993	6	5655
<i>d12r06</i>	1.602	539	1271	0.958	13	39399
<i>d12r07</i>	2.016	945	1844	0.862	9	18283
<i>d12r08</i>	2.630	1879	4627	0.857	16	7981
<i>d12r09</i>	2.369	1671	2784	0.898	11	9414
d12r10	7.762	11431	11606	0.138	18	32059
<i>d13r01</i>	2.163	1061	1753	0.924	11	21032
<i>d13r02</i>	2.881	2054	3715	0.888	14	25639
<i>d13r03</i>	3.444	2580	3192	0.909	11	11493
d13r04	5.302	5856	4588	0.561	13	40601
<i>d13r05</i>	3.343	2671	4750	0.790	12	34247
<i>d13r06</i>	2.410	1441	2377	0.915	10	41400
<i>d13r07</i>	2.280	1395	1606	0.908	10	24211
<i>d13r08</i>	1.879	779	1544	0.882	9	20313
<i>d13r09</i>	1.919	776	1379	0.919	14	36260

Reverse type signifies T fields not meeting final acceptance criteria.

Bold italics type signifies 100 final T fields as discussed in Section TFIELD-7.3.


Table TFIELD-11. Summary Information on T Fields (Continued)

T Field	SS RMSE (m)	SS Phi (m ²)	Transient Phi (m ²)	Steady-State-Fit Slope	# of Failed Well Responses	Time to WIPP boundary (yr)
d13r10	6.063	6685	2693	0.360	14	220354
<i>d21r01</i>	2.151	1555	2307	0.942	13	10042
<i>d21r02</i>	2.087	1431	2473	0.928	9	9023
<i>d21r03</i>	2.346	1299	744	0.907	6	11671
<i>d21r04</i>	2.523	1978	2908	0.905	13	15717
<i>d21r05</i>	2.001	932	1417	0.960	10	23750
<i>d21r06</i>	1.721	655	1688	0.962	8	20715
<i>d21r07</i>	2.182	1179	2725	0.934	9	20141
d21r08	6.620	8618	5337	0.534	14	19534
d21r09	7.750	11501	11124	0.397	19	33308
<i>d21r10</i>	2.959	2226	4615	0.974	13	7384
d22r01	23.126	94895	18190	0.103	15	47563
<i>d22r02</i>	3.629	3197	5250	0.785	10	101205
<i>d22r03</i>	4.061	3464	3119	0.642	11	7067
<i>d22r04</i>	4.894	5073	4068	1.017	12	10537
d22r05	3.566	3160	9863	0.797	18	14385
<i>d22r06</i>	2.469	1145	3635	0.900	9	44309
<i>d22r07</i>	2.080	999	1413	0.916	9	21589
<i>d22r08</i>	1.837	809	1681	0.914	10	30771
<i>d22r09</i>	1.822	724	1734	0.988	19	15870
<i>d22r10</i>	2.452	1684	735	1.004	5	39116

Reverse type signifies T fields not meeting final acceptance criteria.


Bold italics type signifies 100 final T fields as discussed in Section TFIELD-7.3.

- 1
- 2 The number of well responses that fail the tests described in Section TFIELD-7.1.3 should be
- 3 related to the transient phi for each T field because both are measures of the match between the
- 4 measured and modeled transient heads. Figure TFIELD-54 shows a plot of transient phi versus
- 5 the number of failed well responses for all 146 T fields. A definite correlation is evident up to a
- 6 phi of approximately 8,000 m² (86,000 ft²). Beyond that value, the number of failed well
- 7 responses simply remains high (≥14).
- 8 The number of failed well responses is plotted against travel time in Figure TFIELD-55 for each
- 9 of the T fields. The scatter in travel time appears to increase with 14 or more failures, but the
- 10 majority of T fields still have travel times in the same range as the fields with less than 14
- 11 failures. Thus, the number of failed well responses alone does not appear to discriminate well
- 12 among T fields.



1
2

Figure TFIELD-54. Transient Phi Versus Number of Failed Well Responses



3
4


Figure TFIELD-55. Number of Failed Well Responses Versus Travel Time

1 **TFIELD-7.3 Final Acceptance Criteria**

2 Of the criteria discussed above, the two related to the steady-state heads (RMSE and steady-
 3 state-fit slope) appear to be more effective at identifying poorly calibrated T fields than the two
 4 related to transient heads (transient phi and number of failed well responses). The range and
 5 scatter of travel times appears to increase at RMSE values beyond 6 m (20 ft). Applying an
 6 RMSE cutoff of 6 m (20 ft) leaves 117 T fields, all with travel times less than 102,000 years
 7 except one (d01r06). This cutoff also excludes all T fields with steady-state-fit slopes less than
 8 0.45. Steady-state-fit slopes less than approximately 0.5 appear to lead to significantly longer
 9 travel times, consistent with the low hydraulic gradients the low slopes imply. If a simple cutoff
 10 of a minimum steady-state-fit slope of 0.5 is applied, 116 T fields are left, again with travel times
 11 less than 102,000 years (except d01r06), and also with RMSE values less than 8.6 m (28.2 ft).

12 Five T fields that meet the RMSE less than 6 m (20 ft) criterion fail the steady-state-fit slope
 13 greater than 0.5 criterion, while 4 T fields meeting the slope criterion fail the RMSE criterion.
 14 Thus, 112 T fields meet both criteria while 121 T fields meet at least one of the criteria.

15 Figure TFIELD-56 shows a CDF for the 121 T fields meeting the RMSE and/or steady-state-fit
 16 slope criteria discussed above. Also shown are curves representing the 100 T fields with RMSE
 17 values <5 m (16 ft) and transient phi values <8,000 m² (86,111 ft²), and the 100 T fields with the
 18 largest steady-state-fit slopes (>0.72). All three CDFs are very similar, the most significant
 19 difference being that imposing a cutoff value on transient phi eliminates the T field with the
 20 longest travel time (d01r06). To illustrate the effects of imposing more stringent constraints on
 21 T-field acceptance, a fourth CDF is shown in Figure TFIELD-56 that represents the 23 T fields
 22 that have RMSE values less than 2 m (7 ft) and transient phi values less than 2,000 m²




23
 24

Figure TFIELD-56. Travel-Time CDFs for Different Sets of T Fields

1 (21,527 ft²). These 23 T fields all have steady-state-fit slopes greater than 0.88. This CDF
 2 generally shows travel times similar to those of the other CDFs, except at the tails of the
 3 distribution which are poorly defined because of the relatively small sample size. Thus, because
 4 all the CDFs shown are similar, all 121 T fields meeting the steady-state-fit slope or RMSE
 5 criteria were considered to be acceptably calibrated. The T fields that have been rejected are
 6 shown in reverse type in Table TFIELD-11.

7 Because only 100 T fields were needed, the criteria were refined to eliminate more T fields.
 8 Given that lower travel times provide a conservative (in terms of leading to increased solute
 9 transport) way to discriminate among sets of T fields, the 100 T fields with RMSE values <5 m
 10 (16 ft) and transient phi values <8,000 m² were selected for use in CRA-2004 calculations of
 11 radionuclide transport through the Culebra because that set excluded the calibrated T field with
 12 the longest travel time. These T fields are highlighted in bold italicized type in Table TFIELD-
 13 11.

14 For comparison purposes, the CDF of travel times for these 100 T fields is plotted in Figure
 15 TFIELD-57 with the CDF of travel times for the 100 transient-calibrated T fields used in the
 16 CCA (Wallace 1996). Generally speaking, travel times are two to three times as long in the
 17 CRA-2004 fields as in the CCA fields. Considering the degree of uncertainty involved in
 18 characterizing a geologic medium on the scale of the T fields, a factor of two or three difference
 19 in travel-time CDFs represents excellent agreement.



20
 21 **Figure TFIELD-57. Travel-Time CDFs for CCA and CRA-2004 T Fields**

1 **TFIELD-8.0 Inverse Modeling Results**

2 Some fit statistics (phi, RMSE, etc.) for the 121 T fields that were judged to be acceptably
3 calibrated were presented in Section TFIELD-7.0. Visualizations of the T fields are included in
4 Attachment A. Additional properties or characteristics of the T fields are given below.


5 **TFIELD-8.1 Particle Tracking**

6 Particle tracking was performed in the 121 calibrated T fields from a point above the center of
7 the WIPP disposal panels to both the LWB and the boundary of the model domain, as discussed
8 in Section TFIELD-7.0. The locations of all the particle tracks are show in Figure TFIELD-58
9 and Figure TFIELD-59. In both figures, the particle tracks are shown using only every 20th
10 point along the track because of a limitation in the graphing software. This filtering leads to the
11 particle tracks appearing less smooth than they actually are. Figure TFIELD-58 shows a close-
12 up view of the particle tracks within the WIPP LWB. All of the particles exit the southern edge
13 of the LWB and the majority of the particles exit the LWB to the southeast of the release point,
14 although not as far to the east as the particle tracks for the CCA T fields showed (Ramsey et al.
15 1996, p. 49). Figure TFIELD-59 shows the particle tracks within the entire model domain. The
16 majority of the particles exit the domain nearly due south of the release point. The particles that
17 migrate to the west tend to travel along the boundary of the high-T zone. This result is due to the
18 large amount of groundwater flux within the high-T zone creating a streamline at the high-T
19 zone boundary.

20 **TFIELD-8.2 Fit to Steady-State Heads**

21 Some information about how well the calibrated T fields matched the observed steady-state
22 heads is given in Section TFIELD-7.2.1 and Section TFIELD-7.2.2. Additional information is
23 shown in Figure TFIELD-60 and Figure TFIELD-61. Figure TFIELD-60 shows a scatterplot of
24 the modeled steady-state heads in the 121 calibrated T fields versus the measured heads. Also
25 shown is a unit-slope line representing perfect agreement between the measured and modeled
26 heads, and parallel lines showing a 5-m (16-ft) range on either side. Most modeled head values
27 fall within the ± 5 m (16 ft) lines except for the modeled heads for H-9b, the well with the lowest
28 measured head. As discussed in Section TFIELD-7.2.1, H-9b is the southernmost well in the
29 model domain, and the southern model boundary condition consistently caused the modeled
30 H-9b head to be significantly lower than the measured head.


31 Figure TFIELD-61 shows a histogram of the differences between the modeled and measured
32 heads. The majority of modeled head values more than 8 m (26 ft) lower than the measured
33 values are associated with H-9b. Excluding the H-9b values, the histogram shows a normal
34 distribution of errors with 48% of the modeled heads within 2 m (7 ft) of the measured heads,
35 and 79% of the modeled heads within 4 m (13 ft) of the measured heads. The fit between
36 measured and modeled steady-state heads could probably have been improved by allowing PEST
37 to perform more calibration iterations but, as shown in Section TFIELD-7.3, the travel-time
38 distribution for the T fields would be unlikely to be affected.




1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-58. All Particle Tracks Within the WIPP LWB. The Bold Lines Show the**
 3 **Boundaries of the High-T (Left Side) and Low-T (Right Side) Zones.**

4 **TFIELD-8.3 Pilot-Point Sensitivity**


5 Transmissivities at each of the pilot points within the model domain were altered during the
 6 calibration process. The maximum allowable change was \pm three orders of magnitude in the
 7 middle region of the model domain and \pm one order of magnitude in the low-T (eastern) and
 8 high-T (western) regions of the model domain. Figure TFIELD-62 and Figure TFIELD-63 show
 9 the percentage of calibrated T fields in which each pilot point hit the maximum and minimum
 10 possible value, respectively. The size of the bubble is proportional to the number of times the
 11 value hits one constraint or the other. Figure TFIELD-62 shows that the pilot points south of the
 12 western portion of the southern LWB were most likely to reach their maximum allowable values,
 13 indicating that the base T fields may have underestimated transmissivities in this area. Figure
 14 TFIELD-63 shows that the pilot point placed in the inferred dissolution reentrant between P-14
 15 and WIPP-25 west of the LWB (see Figure TFIELD-38) was most likely to reach its minimum
 16 allowable value, indicating that this reentrant may not be as hydraulically significant as
 17 originally assumed.




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-59. All Particle Tracks Within the Model Domain. The Bold Lines Show**
3 **the Boundaries of the High-T (Left) and Low-T (Right) Zone**
4 **Boundaries. The No-Flow and WIPP Site Boundaries are Also**
5 **Shown.**




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-60. Scatterplot of Measured Versus Modeled Steady-State Heads**



3
4 **Figure TFIELD-61. Histogram of Differences Between Measured and Modeled Steady-**
5 **State Heads**




1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-62. Percentage of T Fields in which Pilot Points Hit Maximum Allowable**
 3 **Values. Corners of WIPP LWB are Shown by Unlabeled Black Dots.**



1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-63. Percentage of T Fields in which Pilot Points Hit Minimum Allowable**
 3 **Values. Corners of WIPP LWB are Shown by Unlabeled Black Dots.**


1 **TFIELD-8.4 Ensemble Average T Field**

2 The 121 T fields that were acceptably calibrated can be combined into an ensemble average T
3 field showing the average properties of the T fields (Figure TFIELD-64). The averaging is
4 performed on a cell-by-cell basis, taking the arithmetic mean of the 121 transmissivity values
5 assigned to each cell. Figure TFIELD-65 shows a close-up view of the ensemble average of the
6 100 T fields used for subsequent calculations in the area surrounding the WIPP site, using a
7 different color scale with transmissivity values “binned” by order of magnitude for clarity. This
8 figure does not show a continuous north-south high-T zone exiting the southeastern portion of
9 the WIPP site, as was present in the ensemble average T field provided in the CCA, Appendix
10 TFIELD, Figure 30. It also shows higher transmissivities in the southwestern portion of the
11 WIPP site than were present in the CCA ensemble average field. These differences explain why
12 the travel paths in the CRA-2004 T fields (Figure TFIELD-58) take a more westerly course, on
13 average, than those in the CCA T fields, and why the CRA-2004 travel times are longer than the
14 CCA travel times (Figure TFIELD-57).



1
2

Figure TFIELD-64. Ensemble Average of 121 Calibrated T Fields



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-65. Close-Up View of the Ensemble Average T Field Near the WIPP Site.**
3 **Note the Different log₁₀ Color Scale from Figure TFIELD-64.**

1 **TFIELD-9.0 Modification of T Fields For Mining Scenarios**

2 The WIPP site lies within the Carlsbad mining district of southeastern New Mexico. Potash
3 mining in the WIPP area involves resource extraction below the Culebra in the underlying
4 McNutt potash zone of the Salado. In the future, potash mining is expected to occur in all areas
5 where economically extractable ore is present, both outside and inside the WIPP LWB. It is
6 hypothesized that mining of potash leads to subsidence and fracturing of the Culebra, resulting in
7 increased Culebra transmissivity. This increase in transmissivity may change the regional
8 groundwater flow pattern in the Culebra and affect the transport of any radionuclides entering the
9 Culebra from the WIPP repository.

10 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1996, p. 5242) guidance for how the
11 potential effects of future mining should be considered in WIPP PA follows:

12 40 CFR §194.32, Scope of performance assessments.

13 (a) Performance assessments shall consider natural processes and events, mining, deep drilling,
14 and shallow drilling that may affect the disposal system during the regulatory time frame.

15 (b) Assessments of mining effects may be limited to changes in the hydraulic conductivity of the
16 hydrogeologic units of the disposal system from excavation mining for natural resources. Mining
17 shall be assumed to occur with a one in 100 probability in each century of the regulatory time
18 frame. Performance assessments shall assume that mineral deposits of those resources, similar in
19 quality and type to those resources currently extracted from the Delaware Basin, will be
20 completely removed from the controlled area during the century in which such mining is randomly
21 calculated to occur. Complete removal of such mineral resources shall be assumed to occur only
22 once during the regulatory time frame.

23 (c) Performance assessments shall include an analysis of the effects on the disposal system of any
24 activities that occur in the vicinity of the disposal system prior to disposal and are expected to
25 occur in the vicinity of the disposal system soon after disposal. Such activities shall include, but
26 shall not be limited to, existing boreholes and the development of any existing leases that can
27 reasonably be expected to be developed in the near future, including boreholes and leases that may
28 be used for fluid injection activities.

29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1996) further states (p. 5229),

30 In order to consider the effects of mining in performance assessments, DOE may use the location-
31 specific values of hydraulic conductivity, established for the different spatial locations within the
32 Culebra dolomite, and treat them as sampled parameters with each having a range of values
33 varying between unchanged and increased 1,000-fold relative to the value that would exist in the
34 absence of mining.

35 Accordingly, for PA purposes, the DOE assumes that all economically extractable potash is
36 mined outside of the WIPP LWB during the 100 years after closure of the WIPP repository
37 during which active institutional control of the site is maintained. Following that 100-year
38 period, the DOE assumes there is a one in 100 probability that the potash within the LWB will be
39 mined during any given century. Therefore, all PA calculations of transport of radionuclides
40 released to the Culebra through inadvertent human intrusion of the repository assume that all
41 potash outside the LWB has already been mined (the “partial-mining” scenario) by the time the
42 intrusion occurs. The “full-mining” scenario is invoked when the sampled time of human

1 intrusion is coincident with or later than the sampled time of mining within the LWB. Under
2 both scenarios, the hydraulic conductivity (or transmissivity) of the Culebra is assumed to be
3 increased by a random factor between one and 1,000 in the areas affected by mining. The
4 process by which the calibrated Culebra T fields were modified to account for the effects of
5 mining, and the characteristics of the resulting modified T fields, are discussed below.


6 **TFIELD-9.1 Determination of Potential Mining Areas**

7 Figure TFIELD-66 shows current potash mines and economically recoverable resources
8 (reserves) in the known potash lease area around the WIPP site, which are the areas where
9 subsidence might occur in the future. The map is based on the BLM map *Preliminary Map*
10 *Showing Distribution of Potash Resources, Carlsbad Mining District, Eddy and Lea Counties,*
11 *New Mexico* (1993). The current version of the map differs from the one used for the CCA
12 calculations in that areas with unleased potash resources, as well as areas that were previously
13 excluded because they were within a one-half mile radius of oil or gas wells, are now included in
14 the area assumed to be mined. Figure TFIELD-67 shows the estimated extent of economically
15 extractable potash within the WIPP LWB.

16 Because the potash mining horizon is located in the Salado, below the Culebra, the areas in the
17 Culebra that might be disturbed by the mining activities are larger than shown on Figure
18 TFIELD-66 and Figure TFIELD-67 due to angle-of-draw effects associated with subsidence.
19 The rationale for determining the extent of these effects is described in Wallace (1996) with the
20 final conclusion stating that an additional 253-m (830-ft)-wide “collar” was to be added to the
21 mining-impacted areas to approximate a 45-degree angle of draw. For the current T fields, a
22 buffer of three cell widths (300 m [984 ft]) was manually digitized and added to the mining
23 zones. This new delineation was then compared to the CCA model mining zones to make sure
24 there were no significant differences outside of those that can be explained by different gridding
25 of the two model domains and the addition of new data (Figure TFIELD-68). The most notable
26 differences between the two versions is that the area of potential future mining along the
27 northeastern boundary of the LWB is now directly connected to Nash Draw to the west, allowing
28 water to bypass the lower transmissivities on the WIPP site, and the area of potential mining
29 extending down the eastern portion of the WIPP site is now directly connected to Nash Draw to
30 the southwest.

31 **TFIELD-9.2 Scaling of Transmissivity**

32 For each of the final 100 T fields selected as described in Section TFIELD-7.3, a random
33 transmissivity multiplier between 1 and 1,000 was assigned using Latin hypercube sampling
34 (LHS) (Long 2004). That multiplier was then applied to the modeled transmissivity values in the
35 mining-affected areas shown in Figure TFIELD-68 outside of the WIPP LWB to create a partial-
36 mining T field, and to the modeled transmissivity values in mining-affected areas both inside and
37 outside the LWB to create a full-mining T field. LHS was performed three times to provide
38 three replicates of 100 full-mining and 100 partial-mining T fields. The purpose of using three
39 replicates is to demonstrate that the LHS has adequately captured the uncertainty in the T fields.
40 The transmissivity multipliers applied to each field for the three replicates are shown in Table
41 TFIELD-12.



1

2

Figure TFIELD-66. Potash Resources Near the WIPP Site

3

TFIELD-9.3 Forward Runs

4

A forward steady-state flow model was run for each of the 100 new T fields under each mining scenario (full and partial) for the three replicates of transmissivity multipliers, resulting in 600 simulations. Particle tracking was performed using DTRKMF on the modified flow fields to determine the flow path and groundwater travel time from a point above the center of the WIPP disposal panels to the LWB. A CDF was produced for each mining scenario (as well as an undisturbed scenario) that describes the probability of a conservative tracer reaching the LWB at a given time.

5

6

7

8

9

10


11

As was done for the CCA, it was assumed that mining impacts would not significantly change the boundary conditions used in T-field calibration. Potash mining has already occurred along the northern boundary of the model domain, and the western model boundary is in Nash Draw where subsidence and fracturing of the Culebra are already incorporated in the model.


12

13

14



1
 2 **Figure TFIELD-67. Potential Potash Distribution Within the WIPP LWB. The**
 3 **Repository Excavations are Shown in the Center.**



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-68. Comparison of CRA-2004 and CCA Areas Affected by Mining**

3 **TFIELD-9.4 Results**

4 **TFIELD-9.4.1 Travel Times**

5 Figure TFIELD-69 shows CDFs of travel time for the unmodified T fields and for the Replicate
 6 1 full- and partial-mining T fields. The partial-mining travel times are consistently longer than
 7 the no-mining travel times. Some of the full-mining travel times are shorter than the no-mining
 8 times, but most are considerably longer. The median travel times across all three replicates for
 9 the full- and partial-mining scenarios are approximately 4.1 and 7.1 times greater, respectively,
 10 than for the no-mining scenario. Figure TFIELD-70 and Figure TFIELD-71 compare the CDFs
 11 of travel time for all three replicates of the partial- and full-mining cases, respectively, to the
 12 Replicate 1 results from the CCA T fields (Wallace 1996). These plots show, first, that all three
 13 CRA-2004 replicates provided very similar results and, second, that the new travel times are
 14 consistently longer than the CCA travel times.


Table TFIELD-12. T-Field Transmissivity Multipliers for Mining Scenarios

T Field	Replicate 1 Multiplier	Replicate 2 Multiplier	Replicate 3 Multiplier	T Field	Replicate 1 Multiplier	Replicate 2 Multiplier	Replicate 3 Multiplier
d01r02	905.50	32.85	13.54	d09r08	66.07	339.80	327.30
d01r04	508.40	345.10	202.20	d09r09	375.70	806.30	374.20
d01r07	340.30	996.50	936.30	d09r10	521.10	906.90	24.83
d01r10	615.20	828.20	391.80	d10r02	181.60	274.60	651.90
d02r02	575.30	579.30	306.80	d10r03	298.50	796.60	816.70
d03r01	104.00	760.50	955.80	d10r04	705.30	364.70	518.20
d03r03	94.06	514.90	77.79	d10r06	84.20	819.40	690.80
d03r06	913.30	187.60	238.40	d10r07	627.30	728.60	551.20
d03r07	630.50	567.10	725.20	d10r08	403.20	414.80	670.30
d03r08	208.90	475.90	85.67	d10r09	464.20	649.90	885.40
d03r09	769.30	750.00	647.80	d10r10	821.40	607.80	925.70
d04r01	130.20	630.30	478.70	d11r01	307.60	895.10	492.90
d04r02	351.90	453.30	996.70	d11r02	236.50	918.30	364.50
d04r03	46.87	310.90	123.90	d11r06	249.90	159.70	5.43
d04r04	194.60	487.90	217.30	d11r07	543.50	86.78	966.70
d04r05	806.90	923.80	138.30	d11r08	18.75	16.92	973.80
d04r06	264.40	584.00	835.30	d11r09	215.40	618.30	576.30
d04r07	931.50	733.90	802.00	d11r10	73.60	168.90	403.20
d04r08	897.90	51.08	96.80	d12r01	317.40	683.30	756.20
d04r10	32.56	256.50	34.02	d12r02	958.60	204.90	598.10
d05r03	394.10	108.30	159.00	d12r03	686.00	322.00	333.80
d05r07	998.20	535.90	145.50	d12r05	860.70	637.50	589.70
d06r02	790.00	679.40	826.70	d12r06	363.80	359.00	56.05
d06r03	384.10	171.20	261.20	d12r07	660.40	434.90	463.10
d06r04	258.50	860.00	293.90	d12r08	940.20	708.20	312.10
d06r05	432.50	754.10	257.60	d12r09	132.50	464.10	794.60
d06r06	10.02	653.20	172.50	d13r01	983.00	971.30	901.70
d06r07	514.10	221.50	915.60	d13r02	672.80	144.50	224.80
d06r10	282.90	70.11	861.40	d13r03	643.20	849.00	415.20
d07r01	927.30	694.20	625.20	d13r05	425.80	118.60	688.00
d07r02	691.30	864.90	737.80	d13r06	961.10	785.90	385.40
d07r05	738.40	775.30	241.60	d13r07	346.10	282.90	711.40
d07r06	450.20	591.70	548.70	d13r08	838.60	78.26	64.98
d07r07	609.60	447.20	841.00	d13r09	491.00	8.68	458.00
d07r08	557.70	942.30	349.00	d21r01	755.40	307.30	632.40
d07r09	538.60	98.94	285.00	d21r02	172.60	396.20	614.80


Table TFIELD-12. T-Field Transmissivity Multipliers for Mining Scenarios (Continued)

T Field	Replicate 1 Multiplier	Replicate 2 Multiplier	Replicate 3 Multiplier	T Field	Replicate 1 Multiplier	Replicate 2 Multiplier	Replicate 3 Multiplier
d07r10	713.60	379.60	187.30	d21r03	591.50	422.30	45.61
d08r01	849.30	408.40	194.00	d21r04	322.70	715.50	276.80
d08r02	569.70	989.10	893.90	d21r05	855.70	870.90	105.80
d08r03	419.50	43.16	356.30	d21r06	272.00	501.20	984.40
d08r04	160.00	834.00	857.00	d21r07	652.50	296.70	940.20
d08r05	971.90	881.10	671.60	d21r10	790.50	212.70	562.50
d08r06	118.80	558.90	743.20	d22r02	163.20	527.50	870.60
d08r07	741.30	130.20	706.70	d22r03	812.70	264.30	534.50
d09r02	729.70	497.00	429.30	d22r04	144.70	140.70	526.30
d09r03	483.00	197.30	168.20	d22r06	26.04	962.70	111.70
d09r04	580.60	661.30	766.40	d22r07	870.30	548.10	609.10
d09r05	228.50	240.90	481.90	d22r08	773.60	235.30	771.70
d09r06	474.10	383.50	449.10	d22r09	53.04	937.70	784.10
d09r07	887.20	952.10	503.30	d22r10	460.40	24.35	434.60


1
2 Given the increase in transmissivity due to mining, the increase in travel time may seem counter-
3 intuitive. However, upon examination of the head contours and flow patterns of the mining
4 cases, the high-T areas corresponding to the mining zones create preferential pathways through
5 the system. Figure TFIELD-72 shows the normalized velocity in each cell for the
6 T field/replicate averaged case for the full-mining scenario. The normalized velocity is the
7 velocity magnitude in each cell divided by the maximum velocity magnitude across the domain.
8 Since the velocity magnitudes are highly skewed, the color bands for Figure TFIELD-72 are
9 nonuniformly scaled at the high end (i.e., a wider range of velocity magnitudes is used to
10 designate the orange and red bands). This allows for a better qualitative comparison of the
11 spatial distribution of high and low velocities. “T field/replicate averaged” means the
12 transmissivity value for each cell is the average of the transmissivities across all T field/replicate
13 combinations for the full-mining scenario (300 T fields in total). Not surprisingly, it is clear that
14 the areas of high velocities correspond with the mining zones. Figure TFIELD-72 also shows
15 how flow is able to move eastward to Nash Draw immediately north of the WIPP site, instead of
16 being channeled down through the site. This effect is even more pronounced for the partial-
17 mining T fields, which have no mined areas of high-T on the eastern portion of the WIPP site.
18 The higher velocities and corresponding higher flow rates through the mining zone areas
19 translate to slower velocities in the unmined areas. Because the starting point for the particle
20 tracking is in an unmined area, travel times are increased compared to the no-mining scenario. A
21 comparison of the average, maximum, and minimum values for the full-, partial-, and no-mining
22 scenario travel times is presented in Table TFIELD-13.



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-69. CDFs of Travel Times for the Full-, Partial-, and No-Mining Scenarios**



3
4 **Figure TFIELD-70. CDFs of Partial-Mining Travel Times for Three CRA-2004 Replicates**
5 **and One CCA Replicate**




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-71. CDFs of Full-Mining Travel Times for Three CRA-2004 Replicates**
3 **and One CCA Replicate**

4 **TFIELD-9.4.2 Travel Directions**

5 In almost all cases, the effects of mining do not alter the generally southward direction of flow
6 from the release point to the WIPP site boundary shown in Figure TFIELD-58 for the unaltered
7 fields. The particle-track directions for the partial- and full-mining scenarios are illustrated in
8 Figure TFIELD-73, Figure TFIELD-74, Figure TFIELD-75, Figure TFIELD-76, Figure
9 TFIELD-77, and Figure TFIELD-78. For the partial-mining scenario, particle tracks are drawn
10 slightly to the east (relative to the fields without mining) toward the mined area along the eastern
11 portion of the southern WIPP boundary. For the full-mining scenario, particle tracks tend to
12 move from the release point to the east to the mined area on the WIPP site, and then to the south
13 along the margin of the mined area.

14 There is a strong similarity within each replicate for each scenario. Individual tracks can be
15 recognized from one replicate to the next, with some slight variations. This indicates that track
16 directions are determined more by the spatial variation of the calibrated T field than by the
17 random mining factors. As long as there is some (see below) increase in the mining zone
18 transmissivities over that of the unmined areas, the tracks for each T field will be similar from
19 one replicate to the next.

20 The partial-mining particle tracks in Figure TFIELD-73, Figure TFIELD-74, and TFIELD-75
21 follow paths very similar to the partial-mining particle tracks through the CCA T fields (Ramsey,
22 Wallace, and Jow 1996, Figure 7.12). The full-mining particle tracks in Figure TFIELD-76,
23 Figure TFIELD-77, and Figure TFIELD-78 are very similar to the majority of the full-mining
24




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-72. Normalized Pore Velocities for the Full-Mining Case. Red Indicates**
3 **Zones of High Velocity. The Black Outline Shows the Full-Mining**
4 **Zones and the Red Box is the WIPP LWB. The T Field Used to**
5 **Produce the Velocity Profile is Averaged Across All T Field/Replicate**
6 **Combinations for the Full-Mining Scenario (300 T Fields in Total).**

1 **Table TFIELD-13. Travel Time Statistics for the Full- and Partial-Mining Scenarios as**
 2 **Compared to the No-Mining Scenario**


Replicate	Statistic	Full-Mining Travel Time (yr)	Partial-Mining Travel Time (yr)	No-Mining Travel Time (yr)
R1	Median	75,410	125,712	—
	Maximum	941,529	1,882,522	—
	Minimum	1,615	5,645	—
R2	Median	73,327	127,265	—
	Maximum	2,196,690	2,499,469	—
	Minimum	2,178	5,573	—
R3	Median	76,097	135,686	—
	Maximum	944,251	5,195,535	—
	Minimum	1,550	5,635	—
Global	Median	75,774	129,202	18,289
	Maximum	2,196,690	5,195,535	101,205
	Minimum	1,550	5,573	3,111

3



4


5 **Figure TFIELD-73. Particle Tracks for Replicate 1 for the Partial-Mining Scenario**



1

2


Figure TFIELD-74. Particle Tracks for Replicate 2 for the Partial-Mining Scenario



3


4

Figure TFIELD-75. Particle Tracks for Replicate 3 for the Partial-Mining Scenario




1
2

Figure TFIELD-76. Particle Tracks for Replicate 1 for the Full-Mining Scenario



3
4

Figure TFIELD-77. Particle Tracks for Replicate 2 for the Full-Mining Scenario



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-78. Particle Tracks for Replicate 3 for the Full-Mining Scenario**

3 particle tracks through the CCA T fields (Ramsey, Wallace, and Jow 1996, Figure 7.13), with
4 fewer tracks trending to the west through the unmined area.


5 Correlation analysis shows weak positive correlations between travel time and the random
6 mining factor for the full and partial-mining scenarios of 0.32 and 0.30, respectively. Figure
7 TFIELD-79 shows the \log_{10} travel times versus the random mining factor for the full- and
8 partial-mining scenarios across all replicates. The weak correlation between the random mining
9 factor and the travel time can be explained as follows. The flow fields are highly influenced by
10 the large mining zone to the west of the WIPP site. This can be seen in the velocity plot in
11 Figure TFIELD-79. An increase in transmissivity in the mining zone means higher flow rates
12 through those areas, and correspondingly lower flow rates through the non-mining areas. Thus,
13 as the mining factor increases, so do travel times.

14 The high scatter shown in Figure TFIELD-79 indicates that the initial (pre-mining) distribution
15 of transmissivity plays a significant role in determining the travel time. The standard deviation
16 of the \log_{10} travel time due only to differences in the T field is 0.5 for both the full- and partial-
17 mining scenarios. The variability around the trendline of Figure TFIELD-79 is normally
18 distributed, with most values falling within three standard deviations of the trendline. This
19 means that the initial distribution of transmissivity accounts for the majority of the three orders
20 of magnitude range of travel times.

1 **TFIELD-9.4.3 Extreme Values**

2 Examination of the extreme travel time values and the causes behind those values is useful in
3 quantifying the range of outcomes given the amount of uncertainty incorporated into the models.
4 Figure TFIELD-80 shows the head contours and particle track for the partial-mining T field
5 (d03r01 from Replicate 3) with the longest travel time, 5,195,535 years. This was the only T
6 field for which the direction of flow was to the east, and the T field also had extremely low
7 gradients across the WIPP site. T field d09r06 from Replicate 2 (Figure TFIELD-81) had the
8 shortest travel time of 5,573 years because of high north-to-south gradients across the WIPP site
9 relative to other T fields. The median travel time is best represented by T field d13r07 from
10 Replicate 2 (Figure TFIELD-82) with a travel time of 129,202 years, which had low gradients
11 across the WIPP site.

12 Most of the full-mining T fields had particle tracks moving from the release point to the mined
13 area to the east, and then south to the WIPP boundary. For the full-mining scenario, T field
14 d22r06 from Replicate 2 (Figure TFIELD-83) had the longest travel time, 2,196,690 years,
15 because of low gradients and the particle track staying in the unmined area for much of its
16 distance. T field d03r03 from Replicate 3 (Figure TFIELD-84) had the shortest travel time of
17 1,550 years because of high gradients in the unmined zone sending the particle directly east to
18 the mined zone. The median travel time is best represented by T field d12r08 in Replicate 3
19 (Figure TFIELD-85) with a travel time of 75,774 years, in which the particle also moved fairly
20 directly to the mined zone.




1

2


3

4


Figure TFIELD-79. Correlation Between the Random Mining Factor and log₁₀ of Travel Time




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-80. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Maximum-Travel-Time**
3 **T Field (d03r01-R3) for the Partial-Mining Case. The WIPP LWB is the Red Box in the Center of the Figure and the Particle Track is the**
4 **Blue Track Originating from the Approximate Center of the WIPP.**
5




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-81. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Minimum-Travel-Time**
3 **T Field (d09r06-R2) for the Partial-Mining Case. The WIPP LWB is**
4 **the Red Box in the Center of the Figure and the Particle Track is the**
5 **Blue Track Originating from the Approximate Center of the WIPP.**




1
2 **Figure TFIELD-82. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Median-Travel-Time**
3 **T Field (d13r07-R2) for the Partial-Mining Case. The WIPP LWB is**
4 **the Red Box in the Center of the Figure and the Particle Track is the**
5 **Blue Track Originating from the Approximate Center of the WIPP.**



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-83. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Maximum-Travel-Time**
3 **T Field (d22r06-R2) for the Full-Mining Case. The WIPP LWB is the**
4 **Red Box in the Center of the Figure and the Particle Track is the Blue**
5 **Track Originating from the Approximate Center of the WIPP.**



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-84. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Minimum-Travel-Time**
3 **T Field (d03r03-R3) for the Full-Mining Case. The WIPP LWB is the**
4 **Red Box in the Center of the Figure and the Particle Track is the Blue**
5 **Track Originating from the Approximate Center of the WIPP.**



1
2 **Figure TFIELD-85. Head Contours and Particle Track for the Median-Travel-Time**
3 **T Field (d12r08-R3) for the Full-Mining Case. The WIPP LWB is the**
4 **Red Box in the Center of the Figure and the Particle Track is the Blue**
5 **Track Originating from the Approximate Center of the WIPP.**

1 **TFIELD-10.0 Summary**

2 Observed Culebra transmissivity has been related to three deterministic factors: the thickness of
3 overburden above the Culebra, the presence or absence of dissolution of the upper Salado, and
4 the presence or absence of halite in units above and below the Culebra. Culebra transmissivity is
5 also related to the occurrence of open, interconnected fractures, which cannot be mapped as
6 easily as the other three factors and must be treated stochastically. A linear-regression model for
7 Culebra transmissivity has been developed based on these factors that provides an excellent
8 match to the observed data, and can be tested through the collection of additional data. This
9 model was used to create 500 stochastic realizations of the distribution of Culebra transmissivity
10 (“base” T fields) in the vicinity of the WIPP site.

11 A MODFLOW-2000 modeling domain was defined extending 30.7 km (19.1 mi) north-south
12 and 22.4 km (13.9 mi) east-west, roughly centered on the WIPP site. This domain was
13 discretized into 68,768 uniform 100-m (328-ft) by 100-m (328-ft) cells. Water-level
14 measurements made in 37 wells in late 2000 were used to define “steady-state” head conditions
15 and constant-head boundary conditions on the northern, eastern, and southern extremes of the
16 model domain. No-flow boundaries down the arms of Nash Draw, representing flow lines, were
17 used on the western side of the model domain, reducing the number of active cells to 53,769.

18 MODFLOW-2000 and PEST were used to calibrate 146 of the base T fields to steady-state heads
19 and transient drawdown responses to seven large-scale pumping tests. This calibration was done
20 by using 100 pilot points to adjust the transmissivity values within the model domain to improve
21 the fit to the observed heads. The pilot points were used to adjust a residual T field that was
22 combined with a previously created base T field to yield the final calibrated T field. Of the 146
23 T fields, 121 were judged to be adequately calibrated for use in WIPP compliance calculations
24 by virtue of being from a single population with respect to the CDF of travel times from a point
25 above the center of the WIPP disposal panels to the LWB. From these 121 T fields, the 100
26 having the best objective fit measures were selected for further use.

27 The EPA requires that the potential effects of future potash mining be taken into account when
28 evaluating the performance of the WIPP disposal system. Accordingly, transmissivities in the
29 areas within the model domain where current or future mining might affect the Culebra were
30 scaled by a random multiplier between 1 and 1,000 obtained from LHS. A single multiplier was
31 used for each T field, applied first to the areas outside the WIPP LWB that might be mined to
32 create a partial-mining T field, and then to the areas both inside and outside the LWB that might
33 be mined to create a full-mining T field. The LHS was performed three times to create three
34 replicates of T fields, leading to a total of 600 T fields. The MODFLOW-2000 water “budget”
35 files from forward runs of these 600 T fields provided the input to radionuclide-transport
36 calculations using SECOTP2D.

37 In all cases (no mining, partial mining, and full mining), the particle tracks on the T fields show
38 travel times that are longer than those calculated for the T fields used in the CCA. In the case of
39 the T fields unaltered for the effects of mining, the longer travel times are caused by a shift of
40 relatively high-T from the southeastern to the southwestern portion of the WIPP site relative to
41 the CCA T fields. In the case of the T fields altered for full and partial mining, the longer travel
42 times are the combined result of the westward shift of high-T discussed above and a change in

- 1 the definition of the areas to be mined that resulted in less water entering the Culebra on the
- 2 WIPP site.

1 **TFIELD-11.0 References**

- 2 Beauheim, R.L. 1987. *Interpretations of Single-Well Hydraulic Tests Conducted At and Near*
3 *the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site, 1983–1987*. SAND87-0039. Albuquerque, NM:
4 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 5 Beauheim, R.L. 2002a. *Analysis Plan for Evaluation of the Effects of Head Changes on*
6 *Calibration of Culebra Transmissivity Fields (Revision 1)*. AP-088. ERMS 524785. Carlsbad,
7 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 8 Beauheim, R.L. 2002b. *Routine Calculations Report In Support of Task 3 of AP-088,*
9 *Calculation of Culebra Freshwater Heads in 1980, 1990, and 2000 for Use in T-Field*
10 *Calibration*. ERMS 522580. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 11 Beauheim, R.L. 2002c. *Analysis Package for Interpretation of 1984 H-3 Pumping Tests*.
12 ERMS 523905. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 13 Beauheim, R.L. 2003. *Analysis Report for AP-100, Task 1: Development and Application of*
14 *Acceptance Criteria for Culebra Transmissivity (T) Fields*. ERMS 531136. Carlsbad, NM:
15 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 16 Beauheim, R.L., and B.L. Fox. 2003. *Records Package for AP-088, Task 4; Conditioning of*
17 *Base T Fields to Transient Heads: Compilation and Reduction of Transient Head Data*. ERMS
18 527572. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Beauheim, R.L., and R.M. Holt. 1990. “Hydrogeology of the WIPP Site.” *Geological and*
20 *Hydrological Studies of Evaporites in the Northern Delaware Basin for the Waste Isolation Pilot*
21 *Plant (WIPP), New Mexico* (pp. 131–79). Geological Society of America Field Trip No. 14
22 Guidebook. Dallas: Dallas Geological Society.
- 23 Beauheim, R.L., and G.J. Ruskauff. 1998. *Analysis of Hydraulic Tests of the Culebra and*
24 *Magenta Dolomites and Dewey Lake Redbeds Conducted at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site*.
25 SAND98-0049. ERMS 251839. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 26 Corbet, T.F., and P.M. Knupp. 1996. *The Role of Regional Groundwater Flow in the*
27 *Hydrogeology of the Culebra Member of the Rustler Formation at the Waste Isolation Pilot*
28 *Plant (WIPP), Southeastern New Mexico*. SAND96-2133. ERMS 243482. Albuquerque:
29 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Currie, J.B., and S.O. Nwachukwu. 1974. “Evidence on Incipient Fracture Porosity in Reservoir
31 Rocks at Depth.” *Bulletin of Canadian Petroleum Geology*, vol. 22: 42–58.
- 32 Davies, P.B. 1989. *Variable-Density Ground-Water Flow and Paleohydrology in the Waste*
33 *Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Region, Southeastern New Mexico*. Open-File Report 88-490.
34 ERMS 238854. Albuquerque: U.S. Geological Survey.
- 35 Deutsch, C.V., and A.G. Journel. 1998. *GSLIB: Geostatistical Software Library and User’s*
36 *Guide*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP.

- 1 Doherty, J. 2002. *PEST: Model-Independent Parameter Estimation User Manual*. 4th ed.
2 Brisbane: Watermark Numerical Computing.
- 3 Goovaerts, P. 1997. *Geostatistics for Natural Resources Evaluation*. New York: Oxford UP.
- 4 Harbaugh, A.W., E.R. Banta, M.C. Hill, and M.G. McDonald. 2000. *MODFLOW-2000: The*
5 *U.S. Geological Survey Modular Ground-Water Model—User Guide to Modularization Concepts*
6 *and the Ground-Water Flow Process*. Open File Report 00-92. Reston, VA: U.S. Geological
7 Survey.
- 8 Holt, R.M. 1997. *Conceptual Model for Transport Processes in the Culebra Dolomite Member,*
9 *Rustler Formation*. SAND97-0194. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 10 Holt, R.M., and D.W. Powers. 1988. *Facies Variability and Post-Depositional Alteration within*
11 *the Rustler Formation in the Vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Southeastern New*
12 *Mexico*. DOE/WIPP 88-004. ERMS 242145. Carlsbad, NM: U.S. Department of Energy.
- 13 Holt, R.M., and L. Yarbrough. 2002. *Analysis Report: Task 2 of AP-088; Estimating Base*
14 *Transmissivity Fields* (July 8). ERMS 523889. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 15 Holt, R.M., and L. Yarbrough. 2003a. *Addendum to Analysis Report, Task 2 of AP-088:*
16 *Estimating Base Transmissivity Fields*. ERMS 527601. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
17 Laboratories.
- 18 Holt, R.M., and L. Yarbrough. 2003b. *Addendum 2 to Analysis Report, Task 2 of AP-088:*
19 *Estimating Base Transmissivity Fields*. ERMS 529416. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
20 Laboratories.
- 21 Hunter, R.L. 1985. *A Regional Water Balance for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site*
22 *and Surrounding Area*. SAND84-2233. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 LaVenue, A.M. 1996. *Analysis of the Generation of Transmissivity Fields for the Culebra*
24 *Dolomite*. ERMS 240517. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 25 LaVenue, A.M., and B.S. RamaRao. 1992. *A Modeling Approach to Address Spatial Variability*
26 *within the Culebra Dolomite Transmissivity Field*. SAND92-7306. Albuquerque: Sandia
27 National Laboratories.
- 28 LaVenue, A.M., T.L. Cauffman, and J.F. Pickens. 1990. *Ground-Water Flow Modeling of the*
29 *Culebra Dolomite. Volume I: Model Calibration*. SAND89-7068/1. Albuquerque: Sandia
30 National Laboratories.
- 31 Leigh, C., R. Beauheim, and J. Kanney. 2003. *Analysis Plan for Calculations of Culebra Flow*
32 *and Transport: Compliance Recertification Application*. AP-100. ERMS 530172. Carlsbad,
33 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

- 1 Long, J.J. 2004. *Execution of Performance Assessment for the Compliance Recertification*
2 *Application (CRA1)* (Revision 0). ERMS 530170. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
3 Laboratories.
- 4 Lowry, T.S. 2003. *Analysis Report: Task 5 of AP-088; Evaluation of Mining Scenarios.*
5 ERMS 531138. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 6 McKenna, S.A., and D. Hart. 2003a. *Analysis Report: Task 3 of AP-088; Conditioning of Base*
7 *T Fields to Steady-State Heads.* ERMS 529633. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 8 McKenna, S.A., and D.B. Hart. 2003b. *Analysis Report: Task 4 of AP-088; Conditioning of*
9 *Base T Fields to Transient Heads.* ERMS 531124. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National
10 Laboratories.
- 11 Meigs, L.C., and J.T. McCord. 1996. Physical Transport in the Culebra Dolomite (July 11).
12 ERMS 237450. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 13 Mercer, J.W. 1983. *Geohydrology of the Proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Site, Los*
14 *Medaños Area, Southeastern New Mexico.* Water-Resources Investigations Report 83-4016.
15 Albuquerque: U.S. Geological Survey.
- 16 Pannatier, Y. 1996. *VARIOWIN: Software for Spatial Analysis in 2D.* New York: Springer.
- 17 Powers, D.W. 2002a. *Analysis Report: Task 1 of AP-088; Construction of Geologic Contour*
18 *Maps* (April 17). ERMS 522086. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 19 Powers, D.W. 2002b. *Addendum to Analysis Report, Task 1 of AP-088: Construction of*
20 *Geologic Contour Maps.* ERMS 523886. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories Center.
- 21 Powers, D.W. 2003. *Addendum 2 to Analysis Report, Task 1 of AP-088: Construction of*
22 *Geologic Contour Maps.* ERMS 525199. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 23 Powers, D.W., and R.M. Holt. 1990. "Sedimentology of the Rustler Formation near the Waste
24 Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site." *Geological and Hydrological Studies of Evaporites in the*
25 *Northern Delaware Basin for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), New Mexico* (pp. 79–106).
26 Geological Society of America Field Trip No. 14 Guidebook. Dallas: Dallas Geological
27 Society.
- 28 Powers, D.W., and R.M. Holt. 1995. *Regional Geologic Processes Affecting Rustler*
29 *Hydrogeology.* ERMS 244173. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 30 Powers, D.W., and R.M. Holt. 1999. "The Los Medaños Member of the Permian (Ochoan)
31 Rustler Formation." *New Mexico Geology*, vol. 21, no. 4: 97–103. EMS 532368.
- 32 Powers, D.W., and R.M. Holt. 2000. "The Salt That Wasn't There: Mudflat Facies Equivalents
33 to Halite of the Permian Rustler Formation, Southeastern New Mexico." *Journal of Sedimentary*
34 *Research*, vol. 70: 29–36. ERMS 532369.

- 1 Powers, D.W., R.M. Holt, R.L. Beauheim, and S.A. McKenna. 2003. "Geological Factors
2 Related to the Transmissivity of the Culebra Dolomite Member, Permian Rustler Formation,
3 Delaware Basin, Southeastern New Mexico." *Evaporite Karst and Engineering/Environmental*
4 *Problems in the United States* (pp. 211–18). Circular 109. Norman, OK: Oklahoma Geological
5 Survey.
- 6 Ramsey, J.L., M.G. Wallace, and H-N. Jow. 1996. *Analysis Package for the Culebra Flow and*
7 *Transport Calculations (Task 3) of the Performance Assessment Calculations Supporting the*
8 *Compliance Certification Application (CCA)*. AP-019. ERMS 240516. Carlsbad, NM: Sandia
9 National Laboratories.
- 10 Roberts, R.M. 2002. *nSIGHTS User Manual* (Version 1.0). ERMS 522061. Carlsbad, NM:
11 Sandia National Laboratories.
- 12 Rudeen, D.K. 2003. *User's Manual for DTRKMF Version 1.00*. ERMS 523246. Carlsbad,
13 NM: Sandia National Laboratories.
- 14 Snyder, R.P. 1985. *Dissolution of Halite and Gypsum, and Hydration of Anhydrite to Gypsum,*
15 *Rustler Formation, in the Vicinity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Southeastern New Mexico.*
16 Open-File Report 85-229. Denver: U.S. Geological Survey.
- 17 U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM). 1993. *Preliminary Map Showing Distribution of*
18 *Potash Resources, Carlsbad Mining District, Eddy & Lea Counties, New Mexico*. Roswell.
19 WIPP Records Center, Carlsbad, NM, ERMS 525210.
- 20 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 1996. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Certification*
21 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (October). 21 vols. DOE/CAO 1996-2184.
22 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Area Office.
- 23 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 2004. *Title 40 CFR Part 191 Compliance Recertification*
24 *Application for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant* (March). 10 vols. DOE/WIPP 2004-3231.
25 Carlsbad, NM: Carlsbad Field Office.
- 26 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996. "40 CFR Part 194: Criteria for the
27 Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40
28 CFR Part 191 Disposal Regulations; Final Rule." *Federal Register*, vol. 61 (February 9, 1996):
29 5223–45.
- 30 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). 2002. *The National Map Seamless Server*.
31 <<http://seamless.usgs.gov/website/seamless/viewer.htm>>.
- 32 Wallace, M. 1996. *Records Package for Screening Effort NS11: Subsidence Associated with*
33 *Mining Inside or Outside the Controlled Area* (November 21). ERMS 412918. Carlsbad, NM:
34 Sandia National Laboratories.

**Title 40 CFR Part 191
Subparts B and C
Compliance Recertification
Application
for the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

Attachment A: TFIELD Visualization




**United States Department of Energy
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant**

**Carlsbad Field Office
Carlsbad, New Mexico**

Attachment A: TFIELD Visualization

D01R02—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 3.915
 Transient Phi (m²): 5110
 Travel Time (yr): 12045

D01R04—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.8120
 Transient Phi (m²): 2563
 Travel Time (yr): 13821

D01R06—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 4.8560
 Transient Phi (m²): 11426
 Travel Time (yr): 241211

D01R07—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.3770
 Transient Phi (m²): 3187
 Travel Time (yr): 42123

D01R08—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.484
 Transient Phi (m²): 4091
 Travel Time (yr): 4399

D01R10—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 1.6460
 Transient Phi (m²): 1476
 Travel Time (yr): 20685

D02R02—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.5070
 Transient Phi (m²): 2889
 Travel Time (yr): 17217

D02R05—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.1840
 Transient Phi (m²): 7224
 Travel Time (yr): 17255

D02R07—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK
- WIPP Site



SS RMSE (m): 3.6480
 Transient Phi (m²): 10047
 Travel Time (yr): 32231

D02R08—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 5.001
 Transient Phi (m²): 7713
 Travel Time (yr): 23571

D02R10—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 6.066
 Transient Phi (m²): 5312
 Travel Time (yr): 6433

D03R01—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- MPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.5060
 Transient Phi (m²): 6053
 Travel Time (yr): 18435

D03R03—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- ◉ High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.1460
 Transient Phi (m²): 7102
 Travel Time (yr): 7171

D03R05—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.8360
 Transient Phi (m²): 4585
 Travel Time (yr): 6638

D03R06—Calibrated




Explanation

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Well (transmissivity) | ----- Nash Draw |
| • Low | — Salado Dissolution |
| • High | ◻ MPP Site |
| ----- Salt Margin M3/H3 | — No-Flow Boundary |
| ----- Salt Margin M2/H2 | — MTRACK |



SS RMSE (m): 1.7290
 Transient Phi (m²): 1899
 Travel Time (yr): 27006

D03R07—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.6550
 Transient Phi (m²): 4399
 Travel Time (yr): 22599

D03R08—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.5450
 Transient Phi (m²): 5593
 Travel Time (yr): 13942

D03R09—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.3520
 Transient Phi (m²): 1580
 Travel Time (yr): 25757

D03R10—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- No-Flow Boundary
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 8.5840
 Transient Phi (m²): 2766
 Travel Time (yr): 15054

D04R01—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.4471
 Transient Phi (m²): 4736
 Travel Time (yr): 80690

D04R02—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.8181
 Transient Phi (m²): 2647
 Travel Time (yr): 40593

D04R03—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.3520
 Transient Phi (m²): 3317
 Travel Time (yr): 13888

D04R04—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.298
 Transient Phi (m²): 2697
 Travel Time (yr): 36245

D04R05—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.5070
 Transient Phi (m²): 1980
 Travel Time (yr): 48168

D04R06—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.7050
 Transient Phi (m²): 5618
 Travel Time (yr): 26199

D04R07—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.1830
 Transient Phi (m²): 2226
 Travel Time (yr): 23105

D04R08—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.444
 Transient Phi (m²): 1560
 Travel Time (yr): 30470

D04R10—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- No-Flow Boundary
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.0600
 Transient Phi (m²): 2593
 Travel Time (yr): 25316

D05R01—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 6.4270
 Transient Phi (m²): 2015
 Travel Time (yr): 86924

D05R02—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.298
 Transient Phi (m²): 6755
 Travel Time (yr): 25610

D05R03—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.444
 Transient Phi (m²): 2655
 Travel Time (yr): 10880

D05R04—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.862
 Transient Phi (m²): 10518
 Travel Time (yr): 14856

D05R05—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.3460
 Transient Phi (m²): 18478
 Travel Time (yr): 5668

D05R07—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.1880
 Transient Phi (m²): 5216
 Travel Time (yr): 13766

D05R10—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.623
 Transient Phi (m²): 7110
 Travel Time (yr): 30955

D06R02—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.9570
 Transient Phi (m²): 2639
 Travel Time (yr): 10353

D06R03—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.637
 Transient Phi (m²): 1703
 Travel Time (yr): 81258

D06R04—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.214
 Transient Phi (m²): 2805
 Travel Time (yr): 18294

D06R05—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.8860
 Transient Phi (m²): 5164
 Travel Time (yr): 36644

D06R06—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.149
 Transient Phi (m²): 2954
 Travel Time (yr): 14935

D06R07—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.518
 Transient Phi (m²): 965
 Travel Time (yr): 12035

D06R10—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.1960
 Transient Phi (m²): 1801
 Travel Time (yr): 21990

D07R01—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.101
 Transient Phi (m²): 2905
 Travel Time (yr): 5082

D07R02—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.0100
 Transient Phi (m²): 3271
 Travel Time (yr): 45647

D07R04—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.5790
 Transient Phi (m²): 7033
 Travel Time (yr): 5638

D07R05—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.7270
 Transient Phi (m²): 5942
 Travel Time (yr): 15097

D07R06—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK
- WIPP Site



SS RMSE (m): 4.3340
 Transient Phi (m²): 6345
 Travel Time (yr): 24641

D07R07—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.4770
 Transient Phi (m²): 2225
 Travel Time (yr): 17038

D07R08—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.2320
 Transient Phi (m²): 2836
 Travel Time (yr): 4355

D07R09—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.2070
 Transient Phi (m²): 1628
 Travel Time (yr): 68629

D07R10—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.782
 Transient Phi (m²): 1150
 Travel Time (yr): 15680

D08R01—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.3610
 Transient Phi (m²): 2458
 Travel Time (yr): 4388

D08R02—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.4180
 Transient Phi (m²): 1326
 Travel Time (yr): 26115

D08R03—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.137
 Transient Phi (m²): 1499
 Travel Time (yr): 28570

D08R04—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.6830
 Transient Phi (m²): 2966
 Travel Time (yr): 24773

D08R05—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.1150
 Transient Phi (m²): 2769
 Travel Time (yr): 15358

D08R06—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.9160
 Transient Phi (m²): 1225
 Travel Time (yr): 13917

D08R07—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK
- WIPP Site



SS RMSE (m): 1.857
 Transient Phi (m²): 1333
 Travel Time (yr): 15027

D08R09—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.7850
 Transient Phi (m²): 7437
 Travel Time (yr): 9691

D09R02—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.2430
 Transient Phi (m²): 4482
 Travel Time (yr): 20048

D09R03—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.2520
 Transient Phi (m²): 989
 Travel Time (yr): 40948

D09R04—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.8920
 Transient Phi (m²): 1123
 Travel Time (yr): 12857

D09R05—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.0610
 Transient Phi (m²): 1088
 Travel Time (yr): 10726

D09R06—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.794
 Transient Phi (m²): 2253
 Travel Time (yr): 10509

D09R07—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.629
 Transient Phi (m²): 4591
 Travel Time (yr): 9472

D09R08—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.895
 Transient Phi (m²): 1406
 Travel Time (yr): 17741

D09R09—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.8260
 Transient Phi (m²): 4453
 Travel Time (yr): 4359

D09R10—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.2730
 Transient Phi (m²): 3976
 Travel Time (yr): 50791

D10R02—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.554
 Transient Phi (m²): 1330
 Travel Time (yr): 3111

D10R03—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.2010
 Transient Phi (m²): 1626
 Travel Time (yr): 12533

D10R04—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.5270
 Transient Phi (m²): 2334
 Travel Time (yr): 3799

D10R05—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.7220
 Transient Phi (m²): 6463
 Travel Time (yr): 28390

D10R06—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.702
 Transient Phi (m²): 4412
 Travel Time (yr): 9210

D10R07—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.8700
 Transient Phi (m²): 1937
 Travel Time (yr): 10068

D10R08—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.3340
 Transient Phi (m²): 2083
 Travel Time (yr): 19093

D10R09—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.1280
 Transient Phi (m²): 3466
 Travel Time (yr): 68052

D10R10—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.7890
 Transient Phi (m²): 1915
 Travel Time (yr): 28367

D11R01—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 2.9700
 Transient Phi (m²): 1655
 Travel Time (yr): 17015

D11R02—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 2.3080
 Transient Phi (m²): 1801
 Travel Time (yr): 14677

D11R03—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 5.7000
 Transient Phi (m²): 6376
 Travel Time (yr): 16014

D11R05—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 5.9520
 Transient Phi (m²): 3921
 Travel Time (yr): 18998

D11R06—Calibrated



D11R07—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 1.639
 Transient Phi (m²): 1727
 Travel Time (yr): 73634

D11R08—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 1.8010
 Transient Phi (m²): 723
 Travel Time (yr): 4520

D11R09—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.073
 Transient Phi (m²): 1712
 Travel Time (yr): 7199

D11R10—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 3.1350
 Transient Phi (m²): 1767
 Travel Time (yr): 14358

D12R01—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.3780
 Transient Phi (m²): 3432
 Travel Time (yr): 23936

D12R02—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.4590
 Transient Phi (m²): 1426
 Travel Time (yr): 26919

D12R03—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.6180
 Transient Phi (m²): 1530
 Travel Time (yr): 16780

D12R05—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.522
 Transient Phi (m²): 1463
 Travel Time (yr): 5655

D12R06—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.6020
 Transient Phi (m²): 1271
 Travel Time (yr): 39399

D12R07—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.016
 Transient Phi (m²): 1844
 Travel Time (yr): 18283

D12R08—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.6300
 Transient Phi (m²): 4627
 Travel Time (yr): 7981

D12R09—Calibrated




Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK

SS RMSE (m): 2.3690
 Transient Phi (m²): 2784
 Travel Time (yr): 9414

D13R01—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.1630
 Transient Phi (m²): 1753
 Travel Time (yr): 21032

D13R02—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.8810
 Transient Phi (m²): 3715
 Travel Time (yr): 25639

D13R03—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.444
 Transient Phi (m²): 3192
 Travel Time (yr): 11493

D13R04—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 5.3020
 Transient Phi (m²): 4588
 Travel Time (yr): 40601

D13R05—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.343
 Transient Phi (m²): 4750
 Travel Time (yr): 34247

D13R06—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.4100
 Transient Phi (m²): 2377
 Travel Time (yr): 41400

D13R07—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.2800
 Transient Phi (m²): 1606
 Travel Time (yr): 24211

D13R08—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.879
 Transient Phi (m²): 1544
 Travel Time (yr): 20313

D13R09—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.919
 Transient Phi (m²): 1379
 Travel Time (yr): 36260

D21R01—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.1510
 Transient Phi (m²): 2307
 Travel Time (yr): 10042

D21R02—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.0870
 Transient Phi (m²): 2473
 Travel Time (yr): 9023

D21R03—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.3460
 Transient Phi (m²): 744
 Travel Time (yr): 11671

D21R04—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.5230
 Transient Phi (m²): 2908
 Travel Time (yr): 15717

D21R05—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.0010
 Transient Phi (m²): 1417
 Travel Time (yr): 23750

D21R06—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.7210
 Transient Phi (m²): 1688
 Travel Time (yr): 20715

D21R07—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.1820
 Transient Phi (m²): 2725
 Travel Time (yr): 20141

D21R08—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 6.6200
 Transient Phi (m²): 5337
 Travel Time (yr): 19534

D21R10—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.9590
 Transient Phi (m²): 4615
 Travel Time (yr): 7384

D22R02—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.629
 Transient Phi (m²): 5250
 Travel Time (yr): 101205

D22R03—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.0610
 Transient Phi (m²): 3119
 Travel Time (yr): 7067

D22R04—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 4.8940
 Transient Phi (m²): 4068
 Travel Time (yr): 10537

D22R05—Calibrated



Explanation


Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 3.5660
 Transient Phi (m²): 9863
 Travel Time (yr): 14385

D22R06—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.4690
 Transient Phi (m²): 3635
 Travel Time (yr): 44309

D22R07—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.0800
 Transient Phi (m²): 1413
 Travel Time (yr): 21589

D22R08—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.837
 Transient Phi (m²): 1681
 Travel Time (yr): 30771

D22R09—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)


- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2

- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 1.8220
 Transient Phi (m²): 1734
 Travel Time (yr): 15870

D22R10—Calibrated



Explanation

Well (transmissivity)

- Low
- High
- Salt Margin M3/H3
- Salt Margin M2/H2
- Nash Draw
- Salado Dissolution
- WIPP Site
- No-Flow Boundary
- MTRACK



SS RMSE (m): 2.452
 Transient Phi (m²): 735
 Travel Time (yr): 39116